Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Joy can be real only if people look on their life as a service, and have a definite object in life outside themselves and their personal happiness."

– Leo Tolstoy

"Fear less, hope more; whine less, breathe more; talk less, say more; hate less, love more; and all good things are yours."

– Swedish proverb

"Readers may be divided into four classes: 1. Sponges, who absorb all that they read and return it in nearly the same state, only a little dirtied. 2. Sand-glasses, who retain nothing and are content to get through a book for the sake of getting through the time. 3. Strain-bags, who retain merely the dregs of what they read. 4. Mogul diamonds, equally rare and valuable, who profit by what they read, and enable others to profit by it also."

– Samuel Taylor Coleridge

1. Don’t Ask the U.S. Military to Save American Democracy

2. Chinese ambassador Xie Feng lays down ‘red lines’ in US-China relationship

3. Israel destroyed reported Iranian underground missile factory in Syria ground raid

4. Shoigu Meets Kim Jong Un Amid Strengthening Russia-North Korea Defense Ties

5. Russia expels U.K. diplomats as Putin warns over Ukraine’s Western weapons

6. Opinion These people have seen Harris in the Situation Room. Here’s what they have to say.

7. Putin draws new red line on long-range missiles

8. Beijing Plans 'Compulsory' Military Training For Chinese Students To Boost China's National Security

9. Iraq touts deal with U.S. to withdraw most troops by 2026

10. Is US losing the AI arms race to China?

11. Bigger than Blackwater: Privatization of security goes worldwide

12. Army to expand holistic health and fitness program to all soldiers

13. 'Transformed By Trauma: Stories of Posttraumatic Growth' Raises Critical Questions About Mental Health Care in America

14. New Mortar and Rocket Training Simulators Could Shield Marines from Blasts Linked to Brain Injury

15. Australian lawmaker calls for US Navy SEALs to work, train Down Under

16. Asia Has No Hegemon

17. OPINION: Why Integrated Deterrence is Lame

18. Functional discrepancy: syncing geographies of bureaucracies

19. Israeli Commandos Carried Out Raid on Secret Weapons Site in Syria

20. Strangers in the Motherland: The Dynamics of Russia's Foreign Recruitment

21. In The Kill Zone: The Life and Times of Willie Merkerson (Part 7)

22. Hook, Message, Call to Action: Advice on Journal Article Writing for Dummies—by a Dummy

23. The Once-Dominant Tank Is Getting Humbled on the Battlefield

24. Army picks two companies to get small drones to brigade combat teams

25. Plan for summit on UN sidelines to seek ways 'to talk sense' into China, Philippines envoy says

26. U.S. Will ‘Do What is Necessary’ to aid Philippines in South China Sea, Official Says

27. From China to Russia: Global Military Budgets Are Catching Up to the U.S.

28. Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Our Enduring Duty to America's Service Members and Their Families

29. Secretary of Defense Announces Seven New Initiatives to Enhance Well-Being of Military Force and Their Families

30. Navy adds $1B to unconventional effort to boost sub production

1. Don’t Ask the U.S. Military to Save American Democracy

On the one hand I wish we did not have to think about these issues. On the other hand we absolutely must.

We must reaffirm our absolute commitment to supporting and defending the Constitution of the United States.

Conclusion:

Congress, for its part, should limit the use of the Insurrection Act, and courts must move swiftly to adjudicate messy cases that might arise because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. United States. Politicians and the courts must do everything in their power to protect the military from a wayward executive because it is not the military’s job to do so.

Don’t Ask the U.S. Military to Save American Democracy

Why the Armed Forces Would Struggle to Rein in Trump

By Peter D. Feaver and Heidi Urben

September 13, 2024

Foreign Affairs · September 13, 2024

As former U.S. President Donald Trump takes another run at the White House, many observers worry about how his second term could shape civil-military relations. The Constitution enshrines civilian control over the military, but this relationship has at times been fraught. During Trump’s first term, senior military leaders, both active and recently retired, helped talk the president out of his most dangerous ideas. Critics of the Trump administration were grateful for the way these officers served as the “adults in the room,” but Trump’s supporters, and Trump himself, believe that the military thwarted him from accomplishing all that he wanted to do.

Trump has made it clear that he won’t let that happen again. If he is elected in November, the United States will face a serious test of its system of civilian control over the armed forces. Trump has, for instance, said he would fire the “woke generals at the top” if reelected and that he would consider using the National Guard and the active-duty military to perform sweeping deportations of undocumented migrants. Trump’s impact on civil-military relations is likely to be far greater and more corrosive than it was during his first presidency because he has gained a better understanding of how he can push the military to do his bidding and is more likely to surround himself with officials who fall in line.

Indeed, the conditions are ripe for Trump or future presidents to upset the balance of civil-military relations. A recent Supreme Court ruling that granted presidents considerable immunity from prosecution could encourage Trump to act more recklessly. Trump himself has expressed the desire to use the military in irresponsible ways, breaking with norms that have long guided the military’s deployment and use. Americans must learn—as so many other peoples around the world have—that the military by itself cannot save democracy from a reckless president.

AWFUL BUT LAWFUL

In July, the Supreme Court delivered a ruling that threatens the relationship between civilians and the military. It ruled in Trump v. United States that former presidents are immune from prosecution for “official acts.” Many legal minds, including the Supreme Court justice Sonya Sotomayor, worry that the decision might allow presidents to compel the military to engage in illegal activity. In her dissent, Sotomayor concluded that the majority opinion all but guarantees that a president would be immune from prosecution for ordering SEAL Team Six to assassinate a political rival. (Chief Justice John Roberts dismissed her concern as “fear mongering on the basis of extreme hypotheticals.”)

Regardless of what the immunity ruling means for the president, it changes nothing for the armed forces on a legal level. The military is still required to follow lawful orders and to resist unlawful ones. Moreover, presidential immunity is not conferred down the chain of command. Even if a president cannot be prosecuted for issuing a dubious order to the military, military officials who implement an unlawful order can and should be held accountable through the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the law that governs the conduct of service members.

The immunity ruling does, however, damage civil-military relations because it could embolden presidents to test the boundaries of unlawful orders. Commanders in chief may now feel less constrained in their decision-making and may pressure the U.S. military to act in ways contrary to democratic norms and traditions. Moreover, the way that presidents transmit policy and instructions to the military—the “regular order” system—is designed so that the military can presume that orders from the president through the chain of command are legal and must be implemented. It is not the case that the military assumes all orders are illegal until proven otherwise by a team rendering a second opinion. Should a president issue an unlawful or potentially unlawful order, the military would face intense pressure from the administration to carry it out before opposition coalesces in the legislative or judicial branches. The immunity ruling thus introduces more doubt and confusion into the regular process of transmitting and receiving orders.

Other misunderstandings about the military’s obligations could compound the negative effects of the immunity ruling. Some senior officers mistakenly believe that the military is obligated to resist orders that are unethical or immoral. In reality, the military should resist only overtly illegal orders. It is not within their purview to determine whether an order is immoral or unethical. Members of the military are certainly guided by professional ethics, but they have limited moral autonomy—much less than the American public probably thinks they do. In many cases, an order may be unethical and immoral but ultimately legal, and the military is obligated to follow it (after letting political leaders understand their concerns). Some senior military officers, for example, opposed President Franklin Roosevelt’s order to intern Japanese Americans during World War II and communicated their disagreement to Roosevelt, but they couldn’t refuse to carry out the order because the Supreme Courtruled it legal. These lawful but awful orders are more likely to emerge if presidents, emboldened by their own sense of impunity, increasingly test the limits of their power.

CALL IN THE TROOPS?

Should Trump become president, he may try to push the boundaries by deploying the military within the United States. Of course, using the military domestically for humanitarian work after natural disasters is familiar and uncontroversial. But in June 2020 the president wanted to use troops to put down Black Lives Matter protests in Washington, DC. (According to former Defense Secretary Mike Esper, Trump asked his advisors whether the armed forces could “just shoot [the protesters] in the legs or something?”) On the campaign trail, he has repeatedly indicated he would use not only the National Guard but also active-duty military troops to quell protests, conduct mass deportations of undocumented migrants, and fight crime within the United States. Since 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act has held that the military cannot be used for law enforcement purposes unless expressly authorized by Congress or the Constitution. But in practice, Posse Comitatus has not been very restrictive, in part because Congress has authorized loopholes. One workaround is the Insurrection Act of 1807, a controversial law that gives the president broad authority to use military force on U.S. soil.

Many presidents have used the armed forces for missions that involve law enforcement, which may be legal but put the military in a situation for which they are inadequately trained. What Trump and his team want to do (and what Trump wanted to do in spring 2020) is not unprecedented. President Warren Harding deployed the army to put down striking miners in West Virginia in 1921 and President Dwight Eisenhower sent troops from the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock to enforce school desegregation in 1957. President George H. W. Bush invoked the Insurrection Act to deploy soldiers and marines to manage the riots in Los Angeles after the Rodney King verdict in 1992, at the request of California’s governor.

In almost every case, the operations were fraught, and the regular military hoped never to have to do it again. Members of the regular military are, in general, not well trained to carry out police work, and the public doesn’t like it when they do. Research by Jessica Blankshain, Lindsay Cohn, and Danielle Lupton shows that Americans prefer that the police rather than the military respond to political protests. And the military might fracture if its members are directed to use force against their fellow Americans in response to domestic partisan frictions—that is neither what service members signed up for nor what they are trained to do. The active-duty force is less experienced than the National Guard in responding to civil disturbances, creating the potential for mistakes in a pressure-charged environment. Such a deployment would also cause public confidence in the military to plummet and could also harm the military by exacerbating recruitment and retention problems in an all-volunteer force. In the worst case, deploying the military in a nakedly partisan fashion could cause fissures within the rank and file and perhaps even split the military itself along partisan lines.

Members of the regular military are, in general, not well trained to carry out police work.

The Insurrection Act is poorly written and gives an extraordinary amount of discretion to the president. It is doubtful the courts would block the president from invoking it to deploy troops to quash demonstrations within the United States. The president would be on shakier legal ground if he were to use the army to round up and deport undocumented immigrants. Such a move would invite political backlash and a number of court challenges and would erode cohesion within the army. It would not, however, change the bottom line: the U.S. military would be obligated to follow the order unless the courts intervened decisively.

Even though the military is obligated to disobey an unlawful order, it is easier said than done. There is little precedent in the United States to draw from. Any commander would probably want reassurance from legal authorities that the order is indeed invalid before refusing to follow it, but he could receive contrary legal guidance from general counsels at the White House and the Department of Defense. If one office says the order is legal and the other disagrees, military officials might opt to follow the legal advice they prefer. If that advice rubs against the president’s wishes, a civil-military crisis may emerge. A determined president could replace an officer who defied an order with one more pliable, or even fire officers en masse until he found someone unscrupulous enough to carry out the unlawful act. Although military officers understand that they must resist unlawful orders, they would do so at considerable personal risk.

MENDING TIES

Once the civil-military relationship begins to break down, the problems are compounded. The tenth lawful but awful order would feel different than the first because Americans would become desensitized to controversial uses of the military and might be less willing to mobilize against them. And if an unprincipled president began his tenure by firing senior military officers for partisan political reasons, the military would lose trust in the executive branch and tensions would grow between the two sides. As has happened in many countries around the world—but not yet in the United States—the president might keep firing anyone who is suspected of insufficient personal loyalty and eventually there may be fewer people left willing to refuse an illegal order.

Given that the immunity ruling strains civil-military relations, it is important for civilian leaders to take steps that will build rebuild trust with the armed forces. For instance, politicians can help by changing how they approach the military in their campaigns. They should avoid engaging in petty partisan fights about military records. It is unhelpful, for example, that the vice presidential candidate JD Vance accused his opponent, Tim Walz, of “stolen valor” because Walz was sloppy in describing his rank. And it is unhelpful for Walz’s defenders to denigrate Vance’s service as trivial because he was in a public affairs role. The campaigns would be better advised to celebrate the fact that each ticket features someone who volunteered to serve in uniform, and then use that as a springboard for serious debate about how to make the all-volunteer force sustainable.

Congress, for its part, should limit the use of the Insurrection Act, and courts must move swiftly to adjudicate messy cases that might arise because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. United States. Politicians and the courts must do everything in their power to protect the military from a wayward executive because it is not the military’s job to do so.

PETER D. FEAVER is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University and the author of Thanks for Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the US Military.
HEIDI URBEN is Professor of the Practice at Georgetown University and the author of Party, Politics, and the Post-9/11 Army.

Foreign Affairs · September 13, 2024

2. Chinese ambassador Xie Feng lays down ‘red lines’ in US-China relationship

Excerpts:

He proceeded to outline in no uncertain terms four "red lines" in US-China relations: Taiwan, democracy, human rights and China's freedom to develop.

"China will not repeat the historical pattern where powerful nations seek dominance," he said in a video address to a conference at New York's Asia Society. "The Taiwan question is the most paramount in China-US relations and must not be crossed. The notion of democracy versus authoritarianism is a fallacy. China's political system and development path are non-negotiable.

The ambassador reinforces my thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions.

Chinese ambassador Xie Feng lays down ‘red lines’ in US-China relationship

https://www.msn.com/en-xl/news/other/chinese-ambassador-xie-feng-lays-down-red-lines-in-us-china-relationship/ar-AA1qtBFa

Story by Mark Magnier • 15h • 4 min read

Interspersed with language hailing the 45th anniversary of normalised relations between the nations was a warning: Don't mess with China

Bookended by hopeful words of mutual understanding and improved relations, China's top diplomat in the US delivered a tough message on Thursday in New York: Do not mess with China and do not seek regime change.

The presentation by Xie Feng, China's ambassador to the United States, celebrated the 45th anniversary of normalised relations, people-to-people ties, explosive bilateral trade growth and past examples of cooperation. But interspersed with the feel-good outreach was his strongly delivered main message.

"Pressure, sanctions, isolation, containment and blockades don't serve the purpose," said Xie. "Rather, they bring self-inflicted trouble and require extra work to offset the unwanted results."

Do you have questions about the biggest topics and trends from around the world? Get the answers with SCMP Knowledge, our new platform of curated content with explainers, FAQs, analyses and infographics brought to you by our award-winning team.

He proceeded to outline in no uncertain terms four "red lines" in US-China relations: Taiwan, democracy, human rights and China's freedom to develop.

"China will not repeat the historical pattern where powerful nations seek dominance," he said in a video address to a conference at New York's Asia Society. "The Taiwan question is the most paramount in China-US relations and must not be crossed. The notion of democracy versus authoritarianism is a fallacy. China's political system and development path are non-negotiable.

Related video: China Will 'Crush' Foreign Incursions in Its Territory, Says Military Official - TaiwanPlus News (TaiwanPlus News)

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"It is critical to avoid these."

Xie ticked off several more features of the US approach he believed were misguided. These included politicisation of the relationship, "imposing prescriptions on others for one's own illness", overstretching national security and playing the "China card" to score domestic points.

"Conflict and confrontation serve no one's interest," he said. "Dialogue and consultation are the better way forward."

Chinese ambassador Xie Feng lays down ‘red lines’ in US-China relationship

Xie mixed the tough medicine with sweeteners, appealing to simpler days when relations were on a more solid footing. These included references to the US and Chinese Flying Tigers pilots who fought the Japanese during World War II, the decades of educational and cultural exchanges, their combined contribution to global economic growth and intertwined ties.

Xie cited two-way investment of US$260 billion involving some 7,000 American companies tied to two-way trade of US$760 billion. "Mutual understanding and accommodation is crucial because neither can bring down the other," said Xie, beamed in from the embassy in Washington. "China wants a stable, healthy and sustainable China-US relationship."

Xie - who has held top postings in Indonesia, Hong Kong and the foreign ministry's North American department - opted not to mention that some of the allegations he levelled against the US, including exaggerated national security concerns and playing up threats to score domestic points, have been levelled at China as well. Nor did the format allow for questions.

The American Chamber of Commerce in China has called on China to dial back its "extreme" focus on national security as foreign companies try to navigate China's opaque laws, swooning economy and concerns over protectionism.

"As much as China wants to attract more foreign investment, there are forces within the government which lean in the direction of impeding foreign investment because of an extreme emphasis on national security," said Lester Ross, chairman of the chamber's policy committee, at the April release of its annual white paper.

David Firestein, chief executive of the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations, another speaker at Thursday's "Vision China" conference, which was sponsored by China Daily, outlined several US assumptions that have undermined relations.

These include a common American belief that US-China relations are a zero-sum game, that China seeks to supplant US global leadership and that bilateral trade is not mutually beneficial.

"Because assumptions relate very directly to policy, our policy has shifted," Firestein said. "American policy for China has veered off course because the assumptions have changed in many ways, radically."

Kitty (left) and Kelly Van Dries, sisters from Texas who handed Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping a cowboy hat during his visit to the US in 1979. Photo: Mark Magnier

In a bid to evoke better times, conference organisers invited Kitty and Kelly Van Dries, two Texas residents who handed Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping a cowboy hat at a Texas rodeo in February 1979, an image that helped soften China's image.

During his remarks, Xie called the May 14, 1979, launch of US-China diplomatic relations the "most important event in international relations" over the past half-century, which has promoted "global peace and prosperity", before citing other complaints about America's approach that, he said, have undercut ties.

These include spreading disinformation to produce "chilling effects", resurrecting McCarthyism - the mid-century period of anti-communist excesses - threatening economic decoupling, trade and tech wars and failing to respect "territorial integrity".

China's sweeping claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea - and the area's estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas - have antagonised competing regional claimants, including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

The latest flashpoint has been around the disputed Sabina Shoal, claimed by the Philippines as part of its exclusive economic zone that Beijing does not recognise. The Philippines, a US treaty ally, and China have seen several "intentional" ship collisions in recent weeks that each side blames on the other.

"A conflict between China and US would be unbearable for both, and the world," Xie said. "We hope the US will work with China to enhance cooperation and address differences."

Israel destroyed reported Iranian underground missile factory in Syria ground raid

Axios · by Barak Ravid · September 12, 2024

An elite Israel Defense Forces unit conducted a highly unusual raid in Syria earlier this week and destroyed an underground precision missile factory that Israel and the U.S. claim was built by Iran, according to three sources briefed on the operation.

Why it matters: Israeli airstrikes on Syria have increased since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel as cross-border conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel intensified. But the raid on Sunday was the first ground operation the IDF has conducted in recent years against Iranian targets in Syria.

The destruction of the factory appears to be a significant blow to an effort by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision medium-range missiles on Syrian soil.
The Israeli government has stayed unusually silent about it and didn't claim responsibility in order not to provoke a retaliation by Syria, Iran or Hezbollah, sources said.
Spokespersons for the IDF, Israel's Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister's Office declined to comment.

Driving the news: Syrian state media and Syria's opposition organization reported heavy airstrikes by the Israeli Air Force on Sunday night local time in several areas of western Syria, including near the city of Masyaf, which is close to the border with Lebanon.

State media said at least 16 people were killed and 40 others were injured, and condemned the airstrikes as "blatant aggression." The Iranian foreign ministry also condemned the attack, calling it "criminal."
On Wednesday, a Syrian opposition television channel and Greek Middle East expert Eva J. Koulouriotis both reported the airstrikes were a cover for an Israeli ground operation in Masyaf.
Three sources with knowledge of the operation confirmed to Axios that the Israeli Air Force elite unit Shaldag conducted a raid and destroyed the facility.

Zoom in: Two sources said Israel briefed the Biden administration in advance of the sensitive operation and the U.S. didn't oppose it. The White House didn't respond to a request for comment.

The Israeli special unit surprised the Syrian guards at the facility and killed several of them during the raid, but no Iranians or Hezbollah militants were hurt, one source said.
The special forces used explosives they brought with them in order to blow up the underground facility, including sophisticated machinery, from inside, two sources said.
The airstrikes were intended to prevent the Syrian military from sending reinforcements to the area, one source said.

Behind the scenes: Two sources with direct knowledge told Axios the Iranians began building the underground facility in coordination with Hezbollah and Syria in 2018 after a series of Israeli airstrikes destroyed most of the Iranian missile production infrastructure in Syria.

According to the sources, the Iranians decided to build an underground factory deep inside a mountain in Masyaf because it would be impenetrable to Israeli air strikes.
The sources claimed the Iranian plan was to produce the precision missiles in this protected facility near the border with Lebanon so that the delivery process to Hezbollah in Lebanon could take place quickly and with less risk of Israeli airstrikes.
Israeli intelligence services discovered the building process and monitored it for more than five years under the code name "Deep Layer". The Israelis realized they would not be able to destroy the facility with an airstrike and would need a ground operation, one of the sources said.
The Israeli military considered conducting the operation at least twice in recent years but it wasn't approved because of the high risk, one source said.

Editor's note: This story was corrected to show that the Israeli Air Force elite unit Shaldag conducted the raid, not the IDF unit Sayeret Matkal.

Axios · by Barak Ravid · September 12, 2024

4. Shoigu Meets Kim Jong Un Amid Strengthening Russia-North Korea Defense Ties

Shoigu Meets Kim Jong Un Amid Strengthening Russia-North Korea Defense Ties

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · September 13, 2024

The meeting follows the signing of a defense pact between Russia and North Korea, as Moscow seeks to secure ammunition and resources amid its ongoing war in Ukraine.

by Kyiv Post | September 13, 2024, 12:12 pm

This picture taken on September 16, 2023 and released from North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on September 17, 2023 shows North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (R) shaking hands with Russia's Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu during a visit to Knevichi airfield near Vladivostok, Primorsky region. (Photo by KCNA VIA KNS / AFP)

China
Russia

According to Moscow’s official statement, Russian Security Council chief Sergei Shoigu met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Friday.

The meeting follows the signing of a defense pact between Russia and North Korea, as Moscow seeks to secure ammunition and resources amid its ongoing war in Ukraine.

“The discussions in Pyongyang occurred in a uniquely trusting and friendly atmosphere, aligning with the agreements reached during President Vladimir Putin’s state visit,” Russia’s Security Council announced.

It added that Shoigu’s talks with Kim will significantly advance the implementation of the defense agreement.

Shoigu, who served as Russia’s defense minister until May, visited Pyongyang as Russia faces mounting international isolation and intensifying accusations from Western countries and South Korea of receiving arms from North Korea to support its war efforts.

Ukraine has previously claimed to have found North Korean munitions on the battlefield.

The international community heavily sanctions both Russia and North Korea. While Moscow has historic ties with Pyongyang, dating back to Soviet assistance in the founding of North Korea, relations have further strengthened following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which led to a sharp deterioration of its ties with the West.

In June, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea, where he signed a mutual defense pact with the reclusive regime.

Russia Recaptures Part of Kursk Region

“Units of the ‘North’ group of troops liberated 10 settlements within two days,” Russia’s defense ministry said in a statement.

The deepening military cooperation between the two countries has drawn sharp criticism from the West, which continues to monitor the evolving alliance closely.

