Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"He who would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself."

– Thomas Paine

"Live so that when your children think of fairness, caring, and integrity, they think of you."

– H. Jackson Brown, Jr.

“The wise man accepts his pain, endures it, but does not add to it by complaining.”

– Marcus Aurelius

1. Congressional Call for Center of Special Operations Analysis

2. U.S. Tells Allies Iran Has Sent Ballistic Missiles to Russia

3. $10 Million and a Fake Investor: How the Kremlin Allegedly Built a Conservative U.S. Media Startup

4. Most Mass Shooters Telegraph Their Attacks. These Teams Are In the Business Of Stopping Them

5. Was There a Chinese Agent Working in the New York Governor’s Office?

6. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 6, 2024

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, September 6, 2024

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2024

9. Free Burma Rangers – Open Volunteer Positions 6 September 2024

10. Commentary: China-Philippines trust in troubled waters

11. US university Georgia Tech to end China partnerships following concerns over military ties

12. Secret American special forces boats spotted in Scotland

13. Unleashing Private Capital: A Strategic Shift to Boost Allied Defense

14. Special Operations Forces: Summary of Armed Overwatch Reports

15. US Special Operations cuts Armed Overwatch acquisition nearly 20%

16. ‘Men of War’ Review: A Delirious Doc About a Former Green Beret Trying to Overthrow the Venezuelan Government

17. When Students Become Terrorists

18. Carrier Captain In Combat: What Went On During 7 Months Under Fire Around The Red Sea

19. Reporter's Notebook: Why foreign policy might matter

20. US Army’s next budget invests heavily in drones and electronic warfare

21. Military must move beyond integration to inclusion

22. The Surface Navy and the Long War

23. Efficacy in Our Nation’s Deterrence Strategy

24. Military Reform: Reversing the Decline

25. Disinformation dilemma: US hands are way dirty, too

26. Five Yalies selected as 2024 Tillman Scholars for their achievements, potential in service

27. US election integrity fears heighten tension ahead of presidential vote

28. Combat swimmer operations and their importance in a near-peer conflict

1. Congress and the Future of Special Operations: Congressional Call for Center of Special Operations Analysis

I missed this in as I have not studied the NDAA that is in draft:

The Senate approved the 2025 NDAA on June 13, 2024. Section 903 demands that:

“Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan, including appropriate milestones and timelines for completion, for achieving the requirements… establish a Center for Special Operations Analysis to lead special operations-related analysis for the Department and ensure senior civilian and military leaders have adequate analytical support for decision making related to the organization, training, equipping, and employment of special operations forces.”

The Center for Special Operations Analysis (CSOA) is envisioned as a crucial entity dedicated to advancing special operations' strategic understanding and effectiveness. Its mission should be to conduct comprehensive research and analysis to enhance the strategic capabilities of special operations forces. This includes ensuring alignment with national security objectives and guiding decision-making in training, equipping, and employing SOF to achieve strategic objectives.

I recall in 2016 when the NDAA had Sec 1099 that demanded that DOD provide a strategy for countering unconventional warfare by Russia and other malign actors within 180 days. That strategy has never been submitted to this date. Will this also go the way of the Congressionally mandated John S. McCain Irregular Warfare Center that Congress intended to be established at Arizona State University?

Congress and the Future of Special Operations

Congressional Call for Center of Special Operations Analysis

By Practitioners, For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth – September 7, 2024

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/congress-and-the-future-of-special-operations

“A command that resources operations and is assigned to build joint SOF capable of fighting the next war (not the last one) cannot argue for resources without a strategy. Win, Transform, People is not a strategy and cannot be assessed or analyzed.”

-Former J52 Chief of Plans (2019)

Introduction

The 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 903, mandates significant reforms to institutionalize the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). These Congressionally directed reforms include a systematic review and update of Department of Defense (DoD) policies to strengthen the Assistant Secretary’s authority over special operations, the development of a long-term staffing plan, and clarifying administrative roles between the Assistant Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The NDAA also requires the establishment of a Center for Special Operations Analysis, which will serve as a critical hub for specialized analysis to support senior leaders in making informed decisions about the organization, training, and employment of special operations forces. The creation of this center is a long-overdue requirement that addresses the growing need for dedicated analytical support within the Department of Defense for special operations. But it will significantly impact USSOCOM (Special Operations Command).

By enacting Section 903, Congress is clearly directing SOLIC to organize its affairs more effectively. SOLIC needs holistic reform to sufficiently perform the tedious but critical functions of a service-like civilian oversight entity. The legislation is also a direct shot across the bow to USSOCOM, challenging it to empirically justify its resourcing requirements and demonstrate its strategic value by achieving or showing progress towards DoD objectives.

SOLIC will rely on USSOCOM to provide data and analysis to meet the Congressional demand set forward by Section 903. Still, neither is well prepared to respond in 90 days (clocks up this month) with a strategy for the CSOA. If the past is prologue, this will be just another requirement to either ignore or, more likely, cobble together something far short of what Congress has in mind. However, providing solid data to Congress for people, money, training, and operations should be taken seriously.

Section 903 presents the SOF Enterprise with an enormous opportunity to make a much-needed transformational and bureaucratic shift. This article will explore the opportunity for SOLIC and USSOCOM to build an assessment and analysis program, paired with a USSOCOM operational and service-focused strategy, to determine special operations budgeting and programming, legislative affairs, operations, and manpower requirements. The ability to empirically back SOF budget and manpower requirements can translate into operational capabilities and a well-positioned seat at the Joint Force table.

The Situation

Before delving into what the HASC is asking for, it may be helpful to frame some of the issues SOLIC and USSOCOM must overcome to address what a Center for Special Operations Analysis could be and do for them both. The thing to see past is that this is Congress telling the special operations community how to win at the interservice game of resourcing. Remember this quick peak behind the curtain during the section explaining the Congressional requirement.

In an era of limited resources, SOLIC and USSOCOM must assess the effectiveness of SOF in a standardized and consistent manner. However, assessments have not been consistently implemented across the SOF enterprise. This is particularly true of how TSOCs employ resources to achieve strategic or operational effects. Accurate assessments are crucial for determining whether SOF operations are advancing toward specific objectives, but they have not been asked for systematically by USSOCOM. The essential part is having data on progress towards Intermediate Objectives (IMO). With this data, a command can drive a planning process and resource allocation. Why IMO’s? They are the intermediary steps toward higher command objectives. If progress is being made or not due to a lack of resources, this data can and should be used to justify resources.

SOLIC relies on USSOCOM to provide information that it can present to Congress. This is problematic because USSOCOM relies on narrative reporting rather than assessments and analysis. Directorates, including the J3, collect various types of information from across the enterprise. Still, none of this information can capture operational performance or effectiveness because there are no USSOCOM objectives to measure activities against. Operational and service performance are mostly captured quarterly at the Commanders Round Table (CDRT). The USSOCOM Commander receives oral updates from the operational and component Commanders, which rarely include results supported by verification. A results-oriented culture is not evident, in large part because the command has no strategy and, therefore, no strategic objectives to strive for.

Section 903 presents an opportunity for SOLIC, USSOCOM, and the operational and component SOF commands to align strategy and analysis for better resource acquisition and application. USSOCOM and SOLIC can develop strategic objectives and demonstrate joint SOF effectiveness and performance towards them. The information will help develop products for Congress, backing up SOLIC budget and manpower requests with validated data. Reports on global SOF activities alone are insufficient to justify funding. USSOCOM must demonstrate the effectiveness of SOF operations with quantifiable results to secure resources and maintain relevance in inter-service and strategic competition.

What Congress Wants

What does Congress want? Sometimes, that is unclear or even deceptively, and hazardously, political. But this time, Congress is throwing special operations a lifeline. SOLIC and USSOCOM have to compete for dollars now and in the future in a way they did not in the past. Congress is telling SOLIC and USSOCOM that the old-fashioned narrative “we took actions, but the results are uncertain” will not fly in a world where results matter. In a resource-constrained environment, as Congress is likely to face going forward, results get paid. How are results determined? With facts, figures, and some arithmetic.

The critical thing for SOLIC and USSOCOM to figure out is what to measure and how. Empirical information collected and analyzed should support decision-making about the organization, training, equipping, and employment of special operations forces. Behind these time-honored military requirements is the veiled point that, to date, Congress has not had enough or the correct information to make compelling arguments for SOF when faced with competing demands from the other services. Meeting Congressional demands means fulfilling the letter and spirit of Section 903, 2025 NDAA law.

In short, Congress will need to understand four things:

What did the Joint SOF enterprise (as a whole, not by service) accomplish to support NDS objectives for a given period?
Were the forces adequately trained, equipped, and funded to achieve objectives?
What NDS objectives will Joint SOF achieve over the next five years?
What could SOF do with more or less funding and personnel?

The first two are questions about the past, and the last two are about the future. There are many other questions, but these four are fundamental. From a Congressional viewpoint, they need to know, “What did SOF achieve, what will SOF achieve, and what can SOF do with more or less money and/or more or fewer people?”

The Center for Special Operations Analysis – Mission & Org

The Senate approved the 2025 NDAA on June 13, 2024. Section 903 demands that:

Mission:

Primary. Provide specific operational and environmental assessments and analysis of global joint SOF activities, manpower allocation, and budgetary requirements.
Secondary. To provide in-depth strategic analysis and insights that inform decision-making processes for special operations.
Tertiary. Support innovation in strategic planning and execution within special operations by having assessment and analysis personnel participate in planning to build measures directly into SOF strategy.

Organization:

The CSOA should be organized using a “think tank” model like RAND.
The CSOA should include interdisciplinary teams comprising strategists, assessment experts, data analysts, academic researchers, subject matter experts, and divisions focused on strategic research, budgeting, personnel development, equipment, and educational outreach.
SOLIC should be the SCOA administrative manager, with a center director endowed with enough autonomy to analyze special operations without undue influence.

Intent:

To serve as the primary assessment and analysis capability of applied joint special operations forces, the effects they create, and the requirements to man, train, and equip them.
To cultivate a repository of strategic knowledge supporting joint special operations’ continuous evolution.

USSOCOM and SOLIC:

Regular information exchanges and joint initiatives should be established to ensure that the CSOA's outputs directly address the strategic needs of USSOCOM and SOLIC.
Create a layered approach to building assessments at SOLIC and USSOCOM that collects and analyzes required data from the operational elements and components.

This framework would ensure that the CSOA effectively contributes to the strategic advancement of special operations forces while providing Congress with essential information for budgeting, manpower, and strategic considerations.

Analysis Requires a Strategy To Measure Activities Against

To meet Congress's demands and enhance the understanding of SOF capabilities, SOLIC and USSOCOM must collaborate to create a new analytical capability that aligns with legislative requirements. For the CSOA to be a valuable tool for SOLIC and USSOCOM, USSOCOM must develop a global joint SOF strategy built to be measured for performance and effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives, which is crucial for effective resource allocation. USSOCOM must also develop a “service-like” strategy that outlines the path to building joint SOF relevant to future warfare.

In short, SOLIC and USSOCOM need to develop measurable strategies and work with Congress to clarify relevant data for oversight. These two organizations must be responsible for building operational and service-oriented strategies and creating analytical capabilities to guide the enterprise and track progress.

Moving forward, assessment and analysis must be conducted along two critical tracks:

Title 10, Section 164, which designates USSOCOM as a Functional Combatant Command, and,
Title 10, Section 167 outlines USSOCOM's organizational responsibilities, including SOF integration, budgeting, programming, force development, doctrine development, education, training, and unique acquisition authority.

Operational requirements under Section 164 will drive near-term manpower, training, equipment, and force employment found under Section 167. However, near-term requirements are only one problem to solve. Using a strategy and a future operating concept, long-term requirements must also be identified under Section 167. For Sections 164 and 167, establish the end state, then work backward to create the steps (IMOs) necessary to get there.

The operational and component assessment teams should collect data on IMO progress to define effectiveness and performance at that command level and then pass that information to USSOCOM. This implies that much of what must be done must be completed at USSOCOM, and therefore a Tampa branch of the CSOA may need to collect and analyze data before sending it to SOLIC.

Three USSOCOM Commanders have tried and failed using the “People, Win, Transform” formula (moving the words around does not improve it) instead of traditional strategies to guide the command. This construct cannot substitute for traditional military requirements like mission, objectives, execution, and coordinating instructions. The USSOCOM mission is unclear, and objectives that reach five years into the future are fuzzy at best and non-existent at worst. A command that resources operations and is assigned to build joint SOF capable of fighting the next war (not the last one) cannot operate this way………and Congress knows it. So do the services. By combining the effort to build the CSOA with operational and “service-like” strategies, USSOCOM can win the competition for resources and develop and employ the right force for the world of strategic competition. The bottom line assumption here is that special operations forces are performing; there is just no scientific way to present that fact.

Conclusion - Competition is the New Black

While counterterrorism (CT) efforts are ongoing, they are no longer the top national priority. China and Russia are now the pacing and acute threats and drive DoD resourcing decisions. The services and Joint Staff have focused on conventional forces as the primary deterrent for conflict and agent for competition with China and Russia. The services see little to no role for SOF in daily competition, much less conflict. This line of thinking is fundamentally flawed. SOF has much to offer in the “gray zone” of competition and preparation for conflict. The perception that SOF should focus only on counterterrorism and leave strategic competition to conventional forces will leave considerable capability gaps against our nation’s primary rivals.

Another recognized problem confronts SOLIC and USSOCOM in the competition for DoD resourcing. The armed services were less than thrilled to take a back seat to SOF for resourcing during the global war on terror (GWOT). The services were understandably eager to return as DoD’s primary focus of attention and funding at the end of GWOT. Plus, the allure of getting back to winning in battle was a tonic after years of propping up governments and training foreign forces destined to lose the struggle against terrorists. The fact that approaches like COIN and CT have consistently produced negative strategic outcomes further entrenches the narrative that SOF cannot be effective in competition because SOF’s ways and means are a proven failure.

Despite contributing to the demise of Bin Laden and the weakening of Al Qaeda, special operations did little to alter the fact that Iran now controls Iraq and the Taliban dominates Afghanistan. This less-than-optimal strategic outcome resulted more from consecutive Presidents’ lack of achievable objectives than the failures of particular approaches. Nonetheless, SOF must demonstrate that it can assume a respected role in strategic competition by supporting conventional forces, aiding allies and partners, collaborating with various government agencies, and conducting effective operations in the “gray zone” against rival powers.

Facilitating an understanding of what SOF can do in competition requires proven, reliable, and repeatable results. The effects of activities must be observed, reported, and analyzed as close to the action as possible. Capturing results can only be done with a USSOCOM-driven program of assessments applied to the entire enterprise, which captures the performance and effectiveness of SOF relative to strategic objectives. If strategic objectives are required, USSOCOM must produce an achievable and measurable strategy supporting higher headquarters’ objectives. Combining with SOLIC to build a Center for Special Operations Analysis is a golden opportunity to establish assessments across the enterprise while simultaneously completing a service-like and joint SOF global operations strategy. Failing to do so may set SOF on a course to irrelevance beyond limited, discrete operations and ever-shrinking manpower and budgets.

Developing SOF strategies, assessment, and analysis capabilities is critical for an enterprise-wide evolution into a more effective force in great power competition. While establishing a CSOA is necessary, it will only be effective with a reliable data collection system across all commands and components. There is likely to be resistance to exposing the successes and failures of a command to empirical analysis. This kind of transparency could challenge a Commanding Officer's leadership. However, strong leadership from SOLIC and the USSOCOM Commander is crucial in setting a positive example, demonstrating that honest data will be rewarded rather than punished.

Ultimately, USSOCOM must endure discomfort to grow into a headquarters that can compete effectively in the internecine resourcing battles and operate more like a conventional service in its relationship with Congress. A piecemeal approach will not suffice; a coordinated, organized effort with a long-term vision is required to ensure the SOF's relevance and efficacy. USSOCOM must forge a new relationship with SOLIC and with Congress. The path forward may be uncomfortable, but it is an essential step into the future for SOF. It demands a steadfast commitment to analysis, attaining objectives, transparency, accountability.

2. U.S. Tells Allies Iran Has Sent Ballistic Missiles to Russia

north Korea mentioned as an afterthought. It seems that Iran has always been more important than north Korea to the media and the pundits (as well as US officials).

Excerpt:

Russia has already received Iranian drones, which it has used in Ukraine. It has also been using ammunition and missiles from North Korea to pummel Ukraine.

U.S. Tells Allies Iran Has Sent Ballistic Missiles to Russia

European officials say Europe and U.S. are working on a sanctions response to Iran’s move

https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-tells-allies-iran-has-sent-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-9558f4c4?mod=hp_listb_pos1

By Laurence Norman

Follow in Berlin, and Michael R. Gordon

Follow and Alexander Ward

Follow in Washington

Updated Sept. 6, 2024 5:05 pm ET

A missile launching during a military drill in southern Iran earlier this year, in a photo distributed by the Iranian army. Photo: IRANIAN ARMY/Associated Press

Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to U.S. and European officials, a move that gives Moscow another potent military tool in its war against Ukraine and follows stern Western warnings not to provide those arms to Moscow.

The development comes as Russia has stepped up its missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, killing dozens of civilians in recent days. Washington informed allies of Iran’s shipments this week, European officials said, including a briefing for ambassadors in Washington on Thursday.

A U.S. official confirmed the missiles “have finally been delivered.”

“We have been warning of the deepening security partnership between Russia and Iran since the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and are alarmed by these reports,” said National Security Council Spokesman Sean Savett. “We and our partners have made clear both at the G-7 and at the NATO summits this summer that together we are prepared to deliver significant consequences. Any transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia would represent a dramatic escalation in Iran’s support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.”

Iran denied it is delivering ballistic missiles for use in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Iran abstains “from engaging in such actions itself, but it also calls upon other countries to cease the supply of weapons to the sides involved in the conflict,” said a spokesman for Iran’s mission at the United Nations in New York.

There was no immediate comment from the Russian Embassy in Washington.

Russia has already received Iranian drones, which it has used in Ukraine. It has also been using ammunition and missiles from North Korea to pummel Ukraine.

The missile deliveries also could have implications for the hopes of the new Iranian government to tamp down tensions with the West. The country’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has said he hopes to improve the domestic economy by winning sanctions relief from Europe and the U.S.

Iran’s military ties with Russia are largely overseen by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In March, Group of Seven leaders warned they would impose coordinated sanctions on Iran if it carries out the missile transfer.

How Iran’s Kamikaze Drones Are Being Used in Israel and Ukraine

Excerpts:

Unlike Russian efforts to seed social media with low-quality bots and trolls that earn little, if any engagement, the alleged scheme helped to launch Tenet as a serious player in conservative media, fueled by content from Trump-supporting personalities who questioned the legitimacy of the 2020 election, had well-known views hostile to U.S. support for Ukraine in its war against Russia and advanced narratives that at times aligned with Russian talking points.

Their work for Tenet, which included interviews with members of Donald Trump’s family, repeatedly attracted the attention of prominent Americans, including billionaire Elon Musk, who on his platform, X, interacted with several of the influencers more than 100 times, a Wall Street Journal analysis found.

“If the American people knew that these views were being directed and paid for by the Russian government, they wouldn’t have 16 million views,” said Brandon Van Grack, a former top official in the Justice Department’s national security division who oversaw efforts to police covert foreign influence. “And the Russian government knew that, which is why the Russian government went to such lengths to hide their direction and funding.”

$10 Million and a Fake Investor: How the Kremlin Allegedly Built a Conservative U.S. Media Startup

Tenet Media posted hundreds of videos, as it was secretly bankrolled by Russia, the Justice Department says

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/10-million-and-a-fake-investor-how-the-kremlin-allegedly-built-a-conservative-u-s-media-startup-b8d510cb?mod=hp_listb_pos2

By Dustin Volz

Follow and C. Ryan Barber

Sept. 6, 2024 11:06 am ET

U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland said that American influencers were unaware of the Russian plot. Photo: roberto schmidt/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—In January 2023, a representative claiming to work with a European finance professional named Eduard Grigoriann shared instructions with a popular U.S. conservative media influencer to start a new YouTube channel.

“Find a personality that could serve as the face of the channel,” Grigoriann’s representative said. “For the right candidate we’re willing to pay around $1-2 million per year.”

The representative was a fictitious persona, as was Grigoriann, U.S. prosecutors said this week. They were fake identities being secretly operated by two Russian nationals seeking to advance Moscow’s desires to interfere in the 2024 presidential election.

Grigoriann’s offer allegedly laid the groundwork for what would later that year become Tenet Media, a seemingly successful startup incorporated in Tennessee. Prosecutors said since launching in late 2023, the company has posted nearly 2,000 videos that have received more than 16 million views on YouTube alone.

Unlike Russian efforts to seed social media with low-quality bots and trolls that earn little, if any engagement, the alleged scheme helped to launch Tenet as a serious player in conservative media, fueled by content from Trump-supporting personalities who questioned the legitimacy of the 2020 election, had well-known views hostile to U.S. support for Ukraine in its war against Russia and advanced narratives that at times aligned with Russian talking points.

Their work for Tenet, which included interviews with members of Donald Trump’s family, repeatedly attracted the attention of prominent Americans, including billionaire Elon Musk, who on his platform, X, interacted with several of the influencers more than 100 times, a Wall Street Journal analysis found.

“If the American people knew that these views were being directed and paid for by the Russian government, they wouldn’t have 16 million views,” said Brandon Van Grack, a former top official in the Justice Department’s national security division who oversaw efforts to police covert foreign influence. “And the Russian government knew that, which is why the Russian government went to such lengths to hide their direction and funding.”

‘Heterodox commentators’

The case has raised questions about what Tenet’s founders knew about the $10 million they allegedly received from the two Russian nationals, Kostiantyn Kalashnikov and Elena Afanasyeva, who were indicted Wednesday on charges of conspiring to launder money and operate as unregistered foreign agents. Both defendants, who remain overseas, worked at Russian state-media outlet RT, which has long been accused of being an organ of Kremlin propaganda. The charges also have spurred complaints from Tenet’s online personalities who say they were as duped as anyone and would have produced the same content anyway.

The logo of Russian state media outlet RT at its Moscow headquarters . Photo: kirill kudryavtsev/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Tenet wasn’t identified by name in the indictment of the Russians, identified only as “U.S. Company-1,” but a person familiar with the matter confirmed the company is Tenet. The court filing said the outlet described itself as a “network of heterodox commentators that focus on Western political and cultural issues.” That language matches the description used by Tenet. Its founders, Lauren Chen and Liam Donovan, also aren’t identified by name in the document. Tenet didn’t respond to a request for comment sent via its website.

Chen—an influencer in her own right, with 572,000 subscribers on YouTube and 157,000 followers on Instagram—describes herself as the host of two shows on Blaze TV and conservative advocacy group Turning Point USA. She also previously wrote for RT. She didn’t respond to requests for comment via email or various social-media accounts. Donovan couldn’t be reached for comment.

“Lauren Chen was an independent contractor, whose contract has been terminated,” Blaze Media CEO Tyler Cardon said. Turning Point USA didn’t respond to a request for comment. YouTube on Thursday took down the Tenet Media page. The platform said it was “terminating the Tenet Media channel and four channels operated by its owner Lauren Chen as part of our ongoing efforts to combat coordinated influence operations.”

Duped influencers

Tenet hired a small collection of popular firebrand conservatives, paid them handsomely, and instructed them to churn out viral political content. Within months of its November 2023 launch, Tenet was attracting influential audiences and scored interviews with top Republicans, including former President Donald Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr., and daughter-in-law, Lara, after she took over as chair of the Republican National Committee.

Trump-supporting personalities provided content for Tenet. Photo: Alex Brandon/Associated Press

The indictment doesn’t identify the influencers who were recruited beyond referring to them as unnamed commentators. Several who were allegedly paid with Russian funds issued statements denying any knowledge or involvement with foreign election interference.

Tim Pool, a conservative voice who has repeatedly referred to Ukraine as “the enemy” and urged the U.S. to stop supporting Kyiv since Russia invaded the country two years ago, said on X that his YouTube videos were merely licensed by Tenet, and that “never at any point” did the company have editorial control over the content. “Putin is a scumbag, Russia sucks,” he added.

“Myself and other influencers were victims in this alleged scheme,” Benny Johnson, a popular conservative broadcaster who also contracted with Tenet, wrote on X. “My lawyers will handle anyone who states or suggests otherwise.”

In a press briefing Wednesday, Attorney General Merrick Garland indicated Johnson, Pool and other hired talent were unaware of the Russian plot. “The company never disclosed to the influencers or to their millions of followers its ties to RT and the Russian government,” Garland said.

Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Antonov, in comments posted to the Telegram messaging app, denied the accusations. “We categorically reject the false accusations against Russian information structures and demand the lifting of the administrative restrictions imposed on the work of our journalists in America,” he said.

‘Happy to work with the Russian firm’

The 32-page indictment of Kalashnikov and Afanasyeva, issued in Manhattan, repeatedly suggests that Tenet’s founders knew that Grigoriann was fake and not the real source of Tenet’s funding.

There were ample alleged clues.

Prosecutors said one of Grigoriann’s fictitious associates misspelled Grigoriann’s name in at least four different emails to Tenet founder Chen, who is referred to in the indictment as Founder-1.

In one instance, the indictment said, one of Grigoriann’s associates emailed a potential Tenet hire and signed the message as Grigoriann, rather than as the associate, confusing the influencer who received the email.

In another, prosecutors said, Chen was informed by her funders that management and marketing of the new company they were funding would “be done by the Russian firm we agreed to hire,” but added that Chen would remain chief executive. Chen replied she was “happy to work with the Russian firm.” Prosecutors said she also acknowledged in private correspondence that Tenet’s investors were Russians.

Under the veil of Grigoriann and three fake personas of associates who worked for him, the Russians started paying Chen $8,000 a month, prosecutors alleged, using a shell entity in the Czech Republic to make payments to a Canadian company that Chen, herself a Canadian citizen, owned.

