Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something."

– Franklin D. Roosevelt

"I'd rather have a young lieutenant with enough guts to disobey a direct order than a colonel too regimented to think and act for himself."

– William J. Donovan

"History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives."

– Abba Eban

1. Theater Army Strategy – U.S. Army Pacific

2. Fighting Abroad from an Ally's Land (RAND Report on INDOPACIFIC Bassing)

3. USSOCOM Welcomes the New President of Joint Special Operations University, Dr. Paul "PB" Brister

4. DOD Delegation Concludes Military Talks With China

5. China is Learning About Western Decision Making from the Ukraine War

6. Philippines says disputed reef 'not lost' to China despite pullout

7. U.S. Shrugs as World War III Approaches

8. Two examples of disinformation, one of great comms, plus a still relevant observation

9. U.S. Authorities Were Warned About Suspected Trump Gunman

10. Sailor Held by Venezuela for Alleged Maduro Assassination Plot Is a Navy SEAL, Service Records Show

11. New apparent Trump assassination attempt highlights Secret Service strains

12. Pacific Dragon: Is the Shipping Industry Ready for Containerized Missile Warfare?

13. A Step-Change to Beijing’s “Lawfare” in the South China Sea

14. One Million Are Now Dead or Injured in the Russia-Ukraine War

15. Hamas Is Surviving War With Israel. Now It Hopes to Thrive in Gaza Again.

16. Secure Visas for Afghan National Army Special Operations Command

17. Getting Strategic Competition Right: Competing for the System

18. The Soldier and the Constitution

19. Where Capitalism Is Working

20. The Case Against Israeli-Saudi Normalization

21. Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group

22. Why Did Journalists Like Me Take Ryan Routh Seriously?

23. ‘The Gulag Archipelago’ Is More Than Just Harrowing

FOLLOW-UP of a previous report:

So I made the following comments in a previous message about the Army's upcoming Project Convergence. I received a response below from a friend in the Army who provides a very important response to my half sarcastic comments. I think his response is very important and it gives me great confidence about what the Army is doing. And I guess it shows that I am the real dinosaur.

13. Army’s upcoming Project Convergence billed as early test for ‘C2 Next’ plans

I wonder if anyone has ever just gone to Apple or Google or Microsoft and said design a communications network that is simple, secure, intuitive and user friendly. Use concepts from social media and design a C2 system that can push and pull information in an effective way using techniques that all people are familiar with and bring with them when they enter the military. This may work in about 10 years or so when all the military dinosaurs have reached retirement and all the senior leaders then in charge will have grown up with iphones and social media.

I only ask this half sarcastically.

The most excellent and important response:

General George’s number one transformation priority is fixing the network.

He’s directed that we only buy intuitive, software based products. Instead of having a “box” to fight every warfighting function like we did in the GWOT, we’ll be "application based" on tablets and smaller - connected via small satellite dishes (starlink/starshield) or the cell network or connectivity we create. No more trucks pulling massive satellite dishes, not survivable today.

We agree that intuitive and adaptive is the name of the game – that’s why we have Google, Microsoft, and Amazon helping us suss out what Next Generation C2 should look like in a realistic environment.

Keep in mind, Google is the number #1 owner of Fiber in the world and Apple does not have its own communications infrastructure – we have the luxury of using all of the Fiber when we’re stateside because that’s how industry designed it but we don’t have that luxury in combat all the time.

We have so much agreement and inertia across industry and the hill, the real question is, is our procurement and budget process (inside and outside the pentagon) responsive enough to get the fix funded by FY 25? Dinosaurs? We want to go faster.

We should really be heartened by this response and have confidence that our Army is absolutely striving to do the right thing. And I would add that this is the result of a good propaganda effort (and before you think negative thoughts about propaganda please read Matt Armstrong's important essay at number 8 below).

1. Theater Army Strategy – U.S. Army Pacific

The 24 page strategy is at this link with a very useful summary below from the USARPAC G5. https://www.usarpac.army.mil/Portals/113/PDF%20Files/USARPAC%20Theater%20Army%20Strategy.pdf?ver=kiDo_vqmz_hE6aNkWujMbA%3d%3d

Theater Army Strategy – U.S. Army Pacific

Mon, 09/16/2024 - 10:57pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/theater-army-strategy-us-army-pacific

Editor's Note: Many in the national security community received the following message from the USARPAC G5 on 16 September 2024, It is posted with permission.

The USARPAC strategy can be downloaded HERE.

Strategic leaders, colleagues, and friends —

On behalf of General Charlie Flynn, Commander of United States Army Pacific, I want to provide you with a digital copy of the United States Army Pacific Theater Army strategy that was approved for public release this week. Please take time to review the attachment and the reader’s notes below – and incorporate into articles, analysis, discussion, research, teaching, and policy development.

I reference the classified version below, so if you can, please contact me on SIPR for the complete version.

Very important: The Commanding General who called for this strategy and shaped its development in every critical way has described his vision as building the foundation for peace, stability, and development across the incredibly important Indo-Pacific region. The higher direction is to avoid armed conflict; the military strategy is to be a useful and relevant instrument for national leaders every day, and ready for the future.

Reader’s Notes – USARPAC Theater Army Strategy: 2025-2035:

In June, the Commander, United States Army Pacific approved a classified Theater Army Strategy: 2025-2035, subtitled “Get in Position to Compete, Fight, and Win!”
This week, an unclassified summary was approved for general release (attached)
The capstone classified strategy, which includes detailed objectives and decision points, builds on earlier work
In November 2022, the USARPAC planning team distributed a White Paper: Theater Army Strategy presented and discussed at the Fall 2022 USARPAC Commanders Conference
Why a theater army strategy? What does it provide? As a Theater Joint Force Land Component Command (think of a four-star general’s warfighting headquarters for the region), USARPAC is a subordinate joint force command and conducts nested campaign planning under USINDOPACOM – under the Combatant Commander’s theater campaign plan
Our campaign planning is captured in the classified Theater Army Campaign Plan (or TACP)
Given all of this classified work, it is both unusual and especially important for interested American citizens (and friendly non-Americans as well) to see, to get an inside glimpse of high level strategic thinking – that’s what this unclassified document provides
By theater army strategy we mean an overarching construct (framework) outlining the TJFLCC’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power – we “work” alongside diplomacy, economic policy, and informational activities – in order to achieve national strategic and theater strategic objectives
The rationale for a theater army strategy comes from: increasing geopolitical uncertainty (with China, DPRK, and Russia – and regional changes to security postures, and domestic politics) – within uncertainty, we provide national policy leaders the certainty of landpower…
Previous operational assumptions about force deployment, employment, and readiness no longer fit the USINDOPACOM AOR; forces must be more compact, self-sufficient, organized to operate on joint interior lines, mobile, distributed over large areas of complex terrain, working with regional partners with varying capabilities and levels of authorities to operate with us
Why a theater army strategy now? The theater army echelon is 'returning' as the echelon of land power decision
The central idea – part of a Combined Force (with Allies like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines) and part of a Joint Force (with other U.S. Military Departments), USARPAC secures the tactical basis, the locations, routes, facilities, and cooperation and agreements, for the joint force’s ability to achieve operational positional advantage
Positional Advantage – that condition (or circumstance) of relative superiority over an adversary (or competitor) that comes from securing (including preventing adversary negative effects) a number of ‘points of relative advantage’ that together provide for ‘staying power’ (or maintaining operational endurance), combat power and overmatch
By restoring the centrality of positional advantage we are not introducing a new buzzword, but we are reestablishing our historic experience with large scale operations over very large geographic areas
Important: position of relative advantage – a location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat (overmatch) or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage (you can find this in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 on the Army Publishing Directorate website)
Positions of advantage are achieved primarily through maneuver – synchronization of fires (and information) and movement – but of course non-maneuver, non-fires actions are also critical to military success
Against a peer adversary, friendly forces must have positional advantage to successfully advance and secure objectives (this is how we return decisiveness to operations in large scale combat operations) – like in 1968, 1976, 1982, 1986, 1993, and so forth, the U.S. Army must do the work that ensures joint operations will be decisive
Landpower – the ability – by threat, force, or occupation – to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (also in ADP 3-0) – important: deterrence and assurance (implied by occupation) may be seen as incorporated
Competition – infinite game – “wins” today shape the next round of competition – players may change game board, pieces, rules
War – the ultimate decision sought by states when interests clash and violence is chosen – is one important, but not the only, underlying idea to the Theater Army Strategy
Considering the strategic environment – China is developing A2/AD capabilities not just to deny opponents the ability to strike its homeland but also to enable its own regional power projection
The combined/joint force must be prepared to disrupt and defeat the adversary’s combination of mass, interior lines, and magazine depth from and across all warfighting domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace)
China works to negate U.S. military advantages in space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and information environment – is developing significant anti-satellite capabilities, integrating cyber into all aspects of operations, and developing sophisticated air and missile defenses to challenge U.S. power projection and to deny U.S. space-based communications, GPS navigation and precision-guided munitions
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invests in technologies to undermine U.S. ability to achieve overmatch – that is, the ability to enter combat and not lose the initiative: long-range precision fires, air defense systems, electric fires, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
At the higher tactical and operational levels, the intelligence, fires, and air defense equipment and systems that are collectively described as anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities challenge the Joint Force’s ability to achieve air superiority and sea control as well as its ability to project power onto land from the air and maritime domains
To be clear, this tactical description of a battlefield adversary is something the U.S. military has not faced directly in decades
The PLA is developing cyberspace capabilities such as disruptive and destructive malware and space capabilities such as anti-satellite weapons to disrupt U.S. communications and freedom of maneuver
Especially considering a potential war over such a large geographic area like the Indo-Pacific, losing what we call freedom of maneuver can lead almost directly to strategic defeat
Adversary systems have been designed and postured to defeat primarily sea and air forces, and secondarily, to deny, degrade, and disrupt space and cyberspace – not designed to find, fix, and finish distributed, mobile, lethal, non-lethal, reloadable, fixed, and semi-fixed land forces
In a war against a peer enemy, the U.S. military cannot discount key terrain: this Theater Army Strategy takes on key terrain directly (there are important classified details here)
Key terrain – beginning here with the geographic sense – (we work in accordance with Department of Defense doctrine and policy) any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant (in Joint Publication 2-0) or (in accordance with Army doctrine) an identifiable characteristic whose seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to either combatant (found in ADP 3-90)
Key terrain and the Joint Force – importance: by putting combat-credible capabilities on key terrain, the land forces can make the Joint Force, such as the Joint Force Maritime Component Command, appear larger than it actually is – this is because the JFMCC wouldn’t have to commit a surface action group to overwatching the Luzon Strait, or the Sunda Strait, or the Lombok Strait, or the Malacca Strait – those surface maritime assets can be used elsewhere and against other key operational tasks
The Joint Force must have sea control and sea denial for joint all-domain operations – and with Army modernization, the Pacific Theater Army can threaten hostile ships from the shore around key terrain like maritime chokepoints
Additionally, land forces can bring together multinational forces in and around key terrain to be able to see, sense, and understand the operational environment for follow on missions like interdiction, air strikes, and raids
Key terrain, at the operational level and in this particular area of responsibility (AOR), allows movement and maneuver, improves effectiveness of intelligence collection and fires, helps assure allies and key military partners, and enables more effective sustainment and protection
In such a large potential theater of war (or operations) like the Indo-Pacific, the older idea of operational geometry is resurging in relevance and importance to planning –
We see four broad approaches (northern, central, southern, and western), corresponding to four major ocean areas (eastern Pacific, central Pacific, western Pacific, and Indian Ocean)
The four approaches are much more than just simple geographic areas – they are planning constructs for organizing many, in some cases complicated activities including partner nation efforts, training, security presence, physical development for improved multinational military actions, and so forth
In wartime, these approaches might be entire theaters of operations
In campaigning, these references help to spread efforts out oriented on key terrain – in armed conflict, these references would be used to define operational areas, axes of advance, lines of operation, lines of communications, bases of operation, and objectives
We think and plan in terms of a campaigning framework – described in the unclassified strategy as Organize – Generate – Apply – Build
Spatially our operational framework includes at least one Strategic Support Area – a number of Rear Areas – Joint Security Areas – Close Areas – a Deep Area – and an Extended Deep Area
This geometry allows commanders to visualize and describe forces and operations in time, space, and purpose
In campaigning it describes the employment of forces and capabilities – the campaigning framework
The decisive points are generally found where approaches cross close areas (specifics here are classified)
Commanders at echelon define their operational framework, nested with this, and based on the mission, friendly forces, opposing forces, allies and partners, and terrain
Organize – Generate – Apply – Build also describes our Strategic Approach; we operate according to four strategic methods: organizing – generating – applying – building
Intermediate military objectives (classified) – are used because the campaigning (and potential armed conflict) unfold over great distances and extended in time – in a very complex operational environment of allies, key partners, other actors and entities that influence the national military tool
This strategy – and the strategic approach generally represents a ten year block of time
The classified Theater Army Strategy decision points should – if we do our work right – describe how USARPAC changes over time to be more effective within the emerging operational environment
The decision points are by definition strategic, and define the broad course of the Pacific Theater Army and the ‘weight’ of effort – especially at the overall theater army level – they also indicate priority in time – all matters, issues, actions, and activities associated with the decision points are important, worked on continuously (they are always ‘in effect’)
Combined partners – such as the Japan Self-Defense Forces, Australian Defence Force, and Armed Forces of the Philippines, among others – rely on us, our plans and readiness to defend – the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific needs to appreciate the unique and, frankly, strategic role of the U.S. Army to security and stability, and the American people and the populations of allies should have a broad understanding of how military force may legitimately protect what is strategically valuable (at a minimum) – and we hope this strategy serves this purpose

...

Thank you for your attention and consideration of everything provided here.

Comments, questions, issues, elaborations, etc. are welcome. Take care, mjl

Colonel Marco J. Lyons

United States Army

Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 Plans

United States Army Pacific

Fort Shafter, Hawaii

About the Author(s)

Marco J. Lyons

Colonel Marco J. Lyons is Assistant Chief of Staff G5 Plans at United States Army Pacific, where he oversees mid- to long-term strategy, planning, and war games. Col. Lyons has served in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Okinawa in Army and joint positions. Col. Lyons earned a master’s degree in strategic studies from Naval Postgraduate School where his distinguished thesis, under the supervision of David Yost, was an early comparative study of the 1994, 2001, and 2010 nuclear posture reviews. For two years Col. Lyons was part of Army Science Board studies of the multi-domain operations concept. He has published for Infantry, The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the China Landpower Studies Center, and Divergent Options.

2. Fighting Abroad from an Ally's Land (RAND Report on INDOPACIFIC Bassing)

You can download the 159 page report here. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1900/RRA1985-1/RAND_RRA1985-1.pdf

All war planners for the INDOPACIFIC need to review and study this report.

Interesting but very very troubling findings. This report has one of the best discussions of assumptions with the main one being that because China is a mutual threat that the J\apan and the ROK will allow US forces to stage and operate from bases in those countries. The report correctly calls such assumptions into question. It marks the point that it is not clear whether the ROK, Japan, and the Philippines will allow US forces to operate from their countries if those countries are not under threat from China.

However, there is one assumption that is not discussed which is most important. And that is the assumption made by host nations that if they deny US use of bases in its country it will be able to either remain neutral or otherwise will not be threatened or attacked by China.

I think an assumption that needs to be tested for those countries is that if China chooses to attack Taiwan that it will also attack US forces in those three countries to prevent US reinforcements from coming to the defense of Taiwan. A host nation decision not to allow the US to use the bases in the country provides no protection from a Chinese decision to attack US forces where it believes it is necessary for it to ensure success in Taiwan.

Lastly this is an unclassified report. It is reporting on public assumptions and public discussions and statements by host nations. Host nations want to protect themselves from the wrath of China so they are going to keep public agreements ambiguous at the very least. That may not be a bad thing if the intent is to create dilemmas for China. What this report cannot show and what we cannot not know are what agreements have been made privately between the US and host nations among leaders who have a realistic understanding of the full spectrum of threats and the plans necessary to address those threats. The bottom line is that this report provides all the rationale for what needs to take place in classified discussions to reach the right agreements that will serve the mutual defense of all allies.

Fighting Abroad from an Ally's Land

Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Forces in the Indo-Pacific

Jeffrey W. Hornung, Kristen Gunness, Bryan Rooney, Dan McCormick, Lydia Grek, Ryan A. Schwankhart, Gian Gentile, Marisa R. Lino

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1985-1.html??cutoff=true&utm

ResearchPublished Sep 16, 2024

Discussions about U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific often assume that the United States will have the ability to not only quickly access its military capabilities stationed in the region, but also to freely operate from bases in allied countries. The authors of this report explore this assumption, examining the opportunities and constraints that the U.S. military might face when operating from the territories of Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Philippines. The authors examine the basing and access assumptions for the U.S. military should it wish to preposition supplies in, and operate from, these allies in peacetime and in a conflict over Taiwan when these allies themselves have not been attacked.

For this research, the authors conducted a comprehensive literature review of historical and current studies on access; held an internal RAND workshop with military experts to determine the types of capabilities and access requests the United States might make of Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines in a Taiwan contingency; conducted extensive discussions and interviews in the fall of 2022 with officials and experts in Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines and with U.S. government personnel and experts in the United States who work on issues related to these three allies; and examined important agreements the United States has with each treaty ally that are relevant for U.S. military access and basing.

The authors present their findings regarding access and basing for each ally and recommend ways to improve outcomes in both areas.

Key Findings

The agreements that the United States has with Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines regarding U.S. military access and ability to deploy forces in peacetime are ambiguous about U.S. military access in a conflict if the allied country is not directly threatened.
Differences in interpretations of key bilateral agreements related to basing and access have the potential to lead to different expectations about what types of capabilities or forces require the host country's consultation or consent, and what U.S. military activities would be acceptable to conduct directly from that ally in different situations.
More than legal agreements, domestic political considerations — including public opinion and local politics — play a significant role in determining whether U.S. forces are granted access in many situations.
The United States' ability to operate from Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines in a conflict over Taiwan in which the allied country is not directly attacked appears to be limited.
Japan is the most likely to grant access to U.S. forces in a contingency over Taiwan if Japan itself is not attacked, but that support is likely to take time; the ROK and the Philippines are much less likely to grant U.S. forces access if they themselves are not attacked.

Recommendations

Plan for some amount of uncertainty related to access decisions in a conflict, and take into account host nation sensitivities to certain types of capabilities and fears over the risk of Chinese retaliation.
For Japan, discuss intra-country regional differences to determine the most accessible locations for U.S. capabilities or forces; increase exercises and rotational training to normalize U.S. military presence and build community relations; and focus on expanding deployment of nonkinetic capabilities, which are least likely to be trigger host nation concerns. The United States should also discuss with Japan the need for rapid decisionmaking in a conflict, and conduct more engagement to better understand what Japan is willing to do in a conflict.
For the ROK, seek clarity as to whether U.S. deployment of troops over current levels could provide an opportunity to later draw on those forces; frame access requests as intended to deter North Korea when relevant; clarify the conditions under which the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty applies; and work to regularize having U.S. Forces Korea and ROK forces exercise off the Korean Peninsula with like-minded regional militaries.
For the Philippines, use rotational access to maintain a presence throughout the year; conduct a public messaging campaign to support broader strategic initiatives; and ensure compatibility between U.S. access requests and the requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The United States should also work to counter Chinese efforts to influence local Philippine officials and seek clarification on how to invoke and implement the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

3. USSOCOM Welcomes the New President of Joint Special Operations University, Dr. Paul "PB" Brister

Congratulations to the new JSOU President, leading the premier Joint SOF education institution. Hear his message at the link below.

In this short video PB provides one of the best overviews of JSOU. As one of the hidden gems of USSOCOM I do not think JSOU is as well known or as well understood as it should be. Listen to PB describe it here.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZHvJLizoOo

USSOCOM Welcomes the New President of Joint Special Operations University, Dr. Paul "PB" Brister

71 views Sep 16, 2024

USSOCOM Welcomes the New President of Joint Special Operations University, Dr. Paul "PB" Brister Dr. Paul "PB" Brister, the new President of Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), brings decades of experience in both Special Operations and strategic civilian roles to his leadership. With a deep commitment to the university's mission, Dr. Brister is focused on building upon JSOU’s legacy of excellence. He highlights JSOU’s commitment to leadership development, enlisted education, and SOF-peculiar courses that shape the next generation of warfighters. Looking ahead, JSOU aims to adapt to new challenges, including integrating big data, AI, and autonomous systems into its curriculum. Dr. Brister invites collaboration to continue advancing the mission of JSOU and SOCOM.

4. DOD Delegation Concludes Military Talks With China

DOD Delegation Concludes Military Talks With China

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

A Defense Department delegation concluded the latest round of military-to-military talks with Chinese counterparts over the weekend, as U.S. officials continue to emphasize the importance of maintaining open lines of communication for responsibly managing competition.

Pentagon Meeting

Michael S. Chase, deputy assistant secretary of defense for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, hosts delegates from China for meetings at the Pentagon, Jan. 9, 2024.

Download: Full Size (1.66 MB)

Credit: Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza

VIRIN: 240109-D-PM193-1030

Michael S. Chase, deputy assistant secretary of defense for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, led the U.S. delegation to Beijing for the 18th iteration of the Defense Policy Coordination Talks between the U.S. and China.