In early January, U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby reported that Russia had launched North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine on December 30, 2023, and again on January 2 and 6, 2024.

South Korea’s UN representative Hwang Joon-kuk stated that North Korea was using Ukraine as a”"testing ground” for ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

On January 11, Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin announced that the Prosecutor General's Office had obtained the first evidence of the Kremlin’s forces using North Korean missiles in Ukraine.

However, North Korea dismissed the U.S. accusations of transferring ballistic missiles to Russia as “baseless.”

On February 22, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) confirmed that it had documented instances of Russian airstrikes on civilian infrastructure using North Korean weapons. According to the investigation, Russian forces fired more than 20 North Korean-made weapons at Ukraine.

By March 14, the Kharkiv prosecutor’s office reported that Russia had launched approximately 50 North Korean Hwasong-11 missiles across six regions of Ukraine. South Korean officials noted that since the previous year, North Korea had supplied around 7,000 containers of ammunition and other military equipment to Russia.

In July, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik revealed that North Korea had transferred more than 5 million artillery shells and dozens of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine.

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · September 13, 2024

5. Russia expels U.K. diplomats as Putin warns over Ukraine’s Western weapons

One form of escalation. Diplomatic escalation.

Russia expels U.K. diplomats as Putin warns over Ukraine’s Western weapons

Putin gave his sternest warning to date about the use of Western weapons in Ukraine ahead of a meeting of British and U.S. leaders over the matter.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/13/russia-putin-uk-missiles-diplomats/

A car of the British ambassador drives out of the embassy in Moscow on Friday. (Evgenia Novozhenina/Reuters)

By Robyn Dixon

September 13, 2024 at 5:47 a.m. EDT

Russia on Friday stripped six British diplomats of accreditation, accusing them of spying, ahead of a crucial White House meeting between President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer that may allow Ukraine to strike military targets deep inside Russia using some long-range Western weapons.

On the eve of the meeting, President Vladimir Putin also issued a tough warning that if Ukraine fired Western missiles deep into Russia, it would mean that Russia was at war with NATO, and Moscow would respond accordingly.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) said that Britain’s Foreign Office was coordinating “the escalation of the political and military situation” in Ukraine in an attempt to ensure Russia’s defeat in the war.

As part of this alleged effort, the British diplomats in Moscow were “threatening the security of the Russian Federation,” the FSB said in a statement.

Putin’s threat underscored Moscow’s unease about the impact such a decision as allowing Ukraine to target Russia using some long-range weapons might have on the strategic balance in the war.

“The issue is not whether to allow the Ukrainian regime to make strikes on Russia or not. The issue is to decide whether the NATO states are directly involved in the military conflict or not,” Putin said.

“If this decision is made, it will mean nothing other than the direct involvement of NATO states, European states, in the war in Ukraine,” Putin said in a television interview late Thursday.

He said it would change “the very nature of the conflict. This will mean that all NATO states, the United States, the European countries are fighting with Russia. And if so, then given the change in the very essence of this conflict, we will make corresponding decisions based on the threats that will be created for us.”

Ukraine has repeatedly dismissed such threats from Russia, maintaining that Putin never follows through. On Friday, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also recommended not getting too worried over the Russian leader’s remarks.

“I would not attach excessive importance to the latest statements from President Putin,” Tusk told a news conference. “They rather show the difficult situation the Russians have on the front.”

The war against Ukraine, planned as a short, sharp operation, has instead turned into a long, bloody war of attrition, which British intelligence recently estimated had cost Russia more than 610,000 soldiers, killed or wounded in action.

The FSB said that the expulsions of the six diplomats was a first step in response to “the numerous unfriendly steps taken by London.” It said it had found “signs of spying and sabotage” by the six British diplomats from the political department of the Moscow embassy.

An FSB officer who appeared on state television on Friday morning said that British diplomats had met with journalists from Novaya Gazeta newspaper and from the rights group Memorial.

Memorial, a Nobel peace laureate, has, like hundreds of media, civil society organizations, journalists and activists, been declared a “foreign agent” by Russian authorities.

“It’s a classical British spy. It’s fun watching him, but it can’t be tolerated any further,” the FSB officer said.

“We got sick and tired of tolerating this circus as they went jogging … across Moscow and through urban forests, their one-day visits to neighboring towns for the purpose of sitting on a bench for several hours in the frost, or multiple changes of public transport and taxis to escape from security services in order to visit some gathering of foreign-agent NGOs that lobby for migrants’ interests,” he said.

State television broadcast the names and photographs of the expelled diplomats.

By Robyn Dixon

Robyn Dixon is a foreign correspondent on her third stint in Russia, after almost a decade reporting there beginning in the early 1990s. In November 2019 she joined The Washington Post as Moscow bureau chief. follow on X @RobynDixon__

6. Opinion These people have seen Harris in the Situation Room. Here’s what they have to say.

I offer this not as a partisan endorsement of criticism, only as insight into the VP as the possible next CINC.

Is this a puff piece by David Ignatius showing support for the VP or is this an objective assessment? You decide.

As an aside this does offer insight into some of the national security decision making during the current administration if you can accept the reports of anonymous interviewees.

Opinion These people have seen Harris in the Situation Room. Here’s what they have to say.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/09/12/harris-commander-predictions-colleagues/

Harris is “more hard-line than most people think,” says a retired four-star general who has briefed her many times.

8 min

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From left, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Vice President Kamala Harris, President Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in Arlington to mark the 23rd anniversary of 9/11. (Shawn Thew/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

By David Ignatius

September 12, 2024 at 10:52 a.m. EDT

Would Kamala Harris make a good president and commander in chief? The vice president certainly strengthened her case with a deft performance in Tuesday night’s debate. To use a combat metaphor, she appeared to encircle and at times overwhelm her adversary.

Harris was forceful in discussing America’s role in the world and her commitment to a strong, secure nation. She stole some of former president Donald Trump’s lines, calling him a “disgrace,” a weak leader and a man manipulated by the flattery of dictators.

But skillful performance as a debater isn’t the same thing as executive leadership. Baiting an opponent on television isn’t preparation for making decisions in the Situation Room. So it’s important to examine how Harris would perform on national security issues in office if she won the presidency.

To get a better sense of her potential strengths and weaknesses, I interviewed more than a half-dozen current or former officials who have observed her in the Situation Room or other sensitive national security meetings.

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They all expressed versions of the same basic theme: Harris behaves like the prosecutor she was for much of her career. She’s skeptical, probing, sometimes querulous. She can be impatient and demanding. But she asks good questions. And if she’s convinced of the need, she’s not afraid to act. “She’s more hard-line than most people think,” said one retired four-star general who has briefed her many times.

One top member of her staff put it this way: “She’s always the same person, pushing for information, making sure people aren’t bulls----ing her.” Having watched her often in discussions about using military force, he concluded: “Her approach is to measure twice, cut once. But she’s not afraid to take the shot.”

Based on these and other conversations, I can offer a narrative of the “hidden Harris” as she was involved in key national security decisions during the Biden administration. My sources requested anonymity, but each detail in this account comes from someone who was with Harris when the events happened.

Harris got off to what her aides agree was a bumpy start with her intelligence briefer. During the administration’s first year, the briefer was presenting a classified personality profile of a female foreign leader Harris would be meeting. The briefer was a woman, but Harris thought some of the language she was using was gender-biased. Rather than just voicing her discomfort, Harris requested an intelligence community internal review.

The result, never previously reported, was an internal assessment by the intelligence community of whether analysts had routinely used gender-biased language in intelligence reports. The review examined several years of analytical reports, comparing how often certain words had been used about women and men. Harris was so concerned that she asked intelligence agencies to train their analysts to avoid any such bias in the future. She also requested more reporting from the intelligence community on gender issues and sexual violence around the world.

Though she is said to have been pleased by the agency’s responsiveness to her concerns, after that first year she dropped the personal, one-to-one briefing.

A spokesman for Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines declined to comment on the gender-bias review. The ODNI oversees the President’s Daily Brief and other reports to top officials, but many of them are prepared by analysts at the CIA.

The Biden team’s first big national security crisis was Afghanistan in mid-2021, and Harris played an interesting role. Philip H. Gordon, her national security adviser, agreed with the Pentagon that President Joe Biden’s plan to pull all U.S. troops from Kabul would be unwise. Biden strongly disagreed. Harris pressed the Pentagon briefers about what would happen if 2,500 U.S. troops remained, as the military wanted. Would the Taliban resume attacks on Americans — and would more U.S. troops be needed to protect the residual force? Pentagon officials conceded that additional forces might indeed be necessary.

Harris backed Biden’s decision to pull all the troops out — which led to a collapse of the Afghan government and a chaotic, bloody withdrawal. On that issue, and all other major ones, she was careful to always support Biden when he’d made his choice — as vice presidents nearly always do.

The border problem vexed Harris during her first year, and it remains a campaign issue now. Biden asked her to take charge of stemming immigration from the so-called Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. In a June 2021 speech in Guatemala, she delivered a sensible message: Stay home. But that was unpopular with progressive Democrats, and the White House left Harris holding the bag.

Though Republicans have tried to tag her as “border czar,” it’s more accurate to say that she was captive of the administration’s sluggish and reactive policy. Democrats were allergic to anything that looked like Trump’s harsh border enforcement measures. When Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra was reluctant to shoulder responsibility for overcrowded facilities, leaving blame to rest with Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Harris stood with Mayorkas, telling him after a key White House meeting, “I saw exactly what went on in there.”

The Ukraine war has been the administration’s biggest foreign policy challenge. Harris was fully involved in the run-up. When Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned the administration in October 2021 that the Russians were preparing to invade, one participant in the briefing remembers Harris pressing him for details: “How fast can the Russians move? What kind of units do they have? What are their capabilities?”

On the eve of the invasion, Harris personally delivered to President Volodymyr Zelensky the decisive intelligence that the Russians were coming. The meeting took place at the Munich Security Conference, days before the Russian invasion on Feb. 22.

Zelensky was still dubious about the invasion and questioned Harris’s troop numbers. “You’re wrong,” Harris told him bluntly. “They’re going in.” She pressed Zelensky on whether he had a plan to defend Kyiv and to leave the city if necessary. The Russians did indeed come across the border. Zelensky bravely stayed and fought. He reportedly tweaked the administration later for having talked about possible evacuation, saying: “I need ammunition, not a ride.”

Through the Ukraine war, Harris has shared Biden’s twin objectives of supporting Ukraine’s armed resistance and avoiding a U.S. war with Russia — goals that have sometimes been in conflict. This debate now focuses on whether the United States should remove its limits on Ukrainian use of long-range ATACMS missiles, to allow them to strike targets deep inside Russia.

Harris, characteristically, has made a lawyerly assessment of pros and cons. She and her advisers have queried whether, given the limited number of ATACMS available, they might be more useful striking Russian targets in occupied Crimea — especially given intelligence reports that Russia has pulled its aircraft that target Ukraine back to bases beyond the missiles’ 300-kilometer range. Another concern for the Harris team is whether the Russians might retaliate by giving long-range missiles to adversaries, such as the Houthis in Yemen, further threatening Red Sea shipping and perhaps Israel.

Harris hasn’t been convinced that helping Ukraine strike deep inside Russia would be a good trade-off for the United States. But Biden is said to be exploring a possible relaxation of rules, and Harris undoubtedly will support his decision. Colleagues say she has taken a similarly measured approach to other issues of escalation risk

A key moment was October 2022, when Russia signaled it might use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a collapse of its forces after they had fled Kharkiv and Kherson. Harris joined a discussion of “what if” questions: Might the Russians demonstrate using a tactical nuke, over the ocean, say, or fire one in Ukraine? How big a bomb? How many casualties would result? How would the United States respond? In the end, the Russians conveyed to senior U.S. officials that they didn’t intend to use tactical nukes.

On the Middle East, Harris has privately voiced the same mix of goals she described in Tuesday’s debate. She’s committed to defending Israel’s security but thinks too many Palestinian civilians have died and that the war must end now with a cease-fire and hostage release. That’s Biden’s position, too — balancing complex and possibly irreconcilable goals.

Through nearly four years, Harris has had a seat at the table on the most sensitive national security issues. Her careful approach has mirrored Biden’s. Hawks might argue that she has been too cautious, on supplying weapons to Ukraine, for example. Progressives might argue that she has been too ready to support use of military force, by Ukraine or Israel.

Harris as commander in chief would continue the traditional bipartisan foreign policy consensus. That should reassure allies who want a forward-leaning America, and it might worry those who think we’re overextended.

Lawyers have played a decisive role in national security policy — from Dean Acheson to Jake Sullivan. Harris would sustain that long line of lawyerly balancers and trimmers who weigh risks and benefits before they take action. She might turn a page in our domestic life, but not so much in foreign policy.

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Opinion by David Ignatius

David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column for The Washington Post. His latest novel is “Phantom Orbit.” follow on X @ignatiuspost

7. Putin draws new red line on long-range missiles

Good. It is about time we bust someone e;se's red line (Note my sarcasm).

Putin draws new red line on long-range missiles

Article information

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crrlr87e5elo.amp

Author,Steve Rosenberg
Role,Russia editor, BBC News
4 hours ago

The headline in this morning’s Kommersant newspaper captured the drama.

“Vladimir Putin draws his red line.”

Will the West cross it? And, if it does, how will Russia respond?

Speaking in St Petersburg, President Putin sent a clear warning to the West: don’t allow Ukraine to use your long-range missiles to strike Russian territory.

Moscow, he said, would view that as the “direct participation” of Nato countries in the war in Ukraine.

“It would substantially change the very essence, the nature of the conflict,” the Kremlin leader continued.

“This will mean that Nato countries, the USA and European states, are fighting with Russia.”

He claimed that, for missile launches into Russia, Ukraine would require data from Western satellites and that only servicemen from Nato member states would be able to “input flight missions into these missile systems”.

Russia has drawn red lines before. And seen them crossed before.

On 24 February 2022, when he announced the start of his "special military operation" – the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – President Putin issued a warning to “those who may be tempted to interfere from the outside”.

“No matter who tries to stand in our way or create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately,” the Kremlin leader had declared.

“And the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”

Western leaders ignored what was widely interpreted at the time as nuclear sabre-rattling. The West has since provided Ukraine with tanks, advanced missile systems and, most recently, F-16 American fighter jets.

This year Russia has already accused Ukraine of using American long-range ATACMS missiles to target Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula annexed by Russia.

What’s more, over the last two years, Russian officials and the state media here have on many occasions accused the West of “fighting Russia” or launching “a war” on Russia. Even though it was Russia that invaded Ukraine.

But from the tone of President Putin’s latest remarks, it’s clear he considers that the targeting of internationally recognised Russian territory with Western missile systems would take the conflict to a new level.

What he didn’t make clear yesterday is how Moscow would respond.

“We will take corresponding decisions based on the threats to us that will be created,” Vladimir Putin said.

On Friday, Russia withdrew the accreditation of six British diplomats, accusing them of “subversive activities” and threatening Russia’s security.

But Putin’s potential response is much broader. He offered some clues back in June.

At a meeting with the heads of international news agencies, he was asked: how would Russia react if Ukraine was given the opportunity to hit targets on Russian territory with weapons supplied by Europe?

“First, we will, of course, improve our air defence systems. We will be destroying their missiles,” President Putin replied.

“Second, we believe that if someone is thinking it is possible to supply such weapons to a war zone to strike our territory and create problems for us, why can’t we supply our weapons of the same class to those regions around the world where they will target sensitive facilities of the countries that are doing this to Russia?”

In other words, arming Western adversaries to strike Western targets abroad is something that Moscow has been considering.

Earlier this month, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, announced that Russia was set to revise its nuclear doctrine: the document that lays out under what circumstances Moscow may consider using nuclear weapons.

He suggested that the decision to revise the doctrine was “connected with the escalation course of [Russia’s] Western adversaries”.

er Starmer and Foreign Secretary Lammy arriving in the US

Meanwhile, Sir Keir Starmer is in Washington for talks with President Biden. Among the issues the two leaders are expected to discuss is the question of Ukraine and long-range missiles.

“Russia started this conflict. Russia illegally invaded Ukraine,” Sir Keir said on his way to Washington. “Russia can end this conflict straight away.”

Western leaders will need to decide which they consider greater: the risk of escalation of this conflict, or the need to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of western missiles.

8. Beijing Plans 'Compulsory' Military Training For Chinese Students To Boost China's National Security

So what is the purpose? Prepare for national mobilization? Political, ideological, and social control? Or just what totalitarian governments do? (because they can).

Excerpts:

This action aligns with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ongoing efforts to promote the inclusion of national security in the educational curriculum. The amendment to the draft calls for Chinese schools to expand their national defense curriculum to improve students’ comprehension of military service.

A draft published by Chinese state media reads: “National defense education in schools should be combined with teaching military service knowledge to enhance the student’s awareness of military service in accordance with the law and create a good atmosphere in which military service is considered honorable.” The report further quoted that, “The draft also improves provisions about the launching of education and training for reservists.”

Under the suggested changes, both local military authorities and national educational authorities would be required to oversee marching and marksmanship drills at high schools and universities. Local governments would fund the costs of these activities.

Beijing Plans 'Compulsory' Military Training For Chinese Students To Boost China's National Security

eurasiantimes.com · by Sakshi Tiwari · September 13, 2024

In a significant development aimed at enhancing military training for civilians in China, the nation is advancing legislation that mandates fundamental military training for high school and college students.

According to reports, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, China’s upper house of parliament, will meet through September 13 to discuss a draft amendment to the National Defense Education Law. Having undergone its first reading in April, the law will likely be passed by the end of the year.

This action aligns with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ongoing efforts to promote the inclusion of national security in the educational curriculum. The amendment to the draft calls for Chinese schools to expand their national defense curriculum to improve students’ comprehension of military service.

A draft published by Chinese state media reads: “National defense education in schools should be combined with teaching military service knowledge to enhance the student’s awareness of military service in accordance with the law and create a good atmosphere in which military service is considered honorable.” The report further quoted that, “The draft also improves provisions about the launching of education and training for reservists.”

Under the suggested changes, both local military authorities and national educational authorities would be required to oversee marching and marksmanship drills at high schools and universities. Local governments would fund the costs of these activities.

The draft stipulates that education departments under the State Council and relevant elements of the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military decision-making body, would collaborate to write student manuals on military training. Universities that disobey the law risk criminal prosecution.

Chinese students undergoing military training (Via X)

According to the report, the NPC Standing Committee deemed the adjustments necessary because China needs to bolster national defense education in light of recent changes on the “home and international fronts.”

In September, to raise public awareness about defense education, the Communist Party’s publicity department plans to screen documentaries, open military installations to the public, and require military training in schools. The Education Ministry also released a university-level national security textbook in August.

These moves come amid concerns that the escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea could spiral into a full-blown military confrontation with the United States.

According to some critics of the Chinese government, Xi’s increasing emphasis on military training for civilians is a sign of increased nationalism in advance of a possible invasion of Taiwan.

China Is Broadening The Scope Of Military Training

China has two types of military duty: mandatory and voluntary, with the latter becoming the main category as of 2021.

According to the Military Service Law, all citizens, regardless of their race, ethnicity, occupation, place of origin, religion, or educational attainment, are required to serve in the armed forces. The present National Defence Education Law mandates that senior high schools and colleges provide military training to their students.

The Law on National Defense Education was first passed in 2001 and updated in 2018, along with other laws, as part of a package of changes.

The earlier iteration of the legislation served primarily as a guideline; however, the suggested amendments assert that fundamental military training ought to be offered to high school students and individuals enrolled in higher education institutions during their academic tenure. As per the modifications, junior high school pupils are now permitted to do military training.

These adjustments are intended to raise “national defense awareness” throughout society and facilitate the second-largest economy in the world’s adjustment to “many new domestic and international changes.” Reports, though, do not describe what that would involve.

The draft amendment follows a series of other national security initiatives from Beijing in the previous 12 months. These include the country’s Patriotic Education statute, which was amended and entered into effect in January, a wide-ranging public campaign to combat foreign spies, and the enactment of adjustments to an anti-espionage statute last year.

High school freshmen undergoing military training (via X)

NPC Chairman Zhao Leji listed the revision of the National Defence Education Law as one of the year’s main legislative priorities, with the intention of “modernizing China’s system and capacity for national security.”

Analysts suggest that the heightened emphasis on national security awareness could encourage a greater number of young Chinese individuals to join the military, potentially intensifying existing nationalist sentiments and fostering animosity or bias against foreign entities.

Zhi Zhenfeng, research fellow at the Institute of Law at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times in April that the country was revising the law in response to the changing national security landscape of the new era.

Zhi clarified that while the current legal framework has been crucial in regulating and ensuring that all citizens receive national defense education, over time, it has become apparent that some of the law’s provisions have not been updated to reflect changing circumstances. He noted that it has to be updated to better fit the new framework, handle new issues, and offer a “stronger legal foundation for advancing national defense education in the new era. “

Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari9555 (at) gmail.com
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eurasiantimes.com · by Sakshi Tiwari · September 13, 2024

9. Iraq touts deal with U.S. to withdraw most troops by 2026

A victory for Iran?

Do we have different views of time? DO we think this is too long? Does Iran think it's no problem as they can wait out the US as this is not a very long time at all?

Iraq touts deal with U.S. to withdraw most troops by 2026

An official said the tentative plan would leave a small American force in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region to guard against Iranian-backed militias.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/09/12/us-troops-iraq-withdrawal/?utm

In this photo from January 2018, U.S. soldiers train with mortars at a small outpost in western Iraq, near the border with Syria. (Susannah George/AP)

By Mustafa Salim, Missy Ryan and Abigail Hauslohner

Updated September 12, 2024 at 6:23 p.m. EDT|Published September 12, 2024 at 3:12 p.m. EDT

BAGHDAD — The United States will withdraw most troops from Iraq over the next two years but leave a small residual force in the northern Kurdistan region under a plan negotiated by American and Iraqi officials, who disclosed some details of the deal this week.

Defense Minister Thabit al-Abbasi said the two nations had reached an agreement that would transition Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led military mission set up a decade ago to combat Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, into a “sustainable security partnership” and would remove in two stages the roughly 2,500 U.S. troops now stationed in Iraq.

“The first phase will begin this year and continue until 2025, while the second phase will conclude in 2026,” Abbasi told al-Arabiya television.

An Iraqi military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe plans that had not been made public, said a smaller American force was expected to remain in semiautonomous Kurdistan to provide a security guarantee for Iraqi Kurds against the Iranian-backed militia groups that hold wide sway in the rest of the country.

The Pentagon and White House did not respond to requests for comment. Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder, a Defense Department spokesman, declined in a news briefing Thursday to confirm whether the plan described by Iraqi officials was accurate from a U.S. perspective.

If completed, the drawdown would mark the second time the United States has pulled most its forces from Iraq in more than two decades of American intervention, since U.S. forces invaded in 2003 to overthrow then-President Saddam Hussein.