In February of last year, according to the indictment, they suggested a “specific shortlist of candidates” to try to recruit for the new media venture. Chen replied that one of the influencers they wanted to hire would cost “well over 2 million a year,” but the Kalashnikov and Afanasyeva made clear that wouldn’t be a problem.

Grigoriann was “OK with over $2m as long as we get the right person on board, under the right conditions,” the Russians replied, prosecutors said.

Even when Chen cautioned that the influencer would demand closer to $5 million a year—a sum she said would threaten profitability of the startup—the funders didn’t balk. “We would love to move forward,” they replied, according to the indictment.

At times, the talent recruited for Tenet appeared somewhat dubious of Grigoriann. Chen relayed to her funders that some of the influencers wanted more information about Grigoriann before moving forward. In April 2023, Chen herself did Google searches for “Eduard Grigoriann” and his bank account, and turned up nothing. A couple of weeks later, the Russians sent Chen a visual résumé of Grigoriann that included an image of a man on a private jet peering wistfully out a window.

A fake curriculum vitae for Eduard Grigoriann was included in the indictment with blurring and redactions. Photo: Justice Department

The résumé said Grigoriann was born in Brussels, held a master’s in “Accounting, Finance and Political Science” and had worked as a financial analyst and consultant around Europe and in Singapore before starting his own private equity and wealth management company.

“Mr. Grigoriann intends to establish a conservative news outlet that offers expertise and experience for a wide audience in the Western world and beyond,” the résumé concluded.

In the end, one influencer agreed to work with Tenet Media for $400,000 a month plus a $100,000 signing bonus, while another received $100,000 per video.

On Thursday, Tayler Hansen, one of Tenet’s star talents, said on X that the company had “ended” following the Justice Department indictment.

“I will now be pursuing other job opportunities so I may continue to report on vital news stories this election season,” Hansen said, adding he was looking for independent funding for his work.

Andrea Fuller and Jeff Horwitz contributed to this article.

Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com and C. Ryan Barber at ryan.barber@wsj.com

Appeared in the September 7, 2024, print edition as 'How the Kremlin Allegedly Built A Conservative U.S. Media Startup'.

4. Most Mass Shooters Telegraph Their Attacks. These Teams Are In the Business Of Stopping Them

Regarding this latest shooting in Georgia, I wonder what kind of effect the immediate arrest of the father will have on the parents of future shooters who are minors?

Excerpts:

An investigator visited Colt Gray’s home that Sunday, May 21, and then emailed the FBI saying “area schools” had been made aware. But in the interview Friday, Sheriff Mangum said school district officials have said they don’t have documentation of the warning. She said the deputy has since left the sheriff’s office and she was trying to determine whether anyone received it.

“I’m very disturbed,” she said. “I don’t know what to think and I’m very disturbed.”

The FBI tip was alarming at first glance. Online threats including photos of guns had been posted on Discord, a social-media site, by a user whose profile name was Lanza spelled in Russian, referencing the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter, according to an incident report released by the sheriff’s office. An email associated with the account belonged to Gray, according to the FBI, the report said.

Gray’s father told investigators he had hunting rifles in the house, but said his son didn’t have unsupervised access to them. Gray denied making threats, saying he’d stopped using Discord because his account had been hacked, according to an incident report. The investigators said they couldn’t substantiate that Gray was behind the account so they dropped the case, the report said.

Gray’s father has been charged with second-degree murder, involuntary manslaughter and cruelty to children stemming from “knowingly allowing his son, Colt, to possess a weapon,” authorities said.

Threat-assessment experts say the Georgia shooting demonstrates that more needs to be done even if no arrest is made, and that threats shouldn’t be brushed off.

“That’s still the hardest thing: getting people to take these things seriously,” said Nicoletti.

Most Mass Shooters Telegraph Their Attacks. These Teams Are In the Business Of Stopping Them

A growing field of experts assess threats and intervene with monitoring or therapy. Some call it the best hope ‘for preventing tragedies.’

By Zusha ElinsonFollow

Sept. 6, 2024 9:02 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/solutions-for-mass-shooters-threat-assessment-schools-56ac348b?mod=latest_headlines

The 14-year-old charged with killing two students and two teachers at a Georgia high school this week cut a sickeningly familiar figure: A troubled teen who had been reported to authorities for alleged past threats to carry out a school shooting.

Most mass shooters let the world know they are going to strike. When researchers at the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center studied school attacks between 2008 and 2017, they found that 77% of perpetrators threatened their targets or shared their intentions beforehand.

So why can’t they be stopped?

In the growing field of threat assessment, professionals say there is a way to stop them long before they pick up a gun. These experts work at schools, businesses and police agencies to identify, evaluate and manage threats with interventions such as monitoring, therapy or, in extreme cases, arrest.

“Every time there’s a shooting, people say nothing can be done,” said John Nicoletti, a pioneer in the field and co-founder of the threat-assessment firm Nicoletti-Flater Associates. “They don’t realize a lot of things can be stopped.”

Students, faculty and community members gather after the shooting at Apalachee High School. Photo: Megan Varner/Getty Images

Families participate in a candlelight vigil dedicated to victims of the 2022 mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas. Photo: Brandon Bell/Getty Images

Detecting warning signs

The field has grown with the rise of mass shootings. The Association of Threat Assessment Professionals counts 4,300 members, versus 1,170 a decade ago.

Threat assessment is being used in more schools than ever. Nine states, including Florida and Texas, now require schools to have teams for this work. A bipartisan bill passed after the 2022 Uvalde elementary-school massacre included new funding for training in the discipline.

Advocates say when done right it has prevented school attacks.

Threat-assessment teams of psychologists, law enforcement, security and educators look for signs of what they call “proactive attack behavior,” such as hit lists, maps of the school, accumulation of weapons or a fascination with school shooters, said John McDonald, chief operating officer of the Missouri School Boards’ Association’s Center for Education Safety. They discount things like offhand threats made in playground spats.

Schools vary on how they handle students deemed to be credible threats. In the school district where the 1999 Columbine High School massacre occurred, case managers have been assigned to talk with them regularly, monitor their social media and check in with their therapists—even sometimes for years after they graduated or left school, said McDonald, the former security chief there. The program is more extensive than most.

A family embraces after the Apalachee High School shooting, in which a 14-year-old has been charged. Photo: christian monterrosa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

In one case, a student involved in aggressive behavior who was found to be mapping out school cameras and making a type of camouflage suit used by snipers was monitored by the district after he left school. He didn’t launch an attack. In another, a student who made violent threats at the high school and nearby community college was given intensive therapy.

“It’s really tough work,” McDonald said. But it has shown success, and more experts are zeroing on how, when taken seriously and carried out properly, this work might be among communities’ best defense.

The Secret Service said in its 2019 report on school attacks that a threat-assessment team “is the best practice for preventing future tragedies.”

Crucial planning and prevention

The field faces big obstacles. Schools that haven’t experienced an attack are less likely to make threat assessment a priority. School budgets favor physical security like cameras and metal detectors. Some parents recoil at the intrusive monitoring that is often part of these programs. And critics say threat-assessment programs can target the wrong students. After Texas required schools to do them in 2019, researchers at the nonprofit Texas Appleseed found Black students were disproportionately represented in threat-assessment processes.

Students identified as threats also weren’t given enough help, they found. “It’s a lot of disaffected, isolated young white boys who are perpetrating these acts of mass violence,” said Andrew Hairston, Appleseed’s education justice project director. “Based on the data, they are very unlikely to receive this threat-assessment process.”

And even when schools do adopt such teams, there are major gaps in expertise.

Balloons are released during a vigil for the victims of the Apalachee High shooting. Photo: christian monterrosa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

“The discipline of threat assessment is outpacing the competent application of it in schools,” said Bryan Vossekuil, a retired Secret Service special agent who co-wrote a seminal study on school shootings for the agency two decades ago.

Schools have improved at identifying and reporting risks, but not all districts have expertise to properly evaluate whether a student is likely to carry out an attack. And even fewer are prepared for the crucial final step: keeping tabs on the troubled student and devising a plan to prevent them from lashing out violently if their threatening behavior doesn’t rise to the level of a crime.

“People are seeing something and saying something, but when they report there may be no mechanism to address the threat if no arrest is made,” said Russell Palarea, chief executive of the threat-assessment firm Operational Psychology Services.

Communication confusion

In Georgia, the 14-year-old alleged shooter in this week’s school attack, had been interviewed by law enforcement a year ago. But on Friday, confusion was unfolding about whether the 2023 incident involving the teen was shared with relevant schools as previously thought, Jackson County Sheriff Janis Mangum said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.

Mangum said the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office responded after the Federal Bureau of Investigation received a tip on Saturday, May 20, 2023, about an online threat to shoot up a middle school. The sheriff said the teen was then a student at Jefferson Middle School, which had already let out for summer the day before.

Accused Georgia School Shooter’s Father Charged With Second-Degree Murder

Was There a Chinese Agent Working in the New York Governor’s Office?

Prosecutors say Linda Sun used her position as a trusted government aide to benefit Beijing for years—and reaped the rewards

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/was-there-a-chinese-agent-working-in-the-new-york-governors-office-0f972d86?mod=latest_headlines

By Kristina PetersonFollow, James T. AreddyFollow, Jimmy VielkindFollow and James FanelliFollow

Sept. 6, 2024 5:41 pm ET

In 2002, Linda Sun was a finalist in a Manhattan ballroom competing for the crown of the Miss New York Chinese Beauty Pageant.

Then 18 years old, Sun, who had emigrated more than a decade earlier from the eastern Chinese city of Nanjing with her parents, was dressed in a strapless, full-skirted gold ball gown. She said in the program that her career goal was to become a United Nations ambassador. “I want to help the countries of the world understand each other better and learn how to accept each other,” she wrote.

Two decades later, Sun, now 40, was arrested this week on charges of acting as an illegal agent on behalf of China from her former perch as an aide to two New York governors. In return, she and her husband, exporter Chris Hu, allegedly received millions in kickbacks that helped them purchase a home worth more than $3 million on a cul-de-sac in Manhasset, N.Y., a $2-million ocean-view condo in Honolulu and a 2024 Ferrari.

Friends said that they believed she had married into money, since she started wearing eye-catching rings and carrying designer handbags after her wedding at a Long Island catering hall in 2013. While working for the state, she told co-workers that her husband was a successful businessman, a former colleague said.

New York Gov. Kathy Hochul (left) is introduced by Linda Sun (center) to leaders of Chinese associations at an event in Flushing, N.Y. in October 2021, in a still image made from a video.

Acquaintances viewed Sun as intelligent, friendly and capable. One said her jobs representing the governor’s office seemed to mainly involve protocol, like handing out essentially meaningless proclamations at various events.

But as she was in contact with Chinese government officials through her regular job duties, she developed closer relationships with them—and began using her access in surreptitious ways as far back as 2016 and through last year, prosecutors said.

Sun covertly worked to help China by fending off Taiwanese representatives’ efforts to meet with New York state politicians and facilitating Chinese officials’ travel to the U.S., at one point forging the signature of the current New York governor, Kathy Hochul, on an invitation letter to help the officials obtain visas, the indictment alleged.

Among other moves, Sun successfully pushed to prevent Hochul, then the lieutenant governor, from recognizing the detention of members of China’s mostly Muslim Uyghur community in Hochul’s videotaped message to celebrate the Lunar New Year.

Sun’s support for Beijing’s views over the years appeared to have been noticed—and rewarded.

Sun frequently traveled to China, including visits where she moved in politically powerful circles, according to the indictment and media accounts of her visits. In 2019 Sun was a guest at a banquet in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People to celebrate the Chinese Communist Party’s 70th year in power, a milestone event in the party’s history.

Chinese officials helped cultivate and expand her husband’s business exporting American lobsters into the country, according to prosecutors, and helped Sun’s cousin to secure a 10-year employment contract to work at a government trade-promotion agency. Chinese officials also helped foot the bill for multiple visits by Sun and members of her family. One contact reserved for her in early 2018 a presidential suite at the Westin Beijing Chaoyang, where former first lady Michelle Obama had previously stayed. The head of China’s consulate in New York had his personal chef prepare Nanjing-style salted ducks for Sun’s family.

Sun posed at a Great Hall of the People banquet in Beijing in 2019 to mark the 70th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party’s control of China.

Her arrest and the details of her alleged behind-the-scenes influence campaign shocked former colleagues from a political career that began in Flushing, Queens and reached the upper echelons of New York State government.

Sun and her husband pleaded not guilty to the charges, which also include visa fraud and conspiring to launder money. She was released on $1.5 million bond while her husband’s was set at $500,000. “We are disappointed by the filing of these charges, which are inflammatory and appear to be the product of an overly aggressive prosecution,” Sun’s lawyers said.

A spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Ministry said she couldn’t comment on “domestic” U.S. affairs and added “we oppose any malicious association, slander or defamation against China.”

This account is based on interviews with more than two dozen people familiar with Sun’s work in government and the Chinese-American community as well as the investigations that led to her indictment.

Sun’s defenders said they viewed her efforts as reflecting the sentiments of many Chinese-Americans and said some could be viewed more innocuously; her duties included acting as a liaison with consulates. But the allegations laid bare the extent to which Chinese officials have worked to cultivate relationships at multiple levels of the U.S. government in order to influence public messages, not just hunt for state secrets.

“This is a betrayal of New Yorkers and of the American people,” Hochul said.

Sun’s first forays into politics began as a teenager. At 14, she helped her parents prepare for their naturalization test. As a student at the selective Bronx High School of Science, she led a youth branch of a Chinatown immigration support group that staffed soup kitchens on holidays, which earned her a service award from then-New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani.

She earned a degree at Barnard College and later a master’s at Columbia University, and remained focused on a career in government, according to her accounts in media profiles and official biographies. And while she didn’t win the 2002 beauty contest or become a U.N. diplomat, she later returned to the pageant as a judge.

While volunteering at the New York City Police Department’s community outreach unit, she met Grace Meng, the daughter of a former New York state assemblyman. Sun helped her campaign for the seat Meng’s father once held and then joined her office when she won. Sun eventually rose to chief of staff. Federal investigators believe she established connections with Chinese government officials while working for the assemblywoman, according to a person familiar with the investigation.

A page from the program from the 2002 Miss New York Chinese Beauty Pageant shows Linda Sun as one of 16 finalists at the August 2002 event.

The small group of employees in that office went to karaoke bars together in Flushing and out to local restaurants on their lunch breaks, former colleagues said. Most of the office, as well as Grace Meng and other politicians, attended Sun’s wedding.

A spokesman for Meng, who is currently a U.S. congresswoman, said: “We don’t know anything about the charges other than what has been reported. But these allegations are serious and deeply troubling, and like many people, she was shocked to learn about them.”

With Meng’s recommendation, Sun joined then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s administration in 2012. She was responsible for outreach to Asian-American enclaves, a job that entailed meeting with community leaders and groups. In one meeting with food delivery workers, many of whom were ethnic Chinese, she jumped in to translate, according to someone in attendance.

People who worked with Sun in that early period said she was good at her job, which involved weighing in on matters of sensitivity to Asian constituents. Part of that included giving advice on the language of formal statements and on which people administration officials should and shouldn’t meet with, according to people who interacted with her.

“Obviously we asked her point of view for how things would play in Flushing and Kew Gardens—not how it would play geopolitically,” one Cuomo administration official said, referring to neighborhoods in Queens with large ethnic Chinese populations.

After becoming lieutenant governor in 2015, Hochul, a native of upstate Buffalo, was eager to engage with New York City-area voters and attend dinners held by chambers of commerce representing different ethnic groups. Sun was happy to take her, people who interacted with them said.

While she never pierced Cuomo’s inner circle, Sun held a series of jobs in his administration and at state agencies. She kept up her community liaison work but in ways that appeared to cross a line, prosecutors alleged, and pursued not just the interests of the governor but also those of Beijing.

According to prosecutors, she kept the Chinese consulate in New York apprised of her efforts.

In early July 2019, for example, a deputy consul at Taiwan’s diplomatic outpost in New York alerted Sun to some news. Taiwan’s president would be visiting New York the following week, on July 12. Would Sun and Cuomo be able to attend a banquet in her honor?

Within minutes, Sun forwarded the email to the political section chief at the Chinese consulate in New York and texted: “Just an FYI / I already blocked it,” according to the indictment.

Prosecutors allege Linda Sun and her husband laundered proceeds of his China-linked business to pay more than $3 million for this home in the Long Island town of Manhasset, N.Y., which the FBI raided in July and where the couple was arrested. Photo: J. Conrad Williams Jr./Newsday RM/Getty Images

The next day, according to prosecutors, Sun gave the Taiwanese official a false excuse that Cuomo would be in the Catskills that day hosting his staff. (The retreat was actually a day earlier.) Two days before the banquet, Sun checked again with Cuomo’s staff to confirm no banquet with Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen ended up on his schedule.

“I am not seeing that we have anything for tomorrow (or at all),” she heard back. “Perfect!” she wrote, the indictment said.

The banquet happened as scheduled, and Sun was on hand—protesting the visit, according to a photo included in the indictment that shows her standing in a group waving Chinese and American flags.

Meanwhile, Sun and her family made multiple trips to China, including a visit to the Henan province organized and partially funded by the local government, the indictment says.

“I think the Henan government pays for everything,” she wrote to an associate. The trip also included business meetings arranged for Sun’s husband, Chris Hu. The head of a party-linked organization agreed to intervene in customs issues on Hu’s behalf, while another connected him with Chinese government leaders and other officials, prosecutors allege.

For Sun’s work, she and Hu received millions of dollars in kickbacks that flowed to them through Hu’s business dealings in China, prosecutors say. Hu in part funneled money into the U.S. through an account set up under a relative’s name, according to the indictment. The couple also allegedly received gifts from the Chinese consulate, including orchestra and ballet tickets.

One autumn 2019 visit to Beijing landed on the FBI’s radar; agents interviewed Sun about her attendance at the 70th anniversary reception for the Chinese Communist Party. She told them she had been in China for a family visit and that a real-estate developer from Long Island had gotten her a ticket for the festivities.

After the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, Sun’s assignments shifted. She helped the state respond to a wave of anti-Asian hate incidents that followed as the virus moved from Wuhan, China, to New York and helped to source medical supplies, people who worked with her said. She again secretly kept Chinese government officials in the loop, according to prosecutors.

On March 16, New York City closed its public schools, and state officials convened on a conference call to discuss the government’s response to the brewing crisis. Also listening in: the same Chinese consular official she had alerted about the Taiwanese president’s visit. Sun secretly gave him access to the call, the indictment says.

When Cuomo was forced from office by a sexual harassment scandal the next year, it led to a promotion for Sun. Hochul remembered her work during past community events and named her a deputy chief of staff. The new administration noted Sun was the “highest appointed Asian-American in the administration.”

Sun appeared on stage at China’s New York consulate alongside Consul General Huang Ping for a Lunar New Year event in January 2023. Photo: Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in New York

Shortly after Hochul became governor, she attended an outreach event in Flushing, where a video showed Sun circulating in a red dress and introducing Hochul to leaders of Chinese patriotic associations. At least one of these groups is identified in the indictment as an influence operation controlled by Beijing.

Many of Sun’s other efforts benefited New Yorkers. For example, she brought Covid-19 vaccines to Manhattan’s Chinatown when inoculations were only beginning and doses were scarce, community members said. “She helped us become one of the first pop-up stations in the city,” said Justin Yu, the former president of a Chinatown community organization. Sun helped translate for Chinese-speaking patients who needed to fill out vaccination cards, he said.

Some colleagues in the new administration said she bullied and dressed down subordinates, according to a former state official. Complaints were made to her supervisors about the behavior, the official said. She also had difficulty completing some projects on time, according to the official. She was transferred to a position at the state Labor Department in the fall of 2022.

In early 2023, Sun allegedly strayed outside the confines of her new role to obtain a gubernatorial proclamation celebrating the Lunar New Year to present to the Chinese consul general, Huang Ping. Without getting approval from the governor’s office, she persuaded a state employee to send the framed proclamation to her home address on Long Island. In return Sun sent a personal gift basket and wine to the employee’s relative, according to the indictment.

Sun presented the proclamation to Huang on stage at the consulate’s New Year celebration—but she wouldn’t remain employed by the state for long.

On Valentine’s Day in 2023, Sun was interviewed by the state’s Office of the Inspector General about the proclamation. By March 2, she had been fired. A spokesman for Hochul said Sun was terminated after state officials discovered evidence of misconduct, and they reported her actions to law enforcement.

Sun then worked as the campaign manager for Austin Cheng, a Democrat who ran unsuccessfully in the 2023 race to replace former Republican New York Rep. George Santos. She accompanied him to an annual gathering of New York politicians in San Juan, Puerto Rico, that year to build support for his candidacy.

In July 2024, she hosted her state government colleagues at her stately brick home with a three-car garage, according to two people familiar with the event. A few days later, before the sun rose, the FBI searched the house.

U.S.-China Tensions

Tracking the complicated relationship of the world's two largest economies

A spokesman for Cuomo put distance between himself and Sun after she was charged on Tuesday, saying she was “one of many community liaisons who had little to no interaction with the governor.”

Several Republicans in the state called for independent investigations. Hochul on Wednesday said Sun was a midlevel aide hired by her predecessor with “no real role in my policies.”

Appeared in the September 7, 2024, print edition as 'Was There a Chinese Agent Working in the New York Governor’s Office? From Pageant Contender To Alleged China Agent'.

6. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 6, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 6, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-september-6-2024

Data Cutoff: September 4, 2024

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced that it will lift restrictions on PRC tourism to Kinmen and Taiwanese pomelo imports, likely to economically reward Kuomintang-leaning regions and legitimize the Kuomintang as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan.
The PRC maintained a high number of air incursions of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in August.
Network analysis firm Graphika identified PRC state-operated accounts on Twitter and TikTok that posed as Americans to undermine US political institutions and stability ahead of the 2024 US presidential elections. PRC information operation narratives have evolved to focus on sowing political division and undermining faith in the US electoral process.
PRC state broadcaster CCTV ran a segment on August 27 that publicized a People’s Liberation Army air defense exercise to counter enemy drone swarms. The PLA’s focus on countering drone swarms is likely a reaction to Taiwan’s evolving defense strategy that emphasizes asymmetric defense.
The China Coast Guard rammed a Philippine Coast Guard vessel near Sabina Shoal as part of its broader intimidation efforts to decrease the Philippine presence in the South China Sea. This is the third time that the CCG rammed a PCG ship near the Shoal during the last two weeks.

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, September 6, 2024

Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, September 6, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024

Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the Wall Street Journal. An anonymous European official told the outlet that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected. Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Ababil missiles have a range of around 86 kilometers and can carry a payload of 45 kilograms, while Fateh-360 missiles have a range of around 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms. It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Iran has meanwhile expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran throughout 2024 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia, according to Reuters. Russia has recently intensified drone and missile attacks into Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles. Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and to disrupt Ukraine’s defense industrial base.

The rate of Palestinian militia rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks. Israeli media reported that this decrease is due to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) beginning to immediately evacuate Gazan residents in areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area. This approach often includes Israeli airstrikes targeting rocket launch sites. The IDF has reportedly pursued this approach regardless of the volume of rockets fired or where the rockets landed. CTP-ISW has observed rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory decrease significantly since June 2024, which is consistent with the reporting of this new Israeli approach. The decrease is also likely due to the Hamas stockpile of rockets dwindling. Gazan residents have reportedly pressured Hamas to refrain from firing rockets from certain neighborhoods in response to this new Israeli approach. Clashes have erupted between Hamas members and residents in some cases, according to Israeli military officials. An IDF source said that, in one incident, a Gazan clan attacked Palestinian fighters with clubs as the fighters tried to fire a rocket.

Hamas has begun exploring new ways to pressure the Israeli public as firing rockets has become harder. Hamas has relied on its rockets for years to impose such pressure. But the loss of its stockpile and new Israeli approach have made this option decreasingly viable. Hamas has thus begun calling for suicide bombing attacks targeting civilians in Israel. Hamas claimed responsibility for an attempted suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in August 2024, marking the first time that Hamas has made such a claim since 2008.

Key Takeaways:

Iran-Russia: Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia will likely use the missiles to attack Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure over the coming months.

Gaza Strip: The rate of Palestinian rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks partly due to the IDF beginning to immediately evacuate areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area.

Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Hamas has continued to conduct an information operation to erode Israeli willingness to continue fighting in the Gaza Strip and to pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal on terms favorable to Hamas.

Caucasus: Iranian officials have continued expressing opposition to Azerbaijani efforts to link Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave going through Armenia. Tehran is responding to Russia changing its policy to support this connection.

Iran: Senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with members of the newly formed Masoud Pezeshkian administration. These meetings reflect the close coordination between Khamenei’s and Pezeshkian’s circles.

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024

US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. An anonymous US official confirmed to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that Iran delivered the missiles to Russia and a senior European official stated that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected. Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Reuters reported on July 7 that Iran expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran since August and October 2023 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia. Russia recently intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles. Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy. military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and disrupt Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war. Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas. Austin reiterated a Biden Administration talking point that since Russia has moved aircraft conducting glide bomb strikes out of range of US-provided ATACMS missiles, it somehow renders Ukraine’s request to use ATACMS in Russian territory against hundreds of known stationary military objects moot. ISW has previously noted there are at least 209 of 245 (over 85 percent) known Russian military objects in range of ATACMS that are not air bases and not within range of US-provided HIMARS that the US does allow Ukraine to use in Russia under limited circumstances. Austin also argued that Ukraine has its own domestically produced capabilities that can attack Russian targets well beyond the range of Western-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Most of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities come from domestically produced long-range drones, which Ukraine cannot use to cause the same level of damage as long-range missiles due to drone payload limitations. Russian forces can also more easily harden facilities against Ukrainian drones than Western-provided missiles. Ukraine has begun to produce and successfully field long-range precision weapons with payloads more comparable to Western-provided long-range missiles but currently lacks the quantity of these domestically produced systems to significantly threaten Russian military targets within Russia at scale.

