Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The secret of change is to focus all of your energy, not on fighting the old, but on building the new."

– Socrates

"People who know little are usually great talkers, while me who know much say little."

– Jean Rousseau

"Nonay will stop you from creating. Do it tonight. Dt it tomorrow. That is the ay to make your soul grw."

– Kurt Vonnegut

1. Modernizing Korea’s United Nations Command

2. South Korea's Nuclear Weapons Debate: A Third Way Forward?

3. North Korea's Kim Jong Un emphasises importance of strengthening naval power

4. North Korea Launches New Salvo of Balloons, but the South Barely Shrugs

5. How North Korea will seek to play the next U.S. president

6. Escapees develop leadership skills at the Bush Institute's North Korean Human Rights Workshop

7. N. Korea launches trash balloons toward S. Korea for 5th day

8. N. Korea's Kim visits several military facilities ahead of regime's founding anniversary

9. N. Korea decries S. Korea-U.S. security exercise Washington as 'nuclear blackmail'

10. Over 100 mln won in damage caused by N. Korean trash balloons in wider Seoul area

11. Why North Korea is surprised by Moscow being penetrated by drones

12. Free food, forced thanks: Inside N. Korea's flood relief efforts in Uiju county

13. US presidential election: a view from Seoul

14. North Korea reveals new, larger ICBM under development

15. Why did S. Korea suddenly declare Oct. 1 temporary holiday?

16. ‘12.12: The Day’ Selected As South Korea’s Oscar Entry

17. The Sherman's voyage to tiger-infested Wonsan

1. Modernizing Korea’s United Nations Command

I missed this important article from Clint Work last month.

The headline editor has made a common error. The UN Command is hosted by South Korea. It is led by a US commander as authorized by UN Security Council resolutions in 1950 establishing the command to help defend South Korea from north Korean aggression and designating the US as the executive agent to organize and support the command. It is not "Korea's UNC". It is the UNC that is located in Korea to maintain the armistice and possibly be a force provider to the warfighting command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command if Kim Jong Un misclaates and resumes hostilities that were suspended by the 1953 Armistice Agreement..

This is arguably one of the most misunderstood and perhaps under-appreciated military organizations. Clint provides some important history and analysis of the ongoing evolution of the command with some of the challenges that lie ahead.

Excerpt:

UNC modernization’s complications reflect the turbulent institutional history of a command that has meant different, sometimes contradictory things to its various stakeholders at different points in time. For Washington, it provided a mechanism to command multinational forces and garner international legitimacy for its participation in the Korean War. However, U.S. officials deemphasized and even sought ways to scrap the UNC in the 1970s—as important functions were transferred to Seoul or the U.S.-ROK alliance—yet moved to reenergize it following the end of the Cold War.

The ROK was once abjectly dependent upon the UNC. But given Seoul’s remarkable transformation, it bucks any attempts to restrict its hard-won agency. Nonetheless, Seoul cannot avoid that its one and only ally, upon whom it has depended for its ultimate national security for its entire sovereign existence, still commands the UNC. Finally, UNC member states have undergone stark undulations in their own commitments. After the Korean War, some left the command and never returned. Others departed but then rejoined yet with widely varying levels of commitment. Moreover, there is a significant legal gray area surrounding the command, given its multiple stakeholders, tenuous connection to the United Nations, and complicated institutional evolution.

Nevertheless, efforts are undoubtedly underway to enhance the UNC. If there is political will and continuity in the effort, it can be more proactively transformed and even, to an extent, redefined. However, careful, consistent, and cohesive communication between Seoul, Washington, and UNC member states and with their publics about the purpose the UNC serves and—importantly, does not serve—will be critical.

Modernizing Korea’s United Nations Command

The National Interest · by Clint Work · August 27, 2024

The United Nations Command (UNC), a U.S.-led multinational command that enforces the Korean Armistice Agreement and coordinates international contributions to maintain peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, recently welcomed increased contributions from existing Sending States—countries that provided combat forces during the Korean War—and the accession of new members.

On June 11, New Zealand announced it would deploy forty-one additional personnel to the UNC and its Military Armistice Commission, and Germany joined the UNC on August 2 as its eighteenth member state. Such developments are part of a longer-term effort to bolster the standing and functions of the UNC in an increasingly complex strategic environment on and around the peninsula. Often characterized—with some justification—as a U.S.-driven effort, UNC modernization reflects a mix of additional variables, including the member states’ deepening bilateral relationships with Seoul and increased fidelity to the goal of peace and security in Korea and the Indo-Pacific. The Yoon administration’s effort is to enhance the UNC and ROK agency within it, as well as the growing linkages between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.

Still, challenges remain. For one, in the 2000s and 2010s, ROK progressives and conservatives—if for different reasons—heavily critiqued the UNC for infringing on Korean sovereignty. Such sentiments persist and could become resurgent. Additionally, the UNC’s enhancements provide symbolic and signaling value. Yet, there is a limit to the member states’ contributions and a lack of concrete legal and operational agreements between those states and Seoul. Finally, multilateralizing Korean security is beset by misaligned expectations and risks, accelerating dueling narratives about escalation on and beyond the peninsula.

New Leadership and Strategic Landscape Shifts Discourse on the UNC

A shift in Korean leadership and the strategic landscape has altered the ROK’s discourse on and enhanced US efforts to bolster the UNC. More than any previous ROK administration, the Yoon administration has pushed to modernize the UNC and sought to shape the process. In the context of North Korea’s steadily advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and new nuclear policy law, Seoul has sought various ways to enhance deterrence in Korea. Beyond the Yoon administration’s primary objective of strengthening Washington’s extended deterrence commitment, a more robust commitment from the UNC is another part of the equation.

Seoul’s hosting of the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting in November 2023—one day after the annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting—was the starkest evidence of this effort. It was the first such gathering hosted by the ROK and combined defense representatives from UNC member states, yet only Seoul and Washington sent their highest-level defense officials. In the joint statement following the meeting, the participants noted their determination to “continue increasing mutual exchange and cooperation between the ROK-U.S. Alliance and UNC Member States to inform our combined training and exercises” and “that they will be united upon any renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean Peninsula challenging the principles of the United Nations and the security of the Republic of Korea.” Although a notable statement, it was a toned-down reiteration of the Greater Sanctions Statement released following the 1953 armistice, which more forcefully stated that the Sending States would be “prompt to resist” any such renewal of hostilities and threatened to expand the conflict beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Additionally, by highlighting the direct connections between South Korea’s security and the seven UNC Rear bases in Japan, President Yoon embedded improved Seoul-Tokyo relations and strengthened U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation within a multilateral framing. The administration also embraced expanding the UNC, signaled its intent to increase South Korea’s own staffing of the command, and aims to hold a second ROK-UNC ministerial meeting this fall in Seoul (separate from the SCM in Washington). Seoul’s newfound embrace of the UNC as integral to deterrence on the peninsula was also made evident in U.S. and ROK officials jointly announcing UNC member states’ participation in the alliance’s combined military exercises last summer—a statement previously made by U.S. officials alone.

Furthermore, ROK and U.S. efforts to enhance the UNC have developed alongside an evolving conception of Indo-Pacific security and its growing linkage with the Euro-Atlantic. The latter linkage is structurally driven by U.S.-China competition yet was significantly accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Washington conceptualized and increasingly signaled a networked or lattice-worked region, minilateral groupings took on new value and purpose. The UNC, while historically centered on Korea, was increasingly tied to Northeast Asian and Indo-Pacific security.

To be sure, both Wellington and Berlin’s recent contributions to the UNC are specifically focused on Korea. New Zealand’s personnel will take on roles in the UNC honor guard and UNC Security battalion operating on the DMZ. Germany will deploy a Bundeswehr’s modern A319 OH observation plane starting in September. Further, though not specifically a UNC operation, New Zealand just deployed a ship to monitor North Korea’s maritime sanctions evasion activities for the first time, joining ships for fellow UNC member states Germany and Canada. Yet they framed their contributions in broader terms.

In June, New Zealand’s Defense Minister Judith Collins noted “our need to step up to better support peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the Indo-Pacific more widely,” a sentiment reinforced by Foreign Minister Winston Peters. Also, at the ceremony marking Germany’s accession to the UNC, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius emphasized the close linkage between European and Indo-Pacific security. Such messaging aligned with President Yoon and German chancellor Olaf Scholz’s meeting at the seventy-fifth NATO Summit in Washington, during which they expressed concerns about North Korean provocations, deepening Russia-North Korea ties, and vowed to expand security cooperation between NATO and South Korea.

Persistent Challenges, Limitations, and Risks

Yet despite shifts in discourse and significant developments around UNC modernization, persistent challenges remain. There has long been opposition across the political spectrum within South Korea to the UNC, based on the belief it infringes on critical areas of Korean sovereignty—particularly regarding inter-Korean engagement and self-defense measures against external threats. A growing multilateral grouping affecting core Korean sensibilities and decisions could, depending on the political context in the future, elicit strong pushback.

A future progressive leader in Seoul, while facing severe obstacles to re-engaging Pyongyang given Kim Jong Un’s seemingly fundamental shift on inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification, would bristle against any real or perceived UNC-driven restraint on their efforts. Further, likely inclined to seek greater autonomy from the United States—including through the OPCON transition—longstanding critiques of the UNC could reemerge under future progressive leadership. However, such tensions are not exclusive to the progressive camp in Seoul. It is conceivable that the current Yoon administration or a future conservative administration might turn away from the newfound embrace of the UNC based on various unmet or misaligned expectations.

One reported rationale for UNC modernization is to help shore up Korean deterrence in the event of Trump’s return to the White House. However, this misses the obvious point that the UNC remains a U.S.-led command. If there is less American fidelity to the alliance or CFC under Trump, that also would extend to the UNC. Furthermore, under such circumstances, many UNC member states themselves would face similar concerns about a waning U.S. security commitment, causing them to reorient their focus toward shoring up their own defenses rather than commitments elsewhere. These are not entirely binary choices, but on balance, their attention would likely shift away from Korea.