Like the first American exit in 2011, a U.S. withdrawal would probably leave behind an Iraq saddled with significant security vulnerabilities, sectarian divisions and corruption, problems that helped give rise to the Islamic State, which seized a vast swath of the country in 2014.

The government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, like other recent Iraqi leaders, has maintained close ties with neighboring Iran, another Shiite Muslim power that has backed a set of powerful Iraqi militias pressuring Baghdad to finalize the U.S. departure.

U.S. officials have long acknowledged the ongoing negotiations that they have said aim to outline an “orderly transition” from the multinational military mission. At its peak, the U.S.-led command included thousands of American and allied troops in Iraq and Syria supporting massive air and ground operations against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.

Following the culminating battles against the bulk of ISIS forces in 2016 and 2017, in Iraq’s city of Mosul and Syria’s city of Raqqa, the number of U.S. personnel decreased. Today, a much smaller mission headquartered in Baghdad is headed by a two-star officer, Maj. Gen. Kevin Leahy.

Washington and Baghdad have already agreed in principle to end America’s anti-ISIS mission in Iraq as part of what President Joe Biden and Sudani described this spring as a “natural evolution” as that threat abates.

Reuters recently reported the existence of a two-stage plan to withdraw American forces by 2026.

For the United States, an ongoing military presence in Kurdistan, where the Pentagon has long operated a low-profile mission near the capital city of Arbil, would also be key to sustaining its operations in neighboring Syria, where about 900 American troops remain. The government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has tolerated the U.S. presence in the eastern part of his country, but the two nations do not have official relations.

While American troops are no longer involved in regular combat operations in Iraq and Syria as they were in previous years, they remain exposed to danger.

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Since the eruption of renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip last fall, U.S. positions in Iraq, Syria and Jordan have come under renewed rocket, missile and drone attack by Iranian-backed militias. Three U.S. troops were killed in January at a U.S. base in Jordan supporting operations in Syria. American forces have conducted periodic airstrikes in response, most recently in July.

American troops also continue to conduct periodic operations against remaining ISIS militants. Last month, seven U.S. troops were wounded doing so in western Iraq.

Iraqis gather at the site of a burned vehicle targeted in a U.S. drone strike in east Baghdad in February. (Hadi Mizban/AP)

Sudani’s government is eager to demonstrate he can end or at least curtail the American presence, which remains controversial given America’s history in Iraq and the sway of militias hostile to the United States. Militia groups with ties to Iran have threatened to resume or intensify attacks against foreign troops if they do not depart.

Hussein Allawi, an adviser to Sudani, said there would soon be a joint announcement about the planned withdrawal. “We want the relationship with the United States to return to what it was before 2014,” he said. “The need for the international coalition ended with the defeat of ISIS, and now the Iraqi forces are fully capable of handling the security file efficiently.”

Maintaining a military presence in Iraq would also support larger U.S. security goals in the region. In April, an American air defense battery shot down a ballistic missile near Arbil that was believed to be targeting U.S. ally Israel as part of a massive Iranian attack against the Jewish state.

Dana Stroul, a former senior Pentagon official who now serves as research director at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that the return of U.S. personnel a decade ago became necessary when Iraqi security forces largely collapsed amid ISIS attacks.

“I doubt any president would send the U.S. military back in a third time if Iraqi leaders won’t take steps to prioritize this counterterrorism mission,” she said. “That includes preventing the country from becoming Iran’s playground, addressing endemic corruption, resourcing and empowering legitimate security forces, and ensuring that the government is responsive to the needs of all Iraqis.”

Some U.S. lawmakers and aides have been briefed on the developing withdrawal plans, people with knowledge of those classified conversations said.

Rep. Adam Smith (Wash.), the House Armed Services Committee’s top Democrat, characterized the future U.S. troop presence as a significant political challenge for Iraqi leaders.

“The people of Iraq would rather not have U.S. troops in Iraq — and they’d also rather not have ISIS banging away. And they are aware of the fact that we help with that latter problem,” Smith said in an interview. “They want us gone, and they want to figure out how to make that work. And it’s not easy.”

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the issue brought together a host of complex interests for both nations. “The Iraqis understand there’s stability with our presence,” he said. “But there is also a danger to our troops.”

Reed noted that U.S. officials were not pleased that new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian made Iraq the site of his first foreign visit, where he enjoyed a formal welcome by Sudani on Wednesday.

Rep. Cory Mills (R-Fla.), an Iraq War veteran and a member of the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees, said he was especially concerned about the influence of Iran and the militias it supports. Though not opposed to a withdrawal in principle, he said there needs to be a plan to ensure Iraq’s stability.

“I feel that you have an obligation, if you destabilize the nation, to help it to stabilize again,” he said.

Ryan and Hauslohner reported from Washington. Alex Horton in Washington contributed to this report.

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By Mustafa Salim

Mustafa Salim is a reporter in The Washington Post's Baghdad bureau. He joined the paper in 2014, covering the rise of the Islamic State and Iraq's military campaign to defeat it. follow on X mustafa_salimb

By Missy Ryan

Missy Ryan writes about national security and defense for The Washington Post. She joined The Post in 2014 and has written about the Pentagon and the State Department. She has reported from Iraq, Ukraine, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Chile.

By Abigail Hauslohner

Abigail Hauslohner is a Washington Post national security reporter focused on Congress. She was previously a roving national correspondent, writing on topics ranging from immigration to political extremism. She covered war and politics in the Middle East for seven years, and joined the Post in 2012 as Cairo bureau chief.follow on X @ahauslohner

10. Is US losing the AI arms race to China?

Excerpts:

Many experts consider it possible for China to surpass the US in the development and use of AI. However, China trails the US in several ways. The US has the world’s largest intelligence budget; the most popular hardware, software and technology companies; and the most advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, both offensive and defensive.

I and other experts expect these advantages to preserve US technological leadership for now, at least – but perhaps not forever.

Is US losing the AI arms race to China? - Asia Times

asiatimes.com · by James Johnson · September 12, 2024

The US government, long a proponent of advancing technology for military purposes, sees artificial intelligence as key to the next generation of fighting tools.

Several recent investments and Pentagon initiatives show that military leaders are concerned about keeping up with – and ahead of – China and Russia, two countries that have made big gains in developing artificial-intelligence systems.

AI-powered weapons include target recognition systems, weapons guided by AI, and cyberattack and cyber defense software that runs without human intervention.

The US defense community is coming to understand that AI will significantly transform, if not completely reinvent, the world’s military power balance. The concern is more than military.

As Chinese and Russian technologies become more sophisticated, they threaten US domination of technological innovation and development, as well as global economic power and influence.

Military leaders see the threat to US technological leadership coming from two main sources: a rising and ambitious China and a mischievous and declining Russia. Taken together, these forces challenge global stability.

The nature of the threat

A 2018 Pentagon report noted that technological developments could change the types of threats facing the US, which might include space-based weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and cyberweapons.

A February 2019 analysis warned that China’s investments in its military’s AI systems – in particular, those supporting robotics, autonomy, precision munitions and cyber warfare – threaten to overtake the US. Chinese government agencies are working closely with the country’s civilian businesses to keep on top of fast-changing technological developments.

In addition, some Chinese and Russian projects have developed military AI systems specifically aimed at what they perceive as US technological weaknesses. For instance, swarms of armed AI-enhanced drones might locate and attack the secure computer systems countries rely on to control and launch their nuclear weapons.

So far the Pentagon’s actions have been largely bureaucratic, rather than concrete. It has released a Defense Department-wide strategy document that articulates broad principles for the development and use of AI in future warfare. The military has established a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, which is tasked with accelerating the delivery and adoption of AI.

But projects with names like “the Third Offset,” “Project Maven” and the “AI Next Campaign” have minimal funding. Leaders have released few details about what they will actually do.

Working with Silicon Valley

The Pentagon has also established the Defense Innovation Unit, with permission to circumvent the cumbersome military purchasing process, to coordinate with Silicon Valley and bring new technologies into military use relatively quickly.

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That unit has sparked discussions about the potential for the Chinese military to acquire and use US-designed technologies, which led to US bans on doing business with many Chinese technology firms.

Many experts consider it possible for China to surpass the US in the development and use of AI. However, China trails the US in several ways. The US has the world’s largest intelligence budget; the most popular hardware, software and technology companies; and the most advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, both offensive and defensive.

I and other experts expect these advantages to preserve US technological leadership for now, at least – but perhaps not forever.

James Johnson is a lecturer at Middlebury

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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asiatimes.com · by James Johnson · September 12, 2024

11. Bigger than Blackwater: Privatization of security goes worldwide

Excerpts:

In Portland, police budget cuts spurred by defunding initiatives following the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests led to the disbanding of special units and a wave of officer resignations and retirements. 911 hold times increased fivefold from 2019 to 2023, as more lenient crime policies allegedly contributed to a rise in crime rates.

In response, thousands of private security personnel now patrol the city, with the number licensed to carry firearms rising by nearly 40 percent since 2019. More than 400 local businesses pay Echelon, a Portland-based PSC, to deploy dozens of guards around the clock.

Echelon and its personnel have attempted to build relationships with the homeless and people suffering from addiction and mental illness by providing food, responding to overdoses, and de-escalating conflicts. While crime in Portland has gone down since its peak in 2022, this reflects nationwide trends and comes as the city has attempted to reinstate police numbers.

American PSCs are expanding their roles across the country. In Las Vegas, Protective Force International formed its own squad in May 2024 to clear out squatters from an apartment complex, in addition to its other security services in the city. In New Orleans, Pinnacle Security is one of many firms operating, with roughly 250 security guards patrolling neighborhoods, businesses, and government buildings.

Conclusion:

As the role of private security continues to expand, regulations must evolve at the same pace. In the US, with regulations primarily established at the state level and lacking uniformity, there is a need for greater oversight to address potential issues effectively. Failing to do so will undermine public accountability by allowing private companies to operate with minimal restrictions, as well as deepen societal divides.

Bigger than Blackwater: Privatization of security goes worldwide - Asia Times

US$248 billion global market for private security services is – for better or worse – reshaping law enforcement nearly everywhere

asiatimes.com · by John P Ruehl · September 11, 2024

In August 2024, due to a US$4 million budget shortfall, Idaho’s Caldwell School District terminated its $296,807 contract with the local police department, opting instead for armed guards from Eagle Eye Security.

The new $280,000 contract is just a drop in the bucket of the roughly $50 billion US private security industry and the $248 billion global market that is reshaping law enforcement worldwide.

While private military companies (PMCs) like Blackwater (now Academi) and Wagner have gained notoriety in war zones, private security companies (PSCs) are rapidly expanding in non-combat settings.

Despite some overlap between the two, PSCs generally protect assets and individuals. Often collaborating with law enforcement, the effectiveness and ethical standards of PSCs vary widely, and armed guards are increasingly common. Security guards in the US in 2021 outnumbered police by about 3:2.

Public policy is still playing catch up. Unlike police forces, PSCs operate under contract rather than direct taxpayer funding. They also don’t have the same level of regulation, oversight, or accountability.

Criticisms of the police—such as excessive force and inadequate training—are frequently directed at private security officers as well. Many former police officers with controversial histories find employment in PSCs, where barriers to entry are low. Turnover, meanwhile, remains high, while wages are minimal. Yet the sector’s ongoing expansion appears inevitable.

Government forces and private security forces have been a part of society for millennia. Government forces mainly responded to unrest rather than preventing crime, often relying on volunteers.

Private security options included hiring guards and bounty hunters, while communal efforts like the “hue and cry”—where villagers collectively chased down criminals— were also common ways of enforcing security.

With increasing urbanization, though, traditional law enforcement methods became less effective, prompting the creation of the first modern police force, the London Metropolitan Police, in 1829. Distinct from the military, more accountable to city authorities and business interests, and focused on crime prevention, this model was adopted by Boston in 1838 and spread to nearly all US cities by the 1880s.

The emergence of public police forces coincided with the birth of the modern private security industry. Founded in the US in 1850, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, as it was eventually called, is considered the first modern PSC.

With its nationwide reach, investigative expertise, and role in safeguarding companies, Pinkerton distinguished itself by protecting businesses from theft, vandalism, and sabotage.

Its controversial role in events like the Homestead Strike of 1892, when the company “essentially went to war with thousands of striking workers,” led to greater regulatory scrutiny, but the company continued to drive industry growth.

After World War II, the rise in PSC use within US residential communities boosted demand, further accelerated by the racially tinged civil unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, which spurred private initiatives to police cities.

The 1980s brought deregulation and professionalization, as many corporations established in-house security departments and PSCs prioritized hiring former law enforcement officers over those with military backgrounds.

Today, private security has a global presence, providing services ranging from bouncers and bodyguards to crowd control units and specialized armed teams. PSCs are generally cheaper than using police forces, and the widespread adoption of surveillance and other technologies has increasingly leveled the playing field.

However, private personnel primarily serve as a visible deterrent, discouraging crime through their presence rather than direct intervention. They are often focused on monitoring and patrolling, which can divert criminal activity rather than resolve it. As the demand for private security grows, debate continues over their role and broader societal impact.

US ratios of police staffing to civilian population peaked around the early 2000s, and police agencies say shortages are now widespread. As police departments have struggled to boost their ranks, PSCs have filled the gap.

Allied-Universal, with 300,000 American employees, is one of the largest private employers in the country. Meanwhile, for high-net-worth individuals like Mark Zuckerberg, personal security expenses can exceed $14 million annually.

PSCs have stepped in to respond to a variety of situations, including protests at universities. In January 2024, Apex Security Group personnel dismantled pro-Palestinian encampments at UC Berkeley, later clearing similar sites at Columbia University in April and UCLA in May.

Many PSCs, however, pursue more lucrative long-term contracts. UCLA has paid Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC) for campus patrols for years, and UC San Francisco spent $3.5 million on CSC in 2023, according to watchdog group American Transparency.

PSCs are also widely employed to target the unhoused and address shoplifting in California. Following a rise in the state’s homeless population by 40 percent since 2019 and an increase in petty crime, PSCs have secured valuable contracts with local governments, private businesses, families, and individuals.

The Bureau of Security and Investigative Services oversees the sector in the state, but incidents still raise concerns. In May 2023, an Allied Universal guard fatally shot Banko Brown, an unarmed Black person suspected of shoplifting. The San Francisco district attorney’s office chose not to file charges, sparking public outcry.

In Portland, police budget cuts spurred by defunding initiatives following the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests led to the disbanding of special units and a wave of officer resignations and retirements. 911 hold times increased fivefold from 2019 to 2023, as more lenient crime policies allegedly contributed to a rise in crime rates.

In response, thousands of private security personnel now patrol the city, with the number licensed to carry firearms rising by nearly 40 percent since 2019. More than 400 local businesses pay Echelon, a Portland-based PSC, to deploy dozens of guards around the clock.

Echelon and its personnel have attempted to build relationships with the homeless and people suffering from addiction and mental illness by providing food, responding to overdoses, and de-escalating conflicts. While crime in Portland has gone down since its peak in 2022, this reflects nationwide trends and comes as the city has attempted to reinstate police numbers.

American PSCs are expanding their roles across the country. In Las Vegas, Protective Force International formed its own squad in May 2024 to clear out squatters from an apartment complex, in addition to its other security services in the city. In New Orleans, Pinnacle Security is one of many firms operating, with roughly 250 security guards patrolling neighborhoods, businesses, and government buildings.

In Chicago, a 2021 accusation by Mayor Lori Lightfoot that businesses were failing to take adequate theft prevention measures spurred greater private initiatives. The Fulton Market District Improvement Association, a local group supported by local restaurateurs and developers, launched private patrols with P4 Security Solutions in 2024. P4 personnel operate both on foot and by car and provide security to other Chicago neighborhoods, with plans to expand further.

Private security, however, is not just a US phenomenon. PSCs are well established globally, no more so than in Latin America. From the 1970s onward, the War on Drugs fueled massive transnational criminal empires and widespread police corruption.

As military dictatorships ended in the 1990s, the transition to democratic governments in Latin America often resulted in weak institutions, leading to instability and security challenges. In response, private security boomed, primarily serving the wealthy.

Today, Latin America is home to more than 16,000 PMCs and PSCs employing more than 2 million people, often outnumbering police forces in poorly regulated markets. Their rapid expansion has led to serious issues, including criminal infiltration of PSCs in Mexico and El Salvador and claims of extrajudicial killings in Guatemala. Western resource companies, in coordination with local authorities, have also used PSCs to safeguard their operations and confront protesters in the region.

Latin America has typically been a source of recruitment for the private security industry, with many US PMCs employing personnel during the War on Terror. Recently, the region has also become a market for foreign PSCs. Chinese PSCs, while restricted domestically, are increasingly involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in the region, as well as in private ventures.

Zhong Bao Hua An Security Company, for example, has contracts with businesses in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Panama. Tie Shen Bao Biao offers personal protection services in Panama, while the Mexico-Chinese Security Council was established in 2012 to protect Chinese businesses and personnel from violence.

The collapse of security states in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, combined with the adoption of capitalism, created fertile ground for both PMCs and PSCs. In Bulgaria, early PSCs were often founded by sportsmen, particularly wrestlers, with connections to organized crime.

By 2005, a United Nations report estimated that 9% of working men in Bulgaria were employed in private security—a pattern found across the former Eastern Bloc.

Though growth has been slower in Western Europe, PSCs have still expanded. France recently deployed 10,000 security guards across Paris for the 2024 Olympics, only for many of them to strike over working conditions weeks before the opening ceremony.

The European Union has increasingly relied on PSCs to manage its migrant crisis, generating massive profits for the industry. Private actors were quick to label migration as a security threat while supporting policies that promote instability abroad.

Major arms dealers and security firms like Airbus and Leonardo, for example, sell weapons in conflict zones that fuel violence and displacement. They then profit again by selling security equipment to European border agencies.

While violence has decreased across Africa in recent decades, localized instability has led to a surge in the security industry. The distinction between PSCs and PMCs is often blurred on the continent, with PSCs frequently finding themselves undertaking quasi-military roles such as convoy protection, protection of natural resource extraction sites in hostile areas, and armed confrontations.

Chinese PSCs have become more prevalent to compensate for the security gaps left by African governments for BRI investments, contrasting to Russia’s use of conflict-oriented PMCs in Africa. Regulation varies, with minimal oversight in countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and more stringent controls in Uganda.

South Africa’s PSC industry in particular has flourished since the end of apartheid in the 1990s. Rising crime and falling police numbers have led citizens to rely more on the private sector for safety and asset protection.

According to the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, there are 2.7 million registered private security officers working in South Africa, outnumbering police 4:1. Services include patrolling neighborhoods, providing armed guards, and tracking and recovering stolen vehicles.

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The PSC industry’s rise has been fueled by gaps in state security measures. However, in areas where PSCs operate, crime rates frequently remain high due to their focus on protecting private property and individuals rather than maintaining public order.

Financial incentives can also lead to problems being managed superficially rather than addressing underlying issues. Additionally, PSC employees frequently face burnout, low pay, and negative working conditions. As PSCs intersect with private prisons, this has raised further concern over their expanding influence and overlapping roles.

Despite its growth in recent decades, the PSC industry’s progress has proven reversible in the past. By 2001, Argenbright Security controlled almost 40% of US airport checkpoints, but the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) after 9/11 centralized airport security back under government control, with limited private sector involvement.

Nevertheless, the industry is likely to continue expanding, particularly as new initiatives find uses for them. India, which has the world’s largest private security force at approximately 12 million, is expected to continue seeing strong industry expansion, especially in securing its increasing number of private communities, colloquially termed “gated republics.”

Private security already plays a major role in private cities, which are becoming more prevalent worldwide. In these cities, governance is largely handled by boards and CEOs rather than elected officials, and profit motives often overshadow public needs. The safety divide between rich and poor is further exacerbated, as security becomes a commodity instead of a public concern.

In Honduras, the island of Roatán is at the epicenter of a clash between the government and local communities on the one hand and international entrepreneurs behind Próspera, a company developing a private city on the island, on the other. The escalating tensions highlight the realities of under-resourced government forces facing off against well-funded companies backed by heavily armed private guards.

As the role of private security continues to expand, regulations must evolve at the same pace. In the US, with regulations primarily established at the state level and lacking uniformity, there is a need for greater oversight to address potential issues effectively. Failing to do so will undermine public accountability by allowing private companies to operate with minimal restrictions, as well as deepen societal divides.

John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute.

He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022.

This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute. It is republished here with kind permission.

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asiatimes.com · by John P Ruehl · September 11, 2024

12. Army to expand holistic health and fitness program to all soldiers

"Humans are more important than hardware" applies to all services and all servicemembers.

It is great to see this as an Army priority.

Army to expand holistic health and fitness program to all soldiers

militarytimes.com · by Todd South · September 12, 2024

The Army is expanding its new all-around health and fitness program, which includes professional civilian staffing, workout gear and more, to all soldiers rather than only combat brigades.

Army Vice Chief of Staff James Mingus told soldiers at the Maneuver Warfighter Conference at Fort Moore, Georgia, on Wednesday that the Holistic Health and Fitness program, also called H2F, will roll out across the entire force.

The program was showing too much benefit to be used only by the combat arms brigades, according to the four-star.

“It is an Army program, and it is making a huge difference on how our soldiers are performing out there,” Mingus said.

The Army launched a pilot H2F program in late 2018 and began equipping combat arms brigades with full complements of gym equipment and H2F staff, including physical therapists, dietitians, occupational therapists, athletic trainers, strength and conditioning coaches and cognitive performance specialists, in 2020.

Early data shows 37% suicide decrease in units with holistic health

The program also shows improved metrics on other negative behaviors such as substance abuse.

The program’s holistic approach addresses five domains: physical, spiritual, mental, sleep and nutrition.

The original plan called for the service to outfit all 110 combat arms brigades by 2030. Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George announced last year that the Army would speed up fielding by increasing the annual number of brigades from 10 to 15. The fully resourced program had reached 50 brigades this year, including some military police, medical, engineer and sustainment brigades, according to Army data.

Mingus didn’t share specifics or timelines on the rollout, which will require more funding from Congress. But he advised leaders to begin work in their units now.

“A lot of our formations still don’t have it but there are things you can do,” Mingus said. “I would challenge you to study what is the essence of how you assess the program and execute functional fitness, nutrition, sleep.”

Capt. Rudolph “Trey” Smith III, takes the Army Combat Fitness Test on Rhine Ordnance Barracks in Kaiserslautern, Germany. (Pfc. Alyssa Norton/U.S. Army)

The Center for Initial Military Training, or CIMT, at Fort Eustis, Virginia, launched the Holistic Health and Fitness website in late August. The site contains information on all aspects of the program such as unit resources, the H2F Academy and the command’s annual H2F Symposium.

“We wanted to develop a website that provides tools for soldiers to help them take a hard look at themselves and really assess their personal health and fitness while also providing resources from subject matter experts so they can improve in all five readiness domains,” Lt. Gen. David Francis, CIMT commander, said in a statement.

