|
Sometimes I think we should go back to the old doctrinal definition of Unconventional Warfare to better inform and educate the policy makers and the public.
The UW definition below is from the 1997 Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (which was the last time the encyclopedia was published). It is really quite a document that provides detailed explanations of doctrinal terms in a single resource. I really wish the doctrine people would reprise this because it would be really helpful to academics, pundits, the press, Congressional staff, and the public.
It is available at these links for those who might want to see how we used to describe many of the doctrinal terms. (I recommend reading the descriptions of special operations and Special Forces in particular)
Download here:
https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp-encyclop(97).pdf
Online here:
https://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041025210802/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm/ency.htm
Below Doug Livermore's article I have pasted the encyclopedia description of UW for those who may be interested.
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 1-2)
Excerpts:
This resurgence of elite unit behind-the-lines operations has broader implications for the conflict.
First, it underscores the importance of unconventional warfare in the current phase of the war. As both sides continue to adapt their strategies, this will be crucial.
Second, such operations highlight the vulnerability of Russian rear areas, even those deep within their own territory. This could force Russia to reallocate resources to protect these areas, potentially weakening their frontline positions and giving Ukrainian forces an advantage.
Finally, successful elite unit operations could have a significant psychological impact on both Russian forces and the civilian population. For Russian soldiers, the realization that they are vulnerable even within their own borders is already causing a precipitous decline in morale. Hundreds of Russian troops have readily surrendered to the advancing Ukrainians. And for the Russian public, such attacks could undermine confidence in the government’s ability to protect the country, increasing domestic pressure on the Kremlin to seek a resolution to the conflict.
Ukraine’s Special Operations Troops Sow Destruction in Russia
August 23, 2024
Elite Ukrainian units have had a significant effect working behind the lines of the Kursk offensive. These are classic unconventional warfare tactics, writes US Special Forces officer Lt. Col. Doug Livermore.
cepa.org · by Doug Livermore · August 23, 2024
War is never a happy experience, but these must be satisfying days for Ukraine’s special operations forces soldiers. After the war stagnated into a largely static conflict, their role was restricted. Now they’re off the leash.
Kursk Oblast, just across the Ukrainian border, provided near-perfect territory for the cloak-and-dagger work of Ukraine’s veteran elite units. It is a key logistical hub and base of operations for Russian military activities in eastern Ukraine, is thinly defended by a Russian army that didn’t see the sucker punch coming, and houses vital railways, supply routes, and military installations.
By targeting Kursk, Ukrainian forces aim to stretch Russian defenses, forcing the diversion of resources from the frontlines in Ukraine to protect rear areas. This strategic pressure could weaken Russian positions, creating further exploitable vulnerabilities for Ukrainian forces.
Reports indicate that the units have conducted a range of operations in Kursk, including sabotage attacks on railways, fuel depots, and communication lines, as well as ambushing military convoys and attacking installations deep within Russian territory. Attacks have included video images of special operations forces guiding attacks on Russian bridges and the ambush and capture of Russian conscripts. Another official video purportedly showed them infiltrating Russian territory ahead of the main force.
These operations are emblematic of more traditional special operations forces tactics, where small, highly trained units operate behind enemy lines to achieve strategic objectives with minimal resources.
The impact of these operations extends beyond physical damage. The unpredictability of these attacks creates a sense of insecurity among inexperienced Russian forces, draining morale and forcing them to remain on constant alert. This psychological pressure is a crucial element of the Ukrainian strategy, aimed at weakening the enemy's resolve. Captured Russian conscripts have repeatedly credited their surrender to the overwhelming surprise, speed, and violence of action they experienced at the hands of Kyiv’s elite warriors.
The current wave of operations in Kursk is a stark contrast to the situation just months ago. During the static phases of the conflict, especially in eastern Ukraine, the role of special operations forces was more constrained. Trench-based warfare, characterized by fixed positions and heavy reliance on artillery, provided few opportunities for dynamic, behind-the-lines missions. Consequently, some Ukrainian special operations units were reassigned to roles like drone warfare, which, while important, did not fully leverage their specialized training and capabilities.
The shift back to dynamic operations in Kursk reflects a broader change in the conflict as Ukrainian forces have regained momentum and the frontlines have become more fluid. This shift underscores the adaptability of Ukrainian forces, who have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adjust their tactics to the evolving nature of the war.