Additionally, President Yoon has spoken about an enhanced UNC in a manner that mischaracterizes its role and responsibilities. For example, during his Liberation Day speech in 2023, after calling the seven UNC Rear bases in Japan “the greatest deterrent which keeps the North from invading the South,” he noted, “A renewed North Korean invasion will trigger an automatic and immediate intervention and retaliation by the UNC, and the UNC-rear in Japan is sufficiently equipped with necessary land, sea and air capabilities.”

The UNC’s multilateral framework offers a valuable signaling deterrent and evidence of international diplomatic solidarity—one that Yoon himself has helped strengthen. Nevertheless, the UNC is not a warfighting command (that changed in 1978). The UNC would intervene under such circumstances to mitigate escalation and restore armistice conditions but, most assuredly, not to retaliate. American bases in Japan (seven of which are mutually designated by the United States and Japan as UNC bases for use by UN Sending States) very likely would be involved in a renewed Korean conflict, but under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, especially if those bases were themselves under armed attack. Yet, that would be a U.S.-Japan alliance decision and operation, not a UNC one.

Moreover, invoking the UNC as a retaliatory force gets well ahead of how UNC member states view their commitment. For most members, they simply do not have the resources to commit. Most European UNC member states are currently struggling to provide capacity and capabilities for Europe’s own defense in the context of the Ukraine War. To think they will muster large amounts of resources for Korea—particularly in short order—is unrealistic. And, even if they possessed such resources to deploy and the political will to do so, there remains a lack of formal standing commitments of forces from UNC members for a crisis or conflict or visiting forces agreements for potentially larger force deployments.

Additionally, as concerned as U.S. commanders are about the ROK’s retaliatory rhetoric and potential actions, UNC member states have reservations, too. They do not see enhanced UNC involvement as grounds to threaten retaliation nor want to commit themselves to such a situation militarily. One of the best analysts of the UNC notes that the earlier UNC revitalization effort was unable to address key concerns, namely that the United States rather than the UN maintained unilateral control over the UNC and that the U.S. treaty commitment to the ROK “relegated the UNC to a role of being a multinational force provider to the bilateral combatant command.” Such concerns likely persist. A security crisis in Korea will bring these reservations to the fore and manifest, even if through quiet diplomatic channels, in UNC member states calling for ROK restraint rather than encouraging retaliation.

Finally, overstating or mischaracterizing the UNC’s role may accelerate dueling escalatory narratives on the peninsula and in the region. For example, consistent with its longstanding position on the UNC, the North Korean Foreign Ministry responded to Germany’s UNC accession by saying it was an “act of wrecking peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and aggravating the situation” and the “ever-escalating military confrontation on the Korean peninsula demands the DPRK take more thorough measures for bolstering up its self-defensive capabilities to defend the sovereignty, security and interests of the state.” Chinese voices have echoed such sentiments.

Xinhua News framed Germany’s accession as a U.S.-driven effort to pressure other countries to join the UNC—a command the dissolution of which Beijing has pushed for since the early 1970s—and create a small NATO in East Asia, which undermines regional and global security. Various Chinese netizens have echoed the narrative and promoted strengthened China-Russia strategic cooperation to safeguard regional peace and security jointly.

Such rhetoric is expected. For some, it shows UNC modernization’s effectiveness alongside the development of a broader minilateral security architecture. Pyongyang now faces and must condemn more multilateral partners. Beijing, too, is watching an array of states in Europe and the Indo-Pacific more overtly call out and push back against its assertive and destabilizing behavior. However, a more restrained perspective would counsel against mischaracterizing or overselling the UNC’s purpose and capacities. It risks accelerating a potential crisis for which it may not be properly prepared, provides adversaries fodder to distort public understanding, and takes escalatory counteractions (which, admittedly, they show every indication of taking anyway). After all, many of the critiques Pyongyang and Beijing level against the UNC resonate in South Korea and elsewhere.

The Bigger Picture

UNC modernization’s complications reflect the turbulent institutional history of a command that has meant different, sometimes contradictory things to its various stakeholders at different points in time. For Washington, it provided a mechanism to command multinational forces and garner international legitimacy for its participation in the Korean War. However, U.S. officials deemphasized and even sought ways to scrap the UNC in the 1970s—as important functions were transferred to Seoul or the U.S.-ROK alliance—yet moved to reenergize it following the end of the Cold War.

The ROK was once abjectly dependent upon the UNC. But given Seoul’s remarkable transformation, it bucks any attempts to restrict its hard-won agency. Nonetheless, Seoul cannot avoid that its one and only ally, upon whom it has depended for its ultimate national security for its entire sovereign existence, still commands the UNC. Finally, UNC member states have undergone stark undulations in their own commitments. After the Korean War, some left the command and never returned. Others departed but then rejoined yet with widely varying levels of commitment. Moreover, there is a significant legal gray area surrounding the command, given its multiple stakeholders, tenuous connection to the United Nations, and complicated institutional evolution.

Nevertheless, efforts are undoubtedly underway to enhance the UNC. If there is political will and continuity in the effort, it can be more proactively transformed and even, to an extent, redefined. However, careful, consistent, and cohesive communication between Seoul, Washington, and UNC member states and with their publics about the purpose the UNC serves and—importantly, does not serve—will be critical.

About the Author: Dr. Clint Work

Dr. Clint Work is a fellow and director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). KEI is registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) as an agent of the KIEP, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Image: Keitma / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Clint Work · August 27, 2024

2. South Korea's Nuclear Weapons Debate: A Third Way Forward?

A "threshold state." That would be in keeping with South Korea's current identity. The ROK is a global pivotal state, that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, is a partner in the arsenal of democracy, and supports the rules based internal order.

I have to keep emphasizing that those who advocate for the development of its own nuclear weapons are actually supporting Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy to undermine the legitimacy of the ROK and drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance with the intent to drive US forces from the Korean peninsula. Kim actually welcomes SOuth Korea developing its own nuclear weapons. It does not fear the South having nuclear weapons and likely assesses that before they obtain them the ROK/US alliance will be broken and it will have the advantage to dominate the Korean peninsula.

South Korea's Nuclear Weapons Debate: A Third Way Forward?

Becoming a threshold state, rather than developing a nuclear deterrent outright or continuing to rely on the U.S. umbrella, may be the ROK’s best option.

The National Interest · by SeungHwan Kim · September 7, 2024

The debate over nuclear armaments in South Korea is growing more significant and polarizing. Two main strategies dominate the conversation. The first strategy is to achieve independent deterrence against North Korea through an independent nuclear program. The second strategy focuses on strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella, including measures like nuclear sharing, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and deepening extended deterrence. This strategy was further crystalized in the U.S.-South Korean joint nuclear deterrence guidelines on Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) during the NATO summit.

Recent polls show that 71 percent of South Koreans support developing a domestic nuclear arsenal, driven by concerns over North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and its growing military cooperation with Russia.

At the same time, conservative politicians, such as Governor Kyung Won Na, advocate for a nuclear program. According to this view, South Korea must equip itself with nuclear weapons to ensure national security and respond to potential threats independently.

However, significant opposition remains, with many strategic elites and policymakers favoring strengthened defense mechanisms and reliance on the U.S. security umbrella. They believe that South Korea’s conventional military capabilities, along with U.S. support, provide adequate deterrence and warn that nuclear development could lead to international sanctions, hinder the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and provoke a regional arms race.

A More Acceptable Alternative for South Korea

Considering the ongoing debates in Korea, I propose a third option: acquiring a more robust uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing technology (ENR) for increased nuclear latency. Given its high deterrence capabilities, South Korea should seriously consider achieving nuclear latency through ENR. This would allow it to develop the potential to produce nuclear weapons without actually doing so, thereby not violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a strategy successfully implemented by Japan.

ENR can itself provide significant deterrence capabilities. The fact that a nation already possesses the components and knowledge to build nuclear weapons but has not yet assembled or deployed them highlights its enormous potential. States with potential nuclear latency can implement a “delayed” nuclear counterattack strategy. This means that if such a state is attacked, it could launch a nuclear strike within weeks or months, thereby deterring the initial aggression. Although there is a delay, this approach functions similarly to the deterrence mechanisms used by fully nuclear-armed states. Additionally, opponents like North Korea might hesitate to attack such a state with nuclear latency, fearing it could hasten the completion of South Korea’s nuclear program.

For these deterrence mechanisms to function, the key lies in balancing clarity and ambiguity. The opponent, including North Korea, must be aware of South Korea’s ENR capability. Secretly securing ENR and keeping it highly confidential will not provide any deterrence effect. However, the opponent must be uncertain whether the state will eventually develop nuclear weapons. Absolute clarity that nuclear weapons will never be developed or will certainly be developed undermines the deterrence mechanisms. It is essential to be clear about having a secure ENR program but remain ambiguous about whether the state will fully develop nuclear weapons, indicating that this decision depends on the opponent’s actions. Thus, it would be crucial for South Korea to signal North Korea about its nuclear latency, but at the same time, find a balance with the United States to increase transparency and inspection of Korea’s ENR facilities.

However, the challenge lies in the practical limitations and hardships during the process of achieving nuclear latency and in the diplomatic direction post-armament. It is not only about avoiding economic damage from sanctions and pressure but also developing a new framework of foreign policy.

A Thin Tightrope: Between the United States and China

One concern is whether South Korea is adequately prepared to navigate the balance between the United States and China, given its foreign policy’s inconsistency. South Korea’s approach has fluctuated with different administrations: conservative governments typically strengthen ties with the United States and like-minded states. In contrast, progressive administrations aim to balance relations by improving ties with China alongside maintaining the U.S. alliance and engaging with North Korea. This inconsistency can create challenges for long-term strategic planning when approaching Washington. If the United States were to permit South Korea’s nuclear latency, it would likely come with conditions to follow its China policy. South Korea should consider whether this is acceptable.

Additionally, public trust in the South Korean government’s policies is below the OECD average, with domestic discourse deeply divided. Given the highly polarized political environment in South Korea, it will be extremely challenging for any administration to gain public acceptance for transformative foreign or nuclear policies. At the same time, it is crucial to establish legal frameworks, as conflicts with residents are likely to occur during the planning and construction of nuclear facilities. Currently, South Korea lacks legislation related to high-level radioactive waste storage.