The two sides discussed a range of regional and global security issues as part of the exchange, including U.S. concerns over China's support for Russia's defense industrial base and the impact that support is having on European and transatlantic security.

"DOD also reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defending its Indo-Pacific allies, and the department emphasized the importance of respect for freedom of navigation as guaranteed under international law in light of ongoing aggressive PRC [People's Republic of China] harassment against lawfully operating Philippine vessels in the South China Sea," a senior official said Sunday at the conclusion of the talks.

The U.S. delegation also underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, raised concerns about ongoing provocations from North Korea, and urged China to encourage stability and de-escalation in the Middle East.

Shangri-La Dialogue.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Chinese Defense Minister Adm. Dong Jun in Singapore, May 31, 2024. Austin was in Singapore to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Download: Full Size (1.34 MB)

Credit: Chad J. McNeeley

VIRIN: 240531-D-TT977-1167

The talks mark a continuation of U.S. efforts to maintain the recently reestablished open lines of communication with China.

President Joe Biden secured China's agreement to return to military-to-military talks last November after meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Woodside, California.

In January, senior U.S. and Chinese military officials resumed the U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks at the Pentagon. Prior to that, the high-level talks were last held in September 2021.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III emphasized the importance of maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication at multiple levels during his first meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May.

Last week, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Navy Adm. Samuel Paparo held a video teleconference with China's Gen. Wu Yanan, commander of the military's southern theater. During the call, Paparo noted the necessity of continued military-to-military dialogue.

Video Discussion

Navy Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, holds a video teleconference with China’s Gen. Wu Yanan, commander of the military’s southern theater, Sept. 9, 2024.

Download: Full Size (1.64 MB)

Credit: Navy Petty Officer 1st Class John D. Bellino

VIRIN: 240909-N-PC065-2020

Following the latest talks in Beijing, officials emphasized that the military-to-military dialogue does not signal a change in the U.S. approach to China.

"The department continues to view [China] as our pacing challenge as described in the National Defense Strategy," the senior official said. "[China] continues to be the only U.S. competitor with the intent and, increasingly, the capability to overturn the rules-based infrastructure that has kept peace in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Second World War."

The official added that the U.S. "remains clear-eyed about [China's] intentions and their actions in the region and around the world."

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

5. China is Learning About Western Decision Making from the Ukraine War

Some excellent food for thought. Do we know the answers to these questions? Can we know ourselves as China is trying to know us? ( if you know yourself and know your enemy in 100 battles...)

Excerpts:

In imagining what the Chinese might be learning from Western decision-making on these issues, it might be useful to examine the issue through the lens of key questions that Xi might ask about countries in the West and how they make decisions. I propose five key questions here, but there are likely to be more.

Question 1: How much strategic risk is the U.S., and its allies, willing to take?

Question 2: What is the western threshold for committing its military forces?

Question 3: What is the level of nuclear sabre rattling that is strategically effective without having to use them?

Question 4: How can strategic influence operations be calibrated to stoke escalation terror among western politicians?

Question 5: How can China exploit time to generate a superior strategic tempo, and degrade western decision-making, in any future conflict?

Pacific Theatre

China is Learning About Western Decision Making from the Ukraine War

A Special Assessment on Ukraine and how Western decision-making is informing the strategic calculus of Chairman Xi and the CCP

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/china-is-learning-about-western-decision?utm

Mick Ryan

Sep 17, 2024

∙ Paid

Chinese armoured vehicles on exercises in Russia. Source: RFE/RL

What lessons is China learning from Russia’s war on Ukraine?” is a question that preoccupies many senior policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals. The hope is that Russia’s experience in Ukraine will deter Beijing from invading Taiwan. But Beijing may be drawing different conclusions in the third year of this gruelling war than it did in the first. And the lessons China’s leaders are learning may be the opposite of those the White House wants them to learn.

Xi Jinping Has Learned a Lot From the War in Ukraine, Alexander Gabuev

Wars are full of uncertainty.

Whether it is the uncertainty of what the enemy is doing on the other side of a hill, through to uncertainty about the motivations of political leaders in their decision-making, the ‘fog and friction of war’ is every bit of relevant in considering war in the 21^st century as when Carl von Clausewitz wrote about this concept in the early 1800s.

However, sometimes there are things in war that we can be certain about. I would propose that one certainty of the Russo-Ukraine war is that China is watching it closely. In particular, it is learning to improve its strategic decision models (within the bounds of the CCP system) by watching U.S. and NATO decision-making and responses to the Ukraine war. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan is also prompting Western debates which inform China’s strategic calculus.

I have explored the topic of Chinese learning from the Ukraine War in several previous articles. My first examination of China’s potential observations from the war in Ukraine was published back in April 2022. This was designed as short, initial exploration of what China might learn from the conflict. A year later, in February 2023, I undertook another exploration of how China might be using the war in Ukraine to wargame its own future operations. Finally, in September last year I published a piece here that proposed multiple areas where the Chinese leadership might be learning from the war in Ukraine.

Nearly a year later, I wanted to provide an assessment on one particular aspect of China’s (potential) learning from the war in Ukraine that has political and strategic impact. As such, in this article I will examine how China might be learning from how the West (the U.S. and NATO in particular) have made strategic decisions during the war, up to the latest debate on long range strike, and how this will inform and influence Chinese strategic decision-making.

China Learns from Foreign Wars

The PLA are careful and meticulous students of modern warfare, particularly the U.S. way of war. But despite recent organizational reform efforts, the PLA remains essentially a political entity with a war-fighting mission. It is a party army, not a national army. And its approach to learning and leadership is heavily influenced by its own organization, as well as traditional Chinese culture and education.

What the Chinese Army Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine War, Evan A. Feigenbaum and Charles Hooper

China, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), have previously demonstrated both the willingness and ability for learning and change. In 2023, Toshi Yoshihara examined China’s study of the lessons of the Pacific War. As he writes in his report, published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies,:

Chinese analysts, including those affiliated with the PLA, have subjected the maritime conflict and its campaigns to scrutiny. The historical accounts render clear and sound judgments about the sources of operational success that in turn reveal much about the PLA’s views of strategy and war… Chinese findings from these retrospectives offer tantalizing hints of the PLA’s deeply held beliefs, assumptions, and proclivities about future warfare, such as the penchant for striking first and attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities.

Yoshihara finds in his study of Chinese learning from the Pacific War that Chinese scholars see jointness and amphibious operations as key features of the Second World War. Another topic of interest is the role of shore-based airpower and its influence on the conduct of operations. Other themes in the Chinese writings are the crucial role of intelligence and reconnaissance, and the attrition of forces on both sides, including Japan’s lack of industrial depth and personnel to sustain and recover from its combat losses. The report contains a good bibliography of Chinese sources which I highly recommend.

The Falklands War, the first modern conventional war in the post-Vietnam era, was a case study in the strategies, successes, and failures of the Argentine military as it attempted to deny British forces access to the waters surrounding the islands. The lessons have probably contributed to China’s anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) strategies, with its lessons in sea denial and maritime attack. Few wars more analogous to a Taiwan Strait operation than the Falklands War. The war showed the lethality of new era missile systems as well as the challenges of long-distance force projection, which would be a challenge for those coming to Taiwan’s assistance.

Argentine warship General Belgrano sinks after being torpedoed by Royal Navy submarine during the Falklands War. Source: The Independent.

As Lyle Goldstein has written on this topic: “this author conducted an academic survey of Chinese writings regarding the Falklands War that was published in 2008. That study revealed that Chinese strategists admired London’s objective use of intelligence and its “flexible, joint, and efficient command arrangements.” The airpower discussion notes that the Argentines lacked effective anti-ship doctrine and the related weaponry…one Chinese assessment of the Falklands War concluded that the sinking of the Belgrano cruiser by a Royal Navy nuclear submarine proved to be “the most decisive military operation of the Falklands War.”

James Holmes has also written an interesting piece on Chinese learning from the Falklands War. You can read his article here.

The 1991 Gulf War shocked the Chinese military into a multi-decade recapitalization of its military, and indigenous research and development programs, which has included advanced ships, aircraft, missiles, cyber and space warfare and ground combat vehicles. It has also resulted in reforms to strategic and operational command and control, including better joint integration. Chinese lessons from the 1991 Gulf War – as well as the wars spawned by 9/11 – have included a reformation in their operational doctrine and has resulted in concepts such as ‘intelligentization’ and ‘systems destruction warfare.’

Recently, several experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a study of Chinese writings on the war in Ukraine. Their findings, not surprisingly, indicate that China is studying the war very closely. Every aspect of warfighting, from the national level to tactical operations, is being reviewed by different Chinese scholars and military theorists. You can read the commentaries on Chinese learning from the CSIS experts, as well as translated Chinese articles, here.

China has an evolved capability to study and learn from other people’s wars. Partially this is due to necessity; China has not been involved in large-scale war since its disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979. The poor performance of the PLA in that war saw Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping use it to overcome resistance from PLA leadership for the modernisation of China’s military. But China has since then used its studies of other peoples’ war to inform change in the PLA. The most recent conventional war in Ukraine, like the other wars discussed above, provides an array of lessons. And perhaps the most important lesson is how Western nations make decisions about war.

President Xi in uniform observing naval exercises. Source: The Japan Times

Learning About Western Decision Making

The Chinese Communist Party considers the political aspects of a crisis to be of central importance. Institutional structures and processes for responding to crises are designed to manage and shape their political ramifications.

PRC Crisis Response Behaviors at the End of Xi Jinping’s Second Term, Drew T. Holliday

The Chinese leader, Xi, will have been closely watching how President Biden, the U.S. national security enterprise as well as the NATO alliance make policy decisions about the war in Ukraine. The Chinese will be examining the intricacies of how Russian policies and actions have influenced Western decision-making about the war.

At the same time, the Chinese leadership will be making observations about which capabilities have deterred the West from broadening, or speeding up, its support to Ukraine. It will have watched Russian behaviour in its effort to shape the political discussion in the West about intervening in the air or on the ground. The Chinese leadership will also have observed how outrageously and brutally the Russians can behave without Western forces physically intervening. This will inform the Chinese decision-making about the level of military aggression that it can take towards Taiwan.

The Chinese are not only watching how politicians make decisions, but how western media influences or responds to such decision making, as well as how citizens influence government decisions. Each of these groups will be seen as variables that China either currently seeks to influence or might want to influence in future contingencies.

While the torturous discussion over allowing Ukraine to use American long-range strike weapons to hit targets deeper inside Russia is just one case study the Chinese will use to learn, the war has provided many other strategic debates which will henceforth inform Chinese strategic decision-making. Examples include the slow decisions around provision of HIMARs, tanks, Patriot air defence systems and F-16s, as well as the multi-year discussions on Ukraine’s entry into the NATO alliance and the coordination of economic sanctions against Russia.

In imagining what the Chinese might be learning from Western decision-making on these issues, it might be useful to examine the issue through the lens of key questions that Xi might ask about countries in the West and how they make decisions. I propose five key questions here, but there are likely to be more.

Question 1: How much strategic risk is the U.S., and its allies, willing to take? Noting the lack of boots on the ground in Ukraine by NATO, the very slow rolling process around decision-making for providing military assistance to Ukraine, as well as the lack of effective response to Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, Xi and his advisors might probably assess the answer to this question as “not much risk at all”.

The notion of victory or winning is scoffed at by too many politicians and academics when these concepts still play a crucial role in Chinese and Russian strategic thinking. An entire generation of Western politicians have been raised in the post-Cold War era without ever having to seriously think about issues such as nuclear deterrence, containment, mobilization or conventional warfare. The prevailing ethos since the 1990s has been that globalisation will prevent large scale wars in the future. Western leaders have not had to deal with nations that present them with an existential threat, and do not have the mindset or intellectual foundations for hard-nosed push back against rising aggression from authoritarians.

Consequently, dictators like Putin and Xi are more easily able to mislead Western politicians. They have been taken at face value when they make commitments such as “I am not going to invade Ukraine” or “China is not going to militarise the South China Sea islands” which were only ever designed as statements to buy time (which they did).

As I wrote in a recent piece on audacity, Western leaders are a very timid lot. This has led to timid strategic thinking, and an unwillingness to take anything other than the lowest of risks in confronting Russia or China.

Xi is certain to factor this, and the continued manipulation of Western ‘escalation terror’ into his levels of aggression towards neighbours in the western Pacific and in his future aspirations to achieve dominance in this region. It will also guide his decisions on the level of behaviour that China believes it can get away with without incurring economic sanctions, as well as how brutally China can act towards its neighbours without U.S. or western intervention

Question 2: What is the western threshold for committing its military forces? This is an important question for Xi and his advisors to understand. Very early in Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there was a vigorous debate on the possibility of NATO intervention. Boots on the ground was discussed, and quickly discounted. The establishment of a NATO air defence network over Ukraine was raised by the Ukrainians but also discounted.

Beyond Ukraine, Xi will have been watching the debates in various regional nations about support for American military bases and operations in the region. Several nations, including the Philippines, Australia, Papua New Guinea and Japan have deepened their military ties with the United States over recent years. At the same time, European nations including the UK, France and Germany have committed forces to regular deployments in the Pacific region.

The key subject that will interest Xi is this: will Western nations provide military forces to help defend Taiwan? Nations in the region have largely left this question unanswered or offered ambiguous answers such as President Bidens assertions that the U.S. would defend Taiwan followed by walk backs by administration officials.

Surveys of citizens in regional countries such as Japan and Australia indicate a wariness about committing military forces to help defend Taiwan. Of course, the real answer to the question – and the resolve of Taiwan’s friends to help it – can only really be answered in the wake of a Chinese attack. However, the actions of NATO over Ukraine and the posturing of Pacific nations in the past few years on their Taiwan policy all provide Xi with important data points about when the West is willing to commit military forces in defence of a third-party nation.

Question 3: What is the level of nuclear sabre rattling that is strategically effective without having to use them? The Russian president, as well as some of his advisors, have issued threats about the use of nuclear weapons if the west intervenes militarily in the Ukraine conflict. It has become a standard Russian tactic every time a new Western capability is on the cusp of being provided to Ukraine. This includes the current debate over American long-range strike system. From a Russian perspective, this continuous sabre rattling has probably worked. 32 months into the war, American long-range strike weapons are still not able to be used deep inside Russia.

Chinese DF-41, a ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, during a military parade. Source: RUSI

While the consideration of nuclear weapons can never be overlooked, the West now appears thoroughly terrorised by Putin’s threats. No western military forces have crossed into Ukraine. This has probably encouraged the Chinese to further invest in their nuclear deterrent, as has been described in recent editions of the annual U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military capacity. The 2023 edition of this publication notes that:

[China} is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities…The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion of its nuclear forces. In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates that the PRC possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023—on track to exceed previous projections.

So, the answer to this question is that quite a lot of nuclear sabre rattling can be effective for China as well as Russia. Notwithstanding the Chinese policy of ‘no first use’, nuclear sabre rattling is likely to be an effective influence on Western decision-making about Chinese aggression in the future.

Question 4: How can strategic influence operations be calibrated to stoke escalation terror among western politicians? The Chinese will have observed the impact of strategic influence operations by Ukraine and Russia during the war in Ukraine. The daily speeches by President Zelensky and his addresses to major international gatherings have been crucial in sustaining western military, economic and humanitarian aid. At the same time, speeches by President Putin have stoked news articles and commentary about the West escalating the war whenever a new weapon system is proposed for Ukraine.

Russia has undertaken a wide-ranging misinformation campaign during the war. In recent days, a trove of documents leaked from a Russian propaganda centre have revealed a sophistocated and competently orchestrated campaign to supported far-right parties in the European Parliament elections. These operations have also spread disinformation throughout multiple social media platforms to undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine’s government (and sovereignty) and Western support for it.

For Xi, he will be pondering how to prevent a Taiwanese President generating such influence. Western assistance to Ukraine has made a significant contribution to blunting the Russian invasion and defeating them on the battlefield. The Chinese will be examining ways to prevent such endeavours by the Taiwanese. At the same time, they appear to have realised that confrontational diplomatic approaches erodes Chinese influence and this lesson may be a key reason for recent moderation in Chinese diplomatic interactions with other nations (rogue balloons excepted).

Question 5: How can China exploit time to generate a superior strategic tempo, and degrade western decision-making, in any future conflict? Time is a crucial element in decision-making. This is another old lesson re-learned during the war in Ukraine since 2022. Once it became clear to Putin that his strategy for a rapid takeover of Ukraine had failed in 2022, he shifted to a new strategy. In essence, the Russian strategy since the end of 2022 has been to slowly but inexorably wear down Ukraine while waiting for America and other western countries to lose patience with the war. In December 2022, Putin described how he foresaw an extended conflict in Ukraine when he described the Russian invasion as “a long process.”

Putin clearly judges that the politicians and citizens of Europe and America lack the patience for long wars, as seen in places like Somalia and Iraq. Putin’s strategy since 2022 has been based on the idea that the West will eventually lose interest in Ukraine. He will have been encouraged by the long debate over American assistance to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024, as well as the statements from a minority of members of the US Congress who wished to reduce or even stop American assistance to Ukraine. For Putin, this may be his only viable theory of victory.

Another aspect of time that the Chinese cannot fail to have observed in Ukraine will have been the pace of making decisions and providing support to Ukraine. As Eliot Cohen has written: “Should Western leaders, through their passivity or reluctance, bring about a cease-fire that leaves Russia with Ukrainian territory under its control, they would disgrace themselves as much the French and British leaders did at Munich in 1938—and with less excuse.”

The debate over providing main battle tanks took months to resolve, and this delay ensured that the Ukrainians lacked these decisive armoured vehicles when the Russians were at their most vulnerable at the end of 2022. The decision to finally allow F-16 fighter aircraft for Ukraine in 2023 was likewise very slow, as has been the debate of giving Ukraine permission to strike deeper into Russia with American missiles. As President Zelensky noted during his 2023 Munich Security Conference address:

We need speed. Speed of our agreements. Speed of delivery to strengthen our sling. Speed of decisions to limit Russian potential. There is no alternative to speed. Because it is the speed that life depends on. Delay has always been and still is a mistake.

The exploitation of time is another area where Xi and the Chinese Communist Party are probably confident that they will have learned lessons from this war. Xi and his Central Military Commission will he refining their contingency plans for Taiwan, and ways to distract the United States and Europe, to delay their intervention for as long as possible. They will be looking at ways to act against Taiwan and other nations in the western Pacific that will tie the Americans and their allies in the Pacific in decision-making knots.

The geography of the Pacific, and the western Pacific in particular, are important differences from the war in Ukraine. Time is an even more precious resource in a Taiwan scenario. Ukraine is close to western Europe and aid can be delivered relatively quickly. Taiwan is distant from the nearest country that might be able to support it. The PLA will exploit this in any aggression against the island nation. And while they might believe that a lightening operation would be the preferred method to shock the Taiwanese into submission, if that doesn’t succeed, they may also believe that their backup plan to wait out an impatient West could also bear fruit.

Learning about Decision Making for 21st Century War

Political factors are the main factors that will determine the intensity of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, whereas economic factors will be key to determining the duration of the conflict.

Analysis of Uncertainties Affecting the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Ouyang Xiangying and Zhang Yuxin

The war in Ukraine has provided a wake-up call for political leaders, strategists and defence planners in Europe, America and beyond. But the leadership of the Peoples Republic of China have also been watching closely. The political and military lessons of Russia’s performance – from the tactical to the strategic - will impact Chinese strategic thinking, economic affairs, misinformation operations and the ongoing transformation of the PLA.

It is only prudent for Western policy makers and strategists to assume that the Chinese government is studying the war in Ukraine at least as closely as they studied the Pacific War, the Falklands War, 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. We must assume that CCP and the PLA will learn and adapt, even if there are gaps or shortfalls in our ability to accurately observe all of the Chinese adaptations based on Ukraine observations. China’s ability to study and assess the strengths and weaknesses of western decision-making modalities, and then implement changes within the structures of the CCP, will be a key part of this learning.

There are many areas the Chinese might exploit. However, there is still time for Western nations to study and learn from how they made strategic decisions about Ukraine as well.

Futura Doctrina is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

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6. Philippines says disputed reef 'not lost' to China despite pullout

Philippines says disputed reef 'not lost' to China despite pullout

17 Sep 2024 06:49AM

(Updated: 17 Sep 2024 07:40AM)

channelnewsasia.com

MANILA: The Philippines insisted on Monday (Sep 16) that it had not given up a South China Sea reef, two days after it pulled out a ship stationed there following a months-long standoff with rival claimant China.

Manila had deployed the coast guard flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua to Sabina Shoal in April to stop Beijing from building an artificial island there, as it has atop several other disputed spots in the strategic waterway.

But the ship was abruptly called back to the western Philippine island of Palawan, with Manila citing damage from an earlier clash with Chinese ships, ailing crew members, dwindling food and bad weather.

"We have not lost anything. We did not abandon anything. Escoda Shoal is still part of our exclusive economic zone," Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Commodore Jay Tarriela told a news conference Monday, using the Filipino name for Sabina Shoal.

Beijing claims most of the South China Sea, including Sabina Shoal, despite an international tribunal ruling that its assertions have no merit.

It has acted aggressively towards Philippine government vessels at Sabina and other disputed areas in recent months, ramming, blocking, water-cannoning and even boarding them, causing damage and injuries.

The confrontations have sparked concern that the United States, a military ally of Manila, could be drawn into armed conflict with China.

