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CGG filed a Rules Petition with the State Election Board on July 24 to safeguard the November election by using emergency balloting, which authorizes hand marked paper ballots when voting equipment cannot be properly used. Our press release describes the Rule Petition. We received many messages of support from the public, some wanting more information. The FAQs below are in response to some of the questions we received. Feel free to ask us more-- Marilyn@uscgg.org.
Executive Summary of Proposed Rule here. Proposed Emergency Rule here. See red font for proposed rule language.
--What are emergency ballots?
Emergency ballots are the standard pre-printed ballots to be hand marked with an oval adjacent to the candidate’s name, similar to mail ballots. Most Americans vote on hand marked ballots, not touchscreens. See a sample here.
--Why are emergency hand marked ballots needed for November?
The touchscreen software has been proven to be vulnerable to undetectable attack, and the software was stolen and distributed to numerous unauthorized individuals. The risks of attack are alarmingly high, and have not been mitigated despite recommendation of DHS/CISA and warnings from nation’s experts. Those experts recommended the use of emergency ballots to mitigate the risk, but their warnings went unheeded by the State Election Board.
--Why wasn’t the software replaced and system secured before November?
Sec. of State was informed of these severe vulnerabilities in July 2021, and CISA confirmed the system exploitation risks in 2022, but Raffensperger says he needs until July 2026 to obtain funding and install new software. (5 years after the expert’s report was delivered.)
--Do other states use hand marked ballots?
Yes, hand marked ballots counted by scanners is the most common form of voting across the nation, with 70% of Americans voting this way. It is the gold standard. See green counties on map, indicating hand marked ballot jurisdictions.
--Isn’t using paper ballots “going backwards?”
No, in recent years, most states have abandoned touchscreen voting and returned to hand marked ballots as touchscreen security concerns were understood and cyberattacks escalated. Hand marked ballots is the only safe method of voting, and tabulating by scanner and testing the outcomes is the most reliable counting method.
--Are emergency ballots hand-counted or machine- counted?
The currently used scanner/tabulators count the ballots in the polling places, just as the scanners do now.
--Must precinct ballot scanners be reprogrammed to read hand marked ballots?
No, current standard practice is that scanners are automatically programmed to read either QR code ballots or hand marked ballots. Generally, no new equipment is needed. Some larger counties may need to purchase desktop printers for early voting centers to print low volume ballot styles when needed.
--Aren’t hand counts needed if the scanner software was compromised and distributed to unauthorized people?
The proposal requires audits of at least 50% of the races with two or more candidates to test the accuracy of the declared outcomes prior to the deadline for state certification. Additional optional audits are encouraged.
--Will this make results slower to be announced?
No, hand marked ballots are scanned and tabulated at essentially the same speed as QR code ballots, and quickly available on Election Night.
--Are emergency ballots the same as provisional ballots?
No, while both are printed and hand marked ballots that are identical, emergency ballots are marked by the voter and immediately cast in the polling place scanner. Provisional ballots are put in envelopes with voter information on the exterior for later determination of eligibility and counting.
--Will emergency balloting be expensive?
No, it will save counties millions of dollars. They will have to buy boxes of Sharpies and pay for commercial printing of ballots, but will save tens of thousands of hours of labor for handling, programming, testing, securing, transporting, set up, and maintenance of almost 100,000 pieces of BMD equipment that will not be needed. Commercial printing of ballots is far cheaper than using expensive printer toner to print individual ballots on BMDs.
--How does this affect machine testing?
Using hand marked ballots as standard permits legally compliant and complete Logic & Accuracy Testing, which is not feasible with touchscreen testing. BMD touchscreen testing currently cannot meet basic testing requirements of Georgia law. A federal court requested that SOS/SEB bring testing into compliance and stop unlawful “shortcuts” in 2020, but state officials have not complied.
--Can counties be ready to use hand marked ballots by October early voting?
Pollworkers are already trained to use emergency balloting to deal with events such as power outages or machine malfunctions. In almost every election, emergency balloting is used by a few precincts in response to unanticipated events. Poll workers are trained to transition to emergency ballots with no notice at all.
--Can enough ballots be printed in time?