To acquire ENR capabilities, laws governing the transport and storage of high-level radioactive waste, including laws like the “High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Special Act, " are necessary. While strengthening deterrence against North Korea, which is directly linked to South Korea’s survival, is critical, the lack of consideration of these issues in current discussions on nuclear policies is concerning.

Considering these concerns, the South Korean government should take considerate but bold two-track steps to reach the level of effective nuclear latency through ENR. Currently, the South Korean government’s nuclear regime falls under the “Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.”

The United States initially completely banned uranium enrichment in South Korea. However, the 2015 amendment of the U.S.-Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement permitted South Korea to enrich uranium to less than 20 percent with U.S. consent while still prohibiting the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel or highly enriched uranium. Still, this is not enough for acquiring nuclear latency, considering that 90 percent enrichment is required for weapons-grade uranium. Thus, for South Korea to acquire more proactive ENR capabilities, amending the U.S.-ROK nuclear agreement to increase enrichment above 20 percent would be necessary.

Appeals to the Global Community

Simultaneously, to ensure the negotiation with the United States proceeds smoothly, it is crucial to continue building bilateral trust through increased transparency and adherence to international norms. Japan’s fifteen-to-twenty-year approach, characterized by increased transparency and ongoing improvements in nuclear technology, serves as a valuable model for South Korea. By openly addressing and refining their capabilities related to centrifuge and reprocessing technology in the Tokai reprocessing plant, Japan has secured international allies and built trust, demonstrating the importance of transparency and strategic planning.

Seoul can also implement it by following and updating information via the U.S.-South Korean Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ’s Model Additional Protocol. Once a long-term trust-building process has been adequately established, South Korea can begin to request further nuclear development.

As a nation that prioritizes nonproliferation, the United States already has valid reasons to deny South Korea’s request. However, current geopolitical tensions present challenges to the U.S.-backed status quo. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2023 annual report on Chinese military power notes that China’s current nuclear modernization efforts “surpass previous attempts in both scale and complexity.”

While the direction of China’s nuclear modernization remains a topic of ongoing debate, its qualitative and quantitative expansion undeniably increases the complexity of a nuclear threat. Due to these emerging nuclear threats, along with North Korean and Russian military cooperation, the United States’ need for a new nuclear deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific is rising. This is where cooperation with U.S. allies comes in.

South Korea’s nuclear latency can enhance its alliance with the United States by adding strategic depth and ensuring autonomous deterrence capabilities. This not only bolsters the overall deterrence posture against North Korea and potential U.S. adversaries’ nuclear threats but also demonstrates that South Korea is not entirely reliant on the United States for security, thereby sharing the burden of regional defense.

Seoul must think beyond simply raising the enrichment cap above 20 percent for an effective ENR capability and develop a long-term, consistent plan that enhances alliance trust and transparency amid changing nuclear geopolitics. Adopting a long-term strategy regarding ENR capability will significantly benefit South Korea in building bilateral and international trust in its nuclear latency while maximizing its national security interests.

About the Author

SeungHwan (Shane) Kim is a researcher based in Washington, DC, at the Korea Foundation and a research fellow at the Vanguard Think Tank. He is a master’s graduate from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), focusing on security, statecraft, and East Asia. His previous experiences include roles at the East-West Center, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, the Korea Economic Institute, the Korea Studies Institute, and the ROK National Assembly. His works were published in numerous publications, including The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, the Asia Times, and the Pacific Forum. This article represents the author’s personal views and does not represent the Korea Foundation.

Note: The National Interest currently receives no funding from the Korea Foundation at this time.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by SeungHwan Kim · September 7, 2024

3. North Korea's Kim Jong Un emphasises importance of strengthening naval power

The ROK and US navies call these targets. The more ships and subs the north deploys the more opportunity for our combined naval forces to sink more ships.

Excerpt:

"Now that we are soon to possess large surface warships and submarines which cannot be anchored by the existing facilities for mooring warships, the construction of a naval base for running the latest large warships has become a pressing task," Kim said.

North Korea's Kim Jong Un emphasises importance of strengthening naval power

08 Sep 2024 07:29AM

channelnewsasia.com

East Asia

North Korea's Kim Jong Un emphasises importance of strengthening naval power

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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during a visit to the construction sites of various industrial factories, at an undisclosed location in North Korea, in this undated photo released on Aug 26, 2024. (Photo: Reuters/KCNA)

08 Sep 2024 07:29AM

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SEOUL: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un emphasised the importance of strengthening naval power during a tour of a naval base construction site, state media KCNA reported on Sunday (Sep 8).

"Now that we are soon to possess large surface warships and submarines which cannot be anchored by the existing facilities for mooring warships, the construction of a naval base for running the latest large warships has become a pressing task," Kim said.

During the tour, Kim stressed the need to build a naval port capable of operating the weapons systems of the warships and revealed military measures to deploy anti-aircraft and coastal defence systems for defending the port, according to the report.

Kim said there were geopolitical advantages of the site as a strategic vantage for the country bounded on the east and west sides by the sea. The location of the site was not specified in the report.

A recent satellite imagery analysis by 38 North indicated that North Korea's newest ballistic missile class submarine (SSB), the "Sinpo-C" class, was undergoing an extensive fitting-out period at the Sinpho South Shipyard.

In a separate visit to a shipyard, Kim ordered to increase national investments in shipbuilding projects so that immediate tasks and long-term plans for laying the foundation for the development of the shipbuilding industry are pushed forward as scheduled.

KCNA also reported on Sunday Kim's visit to a defence industrial enterprise, where he stressed the need to make munitions production more scientific and modernised to guarantee the performance of newly-developed military hardware, and an inspection of an artillery academy.

Source: Reuters/zl

4. North Korea Launches New Salvo of Balloons, but the South Barely Shrugs

The double edged word of 7 decades of successful deterrence. The Korean people in the South accept the threat from the north and this allow the north to conduct "creeping normalcy" - slowly and gradually increase its military capabilities and create acceptance of it military actions 9ssutained balloon flights full of waste to South are not just laughed off or ignored (or exploited by opposition political leaders). Eventually the Kim family regime may exploit this.

North Korea Launches New Salvo of Balloons, but the South Barely Shrugs

Hundreds of propaganda balloons ferrying trash have landed in South Korea in recent days, where officials say they typically do not pose a threat.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/08/world/asia/north-korea-balloons-again.html

Balloons floating over the inter-Korea border in Paju last week. Over the past few days, North Korea has sent hundreds of trash-filled balloons over the border and into South Korea.Credit...Yonhap, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Jin Yu Young

Reporting from Seoul

Sept. 8, 2024, 6:17 a.m. ET

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in North Korea and South Korea? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Hong Yoongi was walking near South Korea’s Parliament building in Seoul when he spotted the interloper from North Korea.

The trespasser on Thursday was a balloon that had floated dozens of miles across the inter-Korean border and the Han River in the South to land near the National Assembly complex. But the authorities were on the case, and on the scene. Some military personnel wore white protective gear, masks and gloves to deal with the trash that had scattered on impact.

Over the past five days, North Korea has sent hundreds more drifting toward the South with payloads of trash like waste paper and used plastic bottles. This salvo follows a barrage of thousands of similar North Korean balloons earlier this summer. Pyongyang has said it was provoked by North Korean defectors in the South, who launched their own balloons carrying leaflets criticizing the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, and USB sticks with K-pop music and K-dramas.

The South’s military has said that North’s balloons do not carry “harmful substances.” But they have become a nuisance, landing in farms, public parks in the capital and in residential areas. In July, some came down inside the grounds of the presidential office in Seoul.

Mr. Hong had seen another one of the balloons a few months earlier, near his home in Bundang, south of Seoul. But, he said, “the balloons haven’t affected my daily life at all.”

Living next to a nuclear-armed adversary is the reality for millions of South Koreans, who often shrug off provocations from the North.

“The most annoying part about the balloons is the countless warning texts I get from the government,” said Ahn Jae-hee, a resident of Seoul.

In recent days, officials in the South have sent more than a dozen safety alerts, warning residents to inform the authorities about the balloons and not to touch them. The alerts, sent to mobile phones across the country, give the general location of the balloons.

The South’s military has said it waits for the balloons to land before inspecting them, rather than blast them — and scatter their suspicious payloads — from the sky. Seoul has responded by blaring anti-North Korean propaganda and K-pop across loudspeakers stationed near the Demilitarized Zone between the two countries.

“The balloons are low-intensity provocations from the North, and South Koreans have no real reason to react to them,” said Wooyeal Paik, the deputy director at the Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. So far, he said, there was no indication of espionage, unlike the balloons from China seen over the United States last year, nor did they seem to carry weapons.

Propaganda balloons also flew on the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War. Both sides used them to scatter leaflets condemning each other’s governments. Those tactics had largely faded until their revival this year.

“The balloons have become the new normal,” Mr. Hong said.

How North Korea will seek to play the next U.S. president

Pyongyang has tried and trusted method for buying time to develop weapons

https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-North-Korea-will-seek-to-play-the-next-U.S.-president?utm

Anthony W. Holmes

September 5, 2024 17:05 JST

Anthony W. Holmes was special adviser for North Korea at the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2017 to 2021 and senior expert for international relations at the U.S. Special Operations Command HQ from 2021 to 2024. He is a senior nonresident fellow at the Project 2049 Institute and a senior consultant for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Until U.S. President Joe Biden decided not to seek reelection, North Korea thought the presidential election would be a contest between him and former President Donald Trump. If Pyongyang's Foreign Ministry and intelligence analysts were tracking the polls, as they undoubtedly were, then North Korea also expected former Trump to prevail in November.

Biden's withdrawal from the race and the elevation of Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic Party's nominee changes this calculation, at least for now. As a result, North Korea will have to refine its negotiating strategy between now and November. Plainly, at the end of a U.S. presidential administration, or before a likely transition, Pyongyang always starts laying the groundwork for how it will approach the next one. North Korea's approaches are neither novel nor revolutionary, but they are stubbornly effective.