Francis described the H2F program as the “largest human performance optimization project ever fielded.”

The program’s top priority since its inception has been reducing physical injuries among soldiers during deployment and training. Francis touted the results.

“The initial return on investment shows H2F will pay for itself as it decreases musculoskeletal injuries, reduces non-deployables, and helps soldiers who do get injured return to duty faster,” Francis said.

Early data released by CIMT in April showed H2F-resourced brigades saw a 23% higher increase in Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT) passing rates, along with other performance and behavior improvements.

Behavior and performance data from H2F-resourced brigades compared with non-resourced brigades demonstrated:

14% lower increase* in musculoskeletal injuries = 6,489 fewer injured soldiers.
30% lower increase in musculoskeletal injuries lasting more than 90 days = 3,002 fewer injured soldiers on profile for more than 90 days.
22% lower increase in behavioral health reports = 2,962 fewer soldiers on behavioral health profiles.
20% lower increase in behavioral health reports lasting more than 90 days = 3,002 fewer soldiers on behavioral health profiles greater than 90 days.
502% lower increase in substance abuse profiles = 13,947 fewer soldiers on substance abuse profiles.
23% greater Army combat fitness test passing rate = 4,455 more soldiers passing the ACFT.
27% more soldiers reaching expert on rifle marksmanship qualification = 88,000 more soldiers receiving expert rifle marksmanship qualification.

*Brigades analyzed, both with and without H2F teams, saw increases in most areas from 2021–2023, but those units with H2F teams saw significantly lower increases in all categories.

Source: Center for Initial Military Training

As the Army implements the program across the force, the active-duty combat arms brigades remain a priority, with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve likely waiting longer for resources.

However, the new website can help fill those gaps in the meantime, Sgt. 1st Class Nicholas Rice, an Army Reserve H2F system developer, said in a statement.

“It’s a vital tool in our shared mission to ensure that every investment made in our Soldiers is an investment in a better, more capable version of themselves,” Rice said.

At Wednesday’s conference, the vice chief praised his experience with a precursor program that used similar principles when he served the 75th Ranger Regiment. That program, known as the Ranger Athlete Warrior Program, emerged in the early 2000s to decrease injuries in the notoriously demanding unit.

Mingus carried a version of that program with him when he assumed command of 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort Carson, Colorado, he said.

The program prepared his soldiers to perform in some of the roughest terrain during demanding missions during their 2012 deployment to Afghanistan, according to the general.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

13. 'Transformed By Trauma: Stories of Posttraumatic Growth' Raises Critical Questions About Mental Health Care in America

Excerpts:

"Our mission extends beyond just helping Veterans and first responders," says Falke. "We’re working to change the way mental health care is approached in this country for all people with trauma histories. That’s a monumental task, but it’s necessary."

One of the film’s powerful voices is Captain Charlie Plumb, a Vietnam Veteran and former POW who was imprisoned for nearly six years at the infamous "Hanoi Hilton." "POWs are living proof of PTG," says Plumb. "I survived nearly six years as a prisoner of war—what could challenge me more than that? We only get so many struggles in life, and it’s a terrible thing to waste any of them."

As the home of PTG, Boulder Crest Foundation is committed to changing the narrative around trauma and mental health. "We’re proud to lead this movement," says Goldberg. "Through our work with those on the front lines of our society, we’ve shown that it’s possible to live lives filled with passion, purpose, connection, growth, and service, even after the darkest experiences."

'Transformed By Trauma: Stories of Posttraumatic Growth' Raises Critical Questions About Mental Health Care in America

https://www.wspa.com/business/press-releases/ein-presswire/742403072/transformed-by-trauma-stories-of-posttraumatic-growth-raises-critical-questions-about-mental-health-care-in-america/?utm

News provided by

EIN Presswire

Sep 12, 2024, 6:30 AM ET

A powerful new documentary sheds light on the prevalence and impact of PTSD diagnoses, challenging the current approach to mental health in America.

PTSD has become a catch-all diagnosis. In our country, we’ve created a medical model and 500,000 people to treat it, but it doesn’t work.”

— Ken Falke, Chairman and Founder, Boulder Crest Foundation

BLUEMONT, VA, UNITED STATES, September 12, 2024 /EINPresswire.com/ -- A powerful new documentary, Transformed By Trauma: Stories of Posttraumatic Growth, sheds light on the prevalence and impact of PTSD diagnoses, challenging the current approach to mental health in America. The film tells the inspiring personal stories of Veterans, former POWs, service members, and first responders who have not only survived trauma but have thrived in its aftermath through Posttraumatic Growth (PTG).

"PTSD has become a catch-all diagnosis," says Ken Falke, Founder and Chairman of Boulder Crest Foundation, the global leader in developing, studying, and delivering PTG-based programs. "In our country, we’ve created a medical model and 500,000 people to treat it, but it doesn’t work."

Josh Goldberg, CEO of Boulder Crest, adds, "With the PTSD label, you’re told you have a permanent disorder, and the best you can do is focus on feeling less bad. We need to change that narrative because it’s literally killing people."

The film highlights the science of PTG, which shows that struggle can be a catalyst for profound growth and transformation. Instead of being diminished by trauma, individuals can emerge stronger and more authentic, embodying the best versions of themselves.

Boulder Crest Foundation, a nationally recognized nonprofit and the home of PTG, has spent the past decade pioneering programs based on the science of PTG. Through peer-delivered training programs like Warrior PATHH and Struggle Well, the organization has transformed the lives of more than 100,000 individuals, delivering both agency and hope.

"Our mission extends beyond just helping Veterans and first responders," says Falke. "We’re working to change the way mental health care is approached in this country for all people with trauma histories. That’s a monumental task, but it’s necessary."

One of the film’s powerful voices is Captain Charlie Plumb, a Vietnam Veteran and former POW who was imprisoned for nearly six years at the infamous "Hanoi Hilton." "POWs are living proof of PTG," says Plumb. "I survived nearly six years as a prisoner of war—what could challenge me more than that? We only get so many struggles in life, and it’s a terrible thing to waste any of them."

As the home of PTG, Boulder Crest Foundation is committed to changing the narrative around trauma and mental health. "We’re proud to lead this movement," says Goldberg. "Through our work with those on the front lines of our society, we’ve shown that it’s possible to live lives filled with passion, purpose, connection, growth, and service, even after the darkest experiences."

For more information on the documentary and Boulder Crest Foundation, visit Bouldercrest.org.

14. New Mortar and Rocket Training Simulators Could Shield Marines from Blasts Linked to Brain Injury

New Mortar and Rocket Training Simulators Could Shield Marines from Blasts Linked to Brain Injury | Military.com

military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence

Marines will be using a new simulated mortar and recoilless rocket trainer that could help to protect them from exposure to heavy blasts as concerns over brain injuries from even routine military training have grown.

The Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer, which is currently in use at five Marine Corps bases across the world, allows troops to practice firing the weapons without being exposed to what is called blast overpressure, the shock wave from munitions that is linked to the injuries.

Earlier last month -- before the Marine Corps' simulator announcement -- the Pentagon issued a new policy to track and reduce the risks of blast exposure among service members following pressure from Congress. Previous Military.com reporting showed that traumatic brain injuries have been linked to suicide among veterans and that for years the Department of Defense had effectively ignored the issue.

"Risk reduction is another positive effect of using virtual systems in advance of live training as it allows individual Marines and crews to hone their drills and weapons handling procedures," Morgan Blackstock, a spokesperson for Marine Corps Systems Command, told Military.com on Monday.

"The fact that using these virtual systems does not introduce additional blast overpressure, or other safety hazards, is a positive byproduct of the technology used," she said.

Blackstock said that the simulators will not replace live-fire training, but are meant as a supplement. Simulators are used widely by the military for small-arms training as well.

Simulators now give Marines a chance to get their hands on simulated 81mm mortars and the Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon Systems, or MAAWS.

Veterans reported brain injuries from improvised explosives or other ordnance blasts while serving during the Global War on Terror, and that contributed to long-term brain decay, injury and symptoms contributing to suicide, according to Military.com reporting.

But the injuries were not limited to battlefield exposure. The New York Times reported in May that artillerymen and service members who use mortars and antitank weapons, including in training, were experiencing similar brain injuries to those seen among troops who served in war.

"Understanding the risks associated with repeated blast exposure," the Marine Corps said in the simulator announcement on Aug. 22, the program manager for training systems "has fielded the Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer, which allows Marines across the installation to maintain their proficiency with various weapons systems without the need for live ammunition."

The simulator, which is fielded at Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms, California; Marine Corps Base Hawaii; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and Camp Hansen in Japan, can also be used to practice shooting with night vision goggles and on range qualification courses.

"From a safety perspective, we are committed to preventing negligent discharges," Tripp Elliott, the Marine Corps Systems Command head of safety, said in the release. "We're also focused on mitigating the impacts on hearing and preventing traumatic brain injuries. This has a huge impact. It's crucial that, while training, personnel do so correctly."

military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence

15. Australian lawmaker calls for US Navy SEALs to work, train Down Under

Australian lawmaker calls for US Navy SEALs to work, train Down Under

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · September 12, 2024

SEAL team members use a propulsion vehicle during an exercise in Virginia Beach, Va., July 1, 2024. (Trey Hutcheson/U.S. Navy)

A former Australian Special Air Service officer now serving in his country’s parliament wants U.S. Navy SEALs to train local troops to dive from nuclear-powered submarines Down Under.

A detachment of SEALs should join Submarine Rotational Force-West, scheduled to begin operations at HMAS Sterling, near Perth, in 2027, Andrew Hastie, the Liberal Party shadow defense minister, told Stars and Stripes by phone Thursday.

The former SAS troop commander and Afghanistan war veteran trained to dive from Australian conventional submarines. He pitched his proposal in an opinion piece published Wednesday in The Australian newspaper.

Hastie, a House of Representative member elected from a district near HMAS Stirling, recently toured the USS Hawaii at the naval base. The Virginia-class fast-attack submarine arrived Aug. 26 for several weeks of maintenance by American and Australian technicians.

The visit is designed to build local skills ahead of the deployment in 2027 of one British and four U.S. nuclear-powered boats to the naval base under the 2021 AUKUS defense pact, named for members Australia, United Kingdom and the United States.

As part of the pact the U.S. has pledged to arm Australia with at least three Virginia-class submarines starting in 2032, before Australia can build as many as five new nuclear-powered AUKUS vessels.

Hastie checked out bunks on the Hawaii that can house a platoon of SEALs with space for their weapons and gear. He also saw the lockout chamber that allows divers to emerge from the vessel underwater, he said.

“I have a large and growing navy presence in my district,” Hastie said. “I am expecting to have American kids in our schools.”

The SEALs could train on the same world-class facilities as Australia’s Special Air Service Regiment at Campbell Barracks, Perth, he said.

The proposal has the backing of former SAS Regiment commander Duncan Lewis who was quoted in The Australian on Wednesday as saying: “I strongly support what Andrew’s saying.”

Nuclear-powered submarines should come to Australia with complete capabilities, Lewis said.

“And one of those capabilities is the deployment of special forces from the submarines,” he said. “In the U.S. context, that is done by U.S. Navy SEALs.”

The Naval Special Warfare Center in San Diego referred questions about a potential Navy SEAL mission in Australia to the Naval Special Warfare Command, which did not immediately respond to emailed questions Thursday.

Navy Cmdr. Matthew Comer, a spokesman for U.S. Indo-Pacific command, said by email Thursday that AUKUS focuses only on capabilities development, such as the plan for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.

Outside AUKUS, the U.S. conducts “high-end defense cooperation with Australia to include special operations,” he said.

The Australian navy has diving specialists, but SAS divers are likely to work from the nuclear-powered submarines for covert patrol insertion and extraction, former Australian assistant defense secretary Ross Babbage wrote in an email to Stars and Stripes Wednesday.

“Training with US Navy SEALs to make the most of the capability provided by Australia’s new nuclear-powered submarines will be a valuable extension of the existing covert capabilities held by the SAS,” he said.

The SAS and its forebearers have experience operating from conventional submarines dating back to World War II, said Carlyle Thayer, an emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales and a lecturer at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

“SAS troopers can be launched and recovered from Australia’s Collins-class (diesel-electric) submarines,” he said, by email Thursday. “However, the Collins-class submarine can only launch while surfaced and its range is limited.”

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · September 12, 2024

16. Asia Has No Hegemon

Turn challenge into opportunity? Or the US as a revisionist power???Or bipolarity in Asia is the least bad option?

Conclusion:

The United States no longer enjoys primacy in Asia. But an effort to restore this primacy would be seen by many Asian countries as disastrously revisionist. Instead, the United States should develop a strategy that focuses on shoring up its own position as a status quo power, one of two poles in Asia. This means doing more to reestablish its military edge in Asia by prioritizing the deployment of submarines, fighter aircraft, and warships to the region. Washington should continue to invest in alliances as part of a strategy to deter China but avoid overestimating the importance of these alliances to the overall balance of power in Asia. And to redress the shift away from the United States by the region’s nonaligned countries, it should engage more with them diplomatically and economically. Doing so will not restore U.S. primacy but can help ensure that bipolarity—the least bad option for America and the region—endures.

Asia Has No Hegemon

But U.S.-Chinese Bipolarity Is Good for America and the Region

By Susannah Patton and Hervé Lemahieu

September 13, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Asia Power Index · September 13, 2024

Debates about the balance of power in Asia typically rely on one of three views. Some analysts believe, fatalistically, that China has become an unassailably dominant force in the region. Others place continued faith in U.S. primacy and see China as weak, vulnerable, and ultimately containable. Still others, including U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan, tout the emergence of a multipolar Indo-Pacific that could arrest China’s ambitions for regional hegemony.

An accurate understanding of the balance of power in Asia is critical to the formulation of sound U.S. strategy on China. But none of these prevailing narratives get things quite right. Asia today is uniquely bipolar, dominated by the world’s only two superpowers. Asia is not a European-style concert of powers, a Middle Eastern free-for-all, or a Cold War–era system of opposing blocs. Countries in Asia are for the most part hedging between two giants. The even balance between the United States and China also makes Asia’s power politics the most stable among the major regional theaters.

To construct a more comprehensive and accurate view of the distribution of power in Asia, the Lowy Institute created the Asia Power Index, which goes beyond the traditional shorthand measure of economic size to look at military capability, national resilience, and the expected future distribution of demographic and economic resources, as well as four dimensions of regional influence: economic relationships, cultural influence, defence networks and diplomacy. What it reveals is a durable duopoly: the United States has lost primacy in Asia but remains around ten percent more powerful there than China. Scholars have posited that a power transition is triggered when a rising power’s overall strength approaches 80 percent of that of the established power. By 2018, China had already convincingly breached this threshold. But the dynamic is not that of a rising power eclipsing an established one; it is a dynamic of two powers that will likely continue to coexist as peer competitors applying different means of influence: the United States mainly uses security partnerships; China mainly uses economic relationships.

In Europe, by contrast, a cohesive multipolarity prevents any single country from posing a hegemonic threat. Russia may hope that the United States’ support for Ukraine will falter, but it does not have the resources to launch a direct conflict with a much larger bloc of EU and NATO countries aligned against it. The Middle East, meanwhile, is defined by messy multipolarity. A handful of players—China, Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—are jostling for advantage as the United States continues to retreat from the region, but no regional power reigns supreme.

Bipolarity stabilizes Asia for the moment and enables the United States to protect its vital regional interests, preventing a potential hegemon from disrupting the peace, and safeguarding the economic benefits that Washington derives from trade and investment with the region. But to ensure that this suitable status quo prevails, the United States must contend with the strengths and limitations of its power, rather than overestimate the advantages of its regional alliance partnerships, and strengthen its appeal to nonaligned countries, which are still the majority in Asia.

THE MIRAGE OF MULTIPOLARITY

Asia’s bipolarity has endured even as many have hoped that India and Japan could become pillars in a truly multipolar region. But, according to the index, each of those countries has less than a third of China’s economic capability, a measure that accounts for the size of their economies, as well as their technological sophistication. India and China have the two largest militaries in the world by number of personnel. Yet India’s ability to project power and influence east of the Strait of Malacca is limited. Neither its military nor Japan’s comes close to matching the capability of China’s People’s Liberation Army or the pace of its recent naval buildup. New Delhi and Tokyo can compete with Beijing in terms of cultural and diplomatic influence in Asia. But when it comes to economic relationships—trade, investment, and development financing—Japan has just 40 percent of China’s regional influence, down from 60 percent in 2018, and India a mere 15 percent.

Over the last decade, governments around the world have embraced the idea that Asia should really be understood as a two-ocean super-region, “the Indo-Pacific,” conjuring hopes that India as well as Australia and Japan could play decisive roles in preventing China from establishing a post-American order. But no major powers in the region are able to match China in the absence of the United States as a security guarantor. Without the United States as a balancing force, East Asia would be utterly dominated by China.

The surprising weakness of U.S. partners is disconcerting for Washington. It undermines the narrative that the United States is upgrading the alliance network it built in the Pacific after World War II—a multipolar makeover that the Biden administration has stressed as its primary achievement in Asia. As U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan put it in 2021, a new “latticework of alliances and partnerships” is enabling U.S. regional allies—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand—and other partners such as India to contribute more to the region’s security and to push back against China.

It is true that, with the exception of Thailand, Washington’s Asian allies are more closely aligned with the United States than at any other time since the end of the Cold War. But this must be assessed in the context of deepening bipolarity—a system in which only the United States has the power to challenge China.

A Japanese hovercraft at the biennial U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific military exercises, Waimanalo, Hawaii, July 2024

Marco Garcia / Reuters

Combined military exercises and defense dialogues between the United States and its Asian allies have dramatically intensified since 2021. This strengthening of ties is particularly pronounced in the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which has shifted from focusing purely on the defense of Japan to cooperation on regional and global security issues. And Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul have renewed and institutionalized their trilateral ties.

Australia, meanwhile, is deepening its relationship with the United States by acquiring nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS trilateral security partnership the two countries have with the United Kingdom. The Philippines is stoutly defending its maritime interests in the South China Sea and, in 2024, participated for the first time in combined military exercises with Australia, Japan, and the United States, a grouping that American officials have dubbed “the Squad.” Manila has also given the United States new access to additional military bases, including at sites close to Taiwan.

These achievements offer some advantages to the United States: prestige in the peacetime competition for influence, improved military access and basing in the region, and a minor augmentation to the United States’ capabilities in the event of a conflict with China. They also send a message to Beijing that an outright conflict, especially over Taiwan, could lead to a broader allied response. Indeed, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has seized on the Biden administration’s rhetoric about the collective strength of U.S. partners to draw an explicit parallel between the expansion of NATO in Europe and the United States’ alliance-building efforts in Asia.

Yet both Beijing and Washington overestimate the real changes to the United States’ alliance network in Asia. The comparatively small footprint of its alliances—comprising just five countries—has not grown in decades. Upgrading alliances alone cannot deliver a decisive additional advantage to the United States in its competition with China. In the event of a conflict or military contingency with China, U.S. allies would come under heavy pressure from Beijing to limit the United States’ access, basing, and overflight rights.

Bipolarity stabilizes Asia and enables the United States to protect its vital regional interests.

And the overall size of these U.S. allies’ military forces remains small. When it comes to firepower, as measured by the number of missile launch cells on board ships and submarines, Australia, Japan, and South Korea combined have less than a quarter of the United States’ capability. Together, the defense budgets of U.S. allies in Asia are less than a fifth of that of the United States. Well-known deficiencies in the United States’ readiness for a conflict, such as its inadequate munitions inventories, cannot be quickly remedied through allied cooperation. For instance, Japan’s highly publicized decision in July to sell Patriot missiles to the United States has already been thrown into doubt owing to a shortage of a critical component that only the United States produces.

It is telling that almost every form of renewed security cooperation in recent years has been first sought by a U.S. ally rather than by the United States. The creation of AUKUS, Japan’s partnership with the United States to enlarge its military capacity, and Manila’s renewed cooperation with Washington were all efforts to bind the United States at a time when it has become far more discerning about how it deploys its global power.

And Washington’s actions—if not its rhetoric—show that it understands that Asia is not, in fact, meaningfully multipolar. The United States still resists fully sharing its defense technologies and strategic and operational plans with Asian partners, which can be read as an implicit recognition that these allies are unlikely to make a decisive difference in a conflict with China. Washington remains central in every meaningful security grouping in Asia. Most fundamentally, all of the United States’ alliances in Asia continue to be anchored by bilateral security guarantees, in contrast to the collective defense commitment that applies to NATO allies equally.

THE BENEFITS OF BIPOLARITY

This might all sound like bad news for Washington. Yet in many ways, Asia’s bipolarity is good for the region—and good for the United States. For one thing, the fundamentals of U.S. power in the region remain strong. Overall, the United States’ enduring military advantages outweigh its weaknesses, at least for now, especially in undersea warfare and long-range strike capability. Its capacity to put China’s military assets at risk from afar was demonstrated earlier this year, when a U.S. B-2 bomber fired a low-cost munition and sank a decommissioned Chinese vessel. This type of long-range strike capability is much harder for China to counter than the incremental improvements to the U.S. military posture in Japan and the Philippines.

And even with China’s rapid advances in some technologies, such as electric vehicles, the United States remains a larger global hub of innovation. The United States possesses the world’s preferred currency, enjoys abundant energy resources, and has favorable demographic trends, whereas China struggles on all three of those fronts. Most debilitating to China, its economy faces long-term headwinds caused by a contracting and aging workforce.

The stability brought about by bipolarity in Asia, which has benefited the United States as much as any other country, is underappreciated. Asia has no shortage of flash points, notably over Taiwan and the South China Sea. What is surprising, however, is not that these flash points—and episodic gray-zone clashes—exist but that they have not turned into more deadly conflicts. Contrast this relative peace with Europe, where Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine continues. Moscow, no longer able to wield a veto over Europe’s security architecture, has become its arsonist. In the Middle East, the war in Gaza threatens to escalate into a wider regional conflict as a multitude of players struggle to gain the upper hand.

Countries in Asia should not be complacent about the risk of increased conflict. But they should also recognize that things could be much worse for them. Even from China’s point of view, Asia would be more dangerous and chaotic without the influence of the United States. If the United States were to retreat from Asia, Beijing would still have no clear route to establishing a stable China-centric order. It has territorial or maritime disputes with at least ten other countries in the region. And without the United States’ security umbrella, South Korea—and possibly even Australia or Japan—might seek to develop its own nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear arms race underscores the ultimate value of the Biden administration’s effort to shore up alliances in Asia. By giving allies greater confidence in U.S. commitments and the endurance of a bipolar balance of power, the United States can help prevent them from seeking dangerous alternative pathway to security.

Washington should continue to invest in alliances as part of a strategy to deter China.