Ukraine therefore can only use a limited number of domestically produced long-range strike systems and Western-provided HIMARS to significantly threaten a limited number of Russian military objects within Russia. This scarcity is not reflective of all the long-range strike capabilities that Ukraine possesses, and Western decision-making continues to artificially suppress Ukraine's overall long-range strike capability. ISW has assessed at length that long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would degrade Russia's ability to leverage sanctuary space in Russia for offensive operations in Ukraine and place significant operational pressures on the deployment of Russian air defense, electronic warfare (EW), logistics, command and control (C2), and military support assets. Russia, on the contrary, continues to actively expand its ability to maintain deep precision strikes against Ukraine by increasingly procuring ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea, and continuing to expand its missile production.

Key Takeaways:

US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

The transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia.

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.

Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas.

Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Airbase in Germany on September 6, a significant portion of which will reportedly not be delivered in the immediate future.

Russian forces are increasingly executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers throughout the frontline likely in part because Russian commanders appear to be endorsing the proliferation of such war crimes.

Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to pursue longstanding efforts to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhia Oblast, while also promoting false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to weaken Western support for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels, possibly after receiving backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community.

The Kremlin signaled its commitment to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future and will likely reattempt to deanonymize Russian social media and Telegram channels even though Roskomnadzor withdrew its recently proposed regulations for now.

The Kremlin continues to appoint Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko to positions overseeing Russia's informational efforts as part of efforts aimed at shaping Russian identity and ideology.

Russia continues efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and has been using the Ukrainian information space for several years to hone this capability.

Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient on September 6.

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

Open-source tracking of confirmed Russian military deaths in Ukraine suggests that more Russian volunteers have died in Ukraine than Russian convict recruits and mobilized personnel.

9. Free Burma Rangers – Open Volunteer Positions 6 September 2024

Free Burma Rangers – Open Volunteer Positions 6 September 2024

https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/free-burma-rangers-open-volunteer-positions-6-september-2024

Fri, 09/06/2024 - 4:20pm

Editor's Note: The Free Burma Rangers have been doing incredible work in Burma for decades. Please support them here: https://www.freeburmarangers.org/donations/.

Please go to this link if you are interested in volunteering: https://www.freeburmarangers.org/2024/09/06/open-volunteer-positions/

Information email: info@freeburmarangers.org

Open Volunteer Positions

6 September 2024

Given the high number of messages from interested applicants that FBR receives, we are currently only seeking volunteers who can fill specific roles and have prerequisites and/or prior work experience in a similar field of work. If you are interested in joining the FBR team, we ask that you prayerfully consider if you are willing and able to fill one of the following roles. The positions listed below will be updated regularly if they have been filled and/or if others become available.

All positions are based in Southeast Asia at FBR’s administrative headquarters unless otherwise noted. Please be advised that all volunteer positions are unpaid and FBR does not offer visa support at this time. All long-term positions require a minimum of a two-year commitment.

Finally, we recognize that many potential volunteers are interested in front line relief operations. In order to serve in our Operations Department, volunteers are expected to serve in a support capacity first (such as the open positions below) so that they are fully equipped to help on the front lines.

Current Open Positions

Physicians, Physicians Assistants, and Nurse Practitioners

FBR is seeking physicians, physicians assistants and nurse practitioners with an emphasis on family physicians, pediatricians, internal medicine, OB/GYN, and general surgery who are willing to commit any timeframe greater than one month. Providers must be willing and able to practice in an off-grid, remote environment with limited access to standard medical equipment. A moderate level of physical fitness is required.

Patient Care Appointment Coordinator

The Patient Care Appointment Coordinator assists in coordinating all activities for the FBR Patient Care Team, which manages case referrals from FBR’s Jungle School of Medicine Kawthoolei. This includes coordinating medical appointments for referred patients as well as ensuring that daily needs of room and board for the patient and a caregiver are met. Previous experience in case management may be relevant to this position and some medical knowledge is helpful. Facility with new languages is also a plus. This individual is a key player on the support team, ensuring adequate communication and resource allocation that is vital to successfully bringing help, hope and love to patients in need.

Medical Supply Coordinator

The Medical Supply Coordinator helps procure, process, and ship medicine and medical supplies needed to support relief operations and FBR’s Jungle School of Medicine Kawthoolei. They report to the Medical Department Manager. Attention to detail and a high level of organization are necessary for this position; some knowledge of medicine and medical supplies is also helpful.

Communications Specialist

The Communications Specialist assists in the management and operation of critical communications equipment including satellite internet systems, satellite phones, mobile phones, etc. The Communications Specialist helps to establish secure communications standards and protocols. Attention to detail, a high level of organization, and the ability to predict and troubleshoot IT issues in a variety of environments are useful in this position.

Report Writer

Report Writers support the Reporting and Information Department and FBR’s mission of “getting the news out” by collecting information from FBR field teams and staff to create and prepare reports for publication. Strong writing and editing skills in the English language are required, as well as the ability to work in a highly collaborative environment. A working knowledge of the situation and background of the locations FBR operates, or a willingness to self-educate, is also helpful.

Publications Specialist

The Publications Specialist supports the Reporting and Information Department and FBR’s mission of “getting the news out.” The Publications Specialist serves FBR by leading and executing the creation of FBR’s annual print publications. Previous experience in publications and familiarity with publications programs such as the Adobe suite of products is highly recommended. This individual must have attention to detail, ability to work on a deadline, flexibility and willingness to collaborate, and exceptional communication skills.

Public Affairs/Social Media Manager

The Public Affairs/Social Media Manager is responsible for managing multiple chat groups and FBR’s official social media platforms, all of which are used to disseminate FBR’s field reports in various formats. This role involves maintaining communication with various stakeholders, ensuring the dissemination of accurate and timely information, and providing information to external entities such as news agencies, investigative reporters, and for sanction proposals/court cases. This individual will work directly with multiple information sources as well as various area specialists to develop appropriate content. This position requires initiative and a high level of attention to detail. Some familiarity with the areas in which FBR works is also helpful.

Deputy Supply Leader

The Deputy Supply Leader will work with FBR’s existing supply team to organize and procure all material needed to support operations and the overall mission of the organization. The Deputy Supply Leader reports to the Supply Leader. Must be organized, willing to work a flexible schedule, able to operate a manual transmission vehicle, and comfortable driving in a foreign city.

Gospel Resource Interpreter

The Gospel Resource Interpreter (GRI) is a part-time position within FBR’s Gospel Partnership Department that has the potential to develop into a paid staff position for ethnic language speakers. The GRI is engaged not merely in translating but interpreting Biblical materials in both written and verbal forms, thus thinking with the head and the heart, to contextualize Biblical messages and materials in culturally relevant and appropriate ways. Spoken and written proficiency in English and Burmese is required and proficiency in Karen is preferred.

Application and Media Developer: Gospel Partnership Department

The Application and Media Developer (AMD) is a new position within the Gospel Partnership Department. The AMD will report to FBR’s head Chaplain but work most closely with the Resource Coordinator on a daily basis. The AMD is expected to envision ways to engage others with the gospel in digital formats that can be understood and utilized in cross-cultural contexts.

Short Term Volunteer, 3-6 Months (SLOTS FULL THROUGH MID 2025)

Short Term Volunteers serve FBR in Southeast Asia by performing all necessary tasks that support the overall mission of FBR, mainly clerical and practical tasks. Applicants are required to have an AAA international drivers license and be able to drive manual transmission vehicles. This role is primarily office-based, and field time in Burma and/or the Middle East is possible, depending on demonstrated skills and the needs of the organization, but not guaranteed. Short-Term Volunteers are expected to commit to approximately 20 hours a week for 3-6 months, with most volunteers serving approximately 3 months. When applying for a long-term position with FBR, successful Short-Term Volunteers are given preference.

To learn more or if you are interested in any of these positions, please email FBR’s Volunteer Coordination Team at info@freeburmarangers.org with the subject line: “Volunteer Inquiry_Your Full Name” to begin the application process.

Thank you and God bless you,

Free Burma Rangers

10. Commentary: China-Philippines trust in troubled waters

Commentary: China-Philippines trust in troubled waters

Both countries’ efforts to reinforce their claims in the South China Sea will likely escalate tensions in the medium and long term, says this academic.

Abdul Rahman Yaacob

07 Sep 2024 06:00AM

channelnewsasia.com · by Abdul Rahman Yaacob

CANBERRA: China and the Philippines reached a deal in July to enable the continuation of Philippine resupply missions at the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. The confrontation reached new heights in June when Manila accused Chinese forces of intercepting Philippine boats, seizing supplies and injuring a Filipino sailor.

But the deal has not eased broader tensions as China reportedly fired flares “dangerously” close to Philippine aircraft multiple times in August.

The dispute over Second Thomas Shoal - where the security situation has been deteriorating since 2021 - has been a tinderbox in the broader contest in the South China Sea. China has attempted to block the Philippines’ resupply missions to its marines deployed on an old ship that was deliberately grounded on the shoal in 1999 to serve as a Philippine military outpost.

After the deal was struck, the Philippines undertook a resupply mission at the Second Thomas Shoal without incident. But while the deal has reduced the rapidly escalating tension between the two countries in the short term, it is not likely to significantly impact the longstanding maritime disputes in the South China Sea between Beijing and Manila.

On the contrary, the situation at Second Thomas Shoal can be expected to further deteriorate over time given the deep-seated mistrust between China and the Philippines. Both parties are already disputing the deal’s interpretation, which does not augur well for its durability.

The situation at Second Thomas Shoal serves as an indicator reflecting broader China-Philippines disputes in the South China Sea. Any escalation over competing claims to other contested waters will most likely increase tensions at the shoal.

TENSIONS WILL LIKELY ESCALATE

Two trends suggest that tensions between China and the Philippines will likely continue to escalate.

First, both sides have intensified legal efforts to reinforce their claims in the disputed waters. China has introduced several regulations to justify its actions in the South China Sea. In June, Beijing issued a new maritime rule allowing its coast guard to detain foreign ships and personnel trespassing in its waters for up to 60 days.

This builds on a 2021 law permitting the Chinese coast guard to fire on any vessel intruding into its waters. China continues to ignore the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling which dismissed Beijing’s claims to much of the South China Sea.

Manila has also stepped up its legal warfare to reinforce its claims. In June, the Philippines asked the United Nations to register its extended continental shelf claim in the Western Palawan region.

Manila is also in the process of introducing the Maritime Zones Act, which aims to reinforce the rights and entitlements of the Philippines over its maritime zones, including in contested areas. The passing of the act has already drawn condemnations from China.

The second major trend is the ongoing buildup of military capabilities to counter the other party. China continues to maintain a sizable and permanent military presence in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone through its military outposts on man-made islands, extending its military power across the South China Sea.

The Philippines has modernised its military to avoid being left behind, acquiring anti-ship missile capabilities and stepping up joint exercises with its traditional security partner, the United States, as well as other like-minded partners.

Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr’s administration has also worked to broaden the Philippines’ strategic partnerships, pushing through new defence agreements with Germany and Japan in 2024.

The latter is especially significant. The Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan allows Japanese forces deployed in the Philippines to participate in expanded exercises and potentially deal with humanitarian and disaster relief. The agreement has drawn criticism from Beijing, fearing that it is part of a broader regional trend of defence agreements targeted against China.

DEEP MISTRUST

The interactions between Chinese and Philippine forces on the ground threaten to derail efforts to build trust and work towards a resolution in the contested waters.

The Philippines has accused China of dangerous conduct in the South China Sea multiple times through August, beginning when Chinese combat aircraft reportedly performed dangerous manoeuvres against a Philippine Air Force plane on routine patrol in the South China Sea.

This incident marked an escalation in tensions as China had not targeted Philippine aircraft previously. Though the two parties have set up a hotline at their respective presidential offices, it will do little to de-escalate tensions if China does not use it.

These legal and military trends reflect a deep mistrust between China and the Philippines. Both countries’ efforts to reinforce their claims through assertive diplomatic and political strategies will likely lay the foundation for a greater escalation of tensions in the medium and long term.

While the agreement over resupply missions at the Second Thomas Shoal may provide temporary relief, it fails to address the fundamental drivers of these tensions in an increasingly contested strategic environment.

Abdul Rahman Yaacob is a research fellow at Lowy Institute and an academic advisor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

11. US university Georgia Tech to end China partnerships following concerns over military ties

US university Georgia Tech to end China partnerships following concerns over military ties

07 Sep 2024 08:57AM

channelnewsasia.com

WASHINGTON: Georgia Tech is ending its research and educational partnerships in the Chinese cities of Tianjin and Shenzhen, the US university said on Friday (Sep 6), following scrutiny from Congress over its collaboration with entities allegedly linked to China's military.

In May, the House of Representatives' select committee on China wrote a letter to Georgia Tech asking for details on its research with China's northeastern Tianjin University on cutting-edge semiconductor technologies.

The Chinese school and its affiliates were added in 2020 to the US Commerce Department's export restrictions list for actions contrary to US national security, including trade secret theft and research collaboration to advance China's military.

Spokesperson Abbigail Tumpey told Reuters in an email that Georgia Tech has been assessing its posture in China since Tianjin University was added to the entity list.

"Tianjin University has had ample time to correct the situation. To date, Tianjin University remains on the Entity List, making Georgia Tech's participation with Tianjin University, and subsequently Georgia Tech Shenzhen Institute (GTSI), no longer tenable," Tumpey said.

Georgia Tech, a top-tier US engineering school and major recipient of defence department funding, said in an accompanying statement it would discontinue its participation in the Shenzhen institute, but that the approximately 300 students currently in programmes there would have the opportunity to fulfil their degree requirements.

In January, Georgia Tech touted that its researchers based in Atlanta and at the Tianjin International Center for Nanoparticles and Nanosystems had created the world's first functional semiconductor made from the nanomaterial graphene. It said this could lead to a "paradigm shift" in electronics and yield faster computing.

The US and China, intense geopolitical and scientific rivals, both view semiconductors as a strategic industry with civilian and military uses, including quantum computing and advanced weapons systems.

In its May letter, the select committee noted the Tianjin research centre is affiliated with a Chinese company with subsidiaries that supply China's People's Liberation Army (PLA).

A Georgia Tech scientist who led the Tianjin project has defended the research, saying all the results were available to the public and that the collaboration had passed extensive legal reviews.

China's embassy in Washington did not respond immediately to a request for comment.

"It shouldn't have taken a congressional investigation to spur Georgia Tech to end its partnership with a blacklisted Chinese entity," said US Representative Virginia Foxx, Republican chairwoman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, who had joined the select committee on its letter.

"Nonetheless, we're glad that Georgia Tech has made the right call and we hope other universities follow its lead," Foxx said in an email.

US agencies and Congress have stepped up scrutiny of China's state-sponsored influence and technology transfers at American colleges and universities, concerned that Beijing uses open and federally funded research environments in the US to circumvent export controls and other national security laws.

The US Justice Department under President Joe Biden's administration ended a programme from former president Donald Trump's administration called the China Initiative intended to combat Chinese espionage and intellectual property theft. Critics had said that the programme spurred racial profiling against Asian Americans and chilled scientific research.

12. Secret American special forces boats spotted in Scotland

Secret American special forces boats spotted in Scotland

ukdefencejournal.org.uk · September 5, 2024

An interesting sighting at Glasgow Prestwick Airport has revealed the arrival of Combatant Craft Assault (CCA) boats, which were offloaded from a C-17 Globemaster aircraft.

The Combatant Craft Assault is operated by the United States Naval Special Warfare Group 4 and is designed for a variety of operations.

Its primary roles include medium-range maritime interdiction operations in medium-to-high threat environments, as well as the insertion and extraction of special operations forces.

With a length of 41 feet, the CCA is a compact and agile craft that occupies a niche between the older RHIB (Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat) and the newer Combatant Craft Medium (CCM).

This event has generated considerable interest among military enthusiasts and locals, particularly with reports of the boats being transported to Troon Harbour.

One of the defining features of the CCA is its lightweight construction, which is made possible by the use of SPRINT composite materials. This design enables the boat to perform at high speeds while remaining durable enough for various operational conditions. The CCA is powered by high-performance diesel engines, allowing for quick maneuverability and efficient operation.

Additionally, it has an open-top design with a protective shroud around the crew compartment, and it can be equipped with fold-up armour plating for enhanced crew protection.

In terms of equipment, the CCA is outfitted with advanced sensors that include a maritime radar and a Combatant Craft Forward Looking Infrared (CCFLIR) system. The CCFLIR features infrared and low-light video cameras, as well as a laser range finder, which provide the crew with critical situational awareness during operations.

There are also plans to implement a Surface Search Phased Array radar that will enhance the CCA’s ability to detect and track targets both on the water and in the air, thereby improving its overall operational effectiveness.

The CCA can be transported via C-17 aircraft and has the unique capability of being airdropped onto water under parachute.

This feature allows for rapid deployment in various operational scenarios, making it a versatile asset for U.S. special operations. While specific details about its armaments are not widely publicised, it is believed that the CCA can accommodate various weapon systems, including M2 .50 machine guns, M240 7.62mm machine guns, and MK19 40mm grenade launchers.

George Allison

George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

ukdefencejournal.org.uk · September 5, 2024

13. Unleashing Private Capital: A Strategic Shift to Boost Allied Defense

Thu, 09/05/2024 - 8:07pm

Unleashing Private Capital: A Strategic Shift to Boost Allied Defense

By John Nagl and Dan Rice

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unleashing-private-capital-strategic-shift-boost-allied-defense

The U.S. stands at a pivotal moment in its global security strategy. As the world grapples with war in Ukraine and Chinese aggression in the South-China Sea, the need to bolster the defense capabilities of key allies has never been more pressing. Traditional methods of military aid and direct government spending are insufficient to meet the challenges posed by rising powers like China and Russia. A simple yet transformative policy change could unlock significant private investment in overseas defense manufacturing and strengthen the defense industrial base of U.S. allies in critical regions such as Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific. By expanding the mandate of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to include defense-related projects, the U.S. can incentivize private capital to flow into areas crucial for global security.

Established in 2019 through the BUILD Act, the DFC finances development projects in emerging markets. With a lending capacity of $60 billion, the DFC provides loans, loan guarantees, direct equity investments, and political risk insurance to private-sector-led initiatives to private investors. Created to counter China's growing influence in economically developing key regions of the world, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, the DFC was designed to support projects that align with U.S. interests in fostering economic growth and stability abroad. Additionally, China is helping to expand and shore up deficiencies in the Russian defense industrial base through provision of drones, engines, machine tools, and electronics. However, the DFC's current mandate excludes defense-related projects, limiting its potential to strengthen America’s allies and protect investment.

The concept of using government-backed financial mechanisms to stimulate private investment in defense-related projects is not new. The Marshall Plan, implemented after World War II, is a prime example of how U.S. government intervention in foreign industrial bases can promote stability and attract private capital. By investing in the reconstruction of European economies after the Second World War, the U.S. not only helped to rebuild war-torn nations but also laid the groundwork for long-term economic and political stability in the region. This, in turn, created a favorable environment for private investment, which further strengthened the economic and defense capabilities of U.S. allies. Today, a similar approach could be applied to regions like the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe. The threat of aggression from China and Russia necessitates a robust and resilient defense industrial base. By expanding the DFC's mandate, the U.S. can replicate the success of the Marshall Plan.

The strategic benefits of this policy change are manifold. First, by lowering the financial risk for private equity firms, the DFC can unlock significant capital investment in defense manufacturing in critical regions. The DFC already contributes to stabilizing regions critical to U.S. interests by improving infrastructure, modernizing industries, and laying the groundwork for sustainable growth. Extending this mandate to defense would only further contribute toward this goal. This is particularly important in munitions production, where the demand for advanced weaponry and military equipment is high but the financial returns are often uncertain. By providing political risk insurance and other financial incentives, the DFC can make these investments more attractive to private firms leading to increased production capacity.

Second, expanding the DFC's mandate aligns with U.S. national security priorities by creating robust public-private partnerships that enhance the defense capabilities of key allies. In regions like Australia and Ukraine, where the threat of military conflict is ever-present, a stronger defense industrial base can serve as a powerful deterrent against potential aggressors and encourage private investment that strengthens trade relations and return on investment to the US economy.

The current geopolitical landscape underscores the urgency of this policy change. In the Indo-Pacific, China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea and its growing influence in the region pose a significant threat to the security of U.S. allies and global trade. Additionally, China has expanded its share of arms exports and according to an August report from Merics, an institute for China studies “Chinese weapons are gradually becoming dominant in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, and are making inroads in Central Asia and the Middle East.” Although Chinese arms sales still only represent 5.8% of global arms sales, Chinese firms, operating at the behest of the state face little of the restrictions. They also are fond of selling arms to and engaging in technological cooperation with state sponsors of terrorism like Iran.

Meanwhile, Russia's ongoing conflict with Ukraine underscores the critical need for a resilient defense industrial base in Eastern Europe to deter Russian aggression. In response, the DFC’s CEO, Scott Nathan, announced $357 million in political risk insurance to protect private investment in Ukraine, aiming to rebuild investor confidence. However, to truly secure Ukraine's future, expanding the DFC's mandate to include defense-related projects is essential. Despite the ingenuity of Ukraine's 400 private and 100 state-owned defense companies, many rely on self-funding due to bureaucratic hurdles that stymie long-term planning and production. By unlocking DFC funding for these defense companies, Ukraine can not only bolster its defense sector but also attract further civilian investment, ensuring a more secure and stable recovery.

Expanding the U.S. Development Finance Corporation's mandate to include financing for defense-related industrial projects in allied nations is a strategic move that can enhance global security, attract private capital, strengthen the defense capabilities of key U.S. partners, and subsequently aid the US economy. This policy change would align with national security priorities and create robust public-private partnerships that ensure long-term stability and deterrence in volatile regions. As the world becomes increasingly unstable, the U.S. must take bold steps to bolster the defense capabilities of its allies and expanding the DFC's scope is a critical first step in that direction.

Dr John Nagl and Dan Rice are both West Point graduates and decorated Iraq War veterans.

Dr Nagl is a Rhodes Scholar, served a career as an Armor Officer, and is professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College. Dan Rice is president of the American University Kyiv and served as the Special Advisor to the Commander of the Ukraine Armed Forces for the first year of the war (volunteer).

14. Special Operations Forces: Summary of Armed Overwatch Reports

The GAO report can be accessed here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-107556.pdf

Special Operations Forces: Summary of Armed Overwatch Reports

gao.gov

GAO-24-107556 Published: Sep 05, 2024. Publicly Released: Sep 05, 2024.

Jump To

Fast Facts

This summary examines U.S. Special Operations' plan to spend over $2 billion on a new type of aircraft through the Armed Overwatch program. DOD says this plane will address threats from violent extremist groups.

Congress has expressed concerns and delayed funding for this program. We previously found Special Operations hadn't completed its justification for buying 75 aircraft. It has since dropped the number to 62 but still hasn't completed the justification.

Also, it hasn't determined how to provide reconnaissance and other capabilities found on current aircraft that will be retired.

Our previous recommendations address these issues and more.

Armed Overwatch Aircraft

Highlights

Why GAO Did This Study

GAO issued two reports on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Armed Overwatch Aircraft program. In our first report we found that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was limited in its ability to justify the acquisition of the Armed Overwatch aircraft for three reasons. First, because SOCOM decided on the size of the fleet before conducting required analyses. Second, SOCOM did not assess how changes in the aircraft's capabilities could affect the number needed for operations. And third, that SOCOM has not reevaluated its needs despite changes to operational missions. In our second report, which is classified, our findings highlighted concerns related to risks associated with the capabilities of the Armed Overwatch aircraft, concepts surrounding the types of operations the aircraft will conduct, deployment and operating challenges, and affordability.

What GAO Found

House Report 117-118, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, included a provision that we assess SOCOM's Armed Overwatch program. Our reports address the extent to which the Department of Defense has 1) evaluated SOCOM's analysis to support the number of Armed Overwatch aircraft to acquire and 2) determined the capabilities Armed Overwatch needs to support special operations forces operations and meet mission needs.

Recommendations

We made seven recommendations to DOD that address our findings. DOD concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with six recommendations. The enclosure summarizes our findings and recommendations from these reports and omits classified information related to specific details of the Armed Overwatch effort.

Full Report

Full Report (5 pages)

GAO Contacts

Joe Kirschbaum

Director

kirschbaumj@gao.gov

(202) 512-9971

Office of Public Affairs

Sarah Kaczmarek

Acting Managing Director

kaczmareks@gao.gov

(202) 512-4800

Topics

National Defense

AircraftAircraft acquisition programsSpecial operationsSpecial forcesIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceSocial mediaClassified defense informationGovernment procurementDefense capabilitiesClassified information

gao.gov

15. US Special Operations cuts Armed Overwatch acquisition nearly 20%

US Special Operations cuts Armed Overwatch acquisition nearly 20%

flightglobal.com

Fixed-Wing

By Ryan Finnerty2024-09-06T19:50:00+01:00

US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is cutting its procurement target for the new L3Harris OA-1K close air support turboprop nearly 20%.

A programme review released by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) on 5 September reveals that SOCOM has cut its planned fleet size for the new type to 62 aircraft, down from the original goal of 75 – a reduction of 17%.

The change was apparently made in March although not previously disclosed by SOCOM.

In an earlier audit of the programme – known as Armed Overwatch – the GAO, an independent government auditing agency, criticised the US Department of Defense (DoD) for failing to justify an OA-1K fleet of size of 75 aircraft. OA-1Ks are militarised versions of Air Tractor’s AT-802 crop duster.

“Analysis wasn’t completed before DoD decided to buy the planes,” the GAO said in December 2023. “DoD’s special operations mission requirements have also changed in recent years, and it hasn’t evaluated if it still needs all 75 planes.”