Chinese vessels were harassing resupply missions, and Tarriela said the BRP Teresa Magbanua's water desalinator broke down, forcing the crew to rely on rainwater for drinking "for more than one month now".

He said the crew were also reduced to "eating porridge for three weeks", which "obviously is not nutritious".

"INDISPUTABLE SOVEREIGNTY"

Following the ship's pullout, China's coast guard insisted on Sunday that Beijing "has indisputable sovereignty" over Sabina.

It warned the Philippines to "stop inciting propaganda and risking infringements", adding Beijing would "continue to carry out rights protection and law enforcement activities" there.

But Tarriela on Monday maintained the withdrawal from Sabina was "not a defeat", rejecting comparisons to the Scarborough Shoal, which Manila lost to Beijing after a similar months-long standoff in 2012.

He said it would be "impossible" for China to totally stop the Philippines from sending its ships around the 137 sq km Sabina Shoal.

"The coast guard can carry out whatever it takes for us to make sure that China will not be able to occupy and even reclaim Escoda Shoal," he said.

"We have other coast guard vessels that, as we speak right now, may have been or may already be proceeding to Escoda Shoal," Tarriela said without providing details, citing operational security considerations.

The United States said Monday it continued to support its ally Manila, while slamming the "dangerous ways" Beijing tries to enforce its claim.

"It is up to the Philippines to decide how they operate their vessels in areas where it enjoys the freedom of navigation in the high seas under international law," State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said.

Sabina is located 140km west of Palawan and about 1,200km from Hainan island, the nearest major Chinese landmass.

Source: AFP/rj

channelnewsasia.com

7. U.S. Shrugs as World War III Approaches

Excerpts:

What none of these stories do is connect the dots by analyzing the consequences of repeated American failure on the widely separated fronts of the international contest now taking place. To see what this all means and where it is leading, we must turn to the recently released report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. This panel of eight experts, named by the senior Republicans and Democrats on the House and Senate Armed Services committees, consulted widely across government, reviewing both public and classified information, and issued a unanimous report that, in a healthy political climate, would be the central topic in national conversation.

The bipartisan report details a devastating picture of political failure, strategic inadequacy and growing American weakness in a time of rapidly increasing danger. The U.S. faces the “most serious and most challenging” threats since 1945, including the real risk of “near-term major war.” The report warns: “The nation was last prepared for such a fight during the Cold War, which ended 35 years ago. It is not prepared today.”

Worse, “China and Russia’s ‘no-limits’ partnership, formed in February 2022 just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has only deepened and broadened to include a military and economic partnership with Iran and North Korea. . . . This new alignment of nations opposed to U.S. interests creates a real risk, if not likelihood, that conflict anywhere could become a multitheater or global war.”

U.S. Shrugs as World War III Approaches

A devastating report on global threats and American weakness is met with indifference.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/u-s-shrugs-as-world-war-iii-approaches-devastating-bipartisan-report-716bda71?mod=hp_opin_pos_3#cxrecs_s

By Walter Russell Mead

Sept. 16, 2024 5:04 pm ET

Iranian, Russian and Chinese warships during a joint military drill on March 13. Photo: Iranian Army Office/Zuma Press

The news from abroad is chilling. Washington Post columnist David Ignatius reports from Kyiv that Ukraine is “bleeding out” as its weary soldiers struggle against a numerically superior Russia. The New York Times reports that China is expanding the geographical reach and escalating violence in its campaign to drive Philippine forces from islands and shoals that Beijing illegitimately claims. And Bloomberg reports that Washington officials are fearful that Russia will help Iran cross the finish line in its race for nuclear weapons.

These stories, all from liberal news outlets generally favorable to the Biden administration, tell a tragic and terrifying tale of global failure on the part of the U.S. and its allies. China, Russia and Iran are stepping up their attacks on what remains of the Pax Americana and continue to make gains at the expense of Washington and its allies around the world.

What none of these stories do is connect the dots by analyzing the consequences of repeated American failure on the widely separated fronts of the international contest now taking place. To see what this all means and where it is leading, we must turn to the recently released report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. This panel of eight experts, named by the senior Republicans and Democrats on the House and Senate Armed Services committees, consulted widely across government, reviewing both public and classified information, and issued a unanimous report that, in a healthy political climate, would be the central topic in national conversation.

The bipartisan report details a devastating picture of political failure, strategic inadequacy and growing American weakness in a time of rapidly increasing danger. The U.S. faces the “most serious and most challenging” threats since 1945, including the real risk of “near-term major war.” The report warns: “The nation was last prepared for such a fight during the Cold War, which ended 35 years ago. It is not prepared today.”

Worse, “China and Russia’s ‘no-limits’ partnership, formed in February 2022 just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has only deepened and broadened to include a military and economic partnership with Iran and North Korea. . . . This new alignment of nations opposed to U.S. interests creates a real risk, if not likelihood, that conflict anywhere could become a multitheater or global war.”

Should such a conflict break out, “the Commission finds that the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.”

To summarize, World War III is becoming more likely in the near term, and the U.S. is too weak either to prevent it or, should war come, to be confident of victory.

A more devastating indictment of a failed generation of national leadership could scarcely be penned.

This is not, or should not be, a partisan issue. No recent president and no party escapes responsibility for our current plight. Red and blue America will suffer equally if the global slide toward war continues unchecked.

Even more appalling than the report is the general indifference with which it has been received. Aside from a few honorable exceptions (including a Wall Street Journal opinion piece by Shay Khatiri and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell’s clear-sighted advocacy), the commission’s report sank like a stone. There has been no uproar in the press, no speechifying by presidential candidates, no storm on social media, no sign that the American political class takes the slightest interest in the increasing fragility of the peace on which everything we cherish depends.

That isn’t new. Congress, much of the media and public opinion at large have ignored alerts from respected defense leaders at least since Robert Gates warned almost 12 years ago of the dangerous consequences of defense cutbacks. The commission’s report is now warning that the long-deferred bill is coming due.

If history teaches anything, it is that decadence this deep, carried on this long, entails enormous costs. Our adversaries’ conviction that the inattention of a flabby political class is bringing the Pax Americana to an inglorious end is a key reason why nations as suspicious of one another as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have chosen this moment to make common cause against us.

The prophet Ezekiel spoke about the duty of the watchman on the city wall to sound the trumpet when enemies approach. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy has fulfilled its mission. But judging from the indifference with which its report has been greeted, more and louder trumpets need to sound. Not since the 1930s have Americans been this profoundly indifferent as a great war assembles in the world outside, and not since Paul Revere traversed the dark country lanes of Massachusetts have Americans more urgently needed to rouse themselves from sleep.

WSJ Opinion: The Replicator Drone Initiative and the Department of Defense

Two examples of disinformation, one of great comms, plus a still relevant observation

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/two-examples-of-disinformation-one?utm

Things found rummaging through old presentations last week (looking for something I never did find)

Matt Armstrong

Sep 17, 2024

While digging through old presentations this week, I came across some interesting tidbits that might be worth a second look.

First up is an April Fool’s joke from the BBC. Broadcast in 1957, it told the home audience how spaghetti, then not well known in the UK, was grown and harvested. Setting aside the feelings of those who contacted the BBC to inquire how to get spaghetti tree seeds of their own, this was a harmless prank. It is a humorous example of the potential of disinformation, which this was since it was intentional, that exploits gaps in knowledge and information of the target.

The next example is a favorite of mine that I frequently shared in my “now media” presentations over a dozen years ago. I introduced the concept of “now media” to challenge the reductive and flawed comparison between “new media” and “old media” that was common at the time.

In this case, a journalist inadvertently inserted misinformation into their article. Although immediately notified of the error, the newspaper ignored the request to correct the mistake and the misinformation was repeated in a subsequent article. After the second article, a clear follow-up that revisited the topic of the first, including a copy-and-pasting of the misinformation, was published a note added to it, but the original error in the text remained uncorrected. As for the first article, the error remains today and there is no correction notice.

In 2009, the Washington Posts’s Walter Pincus wrote two articles about the Defense Department’s massive information operations budget. The spending faced intense scrutiny (deserved for a list of reasons). His first article, published on July 28, 2009, appeared prominently above the fold on the front page of the print edition and contained a significant error. Here’s the relevant excerpt from “Fine Print: Panels Raise Concerns Over Pentagon's Strategic Communications”:

The Pentagon spends nearly $1 billion a year on its strategic communications, its contribution to the "war of ideas" that until recent years had been the sole province of the State Department's public diplomacy effort. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in the military getting money more easily than the diplomatic corps, and the dominance of military personnel in those countries has led to an increasing military role in information operations.

State Department special envoy Richard C. Holbrooke told journalists in March that "the information issue -- sometimes called psychological operations or strategic communications" -- has become a "major, major gap to be filled" before U.S.-led forces can regain the upper hand in Afghanistan.

Last week, the House Appropriations Committee, in approving the fiscal 2010 defense funding bill, said that it had identified 10 strategic communications programs that had grown from $9 million in fiscal 2005 to a "staggering $988 million request for fiscal 2010." The committee said many of the costlier programs appear as "alarmingly non-military propaganda, public relations, and behavioral modification messaging."

The error is in the last paragraph. The committee did not identify 10 (ten) programs that cost nearly $1b. The committee identified and discussed IO programs, with the letters “i” and “o”, as in information operations, that cost nearly $1b. A rational take is Pincus, or perhaps a research assistant, misread IO as 10.

Much ado about nothing? Yes, now. Fifteen years later this is a nothing burger, but at the time it helped further a narrative of irresponsibility. Now, I don’t mean to imply the information operations programs weren’t irresponsibly run or that “solutions” included throwing money at problems and hoping for the best (“hope” is never a great strategy).1

You’d think the absurdity that 10 programs that cost of $100,000 each four years earlier but grew to cost, on average, $100 million each might spark specific questions from the reporter or an editor. But no, that didn’t happen. The paper, despite messages to the paper and the journalists from the Defense Department and others, never corrected the digital (and thus archive) edition. The error remains at the link above without any note.

Two months later, Pincus wrote a follow up as budget negotiations resumed after a summer break. Same topic, same journalist. Same error. In this September 27, 2009, article, Pincus copy and pasted the false claim that Congress “identified 10 strategic communications programs” that would cost a “staggering $988 million” in the next fiscal year.2

Again, there were calls to fix the error. In case, while the body of the article was left intact, a correction appeared above the digital edition sometime after it went live.3 Given the relationship between the two articles, I think it is reasonable to expect a similar correction was applied to the earlier. It wasn’t.

A practical question: does the intentional failure to correct known misinformation constitute disinformation given the paper and journalists were aware of the errors immediately after publication?

This seems to rise above the press’s evergreen problem of issuing corrections. In this case, the error was the paper’s own making and they were immediately notified of it. Both times. I wonder if reason for the failure to act was institutional (the media’s general take on corrections), cultural (WaPo’s take on corrections), reputational (correcting this journalist), situational (the paper felt it wasn’t worth the time because it felt only certain people digested the details), or some combination. Regardless, it’s a small example used for a larger discussion.

By the way, here is the House report Pincus copied from:

According to the Department's limited response for information on this funding, IO programs have grown at an enormous rate, from approximately $9,000,000 in fiscal year 2005, to a staggering $988,000,000 request for fiscal year 2010. The requested growth in these programs from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010 alone is just over $200,000,000.

The Committee believes that the Department of Defense, and the Combatant Commands which drive the demand for information operations, need to reevaluate IO requirements in the context of the roles and missions of the United States Military along with consideration for the inherent capabilities of the military and the funding available to meet these requirements. In support of this evaluation, the Committee has determined that many of the ongoing IO activities for which fiscal year 2010 funding is requested should be terminated immediately.

I included the paragraph that followed the “staggering” passage Pincus used to show IO appeared in a way that wouldn’t support “ten.”

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To break away from the pattern, here is an example of great comms in the field. I shared this—as recently as two weeks ago—to showcase that doing things right can make make a difference. The problem with informational efforts is success usually means something didn’t happen. Done right, informational activities can block or lessen adverse actions. So when trying to justify a program, capability, or the purpose of an office, proving a negative is often required and often falls on deaf ears and blind eyes that prefer the tangible and visceral.

It is 2008 in Iraq, when those “ten” programs were growing massively. The people involved were not funded by those programs, they were the standard features of any HQ. It was discovered a US Army sniper from the 4th Infantry Division was using a Koran for target practice. Iraqis, including military partners, were upset. Major General Jeffery Hammond, as the division’s commander, sent the soldier home and delivered a personal apology in person. The situation was diffused with barely a word in the US or really any knowledge of the event.

The unique feature of the apology, which is likely what made it effective, was it was written to be culturally, not just linguistically, specific, rather than an American-English apology translated into Arabic.

I am a man of honor, a man of character. You have my word, this will never happen again. In the most humble manner, I look into your eyes today and I say, please forgive me and my soldiers. The act of this Soldier was criminal. He has been relieved of duty, reprimanded, dismissed, and redeployed. This soldier has lost the honor to serve the United States Army and the people of Iraq here in Baghdad.

The only recognition of this in the US that I found around the time it happened was ridicule. Ignorant of the situation on the ground and equally ignorant of the informational impact of actions, these negative responses, mostly discussion board threads, all mirrored a cartoon I found—and won’t publish here—of Hammond puckering up to kiss an Iraqi’s arse.

For general news coverage of the event, see this or this.

Finally, a statement that remains relevant and fitting today:

Propaganda on an immense scale is here to stay. Technological advance may have made this as important to diplomacy as the invention of gunpowder to the military… We still write diplomatic notes, but we try to reach directly into as many foreign homes as we can. Every other major power is doing the same... I am convinced that unless the United States continues to utilize this new method we shall be left at the post by other countries which are becoming skilled in the use of mass media.

A few things about this. First is the use “propaganda.” I’ve written about the “propaganda of propaganda” (extended audio version here, and I hope to expand the subject into an academic paper), and the misuse of the word. The quote above is from a time when the word did not always carry the baggage it has today. Propaganda was not inherently deceitful and often required a qualifier—ours, there, good, bad, etc.—otherwise it could be interchangable with today’s “information” or “communications” with the erudite understanding that communicating information is intended to influence.

One example of the neutrality of the term comes from 1938. Pushing back on a Congressional plan to establish a US government radio operation aimed at Latin America in response to (seemingly successful) German influence operations (radio, diplomatic, economic, and cultural) across the southern nations, the president of the National Association of Broadcasters, a US trade association representing over 400 radio operators, led the effort to block the government’s (Congress’s, really) effort. The association’s central argument was succinct: “that the [US] radio industry already provides ample technical and artistic facilities for South American propaganda broadcasting.”4 No one can claim this “propaganda” was to be deceitful.

I can list plenty of other examples after the war where the word is neutral. There were frequent statements along the lines of “truth is the best propaganda.” Edward R. Murrow is famously cited as saying that in 1963, but others said the exact or similar words for nearly two decades before. William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1945-1947, who oversaw a portfolio vastly greater than the USIA Director ever did, said, “The best propaganda in the world is the truth.”5 It wasn’t just an American idea. In June 1945, a Romanian newspaper editor closed his editorial about his of the US press attaché in Bucharest with this line: “In an honest, democratic world, objective information is the best propaganda, the only efficient one.”6

Back to the quote above. The statement was made by George V. Allen in an address delivered at Duke University on December 10, 1949, entitled “Propaganda: A Conscious Weapon of Diplomacy.”

I should note a kind of footnote here that relates to my recent post about the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In the post, I pointed out that a career foreign service officer has never been confirmed to be the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. I also shared the work of a Russian researcher that discussed the differences in hiring qualifications between USIA Directors and this undersecretary. George Venable Allen served as a US ambassador before serving as the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, succeeding William Benton. He then went overseas as an Ambassador again and later served as the Director of the US Information Agency.

Allen’s caution about being “left at the post” were overcome. Recent decades, however, shows the excerpt above and his broader Duke address include useful reminders for present legislators and policymakers. Allen did not narrowly argue on the need to “counter” the Russians or Chinese, but that there was a broader need to proactively engage abroad. “Our information, or propaganda, activity is by no means directed solely at peoples behind the Iron Curtain.” Today, being reactionary and narrow is the norm.

Who remembers the Lincoln Group and Leonie Industries, for example? The not-so-temporary outsourcing of the skills and capabilities continues to limit us today. See https://mountainrunner.us/2009/08/dod_ig_report/.

I want to say the second article was on the front page but below the fold of the print edition. The WaPo site doesn’t provide the ability to see the print version like the NYT does. If it does, let me know.

In my notes somewhere I probably have something on about when the correction appeared.

The same people who opposed this pre-war effort as redundant to commercial efforts later supporting the government effort after the war. The change in attitude came from acknowleding an accessibility issue: there were countries (think: markets) where commercial operations, setting aside the lone non-profit broadcaster, couldn’t reach or had no incentive to reach. But, in 1938, there were a handful of US broadcasters listened to operated internationally and they treated the ability as an experiment. While the Germans published their radio programming schedules in local papers, the US broadcasters essentially just hurled electrons south without much interest because the only real return on investment was experience and evolving the technology.

This was during an NBC University of the Air broadcast program broadcast December 15, 1945. Benton, William Stone, Director of the Office International Information and Cultural Affairs, and Loy Henderson, Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, were discussing “Our Foreign Policy” with program host Sterling Fisher. Part of Benton’s pitch was necessary legislative authorization of the post-war international information and cultural programs, the former of which had arrived at State following an executive order of August 31, 1945 (which happened to be the same day Benton was asked to take the job of assistant secretary).

The editor was Emil Serghie and his editorial was dated June 22, 1945. The source is the November 1945 edition of “The Outpost,” the in-house newsletter of the Office of War Information.

9. U.S. Authorities Were Warned About Suspected Trump Gunman

There are no intelligence failures. There are only failures to heed the intelligence.

Keep this paragraph in mind when you hear people assigning political leanings to Mr. Routh to explain his actions. He was not of the left or right. He appears to be just a whack job in the clinical sense.

I do wonder who many more of these guys we know about (the numbers are probably astronomical and cannot be handled by intelligence and law enforcement).

Excerpt:

Her view of him changed during dozens of meetings and chance encounters they had in Kyiv, she said. He talked about wanting to kill Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, Walsh recalled, saying he also mentioned Trump and President Biden, though Walsh said she couldn’t recall if he threatened them.

U.S. Authorities Were Warned About Suspected Trump Gunman

Ryan Routh criticized Trump and threatened to kill Vladimir Putin, setting off alarm bells among those involved in Ukraine assistance efforts

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/u-s-authorities-were-warned-about-suspected-trump-gunman-153dab6f?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Jane Lytvynenko in Kyiv, Deborah Acosta

Follow in West Palm Beach, Fla., and Vera Bergengruen in Washington

Sept. 16, 2024 9:21 pm ET

Ryan Wesley Routh taking part in a rally in central Kyiv in 2022. Photo: Efrem Lukatsky/Associated Press

The gunman suspected of attempting to assassinate former President Donald Trump acted so erratically during his years as a pro-Ukraine activist that other Americans who encountered him flagged his behavior to U.S. authorities.

Ryan Wesley Routh was taken into custody in Florida on Sunday after Secret Service personnel spotted and opened fire at a man pointing a rifle through the fence at a West Palm Beach club where Trump was golfing. The man fled in a black Nissan and was quickly apprehended.

But it was Routh’s time in Ukraine, where he traveled shortly after the Russian invasion in 2022 hoping to join the fight, where his tumultuous life full of failures and brushes with the law seemed to spiral further downward—and to alarm those who came in contact with him.

How the Second Assassination Attempt on Trump Unfolded

Sailor Held by Venezuela for Alleged Maduro Assassination Plot Is a Navy SEAL, Service Records Show

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/09/16/navy-releases-service-record-of-seal-held-venezuela-alleged-assassination-plot-against-maduro.html

The Navy on Monday released the service details of a sailor who was detained by Venezuelan authorities at the end of August after a top official in the country alleged he was part of a plot to assassinate President Nicolás Maduro and overthrow his regime.

Wilbert Joseph Castaneda, who has been held in Venezuela for more than two weeks, is a petty officer first class and Navy SEAL who has been in the service since 2007, according to the records provided by the Navy. A U.S. official had earlier confirmed that an enlisted sailor was detained late last month as the country is embroiled in a disputed election that Maduro claims to have won.

The Associated Press reported that Venezuela Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello identified Castaneda as one of three Americans, as well as two Spanish and one Czech citizen, who were arrested as part of the alleged assassination plot.

Cabello claimed that all six were part of a CIA-led plot to overthrow the Venezuelan government and showed images of rifles that he said were confiscated from some of the arrested, according to the AP. However, U.S. officials have refuted that claim, and some of Cabello's claims about Castaneda do not appear accurate.

Those tensions have been building since Venezuela's July 28 election between Maduro and Edmundo González, which officials from several countries say was stolen by Maduro.

However, both State and Defense department officials have said that there is no U.S. government plan to overthrow Maduro, and a State Department spokesperson told Military.com that "the United States continues to support a democratic solution to the political crisis in Venezuela," in an email Monday.

The State Department spokesperson also confirmed that they were aware of "unconfirmed reports of two additional U.S. citizens detained in Venezuela."

Navy records for Castaneda, who appears to have first been detained, but not identified, on Aug. 30, show that the sailor joined his first SEAL team in 2009 and bounced between teams on the East and West coasts throughout his career. He was promoted to petty officer first class in June 2013.

Typically, the Navy will not offer further details of what team a SEAL is assigned to out of security concerns.