The existence of two poles also gives most Asian countries the opportunity to swim between them and avoid having to align with just one. U.S. diplomacy “is not about forcing countries to choose,” Blinken said in articulating this proposition in 2022. “It’s about giving them a choice.” The existence of this choice matters because nonaligned countries are the majority and the center of Asian regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the East Asia Summit. Some of these countries—Singapore, for example—use the space that bipolarity affords them to hedge against the risk of overdependence on any one partner. Others, such as Vietnam, have even profited more directly from U.S.-Chinese competition by positioning themselves as “connector economies,” or intermediaries between the two superpowers, which no longer wish to maintain strong direct economic ties.

It is among countries outside the alliance system, however, that Washington also faces the greatest danger to its standing in Asia. The United States does not need the nonaligned countries to choose it —they never will. But there are worrying signs that these countries are gradually drifting toward China and abandoning active hedging. For example, many countries in Southeast Asia are shrugging their shoulders at China’s bullying and coercion of the Philippines. In a high-profile move, Malaysia recently recognized Beijing’s position on reunifying Taiwan. Indonesia, for its part, sees Beijing as by far its most important partner supporting its economic development. China is on track to secure permanent access to a military base in Cambodia in a secretive deal. Even as its allies rally behind the United States, a view has hardened among the region’s hedgers that it is a distant and unreliable power.

The United States no longer enjoys primacy in Asia. But an effort to restore this primacy would be seen by many Asian countries as disastrously revisionist. Instead, the United States should develop a strategy that focuses on shoring up its own position as a status quo power, one of two poles in Asia. This means doing more to reestablish its military edge in Asia by prioritizing the deployment of submarines, fighter aircraft, and warships to the region. Washington should continue to invest in alliances as part of a strategy to deter China but avoid overestimating the importance of these alliances to the overall balance of power in Asia. And to redress the shift away from the United States by the region’s nonaligned countries, it should engage more with them diplomatically and economically. Doing so will not restore U.S. primacy but can help ensure that bipolarity—the least bad option for America and the region—endures.

Susannah Patton is Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and the Project Lead for the Asia Power Index, which measures resources and influence to rank the relative power of states in Asia.
Hervé Lemahieu is Director of Research at the Lowy Institute. He developed the Asia Power Index in 2018.

Foreign Affairs · by Asia Power Index · September 13, 2024

17. OPINION: Why Integrated Deterrence is Lame

Excerpts:

At its core, integrated deterrence a deeply flawed approach to most contemporary security challenges. It obfuscates and overcomplicates what should be a straightforward strategy characterized by the timely and decisive application of hard power .Worse, it sends mixed signals, underestimates the resilience of our adversaries, and weakens the credibility of our military forces.

If we are serious about defending the homeland, we need to return to the basics. Integrated deterrence is nothing more than a bureaucratic dream that undermines national security and emboldens our enemies. It’s time to discard this failed fantasy and restore deterrence to what it must be to work — built on strength, backed in credibility, and communicated clearly to adversaries and allies alike.

OPINION: Why Integrated Deterrence is Lame

By Rogue One

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/opinion-why-integrated-deterrence-is-lame?postId=2fad1e60-7573-4446-95b6-b28bf2a5847a&utm

Integrated deterrence, the latest darling of defense strategists, is a misguided and overly complex strategy that promised much but has delivered little. Traditional deterrence is simple—project overwhelming military power to dissuade adversaries from taking aggressive actions. Integrated deterrence, however, overcomplicates decision-making. The NDS outlines a vision where everything functions seamlessly across all services and domains, while being perfectly synchronized with all our allied partners and interagency stakeholders. In essence, it suggests achieving flawless coordination and execution in all areas simultaneously. Such an expectation, however, is highly ambitious and will only work in fantasyland.

"One of the most glaring failures of integrated deterrence is its inability to influence Russia's behavior in Ukraine."

At its core, effective deterrence depends on the credible threat of hard power. Integrated deterrence undermines this by shifting focus to softer tools like diplomacy and sanctions, which DoD has almost no control over and which simply don't carry the same weight with hard actors that only respect hard power. Adversaries are more likely to test the resolve of a country that mixes military threats with economic actions because they know that integrated deterrence weakens the military's hand. This dilution sends a mixed message of hesitation rather than strength. Our enemies understand that if we’re preoccupied with diplomacy and economic measures, the likelihood of swift military retaliation is diminished. This mixed messaging is disastrous when it comes to deterring aggression.

One of the most glaring failures of integrated deterrence has been its inability to influence Russia's behavior in Ukraine. The strategy's reliance on coordinated efforts across multiple domains—diplomatic, economic, cyber, and military—has proven ineffective. Russia's swift and focused actions have continually outpaced the international community's response, exposing the strategy’s shortcomings. Furthermore, the lack of a unified stance and decisive action from key global powers has eroded the credibility of deterrence measures, allowing Russia to act with impunity with minimal consequences and ultimately protracting the conflict.

"The idea that economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation will deter authoritarian regimes like Russia, Iran, or North Korea is absurd. The enemy always gets a vote."

Integrated deterrence also places far too much reliance on international cooperation and the willingness of allies to act in unison. In theory, a coordinated response from a group of nations sounds ideal, but in reality, it can be a dangerous fantasy. Allies have their own political and economic interests, and these often don’t align with those of the United States. In moments of crisis, we can’t base our theory of success on the fanciful notion that our partners will always step up, or that their actions will align with our interests. Depending on others to uphold collective security is naive, especially when those nations may have no appetite for conflict or face internal pressures that pull them away from global commitments.

The problem of inconsistent messaging compounds the flaws of integrated deterrence. Savvy actors like the PRC and Russia thrive in ambiguity—we can only eliminate this when our adversaries know what to expect if they cross the line. Swift, decisive action must follow if they choose to do so. Unfortunately, integrated deterrence is rife with mixed signals. One day we threaten military action, the next we push for negotiations, and in between, we impose sanctions. This inconsistency confuses not only our enemies but also our allies, eroding confidence in our strategy. Adversaries are emboldened when they sense hesitation or conflicting priorities, and they may miscalculate, assuming that military action is off the table when it isn’t.

"Savvy actors like the PRC and Russia thrive in ambiguity—we can only eliminate this when our adversaries know what to expect if they cross the line. Swift, decisive action must follow if they choose to do so."

One major flaw of integrated deterrence is that it completely underestimates the aggressiveness and resilience of certain adversaries. The idea that economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation will deter authoritarian regimes like Russia, Iran, or North Korea is absurd. The enemy always gets a vote. These regimes are hardened to economic hardship and often operate outside international norms, so traditional tools of pressure simply don’t work. They prioritize power and survival over economic stability, making them far less susceptible to the softer elements of deterrence. Integrated deterrence wrongly assumes that adversaries will respond rationally to these pressures, which they never do.

" Integrated deterrence is utterly useless against extremists who don’t play by the rules of conventional warfare. Diplomatic measures and sanctions won’t deter terrorists; only decisive military action can."

Integrated deterrence is also poorly suited for the kind of asymmetric warfare we see today. Non-state actors, terrorist groups, and insurgents don’t care about economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation. These groups operate outside the bounds of statecraft, often thriving in unstable environments. Integrated deterrence is utterly useless against extremists who don’t play by the rules of conventional warfare. Diplomatic measures and sanctions won’t deter terrorists; only decisive military action can. By spreading the focus across different tools, integrated deterrence leaves us ill-prepared to combat these modern threats.

Integrated deterrence erodes the credibility of military force as the ultimate deterrent. When military action is constantly blended with non-military tools, the threat of force becomes less believable. Adversaries may start to view military threats as empty bluffs, assuming that diplomatic or economic measures will be prioritized instead. Effective deterrence requires that the threat of force be both credible and immediate. By watering down the hard power aspects of deterrence, integrated deterrence makes it less likely that our enemies will take our threats seriously, and that’s when they’ll push boundaries and test their limits.

"At its core, Integrated deterrence is a deeply flawed approach to most contemporary security challenges. It obfuscates and overcomplicates what should be a straightforward strategy characterized by the timely and decisive application of hard power."

At its core, integrated deterrence a deeply flawed approach to most contemporary security challenges. It obfuscates and overcomplicates what should be a straightforward strategy characterized by the timely and decisive application of hard power .Worse, it sends mixed signals, underestimates the resilience of our adversaries, and weakens the credibility of our military forces.

If we are serious about defending the homeland, we need to return to the basics. Integrated deterrence is nothing more than a bureaucratic dream that undermines national security and emboldens our enemies. It’s time to discard this failed fantasy and restore deterrence to what it must be to work — built on strength, backed in credibility, and communicated clearly to adversaries and allies alike.

18. Functional discrepancy: syncing geographies of bureaucracies

Another excellent history that is relevant today from Matt Armstrong.

Excerpts:

Back to the department at the time. It is easy to see why the “curious contours” were an apt analogy for the department’s organization chart which grew haphazardly over time. One assistant secretary’s portfolio included finance, aviation, Canada, Greenland, the Passport Division, the Division of International Conferences, and the Translating Bureau. Another assistant secretary was responsible for matters related to fisheries while also chairing the department’s Political Planning committee. Duplication, uncertainty, conflict, friction, and diffused responsibility was common. Economic affairs were handled by seven ranking officials while some divisions reported to two or more leaders. Division of International Communications reported to three different assistant secretaries.

The second part of the reorganization came in December 1944 with Stettinius as the Secretary of State. Further adjustments were made. For this readership, the key change was elevating the public information function from an administrative function to a new Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Relations.2

It took nearly half the century to update the State Department in the 20th Century. We’re just shy of a quarter through the 21st Century, so we have two decades to be better. (You take whatever solace you can when discussing the State Department, right?)

Functional discrepancy: syncing geographies of bureaucracies

Unnecessary bureaucratic friction that is "normal" in US foreign affairs

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/organizing-the-foreign-affairs?utm

Matt Armstrong

Sep 13, 2024

A longstanding, often overlooked discrepancy exists between the State Department and the Defense Department in how they divide the world for their respective bureaucracies. Years of accomodation may be normalized, but it can hinder effective foreign policy in today’s complex environment.

Earlier this week, I criticized the Commission on the National Defense Strategy framing around the need to be better in the information space. My critique was justified even if their take is commonly held, repeatedly declared, and never leading to change.1

In the spirit of balance, the commission offered a recommendation I support as presented.

The Commission also recommends that the Department of State, USAID, and DoD review their differing ways of dividing the world into regions and commands and align their respective areas of responsibility to improve coordination across the departments and make it easier for other nations to engage the United States.

I’ve long advocated for the harmonization of the State Department’s and Defense Department’s organization around geography. So let me drag something out of the past. I don’t recall if it was something on my blog or a presentation I gave, or possibly both, but I was asked to write a memo on this back in 2010.

…efforts at reform [at the State Department] are hindered by an institutional structure rooted in a 19th-century view of the world. The days of traditional diplomacy conducted behind closed doors are over. The democratization of information and means of destruction makes a kid with a keyboard potentially more dangerous than an F-22. Addressing poverty, pandemics, resource security, and terrorism requires multilateral and dynamic partnerships with governments and publics. But the State Department has yet to adapt to the new context of global engagement. The diverse threats that confront the U.S. and our allies cannot be managed through a country-centric approach. For State to be effective and relevant, it needs to evolve and become both a Department of State and Non-State.

Currently, State’s structure impedes its efforts to develop coherent responses to pressing threats. The vesting of authority in U.S. embassies too often complicates interagency and pan-regional coordination and inhibits the effective request for and distribution of resources. No less significant, the structure also implicitly empowers the Defense Department’s regionally focused combatant commands, like Central Command, as alternatives to the State Department. Compounded by years of managerial neglect, and a lack of long-term vision, strategic planning, and budgeting, the State Department requires high-level patches and workarounds to do its job adequately…

Foggy Bottom’s regional bureaus are, on their face, like the Defense Department’s combatant commands... If Defense were to mimic State’s structure, it would be akin to making European Command subservient to individual U.S. military bases in Europe.

Now, I have not seriously looked at this issue for many years. I suspect, though, that since the commission believe it important enough to mention, it remains an issue without substantive change since my memo was published fourteen years ago.

Of course, the discrepancy and its byproducts did not manifest fourteen or even twenty years ago. This has been an enduring problem hindering timely and effective interagency collaboration. The failure to make an impactful change despite the known and unnecessary challenges for so long returns us to the same challenge of leadership raised in my earlier post.

The commission included USAID in their analysis, but I didn’t and won’t because I don’t know enough about that agency. As far as the State Department and the Defense Department, there are two basic elements at work here. First, the State Department sees the world through a country-level lens while the Defense Department looks at regions. The difference is largely driven by the way the US, and thus the State Department, views and empowers ambassadors. Second, the lack of alignment between the State Department’s regional bureaus and the Defense Department combatant commands.

Again, from my short analysis from 2010:

The geographic breakdowns of the State Department and the Defense Department must also be synchronized to facilitate greater government coordination. State’s six regional bureaus – Western Hemisphere, European and Eurasian, Near Eastern, African, South and Central Asian, and East Asian and Pacific – only loosely align with the seven combatant commands (the Pentagon splits the Western Hemisphere into two commands).

There are a few, but significant, differences. For example, the State Department includes North Africa in its Near East Bureau, while Central Command, which covers the Middle East, includes only Egypt among North African countries (Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, among others, fall under the African Command). Another difference: the Near East Bureau’s eastern border is Iran, and thus does not include Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the other -stans, which fall under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs; all those countries fall under Centcom in the Defense Department.

I recommended elevating the regional bureau leadership from assistant secretaries to undersecretaries and moving them out from under the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and working directly with the Secretary of State. I also argued they should not be political appointees but experienced career officers.

The pushback I received from senior career foreign service officers at the time generally fell into two categories. First, the assistant secretaries are viewed above their title, and as undersecretaries some argued, by their interagency partners. That may be true, but that selective compensation (not all assistant secretaries get elevated that way) hints at broader leadership and staffing problem. Second, increasing the direct reports to the Secretary would unnecessarily burden the Secretary of State. Let’s unpack that second objection.

The second argument against elevating geographic bureaucs to the level of the functional bureaus, at I’ve understood it, revolves around a point that hasn’t been openly discussed. The issue is obvious when you see it: the Secretary of Defense is hired as a manager of a large enterprise while the Secretary of State is not. Historically, the Secretary of State has been the second chief diplomat, behind the President, making any serious managerial role interference.

Opposition to an active managerial role by the Secretary of State, notably for operational functions, has been a historic problem and was the primary cause of fragmenting and separating the informational element of policy from the State Department in 1953. The view that a managerial role was a distraction to the Secretary of State’s foreign policy role was reiterated in 1957 when the Secretary of State rejected the President’s request to reintegrate the flailing information function into the Department. In recent decades, this seems evident in the State Department’s two Deputy Secretaries of State to manage the department. Admitedly, I don’t know enough about the division of labor there, but I always wondered how these positions align with the Under Secretary for Management.

A serious reassessment of the organizational chart of department that will help move the department toward a 21st Century foreign ministry is necessary. It could be worse. If we compare the situation today with the last major overhaul, we’re still ahead of the game.

In April 1944, a scathing review of the State Department and the need for reform appeared in the academic journal The American Political Scient Review. The authors were Walter Laves and Francis O. Wilcox, both had been well positioned for years to see the department in operation and both would go on to have substantial careers in foreign affairs. Normally, I share parts of the first two paragraphs of this article, but sharing the first three paragraphs in their entirety makes their opening even more applicable to the present. Unfortunately, it’s arguable that little editing is necessary to adapt this opening for a review written today.

For many years there has been widespread discussion of the need for reorganizing the Department of State. Students, publicists, members of Congress, and members of the Department itself have repeatedly pointed out that the Department has not been geared up to performing the functions required of the foreign office of a great twentieth-century world power.

The chief criticisms of the Department have been four: (1) that there was lacking a basic pattern of sound administrative organization, (2) that the type of personnel found both at home and abroad was inadequate for the job required in foreign affairs today, (3) that the Department was too far removed from the public and from Congress, and (4) that it was not prepared to provide leadership for, and maintain the necessary relations with, other federal agencies. As nearly every aspect of our life has come to be related to events and activities in other countries, the scope and subject-matter of the State Department's responsibilities have vastly expanded. Yet during the last three decades, when the importance of foreign relations has particularly increased, the operating structure of the Department has not been adequately reorganized. Some new functions have been undertaken, but this has resulted more from chance accretion· of responsibilities to existing persons or offices than from rational planning and assignment of tasks.

Great as the need for reorganization was before the United States entered the present war, it became increasingly serious as the responsibilities of global and total war devolved upon the federal government. The political tasks of the war program which fell to the State Department were difficult enough: to establish and stay on good terms with our Allies, to win more friends, and to weaken the enemy. But in addition the Department had the function of guiding a number of new agencies engaged in foreign activities.

In February 1944, just before this was published, the State Department began a substantial reorganization in two-parts. At the time, there was no need for Congressional action. The Secretary of State issued a Departmental Order, likely mostly written by the Under Secretary (then there was only one undersecretary), Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who had previously been chairman of US Steel.

What did the reorganization fix? Laves and Wilcox tell us that the “Department’s organizational chart reminded one somehow of the curious contours of the Department building itself.” This was a dig at the State, War, and Navy Building, now known as the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next to the White House. One reporter at the time described the building like this: “If you’re ever looking out of the window in this building, and you see a man on the street shudder when he looks toward it, you can bet your life that man is an architect.”⁠ The State Department didn’t move to the “New State Building,” previously known as the “New War Building” since the War Department had previously decamped to there before moving onward to the Pentagon, until January 1947, after George Marshall was sworn in as Secretary of State. The New State Building is no longer “new” and is now called the Harry S. Truman Building.

Back to the department at the time. It is easy to see why the “curious contours” were an apt analogy for the department’s organization chart which grew haphazardly over time. One assistant secretary’s portfolio included finance, aviation, Canada, Greenland, the Passport Division, the Division of International Conferences, and the Translating Bureau. Another assistant secretary was responsible for matters related to fisheries while also chairing the department’s Political Planning committee. Duplication, uncertainty, conflict, friction, and diffused responsibility was common. Economic affairs were handled by seven ranking officials while some divisions reported to two or more leaders. Division of International Communications reported to three different assistant secretaries.

The second part of the reorganization came in December 1944 with Stettinius as the Secretary of State. Further adjustments were made. For this readership, the key change was elevating the public information function from an administrative function to a new Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Relations.2

It took nearly half the century to update the State Department in the 20th Century. We’re just shy of a quarter through the 21st Century, so we have two decades to be better. (You take whatever solace you can when discussing the State Department, right?)

More Cowbell

For something completely different, here’s a palate cleanser. This is a “cow parade” I rode past a couple of years ago while I still lived in Switzerland. In a couple of weekends, it’ll be time for the same cow parade as they move them from their mountain meadows to the lowlands. It’s safe for work but watch your volume, the cow bells are loud. If you want “more cowbell,” you’ll get it here.

That their suggestion is fundamentally identical to recommendations made over many years, something I’ve labeled the “bring back USIA” genre. That repeated calls for nearly the same thing have been made over many years should have raised further questions about why change hasn’t happened.

Laves and Wilcox published two additional papers looking at the department in October 1944 and April 1945. If you’re reading this footnote, you may also be interested in my comment to others on my last post.

19. Israeli Commandos Carried Out Raid on Secret Weapons Site in Syria

Israeli Commandos Carried Out Raid on Secret Weapons Site in Syria

The missile production facility was destroyed in the attack, according to Western officials. Syrian state media reported that 18 people were killed in the strike.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/12/us/politics/israel-raid-syria-weapons.html

Damage on the outskirts of Masyaf, Syria, after Israeli strikes this week. Credit...Louai Beshara/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Helene Cooper Eric Schmitt Julian E. Barnes and Ronen Bergman

Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Julian E. Barnes reported from Washington, and Ronen Bergman from Tel Aviv.

Sept. 12, 2024

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Israel and Syria? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Israel carried out a commando raid in Syria on Sunday that obliterated a Hezbollah missile production facility near the Lebanese border, killing a number of people at the site, according to American and other Western officials.

The operation included a daring raid by Israeli special forces, who rappelled down from helicopters and apparently seized materials from the missile facility, the officials said. Ground forces were used in the attack because of its complexity and to recover information from the secret weapons site, the officials said, adding that there were no Israeli casualties.

The officials said the raid included airstrikes on the sprawling site, the Scientific Studies and Research Center, which is near Masyaf, in the country’s northwest.

Syria’s state news agency, SANA, reported on Monday that 18 people were killed and dozens more injured. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a group based in Britain that tracks the conflict in Syria, said the strikes hit an area containing a scientific research institute where work on developing short- and medium-range precision missiles is conducted.

Israel has declined to comment on the raid.

Before conducting the strike, Israel notified senior American officials, including Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the head of United States Central Command, according to a U.S. official. On Sunday, General Kurilla visited the underground war room of the Israel Defense Forces’ Northern Command, where he was presented with the military’s operational plans for Lebanon, according to the Israel Defense Forces.

Independent experts, Israeli officials and the U.S. government have described the institute in Syria as a center of weapons research and development, aided by the country’s ally Iran.

Israel has struck Masyaf, about 25 miles from the Mediterranean coast, several times in the past. In 2018, Israel assassinated a Syrian scientist who worked at the facility developing precision-guided munitions.

In fact, Israel has been gunning for the facility for many years, according to a former senior Israeli official who still advises the government and is familiar with Israeli efforts to neutralize the site.

Chemical weapons were developed there before Syria’s civil war began in 2011.

Years later, he said, Gen. Qassim Suleimani, who was leading Iranian foreign operations, urged President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to allow Iranian scientists to refurbish the weapons labs at the site, which had become a key missile and munitions manufacturing facility for Hezbollah. Israeli officials believe that Hezbollah wanted the facility to be in Syria because its leaders thought Israel would be less likely to strike Masyaf than sites in Lebanon.

One of the Western officials said Israel had attacked the facility several times but could not reach the fortified inner rooms with airstrikes alone. The decision to send in commandos, he said, was to make sure that this time, the site would be destroyed.

Middle East Crisis: Live Updates

Updated

Sept. 12, 2024, 9:25 a.m. ETSept. 12, 2024

The airstrikes late Sunday and early Monday amounted to one of the deadliest attacks in Syria in months. SANA said that in addition to the 18 dead, 37 people were injured in the strikes, including six who were in critical condition. The agency said that roads and water, power and telephone infrastructure were damaged.

Although the facility has, in the past, been associated with chemical weapons production, there was no such work being done there in recent years, officials said.

But the facility was making precision-guided missiles for Hezbollah, which some government analysts feared would allow the group to strike targets more accurately in northern Israel.

Writing in the “Syria Weekly” Substack, Charles Lister, the director of the Middle East Institute’s Syria and counterterrorism programs, offered more details about the Israeli operation.

Mr. Lister said that an initial round of Israeli airstrikes destroyed at least four Syrian military positions around Masyaf, including an air defense site.