That analysis remains uncompleted, according to the latest GAO review. While the full report is classified and was not released publicly, a limited summary of the findings was made available to the public.

Source: L3Harris

The L3Harris OA-1K is a militarised derivative of Air Tractor’s AT-802 crop duster

According to the summary, SOCOM plans to spend $2 billion through 2030 (the Pentagon’s fiscal year 2029) on Armed Overwatch acquisition. When L3Harris won the competitive contract in 2022, the total value was estimated at up to $3 billion.

Some 85% of the programme’s total budget will be spent prior to the completion of testing in 2026, the GAO now says, with a full-rate production decision following later that year.

The GAO remains critical of the approach, saying moving forward without adequate analysis leaves the Pentagon at risk of buying too many aircraft that lack desired capabilities or necessary support.

“Such testing would enable the department to determine how the aircraft could be used,” the GAO adds.

In particular, the agency appears critical of SOCOM’s plan to divest existing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms in favour of the OA-1K, which military officials say is meant to serve primarily in close-air support roles.

“It’s not a replacement for any ISR platforms,” Colonel Justin Bronder said at the annual Special Operations Forces Week conference in May.

Bronder manages the SOCOM office handling fixed-wing aircraft procurement. The command operates its own independent acquisition system within the Pentagon.

As part of the Armed Overwatch procurement, SOCOM plans to divest two legacy reconnaissance-only aircraft, including the Pilatus U-28A turboprop, using those resources to support the OA-1K.

But the GAO remains sceptical that the Armed Overwatch programme will deliver an aircraft capable of adequately replacing the ISR capability.

“SOCOM has not taken steps to plan for or add critical ISR capabilities provided by soon-to-be divested aircraft,” the latest report says. “SOCOM has not addressed risks associated with the loss of these capabilities if the new aircraft does not provide them.”

SOCOM’s procurement office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Source: US Air Force/1st Special Operations Wing

US government auditors remain critical of the Armed Overwatch programme, particularly SOCOM’s decision to sunset the Pilatus U-28A Draco reconnaissance type before fully evaluating the ability of the new OA-1K

The GAO also previously raised questions about the operational suitability of low-altitude, low-speed turboprops at a time the Pentagon is broadly shifting focus toward countering modern industrial adversaries like Russia and China that have large stocks of precision anti-aircraft missiles.

SOCOM’s Bronder countered that critique in May, saying OA-1Ks would operate in “conflict on the margins” of the so-called “great-power competition” between Western allies and the authoritarian bloc led by Russia and China.

L3Harris confirmed to FlightGlobal on 6 September that it delivered the first two OA-1K trainer aircraft in June, which are currently being used to certify test pilots on the new type.

”We have completed modification on the first production aircraft, which is in the testing phase,” L3Harris says. ”We also have eight aircraft in work at our Tulsa production facility.”

While the company did not provide an exact date for the turn over of the first operational aircraft, it says the programme is “on track” and that aircraft will be delivered following the completion of certification activities.

At the SOF Week conference in May, L3Harris president of ISR Jason Lambert told FlightGlobal the company planned to deliver the first operational aircraft by year-end. L3Harris has been completing OA-1K flight testing and certification in Waco, Texas, while final assembly takes place Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Ryan FinnertyRyan Finnerty is the Americas defence reporter for FlightGlobal.com and Flight International magazine, covering military aviation and the defence industry. He is a former United States Army officer and previously reported for America’s National Public Radio system in New York and Hawaii covering energy, economics and military affairs.View full Profile

16. ‘Men of War’ Review: A Delirious Doc About a Former Green Beret Trying to Overthrow the Venezuelan Government

Excerpt:

Gatien and Corben weave all these strands together in an engrossing tale, or rather, several competing narratives. There’s Goudreau, whose stated idealism undeniably was only part of why he got involved with these various figures’ plot to send a platoon of dissidents into Caracas to topple the government — the fact he was offered over $200 million for the mission was certainly a huge part of it. There’s Rendon and all the others interviewed for the film or captured in archival footage by Goudreau himself, who deliberately occupy a place of plausible deniability: If Goudreau’s coup attempt, Operation Gideon, had succeeded when it was launched in early 2020, they’d stand to gain. If it failed, they could deny involvement. (Spoiler alert: Operation Gideon did not succeed.)

‘Men of War’ Review: A Delirious Doc About a Former Green Beret Trying to Overthrow the Venezuelan Government

Indiewire · by Christian Blauvelt · September 7, 2024

The fog of war, men searching for meaning in senseless situations, and the fraught interplay of competing drafts of history are themes that have popped up quite a bit in documentaries and narrative features premiering at the fall festivals this year. None of these have been built on quite as mercurial and ever-shifting a foundation as Jen Gatien and Billy Corben‘s documentary “Men of War,” a nothing-is-what-it-seems head trip about a former Green Beret who tried and failed to overthrow the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela.

It’s such a complicated film, it’s easy for a viewer to get lost. But hey, so did its subjects.

Jordan Goudreau knew he wanted to be in the U.S. Army since he was a kid obsessed with playing “war” and dressing in combat fatigues. The fact that he was Canadian did not dissuade him. He knew he would likely not get to see combat in the Canadian Army, so he trained to be a Green Beret in the U.S. Throughout “Men of War,” he talks with reverence about his time in warzones and still says that he wants to fight for, and even die for, anyone who is oppressed. That’s a little harder because the U.S. Army recommended he not be retained after his years of service due to signs of unresolved PTSD. Throughout the film, the fortysomething Goudreau speaks with such an intense, unblinking resolve, it’s like he lives “in the moment” perpetually. And though that can have its value, particularly in a combat situation, it’s clearly resulted in an inability to see the bigger picture at times.

As such, around 2019, upon entering into “contract work” — better known as mercenary work — he fell in with various members of the Venezuelan opposition to that nation’s government, ruled with an iron fist and flagrant disregard for democratic norms by Maduro. There was an ex-Hugo Chavez general who opposes Maduro named Cliver Alcala. There was Maduro’s outright rival, thought by many to have legitimately won a recent presidential election, Juan Guaido. And there was a Miami-penthouse-dwelling Venezuelan dissident named J.J. Rendon, who has a major thing for ninjas.

Not to mention, as might be expected, several high-ranking figures of the Trump administration entered Goudreau’s life as well, including Keith Schiller, the head of Oval Office Operations for the then president and his longtime bodyguard for years beforehand.

Gatien and Corben weave all these strands together in an engrossing tale, or rather, several competing narratives. There’s Goudreau, whose stated idealism undeniably was only part of why he got involved with these various figures’ plot to send a platoon of dissidents into Caracas to topple the government — the fact he was offered over $200 million for the mission was certainly a huge part of it. There’s Rendon and all the others interviewed for the film or captured in archival footage by Goudreau himself, who deliberately occupy a place of plausible deniability: If Goudreau’s coup attempt, Operation Gideon, had succeeded when it was launched in early 2020, they’d stand to gain. If it failed, they could deny involvement. (Spoiler alert: Operation Gideon did not succeed.)

The filmmakers even have extensive interviews with Alcala, speaking to him over shaky Facetime, because he’s now in a U.S. prison. At some point it appears that the other Venezuelan opposition forces may have sold the ex-general out to the DEA for earlier crimes, as they feared he might take power himself if Operation Gideon succeeded. And there’s also the brother of one of the American ex-Special Ops soldiers who Goudreau enlisted for the cause, who emphatically alleges that Goudreau led these Americans into certain doom, claiming that he goaded them on until they were in fact captured.

No one is right and everyone is wrong here, and it’s a knot of plotting and backstabbing and misguided intentions and stated aims versus indifferent execution that makes what happened almost impossible to parse. And that’s the point, clearly. What is the truth when literally everyone involved is living their own separate version of the truth? There’s definitely a metaphor for the forever wars mindset in the U.S. for the past 20 years, of a feeling that some causes are worth pursuing even if you’re not sure why. But of course it turns out that some of the opposition forces here that Goudreau apparently believed in so much may have only wanted to enrich themselves: To weaponize people’s hatred of the Maduro regime and profit on that hatred to their own ends. There’s a suggestion that some of them are in fact covertly working for the regime.

Certainly, the Trump administration officials who decried Maduro endlessly to appeal to Venezuelan expat voters in South Florida had no real intention on any follow through. This is a portrait of what happens in the U.S. government when comms strategy replaces actual policy. You end up with something like Operation Gideon, not even a Bay of Pigs-level fiasco. More, as it was called at the time, a Bay of Piglets.

Goudreau is an undeniably compelling lead character for “Men of War.” He’ll issue a stunning quote like this: “I learned that this government is not worth fighting for. I learned that people are worth fighting for. And if there are people who are oppressed, send me. I’ll fucking fight and die, man. I hate to say that, but fucking violence solves problems. Change happens through men with guns. It’s bad, but hey man I guess it gives me good job security at least.” And then he immediately breaks into tears because he’s in D.C. and hears “Taps” playing in the distance.

An unexamined life such as this can lead to a downward spiral. Twenty years of an unexamined national psyche can lead to catastrophe. For our nation, and others.

Grade: B

“Men of War” world premiered at the 2024 Toronto International Film Festival. It is currently seeking U.S. distribution.

Want to stay up to date on IndieWire’s film and critical thoughts? to our newly launched newsletter, In Review by David Ehrlich, in which our Chief Film Critic and Head Reviews Editor rounds up the best reviews, streaming picks, and offers some new musings, all only available to subscribers.

Indiewire · by Christian Blauvelt · September 7, 2024

17. When Students Become Terrorists

Excerpts:

In this respect, we may be living through a different worst-case scenario to Americans of the ’70s. Not bombings and domestic terrorism, but something shocking nonetheless: Universities, charitable foundations, law schools, and multimillionaires operating in concert with revolutionaries on campus who have begun to call for “Death to America.”

In other words, the danger today is no longer subterranean; it’s the weather overground.

Leaders of the radical student group the Weathermen march at the ‘Days of Rage’ protests over the trial of the Chicago Seven in 1969. (Photo by David Fenton via Getty Images)

When Students Become Terrorists

https://www.thefp.com/p/when-students-become-terrorists

The Weather Underground railed against the establishment. Today’s campus protesters are supported by it. Call them the Weather Overground.

By Eli Lake

September 7, 2024

Last year, American universities exploded with protests over a war half a world away in Gaza. In solidarity with the perpetrators of October 7, keffiyeh-clad students covered campus grounds with “encampments,” took over buildings, waved the flags of terrorists, and menaced Jewish classmates.

As fall semesters begin this week, some major universities—from NYU to UCLA—have implemented new rules to protect Jewish students from the protesters who declared sections of campus no-go zones for “Zionists,” which often just meant Jews.

Nonetheless, the chaos appears to be returning.

A week ago, at Temple University, protesters marched in solidarity with Palestinian “resistance against their colonizers.” As students returned to class at the University of Pittsburgh, a man attacked a group of Jewish students with a bottle. Meanwhile, at the University of Michigan, four protesters were arrested during a “die-in.”

“The longer the war in Gaza, the longer the unrest in the Middle East continues, the greater the fertile ground for an escalation or expansion of protests,” Bruce Hoffman, a Brookings Institution scholar and expert on domestic terrorism, told The Free Press. Hoffman believes serious violence is not out of the question, if campus encampments are dismantled and protesters become convinced they are the victims of an oppressive state bent on usurping their rights.

History teaches that a few true believers can do plenty of damage once they decide that boycotts and sit-ins aren’t making a difference. It’s therefore worth considering a worst-case scenario, in which a vanguard decides demonstrations are not enough. That’s what happened in the late 1960s when a small band of radicals moved from protest to violent resistance. They were known as the Weathermen, and like today’s student protesters, they emerged from the Ivy League and other elite universities.

Between 1969 and 1974, this small gang of violent, far-left intellectuals bombed Congress, police stations, courthouses, and the Pentagon. They changed their identities to avoid detection, dyed their hair, and lived off-grid, while working to destroy the “imperialist” country they detested. The Weathermen were motivated by their disgust with the Vietnam War, a war their generation was conscripted to fight. In their eyes, this great crime made the nation irredeemable.

America needed a second revolution, by any means necessary.

The leaders of the Weathermen, also known as the Weather Underground, did not rise from poverty or want. Most came from good families and attended the best schools: Columbia, Cornell, Michigan, the University of Chicago. In fact, the Weathermen are mocked in Radical Chic, Tom Wolfe’s iconic send-up of elites besotted with radicals who want to destroy the social order they sit atop.

These leaders included Mark Rudd, the star of Columbia’s student uprising in 1968, and his classmate John Jacobs, an amphetamine-addicted theorist of revolution known as J.J. Beside them were Bill Ayers, a scruffy organizer and saboteur, who grew up in a well-heeled Chicago family, and his future wife, Bernardine Dohrn, a former cheerleader with a law degree who was the driving force behind the group.

Indeed, it was Dohrn who made the evening news with Walter Cronkite with a recorded message announcing the group’s 1970 fall offensive, in which she claimed responsibility for destruction across the nation. “Now we are everywhere,” she said. “And next week, families and tribes will attack the enemy around the country. We are not just attacking targets. We are bringing a pitiful, helpless giant to its knees.”

She issued a warning to President Nixon and members of his administration: “Come to the high schools and campuses, but guard your planes. Guard your colleges. Guard your children. Guard your doors.”

Listen to her message, and you’ll hear the sound of an American nightmare.

What leads a person to put down their placard and pick up a gun? This is what fascinates me: the plunge a radical takes from protest to resistance. The West German terrorist Ulrike Meinhof defined the distinction as follows: “Protest is when I say I don’t like this. Resistance is when I put an end to what I don’t like.”

In resisting a system that had plotted and funded what they saw as a genocide in Vietnam, the Weathermen believed anything—sabotage, bombings, bank robberies, even murder—was acceptable.

The roots of the Weathermen go back to 1969, the year Charles Manson’s death cult committed its crimes; the year hell broke loose at the Rolling Stones concert at Altamont Speedway in California. The nation was still reeling from 1968—the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had raised a question: What now for America? In West Germany, radicals were setting department stores and publishing houses ablaze. Perhaps it’s easy to see why, in 1968, some Americans thought violence was the answer.

The aftermath of the bombing of NYC police headquarters building by an offshoot of the SDS on June 9, 1970. (Photo by David Fenton via Getty Images)

At the time, campus protests across the country fell under the banner of Students for a Democratic Society, or SDS. But at the SDS convention in June 1969, internal disputes threatened to break the group apart. In fact, this convention turned out to be a pivotal moment for the American left.

A battle for control raged between two radical factions: Progressive Labor, traditional Marxists who believed the student movement should empower workers to seize the means of production, and the New Wave. The latter was composed of the future leaders of the Weathermen, whose politics are best summed up as black liberation at home, third-world revolution abroad.

You might hear an echo of these politics in the student left of today: In the last five years, the two causes that have most animated them have been Black Lives Matter and the Palestinian struggle against Israel.

In short, 1969 was perhaps the year the old left gave way to the left we all recognize.

Within SDS, the momentum was with the New Wave, with Dohrn and her comrades at the helm. They orchestrated a coup of sorts, seizing control of SDS headquarters, its petty cash fund, and the printing press. The following month, Dohrn led a delegation to Cuba, where she posed for adoring profiles in Cuban magazines and met with representatives of the Viet Cong, who presented her group with rings forged from the steel of downed U.S. aircraft.

By this point, her organization was known as the Weathermen, taking their name from the Bob Dylan lyric they’d quoted in their position paper at the SDS convention: You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.

Once they returned to the States, the Weathermen fanned out across America and set up collectives in major cities—Chicago, Seattle, Cleveland, New York. The focus that summer was on recruiting young people for an organized riot that would place the Weather Underground on the national stage. It would be known as the “Days of Rage.”

It was meant to be four days of chaos in Chicago, a deliberate escalation of the anti-war and civil rights marches of the 1960s. The radicals were not just preparing for angry cops swinging billy clubs; they were arming themselves to initiate the conflict. They pledged to bring the war home.

It began with the bombing of a statue commemorating police who died in clashes with labor activists in 1886. The blast shattered 100 windows in downtown Chicago. Miraculously, no one was killed. Two days later, a few hundred angry Weathermen arrived at Lincoln Park in football helmets, gas masks, and goggles. They had packed baseball bats, among other crude weapons, useful for smashing windows.

But while they did break a lot of glass, by any other measure the “Days of Rage” were a bust. The Weathermen had spent months recruiting what they had hoped would be thousands of youths willing to rampage. Instead, they ended up with a few hundred. What’s more, their fellow radicals thought it was a terrible idea. Even the Black Panthers, whom the Weathermen adored, distanced themselves from this bunch of privileged college grads who had turned themselves into a violently futile American insurgency.

The Weathermen were undeterred by the failure. They were part of a global revolution, and even if some of their allies didn’t know which way the wind was blowing, it didn’t mean the students were wrong.

In the final week of 1969, the Weathermen held what the author Bryan Burrough called “the pep rally from hell” in his illuminating book Days of Rage. Others called it “The Wargasm.”

It was held in Flint, Michigan, in a rundown dance hall with shotgun holes in the door. The Weathermen had decked out the place with posters of their heroes: Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung, Malcolm X, and Eldridge Cleaver. Above the stage, they hung a giant six-foot cardboard machine gun. During the day, they practiced karate and did calisthenics. In the evening, they sat through speech after speech on the glories of violent revolution and killing police officers.

After Flint, the Weather Underground unleashed a campaign of bombings. They weren’t as lethal or well-planned as attacks by other terror organizations of the period, such as the IRA. And the relatively low body count is cited by those looking to retrospectively brand the Weathermen as essentially nonviolent. Ayers, in his memoir Fugitive Days, paints the group as fundamentally opposed to killing civilians. But the Weathermen weren’t trying to avoid bloodshed; in fact, their intent was clearly murderous.

A few months after the Wargasm, Weathermen placed dynamite bombs at a busy police station in Detroit as well as at the Detroit Police Officers Association. The bombs were found before they were detonated, thanks to an FBI informant, but the organization had meant to kill.

In Berkeley, meanwhile, a former Weathermen associate told authorities that the group was responsible for a nail bomb at the Park Police station that killed two policemen in February 1970. This case was never prosecuted.

And in New York City, a Weatherwoman named Cathy Wilkerson—a graduate of Andover Academy and Swarthmore College—enabled her comrades to turn her father’s Greenwich Village townhouse into a bomb factory. The plan was to place a massive explosive device at a dance for noncommissioned officers at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Had the plan worked, hundreds of young GIs would have perished. But a faulty timer detonated as the terrorists were assembling their bombs, killing Terry Robbins, a leader in the New York faction, and two other comrades, Diane Oughton and Ted Gold.

Cathy Wilkerson managed to escape, and went on the run for almost a decade. Meanwhile, Dohrn and others were placed on the FBI’s most-wanted list.

Firefighters in the Greenwich Village neighborhood of New York, which was rocked by three explosions on March 6, 1970, while members of the Weathermen constructed bombs in the townhouses. (Photo by Marty Lederhandler)

After the townhouse disaster, the Weathermen adopted a new strategy. No more killing. Their bombs would be warnings, not weapons. The plan was that an operative would call in a bomb threat at a politically symbolic building—a university weapons lab, the Pentagon, or a courthouse—usually late in the evening. Once it had been evacuated, there would be an explosion.

These attacks succeeded in being deeply symbolic. A late-night explosion on the Senate side of the U.S. Capitol in March 1971, for instance, sent shockwaves around the country, with the Senate majority leader describing it as “sacrilegious.”

By this point, the Weathermen were the FBI’s public enemy number one. In the spring of 1970, the bureau’s director, J. Edgar Hoover, sent an emergency memo to field offices in cities where the Weathermen were suspected to be operating, demanding his operatives do everything in their power to stop the radicals. This directive backfired massively.

The FBI, in this era, was a law unto itself. The bureau illegally surveilled hundreds of people and groups it deemed threats to the state. It spied on the Weathermen and even their friends and families without getting permission from a judge or a U.S. attorney.

Concerned that the FBI’s lawbreaking and corner-cutting would be revealed in court, the Justice Department did the unthinkable: It pulled back from prosecution of the Weathermen. In order to save its skin, the establishment let the bombers get away.

And eventually, it punished the men who had pursued them. In 1980, senior FBI leaders who had authorized wiretapping and bugging the Weathermen were convicted of violating the constitutional rights of their targets.

Donald Strickland, one of the FBI agents who had investigated the radical group, summed up his frustration: “We did all this stuff, risking our lives every day, putting our lives on the line,” Strickland said. “And we end up being the villains! And these Weathermen scumbags end up being the fucking Robin Hoods!”

It was quite the reversal.

By 1980, Dohrn and Ayers had been in hiding for a decade. But a few weeks after senior FBI leaders were convicted, they turned themselves in. Many of the charges against them had been dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct. Dohrn accepted a plea bargain to misdemeanor charges of aggravated battery and bail jumping, paid a $1,500 fine, and was sentenced to three years probation. Ayers wasn’t charged at all.

Some comrades threw them a dinner party in New York to mark the occasion. “It was gourmet food, fine wines, first growth Bordeaux,” one Weatherman, Brian Flanagan, recalled in an interview with Burrough, the Days of Rage author. Flanagan was arrested during the Days of Rage and charged, among other things, with assaulting a city prosecutor—only to be acquitted.

This is a key, and often overlooked, part of the Weathermen story. They skated, and for the most part, were able to slip comfortably back into society.

Dorhn did serve a seven-month sentence at a women’s prison in New York City in 1982—but not for orchestrating the Days of Rage, or for running an organization that once sought to murder cops and soldiers. No, Dohrn went down for refusing to cooperate with a grand jury.

In 1981, her comrades, David Gilbert and Kathy Boudin, had been part of an attempted robbery on an armored Brink’s truck in Nanuet, New York. In classic Weathermen style, the heist was a debacle: Two cops and a security guard were killed. Dohrn did her brief stint for not ratting on her comrades. Nevertheless, Gilbert and Boudin served lengthy jail sentences.

But they were an exception: Most Weathermen paid no meaningful price for their days as fugitives and terrorists. Many went on to successful careers within the system they once sought to destroy. Dohrn was hired by the prestigious Chicago law firm Sidley Austin. Though she was denied entry to the New York and Illinois bars, she became a law professor at Northwestern University. She founded the American Bar Association’s Children’s Rights Litigation Committee; she is vice chair of the Children’s Rights Division of Human Rights Watch. A distinguished career by any measure.

She also raised Gilbert and Boudin’s child, while they completed their time in prison. That child, Chesa Boudin, won the election to become San Francisco’s district attorney in 2020, and soon stopped prosecuting many crimes in the city. He lost a recall ballot initiative in 2022.

As for Dohrn’s comrades, Eleanor Stein, a Weather Underground leader who penned a book for political activists, became an administrative law judge in New York, and now teaches at Albany Law School. Susan Rosenberg, who served 16 years in federal prison for stockpiling 750 pounds of explosives and was suspected of playing a role in the Brink’s robbery, had a second career in nonprofits. In 2001, she was pardoned by Bill Clinton. She served on the board of the charity that funded Black Lives Matter in the late 2010s.

Bill Ayers went on to become a professor of education at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Since 1999, he has served on the board of the Woods Fund Chicago, which supports community organizers. One of his fellow board members was a state legislator and law professor named Barack Obama.

It was Ayers who wrote, in his 2001 memoir, the perfect epitaph for what became of the Weathermen: “Guilty as hell, free as a bird—it’s a great country.”

The story of how these avowed enemies of the state were welcomed back into the institutions they once wanted to destroy brings us back to this essay’s original question. What is the worst-case scenario for protesters on campus today?

These are young people who, for instance, signed an open letter eleven months ago which began with these words: “We, the undersigned student organizations, hold the Israeli regime entirely responsible for all unfolding violence.” Thirty-one organizations signed this missive, blaming a pogrom on its victims, which was put together by the Harvard Palestine Solidarity Groups. And this was when Israel was still counting its dead, before any retaliation in Gaza. The date was October 8.

In the late 1960s, when campus leftists showed solidarity with the Viet Cong, expressing support for the deaths of American GIs, faculty and administrators were largely horrified by the radical turn of the students. Now, professors and deans at top universities march right alongside them.

Today’s radicals are also supported by the establishment—and the capitalist system—they often profess to disdain. Just look at who has funded the groups causing the most trouble.

The People’s Forum, a group that organized some of the first demonstrations to praise Hamas in New York after October 7, is funded by tech mogul Roy Singham.

Or consider Jewish Voice for Peace, which organized sit-ins in the U.S. Capitol and other public buildings, as well as anti-Zionist encampments at universities last semester. They have received significant funding from pillars of the American establishment, including the Tides Foundation, which in turn received money from George Soros, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, according to an investigation from Politico.

Protesters from Jewish Voice for Peace occupy the Canon House Building in Washington, D.C., the day before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was set to speak before Congress in July 2024. (Photo by Tierney L. Cross via Getty Images)

And then there’s Students for Justice in Palestine. The organization has raised tens of thousands of dollars through donor advisory funds managed by mainstream financial institutions like the Morgan Stanley Global Impact Fund and the Fidelity Investments Charitable Gifts Fund. Maher Bitar, a leader of Students for Justice in Palestine in 2006, is now a senior official on President Biden’s National Security Council, in charge of coordinating defense and intelligence policy.

In this respect, we may be living through a different worst-case scenario to Americans of the ’70s. Not bombings and domestic terrorism, but something shocking nonetheless: Universities, charitable foundations, law schools, and multimillionaires operating in concert with revolutionaries on campus who have begun to call for “Death to America.”

In other words, the danger today is no longer subterranean; it’s the weather overground.

Eli Lake is a Free Press columnist. Follow him on X @EliLake, and click below to listen to him talk about the themes of this essay in a special episode of Honestly:

18. Carrier Captain In Combat: What Went On During 7 Months Under Fire Around The Red Sea

I followed @ChowdahHIll on Twitter as he worked to maintain a connection between his crew and the US and keep up morale.