Shortly after his detention became public, a U.S. official told Military.com that Castaneda was "not on official travel or approved leave."

CBS News reported that Castaneda had also been stripped of his Special Warfare insignia -- commonly known as the Trident -- indicating that the elite warfare community was in the process of removing him from its ranks.

The records offered by the Navy also do not back up Cabello's claim that Castaneda deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq and Colombia. The Navy's data does not show that Castaneda was awarded either the Iraq or Afghanistan campaign medals -- though those records are not always complete.

The Navy's data on Castaneda does show that he has a track record of deployments, with four Sea Service Deployment ribbons, two Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary medals, and an Armed Forces Service Medal.

His records also do not show any combat or valor awards, though he did receive three Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medals.

The Venezuelan's allegation that Castaneda, along with the five others, were plotting to overthrow Maduro is not as far-fetched as it may seem.

In 2020, a former U.S. Green Beret, Jordan Goudreau, helped arm and train a group of around 300 Venezuelan army deserters in neighboring Colombia who were then supposed to sneak into Venezuela and help ignite a rebellion against Maduro.

The plan fell apart, several combatants were killed by Venezuelan security forces, and two of Goudreau's U.S. Special Forces compatriots were arrested by the Maduro regime.

Goudreau was arrested in July 2024 in New York on federal arms smuggling charges and is now awaiting trial.

Venezuela is also simply a dangerous country for Americans, especially given the increasing sanctions against allies of Maduro by the U.S. The State Department has long warned American citizens not to travel to Venezuela, citing "a high risk of wrongful detention."

The travel warning also notes that Venezuela's "security forces have detained U.S. citizens for up to five years" and the U.S. "is not generally notified of the detention of U.S. citizens in Venezuela or granted access to U.S. citizen prisoners there."

Last year, the Biden administration signed off on a deal in which Maduro released 10 Americans in exchange for a presidential pardon for Alex Saab, who was being held in custody on money laundering charges and, according to prosecutors, was helping the Venezuelan strongman avoid U.S. sanctions.

11. New apparent Trump assassination attempt highlights Secret Service strains

A thankless and tough job that is not like how it is portrayed in the movies.

New apparent Trump assassination attempt highlights Secret Service strains

By Andy Sullivan, Helen Coster, Tim Reid and Richard Cowan

September 17, 20246:04 AM EDTUpdated 8 min ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-apparent-trump-assassination-attempt-highlights-secret-service-strains-2024-09-17/?utm

WASHINGTON, Sept 17 (Reuters) - Two months after Donald Trump narrowly survived an assassination attempt, a gunman hid undetected for nearly 12 hours on the edge of the golf course where Trump played on Sunday under the protection of an agency that is being pushed to its limits.

As the 2024 presidential election enters its final stretch, the U.S. Secret Service is operating with about 400 fewer employees than Congress has authorized, government records show.

The problem is not likely to be fixed before the Nov. 5 election, as the agency typically takes more than 200 days to fill open positions.

Since President Joe Biden ended his re-election bid in July and Vice President Kamala Harris took over as the Democratic presidential candidate in a tight race against the Republican Trump, the Secret Service has had to expand its protective coverage to a wider group of officials.

That has placed unprecedented strains on the agency, according to interviews with three former Secret Service agents and a former head of the department that oversees it.

"The pace, the expectations, the pressure has never been worse than it is right now," Kenneth Valentine, a former agent, said in a phone interview.

Trump's desire to golf, in private, at one of his Florida clubs on Sunday also meant that agents did not perform the sort of routine site survey that might have led them to find the alleged gunman before Trump came within a few hundred yards of where the man had holed up for hours, with food, near the fifth hole of the Trump International golf course.

Acting Secret Service Director Ronald Rowe - who stepped into his role in July when the agency's former leader resigned after Trump narrowly survived the first assassination attempt - says his agents are already working at high levels of stress.

"We are redlining them," Rowe said at a news conference on Monday.

Democrats and Republicans in Congress say they could sign off on additional funding in the coming weeks. But that will do little in the short term to fix a personnel shortage that forces agents to work long hours in pressure-filled situations.

The risk of failure was made clear on July 13, when a gunman fired six shots from atop a building at a Trump rally in Pennsylvania, killing a rallygoer and grazing the Republican candidate's ear.

Secret Service agents quickly hustled Trump to safety and killed the gunman, but agency leaders acknowledge he should have never been able to fire shots in the first place.

AGENCY 'ASHAMED'

Rowe told lawmakers on July 30 that he was "ashamed" of security lapses in the incident.

On Sunday, a Secret Service agent spotted the suspected gunman at the Florida golf course, glimpsing the muzzle of his AK-47-style rifle. The agent opened fire, driving him away before he had a direct line of sight to Trump or could fire a shot.

The suspect, Ryan Routh, was apprehended shortly after.

Still, security experts question why the agency did not find him sooner.

"How was Routh not spotted by an advance team? Did the (Secret Service) use a drone over the golf course? Dogs? If not, why not?" said Lora Ries, who oversaw the Secret Service as a top official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security during Trump's administration.

Rowe told reporters that Trump's Sunday golf outing was not announced to the public. That meant that the agency did not mount an intense security sweep beforehand, which could have signaled his imminent arrival.

Trump's penchant for playing golf on his own courses, which are open to members, creates greater security challenges than past presidents like Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, who typically played on military courses that could be closed to the public, former agents say.

Trump said Monday he wants more agents protecting him. As a candidate and former president, he is afforded fewer agents and resources than a sitting president.

STAFFING SHORTFALL

The Secret Service employed 7,879 people as of February, the most recent figures available.

That trails a plan that a previous agency director, James Murray, laid out to Congress in 2022, when he said he aimed to have 8,305 staffers within a year and 10,000 by 2027.

Though Congress boosted the Secret Service's budget by 9% this year to account for the 2024 election, the agency cannot quickly staff up. The demanding nature of the job means that only 2% of applicants typically are hired, Rowe told Congress in July.

The agency also has struggled in recent years to retain agents lured by more lucrative private-sector work, he said.

That shortage makes it more difficult for agents to remain on the job, as they must rush from one assignment to another.

"The Secret Service does not have the resources, it doesn’t have the bodies," said former agent Bill Gage in an interview.

Get weekly news and analysis on the U.S. elections and how it matters to the world with the newsletter On the Campaign Trail. Sign up here.

Reporting by Andy Sullivan, Helen Coster, Tim Reid and Richard Cowan; Editing by Scott Malone and Stephen Coates

12. Pacific Dragon: Is the Shipping Industry Ready for Containerized Missile Warfare?

Pacific Dragon: Is the Shipping Industry Ready for Containerized Missile Warfare?

gcaptain.com · by John Konrad · September 16, 2024

USS Savannah (LCS 28) conducts a live-fire demonstration in the Eastern Pacific Ocean utilizing a containerized launching system that fired an SM-6 missile from the ship at a designated target. US Navy photo.

John Konrad

Total Views: 34

September 16, 2024

In a groundbreaking naval exercise, the U.S. Navy and its allies tested the launch of one of its most powerful defensive missiles from a shipping container, marking a significant leap in ship defense technology. During Pacific Dragon 2024, the system successfully launched Raytheon’s SM-3 Interceptor anti-ballistic missile, showcasing a new level of flexibility in defending against airborne threats. What’s even more intriguing—and unsettling for some—is the potential to deploy these containerized missile systems on commercial vessels, blurring the lines between civilian and military assets.

Could these systems be installed on commercial ships to defend against threats like Houthi missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea? While it’s a remote possibility, it raises serious questions about the future of maritime security. Extensive testing, and even tougher international discussions on the legalities of arming merchant ships, would be required before this concept could become reality.

A New Era for Naval Warfare: The Mark 70 PDS and Its Capabilities

Central to this exercise was the Mark 70 Mod 1 Payload Delivery System, a containerized version of the Navy’s Vertical Launch System (VLS). This system packs four VLS cells into a standard shipping container, making it easily transportable by semi-truck and mountable on a wide range of naval platforms. It’s a flexible, modular solution that can enhance missile defense capabilities both on land and at sea.

While the test relied on Aegis systems for missile guidance, defending commercial ships could be done using simpler sensors—such as drones or commercial radar—or with offboard sensors feeding targeting data from UAVs. In fact, the U.S. Navy already successfully engaged a ballistic target using offboard sensor data during the Pacific Defender 24 exercise off the coast of Hawaii, according to Naval News.

Containerized Missiles on Commercial Ships: A Growing Concern

The flexibility of the Mark 70 PDS is a major advantage for the Navy—but it’s also a cause for concern. Imagine a future where an innocent-looking cargo ship is armed not just with goods but with advanced missile systems capable of striking enemy targets. This scenario opens up a potentially dangerous new chapter in hybrid warfare, where commercial vessels could be turned into covert weapons platforms.

With rising tensions from near-peer adversaries, containerized missiles could be hidden aboard commercial ships or deployed to forward bases under the radar. These systems could rapidly be positioned in contested zones, giving nations a strategic edge—but also introducing serious risks.

Why Pacific Dragon 2024 Matters

The implications of Pacific Dragon 2024 are far-reaching. The successful launch of the SM-3 from a containerized platform proves that the Mark 70 system can do more than increase magazine depth on Navy ships. It can also bring missile defense capabilities to vessels that aren’t equipped with advanced systems like Aegis. This means that smaller, less fortified ships—or even commercial ones—could be equipped with state-of-the-art missile defense systems, relying on offboard sensors for targeting.

The Future of Naval and Commercial Defense

As adversaries like Russia and China ramp up their missile capabilities and hybrid warfare tactics, the idea of deploying containerized missiles on both military and commercial platforms becomes more attractive—and more dangerous. Defensive systems like the SM-3 could be a welcome addition in high-risk areas like the Red Sea, offering protection from threats like Houthi attacks. But this raises a chilling question: if containerized defensive missiles can be placed on commercial ships, what’s to stop nefarious actors from swapping in offensive missiles?

In fact this news comes just days after Anduril Industries, a California defense firm known for its disruptive approach to military tech, announced the new Barracuda modular missiles. Though Anduril hasn’t stated these weapons could find their way onto commercial vessels, it’s clear they are building technology that could fundamentally alter the way we think about ship defense. These anti-ship and land attack missiles, which cost significantly less than an SM-3 and might be capable of being lauched from shipping pallets, might transform even simple cargo ships and boats into lethal forces in a conflict.

The potential for misuse is real, and as the lines between civilian and military assets blur, the stakes have never been higher.

13. A Step-Change to Beijing’s “Lawfare” in the South China Sea

Excerpts:

China has successfully blurred the lines between civilian and military activity, both in building artificial islands in the South China Sea, which has been very successful (The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative shows the progression of these features from coral atolls to substantial military bases), and lawfare, which is following the same trajectory.

Historically, much of the harassment of Philippine (and other) vessels was not done by the CCG but by the Peoples Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFFM). However, since the introduction of CCG Order #3, the CCG has taken a more direct role, presumably to set precedents for operation of that law. This trend could mark a step change in China’s approach to dealing with what it sees as jurisdictional challenges in the South China Sea, particularly as the CCG’s increasingly militaristic behaviour in recent years (and particularly in recent months) impacts on its ability to claim civilian status. China may, by its own actions, be partially reducing the very ambiguity it seeks to exploit.

The “salami slice” approach to island building in the South China Sea has worked well for China. The world risks seeing that same approach repeated in international law, upturning key aspects of the Law of the Sea Convention and presenting the world with a fait accompli. Given Australia’s interest in the trade routes which run through the South China Sea, maritime security and stability is vital. It may well be time for the international community to collectively increase tangible support to help protect the Philippines's EEZ and uphold the Law of the Sea Convention.

A Step-Change to Beijing’s “Lawfare” in the South China Sea

By Peter Leavy

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/17/a_step-change_to_beijings_lawfare_in_the_south_china_sea_1058798.html?mc_cid=7d3de233b2&mc_eid=70bf478f36

The “salami slice” approach to island building in the South China Sea has worked well

for China. The world risks seeing that same approach repeated in international law.

Recent Chinese maritime activity around the Second Thomas Shoal marks a potentially new and more aggressive stage in China’s campaign to extend control over the South China Sea. Concerningly, the same type of behaviour has now expanded to Sabina Shoal, only 86 nautical miles from the Philippines island of Palawan. Chinese assertiveness is spreading laterally, becoming more violent, and may well be tied to new laws China recently granted itself.

China has long used “lawfare” – leveraging legal systems and principles to achieve military and strategic objectives – to exploit the seams that democracies have between military and civilian activities. They create and exploit legal ambiguities as part of a deliberate strategy. As the PLA Daily commented in describing the People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFMM), a para-military organisation: “Putting on camouflage, they qualify as soldiers; taking off the camouflage, they become law-abiding fishermen.”^⁠

On 15 June, China implemented the “Provisions on Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Agencies 2024”, also known as CCG Order #3. This law allows China Coast Guard (CCG) commanders to detain foreign vessels and personnel for up to 30 days (or 60, for “complicated” issues) if they are in “waters under Chinese jurisdiction”. Such jurisdiction is not defined, although it is likely based on the flawed Nine-Dash Line concept that the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled illegal in 2016.

The first target for these new powers was the Second Thomas Shoal, known as Ayungin Shoal in the Philippines, which is well within the Philippines exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but almost 600 miles from Hainan Island, the nearest Chinese territory. The Philippines deliberately ran a ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, aground on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 and have kept a contingent of Marines there ever since. China has repeatedly objected to the Philippine presence and while it has regularly interfered with resupply missions, its long-term strategy seems to have been to allow the ship to deteriorate. However, when the Philippines started transporting building supplies to repair the vessel in 2023, China’s actions became more aggressive.

In 2021, there were typically less than five Chinese vessels around Second Thomas Shoal during Philippine resupply missions, but that number peaked at almost 50 by the end of 2023. The number fell in early 2024 before rising to 20 in mid-year, accompanied by greater violence and intimidation. In February 2023, China used a military-grade laser and in August, lasers and water cannons to harass Philippine vessels. Throughout 2024, there have been numerous clashes, culminating in an incident on 17 June that saw eight Philippine servicemen injured, one losing a thumb.

The increasing level of violence is concerning enough, but China’s intimidation has now moved even closer to the Philippines, with five significant incidents in the recent weeks around Sabina Shoal. After a series of such incidents on 22 August, China Coast Guard spokesman, Geng Yu, said a Philippine vessel had “deliberately collided” with a CCG vessel:

Philippine Coast Guard vessels illegally entered the waters near the Xianbin Reef in the Nansha Islands (China’s terms for Sabina Shoal and Spratly Islands, respectively) without permission of the Chinese government. The China Coast Guard took control measures against the Philippine vessels in accordance with the law.

China has successfully blurred the lines between civilian and military activity, both in building artificial islands in the South China Sea, which has been very successful (The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative shows the progression of these features from coral atolls to substantial military bases), and lawfare, which is following the same trajectory.

Historically, much of the harassment of Philippine (and other) vessels was not done by the CCG but by the Peoples Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFFM). However, since the introduction of CCG Order #3, the CCG has taken a more direct role, presumably to set precedents for operation of that law. This trend could mark a step change in China’s approach to dealing with what it sees as jurisdictional challenges in the South China Sea, particularly as the CCG’s increasingly militaristic behaviour in recent years (and particularly in recent months) impacts on its ability to claim civilian status. China may, by its own actions, be partially reducing the very ambiguity it seeks to exploit.

The “salami slice” approach to island building in the South China Sea has worked well for China. The world risks seeing that same approach repeated in international law, upturning key aspects of the Law of the Sea Convention and presenting the world with a fait accompli. Given Australia’s interest in the trade routes which run through the South China Sea, maritime security and stability is vital. It may well be time for the international community to collectively increase tangible support to help protect the Philippines's EEZ and uphold the Law of the Sea Convention.

Peter Leavy retired from the navy in 2024 after 40 years service. He commanded HMAS Stuart and HMAS Sydney as well as the Australian Defence Force Academy. He also served as Australia’s naval attache to the United States and worked in the Navy’s strategic policy and futures area. He is a PhD candidate with the National Security College at the Australian National University, researching contemporary maritime strategies for medium powers and is the President of the Australian Naval Institute.

This article appeared originaly on Lowy Institute's the interpreter.

14. One Million Are Now Dead or Injured in the Russia-Ukraine War

This is Putin's War.

One Million Are Now Dead or Injured in the Russia-Ukraine War

High losses on both sides are posing problems on battlefield and accelerating demographic fears

https://www.wsj.com/world/one-million-are-now-dead-or-injured-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-b09d04e5?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Bojan PancevskiFollow

Updated Sept. 17, 2024 12:04 am ET

KYIV, Ukraine—The number of Ukrainians and Russians killed or wounded in the grinding 2½-year war has reached roughly one million, a staggering toll that two countries struggling with shrinking prewar populations will pay far into the future.

Determining the exact number of dead and wounded in the conflict has been difficult, with Russia and Ukraine declining to release official estimates or, at times, putting out figures that are widely mistrusted.

A confidential Ukrainian estimate from earlier this year put the number of dead Ukrainian troops at 80,000 and the wounded at 400,000, according to people familiar with the matter. Western intelligence estimates of Russian casualties vary, with some putting the number of dead as high as nearly 200,000 and wounded at around 400,000.

The losses are causing problems for Russia as it uses waves of poorly trained soldiers to try to advance in Ukraine’s east while also trying to counter a recent Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region. But they are significantly more damaging for Ukraine, with a population less than one-quarter the size of its giant neighbor’s.

The high—and fast-rising—tolls on both sides highlight what will be a devastating long-term effect for countries that were struggling with population declines before the war mainly because of economic turmoil and social upheavals. They also illuminate one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s own motivations behind launching the invasion in 2022: to boost Russia’s population by absorbing Ukrainians. Russia’s invasions and capture of Ukrainian territory over the past decade have caused Ukraine to lose at least 10 million people under occupation or as refugees, according to government estimates and demographers.

Ukrainian and Russian population levels

Soviet Union collapses

Russia invades Crimea

Russia invades Ukraine

200

million

PROJECTIONS

150

Russia

100

Ukraine

1950

2000

2100

Source: United Nations

Putin has long declared addressing Russia’s chronic demographic decline a priority, and the Kremlin has since embarked on a campaign of Russifying occupied territories, including large-scale abduction of children and pressuring Ukrainians to obtain Russian citizenship. In the occupied Donbas region, selling property and other transactions now require obtaining Russian citizenship.

Today’s Ukraine was once part of the Russian Empire, and Putin has repeatedly said he seeks to revert the country to that state. He denies Ukrainian identity and statehood and claims that Ukrainians, a largely Slavic and Orthodox Christian people, are in fact part of the Russian nation.

“Demographics is a priority for Putin, and he wants to use Ukraine and its people to consolidate the Slavic core of Russia,” said Ivan Krastev, a Bulgarian-born political scientist and an author of a coming book on European demographics. “But for Ukraine, the dilemma is existential: How many people can you lose in a war before losing your future?”

The train station in Pokrovsk, Ukraine. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

Refugees leaving Pokrovsk on a train. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

Putin’s single most effective measure to boost Russia’s population before the full-scale invasion was the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, which added around 2.4 million people to Russia, according to Krastev, who based his estimates on the latest Russian census.

While Russia has gained population by grabbing territory, the war has had a devastating effect on its internal demographics and the labor market. Well over 600,000 Russians fled the country since the full-scale invasion started. They are mainly younger and upwardly mobile professionals who were able to afford relocating to foreign countries and starting a new life.

Hamas Is Surviving War With Israel. Now It Hopes to Thrive in Gaza Again.

Khaled Meshal, one of Hamas’s most senior officials, said in an interview that the militant group expects to play a decisive role in the enclave when the war is over.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/world/middleeast/hamas-gaza-israel-future.html

People walking on a street in Khan Younis, in the south of the Gaza Strip, on Sunday.Credit...Mohammed Saber/EPA, via Shutterstock

By Adam Rasgon

Reporting from Doha, Qatar

Sept. 17, 2024, 5:03 a.m. ET

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Israel says it has killed thousands of Hamas’s militants, dismantled the command structure of nearly all its battalions and pummeled its tunnel network. The bombing campaign in Gaza has been so devastating that the urban landscape in the territory has become unrecognizable.

But Israel’s military has said that eliminating Hamas isn’t possible — even if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for “total victory” over the militant group.

One of Hamas’s most senior officials, Khaled Meshal, maintains that the group is even winning the war and will play a decisive role in Gaza’s future.

“Hamas has the upper hand,” Mr. Meshal said in an interview with The New York Times in Doha, Qatar, where he is based. “It has remained steadfast” and brought the Israel military into “a state of attrition,” he said.

Hamas’s reasoning is simple — winning simply means surviving and, at least for now, the group has managed to do that, even if it is severely weakened.

The comments by Mr. Meshal, 68, in the two-hour interview in the living room of his home in Doha, offered rare insights into the thinking of Hamas officials. He is one of the most senior figures in Hamas’s political office and is considered a key architect of the group’s strategy.

Mr. Meshal was the target in 1997 of a failed assassination attempt by Israel in Jordan, and he served as Hamas’s political chief for more than two decades. In early September, U.S. federal prosecutors unsealed charges against him and other Hamas leaders, accusing them of playing a central role in planning and carrying out the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel.

In the interview, Mr. Meshal made clear that Hamas officials are not in a rush to conclude a cease-fire with Israel at any price, and will not give up on their main demands for an end to the war and an Israeli withdrawal.