Here's how Pyongyang is likely to play this:

First, North Korea will state semiofficially that it is uninterested in negotiations with the U.S., using terms such as Washington "can't be trusted," or won't change its "hostile policy," and point to U.S. military exercises in South Korea that "bring the country to the brink of war." Pyongyang will release dozens of statements in state-controlled media at increasingly higher levels of regime authoritativeness to make this point.

Second, North Korea will simultaneously hint that it is open to negotiations if the U.S. and its allies make shows of good faith. These never change and must be one-sided. It will seek the relaxation of sanctions and their enforcement, as well as the curtailing of military exercises.

Third, North Korea will conduct some kind of public and unmissable event such as a nuclear test or demonstration of a new capability, such as the country's first ICBM launches in 2017. North Korea will pair this event with an authoritative statement from a senior official, most likely Kim Jong Un's sister Kim Yo Jung, about how North Korean cannot be intimidated and is ready for war at the drop of a hat. This statement will include a laundry list of U.S., South Korean, and Japanese "crimes."

A Hwasong-18 ICBM is launched from an undisclosed location in North Korea in this image released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency in July 2023. © Reuters

North Korea's goals with the negotiations will not change no matter who is president, only the methods. Why does Pyongyang conduct itself this way? Because it works. Here is how:

Step one is designed to set the stage for the entire enterprise. You do not enter a high-stakes negotiation advertising how important it is to you. Pretending to be indifferent, detached, and resigned to the current state of affairs works in Pyongyang's favor. The U.S., on the other hand, will enter negotiations full of hope and unfounded optimism that this time, under this president, things may be different.

Step two is built around setting up North Korea's "golden concession" negotiating strategy. In sum, this is the Western belief that there is some bold, unilateral, upfront, unreciprocated concession that Pyongyang wants, but for which it is too proud to ask, that will finally resolve our longstanding disagreements. North Korea embraces this negotiation strategy because it makes the U.S. negotiate with itself over increasingly bolder concessions, while also offering more and more to keep North Korea at the table. The longer a negotiation drags on, the more reaching an agreement, any agreement, becomes the goal.

Step three does a few things. It both sows the idea that there is some cabal of North Korean "hardliners" opposed to peace that must be appeased by the imbalanced concessions that emanate from Washington to Pyongyang. It also reinforces the idea that the regime is resigned to war if it doesn't get what it wants. It elevates the voices inside the U.S. who argue for "negotiations without conditions" and to find new incentives to keep Pyongyang from walking away.

North Korea would probably be more comfortable negotiating with Trump because it thinks it knows how to handle him: i.e., flattery over his negotiating skills, his willingness to take big risks, his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. However, as Trump's correct decision to walk away from the second summit in Hanoi demonstrated, that strategy is not guaranteed to succeed.

A President Harris would be a new variable for Pyongyang, but I suspect North Korea would believe its classic playbook is sufficient, with minor changes around the margins, to at least sound like it is addressing a Harris administration directly. In fact, North Korea may not feel the need to play this game much at all, so long as Russia and China are more interested in frustrating the U.S. in Ukraine and the Middle East than addressing the North Korea problem.

Fundamentally, North Korea is negotiating to buy time in order to develop sufficiently advanced, credible, and reliable weapons systems so that it can achieve its goal of ending U.S. security guarantees on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea believes that once it has convinced South Korea that Washington will not "trade Los Angeles for Seoul," the U.S.-South Korea alliance will end, and then it can coerce Seoul into some form of reunification on terms favorable to it. This is step four. Thankfully it has never achieved that step.

All in all, it is imperative that U.S. decision-makers continue to look at North Korea as a national and international problem, not a partisan one. No individual leader can "solve" the North Korea threat through dialogue because we are negotiating about different things. The U.S., South Korea, Japan, and our allies want to reassure Pyongyang that we bear it no ill will, and that resolution of the nuclear program would open up the door to economic growth and prosperity.

North Korea wants to buy time and, in its view, use our political and historical naivety against us.

6. Escapees develop leadership skills at the Bush Institute's North Korean Human Rights Workshop

Kudos to the Bush Institute.

Escapees develop leadership skills at the Bush Institute's North Korean Human Rights Workshop | George W. Bush Presidential Center

bushcenter.org · by Learn more about Nicole Hawkins.

Read September 4, 2024

Nicole Hawkins

Associate, Communications

George W. Bush Institute

North Korean escapees and participants of the Bush Institute's North Korean Human Rights Workshop make heart hand gestures with Ambassador Julie Turner, U.S. Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights Issues. Photo credit: George W. Bush Presidential Center

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North Korea

Each September, the George W. Bush Institute welcomes North Korean escapees to Dallas for a multi-day gathering aimed at helping participants develop their leadership and advocacy skills. At this year’s third annual North Korean Human Rights Workshop, a group of 12 North Korean escapees participated in powerful sessions with leaders and activists, including Ambassador Julie Turner, the U.S. Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights Issues.

Ambassador Julie Turner speaks to North Korean escapees at the Bush Institute’s third annual North Korean Human Rights Workshop on Sept. 4, 2024. Photo credit: George W. Bush Presidential Center

This year’s gathering comes ahead of the 20th anniversary of the North Korean Human Rights Act. Signed into law by President George W. Bush on Oct. 18, 2004, the act aims to provide humanitarian assistance to those living in North Korea and humanitarian and legal assistance to those who have escaped the hermit kingdom.

Joseph Kim, Research Fellow at the Bush Institute and founder of the workshop — who was one of the first North Korean escapees to come to the U.S. under the North Korean Human Rights Act — said the goal of the gathering is to equip North Koreans with knowledge and skills to “help them not only reach their potentials but also help them to become the next generation of leaders dedicated for the cause of [a] free North Korea.”

Many workshop participants are recipients of the Bush Institute’s Lindsay Lloyd North Korea Freedom Scholarship, which helps North Korean escapees and their children pursue higher education and build productive, prosperous lives. To date, nearly $350,000 has been awarded in the form of 84 scholarships.

On Sept. 14, 2023, President and Mrs. George W. Bush welcomed 14 North Korean refugees to the George W. Bush Presidential Center for the second annual North Korean Human Rights Workshop. Photo credit: George W. Bush Presidential Center

In addition to supporting North Korean refugees living in the U.S., the Bush Institute supports policies aimed at stopping the horrific human rights violations occurring within North Korea. In 2023, the Bush Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a policy paper urging the administration, Congress, the international community, and the United Nations to take action to weaken China and Russia’s ability to facilitate North Korea’s human rights abuses. Read the report here.

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7. N. Korea launches trash balloons toward S. Korea for 5th day

Th S**t show from Kim Jong Un continues.

N. Korea launches trash balloons toward S. Korea for 5th day | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 8, 2024

SEOUL, Sept. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea sent more trash balloons toward South Korea on Sunday, the South's military said, in what marked the fifth straight day of such launches.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the North resumed its balloon campaign at around 9 a.m., just hours after it floated some 200 balloons late Saturday.

"Considering the safety of our people as the top priority, the military will resolutely and calmly respond in accordance with the manual," the JCS said.

In response to the balloon launches, the South's military has been blasting daily anti-North Korean propaganda broadcasts through loudspeakers on the border since July 21. It has refrained from directly shooting down the balloons, citing safety concerns.

Around 50 trash bundles landed in the capital and Gyeonggi Province from Saturday's launch, but no hazardous materials have been found, the JCS said. They largely contained scrap paper, pieces of plastic and plastic bottles.

Since late May, the North has launched thousands of balloons carrying trash in retaliation against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent across the border by North Korean defectors and activists in South Korea.

Sunday's launch marked the 17th round of balloon launches since late May.

One of the hundreds of trash-carrying balloons sent by North Korea overnight is found in a rice paddy in the northwestern border county of Ganghwa, in this June 10, 2024, file photo. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 8, 2024

8. N. Korea's Kim visits several military facilities ahead of regime's founding anniversary

Preparing for a parade or provocation?

N. Korea's Kim visits several military facilities ahead of regime's founding anniversary | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 8, 2024

SEOUL, Sept. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has inspected several military facilities, state media reported Sunday, after nearly a month primarily focused on restoration efforts following severe flood damage.

In addition to visiting the O Jin U Artillery Academy on Friday, Kim inspected a shipbuilding yard, a munitions factory and a naval base construction site, according to multiple reports by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Since the heavy rains in late July, which caused widespread flooding in the northern provinces of Jagang and North Phyongan and displaced thousands, Kim has concentrated on recovery efforts.

The military inspections came as North Korea prepares to celebrate Monday's 76th anniversary of the regime's founding.

During his visit to the academy, Kim said the institution "should thoroughly implement the Party's idea of prioritizing the artillery and its policy on military education in the future," the KCNA said.

The academy, previously named the Kim Chol-ju Artillery Academy -- named after the younger brother of Kim Il-sung, the late grandfather of Kim Jong-un -- was renamed in 2013.

This is believed to be the first time Kim Jong-un has visited the academy since coming to power.

After inspecting the naval base site, Kim stated that building "a modern and multifunctional naval base is a process of key importance in developing the naval force into a powerful service in conformity with the regional security environment preparedness."

While touring the shipbuilding facility, Kim emphasized that "the strengthening of naval force is the most important matter in firmly defending the maritime sovereignty of the country and stepping up the war preparedness at present."

During his visit to defense industrial enterprises, Kim expressed gratitude to workers for "carrying out the huge munitions production tasks in a responsible and correct way and making a great contribution to the development of our armed forces."

The timing of Kim's visit to the three locations, as well as their exact locations, was not disclosed.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C, in black suit) speaks during his visit to O Jin U Artillery Academy on Sept. 6, 2024, in this image provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 8, 2024

9. N. Korea decries S. Korea-U.S. security exercise Washington as 'nuclear blackmail'

Good. We have Kim's attention.

But notice the mirror imaging and telegraphing what the regime is all about - e.g., "blackmail diplomacy."