One key enabler of Ukrainian operations is the increased use of technology and intelligence. Real-time intelligence, likely gathered from local sources, drone surveillance, and signals intelligence, has been critical in identifying targets and planning missions. Drones are now a force multiplier for Ukrainian special operations forces ranging in the Russian rear areas, enabling them to conduct reconnaissance, assess damage, and even deliver precision strikes.
The element of surprise has also been pivotal. The unit's forces have demonstrated a high level of operational security and discipline, successfully infiltrating deep into Russian territory, executing missions, and exfiltrating without detection. As the Russian-Ukrainian border was protected mainly by second and third-rate Russian conscripts and domestic security forces, Ukrainian troopers had incredible latitude compared to conditions in Eastern Ukraine. This surprise not only maximizes the impact of their operations but also minimizes risk to the operatives involved.
This resurgence of elite unit behind-the-lines operations has broader implications for the conflict.
First, it underscores the importance of unconventional warfare in the current phase of the war. As both sides continue to adapt their strategies, this will be crucial.
Second, such operations highlight the vulnerability of Russian rear areas, even those deep within their own territory. This could force Russia to reallocate resources to protect these areas, potentially weakening their frontline positions and giving Ukrainian forces an advantage.
Finally, successful elite unit operations could have a significant psychological impact on both Russian forces and the civilian population. For Russian soldiers, the realization that they are vulnerable even within their own borders is already causing a precipitous decline in morale. Hundreds of Russian troops have readily surrendered to the advancing Ukrainians. And for the Russian public, such attacks could undermine confidence in the government’s ability to protect the country, increasing domestic pressure on the Kremlin to seek a resolution to the conflict.
Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice President for Solution Engineer at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves as Chair of the Advisory Committee for No One Left Behind.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
Read More
cepa.org · by Doug Livermore · August 23, 2024
Unconventional warfare (UW) includes guerrilla warfare (GW) and other low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape (E&E). (See figure below.) GW consists of military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush tactics against enemy vulnerabilities. In the latter stages of a successful insurgency, guerrilla forces may directly oppose selected, vulnerable enemy forces while avoiding enemy concentrations of strength.
Subversion is an activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. All elements of the resistance organization contribute to the subversive effort, but the clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.
Sabotage is conducted from within the enemy’s infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe from attack. It is designed to degrade or obstruct the warmaking capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war material, facilities, utilities, and resources. Sabotage may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel. Once accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources
to guard against future attack.
"In UW, the intelligence function must collect, develop, and report information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of the established government or occupying power and its external sponsors. In this context, intelligence activities have both offensive and defensive purposes and range well beyond military issues, including social, economic, and political information that may be used to identify threats, operational objectives, and necessary supporting operations.
E&E is an activity that assists military personnel and other selected persons to:
• move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control;
• avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control;
• once captured, escape. Special operations personnel often will work in concert with the Joint Search and Rescue Center of the joint force commander (JFC) while operating in an E&E network.
UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become a protracted politico-military activity. From the US perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving US national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war. The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. Special operations forces (SOF) provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic or operational objectives.
When UW is conducted independently during military operations other than war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include the following:
• Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority."
• Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
• Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.
• Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
• Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.
When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. However, the political and psychological implications remain. UW operations delay and disrupt hostile military activities, interdict lines of communications, deny the hostile power unrestricted use of key areas, divert the hostile power’s attention and resources from the main battle area, and interdict hostile warfighting capabilities. Properly integrated and synchronized UW operations can extend the depth of air, sea, or ground battles, complement conventional military operations, and provide the JFC with the windows of opportunity needed to seize the initiative through offensive action.
During war, SOF may directly support the resistance movement by infiltrating operational elements into denied or politically sensitive areas. They organize, train, equip, and advise or direct the indigenous resistance organization. In situations short of war, when direct US military involvement is inappropriate or infeasible, SOF may instead provide indirect support from an external location.
UW may be conducted by all designated SOF, but it is principally the responsibility of Army special forces. Augmentation other than SOF, will usually be provided as the situation dictates by psychological operations and civil affairs units, as well as other selected conventional combat, combat support, and combat service support forces.
Related Terms"
"special operations
Source Joint Publications"
"3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations"
| 