Independent analysts have made similar assessments about Hamas’s priorities. “They completely feel time is on their side,” said Ghaith al-Omari, an expert on Palestinian affairs. “They think they’re the only game in town.”

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The Hamas political leader Khaled Meshal in Cairo, in 2011. He said in an interview that Hamas will play a decisive role in Gaza’s future.Credit...Amr Nabil/Associated Press/Associated Press

It is a confidence continuously tested on the battlefield in Gaza. While Hamas remains a powerful force in the enclave, it has faced criticism from Gazans who blame the group for putting them in harm’s way. And Hamas’s definition of success may no longer be valid if the war drags on for years and Israel succeeds in taking out much of Hamas’s remaining firepower, according to Palestinian analysts.

At the war’s start, President Biden expressed a similar position to that of Mr. Netanyahu — that Hamas needed to be eliminated. But Mr. Biden no longer speaks of its eradication, and both the United States and Israel have taken part in indirect negotiations with Hamas.

Mr. Meshal said he took that to mean that the United States was acknowledging Hamas was not going anywhere.

“The Israeli-American vision wasn’t talking about the day after the war, but the day after Hamas,” he said, referring to the initial stance by Israel and the United States.

Now, he said, the United States is saying, “We’re waiting for Hamas’s response.”

“They’re practically recognizing Hamas,” he added, without mentioning that the group has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States and Israel.

Some current and former Israeli security officials also say they believe that Hamas is unlikely to be defeated in this war.

“Hamas is winning this war,” Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni, a former commander of the Israeli military’s Gaza division, said. “Our soldiers are winning every tactical encounter with Hamas, but we’re losing the war, and in a big way.”

Thousands of Hamas fighters and government officials continue to wield control over large parts of Gaza. In cities where Israeli forces briefly took control, their eventual departure left a void that was swiftly filled by Hamas and other militant groups.

General Shamni said that while it was undeniable that Israel has devastated Hamas’s military capabilities, Hamas has retaken towns within “15 minutes” of Israeli withdrawals.

“There’s no one that can challenge Hamas there after Israeli forces leave,” he said.

The greatest failure, General Shamni said, is that Mr. Netanyahu has not tried to introduce a realistic alternative governing body in Gaza in the aftermath of Israeli retreats.

In late June, Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, the Israeli military spokesman, dismissed Mr. Netanyahu’s proposition that Hamas could be wiped out.

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Daniel Hagari, the chief spokesman for the Israeli military, on the rooftop of a Palestinian home during an escorted tour for international journalists in the central Gaza Strip in January.Credit...Avishag Shaar-Yashuv for The New York Times

“Hamas is an idea,” he told Israel’s Channel 13. “Those who think we can make Hamas disappear are wrong,” he said. “The thought that it is possible to destroy Hamas, to make Hamas vanish — that is throwing sand in the eyes of the public.”

Last month, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant described Mr. Netanyahu’s “total victory” slogan as “nonsense.” And some Israeli security officials have said the battle with Hamas will be left for their children.

The Israeli military has said it has killed more than 17,000 militants in Gaza. A military intelligence official said this summer that Israel had succeeded in undermining Hamas’s ability to fire long-range rockets at Israel, though they had other less sophisticated munitions.

The process of taking over and demolishing tunnels, the official said, was an extremely complex engineering project that could take years.

Some members of the military leadership have concluded that a cease-fire with Hamas was the best path forward, even if it leaves the group in power for the time being.

Despite Hamas’s immense losses, including many senior commanders killed by Israel, Mr. Meshal said he was confident that the group would play a dominant role in Gaza following the war. He dismissed alternative American and Israeli proposals for administering the territory without Hamas.

“All their illusions about filling the vacuum are behind us,” he said.

The United States has proposed bringing a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority to Gaza; Israel’s defense minister has suggested that Arab forces provide security in the territory; and Mr. Netanyahu has considered working with “local stakeholders with managerial experience.”

“Assuming Hamas won’t be in Gaza or influencing the situation is a mistaken assumption,” Mr. Meshal said, insisting that Palestinians alone would determine arrangements for the territory.

Hamas’s confidence about maintaining a dominant role in a postwar Gaza has also been seen in private meetings with Palestinian politicians.

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Israeli soldiers exiting a tunnel last year that they said was operated by Hamas. The militant group remains hunkered down in its tunnel network across the Gaza Strip.Credit...Tamir Kalifa for The New York Times

When Samir al-Mashharawi, a Palestinian politician, met with Hamas leaders in Doha in November of 2023, Hamas appeared willing to share power broadly in Gaza, even on the sensitive issue of security, according to two Palestinians familiar with the gathering. Mr. al-Mashharawi is a close confidante of Mohammed Dahlan, an influential Palestinian exile who works for the president of the United Arab Emirates.

When Mr. Mashharawi met Hamas officials more than six months later, they shared a more uncompromising message: the group was ready to work together on civilian issues, but Hamas’s military wing and its internal intelligence forces were off limits, the two Palestinians said.

With the first anniversary of the war approaching, Akram Atallah, a columnist for Al-Ayyam, a Ramallah-based newspaper, listed Hamas’s accomplishments: It has stopped Israel from achieving a decisive victory; it has forced Israel to dispatch representatives to negotiate with it; and it has preserved a substantial number of fighters.

He also said that Hamas’s grip could be undone with time. “If the war ends now, it would be a victory for Hamas,” Mr. Atallah said. “But if it ends in two years, the results could change, and we don’t know where things will go.”

Whatever happens to Hamas, it is civilians who have paid the highest price in Gaza. Tens of thousands of people have been killed, and most of its population of around 2 million has been displaced.

Many Palestinians in Gaza have lashed out at Hamas for launching the Oct. 7 attack on Israel that left 1,200 people dead, accusing the group of giving Israel a pretext to wage a massive bombing campaign that has reduced cities to rubble.

Mr. Meshal dismissed criticism of Hamas’s decision. Palestinian critics of Hamas represented a minority, he said.

“As a Palestinian, my responsibility is to fight and resist until liberation,” he said.

He acknowledged that the assault had caused enormous destruction but said it was a “price” Palestinians must pay for freedom.

Asked how the Hamas-led attack had helped improve the situation given the devastation in Gaza, he insisted it was less about achieving a military victory over Israel than making it realize its policies weren’t sustainable.

“Before Oct. 7, Gaza was dying a slow death,” Mr. Meshal said. “We were in a big prison and we wanted to get rid of this situation.”

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Internally displaced Palestinians walking near destroyed buildings in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on Sunday.Credit...Mohammed Saber/EPA, via Shutterstock

Adam Rasgon is a reporter for The Times in Jerusalem, covering Israeli and Palestinian affairs. More about Adam Rasgon

16. Secure Visas for Afghan National Army Special Operations Command

Conclusion:

By helping its Afghan special operations partners left behind, the United States could address multiple challenges simultaneously. The passage of the Afghan Adjustment Act would help heal the moral injury caused by the abandonment of its allies while also providing a crucial pool of manpower for the special operations units that so much of America’s national security rests upon. Additionally, it would prove to existing and potential allies that the United States stands by its friends in the face of adversity, furthering its interests around the globe. The Afghan Adjustment Act should be made law.

Secure Visas for Afghan National Army Special Operations Command - War on the Rocks

Sean M. Kingsland and Erin K. McFee

September 17, 2024

warontherocks.com · by Sean M. Kingsland · September 17, 2024

As the third anniversary of the sudden and disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan has come and gone, the tragedy continues to play out. Hundreds of men and women who fought alongside American troops are stuck in legal limbo, living in America but still very far from stability and safety for their families. As they languish in immigration purgatory, their families are hunted by the soldiers of an extremist theocracy that they fought to defeat. The members of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command were some of America’s staunchest allies in its longest war, and yet the U.S. government has failed to uphold its moral responsibility to the people who fought shoulder to shoulder with it. As a result, they are left with uncertain futures, separated from their families and facing possible deportation to unknown destinations. Besides moral or ethical considerations, the failure of the United States to protect its allies has grave consequences for its future interests on the world stage. This mistake can and should be rectified, for the security of America and for the warriors who fought alongside it.

The United States already has the programs and policies necessary to assist these allies. The eligibility requirements for Special Immigrant Visas, currently reserved for translators employed directly by the American government, should be expanded to include Afghan special operations veterans and their families. Passing the Afghan Adjustment Act, a bill already introduced in the Senate, would honor a long overdue promise and bring much needed clarity and continuity to these Afghan special operations partners.

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Allies in Need

The special operations forces service members were the best of the Afghan army and were instrumental in the fight against the Taliban. It is estimated that Afghan special operations units conducted 80 percent of all Afghan National Army offensives in 2018 while only making up 6 percent of the force. A policy paper by the Corioli Institute, in partnership with Honor the Promise, reveals their extraordinary courage, with some members continuing to fight long after their commanders had abandoned them, living on only unsalted rice for weeks and holding their outpost alone against the Taliban. They were invaluable partners to America since their inception in 2011: truly partners. This elite fighting force was paid for and created by the U.S. military. They were trained by America’s finest warriors, to the standards of American and NATO special operations forces. Despite their impressive contributions to the American war effort, these veterans have been denied a reciprocal partnership.

The main reason for their predicament is a gap in current immigration law. The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 provides Special Immigration Visas to any Afghan national who “was or is employed by or on behalf of the United States Government in Afghanistan.” While this may seem like a reasonable requirement, it excludes some of the most deserving and most at risk from the Taliban. Interpreters and translators paid directly by the U.S. government have been given this special status, though even they have faced bureaucratic hurdles and long delays. Afghan special operations veterans, though just as deserving and in similar danger, remain unrecognized.

Instead of rewarding these men and women for their service to the country, the United States has left Afghan special operations veterans to struggle through the asylum process alone. In the eyes of the law, they are indistinguishable from asylum seekers who have not made the same sacrifices for American interests. Thankfully, this oversight can be fixed. There is already a bill lying forgotten in the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Called the Afghan Adjustment Act, its main thrust is to designate members of Afghan special operations forces and other at-risk units of the Afghan defense forces as eligible for Special Immigration Visas. Not only would this bill give clarity and a path forward to those Afghan special operations partners already in the United States, it would also reunite them with their families and help save the lives of those who were left behind in Afghanistan. While the bill would certainly satisfy the moral argument, there are practical reasons for its passage as well, primarily in America’s foreign endeavors.

Strategic Considerations

International relations scholars have studied the effect of national reputations for years. The conduct of the United States towards its allies and partners has a direct bearing on its national security and broader goals around the globe. The importance of reputation extends to many areas of national concern including nuclear deterrence and even economics. The abandonment of America’s allies has hurt and continues to hurt its international reputation. However, this argument has its opponents. Immediately following the withdrawal and more recently, international relations scholars have written and commented on a lack of response from the international community. An article for Foreign Policy in August of 2021 argued that much of the concern over the “Afghan Debacle” was overblown and premature and, in fact, might actually be seen in a favorable light as evidence that the United States can make difficult but practical choices rather than continue to waste money on a costly and unwinnable war. Recent research also revealed that some international citizens were more confident in U. S. security commitments, though only after strong messaging, while American citizens continued to worry about their country’s reputation abroad.

Despite the recent challenges to reputation theory and the blasé response of some scholars to the Afghanistan withdrawal, the failure of the United States to uphold its commitments to its Afghan special operations partners is a serious problem for its future interests. One of the biggest challenges that America’s continued inaction causes is domestic. Though the research cited above may ease fears about foreign perceptions, the American public is still very much concerned with their nation’s reputation on the world stage. When Americans are reminded of the Afghanistan withdrawal they “become significantly more pessimistic about the credibility of U.S. security commitments abroad.” Furthermore, the Pew Research Center found that a majority of Americans supported admitting Afghan refugees. With trust in political institutions at an all-time low, the passage of the Afghan Adjustment Act would be a building block of trust that responds to the wishes of the American people and strengthens the reputation of the United States on the world stage.

Reputations still do matter, especially in the formation and maintenance of alliances. Two studies found that states that consistently uphold their commitments are more likely to be involved in alliance formation. Additionally, states seek out alliances with those that remain true to their word. Furthermore, reputations are not confined solely to alliance building. Another study in the field of reputation theory investigated how bilateral investment treaties affected the flow of foreign direct investment into a country. When countries adhered to treaty commitments, foreign direct investment grew. In contrast, those who stood before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes saw a decline in their levels of foreign direct investment. These studies show that a nation’s reputation is crucial to achieving its foreign policy objectives.

With reputation playing such an important role in international affairs, America’s failure to provide for its Afghan special operations partners certainly hobbles its efforts around the globe. This is especially problematic as it faces renewed challenges from old foes like Iran and Russia as well as rising defiance from China. To face such a wide array of threats, the United States will need stalwart and eager allies from around the globe. These potential comrades will take note of how former partners were treated. To that end, the Afghan Adjustment Act, or similar legislation, would go a long way toward repairing America’s diminished reputation. It would signal commitment and compassion and reassure partner nations that they would not be abandoned.

Ensuring Afghan special operations veterans are given a new home in the United States not only aids its foreign policy but also its defense policy. The U.S. military is facing a serious manpower shortage that threatens the national security of the nation. This recruiting problem is also affecting the special forces community, as Congress considers cuts to special operations personnel numbers even as their operational tempo increases. Trained by U.S. special operations forces, Afghan special operations veterans represent a ready-made solution to the problem. While it would not provide a long-term fix, these battle-tested fighters would constitute a seriously needed boost to the beleaguered units without nearly as much expense and time usually associated with special forces recruitment. According to the Corioli Institute policy paper mentioned earlier, many Afghan special operations veterans feel a sense of kinship with their American counterparts, a warmth that is reciprocated. This loyalty is extended to the United States itself, with many former Afghan fighters expressing a desire to serve in the U.S. military. One interviewee stated, for example, that “I want to serve my country. I am eating here. I am drinking here. I am [wearing] clothes in this country. Then, I should defend this country. Anywhere they want me to go, I’ll go.” However, their precarious legal status prevents them from putting their skills to use, which are instead wasted on menial labor, providing yet another compelling reason to address the gap in immigration law. Though the above research was conducted among Afghan National Army special operations forces, it is recommended that others undertake similar studies among other potentially affected and equally valiant partner forces in this and other contexts.

Conclusion

By helping its Afghan special operations partners left behind, the United States could address multiple challenges simultaneously. The passage of the Afghan Adjustment Act would help heal the moral injury caused by the abandonment of its allies while also providing a crucial pool of manpower for the special operations units that so much of America’s national security rests upon. Additionally, it would prove to existing and potential allies that the United States stands by its friends in the face of adversity, furthering its interests around the globe. The Afghan Adjustment Act should be made law.

Become a Member

Sean M. Kingsland is a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and rising sophomore at the University of Chicago majoring in political science. He studied Pashtu at the Defense Language Institute and served as a cryptologic linguist and signals intelligence analyst with the Marine Corps’ 1st Radio Battalion. He is now an intern at the Corioli Institute, focusing on former Afghan special operations forces reintegration and working with the policy and advocacy team to promote impactful policies for formerly armed actors.

Dr. Erin K. McFee is a professor of practice at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, where she focuses on climate security and the reintegration of formerly armed actors (e.g., military veterans, ex-guerrillas, former cartel members, ex-insurgents). She is also the president and chair of the Corioli Institute, a UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, an affiliated faculty at the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and the lead researcher at the University of Chicago’s Office for Military Affiliated Communities. Her opinions do not represent those of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies or the U.S. government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Sean M. Kingsland · September 17, 2024

17. Getting Strategic Competition Right: Competing for the System

I think the Joint Concept for Competing is an important document but too often overlooked or not well accepted within DOD or the national security community.

Excerpts:

The Joint Concept for Competing is a farsighted document with much to commend it. It builds on a legacy of innovative thinking that transplanted ideas from the world of special operations into mainstream defense strategy via its predecessor, the 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning. One of these ideas was to apply “systems thinking” to deal with the complexity of the competitive space below the threshold of war. This is a powerful concept, and by building on it, the authors of the next JCC can revolutionize and bring a durable advantage the United States’ approach to strategic competition.

...

The 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning promised a revolution in how the United States uses its substantial military power. This was based on “the fundamental insight that the Joint Force plays an essential role . . . outside of the military sphere: competition below the threshold of armed conflict.” The 2023 Joint Concept for Competing took the baton and ran with it, but the revolution is not yet complete. In its recent report, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy saw “few indications that the U.S. government is consistently integrating tools of national security power.” (This was one of the main objectives of both concepts.) The next version of the Joint Concept for Competing gives General Brown and its authors the opportunity to finish the job by going all in on systems thinking. The complexity of modern strategic competition demands nothing less. Although if they want more people to read this version, they simply should write a shorter document. Less is always more.

Getting Strategic Competition Right: Competing for the System - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Tim McDonald, Sean Monaghan · September 17, 2024

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“A serious problem in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.” This Soviet observation during the Cold War could easily apply to the Joint Concept for Competing, released last year by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley. At ninety-one pages and over thirty thousand words the JCC is unlikely to be read by many serving personnel. That is a shame because it is an important document—so important it is now being updated by Gen. Milley’s successor General Charles Q. Brown.

The Joint Concept for Competing is a farsighted document with much to commend it. It builds on a legacy of innovative thinking that transplanted ideas from the world of special operations into mainstream defense strategy via its predecessor, the 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning. One of these ideas was to apply “systems thinking” to deal with the complexity of the competitive space below the threshold of war. This is a powerful concept, and by building on it, the authors of the next JCC can revolutionize and bring a durable advantage the United States’ approach to strategic competition.

First Things First: Why Systems Thinking?

Systems thinking is an approach to analyzing complex systems. Complex systems are open environments in which structure and agents interact to create emergent behavior that is often unpredictable. The competitive space below the threshold of war—sometimes called the gray zone—is a typical complex system. Private hackers steal data. Rogue ships damage pipelines and cables. Saboteurs damage train lines and burn down factories. Assassins for hire target industry executives. Proxy actors foment political unrest. Beijing uses its coast guard and economic might to coerce its neighbors. Russia uses bot farms to generate industrial-scale disinformation and hack elections. Iran’s proxy militias conduct military campaigns in the Middle East. North Korean hackers steal secrets. Complexity abounds—and compounds when these tools are used in “hybrid” combinations.

Systems thinking acknowledges the true nature of complex systems and treats them accordingly. Tried-and-tested systems thinking methods can be used to “win” the gray zone—or at least compete more effectively in this complex environment. These tools already exist but are rarely acknowledged or used. Part of the problem is thinking about complex systems seems abstract, even if the basic ideas are intuitive. As the late political scientist Robert Jervis explains in his 1997 book, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life: “Although we all know that social life and politics constitute systems and that many outcomes are the unintended consequences of complex interactions, the basic ideas of systems do not come readily to mind and so often are ignored.” This is unfortunate because, as Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen point out in their 2008 book, Harnessing Complexity: “Whether or not we are aware of it, we all intervene in complex systems.”

The JCC takes initial steps toward incorporating systems thinking but could go much further. The language and ideas of complex systems feature throughout. The central idea of the concept is to “view strategic competition as a complex set of interactions.” However, if the concept is actually influenced by systems thinking, there is little evidence of it. The extensive bibliography contains nothing relevant (the hand of John Maynard Keynes’ dead scribblers might well be at play here).

For example, take the concept’s three “supporting ideas.” These are based on systems principles, even if the document does not acknowledge it. The first—“expand the competitive mindset”—is akin to “forest thinking,” which means seeing the bigger picture to tackle challenges at the source. The second—“shape the competitive space”—refers to the power of “leverage,” another principle of systems thinking, which holds that some actions to intervene in systems are more powerful than others. The third supporting idea—“advance integrated campaigning”—borrows from the cybernetics principle of “requisite variety,” which requires sufficient levers to meet the complexity of the environment.

However, while the language and ideas are there, much more could be done to apply systems thinking in the JCC. These prospects are currently undermined by the reliance on established US military planning doctrine that pervades the JCC—particularly the concept’s centerpiece, the “structured approach for strategic competition.” The principles of military planning are largely unchanged since the Napoleonic Wars and not well suited to complex systems. The authors of version two of the Joint Concept for Competing can address these limitations and improve the concept by doing three specific things. The first is to clearly define what the United States and its allies are competing for. The second is to update traditional military planning concepts based on systems thinking principles. The third is to implement a twin-track framework to contend for near-term interests while shaping the broader environment to deliver strategic objectives.

Competing for the System

It is commonplace for officials to pronounce that the United States is embroiled in a strategic competition with China, but often it is not clear exactly what the United States is competing for. A systems thinking perspective suggests the competition is for the system itself. This basic insight is provided by Donella Meadows, who contrasts the leverage of rules and norms with merely moving pieces around the board: “Power over the rules is real power.”

The current JCC recognizes the significance of rules and norms when it says, “U.S. national security is founded on . . . leading and sustaining a stable and open international system.” But it does not follow through by making clear that the object of strategic competition is the system itself. As the political scientist Michael Mazarr clarifies, “At its core, the United States and China are competing to shape the foundational global system—the essential ideas, habits, and expectations that govern international politics.”

At an abstract level, competing for the system involves striving to shape the structure of the international order. Key elements are both observable—such as institutions, rules, relationships, and the strength of military and economic forces—and less tangible—such as cultural influence, reputation, and expectations. If strategy is about making simple rules, then rule number one of the JCC might be: Thou shalt compete for the system.