A good report that provides insights into the human and strategic side.

Excerpts:

Q: What was it like when you saw the results?

A: Eh, just doing the job, right? So a little bit of pride, a little bit like ‘you got the job done, you were supporting the mission.’ So it provides purpose. The mission was to degrade their capability. And then if you put more thought into it, what we were doing was saving other people’s lives, including Navy sailors, but merchant mariners as well. So to me, that was sort of like the implied or unstated mission, and it was something we took a lot of pride in.

Toward the end, we had a few instances where we got to rescue people who had been attacked by Houthis. And that brought a lot of joy and pride to the Strike Group to be involved in those operations. One of them involved the Motor Vessel Tudor. When they started sinking, the [cruiser] Philippine Sea rescued 25 Filipinos, kind of ironic there, and brought them aboard, brought ‘them to the Ike, and then we got to take care of them. And the best part about it is how the sailors on their own got together and said, ‘Hey, we’re gonna take care of these merchant mariners, ’cause they just had a tough time. They lost one of their own.’ And when I came down to visit them, they were singing songs in Tagalog, because we have quite incredible diversity throughout the Navy that we can do things like that. We actually rescued an Indian mariner who speaks, if I get this right, I think it’s Hindi and/or Hindu. I always screw those two up. But we found a sailor who could speak it, and I kept saying, well, how do you know she can actually speak it? Because I wanted someone to do some more thorough translation. And they said, ‘well, she was on her phone with her husband arguing with him for 30 minutes. We’re pretty sure she could speak it.’ So we brought her down. She was a junior sailor, an E-3, and she provided translation. She got to see firsthand what we can do and sort of what America cares about in these situations. And I have to say that there were other countries that I won’t name, that did not participate in rescuing these merchant mariners, but we always stepped in when we could.

Q: Why wouldn’t they?

A: I don’t know. Out of convenience or maybe their fear of the threat or lack of care, I don’t know. I honestly don’t know.

Q: Were they part of either Operation Prosperity Guard or Operation Aspides?

A: Oh no, these were not. Our coalition vessels would’ve jumped in at a moment’s notice. These were other merchant vessels from other countries.

Carrier Captain In Combat: What Went On During 7 Months Under Fire Around The Red Sea

We go in-depth with Capt. Chris "Chowdah" Hill about the Eisenhower's grueling and dangerous deployment that faced a bevy of new tactical realities.

Howard Altman, Tyler Rogoway

Posted on Sep 6, 2024 8:52 PM EDT

37 minute read

twz.com · by Howard Altman, Tyler Rogoway

Navy Capt. Christopher “Chowdah” Hill commands the Nimitz class aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower which recently returned from the Middle East. The historic, nine-month deployment saw the ship and its escorts under fire from an array of weapons old and new and ended up being one of the most dangerous and grueling the sea service has experienced since the Korean War. Now the combat-proven skipper opened up to TWZ like never before about what being under constant threat of attack was like and the rapidly changing tactical realities he and thousands of his sailors faced while plowing the waters of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group (IKECSG) was called into the region following the Oct. 7 surprise Hamas attack on Israel. Once there, they battled Houthi rebels repeatedly attacking them and commercial shipping off Yemen’s shores. Collectively, the IKECSG used its various weapons to destroy a bevy of Houthi aerial drones, missiles, uncrewed surface vessels, and undersea vehicles, and different kinds of targets ashore, firing nearly 800 missiles and other munitions in the process. They also helped defend Israel from the first-ever direct attack from Iran.

Navy Capt. Chris “Chowdah” Hill, commander of the Nimitz class aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower. (@Chowdahhill X account)

The Eisenhower and the vessels in the carrier strike group experienced a remarkable number of other firsts.

A U.S. Navy EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jet deployed to the flattop claimed the type’s first air-to-air kill, likely downing a Houthi drone. Growlers from Ike’s air wing also employed AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles (AARGM) for the first time in combat in the course of those operations, including in a strike that destroyed an Mi-24/35 Hind gunship helicopter on the ground that The War Zone was first to confirm. An Arleigh Burke class destroyer attached to the carrier strike group fired the Navy’s newest missiles in combat for the first time. An F/A-18F Super Hornet pilot assigned to the Ike became the first woman in U.S. military history to score an air-to-air kill. It was also the first time anti-ship ballistic missiles were used in combat, a challenging threat Ike and its escorts had to confront on a regular basis.

Here is our in-depth exchange with Hill — a Quincy, Massachusetts native and former E-2C Hawkeye flight officer. Some questions and answers have been slightly edited for brevity and clarity.

Everything Changed Oct. 7

Q: How much was the Middle East on your radar as a major contingency leading up to your cruise and what was it like on Oct. 7th [when Hamas attacked in Israel]? Did you realize everything for your crew was about to change?

A: Prior to Oct. 7th, the crew was pretty excited about a potential port call, multiple port calls to the Mediterranean and the North Sea. We were going to do NATO exercises. Everybody was super pumped about that. And this was important for the crew because prior to that, they had done two back-to-back deployments in 2020 and 2021. So it was a lot of excitement, but again, that all changed on Oct. 7th. Hamas invades Israel, and then we go ahead and deploy a week later. We didn’t really have a mission right away, other than to make best speed to the eastern Med, meet up with the [aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford], take some pictures, provide some presence operations to deter countries around Israel during that time. So it was a big flip. And the thing is, when we go through our workup training, we’re doing a lot of preparation for pretty much anything. We don’t really focus on specific threats each time. We focus it on more of a generic threat because we know that when we get out there, it could be anything. And in this case, it was something. So that’s kind of our approach to it.

An F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter jet, attached to the “Fighting Swordsmen” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 32, takes off from the flight deck aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas Rodrigue MC3 Nicholas Rodriguez

Q: How did the mood on the ship change when you arrived in a very hot free-fire zone where ships are being attacked left and right? This was very obviously unlike anything the Navy has confronted in a long time. What was that like?

A: You know, I haven’t been asked that question, but kind of an interesting thing happened. So we had been talking about the potential for going to war, it’s just what we do when we’re doing workups, and it’s built into our mission and vision statements. And so we went ahead and actually ended up doing that. And I would talk to the crew almost every day and remind them, because a lot of them – a couple of thousand – it was probably their first tour. I kept saying, ‘hey, this is not normal. What we’re doing, this is unprecedented, and everybody here should be so proud of what you’re doing.’ But it’s not something the Navy has done in modern history as far as we know.

Q: So that was quite a revelation I imagine.

A: Oh, yeah. It was just an interesting response, but the fact that I had to keep reminding them that we have a mission and purpose in this theater, our job was to deter or degrade the capability of the enemy. And we were doing just that and reminding people that they were part of that. And that’s important for maintaining morale in difficult situations like that. We didn’t have many port calls. We had two towards the end, so there’d been more than six months before the sailors were really allowed to get off the ship. And that’s happened before historically, but it’s still tough. Morale is super important. It’s what leads to success. We got to see success from our perspective at the micro-tactical level. And the sailors did a super job.

The aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) sails in the Gulf of Aden, Dec.18, 2023. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to support maritime security and stability in the Middle East region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas Rodriguez) The aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower sails in the Gulf of Aden, Dec.18, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas Rodriguez)

Q: As good as the U.S. Navy’s defenses are, there had to be a real worry that a drone or a missile might leak through. What was it like commanding a ship moment-to-moment, knowing there was an opposing force with throngs of drones and anti-ship missiles who really wanted to sink your ship and those in your strike group?

A: Well you have to live your life. You can’t obsess about these things. But we put measures in place. Everything from the ISR intelligence – surveillance, reconnaissance – be able to detect things early enough, station ourselves so there’s plenty of time to react, defense-in-depth built-in with multiple ships in the strike group defending themselves and the aircraft carrier. And then being on an aircraft carrier, when you have plenty of warning, you can launch aircraft. And we’ve launched multiple alert aircraft to respond to threats. And it just became, at some point, routine.

Q: Routine, really?

A: Yeah, you kinda have to make it routine because if you’re living in sort of an extremis situation, a lot of that’s your own doing, right? So you have to set up the manning. When people are sleeping, make sure they have circadian-friendly watch rotations. They have normal days. So I would carefully worry about the manning on the flight deck, so people get adequate sleep. And we got better. We learned over time to massage that, so that we could respond to any threat. And again, it became fairly routine and they were good at it. But again, this is stuff that we had practiced prior to deployment during our composite unit training exercise, which is sort of our capstone event to certify us for deployment. And that’s like a five- to six-week evolution. All carrier strike groups go through it, and it’s pretty intense.

Q: Did the air wing already prepare for major drone barrages before the cruise, or really adapt on the fly? Were you praciticing to deal with the drone barrages?

A: That’s probably something I can’t answer right now.

Aviation Ordnanceman quality checks Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) in preparation for flight operations aboard the Nimitz class aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) in the Red Sea, Feb. 24. (U.S. Navy photo) AE3 Lauren Duval

Q: What’s the big takeaway from dealing with lots of aerial kamikaze drones and drone boats?

A: Some people would say it’s a step up in technology. I don’t think of it that way. It’s still a vehicle that’s weaponized, whether it’s a surface vessel or an air vehicle. It just doesn’t have somebody driving it. Where this provides advantages potentially is the entire network that helps control those vessels. So, you’re not essentially going after just the target. There are other targets associated with it, right? So you can look at it differently in that sense. It brings about its own vulnerabilities, and the other part of it is these things are going rather slowly, so it makes it easier.

Q: Did you see any advancement in the Houthi aerial or sea drone capabilities? Did you see any kind of iterative developments?

A: Yeah, that’s one of those things I can’t really answer, sorry.

The first image of the Houthi drone boat that struck the bulk cargo carrier M/V Tudor.

Q: Was the first shoot down by a Super Hornet an eye-opener? How many did they take down in all?

A: I know there were several dozen shot down by fighter jets. It was not an eye-opener. It was expected, so we knew that eventually, it would happen. So we prepared for it, and then the fighters started executing and they did a superb job.

Q: We saw a new air-to-air missile loadout configuration rushed into service to address this threat. Can you talk a little about how that came about and was subsequently put into play?

A: That’s probably one I can’t answer. But what I can say is anytime there’s a different type of threat out there, we change the configuration of what we load on aircraft, right? And it makes sense. If you’re gonna go after surface vessels, you’re gonna need certain air-to-ground ordnance. Different types of air-to-air threats, you’re gonna put on different ordnance. So that’s pretty easy for us to adapt in just a few hours we can make those changes.

Q: Do you need permission from a higher headquarters to use new weaponry or is that something you can do on the fly?

A: If you’re gonna do something that’s brand new, you’d need to get approved by one of the what do they call it? Yeah. See, this is not my area, but you basically get an in-flight change approved from an offsite organization in the Navy to make sure it would actually work.

An F/A-18E Super Hornet, attached to the “Gunslingers” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 105, launches off the flight deck during flight operations aboard the Nimitz class aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) in the Red Sea, April 20. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to support maritime security and stability in the Middle East region. (Official U.S. Navy photo)

Flying In A Hawkeye

Q: So you’re an E-2 Hawkeye guy. The Screwtops on Ike‘s air wing were among the last squadrons flying the C model over the vastly improved D model. They had to be essential players in the defense of the carrier strike group, and pretty much everything else in the region. Can you talk about some feats they pulled off despite their aging systems?

A: The Hawkeye – no matter what grade or variant and how old it is – its secret weapon is actually the people inside it and their ability to talk on the radio. So you have multiple radios on the aircraft. They go out there and they sort out the situation so that they can make fires more efficient, right? This is something that we’ve been doing in the Hawkeye community back to the late ’60s. And it hasn’t evolved a lot, but the technology has evolved, certainly. The Hawkeye also becomes sort of an intel node where it’s getting a lot of information that it can feed to the fighters to affect the target in a more rapid fashion. So even the E-2C Hawkeye 2000, which the Screwtops had, was very capable on that front. So not only do they have the radios, they have the radar, they have the intel feeds, they can kind of put that all together, put it into a fighter cockpit, and make something happen. And the Screwtops are doing that literally every single day. And I got to fly with them about once a week and get to see it myself.

Q: What was that like?

A: Oh, it was great. The operations became fairly routine and they would just say, ‘here you go, sir. You can control the aircraft.’ And so I would talk on the radio and I was probably at 50% of my original capability, ’cause the last time I flew seriously was 10 years ago. But I fumbled through it and we got the job done.

U.S. Navy Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) 2nd Class Brandon Frayde guides an E-2C Hawkeye, attached to the “Screwtops” of Airborne Command and Control Squadron (VAW) 123, to launch during flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) in the Red Sea, Nov. 5, 2023. The Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to support maritime security and stability in the Middle East region. (U.S. MC3 Janae Chambers

Q: What was the most challenging thing you experienced while you were up there?

A: There weren’t too many challenging things, but it was frequently very busy, and getting to work with the fighters and pass them targets to destroy, I got to do that. And that, again, was a fairly routine thing that the Hawkeye guys were doing quite frequently.

Q: How many carrier skippers get to do that?

A: Every carrier skipper has the opportunity to do it but it depends on what platform they’re comfortable with. So, for instance, a Hornet pilot might want to fly the Hornet. The previous XO that we had flew in the Hornet as well, and I could fly in the Hornet. I did a lot of flights in the F-18 and a few in the Growler as well, just to kind of mix it up, but I was most comfortable in the platform that I flew for almost 20 years. So towards the end, I just flew in the Hawkeye every week.

This is what happens when a Hawkeye crew walks to their aircraft… pic.twitter.com/APLJVgZ4EQ

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) February 7, 2024

Q: Can you talk about any of the targets that you were involved in taking out?

A: Just in general, I could say that the targets were surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, surface-to-air missile systems, enemy radars, anytime they had missiles queuing up, that kind of stuff. Pretty much the standard targets that you would have in this situation. So trying to get after things before they actually get airborne.

A Deployment Of Firsts

Q: So many firsts on this cruise tactically speaking. Anti-ship ballistic missiles came into play in a big way. How did your teams adapt to that and what are your thoughts on how they change things for future naval operations?

A: I think there are some potential lessons learned here for the future of naval operations with the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which other countries have. So we got a lot of lessons learned from a technical perspective on how to change our tactics, techniques, and procedures. That was all good. So a lot of learning that can be applied to future fights potentially, and it was also just great to see the sailors perform just like they trained. Because again, going back into the workup cycle, we practiced against this fairly regularly, and it was just kind of rote memorization, how they responded, and just did a super job.

Q: What lessons did you learn about drone boats?

A: When there is a new threat or a different kind of threat, we unpack it to the Nth degree and then find the vulnerabilities on our own. Nobody else is telling us to do this. It’s just what we do. And a lot of that was occurring inside the ship by junior sailors, junior officers, like, ‘hey, how could we do better?’ And then we’d apply that change sometimes the same day or the next day, and it would make a difference. Now, I can’t go into the particulars and exactly what we did, but it was just sort of the mindset that we have. We’re not gonna just let it happen, right? If we can do better and be more efficient, we’re gonna find a way to do it. So it’s just this relentless pursuit of perfection and excellence that is sort of ingrained in our culture in naval aviation and the U.S. Navy.

Q: The after-action reports on this will be historic and probably taught at the Naval War College and other places, I imagine.

A: Yeah, possibly. We’re still doing a lot of briefs and passing on the lessons learned all the way down to the software-level detail. We’ll take a lot of lessons. We learned a lot of lessons with the USS Mason and the USS Nitze in 2016 when they were attacked. We learned a lot of lessons from ship driving in 2017 when we had a couple of accidents that were pretty catastrophic. So all these things have just made us better and better over time. Do we have room to grow? Absolutely. There’s no doubt about it, but we have the culture to get better, so we just keep working on it.

Q: Many of the kinetic missions were flown over Houthi territory. It wasn’t heavily contested airspace, but they did have a proven SAM threat. If something went wrong, were you ready to pluck them out of the water and get them out?

A: I can’t go into the details, but as with any strike mission, we always have a side planning effort for combat search and rescue. So we’re probably not going to do these missions unless we have that in place, the CSAR mission. So we had CSAR in place for the entire time there.

U.S. Navy Lt. Justin Roberts, left and Lt. Charles Jinks signal to aircraft during flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) Jan. 17, 2024. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Zachary Elmore) MC2 Zachary Elmore

Q: Your surface combatant escorts did an amazing job all the way around. What were some of the most memorable things you saw as they performed what had to be an incredibly stressful job being attacked themselves fairly regularly and protecting the carrier and the strike group and all the merchant vessels?

A: From the aircraft carrier perspective, our main battery is to get the jets off the deck and also the Hawkeye to provide the command and control. So in order for that entire process to happen – long story short – I need my catapults to work. I need my flight deck personnel to preposition the aircraft. If it’s not during normal flight ops. I need to make sure that the alerts are manned, set, and ready. So when we call it away, we can put a person in the cockpit and then fly.

Watching that whole process is also the upload of the weapons. We have to assume that if you’re setting alert, you don’t know what the threat is going to be exactly. So you have to have a mixed package of weaponry and make sure that the whole process works, which it did. And like I said, we had many instances of making that happen and then getting them out there. But again, a lot of this also relies on defense-in-depth, having multiple ships out there, radars on-station, and exquisite intel to give us heads up so we can make this happen. And that process worked.

F/A-18 Super Hornets launch from USS Dwight D. Eisenhower supporting strikes against on Iranian-Backed Houthi Targets on Feb. 24. pic.twitter.com/bTtRdsCkwg

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) February 25, 2024

Q: The carrier strike group participated in defending against the first direct Iranian attack on Israel. What role did you play and that must’ve been a wild twist in a large number of ways?

A: So for that large attack, all I can say is that we did participate in some way. Just our mere presence in the Red Sea prevents missiles from being the pathway, if you will, to Israel. So that was part of it. There were ships that were providing defense to Israel directly in the eastern Med. And so we were pre-positioned to support them the best way we could. That was the role we played.

Q: Are you able to talk about the use of SM-3 at all? It was the first combat use of that weapon.

A: I think that what you just said is what needs to be said and it was effective.

Q: The whole thing was pretty historic.

A: Yeah, pretty historic. And we’ve talked about that fact a lot. Nine-month deployment, it was supposed to be seven, six and a half months spent in the Red Sea and the sailors performed admirably. But when this happens, you sort of have to sustain it. You join the Navy to see the world. We didn’t get to see a lot of the world, go into port calls, which is the quintessential Navy thing. And we also go to port calls to do maintenance on the ship to fix things that can’t otherwise be done at sea. That eventually happened towards the end of deployment. And then the next part for us was, how can we make sure we adequately and rapidly reward the sailors for the good work that they did? So there’s a big effort to put in for various medals and other items to make sure that the sailors were amply rewarded. And I’ll tell you I probably signed 2,000 different types of awards for my own sailors. My crew is about 3,000, even though I have 5,000 on the ship, but 3,000 I’m directly responsible for and making sure they were rewarded and some people would say, ‘Hey, you know what? They were just doing their job,’ and yeah, they were doing their job, but they’re also doing their job without any knowledge of when they would go home for nine months in a threat weapons engagement zone. And they made things happen in combat to help save lives. So let’s reward them amply. And so we can work on things like retention and retaining sailors for the future.

Q: The carrier strike group expended a lot of munitions during this time. Can you talk about the challenge of expending so many munitions and at-sea replenishment?

A: There were some I can’t really talk to – the cruisers and destroyers. From the aircraft carrier perspective, we had onboard more than enough to handle even several more months at sea because of the huge size of an aircraft carrier. I mean, our weapons magazines, we could probably fit two ships inside them alone. So that wasn’t a concern, although we do worry about missile conservation. You don’t want to be doing this willy-nilly. So we always made sure that we were picking the right weapon for the right target so it would be more efficient that way. But at the end of the day after not considering all the strikes that we did to degrade their capability, when it comes to defending ships you expend what you need to save the crew. And I don’t think anybody disagrees with that.

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group expended 770 missiles and other munitions at Houthi targets over the course of a recently concluded nine-month deployment. Capt. Chris “Chowdah” Hill/USN

Q: The first woman pilot to shoot down an enemy aerial threat happened to be on this deployment. Can you talk a little about that and anything about the pilot?

A: I really can’t, because I didn’t realize this until after the fact that this occurred. I’m not going to speak for the woman herself, but they would probably say, ‘Hey, we’re just doing our job’ and so we kind of make a big thing of it and that’s fine because it is inspiring to a lot of people, no doubt. But from her perspective, she probably felt she was just doing her job. We had a similar instance in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. I was told that we had the first female to drop a bomb in combat, and this was a four-day operation against Saddam Hussein’s forces after he kicked out weapons inspectors. But at any rate, again, it’s one of those things that the media kind of discovered it after the fact. And for us, we’re just like, ‘Hey, she’s one of us. We’re all professionals.’

Q: How did you discover it?

A: Oh, I discovered it via social media. I saw someone else post something and I don’t know where they got the information.

Q: What did you think about when you saw that on social media?

A: Oh, I was like, you know what? I’m not surprised. Now, if you think about it, it wasn’t until 1994 that we allowed women to serve on combat ships. And in fact, the USS Dwight D Eisenhower was the first ship to allow women to serve on it. For a lot of the young sailors, it seems like so long ago. For me, this was in my lifetime. This was while I was in the Navy and I got to see that change. I was going through ROTC at Tufts University in 1994 and I remember the women in the unit were at MIT. They were pretty excited that they now had opportunities to serve in combat like the rest of us. So I joined at an age where it was just normal to be serving with women. This is what we do. And we fight together, we go down together. Right? And so it doesn’t really shock us, like it does to the outside world. You know what I mean?

Q: So for the crew, this was no big deal?

A: No. I mean, there is a pride, but it’s just expected at this point. I do tell my women sailors, I’m like, ‘hey, you guys take for granted that this, what we’re doing now is new. And I think a lot of you are in roles that probably a woman has never served in. It just, you didn’t realize it to now until now.’ Right. We had the first African-American reactor officer as a Navy captain on the ship. And she didn’t really want to talk about that either. Right. She just wanted to do her job excellently, which she did do, but that was a source of pride for a lot of junior sailors as well. So mixed emotions, but all positive at the end of the day.

Writing The Book On Morale

Q: We saw all types of new morale boosters from you and on your very popular social media account. From your sports bar-like area to Demo the support dog. How did you come up with all this and what worked and what didn’t? What do you think will be adopted Navy-wide?

A: So we looked at morale in sort of on a spectrum of options you can do to improve it. The theory is if I can improve morale, I’m going to have success in inspections, combat – people are going to care more. And it’s important to understand what morale is and is not. Morale is not necessarily happiness. Morale is something deeper. It’s spiritual. It’s about motivation. It’s highly tied to job satisfaction. That would be sort of like the civilian equivalent. ‘Do I like coming to work?’ Right? ‘Do I want to feel like a part of the work’s mission?’ So we first have to understand that. Step two is you have to get into, ‘hey, I have to make sure all leaders are loving and valuing their sailors.’ We cannot be afraid to use the word love and we have to show it. And I can give a whole menu, we don’t have time, of all the things you can do to show that you value sailors.

We have to make sure they understand mission and purpose. So discussing the mission. And then when they do something, you recognize it publicly that, ‘Hey, we just did our mission.’ And this kind of increases our sense of purpose and feel like we’re part of something greater than ourselves. So that’s the big picture. Now, what else can you do? Well, things like food, right? Food’s important. We take it for granted ’cause we have food and we get replenished almost every week when we’re out to sea. I know sailors still complain about the food. That’s normal. And I say, ‘Hey, why don’t you go on a submarine?’ Right. And then I, of course, now I just offended the submarine guys, because they are very good at utilizing the little amount of food that they do have. So there’s a lot of pride in that world, but food’s important. I mean, we had ice cream socials every single week, of course, taco Tuesdays, pizza on Saturdays, things that you could look forward to. And then resiliency is also tied to morale.

Supplies being flown aboard the Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Facebook page)

We added an additional licensed clinical social worker. We had a civilian-deployed resiliency counselor that could provide therapy. We had a psychologist. So if anyone’s having a tough time or they’re going through a crisis, there was someone there for them to talk to. And then you go to step three. It’s like, okay what what can people do on their limited free time? Well, how about we collaborate with the USO and we create a USO center? So they came in and we refurbished an entire space. It looks like a pub, but you can play video games. You can hold events there. People would reserve it just to have a function, if you will, maybe have a cake or birthday, whatever. We had the facility dog Demo, whose job is to – he’s trained to reduce stress. And Demo was my friend. We hung out several times. I gave him snacks. He put on 15 pounds on deployment. So we’re working on that right now.

Demo is a trained facility dog. He lives on the ship and interacts with crew. His job is to reduce stress and improve quality of life. He did a great job on the recent combat deployment! pic.twitter.com/hCXahhkCKW

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) September 3, 2024

And then finally, having the Wi-Fi. I don’t throw around the word game-changer a lot, but this was a game-changer. And why is it? It’s because this allowed people to near instantaneously when they needed to, on-demand, talk to their external support network, the people that care about you. I realize on the ship you’re still required to be loved and valued. And leadership has to do that. But it’s not the same as mom and dad or your spouse or your best friend and girlfriend or boyfriend to be able to talk to them, especially after nine months of deployment. With my 12-year-old, we were communicating via memes. Right. I guess that’s how you communicate. But it was great. I felt like I was connected every single day. And so I can’t really understate the value of that. But it was just amazing.

And then this also offered the opportunity to do social media. And so, I’m taking some risks here. We’re in an operational environment. Can I get out there and say, ‘here are the sailors and show pictures of them and do some goofy stuff just ’cause I’m a goofy person?’ I’m not going to change my personality. And so I did that. And I found very quickly that my account was discovered by moms and dads and spouses. And they wanted to see pictures of their sons and daughters and spouses. So I said, ‘Okay, I’ll bring them up to the bridge, give them a cookie. It’s a nice gesture. And then post that.’ And people were just ecstatic. And so then I started to get thousands of requests and I just could not keep up with it. But part of morale is sailor recognition. And we tried everything we could. We had a warrior of the day celebrated every day. We had the cookie sailor, which was requested by mom and dad, sailors of the quarter, sailors of the year for all the different departments had it as well.