N. Korea decries S. Korea-U.S. security exercise Washington as 'nuclear blackmail' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 8, 2024

SEOUL, Sept. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea condemned South Korea and the United States on Sunday for holding simulation drills in Washington aimed at enhancing nuclear deterrence cooperation, calling them "nuclear threats and blackmail."

On Thursday and Friday (local time), Seoul and Washington conducted the first tabletop simulation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a key dialogue body for the allies' nuclear deterrence, to bolster nuclear deterrence and operational readiness on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea's foreign ministry issued a statement titled "We will continue to take practical measures to cope with the long-term nuclear confrontation with the U.S," according to the Korean Central News Agency.

The ministry expressed serious concern and bitterly denounced the drills, claiming they are disturbing regional strategic stability and increasing the possibility of a nuclear clash.

"The U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail will be thoroughly deterred by the DPRK's more perfect and developed nuclear forces for self-defence," the English-language statement said. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The North further claimed that Seoul and Washington have also conducted "nuclear war drills" in succession, by mentioning other exercises, such as Iron Mace 2 and Ulchi Freedom Shield.

"The DPRK will strictly control and manage the security situation of the Korean peninsula, which is getting ever more intense due to the U.S. and its followers' nuclear war hysteria, and continue to take practical measures to cope with the long-term nuclear confrontation with the U.S," the statement added.

Seoul and Washington launched the NCG in July last year as part of the Washington Declaration issued by President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden at their summit three months earlier.

Cho Chang-rae (L), head of the South Korean defense ministry's policy bureau, and Vipin Narang, U.S. principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, sign the Framework on the South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) at the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, on Feb. 12, 2024, in this photo provided by Seoul's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 8, 2024

10. Over 100 mln won in damage caused by N. Korean trash balloons in wider Seoul area

That is some dangerous s**t.

Excerpts:

A total of 51 reports were filed, with 13 incidents in Seoul and 38 in Gyeonggi Province, the data showed. Three cases are still under assessment, and thus no damage amounts have been reported.

The most significant single report involved a logistics center located in Seoul's western region, where a trash balloon fell onto a parked vehicle, damaging the car roof and resulting in property damage of over 15.71 million won.

Current laws do not offer a legal basis for the government to provide compensation in cases of property damage caused by North Korea's provocations or trash-carrying balloons.

Over 100 mln won in damage caused by N. Korean trash balloons in wider Seoul area | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 8, 2024

SEOUL, Sept. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's trash-filled balloons have caused combined damage exceeding 100 million won (US$74,600) in the wider capital area of South Korea over the past three months, according to data Sunday.

Damage was reported due to trash bundles that landed in Seoul and the surrounding Gyeonggi Province between May 28 and Aug. 10, according to the city and provincial governments data submitted to Rep. Yang Bu-nam of the main opposition Democratic Party.

A total of 51 reports were filed, with 13 incidents in Seoul and 38 in Gyeonggi Province, the data showed. Three cases are still under assessment, and thus no damage amounts have been reported.

The most significant single report involved a logistics center located in Seoul's western region, where a trash balloon fell onto a parked vehicle, damaging the car roof and resulting in property damage of over 15.71 million won.

Current laws do not offer a legal basis for the government to provide compensation in cases of property damage caused by North Korea's provocations or trash-carrying balloons.

However, the interior ministry has stated it will expedite the processing of damage reports ahead of the revision of related laws.

Since May 28, the North has launched thousands of balloons carrying trash in retaliation against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent across the border by North Korean defectors and activists in South Korea.

Earlier in the day, North Korea sent more trash balloons toward South Korea, marking the 17th round of balloon launches.

One of the hundreds of trash-carrying balloons sent by North Korea overnight is found in a rice paddy in the northwestern border county of Ganghwa, in this June 10, 2024, file photo. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 8, 2024

11.Why North Korea is surprised by Moscow being penetrated by drones

Kim and the nKPA must be thinking what will the advanced capabilities of the ROK and US do to Pyongyang if Ukraine's drones can so easily penetrate Moscow?

This is a Google translation.

Why North Korea is surprised by Moscow being penetrated by drones

https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/c2e0bc15d55cd55cbc18b3c4c2e0bb34ae30b300bc31acfc/armencyclopedia-09062024170820.html

WASHINGTON-Kim Jin-guk kimj@rfa.org

2024.09.08

Drone attack on Moscow oil refinery on September 1, 2024

(Source: X)

00:00 /16:44

( Host ) We will accurately grasp the current state of the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula and seek a path to peace . This is Kim Jin-guk, presenter of ' Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula ' fromWashington D.C. We will connect with Lee Il-woo, Secretary Generalof Korea's ' Independent Defense Network ' .

Moscow was hit by a slow drone powered by a motorcycle engine

( Anchor ) On the first day of September , Ukraine launched the largest drone strike since the outbreak of the war on major cities, including the Russian capital Moscow . The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that most of the drones were intercepted and there were no damages , but there is considerable shock because a facility very close to President Putin's office was hit ?

( Lee Il-woo ) Ukrainelaunched large-scale drone strikes across Russiafrom the night ofAugust 31 to the early morning of September 1 , local time . Numerous drones flew intothe border cities of Kursk, Belgorod , Bryansk , Rostov , as well asVoronezh , Krasnodar , and Lipek, and Moscow and even the Tver region north of Moscow were hit by drone strikes .

Ukrainian suicide drone over Moscow, September 1, 2024 (Source: X)

The number of drones that the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have been shot down was 158 , but if you include drones that were not shot down or even discovered, many estimate that the number of drones mobilized in this airstrike would have been over 200 .

The drone that Ukraine used in the airstrike is a small suicide drone made by attaching a synthetic resin fuselage and wings to a small motorcycle engine , and combining it with an automatic flight chipset and flight control device that can be easily obtained on the Internet . It is not stealth , and not only is it very noisy when flying , but its flight speed is only about 110 km/ h, so once it is discovered, it can be shot down with a rifle .

However, Russia suffered the humiliation of having its first -line air defenses breached in almost all of its border areas due to its failure to respond to these slow drones . In several areas bordering Ukraine, oil storage facilities and military warehouses were hit by drones , and in Zheleznogorsk, Krasnodar Territory in the south, a drone even landed on the grounds of a facility for processing plutonium, a material for nuclear weapons .

But what surprised the Kremlin the most about this airstrike was that Moscow’s air defenses were breached . The Kashira thermal power plant south of Moscow was hit by a drone , and the Konakovo thermal power plant north of Moscow was also hit by a drone and suffered fatal damage . And the Moscow oil refinery, located 10 km from the Kremlin in a straight line , was also hit by a drone and stopped operating .

The Moscow oil refinery, located east of the Kremlin, was just six minutes away from the Kremlin if the drone was flying at its cruising speed . What’s more shocking is that the drone entered the Moscow city airspace from directly south of the Kremlin , while the drone that hit the Konakovo power plant, located northwest of Moscow, also flew straight north from southwest Moscow and passed leisurely over western Moscow before reaching its target .

This must have been extremely disconcerting for Russia, because it meant that if Ukraine were to launch more drones than the ones used in this strike on Moscow, the next time, even the Kremlin, where President Putin’s office is located, would not be safe . It seems that this shock is also why Russia has been carrying out retaliatory attacks on Ukrainian civilians on September 2 and 3 , which amounted to indiscriminate massacres .

Moscow, 6 minutes from the Kremlin , what about the helpless Iron Curtain air defenses ?

( Host ) Moscow is a fortress-like city where Russia's most powerful air defense weapons have built a multi-level dense air defense network , and its air defense weapons and tactics are evaluated to be several generations ahead of North Korea's . How is Moscow's air defense network, which is said to be an advanced version of Pyongyang's , structured ?

( Lee Il-woo ) Russia has traditionally been very interested in air defense since the Soviet era . Its air force has always been inferior to that of the United States , and out of fear that high-performance American bombers would infiltrate and launch nuclear weapons, it has operated an independent military branch called the Air Defense Forces in addition to the Air Force,densely deploying and overlapping a large number of air defense weapons with various ranges and altitudes .

Moscow's air defense operations are handled by the 1st Lenin Special Purpose Air Defense and Missile Defense Corps, which was created in 2015 on the direct orders of President Putin . This unit is a large-scale field army unit with several division-level air defense units under its control , and is an elite air defense unit equipped with all of the best air defense weapons in Russia .

Kremlin drone strike, May 2, 2023 (Source: X video capture)

This unit had all the good air defense weapons , but its weaknesses were exposed on May 2, 2023, when two suicide drones flew into the Kremlin and exploded on the roof . President Putin was furious , and under the special instructions of then Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, air defense weapons from all over Russia , as well as field air defense weapons from front-line battlefields such as Donbas and Crimea, were brought in to significantly strengthen the unit's capabilities .

Pantsir-S2 deployed on the roof of the Defense Ministry building after the Kremlin drone incident on May 2, 2023 (Source: X)

Moscow's air defense network consists of wide-area air defense weapons such as the S-500, S-400, and S-300PMU2 , medium-range air defense weapons such as the S-350 and Buk-M3, short-range air defense weapons such as the Pantsir-S1 and S2, and numerous anti-aircraft guns for stronghold air defense .

The S-500 is the most advanced air defense weapon that has been in service for about a year . It has been touted as the most powerful air defense weapon in human history, capable of intercepting anything flying . Russia claims that it uses three types of missiles with ranges of 400km, 700km, and 1000km , and can intercept not only low-speed targets such as Tomahawk cruise missiles and drones , but also ballistic missiles traveling at Mach 14.2 or faster, hypersonic weapons , and even low-orbit satellites .

The S-400 , which assists this, is an air defense weapon that Turkey purchased even after giving up the F-35 . It uses missiles with ranges of 120km, 150km, and 400km , and these missiles can also intercept aircraft, cruise missiles , drones , and ballistic missiles . The S-300PMU2 is the model right before the S-400 and has performance similar to that of the S-400 .

The S-350 is a cousin of South Korea’s Cheongung medium-range surface-to-air missile, which has also been touted as being able to engage most existing air targets . Another medium-range air defense weapon, the Buk-M3 , can intercept 36 air targets simultaneously at a distance of up to 137 km , which Russia claims is superior to the U.S. Patriot .