On a practical level, the JCC should guide practitioners implementing this rule. One analysis identifies several examples of this guidance. These could include campaign design principles—or simple rules that can be understood and implemented across the organization—analytic mechanisms for identifying and prioritizing actions with the greatest leverage, or generating campaigns that unfold over time. Our earlier analysis recommends “campaigning with the system in mind,” on the basis that culture is more important than strategy.

But even rules and norms must come from somewhere and serve a larger purpose. They come from paradigms—frameworks containing basic assumptions and ways of thinking. As Meadows says, “Paradigms are the sources of systems.” Realizing that paradigms exist is the holy grail of leverage in systems. Mazarr also applies this insight to the competition with China: “It is ultimately a competition of norms, narratives, and legitimacy; a contest to have predominant influence over the reigning global paradigm.” The JCC could use this insight too. Instead of citing Henry Kissinger’s chess-versus-Go analogy to promote a more expansive conception of strategy—which is useful but limited—it could use it to highlight the paradigms within which each game exists (not to mention the paradigm of using games as metaphors).

A Different Approach to Military Planning

Our second suggestion is to replace the paradigm of traditional military planning concepts with principles based on systems thinking. The basic reason for this is that established military planning doctrine is designed for simple and complicated systems, not complex and chaotic ones. Table 1 contrasts established methods of military planning with more relevant systems thinking principles.

Table 1: Traditional and Systems Thinking Planning Principles (Source: Sean Monaghan and Tim McDonald, “Campaigning in the Grey Zone: Towards a Systems Approach to countering Hybrid Threats,” The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies)

An alternative approach can be sketched by augmenting existing military planning precepts with a more explicit focus on systems. Our analysis for The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies took precepts from NATO’s military planning guidance, where they are called “operations design concepts.” The only difference between NATO and US doctrine is that the latter has seven planning steps instead of eight; the substance and methods are the same. This suggests our precepts can be directly applied to US doctrine. These are summarized in table 2 and briefly unpacked below.

Table 2: Planning Precepts (Source: Sean Monaghan and Tim McDonald, “Campaigning in the Grey Zone: Towards a Systems Approach to countering Hybrid Threats,” The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies; Allied Joint Publication 5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations; Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning)

Advantage, not end states. According to military planning doctrine, the application of ways and means to a problem will result in a desired end state, whereas a complexity-oriented approach treats strategy as a continuous and dynamic quest for advantage.

Uncertainty, not risk. US doctrine defines the occurrence risk of an “improbable” event as between 21 and 50 percent. But this concept of risk requires closed systems where probabilities can be reliably calculated, such as casino games. Planning in complex settings necessitates robustness under uncertainty and anticipation of surprises.

Monitoring and discovery, not understanding. Complex systems are often difficult to understand and can be highly unpredictable. Understandings therefore are transient and potentially fragile. Analytic approaches may need to seek general trends more than precise models, searching for patterns and relationships.

Interaction, not addition. Military planning precepts (e.g., phases, decisive conditions, end states, center of gravity) are often based on linear, additive logic. But with many actors and multicausal environments system effects warp actions and behaviors. Interactive logic has an advantage here, where actions and actors shape and are shaped by their environment.

Shaping, not influencing. Influence thinking is central to military planning. Actors are multifaceted, self-motivated, adaptive, and unpredictable, often acting counterintuitively, and so a powerful approach can be to shape the environment in which they operate, to nudge, incentivize, regulate, or constrain.

Variety, not a single course of action. Military planning doctrine is designed to present the commander with a single, preferred course of action. But there are advantages to variety and multilateralism, with success more about hedging bets and robustness than finding a killer app.

Mindset, organizational design, and process. A systems thinking mindset is proactive and curious: it is about probing and shaping the environment, involving stakeholders in positions to influence the system and prioritizing rapid iteration in response to feedback loops.

A Twin-Track Approach to Competing While Shaping

The previous two recommendations—competing for the system and rethinking traditional military planning concepts—demand an approach to implementation that serves two contrasting functions. The first is to compete with adversaries in the near term by gaining advantage, employing variety, adapting, shaping, probing, and iterating. The second is to ensure these actions contribute positively to broader, system-shaping efforts. Planners should be responsive across both scope of focus (from narrow and task-centered to broader and contextual) and time horizon. This can be challenging due to the natural tendency of large organizations to focus on the narrow and urgent over the broad and important. To support competing in both dimensions we offer a twin-track approach, shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: A Twin-Track Approach to Competition and System Shaping (Source: Tim McDonald, “Beginning with System Transformation in Mind,” RAND)

The inner track represents functions for problem solving and adapting. It has a shorter-term focus and moves at a faster speed. It includes identifying problems, diagnosing their causes, and developing and implementing responses. The objective of this activity is to restore equilibrium, stabilize the environment, and take incremental steps toward longer-term objectives.

The outer track is about system shaping. It has a broader aperture and longer-term horizon and can move at a slower pace. Work on this track includes developing strategic goals, future system designs, finding areas to intervene in the system, implementing interventions, and creating institutions, processes, or new stakeholder groups to make the changes stick. Effective leadership here is intersectoral leadership, across defense, the interagency, industry, and the whole of society.

To move from the inner to outer track planners lift their gazes to see more, both in space (more actors, institutions, and relationships) and over time (both upstream causes and downstream effects). And managing both tracks and the inevitable tensions between them will require innovative institutional design. The US government has a tradition of creating interagency mechanisms, such as the National Security Council, joint interagency task forces, interagency policy committees, and bodies for coordinating counterterrorism and cybersecurity. However, research from industry has found that because the objectives, processes, and cultures of such efforts differ, they should be distinct from each other and report on equal footing to the principal or overarching process above them. Existing mechanisms for interagency coordination may serve as platforms, but the focus of their work on each track should be clearly defined.

Less Is More

The 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning promised a revolution in how the United States uses its substantial military power. This was based on “the fundamental insight that the Joint Force plays an essential role . . . outside of the military sphere: competition below the threshold of armed conflict.” The 2023 Joint Concept for Competing took the baton and ran with it, but the revolution is not yet complete. In its recent report, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy saw “few indications that the U.S. government is consistently integrating tools of national security power.” (This was one of the main objectives of both concepts.) The next version of the Joint Concept for Competing gives General Brown and its authors the opportunity to finish the job by going all in on systems thinking. The complexity of modern strategic competition demands nothing less. Although if they want more people to read this version, they simply should write a shorter document. Less is always more.

Tim McDonald is associate policy researcher at RAND, and codirector of its Systems Transitions Applied Research (STAR) Initiative. He is a visiting researcher at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.

Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he focuses on NATO, European security, and defense. He has fifteen years of experience in the UK Ministry of Defence.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including the RAND Corporation and its research sponsors, clients, and grantors.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Tim McDonald, Sean Monaghan · September 17, 2024

18. The Soldier and the Constitution

The 14 minute film can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXztMgWBmV8

This video is intended for use in Army units but it should be viewed by anyone interested in civil-military relations and specifically civilian control of the military..

The Soldier and the Constitution - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Todd Schmidt · September 17, 2024

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Military leaders do not typically spend a great deal of time reading about, reflecting on, or studying civil-military relations. From the time we enter the military to the time we exit, it is not something we are required to do. We do not take significant time to truly understand a bedrock principle upon which our democratic system of government is founded—the principle of civilian control of the military. We now find ourselves bearing the fruits of this neglect.

Each presidential election, we see military service members actively engage in partisan political behavior, either intentionally or out of ignorance to military rules and regulations. Retired military leaders will openly endorse political candidates from both sides of the political spectrum. We see military service members in uniform attending partisan political events, posting partisan commentary on social media, and potentially giving the impression that the military institution may support a specific candidate. As this behavior has increased over the past few decades, we have seen the trust and confidence Americans have in our military decline.

Although trust and confidence in the US military has declined, it is still regarded as one of our most respected institutions in American life. To help safeguard and ensure a healthy relationship with the American public and to promote a democratic, nonpartisan ethic, the US Army’s premier publishing house, Army University Press (AUP), initiated a project that honors and commemorates September 17, 2024, recognized as “Constitution Day.” This project was entitled, “The Soldier and the Constitution,” and provides military service members with a film and recommended reading to help educate us on our duties and responsibilities while serving on active duty.

The film and the recommended reading were developed in partnership with leading scholars at the US Naval Academy and Georgetown University. Together, these products provide a tailored training and education package reinforcing longstanding tradition and principle; a nonpartisan military ethic; and rules and regulations that govern active duty service members in a democratic civil-military relationship. It was important to work with the US Naval Academy and Georgetown to provide perspective and input not only from more than one military service, but from a leading civilian academic institution, as well.

US Navy Captain Dr. Dave Richardson and Georgetown University professor and retired US Army Colonel Dr. Heidi Urben, a former faculty member of West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, cowrote the script of the film. The team at Army University Press and Army University Films produced the video. The team at Army University Books, working closely with Dr. Urben, prepared the recommended reading that will be a chapter in a forthcoming book, Civil-Military Relations: A Primer. The reading is entitled, “Instilling the Nonpartisan Ethic at the Unit Level.”

The team of contributors behind the making of this film and recommended reading hope that these products will be used as intended—educating our military on basic civil-military relations principles that ensure our democracy’s strength and resilience, particularly during periods of increased partisan polarization and division.

In a March 15, 2023 interview, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen described American society as being caught up in a confusing time. Truth and facts are often hard to discern behind a web of disinformation that can create distrust and uncertainty. It is precisely during these times that Americans need to know they can trust national leaders. Behind our national leaders stands the strongest military in the world. It is a strong military that, in many ways, gives legitimacy to our democratic government.

Protecting our military from the blight of partisanship and partisan behavior—as well as the perception of it—is essential to maintaining the trust and confidence of the American public. Americans must be assured that the military’s oath and relationship to the Constitution—not to political party or personality—is unshakeable. This project, “The Soldier and the Constitution,” is a small effort made to educate and inform our military institution. We also hope that it sends a reassuring message that reinforces the military’s commitment to a nonpartisan ethic, civilian control, and healthy civil-military relations.

We hope that military service members from across the military at every level will watch our film, accompanied by the recommended reading, and share it with their colleagues and friends, their unit, and their subordinates, peers, and senior leaders.

Colonel Todd Schmidt, PhD is the director of Army University Press and executive producer of Army University Films. He serves as a senior fellow for the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic at West Point and is author of the book, Silent Coup of the Guardians: The Influence of US Military Elites on National Security.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Rashene Mincy, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Todd Schmidt · September 17, 2024

19. Where Capitalism Is Working

Excerpts:

Switzerland, Taiwan, and Vietnam show that giving people more economic freedom is still humanity’s best hope for economic and social progress. The endless expansion of the state is not a viable solution to the crises of the twenty-first century. It is possible to restrain the state, target public spending more strategically, and leave enough room for people to invest as they see fit, unburdened by a tangle of red tape and government interference.

Though founded on the ideal of limited central authority, the United States has for decades been building a bigger government by running up public debt, rolling out new regulations by the thousands each year, and responding to every new crisis with ever-larger bailouts. This distorted form of capitalism has been aptly lampooned as “socialism for the very rich,” but the cracks in U.S. economic policy run deeper than that slogan suggests.

The United States has increased spending on social programs for the poor and the middle class, especially the elderly, while also carrying out financial-market rescues that mainly benefit the super-rich, who tend to be older and own the lion’s share of stocks, bonds, and property. This is socialized risk—a system of state guarantees against economic pain—for everyone.

The balance of the American “mixed” capitalist system has shifted too far toward state control, which ends up benefiting the established elites. What the United States and other countries around the world need instead are policies that encourage private competition by supporting young people and startups rather than protecting aging incumbents—the oligopolies, billionaires, and tycoons who now dominate the American system. Restoring faith in capitalism will require learning from countries where the system still works for ordinary people, thanks in good part to more limited government.

Where Capitalism Is Working

What the World Can Learn From Switzerland, Taiwan, and Vietnam

By Ruchir Sharma

September 17, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by What Went Wrong with Capitalism · September 17, 2024

Widespread disaffection with the current capitalist systems has led many countries, rich and poor, to look for new economic models. Defenders of the status quo continue to hold up the United States as a shining star, its economy outpacing Europe and Japan, its financial markets as dominant as ever. Yet its citizens are as pessimistic as any in the West. Barely more than a third of Americans believe that they will ever be richer than their parents. The share that trusts the government keeps trending downward, even as the state builds an ever more generous safety net. Seventy percent of Americans now say that the system “needs major changes or to be torn down entirely,” and the younger generations are the most frustrated. More Americans under 30 have a more positive view of socialism than of capitalism.

In countries with emerging economies, it has been a shock to see “the land of the free” abandon its traditional skepticism of centralized power and planning and instead promote big government solutions. Many of these countries, from India to Poland, have not forgotten their own failed trysts with socialism. They were surprised when U.S. President Donald Trump led a revolt against free trade and open borders, and when his successor, Joe Biden, began promoting what National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan called an “economic mentality that champions building.”

And they can no longer look for inspiration to China. The “economic miracle” that began after the Communist Party started ceding power to the private sector in the late 1970s is faltering under leader Xi Jinping. China has returned to its old command-and-control ways, punishing businesses who grow too powerful in the eyes of the ruling party. Weighed down by heavy debts, an aging population, and an overreaching state, China’s economy has fallen off the miracle path.

Yet as these major countries seem to be retreating from capitalism, there are a few places across the income curve, including Switzerland, Taiwan, and Vietnam, where capitalism still works—and their examples are worth emulating. Their governments value economic freedom, limiting their own role in managing the economy and regulating businesses. They recognize that public debt and deficits are serious risks, and so spend public money carefully. They tend to avoid the worst excesses of the current American approach—overspending to stimulate the economy, coddling big corporations, pumping up financial markets mainly to the benefit of billionaires. Above all, these capitalist success stories maintain the key balance of government, providing help for their most vulnerable citizens without narrowing economic freedom.

AN UNLIKELY HAVEN

American progressives often trace their vision of socialist paradise to Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, which are as wealthy as the United States but feature more equal distributions of wealth and offer affordable health care and free college for all.

But Switzerland, though it is rarely held up as an exemplar by those on the political left, is far richer than the Scandinavian social democracies and just as fair. Its $700 billion economy is larger than any in Scandinavia, and it delivers welfare benefits as comprehensive, with more streamlined government, lower taxes, and more financial stability than Nordic social democracies, which have faced several financial crises in the recent past. Switzerland boasts a higher average income, with levels of income inequality that have become comparable to those in Scandinavia. Average family wealth in Switzerland is $685,000—twice the Nordic average. Switzerland is also among the world’s happiest countries, typically scoring in the top five in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Better Life Index. And it has accomplished all of this with a surprisingly lean state: public spending accounts for 35 percent of GDP, versus 55 percent in Sweden.

The Swiss health system requires residents to buy insurance from private providers but offers subsidies for the poor. Its world-class universities charge $1,000 in annual tuition, on average, leaving graduates with far less debt than their peers in most developed countries. Relatively open borders, meanwhile, help make the landlocked country an incubator of globally competitive companies. Forty percent of the population is foreign born.

Switzerland ranks second after Japan in the “sophistication” of its exports, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. The premise of OEC rankings is that making complex exports such as biomedicines or digital hardware require a range of the strengths, from quality universities to research hubs, that drive economic progress. Thriving in every major sector other than oil, Swiss firms account for 15 of the top 100 European companies by stock market capitalization, more than any Scandinavian rival.

The Swiss model has been hiding in plain sight.

The Swiss economy is as decentralized as its federal political system. Many of its most iconic exports come from the country’s provinces: Swiss Army knives from Schwyz, watches from Bern, cheese from Fribourg. Small companies anchor the economy, accounting for two of every three jobs. Only one in six Swiss work for the government, half the Scandinavian average. And the Swiss prefer to work than to collect state benefits. In a 2016 referendum, Swiss voters overwhelmingly rejected a guaranteed monthly income of $2,500, which critics called “money for nothing.”

Over the last decade, most rich countries saw their share of global export revenues fall, but Switzerland’s continued to rise. As a result, the Swiss franc rose in value faster than any other currency, yet exports still thrived. Customers seem glad to pay more for Swiss goods. That inflow of funds helps power the economy.

Swiss fiscal policy is not without its flaws. Trying to slow the rise of the franc over the last decade, the central bank cut interest rates sharply. The result was a lending boom that drove private corporate and household debt up to 280 percent of GDP, a risky height that raises the risk of credit and banking crises in the future.

The world tends to ignore the Swiss model, perhaps owing to the country’s outdated reputation as a tax haven where illicit fortunes hide behind strict bank secrecy laws. In 2015, Switzerland, under pressure from foreign governments, agreed to open its banks to more scrutiny, and the economy did not miss a beat, proving that it owes its success to more than ultra-discreet bankers.

The Swiss model has been hiding in plain sight. Scandinavia has started moving in its direction. Battered by debt crises in the 1990s, which began in the property and banking sectors, Sweden lowered its top tax rate and cut public spending from 70 percent to 50 percent of GDP. It became one of the few developed countries to run budget surpluses, so it was in a strong financial position when the global financial crisis occurred in 2008. Other Scandinavian countries followed suit; in 2015, Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen even lectured a U.S. audience to stop thinking of Denmark as “a planned socialist economy.”

STARTUP ISLAND

After World War II, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan came to be known as the “Asian miracles,” because they invested more heavily in research and development than other poor countries and rose rapidly into the ranks of the rich. Competent governments, working in partnership with industry to export products, guided these miracles. South Korea’s shepherding of Samsung and Hyundai, now massive corporations, stands as a prime example.

Today, Taiwan is the most intriguing among the miracles. Opting to focus on developing smaller companies that manufacture parts for foreign corporations, rather than multinationals that sell products under their own global brands, Taiwan has in recent years surpassed South Korea and the United States as the world leader in advanced computer chips, the critical building blocks for artificial intelligence and other industries of the future.

Until the 1970s, Taiwan was primarily an exporter of textiles and apparel. Then, like many of its peers, it began to modernize its economy by copying Western technology. In 1980, Taiwan’s government, taking cues from Silicon Valley, started setting up “science parks,” each with its own university campus, across the territory to ensure regionally balanced growth. The parks became hothouses for startup companies, which drew talent from those universities and used government bonuses to lure experienced expats back home. A few of these startups would grow to vast scale.

To build its chip industry, Taiwan recruited an MIT grad and Texas Instruments veteran named Morris Chang. Just as Taiwan once made plastic toys for global giants such as Mattel, Chang created a “pure foundry”—a contract manufacturer of chips. He bet billions on the construction of chip fabrication plants, building an insuperable lead over rival countries. The smallest and fastest chips, indispensable for the most advanced digital technologies, are fabricated in foundries. Two-thirds of foundry chips are made in Taiwan. And most of those come from Chang’s creation, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company.

Today, Taiwan is the most intriguing among the miracles.

TSMC is a product of the kind of industrial policy now embraced by many Western politicians—but in the case of Chang and Taiwan, executed by a streamlined government. Public spending hovers around 20 percent of GDP, public debt around 34 percent, and one in 30 workers is employed by the state; all are fractions of the average for other developed countries. By limiting the role of government as spender, debtor, employer, and regulator, Taiwan has created an economy that punches above its weight.

Now a fixture among the world’s largest tech firms, TSMC is rich enough to buy up the island’s best talent, drawing the ire of domestic critics for departing from Taiwan’s roots as an egalitarian society of small entrepreneurs along the way. But unlike American tech titans such as Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk, Chang has not become a lightning rod for public protests against wealth inequality, at least in part because his net worth of around $2 billion is barely a rounding error compared to the fortunes of those executives.

Taiwan does not step in to rescue the financial markets every time they falter or bail out big banks and corporations. Whereas other governments meet every new financial crisis with increasingly generous relief, Taiwan has exercised restraint—even during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, its combined fiscal and monetary stimulus amounted to less than seven percent of GDP, one-fifth the average of the stimulus packages passed in the United States, Europe, the United Kingdom, and Japan.

Though Taiwan’s tax rates are typical for a developed economy, its spending habits are different: light on social programs and health care, heavy on education and research. The result is extraordinary productivity. Output per worker has grown faster in Taiwan than in the G-4 nations every year for four decades. Over the last four years, it has grown eight times faster. These gains may be attributed to the fact that Taiwan generates an unusually high share of its GDP—30 percent—from manufacturing, the industry most closely associated with productivity gains.

As it has endeavored to remain neutral, Taiwan has arguably become the single most valuable prize in the emerging cold war between China and the United States. As the maker of the world’s most advanced computer chips, it is an indispensable link in the tech supply chain. Without access to Taiwan, neither the United States nor China can achieve its ambition of global tech supremacy.

With this critical role, however, comes heightened risk. U.S. defense analysts worry that with its chip fabrication plants clustered on the home island, Taiwan is highly vulnerable to missile threats or naval blockades from mainland China, just 100 miles away. This is a source of perpetual anxiety for a relatively small place—and a tribute to its successes. Taiwan has created a business environment that generates startups alongside giants and produces great wealth, relatively well distributed. If China were not working so successfully to block international recognition of Taiwan, its model of capitalist democracy would be more widely studied.

A QUIET MIRACLE?

China’s historic rise began only after Mao’s dominance of the country ended in the late 1970s and his successors loosened state controls. The country’s minuscule private sector grew to account for more than half of urban jobs and GDP. As its share of world GDP tripled to 15 percent, China reemerged as a global powerhouse. Yet by the late 2010s, it reasserted state control, and growth slowed sharply. Chinese “state capitalism,” now so widely admired by some in the West, was devouring its economic miracle.