Yes. Ballot printing can be performed by thousands of commercial printers. Counties can simply increase their print run size of their print orders for mail, provisional, and emergency ballots that they must order in the current system.
Also, counties have ballot-on-demand printers for in-house printing for immediate needs, although commercial printing is less expensive.
--How will counties manage paper ballots with all the ballot styles in early voting?
Early voting paper ballot management is done routinely in many other states.
This is only a challenge for a few large counties. The vast majority of counties have only one early voting center which is generally in the election office which already stocks all the ballot styles.
The proposed rule requires counties to anticipate and stock at least 75% of their ballot style needs, and print all other ballots upon demand with a desktop printer. Voters tend to visit the same early voting locations near their home or work, and ballot style demand can be reasonably predicted.
--What if a large county fears that it cannot fully comply with paper ballot management in all early voting centers?
Like all state agency rules, the jurisdiction can apply to the SEB for a full or partial waiver, although it should not be necessary, given how routinely this process is handled in other states for early voting centers.
--Does the St. Elec. Bd. have the authority to order emergency ballots as mitigation to a security problem?
Yes, Georgia law vests the SEB with the duty and authority to adopt legally enforceable rules to obtain uniformity in the practices of the local officials, as well as the legality, orderliness, and fairness of the elections. (The Sec. of State does not have rule-making authority.)
Ordering emergency balloting to mitigate a system-wide technology issue or to bring the voting method into compliance with law is certainly in the purview of the SEB. The current BMD system is violating federal and state law in many ways.
--Doesn’t GA law require that BMDs be used as the only method of voting in the polling places?
Electronic BMD balloting is the standard method for polling place voting, “unless otherwise authorized by law.” (O.C.G.A. 21-2-300(a)(2)). Emergency hand marked balloting is authorized by law in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-281 when it is “impossible or impracticable” to use voting equipment components.
Given that BMDs are unsafe for voting and do not comply with many mandated voting system requirements, it is impossible to legally use the system as configured, and it is unsafe.
--Do the counties currently have the authority to use emergency ballots to mitigate security failures without this new rule?
Yes, if the county election board concludes that the system is “impossible or impracticable” to use, the local board can order that the problems be mitigated with emergency balloting. Although it has long been “impossible” to comply with federal and state laws with the touchscreen system, the previous SEB majority opposed individual county efforts to use emergency balloting to achieve legal compliance. (Emergency balloting is authorized by law.)
--Does the touchscreen system violate other laws that emergency balloting remedies?
Yes, see this chart of some of the legal violations of the current Dominion touchscreen system. Emergency hand marked ballots remedy the legal problems. Examples:
- Touchscreens violate voters’ rights to a secret ballot.
- Pre-election testing (L&A) cannot be reasonably conducted on the touchscreens to meet the law, and significant unlawful testing shortcuts are taken.
- Because of QR code use, the voter cannot read the vote they are casting, as required by state and federal law. (Printed text can be different than QR code and is not counted. The QR code is counted.)
- If the BMD ballot is mis-programmed, the voter cannot correct their ballot, as required by federal law.
--Doesn’t the Secretary of State have the sole authority to decertify voting equipment?
The proposed emergency balloting temporary rule does not seek decertification of the voting system. All the components are needed for use in the Nov. elections, but should be reconfigured to limit the BMD use to accessibility needs. All other components also remain in use.
--Will controlling pre-printed blank ballots be difficult to be sure that fraud does not occur with ballot stock in the polling place?
No, it is easier to control, establish chain of custody, and account for pre-printed ballots shrink-wrapped in packs of 50-100 ballots, than to control currently used thousands of pages of blank ballot stock for numerous BMD printers. Also, voters can print up to 3 ballots at their BMD station with the current equipment, and all will be counted if voter is not detected. Proposed rule requires that pre-printed ballot stock must be accounted for and reconciled to the number of voters voting.
--Why is the proposed rule temporary and sunsets in July 2026?
July 2026 is the deadline the General Assembly set to update the software and a cessation of the QR code use. Future new system software can be evaluated for security and legal compliance at that time.
If you wish to comment on the proposed rule, please contact the State Election Board , you may do so by writing Alexandra Hardin, the SEB's paralegal professional, Alexandra Hardin .
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