A cookie compilation! https://t.co/YgCKRGrdfX

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) July 10, 2024

Anytime I would get on the 1MC or the PA system, I would have people kind of feed me. ‘Hey, can you give a shout-out to so-and-so for doing this, that, and the other thing?’ And so I would just say people’s names. People love the sound of their own names, whether they say it or not. And then we go through that. So it’s just that’s kind of the spectrum of morale. A book should be written on it. I’m actually trying to write one. I just don’t have the time to get through it.

Q: What’s it going to be called?

A: Well, the philosophy, I call it ‘The Way of the Warriors Sailor.’ But I think there’s applicability to the civilian world, I think. I haven’t been a civilian for a long time, but so people tell me. So maybe it’ll just be called that and people can take what they can from it.

A: I look forward to reading it. Do you think any of these things will be adapted Navy-wide?

A: No, I don’t think it would. It’s just not how our system’s built. However, I have got the attention of some of the key people that matter to me, like the folks at our leadership schools – some of the leadership at the nuclear naval reactors, and they’re in charge of the nuclear sailors. And I think they need some of this, and I think it would help them and spread to other ships. They’re requesting feedback on what they can do better to teach it. I’ve also gotten requests from various entities in the U.S. Army and from Army leadership schools and that sort of thing. So I just feed them my philosophy. It’s like a little document, about 26 pages, and it goes over a lot of these items in more depth.

Q: What would you like to see adopted? What would be the most important thing you’d like to see happen?

A: Well, I think it’s important to go big and not be afraid to use terms like ‘to love and value,’ and then really understand what mission and purpose is, and truly understand what morale is. In naval regulations, the commanding officer is required to care about the morale of his people. But the thing is, we don’t really teach how to do that, right? A lot of our training is focused on ethics and character building, and that’s all important. But that next step is how do you transform an organization? What can I do? What can I say? That’s the kind of training I think we need to get a little bit more into. So I feel like people are listening, which is good. But again, I don’t make the decisions on these things. I’m just one guy.

Q: Talking about Wi-Fi and morale, did you follow the Navy Times story about the USS Manchester and the surreptitious Wi-Fi system that the chief’s mess installed?

A: Yeah, so there are some pitfalls in going this alone. And I think those articles address some of these issues. Like if you’re going to install a Wi-Fi system, there needs to be controls in place for security purposes to monitor some of the traffic, to be able to turn it off instantly if you have to, for whatever reason, to save the ship. And I would presume, and I don’t know the full story behind it, but this cannot be done willy-nilly. And I think that was part of the issue with that one.

Q: Is an antenna on your ship that you don’t know about a security threat?

A: I would think so. But if you think about it – I’m not a computer guy, right? There is a PII, Personally Identifiable Information. So potentially someone can hack into that and get into your phone, I guess. That could be a problem. But it’s not connected to the ship system. So I don’t think there’s any threat there. But it’s something we have to be cognizant of. Sometimes you have to turn it off.

Q Could it be a beacon for adversarial signals intelligence?

A: Oh, yeah, for sure. It could be a beacon. So that’s why there are instances where you have to shut it off. And it has to be centrally controlled and part of a process. So that’s absolutely correct.

Q: What was your biggest takeaway on leadership after captaining one of the world’s most powerful warships during a time of combat?

A: Well, the first thing is you can’t please everybody, right? Despite the best efforts of all my leaders to follow the way of the warrior sailor – and they were believers in it – there were setbacks. And some people don’t buy into it. Some people could have pre-existing conditions or mental health issues that just kind of take over. We can’t control the morale of what happens at home. That’s the second problem. You could be going through a divorce or you could be getting dumped by a girlfriend or something. Those things I can’t control. And those are high morale issues. But we can control what we can control.

And then, of course, the enemy has a vote, right? So they may say, you know what, the enemy decides that we’re not going to do a port call for six and a half months. And that’s just the way it’s going to have to be. And that’s kind of what we dealt with. And that’s fine. We could go indefinitely. It’s just a nice thing to have to decompress once in a while. So dealing with that. All that built-up morale credit could slowly disappear if you don’t fight for it. So constantly staying positive, constantly doing your basic principles of recognizing sailors because you love and value them, constantly reminding them of their mission and purpose and that every single sailor matters in the mission. And sometimes you have to repeat it over and over because there were times when security sailors would come up to me, ‘Sir, you never talk about security enough.’ And I said, ‘I talked about you guys last week,’ right? So I need to do the repetition thing, rapid, repetitive, relentless, positive communications, R3P is what I call it. It’s hard for me to say the three R’s in a row.

Q: Any takeaways from this deployment that you think might be applicable to a high-end fight against China?

A: Yeah. Some of the logistical challenges, the resiliency challenges, and some of the stuff we learned with regard to drones and missiles. I think all of it is applicable in a future fight. And that’s the kind of lessons learned we’re already sharing. And everyone agrees on that.

Q: Taco Tuesdays aboard the Ike became famous thanks to your tweets about them. What is the Chowdah Hill go-to taco on Tuesdays?

A: I am so old school, low-budget guy. I’ll take a plain old taco shell with some plain old meat with the mix on it to make it taste like taco meat. And a little bit of cheese, maybe a little sour cream and lettuce, boom, done. Right. Very simple. I don’t go crazy on that stuff. Just keep it simple.

Happy Taco Tuesday! pic.twitter.com/gdQOdfa0h8

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) August 27, 2024

Q: Anything I haven’t asked you, anything that I should, anything you’ve never talked about that you’re dying to talk about because you’ve been asked a lot of questions?

A: No. I do end up talking a lot about leadership stuff to people. And I’m saying a lot of the same things. One of the things I do say is what I’m saying about leadership is nothing new, right? I went to the U.S. Naval Institute’s proceedings website with articles going back more than a hundred years. I typed in the word morale and what came up were articles written as far back as World War I saying some of the same stuff I’m saying now. So when I talk about loving and valuing people, maybe I’m taking an extra step in language. A lot of times we get stuck in terms like, ‘hey, we must have dignity and respect for each other.’ I agree with that, but how about we take it to the next step, actually love people? I think we’re at a day and age where we could use a little extremism when it comes to leadership.

And then the other part that bothers me is that many assumptions, sometimes wrong, are made about generational differences. And that bugs me. There is a generational bias that has existed for thousands of years. You can read Aristotle talk about it. You can read about pre-World War II. ‘Hey, this generation they’re disrespectful.’ And then they end up doing what they did in World War II. And then we see it, we start with the millennials 15 years ago, I’m going through training. They said, ‘you know what, this generation, they’re really addicted to technology and social media.’ And they always want to know why. And I said, ‘well, hey, I wanted to know why too, right? And we’re the ones that invented the technology.’ Actually it was the Baby Boomers. So we just kind of made it better and then the millennials made it even better, right? But the fundamental chemistry of the human brain has not changed in a hundred thousand years, nor has good leadership, right? So if people come up to you and say, ‘Hey, this is new school,’ or ‘I believe in old school leadership,’ the question mark appears above my head and I say, ‘No, I’m old school. I have Caesar, Napoleon, Moltke, Eisenhower all backing me up that this is the right way.’

Dwight D. Eisenhower skipper Capt. Chris “Chowdah” Hill is writing a book on leadership lessons. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Facebook)

Q: What will you miss most when you hang up your uniform?

A: Oh, I love the people. I love working with junior people, junior sailors, junior officers. I love telling the stories and I love to see the spark in their eye when they feel like they have mission and purpose and it’s so easy to give it to them because a lot of people say they joined the Navy just because I needed college money. I’m like, yeah, that’s one of the reasons why you join, but you also join to serve, to wear a uniform, to practice salutes in a mirror, which they get a laugh when I say that, because they all did it. And to be part of something greater than yourself, right?

So those are the kinds of words it’s almost too cool to say. So you don’t say it, but you can tap into that as a resource by reminding them that they have that inside them. That is the original source of their morale. I don’t know the word for that, but I want to get after that. And I say to them, ‘some day you’ll be 80, 90 years old, and you’ll be talking about when I was on the Ike, it was an old ship, and talk about what they went through, but they’re going to talk with pride about their experience. So I just have to give them that story for later on in life.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzonecom

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard’s work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.

A fascain

twz.com · by Howard Altman, Tyler Rogoway

19. Reporter's Notebook: Why foreign policy might matter

But it rarely, if ever, has a significant impact on election outcomes. Unless we are at war.

Reporter's Notebook: Why foreign policy might matter

Foreign policy decisions were important to only 3% of registered voters in Nevada, North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona

By Chad Pergram Fox News

Published September 6, 2024 4:59pm EDT

foxnews.com · by Chad Pergram Fox News

Video

House Republicans hope to convert Biden-Harris foreign policy events into a campaign issue

Fox News senior congressional correspondent Chad Pergram reports on House Republicans' criticism of the Biden-Harris administration's foreign policy agenda and how it could impact the 2024 race on 'Special Report.'

Which of these things is not like the others? The economy. The border. Abortion. Foreign policy.

The first three are issues many voters consistently tell pollsters are the subjects most important to them in 2024. Foreign policy? Dwarfed by the others. In fact, recent Fox polling shows that foreign policy decisions were the most important subjects to only 3% of registered voters surveyed in Nevada, North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona. Foreign policy only climbs to 4% when Fox asked the question nationally.

So why care about foreign policy in a race like the one between Vice President Harris and former President Trump? The importance of foreign policy as a determining factor in the race for the presidency rises and falls. Vietnam wore on the public consciousness in the late 1960s. It drove former President Lyndon Johnson away from seeking re-election in 1968. The Iranian hostage crisis certainly didn’t help former President Carter as he stumbled in 1980. It’s believed that former President Reagan scored a boost from improving America’s image on the global stage. Staring down the Soviets certainly enabled Reagan to cruise to victory in 1984.

Former President George H.W. Bush seemingly received no benefit for the 1991 Gulf War nor the fall of the Eastern Bloc in the late ‘80s and early ’90s. This was ironic. The president earned a staggering 91% approval rating just after the Gulf War. Yet he lost to former President Clinton less than two years later. The events of 9/11 lifted the fate of former President George W. Bush in 2001. Bush won re-election in 2004. But casualties from the war in Iraq cost him support that fall.

Vice President Kamala Harris on July 30, 2024, and former President Trump, the Republican presidential candidate, Aug. 3. (AP Photos)

So, should we focus on foreign policy as a crucial issue in 2024? Hard to say. But in a tight race, anything might be decisive. Especially in battleground states where the race is a statistical dead heat.

"Pocketbook issues are always the most important issues for most people," said Rep. Larry Bucshon, R-Ind. But Bucshon offered a caveat.

"(Foreign policy) could be in the national security space part of the election narrative because the vice president was obviously part of this decision-making progress," the Indiana Republican said.

That is precisely what Republicans hope to highlight as Congress returns to session. Biden is out the door. Harris is now the Democratic nominee. And Republicans hope to tell the story of the vice president and foreign policy.

War in the Middle East. Executions of Israeli hostages. Even the controversy involving Trump honoring service members killed in Afghanistan three years ago. Curiously, the incident and questions surrounding how Trump and his team conducted themselves at Arlington National Cemetery may have actually retrained focus on why they were there in the first place: the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan under the watch of the president and vice president.

A mother of one of the 13 U.S. service members killed in the Abbey Gate attack at the Kabul airport railed against the administration.

"We've been disrespected so much in the last three years," Kelly Barnett told Fox. She’s a Gold Star mother who lost her son, Taylor Hoover, in the terrorist attack. "No response from them. No ‘I’m sorry.’"

Republicans see this as connective tissue to Harris.

"I think it's open to criticism because the vice president was intimately involved in that discussion (to withdraw from Afghanistan)," said Bucshon.

Harris even said as much during an interview with CNN’s Dana Bash in 2021 after the withdrawal.

"(President Biden) just made a really big decision. Afghanistan," said Bash. "Were you the last person in the room?"

President Biden holds hands with Vice President Kamala Harris during a ceremony honoring the Golden State Warriors Jan. 17, 2023, in Washington, D.C. (Win McNamee/Getty Images)

"Yes," replied Harris.

"And you feel comfortable?" countered Bash.

"I do," answered Harris.

On NBC, Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., noted that former President Trump "was never able" to get out of Afghanistan despite wanting to do so.

"I give President Biden and Vice President Harris credit for finally ending a war after 20 years," said Khanna.

The California Democrat conceded the administration bungled the withdrawal. But Khanna believes Harris and the president "deserve credit" for actually extracting the U.S. from the protracted conflict. In addition, some Republicans point to the Israel/Hamas war as a flashpoint for the administration.

"Joe Biden and Kamala Harris have tried to hamstring Israel every step of the way here," Rep. Mike Lawler, R-N.Y., said on Fox.

On Fox Business, Rep. Pat Fallon, R-Texas, argued that the only "two-state solution" Harris and vice presidential nominee and Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz care about is winning "Pennsylvania and Michigan."

But when it comes to the Middle East, the administration contends it’s clear who is to blame — despite the Mideast crisis unfolding on its watch.

"Hamas is responsible for their deaths. And as the president said, most leaders pay for their crimes," said White House national security spokesman John Kirby.

The campaign trail now moves from battleground states like Nevada and North Carolina to Capitol Hill as Congress returns to session. Expect congressional Republicans to curate a narrative about the Biden administration’s foreign policy — and latch that to Harris.

The House is slated to vote on a number of measures in the coming days pertaining to China. There may even be legislation tied to Israel and the Mideast War. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is releasing an exhaustive report about the Afghanistan withdrawal imminently. The committee also issued a subpoena to Secretary of State Antony Blinken to testify about the withdrawal Sept. 19.

President Biden speaks to reporters outside St. Edmond's Roman Catholic Church in Rehoboth Beach, Del., after attending a mass Aug. 31, 2024. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)

The State Department contends Blinken isn’t available then. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller called the subpoena "unnecessary," arguing Blinken worked with the committee in good faith. But Foreign Affairs Committee spokeswoman Leslie Shedd said Blinken knew the committee wanted his testimony since late May.

"The chairman offered the secretary any session day in the month of September to come in, and he refused. Instead, he vaguely suggested November or December — when it is far too late for Congress to take legislative action to fix the problems at the State Department that led to the withdrawal," Shedd said.

Regardless, the coming days will present lots of fodder about what went wrong in Afghanistan three years ago. House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., will present the families of the 13 service members killed in Afghanistan with the Congressional Gold Medal in a ceremony Tuesday.

George W. Bush, George H.W. Bush and Jeb Bush stand together for a photo. (Getty Images)

So, do the foreign policy arguments stick to Harris? Unclear. However, you’ll notice that Republicans recently began to invoke the "Biden-Harris administration." That’s a concerted effort to pivot from Biden and Velcro issues to the vice president — once she became the nominee.

But will foreign policy make a difference? It can. But we won’t know until the vote is in. As observed earlier, George W. Bush won re-election over former Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., in 2004. But there were "micro" costs to Bush’s campaign over the Iraq war in particular regions and precincts.

And in a close election, that’s why foreign policy might matter in 2024.

Chad Pergram currently serves as a senior congressional correspondent for FOX News Channel (FNC). He joined the network in September 2007 and is based out of Washington, D.C.

foxnews.com · by Chad Pergram Fox News

20. US Army’s next budget invests heavily in drones and electronic warfare

As we must.

US Army’s next budget invests heavily in drones and electronic warfare

Defense News · by Jen Judson · September 6, 2024

The U.S. Army is planning to ask for more flexible funding for unmanned aircraft systems, capabilities to counter them and electronic warfare tools in its next budget as it takes lessons learned from Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion, according to Christine Wormuth, the service’s secretary.

“I think some of the areas that [Gen. Randy George], the chief [of staff of the Army] and I feel very strongly that we need to invest more in, both from the perspective of the Army... but also the needs of the joint force, is in the areas of unmanned aerial systems, counter-unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare,” she said Wednesday at the Defense News Conference.

For instance, a Ukraine battalion commander told Wormuth earlier this year during training in Germany, that Russian electronic warfare capabilities were increasing “in ways that were concerning,” Wormuth detailed.

“I think you’ll see that in the budget that goes up to Congress next spring,” Wormuth said. “That’s an area where I think we also need to have more agility in our funding mechanisms because of the technology in those capability areas is changing so rapidly that we can’t afford to get locked into something and then be only allowed to use that something for the next 10 years.”

Both Wormuth and George have discussed the possibility of budgeting differently in order to get some capability into the hands of soldiers much more quickly. One of those possibilities is asking Congress to fund pots of money dedicated for a specific capability rather than budget across a number of specific line items that tend to be a specific product or program.

But both have also acknowledged that getting congressional appropriators on board might not be so easy. “Historically, they’re generally… very skeptical of what they see as kind of slush funds. They have a lot of scar tissue around [overseas contingency operations], and how the department has used that over the years,” Wormuth said.

Even so, “there is such a deep realization that we have got to change more quickly and that technology is changing rapidly right now that we do need to have more agile mechanisms,” she added.

Overseas contingency operations, or OCO, funding, used during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to pay for operations abroad, was a separate account with billions outside of the Pentagon’s base budget. It was often used to get extra funding for a variety of things rather than commit to paying for it within regular funding. Congress eliminated OCO funding beginning in FY22. Now the Defense Department must budget for any overseas operations within its base budget.

The Army plans to present a budget in these areas, according to Wormuth, that, for example, used to have 10 to 12 individual line items and now may have two or three.

“If we keep it relatively narrow and focused and we demonstrate that we can use that agility in those areas effectively, we may be able to sort of have a proof of concept,” she said. “I’m cautiously optimistic.”

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

21. Military must move beyond integration to inclusion

Excerpts:

The military is a long way from where it was before becoming an all-volunteer force, when women were dismissed from the military if they became parents, and men could not receive benefits as dependents. In addition, there are numerous dual-career couples and single parents of all genders.

The past four years alone have brought a number of positive changes, including the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, Task Force One Navy, and Women’s Initiative Teams across the force. But without deliberate and sustained effort, the Defense Department and the military services, including the Coast Guard, could backslide.

An integrated military says your children didn’t come in your seabag. An inclusive military will support access to childcare as a family issue, not a “woman’s issue,” family-building resources such as assisted reproductive technologies while asking women to spend the best reproductive years deploying or as geographic bachelors, policies that appreciate the intricacies of surrogacy for gay couples, and other policies that cost nothing but the time it takes to write them. The payoff will be recruiting and retaining the most lethal fighting force to support and defend the Constitution. And once they are relieved of the additional burden of fighting for inclusion, service members can focus all of their energy on promoting a military that fosters great people, leaders, and teams.

Military must move beyond integration to inclusion

Once troops are relieved of the burden of fighting for inclusion, they can focus all of their energy on promoting a military that fosters great people, leaders, and teams.

By Andrea N. Goldstein and Joan Johnson-Freese

September 6, 2024 05:21 PM ET

Commentary

Personnel

Navy

defenseone.com · by Andrea N. Goldstein

Imagine you are serving in an elite military unit. Your job is critical to its operations; your teammates rely on you for their safety and often their very lives. You were carefully screened for this assignment and selected as the best candidate over dozens of other applicants of many backgrounds. But you are excluded from some training and many team-building social events, and despite your demonstrated competence, your value and even your right to be there are constantly questioned because you are a woman. Would this make you—and your unit—less effective?

This scenario is an example of an all-too-common phenomenon: integration without inclusion. One of the co-authors witnessed this type of behavior while serving as an intelligence officer with several SEAL teams, and she is hardly alone. The phenomenon has been studied by, among others, James Minnich, a retired Army colonel-turned-Defense Department professor whose research indicates that inclusion is key to strong national defense forces and national security.

Not every SEAL team functioned this way. Many were fully inclusive—there was only one standard, and that was demonstrating superior performance. These teams’ leaders and members recognized that everyone brought something different to the team and that in itself should be valued. They also recognized the need to account for those differences, which might take the form of writing fitness reports appropriately based on someone’s occupational field, reserving additional shooting-range time for combat support, or ordering kit specifically for women’s different body types and physiological needs.

Changing culture in organizations that adhere to rigid gender stereotyping begins with recognizing that integration is not the same as inclusion. Both bring women into the security sector, but integration expects women to adapt to an existing system, while inclusion ensures that the system adapts to women.

Merely throwing the doors open and saying “anyone qualified may enter” does not suffice. This can create an environment where those who have been newly integrated are told explicitly or implicitly that they should “feel lucky” that those in the dominant group “allow them” to be where they have a complete right to be. Consequently, they become “lesser thans” within the group. Even in the best case, with leaders and fellow team members devoted to rethinking institutional culture and actually listening to people who draw attention to its shortcomings, the “firsts” in a given community have the double burden of navigating institutional and cultural barriers while also just trying to do their job.

Those who would change an organization’s culture must foster the recognition that the differences between men and women strengthen an organization. Men and women have different physiological and socialized differences. Men are generally physically stronger, particularly in the upper body; women are generally more flexible and have greater tolerance to exposure. Men generally respond to threats by fight or flight; women favor non-aggressive, tend-and-befriend options. Men hear literally; women hear nuance and tones. These differences can turn an organization from a toolbox with all hammers into one whose variety of tools make it more effective.

Integration efforts

Over the years, the U.S. military has taken varied approaches to integrating women into previously all-male teams and units. In the early 1990s, the first women to be assigned to surface combatants were sent to their ships and wished good luck. In 2011, when women were first assigned to submarines, the Navy took a boat-by-boat approach, integrating crews from the department head-level on down with several women sent to each boat at once. (In both cases, the greatest resistance came not from the male sailors, but from their wives.) During the post-9/11 wars, the military’s fighting forces created purpose-built teams of women such as the Marine Corps’ Team Lioness in Iraq and the Army’s Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan.

Each of these efforts, and others like them, were frequently portrayed as an experimental and risky approach to the “new idea” that gender diversity is mission-essential, and as necessary as snipers or breachers or other team members. But by the 2010s, it had been clear for several years that women were already doing the job of ground-combat military occupational specialties without actually having the official title and career paths. By 2013, when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that his department would look at opening all jobs to women—an effort that would be completed under his successor Ash Carter—it became clear that any resistance to women in ground combat military occupational specialties was less about evidence and more about ego and masculine identity.

Still, these efforts were generally launched with mere integration in mind, and so failed to meet the promise of an inclusive military. Yet leaders generally remained unconvinced that more needed to be done.

In 2019, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Mary O’Brien was working on her service’s Women’s Initiative Team, an effort to lower barriers to career development for women. “It became obvious we needed to make the business case for policy change with some of our mid-level and senior leaders,” she wrote in a foreword to One Team One Fight: Diversity and Inclusion in the Department of the Air Force, published in June by Air University Press. “Once senior leaders understood how these proposals were directly tied to our warfighting capability through quantifiable metrics”—of recruitment, retention, readiness, resources, and risk to force and mission—“the criticisms of ‘diversity for diversity’s sake’ were negated, and the floodgates opened for a wide variety of changes.”

These changes extended to the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which mandates a diverse workforce: “To recruit and retain the most talented Americans, we must change our institutional culture and reform how we do business. The Department will attract, train, and promote a workforce with the skills and abilities we need to creatively solve national security challenges in a complex global environment.”

The document acknowledges that while most of the structural changes required to integrate the military have been made, the institutional culture is not yet inclusive. There have been no caps on women in the military since the mid-1970s, and most jobs have been open to women in the Navy and Air Force since the early 1990s. Yet some military specialties still have few or no women, and enlisted women and military officers are nearly one-third more likely than men to leave the military after one or two tours.

Most studies about why women depart at higher rates repeatedly cite the same issues: pervasiveness of gender-based violence, including sexual harassment and assault; poor institutional treatment, both culturally and resource-wise, regarding pregnancy and parenthood; and generally exhausting ambient sexism.

Yes, exhausting. Constantly striving to be seen, heard, acknowledged, and valued—while simultaneously not being considered overbearing or aggressive—is exhausting. Having to “prove your value” every day to your colleagues, knowing one mistake is your professional kiss-of-death, is exhausting. And as the recent online “would you rather meet a man or a bear alone in the woods” discussion among women has indicated, being constantly on alert to whether a man is a friend or a Vanessa Guillén-level threat is exhausting. For women in the military, that consideration isn’t limited to the woods, but in an office, barracks, base, ship, or deployment.

Less examined, but another possible cause, is that women learn early on that the military cares more about itself as an institution than caring for its people. From the Navy’s Tailhook coverup in the 1990s to the efforts to hide sexual assaults at the Coast Guard Academy from 1988 to 2006, there is evidence that the military has historically cared more about protecting its image than the truth, and its members. Protecting institutions over people often leads to victim-blaming; consequently, members who are treated as less valued feel less obligated to continue serving.

Moving toward inclusion

The military is a long way from where it was before becoming an all-volunteer force, when women were dismissed from the military if they became parents, and men could not receive benefits as dependents. In addition, there are numerous dual-career couples and single parents of all genders.

The past four years alone have brought a number of positive changes, including the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, Task Force One Navy, and Women’s Initiative Teams across the force. But without deliberate and sustained effort, the Defense Department and the military services, including the Coast Guard, could backslide.

An integrated military says your children didn’t come in your seabag. An inclusive military will support access to childcare as a family issue, not a “woman’s issue,” family-building resources such as assisted reproductive technologies while asking women to spend the best reproductive years deploying or as geographic bachelors, policies that appreciate the intricacies of surrogacy for gay couples, and other policies that cost nothing but the time it takes to write them. The payoff will be recruiting and retaining the most lethal fighting force to support and defend the Constitution. And once they are relieved of the additional burden of fighting for inclusion, service members can focus all of their energy on promoting a military that fosters great people, leaders, and teams.

defenseone.com · by Andrea N. Goldstein

22. The Surface Navy and the Long War

A lot to parse (and for me to learn) about naval warfare.