A second round of strikes hit a building in the complex that connects to underground tunnels, he said.

In the operation’s third phase, Mr. Lister said, several Israeli helicopters crossed into Syrian airspace and dropped off several dozen Israeli commandos on the outskirts of the bunkers.

As the Israeli soldiers advanced on the bunkers, Israeli drones attacked Syrian military troops who were rushing to the scene, he said.

Officials briefed on the operation said the main goal of the ground assault was to destroy the facility. An important secondary objective, officials said, was to collect intelligence about Hezbollah’s weapons development.

Mr. Lister said the facilities in Masyaf and in the neighboring town of Mahruseh have been central to Syria’s development of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, barrel bombs and thermobaric munitions, weapons with special explosive mixtures typically used to destroy buildings and tunnels.

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent. More about Helene Cooper

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 13, 2024, Section A, Page 5 of the New York edition with the headline: Israeli Commandos Destroyed Facility For Hezbollah Missiles in Syria Raid. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

20. Strangers in the Motherland: The Dynamics of Russia's Foreign Recruitment

Excerpts:

Having laid out the structural issues that make foreign troops desirable to both the central government and provincial governments and the evidence that provincial governments play an outsized role in these campaigns, what is the future of foreign troops in the Ukrainian war? In places where the presence of foreign recruiters has become a legal matter or a source of controversy, such as South Asia, efforts have likely been curtailed, or at least are operating at a lower level to avoid further bad publicity and international scrutiny. This latter is likely occurring in Cuba currently. It is very unlikely that foreign recruitment will be curtailed, though, as the provincial governments that likely run such operations have a strong incentive to continue them. And if the Russian government is preparing for the war to stretch on for years, keeping these networks operational will be useful in case a greater reliance on foreign troops becomes needed to keep the army staffed without further mobilization.

Most likely, efforts will shift to countries with lax enforcement or where officials can be more easily persuaded to look the other way. This may include countries that are allied with Russia already, or where there are active conflicts that have produced an excess of soldiers and a dearth of money. The number of foreign soldiers may serve as an indicator of how precarious the manpower situation is getting, with deeper economic and political implications within Russia. More broadly, it is indicative of the strains Russia is enduring in its effort to restore its superpower status.

Strangers in the Motherland: The Dynamics of Russia's Foreign Recruitment - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Harry Stevens · September 13, 2024

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union sent thousands of troops and military advisors abroad to fight in foreign wars. Today, Russia recruits thousands of foreigners to fight in its war in Ukraine. For Russia, a nation with a reputation for endless manpower, this marks a substantial change, highlighting the struggle the Kremlin is having balancing military and civilian economic commitments.

Russia’s foreign recruitment schemes are likely funded and operated by provincial governments, rather than the Kremlin itself, induced by the pressure of regional recruitment systems that force provincial leaders to choose between losing their jobs or slowly feeding their labor force into the meat grinder. Based on an analysis of operations in Cuba, I assess that some states hide their involvement or approval of foreign recruiting to avoid sanctions.

While foreign recruitment accounts for only a small portion of total manpower, and many countries have broken up prominent recruiting efforts, the economic benefits of foreign troops are almost certainly too great to be abandoned. So long as the Kremlin continues to struggle to keep both the front lines and the factories running smoothly, foreigners will continue to appear in Russian uniform.

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The Sources of Foreign Recruits

Based on journalism, reports from nongovernmental organizations, and governmental statements, Russia has conducted recruiting efforts in Cuba, Syria, Central Asia (both in the region and among the large migrant worker population in Russia), and in South Asian countries like Nepal and India. There have been rumors and some reporting of recruitment from additional countries, but a lack of details and evidence makes them unfit for analysis. First, we examine the scale of recruitment operations.

In Cuba, 200 people have been positively confirmed to have joined the Russian military between the summer and fall of 2023, while Cuban-American nongovernmental organizations estimate the figure to be at least 750 and potentially more than 1,000. Numbers in Syria are less clear and less current, but the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported in January 2023 that 2,000 Syrian army soldiers had been dispatched to aid the Russian military. There are no estimates for the number of Central Asians who have joined the Russian military, but between the countries themselves and the five million strong migrant population of Central Asians in Russia, it seems a conservative estimate that several thousand may have joined the Russian military. There is a well-established history of Central Asian people (particularly men) migrating to Russia for work, and many could be attracted to the Russian military with the offer of citizenship and high pay.

Nepal has proved another hotspot for recruiting. Deeply poor, and with a reputation of providing men for the British Army, the nation has become fertile ground for the Russian military. Claims vary widely, with the government reporting that 200 or so have joined, while opposition politicians claim the true figure is about 15,000. Independent activists claim that they’ve been contacted by 2,000 families seeking to get in touch with relatives and children who they believe are in the Russian military. The true figure appears likely to be somewhere in the mid-thousands, with government claims being much too low, while opposition reports of 15,000 too high to be taken at face value without documentation. The middling estimate is supported by the testimony of a Nepali prisoner of war serving with the Russian military, who claimed that 3,000 to 4,000 Nepalis joined up

Estimates for India are spotty at best. The Indian government claimed that between 30 and 40 Indian nationals were serving in the Russian military. This appears at odds with the sheer size of the nation, as well as interviews with a translator who worked with the Russian military; he reported that he personally oversaw the enlistment of 70 to 100 Indians and that there were many other similar recruitment centers across Russia. If we believe this translator, a conservative estimate of Indians in the Russian army would number in the hundreds. Taken together, this handful of nations has likely contributed around 10,000 recruits to the Russian military, most of them in 2023 and early 2024, when these articles were written. When we consider that there are almost certainly recruitment schemes in other countries, and that our numbers do not include most of 2024, the true number of recruits may well be closer to 20,000. These numbers are not large in an absolute sense, accounting for four to five brigades, and the quality of troops has not been elite, but modern great powers have rarely had to rely on foreigners to fill their front lines, even to this extent.

Organization of Recruiting Campaigns

There are multiple pieces of evidence indicating that many of these recruitment schemes are operated by provincial governments rather than the Kremlin. First and most blatantly, a recruiting campaign in Kazakhstan linked back to a website owned by the government of the Sakhalin Republic, a sparsely populated province in Russia’s Far East. Beyond the explicit evidence, Russia’s provinces have a strong interest in minimizing the number of men who leave to join the military. This is especially true for sparsely populated provinces like the Sakhalin Republic (whose population has declined by a full third since 1989), where losing a significant number of men may endanger the viability of underpopulated communities.

For its part, the Kremlin would likely prefer to offload recruitment duties to the extent possible, allowing it to focus fully on fighting the war. One could easily imagine an arrangement between the Kremlin and local governments whereby the local government agrees to fund and operate foreign recruiting operations, with any recruits counting toward the provincial recruiting quota. Provincial politicians and officials occupy their positions at the whim of the Kremlin and could easily be removed by means constitutional or otherwise if they fail to provide their share of manpower. At the same time, recruiting locals to fight can often prove difficult, and the high risk of casualties is a demographic hazard to the long-term outlook of less populated areas. So, a natural solution would be to recruit from abroad, and this appears to have happened.

One indication that these operations have been run by local governments, without the full resources of the Kremlin, is that many recruitment efforts have been run in a slapdash manner and in ways that endanger Russia’s international position for minimal gain. These efforts often operate through networks that recruit civilian labor, which results in criminal and fraudulent behavior.

The best example of this is India. As mentioned, Russian recruitment centers in India yielded a three-digit number of recruits, while operating as human trafficking operations. India has proven a valuable friend for the Kremlin at a time when those are few and far between. Russian oil exports to India have massively increased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and New Delhi has consistently refused to publicly condemn Russia. It wouldn’t make sense, then, for the Kremlin to risk that relationship over less than a battalion’s worth of manpower. But for a small Russian province, that manpower may stave off another wave of mobilization, with all the economic and political damage that comes with it.

Another example of a small recruiting operation is Cuba, where the government claimed to have discovered and dismantled a human trafficking ring that was bringing on Cuban citizens to fight for Russia, which had apparently deceived Cubans into believing that they would be working civilian jobs. Some have questioned this narrative, pointing out that some Cubans in the Russian military and their relatives posted pictures of their service, not the kind of thing that a trafficked person would be likely to do. Additionally, reporting from the last few weeks has indicated that Cubans are still volunteering, trickling into Russia. These could be smaller operations that escaped authorities, or they could represent a deal between Russia and Cuba to rework the system in Havana’s favor in exchange for permission to recruit.

If the Cuban state is turning a blind eye to Russian recruitment, or is even getting something in return, it is understandable why it would claim otherwise. Beset by one of the worst economic crises in its history, the Cuban state is desperate for money and resources, which a manpower-hungry Kremlin might be willing to provide. On the other side, the pretense that Russian recruiting operations are occurring without the knowledge of the state may create a facade that keeps the European Union from sanctioning an already unstable Cuba. With Russia largely recruiting in poorer countries, similar covert arrangements may be present.

Motives and Funding

While the Kremlin and some people outside Russia assert that the nation has nearly endless manpower, much of the data points to difficult choices as the war drags on, with shortages only averted with ever more radical economic incentives or another round of mobilization. It would be fair to say that people have two broad motivations to join the military: patriotism or economic gain. These motivations are both present in varying degrees, but they represent the decisive factors for nearly every volunteer. With the war having raged for nearly two and a half years, it is similarly fair to say that most of those who are primarily motivated by patriotism have already joined up. Nor are there many unemployed people who will join the military because they need a job. Unemployment in Russia hit an all-time low of 2.6 percent in April. So, the largest source of soldiers will likely need to come from employed men. With the country already short of nearly five million workers, further recruitment at home will necessarily come at the cost of business efficiency, with many enterprises likely to close for lack of staff. This points to another reason foreign recruitment has proven attractive. While a Russian worker who enlists deprives the economy of labor, a foreigner who enlists has no impact on the Russian labor sector.

Nor are foreign recruits always paid the 200,000 rubles a month that a Russian private is entitled to. In deeply poor countries, much smaller sums can be attractive. One Nepali man, Sandip Thapaliya, was paid just 75,000 rubles a month. Even for those who are paid comparably, it is unclear if foreign soldiers and their families are entitled to the same payments upon injury or death. Several Indian families whose sons died in Ukraine allegedly received payment from the Russian state, but it is difficult to say whether this is common or if India’s status as a major partner led President Vladimir Putin to take this step. Wounded soldiers and families who are Russian have had trouble getting payouts, so it stands to reason that foreigners, who lack any contacts or familiarity with the Russian bureaucracy, would have even less chance of securing compensation.

By that logic, foreign troops may be substantially cheaper than Russian ones. The Nepalese soldier mentioned above was killed in Bakhmut, and all his family received was a phone call. With death payments to the families of Russian soldiers surpassing 14 million rubles, and death so common on the battlefield, the savings from foreign soldiers are likely significant.

Looking Forward

Having laid out the structural issues that make foreign troops desirable to both the central government and provincial governments and the evidence that provincial governments play an outsized role in these campaigns, what is the future of foreign troops in the Ukrainian war? In places where the presence of foreign recruiters has become a legal matter or a source of controversy, such as South Asia, efforts have likely been curtailed, or at least are operating at a lower level to avoid further bad publicity and international scrutiny. This latter is likely occurring in Cuba currently. It is very unlikely that foreign recruitment will be curtailed, though, as the provincial governments that likely run such operations have a strong incentive to continue them. And if the Russian government is preparing for the war to stretch on for years, keeping these networks operational will be useful in case a greater reliance on foreign troops becomes needed to keep the army staffed without further mobilization.

Most likely, efforts will shift to countries with lax enforcement or where officials can be more easily persuaded to look the other way. This may include countries that are allied with Russia already, or where there are active conflicts that have produced an excess of soldiers and a dearth of money. The number of foreign soldiers may serve as an indicator of how precarious the manpower situation is getting, with deeper economic and political implications within Russia. More broadly, it is indicative of the strains Russia is enduring in its effort to restore its superpower status.

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Harry Stevens is a graduate of the University of Chicago who specializes in Russian affairs and defense economics and conducts research with the Center for the National Interest. He has produced Barbarossa: Apocalypse in the East, a popular history podcast, and currently works in AI.

Image: The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Harry Stevens · September 13, 2024

21. In The Kill Zone: The Life and Times of Willie Merkerson (Part 7)

Another fascinating story. Not so much about Willie Mewrkerson in this one.

In The Kill Zone: The Life and Times of Willie Merkerson (Part 7)

https://thehighside.substack.com/p/in-the-kill-zone-the-life-and-times-229?utm

Exfiltration

Sean D. Naylor and Jack Murphy

Sep 13, 2024

∙ Paid

A C-141 Starlifter in flight. The paratroop jump doors are located on either side of the aircraft toward the rear of the fuselage. (U.S. Air Force photo)

The flatbed truck raced toward the Khartoum airport tarmac just as the hulking U.S. Air Force cargo jet touched down and slowed to a stop.

With the aircraft engines still running, the truck backed up to the paratroop jump door on the side of the plane. The CIA officers on the vehicle scrambled to unload four large wooden boxes from the back of the truck into the jet.

Covered in the bright orange packaging used for diplomatic mail, each box was just big enough to fit a grown man inside. That was fortunate, because that’s exactly what the “diplomatic” cargo consisted of: four undercover Israeli spies the Americans were desperately trying to fly to safety before the Sudanese and their new Libyan allies figured out the ruse.

But despite weeks of meticulous planning, the life-and-death mission now hung in the balance.

Moments before, the CIA station had intercepted a transmission from Sudanese security forces indicating that they knew what the agency was up to. A Sudanese military helicopter was inbound, along with other security personnel.

Sitting in an unmarked car in the airport parking lot, Willie Merkerson heard the station’s warning about the intercept come across the radio. Using the covert communications system with which each CIA vehicle was equipped, he alerted his colleagues in the truck.

“They’re on to you,” he said. “They’re closing in on you.”

The intercept made even the usually unflappable CIA station chief Milt Bearden anxious. “Oh, we’ve got a big problem now,” he thought.

From the U.S. Embassy, Bearden radioed his men: “Get them on the plane now!”

With the help of the Air Force crew, it didn’t take long to manhandle the boxes into the aircraft. The jump door slammed shut. The plane began to move.

There was no time to spare. “The security forces were arriving at the gate now and they said, ‘Where’s the aircraft?’” recalled Merkerson, whose vantage point gave him a clear view of the jet.

The C-141 taxied toward the main runway. Maybe the mission was going to succeed after all.

Then the pilots in the cockpit got a chilling call from the tower: “You are not cleared for takeoff…”

The ‘go’ moment

By the time Bearden had brought the Mossad officers into the embassy the night before the exfiltration effort to get them into the boxes, the mission to safeguard the Israelis had involved almost every officer in the CIA’s Khartoum station. “Most everyone had something to do with it,” Bearden told The High Side. “They were all aware that we were at the ‘go’ moment.”

Beyond the station, however, other than the four Mossad operatives whose lives were at stake, the only person in Sudan who knew what was going on was Hume Horan, the U.S. ambassador, recently returned from his trip to the United States. Even David Shinn, the embassy’s number two official – and the man who had been running the embassy while Horan was making his way back from Washington – was unaware of what was happening. “I knew nothing about it at the time,” he told The High Side.

The gravity of the situation made the atmosphere in the station “very stressful” in the days leading up to the exfiltration attempt, said Mike Shanklin, a newly arrived case officer who said he was not involved in the operation. “Nobody was blasé … Not a soul, oh, no, no, no. Fuck this up? Gone. And in an op like that, anything can go wrong.”

The plan for getting the boxes out of Sudan was in some ways simply the reverse of that for getting them in. The Air Force C-141 Starlifter that had delivered the boxes (along with Jesse, a CIA technical adviser) had arrived after the Sudanese approved a seemingly routine request from the embassy for a supply flight. For the exfiltration, the embassy made a similarly prosaic request.

“We didn’t have to persuade anybody,” Bearden said. “We just really made it all through the normal channel: the flight application, landing permits, embassy supply flight.” A non-CIA embassy support official filed the request, which the Sudanese granted he said.

“We had permission for what was a routine supply flight … coming to pick up communications equipment or something from the embassy arriving on that morning,” Bearden told The Team House. The only difference was that this time the boxes would contain the Mossad officers for whom the Sudanese authorities had spent the previous few weeks on a block-by-block hunt.

After departing Khartoum, the plane would then fly directly to Nairobi, Kenya, where the Israelis would be met by local CIA and Mossad representatives.

The plan for the morning of the mission was to put the boxes holding the Mossad operatives onto a truck that would drive to the airport, where they would be loaded directly onto a U.S. Air Force C-141B transport aircraft.

With the plans made and the boxes ready, there was no point waiting any longer.

“When the time came, I moved these guys into the embassy,” Bearden said, adding that he waited until nighttime on a weekend to do so.

The Israelis would spend just one night at the embassy, and it was only at this point that the CIA men gave the Mossad officers some basic training on how to function in the boxes, according to Bearden. (Merkerson, however, said the Israelis needed more extensive training on “how to breathe [and] how to relax” while confined.)

“We got them all trained up,” Merkerson said. The Mossad officers were as ready as they would ever be.

There was still time for a drink in the chief of station’s office, according to Bob Baer, who recalled sitting in there with the Israelis that night as Bearden kept everyone’s spirits up with a stream of jokes. “They were just killing time ‘til they got out,” he said.

“They were there some hours at night,” Bearden said. “And then in the boxes and out we go.”

Life and death, but “low key”

The four Mossad officers climbed into their crates. CIA personnel sealed up the orange diplomatic pouches around them and moved the four large packages onto a flatbed truck.

Two CIA officers climbed aboard: the support chief – “a smart young guy,” as Bearden described him, who handled administrative and logistics tasks in the station – and Jesse, who would be flying out with the boxes. A non-U.S. citizen embassy driver was behind the wheel, completely unaware of the nature of his cargo, according to Bearden.

There was no question of Bearden going with them. He was too well known to Sudanese security forces and would have drawn attention to the truck. “They would have said, ‘What the hell is he doing there? We’d better take a hard look at this,’” he said. That would have been the opposite of the humdrum routine movement the station’s officers were attempting to portray.

“We wanted it to be so low key,” Bearden said. “A repeat of every time we did a diplomatic pouch delivery.” So, to further that aim, Bearden stayed behind, monitoring proceedings by radio.

The truck pulled out of the embassy compound. The station was in touch with the C-141, which was inbound and on schedule. So far, so good. But each officer involved knew that, with the city in a state of near anarchy, a myriad things could go wrong en route to the airport.

“This [was] high risk,” said Shanklin. “That was a very, very complex operation.”

The mission was taking place during the hottest period of the year in Khartoum, which lasts from early April to early July, when temperatures routinely soar past 100 degrees Fahrenheit. This particular spring morning in 1985 was even hotter than usual, according to former CIA officer Jack Kassinger, who was waiting to receive the flight and its passengers in Nairobi.

“A vehicle breakdown or delay en route would cause very serious problems for our precious cargo,” he writes in an account of his role in the Winter-Spring 2024 edition of “The Intelligencer,” a print-only publication of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. “The medical staff at [headquarters] figured the men could sustain the heat for no more than an hour and a half while enroute [sic] to the airport.”

To Bearden, the heat was just one of many things to worry about. “It was hot every morning,” he said. “It’s the hottest capital city in the world. [But] we were obviously worried about hijackers, [or if] the truck breaks down [or] a gun goes [off]. All those things go through your mind.”

And that was before the truck reached the airport, where smooth, swift action would be required. “We were going to have to land, load and take off before Khartoum tower figured out what was happening in front of their very eyes,” he said.

The drive to the airport was six miles or less, Bearden estimated. The station had to carefully synchronize the truck’s arrival with the landing of the plane to minimize the amount of time the men in the boxes were sitting in the hot sun, vulnerable to any curious Sudanese airport officials. Therefore, the timing of the truck’s departure was determined once the station knew the plane was in the air. “We knew exactly what time it was going to be wheels down [and] we knew the traffic pattern in the morning,” Bearden said.

As the truck made its way to the airport, the station kept in touch with both it and the C-141 by secure radio, to ensure that the truck’s arrival coincided with the plane landing. More than 6,500 miles away at CIA headquarters, “three or four” CIA officers clustered around a secure telephone in the Africa Division offices getting “minute-by-minute” updates on the operation’s progress from Khartoum station, said Jim Senner, who was one of those officers, having just returned from his visit to Sudan.

Khartoum International Airport in a photo taken earlier this century. It was from here that the CIA planned to spirit four Mossad officers out of Sudan under the noses of the local authorities.

One CIA officer was already positioned at the airport: Willie Merkerson, who had spent the previous 72 hours keeping watch on the presidential guard and the 144^th Special Forces Battalion, which were both based beside the airport. “My job was to monitor them for three days and then report in a timely fashion on all their activities and their reaction to anything we’re doing,” he said

With his home close to the airport, Merkerson conducted most of this surveillance from his nondescript vehicle in the airport parking lot, he said. “My car had no diplomatic plates on it,” he added. While he had no ability to intercept radio or telephone conversations in the car, Merkerson did have secure communications back to the station to report what he was seeing and receive updates.

The other CIA officers were similarly equipped, according to Merkerson. “All of us had comms: cov comm – covert communication,” he said. “It can be taken out of the car easily; you could carry it in the house at night. And we could speak to each other on different guard frequencies, and also on the main [channel] back to the station.”

A standoff at the gate

The truck reached the airport and drove around to what Bearden described as a “kind of flimsy gate on the far side of the airfield.” There it was stopped by some nervous-looking guards.

In the wake of the coup a few weeks previously, “everybody was new at what they were doing” in the Sudanese security forces, Bearden told The High Side. This apparently included the guards, who refused to let the truck through and seemed confused as to what to do next.

At first, the support chief flashed the Arabic-language ID card that former President Jaafar Nimeiri’s State Security Organization had given him and a few colleagues. But as Baer had discovered on the day of the coup, those cards had outlived their usefulness. The gate guards stood firm, unimpressed by credentials issued by the recently ousted regime.

The standoff at the gate was costing the CIA men time they could not afford to lose. The C-141 was nearing Khartoum. Bearden was closely tracking its progress. Over the radio, he told his men to be aggressive.

“I said, ‘Just force it through, stick your ID in their face, drive the truck up to the gate and push if you have to,’” he said.

The driver stepped lightly on the gas pedal, inching the truck ever forward while the support chief did the talking. The guards seemed at a loss. The Americans were taking advantage of the chaos that had engulfed even those forces that were supporting the coup.

Finally, the guards gave in. “These guards … looked kind of confused and opened the gate, and then [they] were out on the tarmac,” Bearden said.

But with the jet now in sight, signals intelligence personnel at the embassy monitoring local security forces’ radio traffic suddenly became alarmed: The Sudanese had figured out something was going down at the airport. Using the covert communication system, the CIA station warned the men at the airport.