The Pantsir series, which became famous after being deployed throughout Moscow following the Kremlin drone attack in May last year , is a hybrid air defense system that combines surface-to-air missiles and machine guns . Russia has been promoting this air defense weapon as being specialized for intercepting low-altitude drones and cruise missiles .

In Moscow, there were a whopping 22 medium- and long-range air defense batteries ranging from the S-500 to the Buk-M3 , around 90 missile launchers , 9 short-range air defense batteries identified , and over 40 missile launch vehicles alone, a huge number of air defense weapons deployed , and numerous fighter jets circling on air patrol , but despite this, a breach was made right next to the Kremlin . Putin must have been very surprised , and Kim Jong-un, who is protected by air defense weapons several generations behind Moscow, must have been quite shocked by this incident .

What about Pyongyang then ? ( Moscow copy but more than 2 generations behind )

( Host ) North Korea must have been quite shocked to see Moscow's air defense network easily penetrated by drones . How isPyongyang's air defense network comparable to Moscow's , and does it have the ability to respond to air strikes by the ROK - US joint forces in the event of an emergency ?

( Lee Il-woo ) The poor state of Pyongyang's air defense networkcan be seen in the Matthias Rust incident that occurred 37 years ago . Pyongyang's current air defense networkis comprised of older weapons that are more than two generations behind the Moscow air defense network that was recently breached . The Moscow air defense network that was breached by a young amateur pilot in 1987 is the same model as the weapons currently in charge of Pyongyang's air defense .

Pyongyang's arsenal consists of the S-200, a wide-area air defense system covering the entire central region, the S-75, S-125, medium -range air defense systems under the air defense umbrella of long-range air defense systems known in the West as the SA-5 , and a number of anti-aircraft guns . The S-75 is a command-guided surface-to-air missile with a range of 45 km , known in the West as the SA-2 Guideline , while the S-125 is a command-guided surface-to-air missile with a range of 35 km , known in the West as the SA-3 Gore .

On May 28 , 1987 , when the Kremlin was breached in the skies over Moscow , the Soviets were using the same weapons , but strictly speaking, the Soviets had far more surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets at the time, so in terms of air defense capabilities, the Soviets were better than the North Koreans are now .

Cessna 172 landing on Red Square in Moscow on May 28, 1987 (Source: Wikipedia)

The plane that broke through the Soviet air defense network was a Cessna 172 , a light civilian aircraft also used in the United States , and the pilot was an 18 -year-old boy who had just received his pilot's license at the time and had 50 hours of flight experience .

A man named Matthias Rust , who had just gotten his license and was very interested in piloting an airplane, chartered a Cessna light aircraft in Hamburg, West Germany, filled it up with fuel , and flew to Iceland, Norway , and then Helsinki, Finland . His next destination was Stockholm, Sweden , but shortly after taking off from Helsinki, Rust turned east , flew over what is now Estonia, and then towards Moscow . At 7 p.m. , Rust arrived over Moscow and tried to land in the Kremlin courtyard , but instead of landing there , he went to Red Square, right next to the Kremlin, because he thought the KGB would arrest him there . He circled over the square a few times before landing . Up until this point, the Soviets had no idea that Rust had landed in the middle of Moscow .

When a German-speaking citizen asked Rust , “ Where are you from ?” he replied , “ I’m from Germany . ” This made the people in the square assume he had come from East Germany to celebrate the upcoming military parade, and they spent the next two hours taking pictures and chatting with him .

Two hours later, the security authorities confirmed that the plane had landed and arrested Rust , and later the Soviets lied that their air defense forces had known about the plane's entry into their airspace , but had left it there because they had not received permission to intercept it . Of course , two days after the incident, many of those involved in air defense operations, including Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov and Air Defense Command Commander Alexander Koldunov, were purged .

At the height of the Cold War , the fact that a light aircraft was able to leisurely fly over the western part of Moscow , where all of the Soviet Union's air defense assets were concentrated, and land on Red Square in the center of Moscow, where the Soviet Secretary's Office was located, shows just how vulnerable the Soviet air defense system was at the time . The problem from North Korea's perspective is that the air defense system currently in charge of Pyongyang's air defense is the same equipment as the Soviet air defense system at the time , but the number of units deployed is much smaller .

The air assets of the ROK - US combined forces that will attack Pyongyang in an emergency are state-of-the-art assets that cannot be compared to Cessna fighters . It is impossible for Pyongyang's air defense network, which is at a lower level than the air defense network that was penetrated by Cessna fighters 40 years ago , to stop the air attack of the ROK - US combined forces armed with stealth fighters, stealth cruise missiles , and electronic warfare .

Just Ten Minutes , if the US and South Korea make up their minds, why will they just be destroyed ?

( Host ) At first glance, the air defense networks of countries that use Soviet-made air defense weapons or Russian-made air defense weapons developed from them appear to be very dense and powerful , but in actual combat, they always seem to be weak . Why are there so many vulnerabilities in the air defense operations of countries that use Soviet-made air defense weapons, including North Korea ?

( Lee Il-woo ) If you look at various real-life cases,including the Middle East War , the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the Syrian air raids , you can see that sides armed with Soviet or Russian-made air defense weapons were unilaterally destroyed by American or European air power . If you just look at the catalog specifications of Russian-made air defense weapons officially announced , they are more than capable of intercepting Western fighters or missiles , but that wasn't the case in real combat .

This is due to the performance of the weapon system itself and the problem of operational tactics . Soviet and Russian air defense weapons have very low reliability . The actual range of weapons announced as having a range of 100 km and a speed of Mach 2 is often far less than 100 km , and the speed is also often slower than the official specifications . This reality of weapon specification exaggeration is clearly revealed in the Ukrainian War , where almost every battle was filmed and recorded by various cameras. Russia's proud Pantsir series and Tor series have shown many instances of suicide drones flying right in front of their eyes being hit and destroyed because they could not see them even though their radars were running .

In authoritarian countries like Russia, there are frequent cases where the specifications reported to superiors differ from the actual weapon specifications . In reality, even if the target is not achieved , the perception that “ let’s say it was done , let’s say it was done , let’s say it was like that ” is widespread, so the workers lie and the superiors just let it slide, and this occurs even in the process of developing and manufacturing weapons systems . In this kind of atmosphere, the possibility that the weapons produced will be properly designed and inspected is extremely low .

There are also problems with tactics . Communist and authoritarian countries have a strong fear of coups, so they have very strict control over their subordinate units and rarely allow discretion to frontline commanders . When an enemy appears on the radar, they have to shoot , but since they first ask their superiors, political officers , and security officers, and then receive orders through several chains of command, decision-making is bound to be slow . Not only North Korea , but also Russia and China's air defense operations are very strongly controlled from the central government , so frontline units have no ability to identify targets captured on their radars or respond appropriately .

Above all, low-flying cruise missiles and drones are not easily detected by ground-based radars . Radars are usually deployed at high altitudes and face upward, so the detection rate for low-flying targets is inversely proportional to the distance . This is why it is necessary to operate assets such as early warning aircraft , but Moscow, which was recently penetrated, did not have any early warning aircraft , and North Korea does not have any early warning aircraft at all .

That is why North Korea is also hurriedly building an early warning aircraft , but there is nothing that can be done with just one early warning aircraft . Even if an early warning aircraft is built, it would have to be connected to a single data link between the aircraft and many air defense batteries on the ground to enable real-time command and control , but this costs a huge amount of money, so North Korea does not have the ability to implement this .

Recently, in the memoir of General H. R. McMaster, former national security adviser to former President Donald Trump, there was a story about bombing North Korea during a military parade and eliminating its leadership . If South Korea were determined to fire a cruise missile into the West Sea , the North Korean leadership would be annihilated in 10 minutes .

Damage range when Haeryong Fleet Missile hits Kim Il-sung Plaza/ Lee Il-woo diagram

South Korean naval frigates have a missile called the Haeryong, which is called a " tactical ship-to-ground missile . " It has a range of 250 km, flies at a speed of Mach 0.9 , and contains hundreds of small submunitions that can reduce an area the size of two soccer fields to ashes . If this missile were launched from the West Sea and began its low-altitude infiltration flight outside of North Korea's territorial waters outside Nampo , it would take 4 minutes and 20 seconds to fly from the territorial waters to the podium in Kim Il-sung Square . And just two of these missiles could reduce the entire square and the podium to ashes . And it would be difficult for North Korea to stop, respond , or evacuate this .

In short, North Korea's air defense network is more vulnerable than the Moscow air defense network that was penetrated by light aircraft 40 years ago , and there is no room for improvement in the future , so it will be impossible to defend against it if the ROK - US combined air force decides to attack in the event of an emergency .

( Host ) This was Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of the Korea Independent Defense Network . Now,here's Kim Jin-guk from RFA in Washington, DC .

Editor : Lee Jin-seo , Web Editing : Han Deok-in

12. Free food, forced thanks: Inside N. Korea's flood relief efforts in Uiju county

Again, as SGT Pugh says, "False motivation will get you nowhere." Except in north Korea where it is a survival mechanism.

Free food, forced thanks: Inside N. Korea's flood relief efforts in Uiju county - Daily NK English

Local officials had the recipients of the rations write letters expressing their gratitude for the free food provided by the government, a source told The Daily NK

By Jeong Seo-yeong - September 6, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · September 6, 2024

The Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Aug. 10 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had visited a flood-stricken area of Uiju county, North Pyongan province, on Aug. 8–9. During his visit, Kim encouraged flood victims who are staying in tent shelters in the sweltering heat and provided them with relief supplies. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

Following heavy rains in July, North Korea distributed two batches of food rations to residents of the flood-stricken Uiju county in North Pyongan province in late August, a source said Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The Central Committee ordered the food distribution, which included high-grade grain (wheat grains, wheat flour and corn), biscuits and bread. Each person was given food for one month.

North Pyongan province’s party committee told the flood victims that the grain they received “was not imported from other countries but was produced and processed in the country” and that “the biscuits and bread were also processed and packaged in domestic factories and only the best quality was selected for distribution.”