But it closes with this this:

Traditionally, the middle kingdom’s dynasties fell due to famine and unrest. Their current dynasty rules through the most sophisticated police state the world has ever seen. Nevertheless, China’s underlying social contract demands economic prosperity from their leaders. Even today, a billion people are still governed under the “mandate of heaven.” China will show a strong face as this war stretches on, but behind closed doors they may ask themselves: Is Taiwan worth the threat to my own neck?

The Surface Navy and the Long War

By Ralph G. Francisco

September 2024 Proceedings Vol. 150/9/1,459

usni.org · September 4, 2024

When grappling with an opponent straining at their utmost, a choke is not instantaneous—but it still hurts. Commerce raiding predates the Peloponnesian Wars, but in a future conflict it may help throttle Beijing’s true center of gravity: their control of 1.4 billion people. China relies on uninterrupted overseas trade and stable economic growth and it simply cannot afford a long war. Allied surface forces can and should establish sea control—just not where one might expect.

Goliath Feeds from Afar

In 2020, China consumed over 14 million barrels of oil per day (BPD) in peace time. About 600,000 BPD came overland through Russian pipelines, with Kazakhstan accounting for an additional 400,000 BPD. In 2019, China produced a mere 3.83 million BPD domestically. Approximately 62 percent of China’s oil must come by sea, beyond their missile umbrella, under the nose of the U.S. 5th Fleet.

The Department of Defense (DoD) estimates China’s 600-million-barrel strategic petroleum reserve represents a 90 day-supply. Beijing can offset deficits with coal and natural gas, but their war machine runs on oil. China also suffers from chronic food insecurity, feeding one fifth of the world’s population with only seven percent of its arable land. As a net food importer, disruption to American, Brazilian, or Australian grain imports could be disastrous.

In stark contrast, U.S. oil demands are 20.5 million BPD, with the ability to domestically pump 17 million BPD. No overseas oil imports can be interdicted by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). U.S. farmland is the most productive in the world, with only a fraction of China’s population to feed. COVID-19’s economic damage is still being calculated, but the pandemic exposed Western vulnerabilities to a Chinese dominated supply chain. Essential manufacturing has since been quietly reshored to Mexico, Vietnam, and other friendlier economies.

The Far Blockade

Commerce raiding and sanctions represent a vital strategy that must be executed in tandem with a methodical assault westward. United States Central Command (CentCom) is well positioned to destroy Chinese power projection, manifested through China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) facilities in Djibouti and the Arabian Gulf. U.S. ships can range far into the Indian Ocean, interdicting China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) as surface raiders. Less capable allied frigates, corvettes, and even littoral combat ships (LCSs) can free up precious guided missile destroyers (DDGs). While economic and diplomatic pressure should be used to divert merchantmen before the use of force, recent conflicts in the Red Sea underline shipping vulnerability to relatively unsophisticated forces.

A far blockade would be difficult, but effective over time. Thirty days of high intensity conflict would dip deeply into China’s war reserve of energy and food. Captured oil could be diverted to allied refineries (or sold to an oil-hungry India). The same could be done with grain and other strategic commodities, offsetting the disruption to allied economies. Logistically, China cannot sustain distant combat, especially if the United States destroyed their bases from the Gulf of Aden to Myanmar.

Royal Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Australian forces will be needed to defend critical shipping to East Asia, lest Beijing interdict them. China is unlikely to send forces far beyond their A2/AD umbrella to shepherd tankers home. If they choose to target allied shipping, they risk depleting their magazines and counterattack.

A Bloody High-End Fight

China’s local superiority in sensors and firepower make for a dangerous nut to crack. Ground based antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) with potential hypersonic capability reduce a defender’s reaction time, even if they have an interceptor to match.1 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) warships and aircraft also bristle with long range missiles, many supersonic. Shaping operations to reduce enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) must be conducted in all domains beforehand.

U.S. forces should initially maintain a wary distance. Scores of drones and patrol aircraft would likely be lost on the periphery as each side forms their respective sensor frontier. Throwing an ill-timed punch could result in the loss of multiple carriers and squadrons of irreplaceable aviators.

However, the first island chain is not impenetrable. China’s Yaogan ELINT, radar, and Earth Observation (EO) satellite constellations form the “eyes and ears” of their A2/AD architecture. Localized platforms (long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, submarines, patrol aircraft, ISR balloons) provide target quality track data needed to complete kill chains. These platforms are networked, expensive, and finite. Their neutralization through electronic warfare, cyber, or kinetic means would create gaps in coverage that could be widened and exploited by a skillful commander. Delaying a full-scale counterattack would buy time to mobilize reservists for support duty and refresher training, freeing up active personnel for force generation.

To prepare, the surface Navy should invest in more SM-6 missiles, useful for longer range antiair Warfare (AAW) and antisurface warfare (ASuW). They also should stockpile SM-3 interceptors, and upgrade more Aegis baselines for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). BMD ships stationed outside China’s strike range could replace initial losses.2

Chinese ASBMs constitute a clear and present danger, but their target area of uncertainty widens with range, target maneuvering, and centralized command and control (C2). Hypersonic glide vehicles present a complex maneuvering challenge. Their depressed midcourse altitude shortens radar horizons and makes terminal prediction difficult. Plasma sheathing, however, may blind EO/RF seekers, forcing these weapons to slow to vulnerable speeds. Maintaining a resilient overhead sensor network with survivable connectivity to U.S. BMD shooters would be key. Emissions novel to hypersonic flight can highlight them for tracking, while degrading PLA command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) would further disrupt kill chains.

Kill the Archer, for He Has Too Many Arrows

Allied ships cannot expect to win the salvo exchange without directly sinking enemy combatants and their formidable magazines. Adapting proven technology could bolster organic ASuW capability. Large unmanned surface vehicle (LUSV) missile batteries are promising, but low rate production is doubtful by 2026. Mounting the Maritime Strike Tomahawk or Naval Strike Missile to DDGs, amphibious transport docks (LPDs), LCS, and even U.S. Coast Guard cutters should be considered. A 70 percent solution now is better than an exquisite solution later.

Harpoons from decommissioned cruisers could arm fast patrol craft. Land-based fires further deepen magazines and decouple sensors from launch platforms. Deadly AAW/ASuW geometry could be set around choke points the PLAN must navigate. Surface forces should drill closely with the Army and Marines to hone this concept. Additionally, the United States should fast track hypersonic antiship missiles and pair them with the Zumwalt’s larger vertical launch system (VLS) cells. Seamless joint coordination will be paramount, supported by a robust Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) architecture.

Target Priorities

The 2022 PLAN amphibious lift capacity amounted to 19,080 troops and 666 assault vehicles per transit. This growing force is meant to seize the initial beachhead. Afterward, China’s vast civilian fleet will have to move hundreds of thousands of troops. Targeting landing infrastructure and sinking PLA troop transports would threaten the invasion most directly, and cannot be accomplished by submarines alone. Therefore, the United States must boost Air Force ASuW capabilities to close the Naval Strike Warfare inventory gap. Amassing long-range antiship missiles (LRASM) and updating existing joint air to surface standoff missiles (JASSM) to target shipping is essential. Innovative systems like Rapid Dragon could allow cargo aircraft operating from austere airfields to launch high volume missile raids. Aegis ships should support these and other strike packages. Excellent identification friend or foe (IFF), de-lousing, and loss of communication procedures mitigate fratricide, but must be drilled regularly with allies and between services.

In a communication denied environment, distributed satellite systems like Starlink could be used to guide standoff weapons like LRASM, or even explosive USVs. Australia’s long range Over the Horizon radar network is nested deep within the Outback, making it very survivable. Skywave tracks can be correlated with other sensor data to bring precision fires onto the Straits of Malacca or South China Sea.

A Cultural Shift

Captains must take the initiative to operate flexibly, as they did under William Halsey Jr. and Raymond A. Spruance. Peer adversaries demand skillful emissions control. Third party targeting can complicate localization by enemy forces. Unit dispersion can spread enemy surveillance assets thin. Surface Action Groups can coalesce to coordinate and strike, then quickly disperse, minimizing exposure. Degraded communications will force commanders to conduct tasking without real-time oversight. Baking this into prewar training can ensure wartime unity of effort. This shift toward decentralization and greater trust must be imposed from higher echelons.

The United States must stress realistic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercises with allied diesel boats and absorb lessons learned with humility and adaptation. Supply ships should be retrofitted with torpedo countermeasures and conduct opposed replenishment at sea procedures as standard practice. Fleet oilers will be at a premium so far from home. SSN tasking forward will necessitate aggressive fleet ASW from fixed wing and embarked helicopter squadrons. Stockpiling sonobuoys and torpedoes can offset heavy expenditure rates after the shooting starts. Robust antisubmarine screening will not guarantee immunity, but the elimination of each boat could attrite a potent arm of China’s A2/AD complex.

The United States’ ability to recover hundreds, if not thousands, of shipwrecked sailors across a contested ocean is currently in doubt. Prolonged war at sea will require alternate means of combat search and rescue. Civilian vessels with helicopter facilities can support this, along with sea planes, high-speed ferries, and diesel subs. The Navy must plan appropriately.

Fight Dirty, They Certainly Will

Naval Special Warfare can covertly mine Chinese container ships while they onload abroad. Creative means could then detonate these unwitting trojan horses as they transit narrow Chinese harbors. The delay to military traffic could be immense, and at a minimum would divert resources to sweep ships before they enter port. This effort would complement offensive mining operations.

In this war between great powers, the United States will need to fight dirty. Cyberattacks on port facilities, oil, and gas pipelines are fair game. If U.S. commerce raiders are overtaxed, Letters of Marque could be issued to private military companies with maritime experience. Generous rules of engagement will be needed to address the Chinese Maritime Militia, be they armed or just scouting. Commanders at sea will have to target combatants masquerading as civilians, just as their Army colleagues did on land.

High end warfare should not blind the United States to low tech threats. Harbor and logistics facilities must be hardened at home and abroad against enemy saboteurs. Clandestinely crewed vessels large or small could ram ships during restricted transit. Normal defensive fire may not be able to stop large merchantmen before collision. Fortunately, the war on terror established capable maritime security squadrons. A mature cadre of active and reserve units can help the Coast Guard enforce strict wartime traffic control.

Repairing Forward

During the last Pacific war, enormous resources were allocated to repair battle damage in forward areas. Floating dry docks in Ulithi turned around heavily damaged ships at an amazing rate, much to the consternation of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The tyranny of distance is no different today. Japan’s excellent shipyards are a start, but less vulnerable alternatives are needed.

The United States should source local skilled labor, as well as labor from the Philippines and Australia. Australia’s yards could support repair work but are on their far coasts. These are still nearer than Pearl Harbor (constrained capacity) or San Diego (further still). Mobile dry docks should also be procured for the Philippines or similar havens closer to the battle area.

Just Another Dynasty

Traditionally, the middle kingdom’s dynasties fell due to famine and unrest. Their current dynasty rules through the most sophisticated police state the world has ever seen. Nevertheless, China’s underlying social contract demands economic prosperity from their leaders. Even today, a billion people are still governed under the “mandate of heaven.” China will show a strong face as this war stretches on, but behind closed doors they may ask themselves: Is Taiwan worth the threat to my own neck?

usni.org · September 4, 2024

23. Efficacy in Our Nation’s Deterrence Strategy

Excerpt:

Effective defense policy for the next administration would also force the Pentagon to think more about people. Congress and the next wave of Pentagon leadership must adopt a disruptive mindset to blaze unconventional pathways to get the world’s best technologists under our tent. For example, much of the world’s best tech talent lives outside the United States. The next administration should make it easier, not harder, for the Department of Defense and the companies that build advanced capabilities for the warfighter to gain access to the most talented technologists across the globe. Overly rigid policies on security clearances, the overclassification of data and programs, and burdensome employment-based immigration laws are but a few of the obstacles preventing the Pentagon from getting these technologies onboard. This should be an immediate priority given how far behind our adversaries we are in key technologies.

Efficacy in Our Nation’s Deterrence Strategy

By John Mark Wilson

September 07, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/07/efficacy_in_our_nations_deterrence_strategy_1056808.html

At some point, Vice President Harris and former President Trump will square off onstage and try to have something resembling an adult conversation about defense policy. As we approach that day, it is worth considering some important questions facing both leaders as they make their case to voters about their fitness to serve as Commander-in-Chief. Does the United States need to drastically increase its defense budget to compete with the likes of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea? Does the United States need to double down on developing new technologically superior systems? If the candidates make that argument, the moderator should ask “Why?” At least three times to expose just how wrong they are. Securing our national interests tomorrow doesn’t call for defense reforms. It calls for a completely different approach we can fully implement in the next four years. This means we need a leader with the guts to tell the American people we should spend less on expensive weapons and invest more in inexpensive, simple weapons in mass quantities now. Frankly, there is no alternative if we genuinely care about effective deterrence and winning our next war.

The next President, Congress and Secretary of Defense must not let the Department of Defense slip back into old ways of thinking about weapons programs. Let’s be clear–historically, these leaders and the traditional defense industry have an obsession with expensive weapons programs, and with good reason–they have been highly effective in previous conflicts. But tomorrow, we can’t fight a war with yesterday’s technology and tactics. Militarily (not politically), we got away with it in Afghanistan and Iraq due to the nature of the mission and threat. But tomorrow, we will pay a heavy price for repeating that mistake.

The truth is we simply don’t have the industrial capacity to manufacture sophisticated weapons at the scale required to reconstitute battlefield losses as done during World War II. For example, most Americans would be shocked to learn that it took over two decades to get the F35 into full production and that the Air Force will receive just over 150 of these aircraft annually. Anyone who thinks we can ramp up wartime production of modern tanks, jets, and ships with our current industrial base is delusional. If Vice President Harris and former President Trump make arguments based on the assumption we can, they are advancing dangerous policies that will lead us to a costly military defeat.

A properly calibrated policy would demand the Pentagon divert investment from expensive weapons programs that won’t be ready to “fight tonight” within the next four years to those that will. This would force the Pentagon to work with the commercial industry to procure cheap, expendable systems in mass quantities, such as those used in Ukraine and the Middle East. But cheap doesn’t mean unsophisticated. Enabled by Artificial Intelligence and autonomy, these systems will drive every aspect of warfighting in the coming years, whether we like it or not. In the next conflict, they will be as consequential as the improvised explosive device was during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but with even more lethality. Our adversaries understand this and work daily to be better at their application than we are. I will be clear: our service members will suffer the wages of our sins of laziness and complacency if our next administration does not make fielding these technologies a priority. They will face lethal autonomous and AI-enabled threats that didn’t exist even during our nation’s most recent combat experience. The good news is that the Pentagon is off to a good start with its Replicator Initiative, providing the next administration a foundation to accelerate these technologies further. Frankly, it would be stupid to do otherwise.

Effective defense policy for the next administration would also force the Pentagon to think more about people. Congress and the next wave of Pentagon leadership must adopt a disruptive mindset to blaze unconventional pathways to get the world’s best technologists under our tent. For example, much of the world’s best tech talent lives outside the United States. The next administration should make it easier, not harder, for the Department of Defense and the companies that build advanced capabilities for the warfighter to gain access to the most talented technologists across the globe. Overly rigid policies on security clearances, the overclassification of data and programs, and burdensome employment-based immigration laws are but a few of the obstacles preventing the Pentagon from getting these technologies onboard. This should be an immediate priority given how far behind our adversaries we are in key technologies.

This election season has been full of surprises and will only get more bruising the closer we get to November. Sadly, it is almost a foregone conclusion that the days after this election will be just as contentious as those following the 2020 contest. I won’t dwell on that other than to say that regardless of the outcome, there will be a transition to a new administration. Time is our greatest enemy, and our leaders in DC cannot wait for the dust to settle from a tough political fight or undertake an irrational effort to overhaul things that work just because the previous administration started them. Similarly, the new President cannot accept anything resembling the status quo when fielding the capabilities our men and women in uniform require to perform their dangerous missions. At the same time, reversing years of entrenched culture in the Department of Defense, industry, and Congress will require years of work by conscientious, competent, and bold leaders from both parties, not scared to make a few big bets and even make some enemies along the way.

If our leaders don’t meet this moment, our kids will be flying those expensive aircraft, driving those legacy tanks, and maneuvering large ships into a different kind of warfare, one even more unforgiving than witnessed by previous generations. Perhaps the real question we should ask them is how they will ensure that doesn’t happen.

LTC John Mark Wilson (U.S. Army, ret.), former director at the National Security Council.

24. Military Reform: Reversing the Decline

Excerpts:

To change course and prepare the Marine Corps for future conflict, Congress must act now. Eight administrations of both parties have lived through the unintended consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols act and bi-partisan solutions are now possible.

It took Vietnam to drive the last great U.S. effort at military reform, we cannot let Afghanistan and related military failure be locked in the attic like a crazy uncle. Like a termite infestation or dry rot, ignoring the problems much longer could lead to a collapse of the whole edifice and our nation’s interests and force in readiness, the Marine Corps, depend on it.

Military Reform: Reversing the Decline

By Gary Anderson

September 05, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/05/military_reform_reversing_the_decline_1056296.html

Since 2020, the nation's military has undergone one of the most humiliating periods in its history. The disgraceful rout at Hamid Karzai International airport during the Afghanistan withdrawal. Soon after, the decrepit state of naval maintenance and shipbuilding is the worst since the Navy’s founding.

Further compounding the humiliation, the Marine Corps has been castrated into a regional force whose legendary force in readiness is being replaced by a combination of colonial light infantry and coastal defense artillery.

The tragic decline of our nation’s armed forces coincides with the greatest recruiting crisis that our Army has suffered since the activation of the all-volunteer force in the 1970s.

We are now experiencing the greatest decline in American combat power since the end of World War II. America's military is becoming a hollow force not seen since the Carter years.

The Department of Defense appears incapable of reversing the devastating decline in combat power, all while President Bidne and his administration tout our Military as the most powerful in the world.

The seeds for an even greater debacle have been sewn. Unless there is a significant course correction disaster looms over the horizon. The necessary course correction should be the job of Congress.

Starting with the Navy, as this is written, we have only two aircraft carriers deployed globally, with both anchored in the Middle East for what could become a global crisis. Despite the chest pounding over the Chinese threat, the Navy’s Indo-Pacific presence is akin to the emperor without clothes.

This lack of power projection necessary to deter potential adversaries like China is due to the abysmal state of the U.S. shipbuilding along with incompetence and corruption among the senior naval officers charged with the Navy's maintenance and repair. Most naval personnel I know, officer and enlisted, believe it is only the tip of the iceberg.

So, what can Congress do? An investigation into incestuous relationship between senior naval personnel and the shipbuilding industry and their contractors, often staffed with senior retired sailors would be a good start. Congress also needs new rules to address the army of senior retired military leaders working for defense contractors.

The Navy’s current crisis didn’t just happen during the Biden administration. It simply reached an inflection point after decades of neglect.

We have allowed our maritime industrial base to deteriorate since the end of the Cold War. To get back on course to achieve the requisite level of sea power our Navy requires will take decades.

Congress must consider outsourcing already backlogged emergency and routine maintenance to allied nations who have excess capacity. This admittedly violates "buy American" pledges, but in this case, America has nothing to sell.

Congress must also address the crisis of military recruiting. Namely, the Army’s crisis in recruiting goes much deeper than the dwindling manpower base caused by poor public education, drug use, and the sedentary lifestyle of the video game generation. Women can only go so far in filling the gap. The cadre of healthy young men from the south and rural areas as well as high school athletes that have traditionally made up the core of the combat arms are staying away in droves.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the decline in the military recruiting pool has been the decline in veteran families not recommending service to their children. Approximately eighty percent of the military was comprised of those that had a close family that served in the military. I am one of the many veterans who, if not discouraging military service, are not encouraging young people to pursue it as a career.

Many of us feel that the woke mindset pushing diversity, equity, and inclusion along with critical race theory and other controversial progressive social agendas once relegated to campuses like Columbia and Berkley.

The blame for propagating this progressive social agenda and driving away the traditional recruiting base lays squarely with both the Obama and Biden administrations. Congress must counter the damage done as a recent study at Arizona State University declares “The U.S. Armed Forces should not be a laboratory for social experimentation.” Congress needs to eliminate these social experiments and refocus on the core mission of warfighting and ensuring our nation’s security.

The Marine Corps, however, has staved off the recruiting crisis but can only blame themselves for a striking loss of combat power. Beginning in 2019, then commandant General David Berger radically retooled the Marine Corps from its role as a global force in readiness into a China focused force to help the Navy contesting Chinese aggression in first island chain by placing small Marine Corps units armed with anti-ship missiles on the disputed islets and shoals. The concept known as Force Design 2030, now simply Force Design (FD).

The operational component of FD is Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) with tactical missile shooters across an array of islands known as Stand-in Forces (SIF). To augment the SIF will also be the newly formed Marine littoral regiment.

To implement this new, controversial operational concept during a time of constrained defense budgets, General Berger divested the Marine Corps of much of the combat power that made it a potent world-wide combined arms force in readiness. The Marine Corps rid itself of tanks, heavy engineering units, a majority of cannon artillery, a number of aviation assets, and core elements of its infantry including scout snipers.

The monumental divestiture of historic Marine Corps assets to implement this new operational concept was all conceived behind closed doors without input from any previous commandant and a set of war games. The closed series of war games was conducted at the classified level to "validate" the concept and critics, including several analysts involved, have essentially accused the senior leadership of "cooking the books."

There is a congressionally mandated requirement for a study of the efficacy of Force Design being done by the Center for Naval Analysis, but at this point, it is a work in progress. If that study shows FD/EABO to be ill conceived, Congress should stop all further funding for FD/EABO until the Marine Corps can come up with a viable course correction.

General Eric Smith, the current commandant, was handpicked by Berger and must relinquish his position if the Marine Corps is to restore its lethal force in readiness for the expanding global threats. Smith and Berger recently met with the other eight former commandants who made an impassioned pleas for modification of the FD/EABO/SIF concept to reflect a Marine Corps vision capable of engaging the expanding global threats. However, days later, General Smith issued his Commandant's planning guidance, doubling down on the FD enterprise.

A recent article in JFQ by Adam Clemens “The Marine Corps the United States Needs” states:

The Marine Corps’ statutory mission—amphibious assault to seize advanced naval bases—is not as relevant as it once was, but it cannot be completely dismissed. The Marine Corps needs a mission or set of missions to ensure its relevance in a 21st-century world in which denied environments will become increasingly common. More important, the Marine Corps cannot simply choose the missions it would like to do and hope that the other services and Congress accept those choices and that our partners and competitors respond to them in a way that improves the competitive position of the United States. The Marine Corps must instead optimize itself to suit the Nation’s needs given the choices made by other actors.

To change course and prepare the Marine Corps for future conflict, Congress must act now. Eight administrations of both parties have lived through the unintended consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols act and bi-partisan solutions are now possible.

It took Vietnam to drive the last great U.S. effort at military reform, we cannot let Afghanistan and related military failure be locked in the attic like a crazy uncle. Like a termite infestation or dry rot, ignoring the problems much longer could lead to a collapse of the whole edifice and our nation’s interests and force in readiness, the Marine Corps, depend on it.

Gary Anderson retired as Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

25. Disinformation dilemma: US hands are way dirty, too

I love our federal democratic republic. It is by design messy with necessary infernal friction and conflict. But this is why we will never have an effective national level information and influence activities capability. We are so afraid of this kind of criticism.

We will have to simply stick with the easy button of getting permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist rather than getting permission to put an idea between someone's ears.

Excerpts:

Official U.S. documents also suggest a growing willingness to use disinformation as a tool of psychological operations (PSYOPs). An October 2022 SOCOM (Special Operations Command) procurement document requested new tools for “influence operations, digital deception, communication disruption, and disinformation campaigns at the tactical edge and operational levels” as well as the same technology used to generate online deepfakes.

And, as recently as last month, pro-American messages tied to the U.S military were appearing in ads (in Arabic) on the dating app Tinder in Lebanon.

When it comes to the fight over online disinformation, the U.S. military appears increasingly comfortable with the tools of its adversaries.

In a globalized age, the potential blowback of such tactics is easy to imagine. A Facebook message intended for Iranians is just two clicks — translate and share — away from going viral in the United States. Modern history contains plenty of examples of government propaganda campaigns spreading out of control. A Reuters report in June revealed that the U.S. military was behind a covert anti-China vaccine campaign targeting the Philippines. According to the news organization:

It aimed to sow doubt about the safety and efficacy of vaccines and other life-saving aid that was being supplied by China, a Reuters investigation found. Through phony internet accounts meant to impersonate Filipinos, the military’s propaganda efforts morphed into an anti-vax campaign. Social media posts decried the quality of face masks, test kits and the first vaccine that would become available in the Philippines – China’s Sinovac inoculation.

Conclusion:

As disinformation supplants terrorism on lists of global threats, it may be time to treat it with the same moral clarity.

In past decades, the United States sought to sing two songs at once, spreading propaganda abroad while preserving democracy at home. In the present globalized era, however, we can no longer have it both ways. We must either temper our foreign policy with our domestic values or risk our democracy being corroded by the very measures meant to protect it.

Disinformation dilemma: US hands are way dirty, too

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Thomas Brodey · September 5, 2024

As Biden cracks down on Russian interference in our elections, a look at what the Pentagon has been doing overseas

military industrial complex

Sep 05, 2024

It’s no secret that the Biden administration has made fighting online disinformation a major priority. On Wednesday, it announced sweeping measures to secure the 2024 election from interference, including seizing internet domains and sanctioning Russian operatives.

Such anti-disinformation measures are not without controversy. Just last week, Meta founder Mark Zuckerberg claimed in a letter to Congress that in 2021 the U.S. government had pressured Facebook to censor certain Covid-19 posts in an effort to tamp down what it believed to be misinformation.