Sitting in his car in the airport parking lot, Merkerson had already noticed some worrying signs. “There was a lot of unusual activities going on,” he said. Then the message from the station came across the radio.

“I heard on one of the guard frequencies that there’s a contingent of security people pursuing the aircraft,” he said. “Our plan had been compromised … They had tracked it to the airport and they knew that we were going to use the airplane to get them out.”

In case they had missed it, Merkerson immediately relayed the warning to his colleagues in the truck.

As the C-141 turned into its final approach, the truck headed straight for the runway. Just then, the embassy signals intelligence personnel picked up a transmission about a Sudanese military helicopter inbound to the airport.

Merkerson recalled the voice of “somebody with command authority” – almost certainly Bearden – coming over the radio at that point saying, “Take off, don’t wait for clearance, and be ready for a disaster if it comes,” he said.

The boxes were soon loaded onto the plane.

But as the jump door closed and the plane taxied toward the point where it would turn to take off, the tower radioed the C-141 cockpit, saying, “you’re not cleared for takeoff,” Bearden said.

With four lives at stake, the senior pilot kept his cool and thought fast, in an exchange that Bearden and his team were monitoring back at the embassy. “He said, ‘Roger, Khartoum Tower, thank you very much, cleared for takeoff,’” Bearden recalled. “And the tower kept coming back and saying, ‘No, sir! No, sir! You’re not cleared!’ He said, ‘Thank you very much, Khartoum Tower, cleared for takeoff.’ And he made the turn at about 90 knots and then the next thing, he was airborne.”

The Sudanese government was in such disarray that there was no chance of its poorly equipped air force giving chase. The CIA officers breathed a collective sigh of relief. Almost 40 years later, Bearden remains grateful to the “amazing, cool pilot” whose courage and quick thinking saved the operation.

The truck returned to the embassy, where Bearden waited for one final call from the C-141. When it came, he headed upstairs to the ambassador’s office on the top floor. “I went in to brief Horan,” he recalled. “I said, ‘They just cleared Sudanese airspace. All done.”

At that point the station held what Bearden described as “a little bit of a wheels-up party.”

The seal of the Mossad, the legendary Israeli intelligence service.

Money belts and grilled zebra

When the C-141 landed in Nairobi, Kassinger, an officer posted to the CIA station in the Kenyan capital, was there to meet it.

According to his account, he carried a “deep-cavity Samsonite briefcase” containing four flight suits that the Israelis were to wear as they walked out through customs and immigration. (The CIA had already given them official alias passports in Khartoum.)

But when Kassinger greeted the Mossad officers on the plane after it had landed, he noticed one of them fiddling with a money belt. Further inquiry revealed that the Israelis were wearing a total of four such belts. To avoid having the Israelis carry them on their person as they passed through immigration and passport control Kassinger placed the belts in his briefcase, which he then stashed in his car.

After the Israelis had emerged from immigration without incident, Kassinger had no time to return their money belts before they boarded the bus that drove them to the downtown Hilton hotel. Back at his car, he quickly counted the cash. It came to “well over” $1 million in $100 bills, he writes, adding that after mulling the possibilities, he passed the money to a Mossad agent waiting in the car park.

Bearden was skeptical when informed of Kassinger’s account regarding the money belts, noting that he had already retrieved cash from the Israelis in several currencies when he had them empty their pockets upon arriving at his home. “I’m having big trouble with that story,” he said. If it were true, “that got past us,” he said. “Khartoum never saw any of that.”

What Bearden and Kassinger did agree on is where the Israelis celebrated their newfound freedom: The Carnivore restaurant near Nairobi’s Wilson Airport, which was famous for serving a wide variety of game meats.

“That evening they were out at this wonderful barbecue place outside Nairobi eating grilled zebra,” Bearden told The Team House.

Kassinger writes that it was actually the next evening that he and his wife took the C-141 crew members to Carnivore. Midway through their meal, the waiter brought four bottles of champagne to the table, and indicated to the other side of the restaurant, where the Mossad officers waved “and raised their glasses in our direction,” he writes. “It was amazing how well and how fast the Israelis could get around in the region.”

One last favor

Despite the success of the exfiltration, the Mossad had one last favor to ask of the CIA in Khartoum. The Israelis realized that they had left some important communications gear at their safe house and wanted the Americans to retrieve it for them.

“I was instructed to try and get their commo gear from their house,” Bearden told The High Side. The chief of station said he took it upon himself to try to get the equipment, and brought along his deputy, Alan Platt. They drove to within a couple of blocks of the site, parked, and continued to the house on foot.

“We wandered over and the thing was padlocked – chains and padlocks on gates and doors,” Bearden said. A young Sudanese soldier stood guard outside.

Bearden decided to ignore the guard and tried a key from his pocket on the padlock. The key didn’t work and only served to attract the guard’s attention. “We just kind of said, ‘Well, thanks a lot, wrong house,’ and got out.”

However, Merkerson told The High Side that officers from the station did eventually gain access to the safe house, where they discovered a trove of forged documents. “They had a whole lot of American passports, American stuff, Canadian – all kinds of shit like that,” he said. “We’re talking hundreds of documents.” From Merkerson’s description, the handful of U.S. passports that Bearden had initially confiscated from the Mossad officers represented a tiny proportion of their stash.

In most cases, if the U.S. government caught a foreign intelligence service using forged American passports, there would be repercussions, according to Baer. “Using fake American passports is strictly a no-no,” he said. “It’s something normally we would complain about, but I’m sure we didn’t.”

Bearden confirmed Baer’s suspicion. “I never heard of any complaint,” even though the Israelis’ use of U.S. passports “was all duly reported to Washington,” he said. “There are certain things people don’t want to know.”

To be continued in Part 8

22. Hook, Message, Call to Action: Advice on Journal Article Writing for Dummies—by a Dummy

My favorite four word mantra: Read. Think. Write. Repeat.

Hook, Message, Call to Action: Advice on Journal Article Writing for Dummies—by a Dummy - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Leyton Summerlin · September 12, 2024

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Like a personal journal, the Army’s journals are intended to capture insights, experiences, or ideas and then reflect on them, improving us collectively as a service.

However, contributing these experiences or insights can be intimidating for several reasons. Over the last year, I have learned much about writing by reading almost everything the Army’s journals have published—the good and the bad. I’ve also had the opportunity to meet and learn from some phenomenal writers and editors whose advice I have collected and want to share to help soldiers with great ideas who may simply need another perspective on writing to get started.

I recently spent three weeks traveling the Army, talking about professional discourse and the importance of the Army’s journals. At least once a day, someone would say, “Not all of us have a writing background or a degree like you do. It’s not that easy to just get started.” Well, let me enlighten you on my academic background. I barely passed high school, failed junior English twice, and lied or cheated my way out of any writing assignment I ever had in school because I hated its rigidity and subjectivity. My teachers only passed me because they didn’t want to deal with me for another year. Incoming cliché—if I can do it, anyone can. If you’re like me and struggle with conforming your ideas to what you were told all writing should look like, this different approach to formatting may help.

The traditional five-paragraph essay we all learned in school has a place, but the Army’s journals aren’t always it. Besides, the only person who has an incentive to read your stuffy academic essay is your teacher—they’re getting paid to do it. A journal article—especially an article for the Army’s professional journals—doesn’t necessarily have the same rules, requirements, or intent as other types of writing. You wouldn’t write a unit SOP or the way your high school English teacher taught you to write for class assignments. Why write a journal article that way? Form should follow function, and a journal article should aim to capture your idea, experience, lesson learned, or insight with a relatable feeling and the intent to drive action. Instead of an introduction, three-body, and conclusion format, I recommend we look at our journal articles as hook, message, and call to action.

By adopting this format, you can, as Dr. Trent Lythgoe once encouraged me, “start from a point of no constraints.” The first draft doesn’t need to be perfect; it just needs to have a structure that presents your ideas. The Harding Fellows and journal editors are there to help you polish your work.

The Hook

The editor-in-chief at the Modern War Institute, John Amble, often reminds readers that your hook is your opportunity to grab readers by the lapels, shake them, and tell them they need to listen to you for the next ten minutes. The book Smart Brevity also tells us we have twenty-six seconds to capture our audience’s attention. If you live in modern society, this sentiment will be intuitive and you will have witnessed ever dwindling attention spans as content is served to information consumers in shorter and shorter bursts. If we take this claim as truth and apply it to our writing, your first twenty-six seconds (including the title) is your hook and must all but literally grab the reader. It has to compel the reader to want more and address why they are reading the article.

On a practical level, two considerations stand out when it comes to crafting an effective hook. First, the hook must answer one question: Why does the reader care? Remember, your audience is not getting paid to read your work. You must demonstrate to them that they should want to read it—quickly.

Second, similar to fishing, we can dress a hook to further appeal to a specific audience. Make it intriguing, start with a question or a puzzle to be solved (the Army has plenty), or paint an applicable picture that makes the article’s purpose even more enticing.

The following is an excellent example of a hook that lures the reader with a well-painted picture from. It is the opening two paragraphs of an article written by two junior officers, Iain Herring and Gavin Berke, exploring the requirement for a light, maneuverable platform to defend against unmanned aircraft systems. Consider the way these two paragraphs draw in the article’s audience with purpose.

Imagine you are an infantry platoon leader, moving with your soldiers in a tactical formation toward your objective. Suddenly, indirect fire is raining down on your position. You have a plan to react to indirect fire, and you order your formation to execute the plan. Your soldiers are well trained and well led by their capable squad leaders, and they start to move, immediately and rapidly, from the impact area. But as you move, you realize the indirect fire is walking with you—your soldiers can’t escape it. What you haven’t realized is that there is a small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) observing your movement, allowing the indirect fire to follow you and your soldiers through the woods.

Now imagine the same scenario, except this time you have a mobile counter-UAS (C-UAS) system that can track and shoot UAS on the move. Once again, your platoon is engaged with indirect fire. And once again, your platoon has a plan and executes it on your order. Your light, maneuverable C-UAS vehicle can move with you, detect the UAS observing your platoon’s movement, and neutralize it. Within a matter of seconds, the indirect fire ceases. Your platoon can safely regroup and continue mission.

The Message

What are you telling the audience? Is it a concept you want to share, a lesson you learned, or a unique experience others can benefit from? The message is the pertinent details of your article and, like the hook, is not restricted to a particular framework or prescribed paragraph count. Here are some examples of journal articles that showcase different ways to convey a message:

Concept — Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell Payne’s article in Armor, “Bullets or Weapons: Rethinking Army’s Approach to SUAS Integration,” is an excellent example of sharing a conceptual idea on how the Army should reframe the way the Army views drones.

Lesson Learned — Major David Ellington’s article “Division Sustainment at NTC Rotation 24-03” from Army Sustainment captures valuable lessons learned about deploying and sustaining a division.

Experience — “The Fighting Platoon Sergeant Concept: Leveraging the Experience of a Platoon’s Senior NCO to Control the Assault Element,” by Captain Curtis Garner in Infantry is a great example of capturing an experience others can benefit from.

(Pro tip from Major Ryan Van Wie: Select some of the most impactful domains from the DOTMLPF-P solutions to frame your article. Major Van Wie’s advice can help guide and shape your article and tees up the call to action very nicely. Sergeant Major Shane Short’s article “Enabling Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations,” from Army Communicator, demonstrates this very well.)

The Call to Action

The call to action is the biggest separator between a traditional essay and a journal article—and arguably the most important one. This section of the article must answer the question: Who do you want to do what? Answering this question in an article truly drives change—especially the more well thought out and researched it is. The call to action can almost always be written directly and plainly if an article is shaped around the elements of the DOTMLPF-P framework. One blatant but good example is then-Master Sergeant Eric Tysinger’s “Force Management and Organizational Capability in Joint Base Religious Support” from the May 2024 issue of the Chaplain Journal.

For example, if you think a unit would benefit from integrating a particular piece of equipment, describing what it can do for the organization in the message and why it would be important can be easier than writing the call to action. It’s easy to say, “And in conclusion, my unit should have EUDs with ATAK software because it will provide operational advantages to adjacent forces and ultimately increase lethality.” The call to action needs to answer how the Army can implement this change and provide a course of action for the reader. Where is the money coming from, and how much will it cost? What changes to the MTOE need to be made? Is there a training plan required? How does this impact other parts of the organization? Is there a policy that needs to be changed to facilitate implementation?

Even if an article is written about a unique experience regarding something intellectual, there should still be a call to action. What do you want people to do with the information you just shared? Always make your journal article as actionable as possible. I recommend a brief conclusion to quickly summarize your points and lead to a solid and explicit call to action.

General Tips

Never write solely to say you were published. At best, it’s cringy, and people can read right through it. Write because you care about improving the organization or helping others.

There is no prescribed number of sentences per paragraph or paragraphs per subsection or article. Whatever rules are in the way of getting your ideas out there, either forget them or break them.

When I met Chago Zapata, the editor-in-chief of the NCO Journal, he gave me some great advice regarding the length and word count of our work: “A journal article should only be as long as it needs to be.” Say what you need to say and keep the reader engaged—no more, no less. To improve brevity, I recommend following Dr. Lythgoe, an instructor at the Command and General Staff College, on LinkedIn, where he provides a thankless public service to help writers be more concise in their work. Command Sergeant Major Vincent Simonetti’s article at MWI on achieving training proficiency with drones is also a good example of a straightforward and to-the-point article.

(Pro tip from Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Griffiths: You should be able to read the first sentence of each paragraph and generally understand what the article is about. This advice is great to remember before, during, and after writing to help structure your piece, ensure alignment as it evolves, and conduct final quality checks on coherency when you’re done.

I advise any author to ensure your work is adequately researched (this need not be a daunting task, most of all if you write on subjects you have deep experience with), appropriately rooted in doctrine, and written with your personality and passion. No one who actively reads the Army’s journals or similar publications gets paid to do so—make sure it has your voice and doesn’t read like a textbook. There is nothing more boring than reading an article that seems as if the author was clearly bored while writing it. Make it a goal to ensure your journal article is never read with the voice of Ben Stein from Ferris Bueller’s Day Off as a narrator—give it your personality.

Want To Win the Next War?

Writing is a learned skill, like throwing grenades, shooting tanks, or fixing those pesky S3 shop printers. Anyone can do it, and we all get better with repetition. This is why Army University Press and the Combined Arms Center of the Training and Doctrine Command have just published a special issue of Military Review, “Professional Military Writing.” It is available online now, with eighteen thousand hard copies about to be sent out across the entire Army—approximately five per battalion.

This guide to professional writing is packed with practical advice and tools to help individuals improve their writing skills and get published. It also guides leaders in fostering professional discourse and generating military thought within their formations. The Harding Project guide to professional writing is a resource that provides practical advice and tools to help individuals improve their writing skills.

The Army’s journals, such as MWI, Military Review, MIPB, Field Artillery, Special Warfare, and others stimulate and disseminate military thought that facilitates rapid Army-wide adaptation of competition-winning ideas and insights.

So, grab a copy of the Harding Project guide and get started.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Leyton Summerlin · September 12, 2024

23. The Once-Dominant Tank Is Getting Humbled on the Battlefield

But the tank will never die. We will develop the TTPs and technology to counter drones and the tank will remain a key part of warfighting in my opinion. It is not yet time for it to go the way of the horse in warfighting.

The Once-Dominant Tank Is Getting Humbled on the Battlefield

The rise of drones has prompted armies to change tactics and add defenses to the powerful armored vehicles

https://www.wsj.com/world/the-once-dominant-tank-is-getting-humbled-on-the-battlefield-4a6862c3?mod=hp_lead_pos8&mod=wknd_pos1&mc_cid=fb3ee688d5&mc_eid=70bf478f36

A U.S.-supplied Abrams tank from Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade in eastern Ukraine.

By Alistair MacDonaldFollow

, Gordon LuboldFollow

and Ievgeniia Sivorka | Photographs by Joseph Sywenkyj for WSJ

Updated Sept. 13, 2024 12:02 am ET

POKROVSK, Ukraine—Even as tanks help Ukraine push into Russia, armies are rethinking how the powerful vehicles are made and deployed after a recent history of being humbled in combat.

Tanks were once the king of the battlefield. But the proliferation of drones in Ukraine means the large, noisy vehicles can be spotted and targeted within minutes. That has seen dozens of cutting-edge Western tanks used only sparingly in the battle they were meant to shape, while others have been damaged, destroyed or captured.

In response, armies are adding technology to tanks to spot and protect against drones while also exploring design changes to make the heavy, armored vehicles more maneuverable. Battlefield tactics are already changing and lessons from Ukraine are being integrated into training.

“In the near term, we absolutely need to urgently make some adjustments to maintain the survivability of our armored formations,” said Gen. James Rainey, who heads the U.S. Army Futures Command, which looks at ways to equip and transform the army.

Some Ukrainian tank crews have installed metal cages around their tanks to guard against drones.

The rethink is another sign of how drones are reshaping warfare. Adapting tanks for the drone age is vitally important if Western armies, some of which have placed the vehicles at the heart of their land strategy for decades, are to maintain their edge in conventional warfare. Tanks have adapted to new adversaries before, including planes and antitank missiles.

In recent weeks, tanks have helped Ukrainian forces sweep through Russia’s Kursk region, an area where a pivotal World War II battle took place in 1943. Ukraine’s use of tanks shows how a military vehicle that the British army first rolled out in 1916 still has a role in fast-paced maneuvers, though in this case Kyiv’s forces were met by lightly armed conscripts with little drone cover. For much of the war, Ukrainian forces equipped with the best Western tanks saw them incapacitated within hours.

When crew members from Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade were told last year that they would receive an Abrams tank, they hoped the American machine would allow them to finally puncture Russian lines.

During an early summer visit, their tank sat idle with four other Abrams tanks in a field miles from the front line. Of the 31 Abrams tanks the U.S. has sent Ukraine, six have been destroyed, according to Oryx, an independent team of analysts that tracks losses. Others are now used only sparingly. At $10 million each, tanks like the Abrams aren’t easy to replace. Abrams tanks have yet to be used in the Kursk region.

A soldier holds a new track pad to be installed on a U.S.-supplied Abrams tank. The driver of an Abrams whose call sign is Smilik.

Among other Western tanks sent to Ukraine, 12 of the 18 newer model German-made Leopards have been destroyed or damaged, according to Oryx. Russia has also suffered heavy tank losses, analysts say.

“As soon as you hit the road a drone sees you and then you’re hit with artillery, mines, antitank missiles, drones, guided air bombs,” said the Ukrainian driver of one Abrams whose call sign is Smilik.

At the start of the war, commanders would often hide their tanks and other armored vehicles by digging trenches and camouflaging them. They would then emerge to shoot at the enemy when they came into range.

“Now everything is being watched, so you can’t even dig a hole to hide,” said Lubomyr Stakhiv, a junior sergeant in another brigade. These days they stay out of the range of drones and drive into position to hit the enemy, he said.

A tank commander’s skill was once determined by their ability in tank duels and protecting infantry, but now it is about the ability to covertly fire and quickly retreat, said Anton Havrish, the commander of a tank company equipped with Leopards.

Ukrainian forces are modifying their tanks to protect against drones. Crews often build metal cages around a tank’s turret, some rising like miniature forts.

Tanks are more vulnerable to drones than other armored vehicles because of their sheer size and their large turrets, the top of which is thinly armored. A tank’s cannon also isn’t suited to shooting down drones, and the vehicles typically carry only 30 to 40 shells.

Lubomyr Stakhiv, a junior sergeant in the Ukrainian army.

Drones represent a new threat that is cheaper than the tanks’ traditional foes, such as planes or antitank missiles. Surveillance drones can allow those older adversaries to be better directed at tank formations.

“It is this combination which means they are such a big threat to the tank,” said Col. Juhana Skyttä, the commander of Finland’s Armored Brigade.

The rise of drones has increased the focus of training on the need for constant movement, Skyttä said.

“You cannot leave for even a moment battle tanks in the open area. Whenever movement stops, you have to be below the trees, you have to get cover,” he said.

The U.S., meanwhile, is trying to find lighter metals for its tanks as it tries to make them more maneuverable. The Abrams has a 500-gallon fuel tank and needs several gallons just to start up, making it a behemoth in the U.S. arsenal.

“We have got to get the weight off them,” Rainey said.

M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank

Max speed:

Firing range:

Weight:

Origin:

41.6 mph

2.49 miles

57.2 tons

U.S.

Crew number

Turret 7.62 mm machine gun

12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun

120 mm smoothbore cannon

8 ft.

12 ft.

32.3 ft.

Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank*

Crew number

Max speed:

Firing range:

Weight:

Origin:

43.5 mph

3.1 miles

62 tons

Germany

120 mm smoothbore cannon

8.6 ft.

13.1 ft.

36 ft.

Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank

Max speed:

Firing range:

Weight:

Origin:

34.8 mph

Over 1.86 miles

62.5 tons

U.K.

Crew number

Two 7.62 mm machine guns

L30E4 120 mm rifled gun

8.2 ft.

11.5 ft.

37.9 ft.

*A6 model shown Sources: Military Today; Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (Leopard)

Jemal R. Brinson and Brian McGill/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Efforts are also under way to make tanks harder to detect, from changing how they are painted to reducing their electronic signatures, said Doug Bush, the U.S. Army’s assistant secretary for acquisitions, logistics and technology.

Sweden’s Saab says it is seeing a lot of interest in a camouflage netting it offers that wraps around all parts of a tank, making them harder to see and partly cloaking the heat emitted from the vehicles.

The U.S. and its allies are also adding new countermeasures to many of their tanks. Those include an Israeli system called Iron Fist, which shoots out small explosive munitions when it detects airborne threats.

Poland agreed to buy hundreds of South Korean K2 tanks soon after the war began. When negotiating with their maker, Hyundai Rotem, for a batch of them several months later they added new requirements, including drone-jamming equipment.

Western militaries are looking at making tanks more maneuverable to lessen the threat posed by drones.

Such electronic-warfare devices, which disrupt the signals guiding drones, rendering them mostly useless, are becoming essential on tanks.

“Without it, you won’t make it,” said a Ukrainian gunner of an Abrams tank whose call sign is Joker.

To be sure, many U.S. officials say there is a danger of drawing too many lessons from Ukraine. The country’s flat, treeless landscape is perfect for drones, while tanks have also been kept at bay because Russia was able to dig defenses and lay vast quantities of land mines. Moreover, if the U.S. were fighting a conflict, it would use tanks in combination with planes and air-defense systems that would offer more protection, in a way Ukraine has been unable to do, American officials say.

Large numbers of tanks being destroyed in combat is also nothing new, the Army’s Bush and others argue. Vast amounts were destroyed in World War II, while Israel lost large numbers in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The U.S. Army’s New $13 Million Combat Vehicle That’s ‘Not a Tank’

Army picks two companies to get small drones to brigade combat teams

armytimes.com · by Jen Judson · September 12, 2024

The U.S. Army has picked Anduril Industries and Performance Drone Works to provide Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems, or SUAS, to Army units as part of an effort to buy capability fast and get it into soldiers’ hands as the service races to modernize its force.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George has called the effort “transformation in contact,” where the service buys available commercial-off-the-shelf capability and then battle tests it with soldiers, instead of spending decades developing something before fielding it only to discover it is outdated by the time it gets to units.

“Transforming in contact is the way our Army can adapt its formations and get new technology in the hands of soldiers to experiment, innovate, learn, and change at the pace required,” George said in a statement Thursday. “The Company Level Small UAS Directed Requirement effort is a great example of how we are achieving this.”

The program “is another example of the Army’s ability to rapidly move from an idea to a requirement, to a competition, to testing, to contract awards for production,” the Army’s acquisition chief, Doug Bush, added. “This shows the acquisition system can move at the pace needed to support the Army, especially in rapidly emerging technology areas like small uncrewed aircraft systems.”

Anduril and Performance Drone Works will provide the first tranche of systems that will meet the company-level SUAS requirement in a deal valued at $14.42 million. The service approved the requirement in June 2023.

Change of plans: US Army embraces lessons learned from war in Ukraine

After watching drones destroy tanks in Ukraine and observing both sides struggle to maneuver tanks on the battlefield, the U.S. Army is taking a detour.

Performance Drone Works’ C-100 UAS and Anduril’s Ghost X will give brigade maneuver companies the ability to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition missions. The drones will be reconfigurable with modular payloads and attritable.

The Ghost X drone was spotted earlier this year as part of the Army’s human-machine integration evaluation event at Fort Irwin, California, where it served as the preliminary eyes of an infantry company concealed by the surrounding mountains readying to reclaim a village held by the enemy as part of a live-fire exercise.

The Army is prioritizing the acquisition of small, adaptable and expendable drones as it continues to learn from drone use in the Ukraine and other ongoing wars.

The service was able to move quickly in selecting drones for the first tranche because both platforms are already on the Defense Innovation Unit’s Blue UAS list of technology approved for Defense Department use, the statement notes.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

25. Plan for summit on UN sidelines to seek ways 'to talk sense' into China, Philippines envoy says

As an aside I moderated the panel with Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez this week (also with the Japanese Military Attache). He was quite impressive and we had some excellent discussions before the panel as well as at dinner that evening.. He has been the Ambassador to the US since 2017.

Plan for summit on UN sidelines to seek ways 'to talk sense' into China, Philippines envoy says

By David Brunnstrom

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/plan-summit-un-sidelines-seek-ways-to-talk-sense-into-china-philippines-envoy-2024-09-10/?taid=66e0d690dc107d00013aea50&utm

September 10, 20246:21 PM EDTUpdated 3 days ago

Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. Jose Manuel Romualdez speaks during a U.S. Trade and Development Agency Offshore Wind Grant Signing at Ayala Triangle Gardens in Manila, Philippines, August 6, 2022. Andrew Harnik/Pool via REUTERS/File photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

WASHINGTON, Sept 10 (Reuters) - A summit of at least 20 nations is planned on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly this month to seek ways "to talk some sense" into China over its confrontation with the Philippines in the South China Sea, Manila's Washington envoy said on Tuesday.

"The more countries band together and give a message to China that what they're doing is definitely not on the right side of history, then we have a better than even chance that they will not make that wrong move that we're all fearing," the envoy, Jose Manuel Romualdez said.

Romualdez did not elaborate on plans for the summit, which he said would take place on the sidelines of the annual General Assembly in New York in the week of Sept. 22.

The United States is Manila's key ally. Its State Department and the White House did not immediately respond when asked about the plan.

The Philippines and China have exchanged accusations of intentionally ramming coast guard vessels in the disputed South China Sea in recent months, including a violent clash in June in which a Filipino sailor lost a finger.

Chinese state media on Monday called on the Philippines to "seriously consider the future" of a relationship "at a crossroads".

Referring to Chinese pressure, Romualdez told Washington's New America think tank the Philippines "has never faced this type of challenge since World War Two."

"As of today, they have about 238 (Chinese) ships or militia vessels swarming in the ... area, and they continue to do this day in and day out," he said.

The aim of the summit would be for participants to join with the Philippines in "finding ways to be able to talk some sense into the PRC," he said, using the initials of the People's Republic of China.

Last week, Australia and Japan criticized China for what they called "dangerous and coercive" acts against the Philippines in the South China Sea, and India and Singapore called for a peaceful resolution of all disputes there without use of force.

Romualdez said that while trying to use diplomacy to have a "civil conversation with our neighbors in the north, we also have to continue to try and find ways and means to be able to strengthen our alliances."

The aim was "to give a signal to China, that we're not just one but we're many that are not happy with what they're doing today in the Indo-Pacific region."

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.

Reporting by David Brunnstrom; Editing by Stephen Coates

26. U.S. Will ‘Do What is Necessary’ to aid Philippines in South China Sea, Official Says

U.S. Will ‘Do What is Necessary’ to aid Philippines in South China Sea, Official Says - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · September 13, 2024

A China Coast Guard vessel rams a Philippine ship on Aug. 25, 2025. Philippine Coast Guard Image

Maritime and aerial spats in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines, Washington’s oldest treaty ally in the Indo-Pacific, will be a key talking point in high-level meetings between the U.S. Department of Defense and their Chinese counterparts.

A senior defense official told reporters Wednesday evening that Chinese actions against the Philippines will be raised during the upcoming U.S.-PRC Defense Policy Coordination Talks. The engagement was described as “an opportunity for us to be frank and candid with the PRC about the issues affecting the relationship and the concerns that we have,” the defense official said. Other issues highlighted in the call included Beijing’s support of Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, operational safety and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

The senior defense official called Beijing’s actions as a “threat to regional peace and stability,” noting recent ramming incidents against Philippine Coast Guard vessels by Chinese forces at Second Thomas and Sabina Shoals,

“The United States will do what is necessary to support the Philippines,” the official said. “The Philippines is our oldest mutual defense treaty ally in the Indo-Pacific. We’ve made very clear that the treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine Armed Forces, public vessels or aircraft, including those of its coast guard, anywhere in the South China Sea. So we’re watching further developments there very, very closely.”

No additional details were available about comments made by Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo on the possibility of escorting and supporting Philippine efforts in the South China Sea, no details could be provided. Paparo said last month that a U.S. vessel escorting Philippine forces was “an entirely reasonable option” and within the limits of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

Before Paparo’s statement, Philippine defense and military officials claimed that U.S. assistance had been offered. In July, Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Brawner confirmed the offers of assistance but told reporters that Manila prefers to conduct unilateral operations in the region.

Following Paparo’s offer of escorting Philippine vessels, Brawner reiterated his stance and claimed that the Philippines would only resort to bilateral operations with U.S. forces if there were no other options left.

“When our troops are already hungry, they don’t have any supplies anymore because our resupply mission have been blocked and they are on the verge of dying, then that’s the time we are going to seek the help of the United States,” Brawner said.

Despite the drastic increase in incidents between Manila and Beijing within the last year, the Philippines has yet to take up American offers of direct escort and assistance in its resupply missions. Although U.S. Navy maritime patrol aircraft and warships have been spotted in the vicinity of incidents, the noticeable lack of direct American presence leaves many questions about what the two nations define as an armed attack and tests the 70-year-old mutual defense treaty.

“Manila is trying to find the best approach to the situation in the South China Sea,” Julio Amador, an analyst based in Manila, told USNI News. According to Amador, the decision to conduct “white-hull-to-white-hull diplomacy,” referring to the Philippines’ exclusive use of Coast Guard vessels in countering China, has made the country “reticent” in the deployment of its naval forces.

“Manila also wants to avoid any accusation that Washington drives its decision-making. Manila wants to show agency and do everything that it can before it accepts any aid from ally and partner,” he said, noting Beijing’s claims that their disputes with the Philippines are a result of Washington’s supposed influence on the former U.S. colony.

With these issues in mind, Amador stated that policymakers from Manila and Washington have to work closely to “arrange cooperative activities that will allow for more US naval presence in the SCS without compromising Manila’s ability to handle a crisis on its own.”

America’s Oldest Treaty Pacific Ally

Amphibious combat vehicles attached to Alpha Company, Battalion Landing Team 1/5, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, drive in formation back to the amphibious landing dock USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) following a waterborne gunnery live-fire training during Exercise Balikatan 24 in Oyster Bay, Philippines, May 4, 2024. US Marine Corps PhotoU.S.-Philippine defense and security cooperation has ramped up in foreign military financing, joint patrols, exercises and base infrastructure investment. In July, U.S. officials pledged $500 million to help modernize the Philippine military and Coast Guard. American force posture deployments across the Southeast Asian country have also increased.

USNI News reported in June that the Marine Corps kicked off a deployment of Reaper drones at Basa Air Base, one of nine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites earmarked for hosting rotationally deployed U.S. forces and constructuon projects. Army drones have been routinely operating out of Edwin Andrews Air Base, and the service’s new Mid-Range Capability was sent for Exercise Balikatan and Salaknib in April. The land-based vertical launching system capable of supporting Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 has yet to leave the country, according to comments from the Secretary of the Army

The Philippines and China lay claim to areas of the contested South China Sea. Under its expansive 10-Dash Line claim, Beijing claims virtually the entire region as its own, including the West Philippine Sea, a section that encompasses Manila’s exclusive economic zone. While the region was relatively quiet before 2023, a series of spats between Philippine and Chinese forces erupted across numerous maritime features. Among the most active hotspots was Second Thomas Shoal. Resupply mission to BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57), on Second Thomas Shoal, a rusting Second World War-era landing ship tank with an embarked contingent of Philippine Marines, have been consistently intercepted and harassed by the China Coast Guard. These incidents included the use of water cannons, ramming maneuvers and even boarding actions, culminating in the severe June 17 incident.

New flashpoints are also rising in the disputed region, with the latest at Sabina Shoal. Philippine Coast Guard flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701) has been stationed at the maritime feature since April 16 amid concerns about a Chinese artificial island reclamation attempt similar to those conducted at Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross Reefs. A series of ramming and water cannon incidents around Sabina occured last month, with seven scuffles around and within the shoal during August alone.

news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · September 13, 2024

27. From China to Russia: Global Military Budgets Are Catching Up to the U.S.

Some interesting data.

Excerpts:

Notwithstanding the murk in the numbers, there’s no question that we have moved into a post-post-Cold War world concerning military spending. Twenty-five years ago, it was easy, almost obligatory, to argue that the US defense budget should be cut, perhaps drastically. Now, it is more challenging to make that argument. We missed a generational opportunity to substantially reduce the defense budget, perhaps with long-term implications for global order. The US squandered its peace dividend with the ill-advised Wars on Terror that undermined and failed to secure our national values.

Now, substantial cuts to US defense expenditures are difficult to see absent a drastic change to US grand strategy, a change that few in Washington seem likely to embrace.

From China to Russia: Global Military Budgets Are Catching Up to the U.S.

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Robert Farley · September 12, 2024

Military Hardware: Tanks, Bombers, Submarines and More

Published

13 hours ago

B-2 Spirit stealth bombers assigned to Whiteman Air Force Base taxi and take-off during exercise Spirit Vigilance on Whiteman Air Force Base on November 7th, 2022. Routine exercises like Spirit Vigilance assure our allies and partners that Whiteman Air Force Base is ready to execute nuclear operations and global strike anytime, anywhere. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Bryson Britt)

The United States has had the world’s largest defense budget since the 1980s and possibly longer. Although the budget remains enormous, the gap between the United States and its competitors, both friends and foes, has shrunk over the past decade.

A recent snapshot of global military spending by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) highlights how patterns of military spending have changed and busted a few myths along the way.

A U.S. Air Force Maj. B-2 pilot marshals a B-2 Spirit bomber, deployed from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam in support of Valiant Shield 24, June 13, 2024. The speed, flexibility, and readiness of our strategic bombers plays a critical role in our ability to deter potential adversaries and signal our unwavering support to our allies and partners. Counter-maritime missions provide valuable training opportunities to improve our interoperability and demonstrate that our forces are capable of operating anywhere, anytime, to meet any challenge decisively. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Kristen Heller)

Myths About the U.S. Defense Budget

The United States has a huge defense budget. U.S. spending accounts for 37% of the global total, burdening the economy to the tune of 3.4% of GDP.

The United States has the largest budget in NATO by a large margin, representing 68% of overall NATO spending.

But the US does not dominate as it did a generation ago or even a decade ago. As defense spending surges worldwide, Chinese, Russian, and Indian spending has all accelerated.

While the US spends some 9% more on defense than it did in 2014, China spends 60% more and Russia 57% more.

US allies have also stepped up their efforts. Britain, France, Germany, and Japan have all notched double-digit increases in spending over the past decade; the Poles have increased their budget by a whopping 181%.

210924-N-JW440-1055 SOUTH CHINA SEA (September 24, 2021). The navy’s only forward deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) transits the South China Sea. Reagan is attached to Commander, Task Force 70/Carrier Strike Group 5 conducting underway operations in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Rawad Madanat)

Altogether, this tells us that U.S. primacy has waned and that the world has become more dangerous, two undoubtedly connected trends that do not necessarily track one another directly. The general reduction in global military expenditure (a trend more evident in defense burden than in absolute defense spending) has been reversed; defense budgets are now consistently increasing faster than economic growth, both in competitors to the United States and in allies.

Finding the Defense Money

However, estimating defense spending is more complicated than it sounds, partly because substantial elements of any country’s defense budget tend to lay outside of its official budget.

In the United States, for example, significant military capabilities are budgeted to the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, and even to individual states in the form of National Guard establishments.

Estimating a defense budget is not a simple quantitative exercise; it demands qualitative finesse and close attention to how governments arrive at budgets.

For example, the SIPRI numbers are not adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity, which indexes GDP to local prices. It is cheaper, for example, for China to buy a domestically produced fighter jet than for France, because many of the labor and resource inputs are more affordable in China than in France. This is one of the reasons that Russia, which until recently has spent modestly on its military compared to some European countries, has been able to mobilize such extensive military power in its war against Ukraine. In practice, this means that the raw totals for the Russian and Chinese defense budgets are understated relative to Western budgets.

DF-17 Missile from China. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

However, the PPP adjustment isn’t absolute. The international export market doesn’t care about PPP; a fighter jet is a fighter jet, whether it’s being sold to a rich or poor country, and the buyer can expect to pay something like a market rate. Even when that equipment is primarily built and assembled domestically, components for advanced equipment may only be available at international market rates rather than domestic prices.

An alternative calculation of the US and Chinese defense budgets at the Texas National Security Review, for example, pegged US spending at $1.3 trillion and Chinese spending at $474 billion, 30% and 38% higher, respectively, than the SIPRI estimates. This flexibility in methodology also means that estimates of defense spending are very easy to “cook” for political purposes; it’s not hard for an analyst to show that the United States is particularly secure by using one set of methods, then to turn around and demonstrate that the U.S. is very insecure by using a different set of assumptions.

Parting Thoughts

Notwithstanding the murk in the numbers, there’s no question that we have moved into a post-post-Cold War world concerning military spending. Twenty-five years ago, it was easy, almost obligatory, to argue that the US defense budget should be cut, perhaps drastically. Now, it is more challenging to make that argument. We missed a generational opportunity to substantially reduce the defense budget, perhaps with long-term implications for global order. The US squandered its peace dividend with the ill-advised Wars on Terror that undermined and failed to secure our national values.

Russian T-90M Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Now, substantial cuts to US defense expenditures are difficult to see absent a drastic change to US grand strategy, a change that few in Washington seem likely to embrace.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Robert Farley · September 12, 2024

28. Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Our Enduring Duty to America's Service Members and Their Families

Please go to this link to read the 5 page memo from the SECDEF: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/13/2003543124/-1/-1/0/OUR-ENDURING-DUTY-TO-AMERICAS-SERVICE-MEMBERS-AND-THEIR-FAMILIES.PDF

Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Our Enduring Duty to America's Service Members and Their Families

Sept. 13, 2024

A memo from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III describing the steps taken to support service members and their families through the Taking Care of People initiative.

29. Secretary of Defense Announces Seven New Initiatives to Enhance Well-Being of Military Force and Their Families

Secretary of Defense Announces Seven New Initiatives to Enhance Well-Being of Military Force and Their Families

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3904786/secretary-of-defense-announces-seven-new-initiatives-to-enhance-well-being-of-m/

Sept. 13, 2024 |

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced seven initiatives to improve the quality of life for Service members and their families today. These actions build on the extensive and unprecedented actions that Department of Defense (DoD) leaders have taken over the past four years as part of Austin's Taking Care of People initiative.

Secretary Austin directed the implementation of the following:

Health Care Flexible Spending Accounts (HCFSAs) for Service Members: To reduce out-of-pocket health care costs for Service members, the DoD will make HCFSAs available to Service members for the first time through a Special Enrollment Period in March 2025. HCFSAs are an optional benefit that enable Service members to set aside up to $3,200 in pretax earnings per Service member to pay for health care costs, such as co-payments, contact lenses, glasses, dental care, and annual deductibles.

Access to Wi-Fi Pilot: To reduce out-of-pocket expenses and improve quality of life for junior enlisted Service members, the DoD is implementing a series of pilot projects to provide high-speed Wi-Fi internet access at no cost to Service members living in unaccompanied housing, which will form the basis of a long-term plan to build a Wi-Fi connected force.

Making Moves Easier: Building on previous expansions of move-related payments to Service members, the DoD will increase Temporary Lodging Expense reimbursement to 21 days (up from 14 days) and allow Temporary Lodging Allowance to be authorized for up to 60 days when it is necessary for a Service member or dependent to occupy temporary lodging immediately before leaving a permanent duty station outside the continental United States. The DoD will also initiate a study to review and evaluate increasing the household goods weight allowances for Service members.

Further Expand Spouse Eligibility for My Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) Financial Assistance: To support career advancement for military spouses, eligibility for MyCAA financial assistance will be expanded to spouses of active-duty Service members and spouses of National Guard and reserve Service members on Title 10 orders in the E-7, E-8, E-9, and W-3 ranks. Financial assistance may be utilized to pursue a license, certification, or associate degree as well as testing for college credit and continuing education units. This initiative aims to reduce barriers to employment for military spouses.

Investment in Childcare Workforce: To improve access to childcare for military families, we must invest in our childcare workforce to ensure we can recruit and retain childcare providers. The DoD is working closely with Congress to fund compensation increases for childcare providers and to add key positions—lead educators and special needs inclusion coordinators—that will enhance the developmental and educational support provided to children served by DoD child development centers.

Quality of Life at Remote and Isolated Installations Review: The DoD will conduct a review on risk and protective factors, and prevention capabilities of harmful behaviors at three remote installations. The results of the review will be used to inform and improve quality of life at those locations.

Uniform Costs Review: The DoD will review the quality of standard uniform clothing items issued to the enlisted force and the enlisted monetary uniform replacement allowance rates to ensure they are sufficient.

The Department continues to collaborate with Congress and state partners to ensure the successful implementation and ongoing support of these initiatives.

Find the Secretary's memorandum "Our Enduring Duty to America's Service Members and Their Families" here.

30. Navy adds $1B to unconventional effort to boost sub production

Navy adds $1B to unconventional effort to boost sub production

A non-profit’s sole-source contract pushes third-party funding to a potential of nearly $4 billion.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

By Lauren C. Williams

Senior Editor

September 12, 2024 09:27 PM ET

The U.S. military has added nearly $1 billion to its unconventional efforts to use third parties to kick the nation’s submarine-building industry into a higher gear.

On Tuesday, the Navy announced an up-to-$980.7 million contract to BlueForge Alliance, a two-year-old Texas-based nonprofit firm, for “planning, resourcing, coordinating, and uplifting the U.S. Submarine Industrial Base and Foreign Military Sales requirements.”

The non-competitive, sole-source award doubles the roughly $500 million in Navy funding already given to BlueForge, best known for its splashy BuildSubmarines.com campaign to recruit shipyard workers. It also follows an up-to-$2.4 billion Defense Department contract awarded in July to consulting firm Deloitte to help the nation’s two sub-building shipyards “reach and sustain a programmed production rate of 1+2 submarines per year.”

All this brings Pentagon spending on third-party assistance to its submarine suppliers to a potential total of nearly $4 billion.

The Navy, which is planning to buy just one attack submarine in fiscal 2025, is struggling to restore annual production to two attack boats plus one Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. The nation’s ability to maintain and repair its subs is in even worse shape, with a three-year backlog for major work. And the AUKUS deal to supply submarines to Australia only adds extra pressure.

The new contract to BlueForge aims to extend “critical efforts to strengthen and expand the submarine industrial base,” including helping to diversify and strengthen supply chains and to attract, train, and retain more workers for shipyards and their suppliers, a Navy spokesperson said in a Thursday statement.

It is also meant to improve U.S. defense manufacturing writ large by “scaling” 3D-printing, robotics, automation, and other technologies, the spokesperson said.

The contract was awarded to BlueForge without competition because there was “only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements,” the Pentagon announcement said.

The Navy will award BlueForge just over half of the contract’s value—$503.1 million—in fiscal 2024 funds from “shipbuilding and conversion (Navy)” and foreign partners. Most of those funds are expected to go to the U.S. submarine industrial base, USNI News reported.

The job is the first Navy prime contract awarded directly to BlueForge, a company spokesperson said; its earlier work with the submarine industry was through a subcontract from General Dynamics Electric Boat, one of the nation’s two sub-building shipyards.

Under the contract, BlueForge will try to help the shipyards and their 16,000 suppliers increase efficiency and cut costs, company officials said.

“Mission success depends on the critical role we play as a non-profit, unbiased integrator,” Rob Gorham, BlueForge’s co-founder and co-chief executive officer, said in a Thursday statement to Defense One. “We are actively convening a nexus of public-private partnerships necessary to catalyze the industrial base for the Navy’s next horizon of critical missions and are implementing a whole of nation approach to maximize impact through speed and scale.”

A BlueForge spokesperson said the company has developed a process to guide and measure effects of funding, including investment decision models, data integration and analysis. It is tracking talent attraction, hires and retention and delivery timelines for critical parts, such as major mechanical parts, valves and fittings, electrical parts, and raw materials.

On the technology side, the company is “measuring positive schedule impacts to the Navy's submarine construction goals created by the infusion of advanced manufacturing technologies such as additive manufacturing, robotics, automation, and enhanced non-destructive testing capabilities,” the spokesperson said.

Rep. Joe Courtney, D-Conn., pronounced himself delighted at the news.

“This contract award is another clear example of the tremendous partnership between the Navy, shipbuilders, and BlueForge to increase capacity in the submarine industrial base. With approval from the Navy, BlueForge is executing projects across the country to stand up workforce training pipelines, invest in supply chain companies, and develop innovative technologies to drive expansion of the shipbuilding sector,” Courtney said in a Thursday statement.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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