North Korea has capitalized on the absence of a more concerted effort between Washington and Seoul to pursue a unified strategy. Kim initially turned to diplomacy to avert the United States' possible use of force, halt sanctions that could eventually cripple North Korea's economy, and consolidate gains made in his nuclear and missile programs. Indeed, since initiating diplomacy, Pyongyang has sharpened its "
treasured sword " of nuclear weapons as suggested in a recent International Atomic Energy Agency
report . Furthermore, Pyongyang has weakened the chokehold of international sanctions and strengthened the promise of a peace declaration to preclude Washington from pursuing military options. The relatively late resumption of inter-Korean
family reunions on Monday, after a three-year hiatus, suggests that amidst slowing momentum in talks with the United States, Kim now sees the need to keep pushing on Moon's open-door policy.
Moon indeed appears determined to double down on the preferred Chinese model of rewarding North Korea before it takes meaningful steps toward denuclearization. His
Liberation Day speech suggested a departure from the established U.S.-ROK approach of maintaining economic pressure until North Korea has taken significant actions to dismantle its nuclear and missile systems. He intimated that in Pyongyang next month, he would "take an audacious step [...] toward the declaration of an end of the Korean War." Additionally, Moon is also negotiating with Pyongyang to scale back some of the ROK military's defenses along the DMZ, a move that has
invoked concerns about its ability to defend across the border.
The political variables that could further alter both countries' calculations regarding North Korea, including Moon's
declining popularity and U.S. midterm elections in November, are wide-ranging. Even as public support for the U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong in both countries, the confluence of burden-sharing, wartime operational control, and trade negotiations could test the relationship. The two allies
are slated to conclude negotiations for a new five-year
Special Measures Agreement by year's end, and Trump has made clear that he expects South Korea to shoulder even more significant costs than it has in the past. Meanwhile, Moon would like for wartime operational control to reside exclusively within South Korea as soon as possible, even if the ROK armed forces are ill-prepared for that responsibility.
Amidst political uncertainty, Washington must take concrete steps to guard against any further decoupling of U.S. and South Korean strategies. First, with regards to military cooperation and SMA negotiations, now is not the time for the United States to increase pressure on the ROK military and raise the costs of collaboration. The Trump administration also needs to walk the line between providing support for the peace processes that President Moon is driving forward and reining in some of his unhelpful rhetoric that hints at prematurely relieving economic pressure on North Korea.
Unilateral concessions to North Korea are no more likely to succeed than imposing inflexible demands on the Kim regime. The established principle of action-for-action remains the most sensible framework for dealing with North Korea. The United States needs to temper expectations Moon may be stirring that the United Nations or U.S. Congress will curb sanctions on North Korea before Pyongyang takes verifiable denuclearization actions. The resilience of the alliance rests upon the determination of both American and South Korean leaders to harmonize their strategies, even if it means delaying the gratification of quick political wins.
Dr. Patrick M. Cronin and Kristine Lee are senior director and research associate, respectively, at the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
Image: Reuters