Today, Vietnam, led by a pragmatic communist government, looks much like China did during its miracle phase 20 years ago. With a population less than one-tenth the size of China’s, Vietnam will never have the same global impact, but it, too, shows that capitalism can work even under authoritarian, single-party rule.

Devastated by its civil war, Vietnam was by the late 1980s living on handouts from the Soviet Union. Growth was stagnant. Inflation ran at 700 percent. Hanoi responded by opening the state-run economy to private business, abolishing collective farms, and leasing land to individuals, who were allowed for the first time to sell their produce at a profit, at home or abroad. Output rose fast. Long a rice importer battling hunger, Vietnam became a rice exporter. Even now, as many countries are raising trade barriers, Vietnam remains a communist champion of free markets.

Vietnam steered all its resources toward building an export manufacturing powerhouse, modeled after China’s early reforms. To stabilize its currency and control inflation, Hanoi worked to contain budget deficits. To energize the private sector, it sold off more than 11,000 state companies, leaving just 600 in existence by the late 2010s. To support factories, it invested heavily in transport systems to bring goods to market and schools to educate workers. The country now gets higher marks from the World Bank for the quality of its infrastructure than any nation at a similar income level. Its international high school test scores are often in the global top ten, higher than those of many developed nations, including the United States.

Today, Vietnam looks much like China did during its miracle phase 20 years ago.

Skilled labor is allowing Vietnam to produce ever more sophisticated goods. Giants such as Samsung and Apple have been moving smartphone production into the country. It has staged a multi-decade run of export growth near 20 percent and GDP growth above five percent, matching feats achieved by the Asian miracle countries. In three decades, Vietnam’s average annual income has tripled to nearly $3,000—out of poverty and into the lower-middle income class. The share of the population living on less than $2 a day has fallen from 60 percent to less than five percent; nearly 90 percent have health-care coverage and less than one percent live without electric power, making Vietnam a leader in the war on poverty.

A functioning capitalist system will generate pockets of great wealth, and in 2013 Vietnam produced its first billionaire, Pham Nhat Vuong. A graduate of university in Russia, Vuong got his start introducing instant noodles to Ukraine, a venture that grew into the Vingroup conglomerate. A self-made billionaire, he is more likely to be celebrated than demonized in an entrepreneurial society where most people have seen real progress.

The question is how long Vietnam’s boom can last. Authoritarian rule tends to work best in early stages of development, when strong leaders can force-march the completion of simple tasks like road building. Over time, unencumbered by democratic checks and balances, autocrats often push policies to irrational extremes, triggering major crises that set their countries back. Vietnam’s Communist Party has been in power for half a century, so far without generating any of the financial warning signs of a miracle-ending crisis. New Party General Secretary To Lam’s consolidation of power, however, may put this track record to the test.

And although relatively few, Vietnam’s surviving state firms are huge, accounting for a third of GDP and many of the banking system’s worst loans. If trouble comes, it could start in these opaque state firms. But for now, Vietnam is exporting its way to prosperity, and proving that even communists can successfully manage capitalism by giving people more economic freedom and streamlining the role of the state.

THREE CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM

Switzerland, Taiwan, and Vietnam show that giving people more economic freedom is still humanity’s best hope for economic and social progress. The endless expansion of the state is not a viable solution to the crises of the twenty-first century. It is possible to restrain the state, target public spending more strategically, and leave enough room for people to invest as they see fit, unburdened by a tangle of red tape and government interference.

Though founded on the ideal of limited central authority, the United States has for decades been building a bigger government by running up public debt, rolling out new regulations by the thousands each year, and responding to every new crisis with ever-larger bailouts. This distorted form of capitalism has been aptly lampooned as “socialism for the very rich,” but the cracks in U.S. economic policy run deeper than that slogan suggests.

The United States has increased spending on social programs for the poor and the middle class, especially the elderly, while also carrying out financial-market rescues that mainly benefit the super-rich, who tend to be older and own the lion’s share of stocks, bonds, and property. This is socialized risk—a system of state guarantees against economic pain—for everyone.

The balance of the American “mixed” capitalist system has shifted too far toward state control, which ends up benefiting the established elites. What the United States and other countries around the world need instead are policies that encourage private competition by supporting young people and startups rather than protecting aging incumbents—the oligopolies, billionaires, and tycoons who now dominate the American system. Restoring faith in capitalism will require learning from countries where the system still works for ordinary people, thanks in good part to more limited government.

RUCHIR SHARMA is Chairman of Rockefeller International and the author of What Went Wrong with Capitalism, from which this essay is adapted.

Foreign Affairs · by What Went Wrong with Capitalism · September 17, 2024

20. The Case Against Israeli-Saudi Normalization

Conclusion:

Whoever moves into the White House in January would do well to remember that these thorny and deeply rooted afflictions won’t be solved through accords orchestrated by an outside power. Instead, these problems require patient and painstaking work by the region’s governments, with greater involvement from their citizens. Pushing these partners to take responsibility for their future and their own security through more inclusive, accountable, and transparent governance should be the centerpiece of the next U.S. administration’s Middle East policy. Helping to tackle these endemic issues is more worthwhile than the pursuit of an illusory pact that will leave the United States worse off than before.

The Case Against Israeli-Saudi Normalization

A Deal Won’t Forge a Two-State Solution or Push China Out of the Middle East

By Frederic Wehrey and Jennifer Kavanagh

September 17, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Frederic Wehrey and Jennifer Kavanagh · September 17, 2024

When President Joe Biden leaves office early next year, he will probably do so without having realized a signature item on his agenda for the Middle East—a diplomatic normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, sealed by a formal U.S. security guarantee to Riyadh. Yet this elusive agreement runs the risk of being picked up again by his successor, no matter who wins the election in November. While in office, former President Donald Trump was among Saudi Arabia’s biggest supporters, and he has already signaled his desire to expand the so-called Abraham Accords—a series of bilateral agreements between Israel and a handful of Arab countries, negotiated under his watch—to include Saudi Arabia. Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, could be compelled to revive the deal or some variation of it, both for the sake of continuity and because hammering out a grand bargain in this troubled region would be a foreign policy achievement for a relatively inexperienced politician.

But for Harris or Trump, continuing to elevate this regional accord would be a grave mistake. The proposed arrangement will not end the war in Gaza, solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, block China’s inroads to the Middle East, or counter Iran and its militant proxies. Instead, by committing Washington to defend a deeply repressive Arab state with a history of destabilizing behavior, the pact’s main achievement will be to further entangle the United States in a region that successive U.S. presidents have tried to pivot away from.

The single-minded pursuit of this bad deal has also blinded U.S. policymakers to other, more important drivers of conflict in the region, and it has caused the United States to delay efforts to ramp up pressure on Israel to end its war in Gaza. The next U.S. president should therefore jettison the proposed accord and focus Middle East policy instead on the economic and social issues most important to the region.

RAW DEAL

Though an Israeli-Saudi agreement has yet to be finalized, its broad outlines have already become clear. According to the terms of the proposed accord, Saudi Arabia would formally recognize Israel in return for Israel’s commitment to establish an independent Palestinian state. The United States would promise to defend Saudi Arabia from external attack and support Riyadh’s civilian nuclear program, and the Saudis would give Washington new military access to the kingdom’s territorial waters and airspace. Riyadh would also pledge to restrict Chinese military bases and security cooperation in Saudi Arabia, including foregoing purchases of advanced Chinese technology and weapons and limiting some Chinese investment in the Saudi economy.

Concluding the deal has an obvious appeal for both Israeli and Saudi leaders. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could present it as a political win after facing heavy domestic criticism for failing to prevent Hamas’s horrific October 7 attacks and prolonging the military campaign in Gaza. Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and de facto leader, Mohammed bin Salman, also remains intent on signing some version of the agreement because it offers the kingdom protection, substantial economic benefits, and the prestige of being counted among the United States’ closest allies.

As for Washington, Israeli-Saudi normalization may seem to offer a way to advance a two-state solution—thus ending a conflict that has sucked up U.S. resources and attention—while blocking the growing influence of China in the Middle East. But upon inspection, normalization would achieve neither of these aims. For starters, the deal won’t be the path to peace between Israelis and Palestinians that Washington hopes it to be. There is simply no evidence that Netanyahu—or any Israeli government—will make and adhere to the concessions needed to create a Palestinian state, which Riyadh has demanded as a pre-requisite, no matter what economic and security benefits Saudi normalization might bring. Added to this, Israeli public support for Palestinian statehood has dropped since the Hamas attack: according to a spring 2024 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, just over a quarter of Israelis now support such an arrangement.

Even if Israel and Saudi Arabia were to arrive at some agreement, the prospects that it would create lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians are slim. According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, a majority of Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank support armed struggle against Israel. Some Israelis are armed and radicalized and might also try to sabotage such a deal. In fact, even the normalization deals that Israel has already signed appear to be on shaky ground. After October 7, protests in Morocco and Bahrain broke out against the Abraham Accords. Arab and Israeli leaders are having trouble upholding commitments that have already been made. It would be especially hard for them to adhere to new ones.

Even the normalization deals that Israel has already signed appear to be on shaky ground.

The deal also wouldn’t give the United States any real advantage over China in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been expanding relations with a range of outside powers, including China and Russia, on energy and trade to avoid overreliance on the United States. Riyadh thinks a diversity of partners will attract better economic opportunities and allow access to more advanced technology and military systems, especially in areas where the United States lacks a competitive edge. China and Saudi Arabia, for example, are working together on infrastructure and technology projects as well as on renewable energy initiatives. The deal would not prohibit this activity, and so this trend is likely to continue either way.

The agreement would block Beijing’s military activities by preventing China from building military bases in Saudi Arabia and limiting Saudi acquisition of Chinese weapons and domestic surveillance technology. But these are near-meaningless concessions: military ties are not the main source of Beijing’s growing influence in Saudi Arabia or, for that matter, in the broader Middle East. Today, China has no permanent military presence or planned military bases in Saudi Arabia, is not a major weapons supplier to the kingdom, and the two countries rarely train their forces together. More important, the economic and commercial partnerships that are the real drivers of China’s regional leverage would be left largely untouched.

Notably, U.S. efforts to push China out of other Middle Eastern countries have come up short. In nearby United Arab Emirates, for instance, Microsoft recently announced a $1.5 billion investment in G42, an Emirati artificial intelligence company, brokered with the help of the U.S. government. In return for Microsoft’s funds, G42 agreed to sell off its Chinese investments and remove Chinese-produced technology from its systems in favor of U.S. components and services. Since Microsoft’s announcement of the investment, however, complications have emerged. For example, although G42 has reduced ties with Chinese companies, other Emirati firms have not. As a result, talent and know-how that G42 gains from its partnership with Microsoft could easily flow into firms in the UAE that have deeper relationships with Chinese investors, possibly defeating the purpose of the restrictions.

The terms of the proposed U.S.-Saudi deal are quite different than those between Microsoft and G42, of course, but some of the same challenges apply. Trying to selectively limit Chinese technology and investments inside Saudi Arabia would be difficult, and Beijing would likely maintain a significant and sometimes hard-to-detect presence in the kingdom. Even under the potential accord, for instance, China would probably retain its investments in Saudi ports, which might be leveraged for under-the-radar military operations or to refuel or resupply Chinese military ships. The deal, then, is a poor way to deprive China of a foothold in the kingdom.

GO YOUR OWN WAY

The purported military benefits to the United States of Israeli-Saudi normalization are also overblown. In theory, the agreement would offer the United States some marginal military advantages when it comes to containing Iran. Washington might use new access to Saudi waters and airspace to improve its ability to track and disrupt Iran’s militias and interdict weapons shipments bound for its proxies. But in practice, the military gains would be minimal. Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf Arab countries, seeks to avoid open conflict with Iran or its proxies, and so it has been reluctant to help the United States fend off Houthi attacks in the Red Sea or act against Iranian proxies elsewhere in the region. The agreement is unlikely to change that fact.

Even if it did, the additional access in Saudi Arabia would not give Washington much of a leg up: trying to deter low-intensity militia activity with ever-grander displays of U.S. hard power has often proved disappointing. Iranian-backed armed groups have become masters at inflicting damage to Israel and U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria with just enough restraint to avoid crossing U.S. redlines or triggering escalation. The United States’ campaign to stop Houthi attacks on commercial shipping over the past year is a case in point. Even senior U.S. military officials have acknowledged the operation has been a costly failure because the Houthis have successfully dispersed their weapons and personnel. Washington is not hamstrung by its capabilities or access. It has decided that conducting a larger ground operation, which is probably necessary to stop Houthi attacks by force, is not worth risking American lives or a wider war. With this experience in the rearview, it is doubtful that additional military access in the region would make the United States safer.

Perhaps most worrying, a normalization agreement would bog down the United States in the Middle East at a time when the White House should be prioritizing other global challenges, such as countering Beijing in the South China Sea. Despite receiving millions of tons of advanced weaponry from France, Germany, and the United States, Saudi Arabia needs outside help to defend itself. In the event of a war, it would likely prove more of a liability for Washington than a valued partner. The United States should continue to assist Saudi Arabia in developing niche capabilities it needs to protect itself, such as air defense systems. But it should avoid making a sweeping commitment to send U.S. troops and materiel to defend the regime from external aggression. Such a pledge might dissuade Riyadh from pursuing conciliation with its neighbors and embolden the kingdom to take risks.

The deal would also harm the Middle East in more subtle ways. The relentless pursuit of Israeli-Saudi normalization has sidetracked Washington from helping the region make progress on its actual sources of conflict and extremism. To end the war in Gaza, for example, the United States will need to apply greater and more direct pressure on Israel. Instead, U.S. officials have behaved as if they can resolve the conflict by dangling the carrot of normalization. More broadly, the Biden administration’s preoccupation with this deal has distracted it from other looming problems in the Middle East, including authoritarianism, corruption, human rights abuses, the lack of economic opportunities for young people, and climate change.

Whoever moves into the White House in January would do well to remember that these thorny and deeply rooted afflictions won’t be solved through accords orchestrated by an outside power. Instead, these problems require patient and painstaking work by the region’s governments, with greater involvement from their citizens. Pushing these partners to take responsibility for their future and their own security through more inclusive, accountable, and transparent governance should be the centerpiece of the next U.S. administration’s Middle East policy. Helping to tackle these endemic issues is more worthwhile than the pursuit of an illusory pact that will leave the United States worse off than before.

FREDERIC WEHREY is a Senior Fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a retired U.S. Air Force officer who served throughout the Middle East and North Africa.
JENNIFER KAVANAGH is a Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by Frederic Wehrey and Jennifer Kavanagh · September 17, 2024

21. Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group

Rarely do we read about positive activities.

Excepts:

The examination of Russia’s PMCs like the Wagner Group (and Africa Corps) and Iran’s IRGC reveals a sophisticated and shadowy facet of global geopolitics, where sub-threshold engagements, evasion of Western military strengths, and exploitation of legal ambiguities serve as the modus operandi. Their strategic deployments across Africa and the Middle East subtly mirror the expansive reach of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. These entities are not merely extending their influence across these regions; they are constructing a complex web of influence and connectivity reminiscent of China’s global economic strategy.

Policymakers, military strategists, and intelligence officials facing similar challenges of state-affiliated non-state actors in regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe can draw direct lessons from how the US has countered these networks. Specifically, US efforts to curb the IRGC’s influence in Iraq and Syria and its strategic disruption of Wagner’s activities in Africa, offer valuable insights for addressing current and future threats posed by these actors in other contested regions. This analysis provides an initial framework for adapting successful US counterstrategies to emerging threats from similar state-backed entities.

The integration of lessons learned from the Wagner Group and IRGC’s playbook into our understanding of global influence mechanisms highlights the importance of adaptability, innovation, and holistic approaches in strategy formulation. The United States, despite its vast resources and capabilities, encounters systemic challenges in counteracting the nuanced strategies of these organizations. As we discuss in the second installment of this series, the lack of synchronization across its instruments of national power hampers its ability to present a unified and effective front. This dissonance not only affects the coherence of US foreign policy but also undermines its efforts to mobilize international consensus against the nefarious activities. This is increasingly worrisome as recent reports indicate Wagner cooperation with Iranian proxy, Hezbollah. However, the US’s success in delineating the networks that support these groups and applying direct military force when necessary demonstrates the potential for effective countermeasures.

Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Dalton T. Fuss, Nakissa P. Jahanbani · September 17, 2024

This article is part of Project Proxies and Partners, which explores the promises and pitfalls of security cooperation in war, at peace, and in between. We invite you to contribute to the discussion, explore the difficult questions, and help influence the future of proxies and partners. Please contact us if you would like to propose an article, podcast, or event.

In this two-part series, we investigate successes and failures in the US counterstrategies against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Russian Wagner Group, as the most infamous Russian PMC, and its Africa-focused branch, Africa Corps. This first installment reviews two ways in which the United States contended with both these entities and succeeded. Specifically, we discuss two seized opportunities, where the US successfully leveraged instruments of national power to effectively counter the IRGC and Wagner Group.

Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group – Insider: Short of War

This article is relevant for operators, policymakers, and strategists who are grappling with the evolving threat by state-affiliated non-state actors like Iran’s IRGC and Russian PMCs. It underscores operational similarities between the two actors as well as lessons learned from US. For those engaged in countering these adversaries, this piece provides valuable insights into how strategies from one theater of operations can be adapted to effectively address similar threats elsewhere, ultimately helping to protect US interests abroad.

Introduction

While the Wagner Group has fallen out of the news cycle since the coup attempt in June 2023, it continues to further Russia’s strategic goals in multiple regions. Much ambiguity followed the subsequent demise of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023. For example, it remains unclear what form the group will take, with questions lingering over its base, headquarters, and geographical remit of actions.

Open sources about the Wagner Group paint a picture of a small but flexible bureaucracy reminiscent of another US adversary, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Sepah, and notably its Quds Force, which conducts the IRGC’s extraterritorial missions. The control elements of both entities are somewhat different, as the IRGC is singularly beholden to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Until June 2023, Wagner operated as a military and economic entity that was only loosely affiliated with the Kremlin through Prigozhin. It is therefore appropriate, as the authors do in this article, to refer to the group as “Wagner” prior to that time. Since June 2023, however, the Russian Federation has taken decisive steps to centralize control over private military companies (PMCs), including the Wagner Group, signaling a strategic shift in how these entities operate within its broader military and geopolitical strategy. One key area where Wagner has expanded its influence and operations is the African continent. After 2023, when referring to the group’s activities in Africa, they should be referred their rebranded moniker, “Africa Corps.” For future iterations of the entity formerly known as Wagner, we refer to them as “Russian PMCs.”

The IRGC fits a similar bill in seeking to secure Iran internally and externally as a paramilitary and parastate structure. For Wagner, centralization involves integrating PMCs under the oversight of GRU-affiliated individuals, thereby tightening the Kremlin’s grip on their activities and ensuring alignment with national interests. Open sources reveal a concerted effort by the Russian state to reorganize and repurpose these PMCs, showcasing a lean yet highly adaptable organizational framework that is poised to further Russia’s strategic objectives across multiple regions.

The IRGC and Russian PMCs are not merely extending their influence across these regions: they are constructing a complex web of influence and military, political, social, and economic connectivity. A closer look yields more similarities between the groups’ practices and characteristics, which could, in turn, highlight interesting insights in terms of how they have been countered. Given the US and its allies’ ongoing urgency to restrict these organizations, this piece presents a collection of insights gained from studying the IRGC and the Wagner Group in tandem with the intention of applying these lessons to address both entities effectively.

Russia’s PMCs and the IRGC operate in similarly nefarious ways. First, they are characterized by sub-threshold engagement, or liminal warfare, meaning a penchant for operating below the threshold of war, at the seams of war and peace. Second, they are adept at evading conventional Western strengths. Third, they practice legal warfare, by effectively exploiting operational gaps. These similarities underscore a larger trend of states leveraging non-state actors to achieve their objectives in the contemporary geopolitical landscape. More importantly, they underline an often-disregarded aspect concerning the degree to which these shadowy organizations iteratively refine their strategies based each other’s on the insights and activities.

Given the increasing urgency to curb the influence of these groups across multiple regions, this article serves as a critical resource for policymaking, military, and intelligence audiences aimed at understanding and countering the evolving threats posed by state-sponsored non-state actors like the Russian PMCs and Iran’s IRGC. The article sheds light on the operational similarities between these entities—particularly their adaptability, use of sub-threshold tactics, and exploitation of legal and operational gaps.

By drawing parallels between these two adversaries, this piece provides actionable insights for crafting more effective counterstrategies. It offers a deeper understanding of their methods and also provides key lessons from previous US successes in countering these shadowy organizations. Policymaking, military, and intelligence analysts, strategists, and decisionmakers need to read this to refine ongoing efforts and to adapt lessons learned from one theater of operations to others where similar tactics are emerging. By staying ahead of the evolving strategies of both the IRGC and Russian PMCs, decision-makers can more effectively confront these challenges in an era of strategic competition and protect US interests abroad.