Party officials also stressed to the flood victims that the food distribution represented North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s “great kindness and deep love for the people.”

The provincial party committee had families express their gratitude to Kim in person by standing in front of their rations and shouting, “Long live General Kim Jong Un, the bright sun of Juche Korea!”

Recipients forced to write letters of thanks

The provincial party committee also had the recipients of the rations write letters expressing their gratitude for the free food.

After receiving orders for the thank-you letters, the propaganda and agitation department of Uiju county’s party committee informed the recipients of the main ideological points they should cover in their letters. After the letters were written, they were collected by party officials.

“At present, the provincial party committee and Uiju county’s party committee have received all the letters of thanks from those living in the flooded areas. They’re also preparing an event where these letters can be delivered to the marshal to express the appreciation of the provincial residents after the flood reconstruction work is completed,” the source said.

Although the flood victims in Uiju county are still living in tent shelters and have not received as many benefits as those who were brought to Pyongyang, most of them are still grateful that the state is trying to solve various difficulties such as distributing free food, the source said.

“People who have not received rations for years are very grateful to receive a month’s worth of food for free. They’re also excited because they’re supposed to get more food at the end of September,” he added.

The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · September 6, 2024

13. US presidential election: a view from Seoul

Not meant as a partisan statement, just to inform us of one view from Seoul.

Excerpts:

American politics seems destined to remain in a state of impasse, with neither side likely to dominate the other in the foreseeable future. During this period, U.S. foreign policy will likely oscillate between advocating a liberal international order and embracing "America First."

For over 70 years, South Korea has thrived within the liberal international order. We have grown comfortable within this framework. The "America First" doctrine represents a departure from this comfort zone, a shift that brings both uncertainty and opportunity. As the drama of "Two Americas" unfolds, the decision ultimately rests with the American people. For South Korea, what is required is strategic thinking — setting realistic goals and utilizing limited resources efficiently. We must avoid being overly jubilant or despondent, regardless of the election’s outcome. Instead, we should focus on navigating the changes ahead with a clear-eyed determination to seize the opportunities they present.

US presidential election: a view from Seoul

The Korea Times · September 8, 2024

By Cho Byung-jae

As the 2024 U.S. presidential election approaches, the world watches with bated breath. Will Vice President Kamala Harris rise to become the 47th president of the United States, propelled by a whirlwind campaign? Or will former President Donald Trump, rallying under the banner of "retribution," reclaim the White House after a four-year hiatus? With only two months until the Nov. 5 vote, the stakes could not be higher.

The mood in America is one of deep-seated pessimism. A Pew Research survey last year revealed that 66 percent of Americans believe the U.S. economy will weaken by 2050, 71 percent think the nation’s global influence will diminish, 77 percent expect political divisions to worsen and 81 percent foresee a widening gap between rich and poor. These gloomy forecasts have shown little change over the past year. More recently, a survey from April indicated that 59 percent of Americans believe the country has lost more than it has gained in trade. Whether Harris’ campaign, driven by a new sense of vitality and "politics of joy," can overcome this entrenched pessimism may well determine the election's outcome.

Two Americas: A nation divided

The United States today is more divided than ever — a reality encapsulated by the phrase "Two Americas," first used by Martin Luther King Jr. during the 1960s civil rights movement. King spoke of "one America" that is "overflowing with the miracle of prosperity and the honey of opportunity," and "another America" where millions are "perishing on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity."

Forty years later, political consultant Stanley Greenberg revisited this idea in his book "The Two Americas: Our Current Political Deadlock and How to Break It," published in 2004. His analysis came in the aftermath of the fiercely contested 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore, culminating in the dramatic 35-day Florida recount. Greenberg’s concept of "Two Americas" diverged from King’s, focusing less on economic inequality and more on socio-cultural divides — race, religion, gun control and homosexuality. While the economy remains an external force, race and religion are deeply embedded within our identities.

Two decades later, the idea of "Two Americas" has evolved into a profound ideological chasm. Last July, in a national address announcing his withdrawal from the presidential race, President Joe Biden described America as an "idea." "It’s the most powerful idea in the history of the world," he said. "We’re all created equal, endowed by our creator with certain inalienable rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

In stark contrast, Senator J.D. Vance, Trump’s running mate, defined America as a "nation" during the Republican National Convention just a week earlier. "America," he declared, "is not just an idea or a set of principles. It is our homeland. People will not fight for abstractions, but they will fight for their homes." While an idea is absolute and intangible, a nation is a tangible reality that can be seen and touched. Is America an idea or a nation? As an idea, America champions a liberal international order. As a nation, it embraces "America First."

The battle for America’s soul

Trump and Harris each represent these "Two Americas," communicating their messages through distinct channels. The mainstream media — such as The New York Times, The Washington Post and CNN — are consistently critical of Trump. However, from Trump’s perspective, these outlets are part of the establishment, much like the Democrats or the so-called "deep state," both of which he believes must be dismantled to "Make America Great Again." Trump’s trust lies with Fox News and newer internet platforms like Newsmax, which have become crucial in spreading the message of his MAGA campaign. In 2022, Trump even launched his own social media platform, Truth Social, to bypass traditional media channels altogether.

The battle between these two visions of America is fierce. Both sides have a realistic shot at victory, yet neither possesses the strength to decisively defeat the other. As identity politics refuses to compromise, partisanship deepens, and polarization intensifies. Recent U.S. presidential elections have been determined by razor-thin margins, with a few tens of thousands of voters in key battleground states deciding the winner. The difference in votes may be small, but the implications are enormous.

What it means for Korea

American politics seems destined to remain in a state of impasse, with neither side likely to dominate the other in the foreseeable future. During this period, U.S. foreign policy will likely oscillate between advocating a liberal international order and embracing "America First."

For over 70 years, South Korea has thrived within the liberal international order. We have grown comfortable within this framework. The "America First" doctrine represents a departure from this comfort zone, a shift that brings both uncertainty and opportunity. As the drama of "Two Americas" unfolds, the decision ultimately rests with the American people. For South Korea, what is required is strategic thinking — setting realistic goals and utilizing limited resources efficiently. We must avoid being overly jubilant or despondent, regardless of the election’s outcome. Instead, we should focus on navigating the changes ahead with a clear-eyed determination to seize the opportunities they present.

Cho Byung-jae is chair professor of Kyungnam University. He served as chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

The Korea Times · September 8, 2024

14. North Korea reveals new, larger ICBM under development

One consideration: The road networks in north Korea. How well does the "giant" TEL do on north Korea road networks?

North Korea reveals new, larger ICBM under development

Twelve-axle missile launch vehicle appears during Kim Jong Un visit to factory

https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/north-korea-reveals-new-larger-icbm-under-development/

Colin Zwirko September 8, 2024

Kim Jong Un inspects new ICBM TEL design | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Sept. 8, 2024)

North Korea appears to be developing a new nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that is larger than previously revealed designs, according to NK News analysis of state media photos of leader Kim Jong Un visiting a missile launch vehicle factory.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published an image Sunday of Kim inspecting a transporter erector launcher vehicle (TEL) with 12 axles, more than the largest known TEL for the Hwasong-17 ICBM featuring 11 axles.

Similarities in design with the Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM’s 9-axle TEL suggest the missile for the new TEL will also likely be a solid-fuel type. This type cold-launches from a tube and is able to be launched more quickly than a liquid-fuel type.

NK News modified the state media image published Sunday (top) to compare it to the known Hwasong-18 ICBM TEL (bottom), showing the new one has 12 instead of nine axles, with a longer rear (yellow dotted-line circles), but overall similar design in areas such as the lifting arm (yellow dotted-line squares) | Images: Rodong Sinmun (Sept. 8, 2024), KCNA (July 28, 2023), edited by NK News

The TEL beside Kim in the image is not equipped with a missile launch tube and state media has not otherwise mentioned a new missile.

It remains possible that the new TEL is also for the Hwasong-18, though North Korea has not previously added multiple new axles — an expensive design feature — to a TEL as part of a redesign for a particular system.

North Korea has tested the Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM three times — in April, July and Dec. 2023, but Pyongyang has not explicitly stated its intended range.

A larger missile could be designed to have a longer range, after Kim vowed to produce an ICBM with 15,000 km range (9,320 miles) — encompassing all of the U.S. and indeed most of the earth besides portions of South America — before the end of 2025.

The unnamed factory reported Sunday that Kim visited on an undisclosed date appears to be the March 16 Factory in Phyongsong, North Korea’s main TEL production facility. Kim previously visited in May and Jan. 2024 as well as Aug. 2023 and in previous years.

Photos also showed Kim inspecting a new wheeled TEL design for the 600mm multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), also known as the KN-25, featuring six launch tubes. Previous wheeled versions of the TEL only featured four tubes, though tracked versions featured six.

Kim Jong Un with a new wheeled 6-tube TEL for the 600mm MLRS (KN-25) | Image: KCTV (Sept. 8, 2024)

Edited by Arius Derr

Updated on Sept. 8 at 12:41 p.m. with additional context

15. Why did S. Korea suddenly declare Oct. 1 temporary holiday?

Hmmm.. will be traveling back from Korea that day.

Why did S. Korea suddenly declare Oct. 1 temporary holiday? - The Korea Times

koreatimes.co.kr

gettyimagesbank

Effectiveness of stimulating domestic spending questioned

By Lee Yeon-woo

The government recently designated Armed Forces Day on Oct. 1 as a temporary holiday. As a result, employees can now enjoy a total of nine days off, from the weekend of Sept. 28 to Oct. 6, if they take three additional days of leave.

While the government cited the designation as a means to “increase public awareness of the importance of national security and honor the role of the military,” market observers believe the actual goal is to boost struggling domestic demand. However, they are skeptical about whether the long holiday can genuinely meet expectations for stimulating domestic spending.

Contrary to growing exports, the retail sales index, a key measure of consumer activity, fell by 2.3 percent last month, marking 16 consecutive months of decline.