“In 2021, senior officials from the Biden administration, including the White House, repeatedly pressured our teams for months to censor certain covid-19 content, including humor and satire, and expressed a lot of frustration with our teams when we didn’t agree,” Zuckerberg wrote in the letter sent Sunday. “Ultimately, it was our decision whether or not to take content down.”

While Zuckerberg’s allegations have sparked major debate on the extent to which the government should regulate social media, there can be no doubt that the proliferation of disinformation particularly over social media is a real cause for concern. A recent World Economic Forum report went so far as to name misinformation and disinformation the single greatest threat to global stability for 2024-2025.

However, while the United States takes stringent efforts to combat disinformation, particularly from foreign sources like Russia and China, history shows that it plays by different rules itself. Indeed, the National Security State has at times shown a problematic tendency to dabble in the exact same kinds of tactics that they fight so vociferously from other governments.

In recent years the United States has made a number of forays into covert online influence operations. In 2011, there was Operation Earnest Voice, a military program using “sock puppets” (fake social media accounts) to spread pro-U.S. narratives.

Similar efforts persist to this day. In 2022, the Stanford Internet Observatory released a study of America-based social media sock puppets. It analyzed thousands of coordinated Facebook and Twitter posts targeting people in Russia, China and Iran. Many of these posts contained sensational rumors, like stories of Iranians stealing the organs of Afghan refugees. Some accounts also impersonated hardliners and criticized the Iranian government for being too moderate. Later investigations linked a number of those accounts to the Pentagon.

“The sock puppet accounts were kind of funny to look at because we are so used to analyzing pro-Kremlin sock puppets, so it was weird to see accounts pushing the opposite narrative,” Shelby Grossman, a staffer at the Internet Observatory and a member of the research team that published the paper, told Gizmodo in August 2022.

Official U.S. documents also suggest a growing willingness to use disinformation as a tool of psychological operations (PSYOPs). An October 2022 SOCOM (Special Operations Command) procurement document requested new tools for “influence operations, digital deception, communication disruption, and disinformation campaigns at the tactical edge and operational levels” as well as the same technology used to generate online deepfakes.

And, as recently as last month, pro-American messages tied to the U.S military were appearing in ads (in Arabic) on the dating app Tinder in Lebanon.

When it comes to the fight over online disinformation, the U.S. military appears increasingly comfortable with the tools of its adversaries.

In a globalized age, the potential blowback of such tactics is easy to imagine. A Facebook message intended for Iranians is just two clicks — translate and share — away from going viral in the United States. Modern history contains plenty of examples of government propaganda campaigns spreading out of control. A Reuters report in June revealed that the U.S. military was behind a covert anti-China vaccine campaign targeting the Philippines. According to the news organization:

It aimed to sow doubt about the safety and efficacy of vaccines and other life-saving aid that was being supplied by China, a Reuters investigation found. Through phony internet accounts meant to impersonate Filipinos, the military’s propaganda efforts morphed into an anti-vax campaign. Social media posts decried the quality of face masks, test kits and the first vaccine that would become available in the Philippines – China’s Sinovac inoculation.

Reuters identified at least 300 accounts on X, formerly Twitter, that matched descriptions shared by former U.S. military officials familiar with the Philippines operation. Almost all were created in the summer of 2020 and centered on the slogan #Chinaangvirus – Tagalog for China is the virus….Briefed on the Pentagon’s secret anti-vax campaign by Reuters, some American public health experts also condemned the program, saying it put civilians in jeopardy for potential geopolitical gain.

While the United States does have laws regulating foreign propaganda, they are showing their age. In 1972, amendments to the Smith-Mundt Act (the law enabling programs like Voice of America) banned the State Department from exposing Americans to propaganda meant for foreign audiences. Under Smith-Mundt, foreign influence operations could only happen in languages and locations inaccessible to Americans.

Restrictions aimed at the State Department, however, have no bearing on the Department of Defense, where most 21st century psy-op projects take place. The 2012 Smith-Mundt Modernization Act neutered restrictions on online messaging, and in 2019, Congress passed Section 1631, expanding the military’s power to engage in covert information operations.

Many experts have framed the above online psy-ops as a vital theater of competition between China, and Russia, each of which have their own centralized disinformation programs. As one senior official put it, “ceding an entire domain to an adversary would be unwise.”

Yet such concern over a ‘disinformation gap’ may be misled. While cyberspace remains important, it is far from clear that disinformation is even a useful tool. Foreign influence campaigns often struggle to bridge cultural divides. Many of the posts in the Stanford study, for instance, translated English literally and used American hashtags instead of the local language.

Worryingly, while such mistakes reduce impact on foreigners, they make false messages more accessible to a domestic audience. China’s vaunted “50-cent army” of online propagandists, for example, is by most accounts far better at controlling domestic discourse and attacking dissidents than at impersonating foreigners.

None of this is to say that disinformation is to be taken lightly. However, as a weapon it is harder to wield and quicker to produce blowback than many assume.The United States can do better than fight fire with fire.

As tempting as it may be to go back to the Smith-Mundt-style separation between foreign and domestic audiences, global media has changed too much to put the toothpaste back in the tube. The United States will have to chart a new path, perhaps by forswearing disinformation as a tool of foreign affairs and national security. Such a policy may sound impractical, but it is not dissimilar to the intelligence community’s “duty to warn” other countries, even rivals such as Russia and Iran, about terror threats.

As disinformation supplants terrorism on lists of global threats, it may be time to treat it with the same moral clarity.

In past decades, the United States sought to sing two songs at once, spreading propaganda abroad while preserving democracy at home. In the present globalized era, however, we can no longer have it both ways. We must either temper our foreign policy with our domestic values or risk our democracy being corroded by the very measures meant to protect it.

Thomas Brodey

Thomas Brodey was a Peace Corps volunteer in Madagascar from 2022 to 2024. He has also worked as a Marcellus Policy Fellow with the John Quincy Adams Society and as a World Affairs Councils of America delegate to Qatar. His work has appeared in Inkstick, Responsible Statecraft, and the Wall Street Journal.

26. Five Yalies selected as 2024 Tillman Scholars for their achievements, potential in service

As an aside we have come a long way from the 1960s when some (or most or all?) Ivy League schools rejected ROTC programs. Yale has both Air Force and Naval ROTC programs. https://yalecollege.yale.edu/academics/special-academic-programs/reserve-officers-training-corps-rotc#:~:text=

Five Yalies selected as 2024 Tillman Scholars for their achievements, potential in service

Hillary Browning ’20 LAW ’25, Genevieve Chase ’26, Zac Cobb LAW ’27, Nicole Echols SOM ’25 and Galen Jones SOM ’26 were named 2024 Tillman Scholars over the summer.

Drea Cabral 12:08 am, Sep 05, 2024

yaledailynews.com · by Drea Cabral · September 5, 2024

YuLin Zhen, Photography Editor

Over the summer, five Yalies were named 2024 Tillman Scholars, recognized for their outstanding potential to make a significant impact and their dedication to serving others selflessly.

The Tillman Foundation gets its namesake from Pat Tillman, former NFL linebacker turned U.S. Army soldier who left a lucrative career to serve his country. Tillman died protecting his unit in Iraq as they were ambushed.

The foundation supports active service members, veterans and military spouses who embody the characteristics Tillman valued most: service, scholarship, humble leadership and impact.

These students decided to return to education as a stepping stone to this future service. Tillman Scholars receive assistance for academic expenses, opportunities to develop various skills and a network of fellow scholars across the country.

Of the approximately 1,600 people who applied to be Tillman Scholars, 60 individuals were selected nationwide.

“[Tillman Scholars] believe their best years of service to our country are still ahead of them, and they are committed to strengthening communities at home and around the world.” according to the Pat Tillman Foundation’s website.

Hillary Browning ’20 LAW ’25

On a bet from her father, Browning joined the United States Navy and served for six years as a journalist. Her eight-page daily newspaper allowed seamen aboard the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower to gain access to the outside world.

In an interview with the News, Browning describes her military experience as a “launchpad to college.” After attending community college, she connected with Service to School, a nonprofit organization helping veterans apply to college. At Yale College, she was a member of Grace Hopper College, and she is now in her final year of Yale Law School.

Even though she started and abandoned the Pat Tillman application two or three times, Browning said her experience at Yale and being named a Tillman Scholar have helped her relinquish her self-doubt.

In the future, Browning plans to practice tax law and estate planning. She hopes to help other veterans’ estate plans — to use the benefits they receive to their full potential, to build generational wealth among veterans and their families.

Genevieve Chase ’26

Chase joined the United States Army in 2003 and has since been deployed twice, earning a Purple Heart, Combat Action Badge, Joint Service Commendation Medal and a Bronze Star Medal.

Despite experiencing PTSD and depression upon returning from deployment, Chase advocated for fellow veterans struggling with the return to civilian life. She founded American Women Veterans and advocated for women and LGBTQ+ veterans.

While continuing to serve in the Army Reserve, Chase is currently pursuing her bachelor’s degree in philosophy at Yale College. While at Yale, Chase volunteers as a Court Appointed Special Advocate for foster children. She plans to attend law school in the future.

Zac Cobb LAW ’27

Ater pursuing investment banking in New York for three years, Cobb felt called to service, he told the News. He then spent five years in the United States Air Force as a combat medic engaging in personnel recovery.

Cobb said that Tillman continues to inspire him as an example for everyone to put service before self and that he is honored to continue Tillman’s legacy of service and sacrifice for the greater good.

“I feel an incredible blessing and opportunity to use my Yale degree to continue public service in another sphere that is important to our country and the world outside of the military — that is the justice system,” Cobb told the News.

Now pursuing a J.D. from Yale Law School, Cobb intends to continue working in public service after graduation. He hopes his work will help people understand the significance of Tillman’s sacrifice, as he said, “The world could use heroes like Pat now more than ever.”

Nicole Echols SOM ’25

Sergeant Major Echols has been serving in the United States Army for almost 23 years. Paralleling Tillman’s own experience, Echols was deeply impacted by 9/11 and felt a calling to serve, referring to the decision to enlist as a “leap of faith.”

Echols works in Special Operations, acting as a liaison between foreign militaries and their governments. While still serving out of Washington, D.C., Echols commutes to New Haven every other week to pursue an MBA at the Yale School of Management.

Echols chose Yale because of its reputation and resources, as well as its exceptional community. When speaking of first visiting Yale and meeting her future fellow Yalies, Echols recalls, “they were so warm and welcoming,” and the community was “just a very supportive environment. That’s exactly what I wanted to be a part of.”

To Echols, the award reaffirms the reasons she, Tillman and many other servicemen and women join the military.

“We do it for the service, and we stay in it for the service and the people,” she said.

Nearing the end of her career, Echols seeks out ways to serve outside of the military. She has founded the Uncommon Heroes Foundation, a nonprofit helping other women in Special Operations fund family planning — bridging a gap between the support available to male and female soldiers.

Galen Jones SOM ’26

Jones joined the United States Army at 19, shortly after high school. As a Special Forces Medic, Jones was stationed in Germany and worked throughout Eastern Europe.

In January 2022, just shortly after leaving the military, Jones traveled with a small nonprofit to Ukraine to provide humanitarian aid at the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war. It was there that he decided to become a full-time humanitarian worker.

Jones is in his second year at Yale’s School of Management, pursuing a dual MPH and MBA. He plans to continue Tillman’s legacy by entering the humanitarian space, specifically conflict and healthcare.

“That’s the kind of person I want to be,” Jones told the News.

Yale has 13 professional schools.

yaledailynews.com · by Drea Cabral · September 5, 2024

27. US election integrity fears heighten tension ahead of presidential vote

This is not meant as partisan comments. I believe in our Constitution and a peaceful transfer of power.

You either support and defend the Constitution or you don't.

You either support a peaceful transfer of power or you don't.

And if you think political violence is justified following an election outcome you do not agree with, you are more than a useful idiot for Russia, China and other malign actors who seek to undermine the legitimacy of our federal democratic republic.

Take this poll at Smercomish.com. The results are scary.

https://www.smerconish.com/daily-poll/?utm_source=aweber&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=voteherebuttonfullsize

US election integrity fears heighten tension ahead of presidential vote

voanews.com · by Steve Herman · September 2, 2024

The two major U.S. political parties are expressing concern about "election integrity" ahead of November's vote, focusing on the procedures for registering to vote; casting, counting and certifying votes; and adequately addressing any serious issues that arise.

Democrats accuse Republicans of limiting access to polling stations and plotting to hamper the certification of the results. Republicans suspect Democratic Party operatives of tampering with absentee ballots, manipulating voting machines and keeping ineligible voters on the rolls.

The Republican nominee for a third consecutive presidential election, former President Donald Trump, is facing criminal charges over his attempts to overturn his 2020 election loss. He continues to assert he was not really defeated because it was a "rigged election."

The Democratic Party's nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris, accuses Trump of undermining confidence in elections, while she pledges to uphold fundamental American principles "from the rule of law to free and fair elections to the peaceful transfer of power," as she phrased it during her acceptance speech at last month's party convention in Chicago.

Federal agencies have been conducting tabletop exercises, mindful of January 6, 2021, when Trump supporters, unhappy with the president's defeat, stormed the U.S. Capitol.

The most recent drill included state and local election officials along with federal agencies such as the FBI, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency and the U.S. Cyber Command, as well as postal investigators.

Has the preparation strengthened election integrity?

That is the hope of stakeholders such as the 104-year-old League of Women Voters.

"We'll have to see what happens, what the outcome of the election is, how people feel about it, what protests [there are] and whether that protest crosses the line into violence, and my hope is that it doesn't," league CEO Celina Stewart told VOA.

So far this year, the system has held up well, said Ben Hovland, chairman of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, an independent federal agency established in 2002 to help facilitate the administration of elections.

'We're in good shape'

"We've had a lot of primaries already, both the presidential primaries this year, the state primaries. And, so, election officials have had a lot of practice already this season, and I think we're in good shape going into November," Hovland told VOA.

The Election Assistance Commission and Federal Election Commission are the only U.S. government agencies devoted solely to campaigns and elections. The Justice Department administers and enforces some elections statutes. Most everything else is under the jurisdiction of the individual states and territories. They are tasked with a chain of responsibilities ranging from registering voters prior to elections to certifying the tallies after the elections.

Asked by VOA to assess what would concern him most if the system were put to a stress test, Hovland, a former poll worker, responded, "When I look at the challenges election administrators are facing, there are so many."

"The recent years have been more challenging than most," he said, and more government funding is needed to improve election integrity.

County clerks and other elections officials across the country are hoping for a calmer election than the one four years ago.

In Champaign County, Illinois, in 2020, the local Republican Party tried to have a judge compel the county clerk, Aaron Ammons, to stop counting mailed-in ballots.

"And he dismissed that claim, and I was able to count the ballots," Ammons said. "But they definitely tried it, just like they were trying in other places across the country."

Threats, intimidation and lawsuits have prompted many election officials and volunteers nationwide to quit, said Ammons, who was elected to his post as a Democrat in 2018.

"It does a disservice, and it really is disheartening to the people who do this work if we're not getting the support that we obviously need for being on the front lines of democracy," he told VOA.

The League of Women Voters' Stewart, who is also a member of the National Task Force on Election Crises, agrees.

"To villainize a community service and a civic duty people take on, I think, is really crazy. Even more so, there's just no evidence of any nefarious conduct," she said.

To reassure candidates, party officials and the public, it is important to invite them to watch the system operate, said Eric Fey, the director of elections in St. Louis County, Missouri.

"Opening mail ballots, tabulating ballots, testing voting equipment, manually recounting, auditing after the election — all of these things are publicly observable," said Fey, the co-host of an award-winning podcast about elections administration.

Controversy in Georgia

In Georgia, one of about seven states where Trump and Harris are virtually tied in the polls, Democrats have sued to block new election rules they warn could lead to post-election chaos. The state's election board recently authorized individual county election superintendents to delay or cancel the certification of votes.

Trump has been indicted on multiple criminal charges in Georgia for trying to overturn the state's election result in 2020 and attempting to persuade state officials to declare him the winner even though he lost to Democrat Joe Biden, who was elected president.

In Colorado, where most of the country clerks are Republican and Harris is expected to win the state's 10 electoral votes, there are indications some may withhold certification of November's results.

"Nothing has changed since the 2020 elections. The voting equipment is the same, uncertified, Chinese-built electronics with built-in internet capability," wrote Ron Hanks, the chairman of the state's Republican Party ballot and elections security committee, in a statement to last year's election canvass boards.

The rhetoric is reminiscent of partisan allegations from the 2020 presidential election when conspiracy theorists sought to discredit Biden's victory. Some claimed that voting machines had been manipulated by malevolent outside forces using Italian satellites or thermostats controlled by China — or former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who died in 2013.

"Most folks do not understand the mechanics of how an election is administered. It's so decentralized, and every state is doing it a little bit differently," said Fey in Missouri. "And, no, Hugo Chavez cannot come back from the grave to a voting machine."

In most other democracies around the world, an election may involve a smaller ballot. Constituents may cast their vote for a single member of parliament and a president and answer a referendum question.

In American elections, local voters are often confronted with voluminous ballots containing dozens of candidates, a series of tax and levy bond measure and proposed state constitutional changes.

A single U.S. county may have to count as many votes as would be cast in a mid-sized country, thus it would need to rely on electronic tabulations. Counting ballots by hand is rare, usually occurring when the count is extremely close, and a recount is ordered.

Overall, the American model for elections is not an efficient one, Fey acknowledged.

"It's made to be a responsive model where the government is at a very low level, close to the citizens, and a lot of decisions are not necessarily made at the national level," he said. "So, what we lose in efficiency, we gain in response to this at the local level."

voanews.com · by Steve Herman · September 2, 2024

28. Combat swimmer operations and their importance in a near-peer conflict

One of the hardest things I have ever done is conduct military operations in the waters of the Pacific Northwest, both operations at the mouth of the Columbia River and the Pacific Ocean (Camp RIlea, Oregon and in the (very cold) waters of Puget Sound. I have great respect for SEALs and SF underwater operations (SCUBA) teams.

Combat swimmer operations and their importance in a near-peer conflict

sandboxx.us · September 5, 2024

The U.S. military has shifted its focus from counterterrorism operations to near-peer conflict against adversaries such as Russia and China.

A logical consequence of this shift is a rethinking of special operations missions. The special operations forces (SOF) mission sets will undoubtedly return to those dominant before the pre-9/11 era: direct action against conventional military forces and targets; unconventional warfare in support of wider strategic military objectives; special reconnaissance against both strategic and battlefield tactical targets; and other operations as required to support conventional military operations and objectives.

One of the Navy SEAL Team missions that falls squarely into the direct action category is combat swimmer operations. While these have been virtually unheard of in the era of counterterrorism operations, they would no doubt feature to some degree in a future war with a military peer possessing a capable navy. There are no al-Qaeda naval assets to target and destroy, nor ISIS ports to infiltrate and sabotage, but there sure are plenty of naval targets in both China and Russia.

In a war against China, for example, the United States would face thousands of miles of Chinese coastline. The harbors, naval bases, and ports situated along them are all ripe targets for naval special operations forces to prosecute should the United States and China go to war. The same is true for Russia.

The purpose of combat swimmer operations

China’s Shandong aircraft carrier in port prior to being commissioned, 2019. Chinese aircraft carrier could become targets of SEAL teams in the event of a conflict with China. (Photo by Tyg728/Wikimedia Commons)

The goal of a combat swimmer operation is to attack an enemy naval target, usually situated in a port or near a shore. Those targets might include submarines, warships, naval support vessels, or even maritime infrastructure such as ports, docks, or other fixed structures along the shoreline that support an enemy’s naval operations or maritime commerce. On the other hand, an enemy ship at sea would be a target for the larger navy to prosecute with surface, air, or subsurface assets, not so much for a SEAL team.

What goes into making them happen

A combat swimmer operation is similar to any other SOF mission when it comes to the mission-planning process. An operational order comes down from higher command tasking a SEAL element in theatre to prosecute a target, say a Chinese aircraft carrier in port. If it is a maritime target, as described above, the mission would almost certainly be assigned to a SEAL unit. (The Army’s Special Forces also have Combat Divers, but these operators use water as an infiltration method and don’t conduct actual combat swimmer attacks.)

The SEAL element would plan the mission the same way it plans every mission, the main distinguishing factor would be the added complexity of an underwater infiltration, or one that is some combination of air, surface, and underwater infiltration.

Maritime Special Operations Forces prepares to embark helicopters for a mission during a training exercise aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73). SEALs and Marine Special Operations (MARSOC) forces from Special Operations Command Pacific conducted maritime interoperability training aboard Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Everett Allen/Released)

By way of our carrier example, a SEAL platoon might decide they will insert from a helicopter or submarine located far offshore. They would then use small combat rubber raiding craft to further infiltrate closer to shore. The raiding craft would drop combat swimmer pairs for the final underwater infil to the target. They can also infiltrate with the help of Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCC). (SWCCs are a naval special operation unit specializing in the use of small crafts.)

The actual attack could occur by the placement of limpet mines on the hull of the naval vessel in port, in which the swim pairs place their explosives and never surface. The attack could also entail the combat swimmers surfacing and placing explosives on a target adjacent to the water.

If the attack itself was an assault or raid involving small arms and the prosecution of a target above the surface of the water, then the SEAL team could prosecute the target, and return to the water for exfiltration, or they might be extracted via some alternative direct method such as a helicopter. However, missions that take place above the water’s surface are more aptly described as an “over-the-beach” infiltration and direct action (DA) raid than a true combat swimmer operation. A combat swimmer op generally means the target is in the water and the attacking element does not leave the water or even surface from below.

When the target is successfully destroyed, sabotaged, or incapacitated in some way, the combat swimmers will often already be well into their exfiltration from the target area as they would not want to be close to an exploding naval ship, for example. The SEALs could then exfiltrate the target area in the exact reverse manner they infiltrated, or use different assets, depending on the mission and available resources.

The risks of combat swimmer operations

Placing explosives on the correct target underwater is not as easy as it sounds.

Combat swimmer operations carry the same risks as any other SOF mission. These can include botched navigation to the target, equipment failure, communications breakdowns, enemy contact on infiltration or at the target, failure to successfully prosecute the target, and many more contingencies.

But there are added risks associated with the underwater portion of the operation: Swim pairs can get lost and run out of air navigating to the target; they can have equipment failures below the surface; can fail to place explosives on the correct target (ships look mighty similar when viewed from below the water line); or they can be discovered on target while placing explosives. All of these risks make combat swimmer operations highly complex and perilous, which is why they require hundreds of hours of training and preparation before a maritime SOF element even arrives in theatre.

Combat swimmer operations are a capability that most U.S. military combatant commanders likely highly value within their tactical and strategic quivers. However, in today’s U.S. military, most probably have limited experience or knowledge of the execution of these operations or the actual capabilities of the SEAL elements that carry them out.

Similar to how SOF combat commanders had to rapidly adapt to a new operating environment during the Global War on Terror, conventional force commanders fighting near-peer wars in the future will have to quickly figure out the best way to use their SOF assets. Such is the way wars are generally fought, with the nations able to adapt the quickest often proclaimed the victors.

Feature Image: Navy SEALs emerging from the water. (Sealswcc.com)

This article was originally published in July 2023.

U.S. Tells Allies Iran Has Sent Ballistic Missiles to Russia

European officials say Europe and U.S. are working on a sanctions response to Iran’s move

Excerpts:

$10 Million and a Fake Investor: How the Kremlin Allegedly Built a Conservative U.S. Media Startup

Tenet Media posted hundreds of videos, as it was secretly bankrolled by Russia, the Justice Department says

‘Heterodox commentators’

Duped influencers

‘Happy to work with the Russian firm’

Most Mass Shooters Telegraph Their Attacks. These Teams Are In the Business Of Stopping Them

A growing field of experts assess threats and intervene with monitoring or therapy. Some call it the best hope ‘for preventing tragedies.’

Detecting warning signs

Communication confusion

Was There a Chinese Agent Working in the New York Governor’s Office?

Prosecutors say Linda Sun used her position as a trusted government aide to benefit Beijing for years—and reaped the rewards

U.S.-China Tensions

Open Volunteer Positions

Current Open Positions

Commentary: China-Philippines trust in troubled waters

TENSIONS WILL LIKELY ESCALATE

DEEP MISTRUST

US university Georgia Tech to end China partnerships following concerns over military ties

Secret American special forces boats spotted in Scotland

An interesting sighting at Glasgow Prestwick Airport has revealed the arrival of Combatant Craft Assault (CCA) boats, which were offloaded from a C-17 Globemaster aircraft.

Special Operations Forces: Summary of Armed Overwatch Reports

Fast Facts

Highlights

Why GAO Did This Study

What GAO Found

Recommendations

Full Report

GAO Contacts

Office of Public Affairs

Topics

US Special Operations cuts Armed Overwatch acquisition nearly 20%

‘Men of War’ Review: A Delirious Doc About a Former Green Beret Trying to Overthrow the Venezuelan Government

Grade: B

When Students Become Terrorists

Carrier Captain In Combat: What Went On During 7 Months Under Fire Around The Red Sea

Everything Changed Oct. 7

Flying In A Hawkeye

A Deployment Of Firsts

Writing The Book On Morale

Howard Altman

Reporter's Notebook: Why foreign policy might matter

Foreign policy decisions were important to only 3% of registered voters in Nevada, North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona

US Army’s next budget invests heavily in drones and electronic warfare

Military must move beyond integration to inclusion

The Surface Navy and the Long War

Disinformation dilemma: US hands are way dirty, too

Five Yalies selected as 2024 Tillman Scholars for their achievements, potential in service

US election integrity fears heighten tension ahead of presidential vote

Combat swimmer operations and their importance in a near-peer conflict

The purpose of combat swimmer operations

What goes into making them happen

The risks of combat swimmer operations

Read more from Sandboxx News