Seized Opportunity #1: Outline the Threat Nexus, Sketch the Syndicate

The United States has benefited greatly from private actors who have leveraged open-source intelligence to investigate the structure of these shadowy organizations. Volunteer organizations, like All Eyes on Wagner, Iran Watch, or bellingcat, think tanks, and journalists have taken advantage of leaked private conversations, open-source satellite imagery, financial accounting documents, flight records, shipping records, and clever forensic analysis of mercenaries’ digital footprints to forge a better understanding of these organizations’ infrastructure. These investigations have revealed a “tangled web of shell companies” and a network of economic proxies that illustrate these organizations’ expansive and intricate reach across a number of sectors. These efforts have demonstrated connections between gold companies, oil and diamond smuggling operations, propaganda dissemination platforms, breweries, election interference schemes, and, of course, security services for hire.

These clandestine connections create a constellation of systems that expands the complexity of the network and creates additional obscurity. By uncloaking the activities of these subdivisions, volunteers have eroded the criminals’ most effective weapons–imperceptibility and anonymity. As stated by a former Wagner Group mercenary, “The only way to fight the Wagner Group is to expose what they are doing.” This undermines the “legal vacuum” status that the mercenary group occupies, and it also assists analysts in identifying patterns. Once investigators establish connections between front companies and these paramilitary groups, governments can utilize additional resources to weaken the efficacy of the shells. When the curtain is pulled back to expose these shady operations, governments can employ tools of national power to counter them.

While this may seem like a useless “whack-a-mole” exercise, each sanction or legal action can consume the adversaries’ finite resources. It can push the organization off balance, potentially forcing it to recalibrate internal and external procedures. This can have the added benefit of making future investigations easier. Each time an adversary attempts to circumvent sanctions or legal actions, they leave digital and financial footprints. Monitoring these attempts can provide valuable intelligence to sanctioning bodies or law enforcement agencies, making it easier to track the activities, networks, and methods of the organization. Sanctions and legal actions can disrupt the normal operations of an organization. For example, sanctions might block an entity’s access to international banking systems, making it difficult to conduct transactions globally. This disruption forces the organization to seek alternative, often less efficient, methods of operation, such as using smaller banks or adopting less reliable financial channels.

For example, Africa Corps is heavily involved in the gold trade–relying on routine extractions from the Central African Republic for fundraising. The financial restrictions imposed through sanctions prevent the group from selling this gold through conventional channels, directly impacting their profit margins. Sanctions target the group’s financial networks and access to global markets, forcing them to resort to less transparent and more cumbersome methods of selling their gold. This forces the group to adopt evasion tactics and increases their operational costs, as the group must navigate through a complex web of intermediaries and black markets to monetize their assets. The cumulative effect of these sanctions is a tangible erosion of the financial base of the Africa Corps and, to a lesser degree, IRGC, with its illicit fundraising efforts, demonstrating the efficacy of targeted financial measures in disrupting the economic foundations of such criminal organizations.

Seized Opportunity #2: Leveraging Military Might

These shadowy groups’ strength is the low visibility of their operations. Their small size and clandestine nature allow them to operate discreetly by exploiting weaknesses in their adversaries. This often requires the deployment of limited resources, manpower, and equipment. Because the Wagner Group (and other Russian PMCs) and the IRGC rely on guerrilla tactics and asymmetric techniques like licit and illicit fundraising and supporting state and non-state actors, they cannot scale their organizational structure or expand their military capabilities to effectively compete with conventional military forces.

The situation with Russian PMCs in Africa represents a distinct challenge compared to their operations in Ukraine, not only in scale but also in nature. In most of the countries where Africa Corps works, these Russian contractors operate with minimal external support, integrating into and leveraging the local economies to procure necessary supplies. This mode of operation underscores a significant reliance on ad-hoc logistics and adaptability, often at the expense of operational scalability and sustainability. In Ukraine, these PMCs function in a more traditional military role and benefit from being closely integrated with the Russian military’s logistical network. Russian PMCs in Ukraine are heavily reliant on the Russian military for both logistical support and operational sustainment. This integration with Russian conventional forces helps to alleviate many of the vulnerabilities PMCs face in Africa.

Because these organizations are associated with state adversaries, the United States is often hesitant to employ military might in countering them. In the case of the IRGC, since 2020, the United States has overall demonstrated restraint in responses, as exemplified in the aftermath of an uptick in Iranian-backed attacks in Iraq and Syria after the Israeli war in Gaza to reduce the risk of escalation. Then again, when forced into direct confrontations, these groups often lack the firepower, logistical support, and defensive capabilities necessary to withstand the onslaught of a modern military. The Russians experienced this vulnerability in 2018 in Syria when 300 mercenaries were killed by US Special Operations Forces.

Conventional state militaries with high tech hardware are not the only military obstacle that these groups face. As the Russians encountered in Mozambique, terrorists, likely the Islamic State, proved to be too much for the ill-equipped, poorly-trained mercenaries. It was not the power of another state’s military hardware that defeated these Africa Corps fighters. It was its own logistical constraints and the skill and determination of terrorists that were well-acclimatized to bush warfare.

Conclusion

The examination of Russia’s PMCs like the Wagner Group (and Africa Corps) and Iran’s IRGC reveals a sophisticated and shadowy facet of global geopolitics, where sub-threshold engagements, evasion of Western military strengths, and exploitation of legal ambiguities serve as the modus operandi. Their strategic deployments across Africa and the Middle East subtly mirror the expansive reach of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. These entities are not merely extending their influence across these regions; they are constructing a complex web of influence and connectivity reminiscent of China’s global economic strategy.

Policymakers, military strategists, and intelligence officials facing similar challenges of state-affiliated non-state actors in regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe can draw direct lessons from how the US has countered these networks. Specifically, US efforts to curb the IRGC’s influence in Iraq and Syria and its strategic disruption of Wagner’s activities in Africa, offer valuable insights for addressing current and future threats posed by these actors in other contested regions. This analysis provides an initial framework for adapting successful US counterstrategies to emerging threats from similar state-backed entities.

The integration of lessons learned from the Wagner Group and IRGC’s playbook into our understanding of global influence mechanisms highlights the importance of adaptability, innovation, and holistic approaches in strategy formulation. The United States, despite its vast resources and capabilities, encounters systemic challenges in counteracting the nuanced strategies of these organizations. As we discuss in the second installment of this series, the lack of synchronization across its instruments of national power hampers its ability to present a unified and effective front. This dissonance not only affects the coherence of US foreign policy but also undermines its efforts to mobilize international consensus against the nefarious activities. This is increasingly worrisome as recent reports indicate Wagner cooperation with Iranian proxy, Hezbollah. However, the US’s success in delineating the networks that support these groups and applying direct military force when necessary demonstrates the potential for effective countermeasures.

Dalton T. Fuss is a US Army special forces officer. He received a Master of Arts in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and an undergraduate degree from Texas A&M University. He focuses on the intersection of irregular warfare and technology.

Nakissa P. Jahanbani, PhD is a senior analyst at the Afghanistan War Commission. She is also an Adjunct Lecturer at the Pennsylvania State University. She received a PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany and an undergraduate degree from at American University. She specializes in political violence with a focus on Iran and Iranian-backed groups.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Long Exposure of a Lighthouse at Night (Photo by Unsplash from Freerange Stock)

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22. Why Did Journalists Like Me Take Ryan Routh Seriously?

A very candid self critique from a journalist.

Why Did Journalists Like Me Take Ryan Routh Seriously?

Trump’s would-be assassin was someone we should have treated with extreme skepticism. We didn’t. That’s because he was the right kind of crazy.

By Tanya Lukyanova

September 16, 2024

https://www.thefp.com/p/why-did-journalists-take-routh-seriously

In March 2023 I interviewed a strange man named Ryan Routh. We had been introduced by a source inside Ukraine’s foreign legion, a military unit composed of foreign volunteers from more than fifty countries all over the world.

Routh, a 58-year-old former roofing contractor from Greensboro, NC, who had no military experience, had set up a private organization in Kiev that helped connect international fighters with Ukraine’s military units and aid groups. And he made his way into my story about U.S.-trained Afghan commandos eager to join Ukraine’s war effort.

He seemed genuinely passionate, if perhaps a little too eager to aid a foreign war halfway around the world. After my story published, I never thought about him again.

Until yesterday, that is, when the name Ryan Routh exploded across my phone—and yours.

Routh traveled to Donald Trump’s golf club in West Palm Beach on Sunday, hid in the bushes with an “AK-style” rifle for 12 hours, and then tried to assassinate the former president. It was the second such attempt in as many months.

In the day since his arrest, much has come out about Ryan Routh. He had a long criminal record, for starters. “Records show Routh’s issues with the law go back to the 1990s and include lesser charges of writing bad checks. But in 2002 he was charged with possession of a weapon of mass destruction, a felony, according to North Carolina Department of Corrections records,” according to CBS reporting. “In another incident, he was charged with misdemeanors, including a hit-and-run offense, resisting arrest, and a concealed weapons violation.” I am sure in the coming days we’ll learn even more.

But I didn’t know any of this last year when I sat down to interview Routh for Semafor, where I worked at the time. Nor, apparently, did any of the other outlets who took Ryan Routh seriously.

Right around the time my story ran, The New York Times interviewed Routh for an article about American volunteers on the Ukrainian frontlines. Newsweek spoke to him, too. He reportedly met with elected officials on Capitol Hill, and had contacts inside Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. Journalists, activists, and policymakers saw him as a credible figure.

And that’s despite the fact that his criminal record was there for everyone to see. Journalists could have found it if they had thought to question his motives, or even his sanity. The guy moves to the capital of a nation at war, despite having no personal connection to it. He doesn’t speak Russian or Ukrainian. In retrospect, shouldn’t it have struck the reporters, including myself, as a little bit. . . odd?

The question is: Why didn’t it?

Well, for one, I thought he was doing good work: It was clear he cared deeply about Ukraine’s struggle. I am Russian—born and raised in Moscow—but I consider the Russian war against Ukraine an unjustified act of aggression. So did Ryan Routh. He also came recommended as one of the more capable foreign volunteers in the Ukraine effort—someone who got things done. He’d built relationships with frontline military unit commanders and served as a de facto liaison between foreign fighters and Ukrainian forces. Hundreds of Afghans alone volunteered to fight directly through his website. He arranged visas and helped with other logistics of entering the country. He even traveled to Washington, D.C., to push lawmakers for more support for Kiev. Routh wasn’t just fighting for Ukraine—he was part of a larger narrative of good versus evil.

Perhaps that’s why I and so many others overlooked everything that was so obviously off about him: his unhinged rants—see here and here—his eccentric looks, and his impatience with anyone who got in his way. When The New York Times interviewed Routh in 2023, he apparently shared a message with the reporter: “he needs to be shot,” Routh said of an American foreign fighter who appeared to talk down to him in a Facebook exchange.

Over the past day I’ve been thinking a lot about what else—who else—gets the same kind of pass. These days, the right kind of crazy is there every time you turn on the TV, or scroll through your social media. “No ears were harmed. Carry on with your Sunday afternoon,” Rachel Vindman tweeted casually, referring to Trump’s previous assassination attempt a mere two months earlier. (She later deleted it.)

Last week, MSNBC watchers could tune into Elie Mystal declaring: “Trump supporters are just as despicable as he is,” with the show’s host Joy Reid nodding in agreement. Trump supporters, Mystal said, are “just as ungenerous and have just as little compassion and empathy for others.” It was just another night on cable news. The fact that statements like these generate so little outrage is a clear sign of how degraded our public discourse has become.

Trump’s other would-be assassin, Thomas Crooks, was shot on sight. Usually, the people who try to shoot the president are. But Ryan Routh is very much alive, and he’s the kind of person who doesn’t hesitate to share his views. In the coming weeks, journalists should ask him about his motives, his rationale, his plunge from advocacy into violence, and his broader descent into extremism.

The story of Ryan Routh is a cautionary tale. Our increasing willingness to tolerate madness in the service of the causes with which we might agree risks obscuring the simple fact that the “right” kind of crazy is still exactly that: crazy.

Tanya Lukyanova is a video journalist at The Free Press.

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23. ‘The Gulag Archipelago’ Is More Than Just Harrowing

I often think about who is writing "The Gulag Archipelago" in north Korea.

Excerpts:

Yes, we are called to bear witness as Solzhenitsyn prosecutes his case against one of the most monstrous tyrannies in human history. We are called to observe “the special process of the narrowing of the intellectual and spiritual horizon of a human being, the reduction of a human being to an animal and the process of dying alive.” We must not look away. But Solzhenitsyn’s genius in this book is that he calls us to take the stand. The “experiment” that is Gulag Archipelago is full of horror, indignation, drama, courage, and humility. He calls us to wonder about our own inclinations and temptations as questions are put to us. How would our conduct measure up? Which turn would we have taken at the great fork of camp life?

These are dreadful but needful questions. Solzhenitsyn reminds us in his foreword to the one-volume abridgement of Gulag: “Alas, all the evil of the twentieth century is possible everywhere on earth.” It’s a difficult lesson, but one that readers must continue to take away from this uncategorizable and astonishing book.

‘The Gulag Archipelago’ Is More Than Just Harrowing

Published in English 50 years ago, the book remains a monumental work of history, politics, and literature.

thedispatch.com · by Flagg Taylor · September 14, 2024

Can there be a duty to read a work of literature?

Most people I’ve met who are at least aware of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s masterwork The Gulag Archipelago know that they should read the book. They know of the book’s historical importance and of Solzhenitsyn’s stature as one of the great Soviet dissidents and writers of the 20th century. They know the book is a kind of prison memoir, full of suffering but worth the difficult journey.

But this knowledge does not prepare them for the book as it is. Indeed, it may even prevent them from encountering The Gulag Archipelago in its proper shape. Yes, the book is often harrowing in its portrayal of the reality of the Gulag system. And it is a central work in the story of the Soviet Union—and perhaps in hastening its decline. But it’s also much more and perhaps something wholly other than that.

This has been a problem since the work’s initial publication in English 50 years ago. In an early review, no less a figure than George Kennan—the diplomat and advocate of containment against the Soviet Union—characterized Gulag as “the most powerful single indictment of a political regime ever to be levied in modern times.” This is probably correct, yet Kennan himself goes on to explain that the book is also something more than a political indictment. Solzhenitsyn cautions readers in the fourth chapter of Part 1: “So let the reader who expects this book to be a political exposé slam its covers shut right now.”

Solzhenitsyn undertook the work out of a kind of duty—duty to the truth and duty to his fellow zeks (a slang term for prisoners). Although he started working on it in 1958 by collecting relevant materials, the pace would pick up significantly in 1962 after the official publication of his novella One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Solzhenitsyn was flooded with letters from former zeks thanking him for his work and sharing their experiences. Up to this point he had had doubts about his capacity to undertake such a work. As he remarks in the Afterword to Gulag, “But when, in addition to what I had collected, prisoners’ letters converged on me from all over the country, I realized that since all this had been given to me, I had a duty.”

Given his post-Ivan Denisovich prominence and the Soviet regime’s realization that it had made an enormous mistake in permitting its publication, Solzhenitsyn was closely monitored and hounded by the KGB until his expulsion from the Soviet Union in February 1974. He would require the assistance of more than 100 “invisible allies”(the title of his book about most of these intriguing figures) in order to bring Gulag into being while drawing on the direct accounts of 257 former zeks. That the book even exists is a kind of miracle. In the middle of Part 3 of Gulag, he notes, “I do not expect to see it in print anywhere with my own eyes; and I have little hope that those who managed to drag their bones out of the Archipelago will ever read it; and I do not believe that it will explain the truth of our history in time for anything to be corrected.”

Solzhenitsyn worked tirelessly in two hyper-productive spurts at a remote barn in Estonia over the course of two winters to complete the bulk of the book. As he notes in a chapter devoted to his Estonian friends in Invisible Allies,

During those 146 days at the Hiding Place, I worked as I never have in my whole life. It seemed as if it was no longer I who was writing; rather, I was swept along, my hand was being moved by an outside force, and I was only the firing pin attached to a spring that had been compressed for half a century and was now uncoiling.

And later in Invisible Allies, differentiating Gulag from his other works, he says, “this work had shaped itself; it had not emerged from the workshops of art, but remained oblivious to any of art’s commandments, heedless of a single rule.” Not enough attention has been paid to the work’s subtitle: “An Experiment in Literary Investigation.” The work is extremely varied both in terms of its modes of analysis and the kinds of questions it addresses.

In an early chapter from Part 1, Solzhenitsyn chronicles the many waves of arrests that sent millions into the “corrective labor” system. Here he intends to combat the idea that the camps were purely a phenomenon of the Stalin era and the particular wave rooted in Stalin’s Great Terror is the only one worth remembering. The early chapters of Part 3 chronicle the origins and development of the system. We see the institution of concentration camps for class enemies as the Red Terror was unleashed in 1918; then the birth of the “Northern Special Purpose Camps” in the late 1920s in a former monastery on the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea; and the explosion of the system into the Kazakh steppe and the tundra of the Kolyma region of Eastern Siberia in the 1930s and 1940s.

Solzhenitsyn the investigative historian uncovers the hidden logic underlying the transformation of the system and introduces readers to the key players such as Naftaly Frenkel. In one particularly powerful chapter, Solzhenitsyn describes the zeks’ construction of the Belomor Canal, connecting the White and Baltic seas, with little more than handmade picks and wheelbarrows. “That’s what our gas execution van consisted of,” Solzhenitsyn notes dryly. “We didn’t have any gas for the gas chamber.”

Solzhenitsyn the political and philosophic analyst shows that the Gulag was not an ancillary phenomenon rooted in the deranged appetites of a single tyrant, but a project intrinsically related to the Bolshevik vision, and even to Marx and Engels’ philosophy of labor. Camps were understood as a “torch of progress,” necessary to the punishment of class enemies. Consciousness could be reforged through productive labor. The Party also seized on all of this forced labor to fuel its grand economic ambitions. Solzhenitsyn sees the intersection of these two necessities—the theoretical and economic—as revealing the camps to be “not merely the ‘dark side’ of our postrevolutionary life but very nearly the very liver of events.”

Readers are given a tour of the system’s constituent parts from arrest to interrogation to first cell to transport to transit prison and finally to camp itself. Solzhenitsyn provides a portrait of the women’s camps, the fate of camp children, the relations between ordinary criminals and the “politicals,” and the camp guards and other personnel necessary to run the system.

Now, if The Gulag Archipelago solely comprised these elements—the historical-developmental narrative, the political-philosophic analysis, and the functional-diagnostic portrait (all of which comprises a chapter of Part 1, all of Part 2, and most of Part 3)—it would still be monumental work. But he gives readers much, much more.

In Gulag we find Solzhenitsyn to be an expert in literary portraiture. Early in the work Solzhenitsyn introduces readers to Anatoly Fastenko, one of his cellmates in Lubyanka, who had known Lenin personally. He calls Fastenko a “keeper of the old Russian prison traditions” and a “living history of Russian Revolutions.” Georgi Tenno, a former sailor and circus performer, is the “committed escaper”—whose discipline, tirelessness, and innovation Solzhenitsyn chronicles with genuine astonishment. Arnold Susi, an Estonian lawyer, started Solzhenitsyn on his journey of thinking about politics in a new way. “To understand the Russian Revolution I had long since required nothing beyond Marxism. I cut myself off from everything else that came up and turned my back on it. And now fate brought me together with Susi. He breathed a completely different sort of air.” Fascinating figures like this populate the pages of Gulag, giving the book vitality and humanity one finds primarily in novels.

In Part 4, “The Soul and Barbed Wire,” readers are faced with questions that cut to the very core of human responsibility and freedom. This is Solzhenitsyn at his most philosophic, even theological. He finds true freedom by letting go of the philosophy that he calls “the result is what counts.” He must face the question of what he would do in camp to ensure his own survival. If guided by the ethic that undergirds the Soviet system, the answer is anything. This is the “great fork of camp life.” Solzhenitsyn discovers that genuine human freedom, moral freedom, is nurtured through self-limitation. We human beings are not the mere product of our environment or the incentives which surround us. We have the capacity to respond to an inner calculus. And by this discovery Solzhenitsyn rejoins the great human family. He finds patience, forgiveness, and genuine human friendship.

Yet there is not a hint of personal triumphalism in the book. The possibility of the soul’s “Ascent”—the title of the chapter just described—is followed by a counter-argument for the near necessity of the soul’s corruption in camp. Solzhenitsyn engages other writers like Varlam Shalamov, an inhabitant of Kolyma, on this question of ascent or corruption. In an early chapter from Part 1, “The Bluecaps,” Solzhenitsyn explores the psychology of the interrogators and meditates on how such people were led to undertake such evil work. He reminds his readers that this “wolf-tribe” is not some alien group which has descended from elsewhere. He prods readers to ask themselves this: “‘If my life had turned out differently, might I myself not have become just such an executioner?’ It is a dreadful question if one really answers it honestly.”

Yes, we are called to bear witness as Solzhenitsyn prosecutes his case against one of the most monstrous tyrannies in human history. We are called to observe “the special process of the narrowing of the intellectual and spiritual horizon of a human being, the reduction of a human being to an animal and the process of dying alive.” We must not look away. But Solzhenitsyn’s genius in this book is that he calls us to take the stand. The “experiment” that is Gulag Archipelago is full of horror, indignation, drama, courage, and humility. He calls us to wonder about our own inclinations and temptations as questions are put to us. How would our conduct measure up? Which turn would we have taken at the great fork of camp life?

These are dreadful but needful questions. Solzhenitsyn reminds us in his foreword to the one-volume abridgement of Gulag: “Alas, all the evil of the twentieth century is possible everywhere on earth.” It’s a difficult lesson, but one that readers must continue to take away from this uncategorizable and astonishing book.

thedispatch.com · by Flagg Taylor · September 14, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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