The downturn caused the number of closed businesses in Seoul during the second quarter of this year to reach 6,290, surpassing the 6,258 closures recorded in the first quarter of 2020, when the restaurant industry was severely impacted by COVID-19.

The anticipated economic effects of the temporary holiday is one of the few options left for the government to rely on, as it lacks the financial capacity to stimulate private consumption. The government has already front-loaded 357.5 trillion won ($266.8 billion) — 63.6 percent of the yearly budget — in the first half of this year. But this failed to yield significant results.

In its 2020 report, Hyundai Research Institute estimated that each additional national holiday would increase consumer spending by 2.1 trillion won and create a production-inducing effect of 4.2 trillion won.

A clearance sale notice is displayed at a store in Seoul, Sept. 1. Yonhap

“The designation of the temporary holiday is expected to boost leisure and tourism activities, particularly within the country, which will have a ripple effect on both the service and manufacturing industries,” the institute wrote at the time.

However, the scheme is unlikely to be a game-changer for the recent recession. Market watchers believe that consumption can only recover if income conditions improve.

“There may be a temporary boost in consumption, but with high inflation and interest rates still in place, it seems insufficient to significantly reverse the ongoing weakness in domestic demand,” Chon So-ra, an economics professor at Inha University, said.

According to Statistics Korea, the average monthly household income in the second quarter of 2024 increased by 3.5 percent compared to the previous year. But real income, adjusted for inflation, rose by only 0.8 percent.

The travel industry also reported that people are choosing international trips following the designation of the temporary holiday, contrary to expectations that domestic travel would increase and boost consumer spending. Very Good Tour, a leading travel agency, said Thursday that the number of outbound travelers between Oct. 1 and 4 this year reached 10,121, representing a 27 percent increase compared to the same period last year.

The government acknowledged that the growth in exports has been slower in stimulating domestic demand than anticipated. However, it remains optimistic about a future recovery.

“We anticipate that real incomes and wages will improve further in the second half of the year,” Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok said Sunday during an interview with local broadcaster KBS.

“We cautiously predict that the growth rate of domestic consumption will expand in the latter half of this year compared to the first half, and even more so next year.”

koreatimes.co.kr

16. ‘12.12: The Day’ Selected As South Korea’s Oscar Entry

A "hard power" film to represent South Korean "soft power."

‘12.12: The Day’ Selected As South Korea’s Oscar Entry

deadline.com · by Sara Merican · September 5, 2024

12.12: The Day Plus M Entertainment

South Korea has selected historical action film 12.12.: The Day as the country’s Oscar entry for best international film.

The film was the highest-grossing film last year at the Korean box office and the decision to select it for the Oscars was a unanimous one, the Korean Film Council (Kofic) said.

Set against the backdrop of the December 1979 military coup, the film stars Hwang Jung-min, Jung Woo-sung, Lee Sung-min, Park Hae-joon and Kim Sung-kyun.

Directed by Kim Sung-su, the film was released in November last year. 12.12: The Day‘s domestic success marked the first time in four years since Parasite‘s release that a non-franchise local title crossed 12 million admissions.

12.12: The Day won the Grand Prize for Film and Best Film at Korea’s Baeksang Arts Awards. Hwang also picked up the Best Actor prize at the ceremony. Hwang played the role of Chun Doo-gwang (modeled after the real historical figure Chun Doo-hwan, who later became Korea’s president).

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The film is produced by Hive Media Corp and distributed by Plus M Entertainment.

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deadline.com · by Sara Merican · September 5, 2024

17. The Sherman's voyage to tiger-infested Wonsan

Some Korean history for a Sunday read. I was unfamiliar with this story.

The Sherman's voyage to tiger-infested Wonsan

The Korea Times · September 8, 2024

The port of Wonsan in the early 1900s / Robert Neff Collection

By Robert Neff

The General Sherman, an American merchant ship, sailed up the Taedong River in August 1866 — right up to the very gates of Pyongyang. Ostensibly, the ship’s mission was one of peace: to establish trade and open the Hermit Kingdom to the rest of the world. However, the expedition ended disastrously. The General Sherman was destroyed, its crew slaughtered and its anchor chain became a symbol of defiance against foreign intervention. To this day, North Korea cites the General Sherman incident as an example of early unwanted American adventurism on the Korean Peninsula.

The tale of the General Sherman and its fate is a well-known episode of early Korean-American history, but it might surprise you to know that there was another American ship named Sherman — a military transport vessel — that sailed in Korean waters at the end of the 19th century. Though not as infamous as its predecessor, the Sherman and its crew caused quite a stir among the populace on the East Coast.

In the spring of 1899, the Sherman arrived at Wonsan in modern-day North Korea, in hopes of replenishing its coal bunkers — unfortunately, the Russian navy had recently visited the port and purchased all the coal.

A street view of Wonsan in the early 1900s / Robert Neff Collection

A group of American soldiers, eager for the opportunity to stretch their legs after being cramped aboard ship for so long, went ashore and were soon surrounded by a large number of curious Korean men in winter clothing. Given that our narrator, an American infantry officer, was prone to exaggeration, I am a little skeptical of his claim of “several thousand men, dressed like clowns in a circus …were out on the beach to greet us.” Despite his frequent embellishments, his amusing account of this early encounter is rather interesting.

The Koreans “all seemed very tired, as though they had been working for years without a let up” and were smoking pipes that varied from a mere two feet to an extraordinary 6 feet long. According to our narrator, many of the men “were far too weary and exhausted to hold their own pipes” so they had their servants squat in front of them on the ground. The yangban — upper-class gentlemen — then rested their pipes on the shoulders of their servants.

The soldiers were impressed, though not by the length of the pipes or the iron-fisted power of the yangbans over their servants, but by the manner in which the Koreans squatted — “perched high up upon their heels.”

Playing a game while enjoying a good smoke in the early 1900s / Robert Neff Collection

The Americans soon met a Russian soldier roaming the streets who kindly consented to act as their guide around the city:

“[The] main street runs between rows of pigsties constructed of mud and straw, which afterward developed into the residences of the Coreans — the people, not the pigs, though I am afraid this is a distinction without a difference. We came in a few minutes to a great swamp covered with filth. Opening upon it were several low-class Japanese tea houses, in one of which we took up our station to observe more closely the wonders of this new civilization that is, I believe, about five thousand years old.”

As military men, they were not impressed by the Korean officials they encountered. Each official rode a small Korean pony and “required two minions to hold his steed for him by the ears or snout, while another servant walked by his side and held him in the saddle.”

The “swamp” turned out to be the central market and soon it was filled with merchants who offered the foreigners “a countless number of tiger and leopard skins … at temptingly low prices.” Three or four silver dollars could purchase a leopard skin while tiger skins sold for 15-20 dollars. The Americans all purchased these great cat pelts and draped them over their shoulders causing the narrator to describe the unit as looking “like the Hungarian body-guard of the Austrian Emperor.”

A Korean official is carried on his chair, which is decked out with a leopard pelt. Robert Neff Collection

The Russian guide assured them that the countryside around Wonsan was filled with tigers and leopards and almost nightly they prowled the streets of the city rummaging in the garbage or snatching children who wandered away from the safety of their houses or drunken men who passed out in the streets. He wasn’t exaggerating.

It is a shame the men did not meet any of the foreign missionaries in the settlement; perhaps they would have also learned of the supernatural aspect of the Korean tiger: “[Those] who die by tigers become tiger-spirits, and are so possessed until the tiger devours someone else, and so lets the spirit of the first victim free.” At least one Korean man warned foreigners (those who suffered from an “inordinate love for striped tiger skins”) about the dangers of these tiger spirits, but it is unclear if they heeded his advice.

Seeing the size of the tiger pelts and hearing of their predations upon the Korean public, the American soldiers looked upon their Korean hosts with a newfound respect. It also inspired them to go out on their own tiger-hunting expedition.

A leopard pelt is draped over a chair in the city street. Robert Neff Collection

They asked the Russian to help organize it but, despite his best efforts, he ultimately failed. He patiently explained:

“[The Koreans] say it is impossible to comply with your request for the following reason: the [Korean] sporting calendar is divided into two seasons of equal length. In one man hunts the tiger; in the other the tiger hunts the man; the present is the tiger-hunt-man season, consequently the hunt that you desire would run counter to the natural order of things, and besides it might prove dangerous.”

He then went on to add that Koreans hunt tigers during the winter, when the great beasts “are weakened by starvation” and hampered by the deep snow drifts. The Koreans then dig pits and cover them with twigs and snow and bait the trap with a goat or a pig. When the tiger pounces upon the bait, its weight causes it to fall into the trap at which point the villagers come and “blow him to pieces with their blunderbusses and Chinese muskets.”

Just before the soldiers returned to their ship, they witnessed an angry confrontation between two Korea officials who were upset with their share of the commission from the tiger hides. “Quivering with rage and foaming at the mouth,” the two men met on the beach and the American sailors eagerly made bets amongst themselves as to which of these two men would win what was expected to be “a display of the pugilistic art, according to the [Korean] dispensation.”

The clean streets of Wonsan in the early 20th century / Courtesy of Diane Nars Collection

No punches were thrown, and no insults were hurled, but instead each man took off his hat and silently bowed. The soldiers, perplexed, looked to the Russian for explanation.

“You have seen the end of a lifelong friendship,” he declared laughing. “They have exchanged a formal bow; they have taken off their hats in contempt, and that in [Korea] is the one supreme and unpardonable insult.”

The Americans returned to their ship and sailed off. It is interesting to note that for the next 10 days, many of the soldiers attempted to imitate the manner in which the Korean men squatted on the beach. All failed.

Several decades ago, when I was a young soldier, I had a similar experience with the “Korean squat.” Many of my peers tried to squat like the Korean soldiers in the camp next to us. Everyone failed except for me — probably because I was a lot thinner then. Now just standing up is a chore. I guess some things never really change — except our waistlines.

I would like to express my appreciation to Diane Nars for her assistance and for allowing me to use one of her images.

Robert Neff has authored and co-authored several books, including Letters from Joseon, Korea Through Western Eyes and Brief Encounters.

The Korea Times · September 8, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE