Quotes of the Day:

"Life is not a problem to be solved but a mystery to be lived. Follow the path that is no path, follow your bliss."

– Joseph Campbell

"The basic tool for manipulation of reality is the manipulation of words. If you can control the meaning of words, you can control people who must use the words."

– Philip K. Dick

"Where is the book in which the teacher can read about what teaching is? The children themselves are the book. We should not learn to teach out of any book other than the one lying open before us and consisting of the children themselves."

– Rudolf Steiner

1. Philippines, US, Australia, Canada to hold first joint exercises in South China Sea

2. China launches air, sea patrols near flashpoint Scarborough Shoal

3. US to increase force projection from Australia

4. The Top 100 is here: Find out how defense companies performed in FY23

5. 5 US troops, 2 contractors injured in rocket attack at Iraq base

6. Most Americans oppose sending U.S. troops to defend Israel, poll finds

7. Poole hands command of sprawling US Army garrison in Germany to Flanagan

8. Pentagon planning huge experiment for its connect-everything concept

9. Palantir sends AI-fueled TITAN prototype to Army

10. Austin: USAF Will Increase Bomber Deployments to Australia

11. Army plans to complete new air and missile defense strategy by October ‘25

12. Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu: Back to the Future

13. Resource Wars: How Climate Change is Fueling Militarization of the Arctic

14. Warily, US companies eye co-production deals in Ukraine

15. DoD Innovation Fact Sheet

16. USAA to Pay $64.2 Million to Service Members in Settlement over Improper Bank Fees, Interest

17. NATO Missed a Chance to Transform Itself 

18. Depth of magazine: Preparing the joint force for protracted conflict

19. The Taiwan Fallacy

1. Philippines, US, Australia, Canada to hold first joint exercises in South China Sea

Deterrence or potential for escalation?

How will China respond?

Philippines, US, Australia, Canada to hold first joint exercises in South China Sea

07 Aug 2024 12:02PM

(Updated: 07 Aug 2024 12:09PM)

channelnewsasia.com

MANILA: The Philippines, Canada, United States and Australia kicked off their first joint military exercise on Wednesday (Aug 7) in the South China Sea to enhance inter-operability among their forces, the four countries' military said.

The two-day exercise, which will involve naval and air force units, is the first among the four countries, and follows the first Philippines-Japan joint exercise in the disputed South China Sea last week.

The United States, a treaty ally of the Philippines, has held similar exercises with other countries in the disputed waterway, having carried out drills with Manila and Japan in June.

The four nations said in a statement that they uphold the right to freedom of navigation and overflight of the South China Sea, adding that naval and air force units will operate together in Manila's 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone to improve cooperation and interoperability.

"We stand together to address common maritime challenges and underscore our shared dedication to upholding international law and the rules-based order," the statement read.

China claims as its territory much of the South China Sea, a conduit for roughly US$3 trillion in annual ship-borne trade, despite competing claims by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Manila and Beijing have repeatedly clashed in the South China Sea, accusing each other of aggressive behaviour involving their ships and of damaging the marine environment.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague said China's claims had no legal basis, a decision Beijing has rejected.

China's embassy in Manila did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the four nations exercise.

2. China launches air, sea patrols near flashpoint Scarborough Shoal

A Chinese response to Philippines, US, Canadian, and Australian exercises in the area?

Excerpts:

And while the Chinese military had been deployed near the Scarborough Shoal in the past, one analyst told AFP Wednesday’s action showed they were “becoming more aggressive and forceful”.

“It’s meant to intimidate,” Jay Batongbacal, director of the Manila-based Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, said.

“It’s definitely meant to send a message, a show of force,” he added.

China launches air, sea patrols near flashpoint Scarborough Shoal - CNA

07 Aug 2024 02:27PM

(Updated: 07 Aug 2024 02:47PM)

channelnewsasia.com

Skip to main content

China launches air, sea patrols near flashpoint Scarborough Shoal

This photo shows an aerial view of China Coast Guard vessel inside Scarborough Shoal in the disputed South China Sea on Feb 16, 2024. (Photo: AFP/Jam Sta Rosa)

BEIJING: China on Wednesday (Aug 7) carried out a combat patrol to test “strike capabilities” near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, a flashpoint area also claimed by the Philippines.

Beijing has continued to press its claims to almost the entire South China Sea despite an international tribunal ruling that its assertion has no legal basis.

Scarborough Shoal is 240km west of the Philippines’ main island of Luzon and nearly 900km from the nearest major Chinese land mass of Hainan.

China in 2012 used coastguard vessels to take control of the shoal, a triangular chain of reefs and rocks that are part of a rich fishing ground and had long been used by Filipino fishermen as a safe harbour.

On Wednesday, the Chinese military’s Southern Theater Command said it had “organised a joint combat patrol in the sea and air space” near the area.

The manoeuvres tested “the reconnaissance and early warning, rapid mobility, and joint strike capabilities of theatre troops”, Beijing said.

China has long used its coast guard to press its claims in the South China Sea.

And while the Chinese military had been deployed near the Scarborough Shoal in the past, one analyst told AFP Wednesday’s action showed they were “becoming more aggressive and forceful”.

“It’s meant to intimidate,” Jay Batongbacal, director of the Manila-based Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, said.

“It’s definitely meant to send a message, a show of force,” he added.

“AGGRAVATE TENSIONS”

There has been a series of escalating confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea in recent months, including around a warship grounded for years by Manila on the contested Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands.

One of the most serious incidents took place in June, when Chinese sailors brandishing weapons including knives and an axe boarded Philippine naval vessels near the strategic reef.

The Philippine military said one of its sailors lost a thumb in the confrontation in which Beijing’s coast guard also confiscated or destroyed Philippine equipment including guns.

Beijing blamed the escalation on Manila and maintains its actions to protect its claims are legal and proportional.

In recent weeks, the Philippines and China have agreed on a “provisional arrangement” for resupplying Filipino troops stationed on Second Thomas Shoal and also to increase the number of communication lines to resolve disputes in the waterway.

Last month, the United States said it would provide US$500 million in additional military funding to the Philippines to combat Beijing’s growing assertiveness.

Beijing said in response that “wooing countries from outside the region to provoke confrontation … will only undermine regional stability and aggravate tensions”.

The investment “will only lead to greater insecurity” for Manila, it warned.

Also on Wednesday, the Philippines launched two days of joint sea and air exercises with the United States, Canada and Australia, according to a joint statement.

A Manila military spokesman told AFP that the drills were taking place in the “West Philippine Sea”, the country’s name for areas it claims in the South China Sea.

3. US to increase force projection from Australia

US to increase force projection from Australia

07 Aug 2024 10:30AM

(Updated: 07 Aug 2024 10:36AM)

channelnewsasia.com

SYDNEY: Australia will begin co-manufacturing guided weapons with the US next year to boost supply for allies in the Indo-Pacific and increase a US military presence in the country, including bomber aircraft, the two nations said after annual defence talks.

Australia and the United States are already working to upgrade air bases in northern and western Australia, which are closer to potential flashpoints with China in the South China Sea than Australia's capital of Canberra.

After annual Australia–US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) talks in Annapolis, Maryland, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said there would be an increase in the presence of rotational US forces in Australia.

"This will mean more maritime patrol aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft operating from bases across northern Australia. It will also mean more frequent rotational bomber deployments," he said.

There are no US military bases in Australia, but the northern city of Darwin hosts a US Marine Rotational Force six months each year and the US is building facilities for its marines and visiting air squadrons within Australian bases.

Australia's Defence Minister Richard Marles said the presence of United States forces in Australia contributed to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, and there would be closer collaboration on guided weapons manufacture in Australia.

Australia will begin co-manufacturing guided missiles next year, including the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) used in Ukraine.

"The presence of American force posture in our nation provides an enormous opportunity to work with our neighbours in the region," Marles added.

Japan would increase exercises with the US Marines in Darwin, while Australia and the US would hold regular exercises in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, a joint statement released after the AUSMIN talks said.

The statement mentioned Australia's strategic Indian Ocean territory, Cocos Islands, for the first time, saying the United States welcomed Australia's planned infrastructure upgrades there and supported Australia's completion of this work.

The Cocos Islands, with a population of 600, sit 3,000km west of the Australian mainland and is described by the Australian Defence Force as key to its maritime surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean, where China is increasing submarine activity.

Australia has said it will start construction on an expanded airfield on the island this year, to carry heavier military aircraft, including the submarine-hunting P-8A Poseidon

Source: Reuters/lh

4. The Top 100 is here: Find out how defense companies performed in FY23

Now we can see some stats on the Arsenal of Democracy (less Japan) with only some information (less Russia) from the Arsenal and Axis of malign actors, authoritarians, totalitarians, aggressors, and dictators. (also the axis of upheaval).

The Top 100 is here: Find out how defense companies performed in FY23

Defense News · by Chris Martin · August 6, 2024

The sole Ukrainian business on this year’s Top 100 list takes the lead for the largest defense revenue change, growing by 72% from fiscal 2022 to fiscal 2023.

And though the Ukrainian Defense Industry, formerly known as Ukroboronprom, declined to explain the significant increase, it is telling that the company’s defense revenue grew from about $755 million in FY21 to nearly $1.3 billion in FY22, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Most recently, for FY23, the firm is reporting $2.2 billion in defense revenue.

In fact, more than three-quarters of the companies on this year’s Top 100 list saw their defense revenues rise.

This is reflective of the list’s general — although inconsistent — increase year over year. Looking at just the last five fiscal years, the total defense revenue for those ranked came to:

• FY19: $524.4 billion
• FY20: $551.2 billion
• FY21: $595 billion
• FY22: $533.9 billion
• FY23: $603.9 billion

The latest growth – by 13% – comes amid the Russia-Ukraine war; Israel’s fight with the militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip and its clashes with the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah; as well as tension in the Asia-Pacific region over disputed territory and Taiwan’s independence.

In response to these events, governments around the world are spending more on defense, which in turn boosts industry earnings.

Deeper dive

U.S.-based businesses dominated the rankings with 48 listings, followed by:

• China and the United Kingdom, each with six.
• Germany and Turkey, each with five.
• Israel and South Korea, each with three.
• India, Italy, Norway and Spain, each with two.
• Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden and Ukraine, each with one.
• Alone, France has four listings, and the Netherlands has one. However, it would be accurate to give them each one more in this count because Airbus lists its “main office” in the former and its “headquarters” in the latter.

There are notable gaps in this year’s list. Once again, there are no Russian businesses because they did not respond to our requests for information and we could not locate reputable data sources.

Japanese companies are also not on the list. Defense News contacted the businesses, as well as government officials, several times with requests for data. The government did not publish the relevant information online by press time.

Some private firms that likely earn significant defense revenue, such as General Atomics, opt against providing data, while technology companies, including Amazon and Google, don’t offer comprehensive information on their defense revenue and declined to do so for the list.

We also chose not to include medical and pharmaceutical companies because the list is meant to focus on those organizations producing weapons systems, military capabilities and associated technologies.

For Chinese businesses, we relied on a think tank to provide the data. The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. did not release figures for consideration in this year’s list by press time. The state-run organization last made the rankings two years ago, where it landed in 14th place with more than $13 billion in defense revenue for FY21.

This year we were able to collect information for two Indian companies. However, our correspondent there remains jailed. It has been almost a year since the Indian government arrested Vivek Raghuvanshi, a longtime freelance journalist with Defense News, and officials have declined to provide information about his safety, legal representation and allegations.

For ranked Turkish firms, an asterisk must be applied: Some revenue figures were calculated using so-called inflation accounting methods due to the nation’s high inflation rate. We used those numbers when they were provided; otherwise the data was run in its unadapted form. More information is provided in the footnotes.

We hope this list, which one could accurately describe as part art and part science, offers a snapshot of the state of the defense industry and perhaps what’s to come.

Click here to see the Top 100, a ranking of the largest defense companies in the world.

About Chris Martin

Chris Martin is the managing editor for Defense News. His interests include Sino-U.S. affairs, cybersecurity, foreign policy and his yorkie Willow.

5. 5 US troops, 2 contractors injured in rocket attack at Iraq base

As a reminder we have US contractors almost everywhere that we have US troops. They are in harm's way too.

5 US troops, 2 contractors injured in rocket attack at Iraq base

militarytimes.com · by Lolita C. Baldor · August 6, 2024

Five U.S. service members and two contractors were injured when two rockets hit a military base in Iraq, U.S. officials said Tuesday, providing a bit more detail about the Monday strike.

The officials said five of those injured were being treated at the al-Asad airbase and two were evacuated, but all seven are in stable condition. They did not provide details on who was evacuated.

RELATED

Several US troops injured in rocket attack in Iraq, officials say

The attack comes amid rising tensions following the killings of a senior Hezbollah commander in Lebanon and Hamas' top leader in Iran.

By Lolita C. Baldor

The rocket attack is the latest in what has been an uptick in strikes on U.S. forces by Iranian-backed militias. It comes as tensions across the Middle East are spiking but is not believed to be connected to the killings last week of a senior Hezbollah commander in Lebanon and Hamas’ top political leader in Iran, in suspected Israeli strikes. Both groups are backed by Iran.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss military operations.

In recent weeks, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have resumed launching attacks on bases housing U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria after a lull of several months, following a strike on a base in Jordan in late January that killed three American soldiers and prompted a series of retaliatory U.S. strikes.

Between October and January, an umbrella group calling itself the Islamic Resistance in Iraq had regularly claimed attacks that it said were in retaliation for Washington’s support of Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza and were aimed at pushing U.S. troops out of the region.

6. Most Americans oppose sending U.S. troops to defend Israel, poll finds

Of all US allies, Israel probably needs US troops on the ground in Israel the least.

Sending troops to Israel is one thing. Do Americans oppose sending our Naval and Air power to the region to defend US interests?

Most Americans oppose sending U.S. troops to defend Israel, poll finds

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/06/us-troops-israel-oppose-defend/?utm

Support for such a move has fallen to the lowest level in more than a decade.

4 min

888

A woman holding a child weeps following a reported overnight Israeli strike that hit tents sheltering displaced Palestinians in the courtyard of al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in central Gaza. (Eyad Baba/AFP/Getty Images)

By Bryan Pietsch

August 6, 2024 at 12:30 p.m. EDT

For the first time in recent years, a majority of Americans oppose sending U.S. troops to defend Israel if it comes under attack by its neighbors, according to a nationwide poll released Tuesday.

The survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 55 percent of Americans opposed sending U.S. troops to defend Israel if its neighbors attacked it, while 41 percent supported doing so. Republicans were more supportive of such a move, with 55 percent of them saying they favored sending troops, while 35 percent of Democrats and independents said the same.

The findings come as various threats loom over Israel, including a potential Iranian retaliation for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader, in Tehran, as well as the skirmishes on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon that have threatened to boil over into war.

The poll was conducted online from June 21 through July 1, before Haniyeh’s assassination and the subsequent Iranian threat, among a national sample of 1,056 American adults with an error margin of plus or minus 3.2 percentage points. The sample was drawn through Ipsos’s KnowledgePanel, an ongoing survey panel recruited through random sampling of U.S. households.

Following World news

Following

The Chicago Council poll showed a downward shift in Americans’ support for sending U.S. troops to Israel’s defense since the war in Gaza — although it was not clear whether the decline was specifically tied to the conflict, which began after Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, killing about 1,200 Israelis and taking about 250 of them hostage.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, at far left, speaks while meeting with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, across table at far right, at the Pentagon on March 26. (Jacquelyn Martin/AP)

The share of Americans who support sending U.S. troops to defend Israel if its neighbors attack it (41 percent) is the lowest since the Chicago Council began asking the question in 2010. That year, 47 percent of Americans said they supported sending U.S. troops; in 2012, 49 percent supported it, and in 2014, 45 percent supported the idea. In 2015, 2018 and 2021, 53 percent of Americans supported such a plan.

The United States has repositioned military assets in the Middle East and Europe in recent days as it braces to help Israel defend itself against a potential Iranian response. When Iran sent a barrage of missiles toward Israel in April in another back-and-forth of attacks, it was a U.S.-led coalition that helped Israel fend off the bombardment. (The Iranian attack was in response to an Israeli strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus, Syria.)

The Chicago Council poll found a similar 56 percent of Americans opposed the use of U.S. troops if Iran attacked Israel, while 42 percent supported using troops in this situation.

Although Israel and the United States often describe themselves as each other’s closest ally and dearest friend, the two countries do not have a formal pact that obligates the United States to come to Israel’s defense, or vice versa.

The use of U.S. troops on the ground to defend Israel against an adversary has not recently been floated substantively, but it’s nonetheless a sensitive matter for the American public. When the United States built a pier off the coast of the Gaza Strip in a largely failed attempt to get more aid into the besieged enclave, the Biden administration made clear that “no U.S. boots will be on the ground in Gaza as part of the operation.”

The findings track with other polls that have shown an American public appearing to sour on Israel amid the war in Gaza, which has killed 39,653 Palestinians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. The ministry does not distinguish between civilians and combatants but says the majority of the dead are women and children.

A Gallup poll released in March found that most Americans disapproved of Israel’s military action, with 55 percent disapproving of it and 36 percent approving of it. A Gallup poll late last year found higher support — 50 percent — among Americans for the Israeli military’s actions in Gaza.

Israel and Hamas, via intermediaries including the United States and Qatar, have reportedly gotten close in recent weeks to reaching a deal that would wind down the war and return the hostages, dead and alive, still being held in Gaza. But an agreement has not been reached, with the killing of Haniyeh likely to have thrown negotiations off course.

Emily Guskin contributed to this report.

7. Poole hands command of sprawling US Army garrison in Germany to Flanagan

It seems SF officers end up commanding a disproportionate number of garrisons. 

But I think this comment about the outgoing commander is something that should be emulated by garrison commanders who need to have a strong relationship with the community (the military as well as the local civilian community).

Poole had been in charge of the garrison since July 2022. A German speaker, he is perhaps best-known for his candid, off-the-cuff updates to the force on radio and social media.

Poole hands command of sprawling US Army garrison in Germany to Flanagan

Stars and Stripes · by Matthew M. Burke · August 6, 2024

Army Col. Stephen Flanagan speaks to reporters Aug. 6, 2024, after taking command of U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria in a ceremony at Tower Barracks in Grafenwoehr, Germany. (Matthew M. Burke/Stars and Stripes)

GRAFENWOEHR, Germany — An experienced Special Forces commander with multiple combat tours of Iraq and Afghanistan took command Tuesday of a sprawling garrison in Bavaria that has provided extensive training to Ukrainian troops fighting Russia.

Col. Stephen Flanagan took leadership of U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria from Col. Kevin Poole during a ceremony on the Tower Barracks parade field.

The garrison, home to the 7th Army Training Command, is spread among four locations: Grafenwoehr, Vilseck, Hohenfels and Garmisch. It includes the vast Grafenwoehr Training Area.

Flanagan, a Massachusetts native, said in an interview after the ceremony that he would continue his predecessor’s efforts to improve infrastructure and processes such as vehicle registration.

“Funding is always a challenge,” he said. “But (we’ll) work with the teams here to continue moving things forward, to continue to make life better for the units, the soldiers, the families.”

The Bronze Star recipient takes over at a fraught time in Europe. The war between Russia and Ukraine appears to have stalled, and Russian proxies have been accused of plotting attacks on U.S. bases and personnel in Germany. Two dual German-Russian nationals were arrested in April after German prosecutors accused them of surveilling the Army training area in Grafenwoehr, the news magazine Der Spiegel reported at the time.

Outgoing U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria commander Col. Kevin Poole delivers remarks during a change of command ceremony at Tower Barracks in Grafenwoehr, Germany, on Aug. 6, 2024. (Matthew M. Burke/Stars and Stripes)

Members of the German and U.S. military communities in Bavaria turn out for a change of command ceremony at Tower Barracks in Grafenwoehr, Germany, on Aug. 6, 2024. Col. Stephen Flanagan assumed command of U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria from Col. Kevin Poole. (Matthew M. Burke/Stars and Stripes)

German army black powder shooters fire a volley during a U.S. Army change of command ceremony at Tower Barracks in Grafenwoehr, Germany, on Aug. 6, 2024. (Matthew M. Burke/Stars and Stripes)

An Army honor guard stands at attention during a change of command ceremony at Tower Barracks in Grafenwoehr, Germany, on Aug. 6, 2024. Col. Stephen Flanagan assumed command of U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria from Col. Kevin Poole. (Matthew M. Burke/Stars and Stripes)

Flanagan comes to the Bavaria garrison after completing an Army War College fellowship with the Fletcher School at Tufts University, his Army biography states.

He is a Ranger school graduate and former airborne rifle platoon leader who was part of the task force that hunted down and captured deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, according to the biography.

He also led a Special Forces detachment through two combat tours in Iraq, as well as in Israel and Mali.

Poole had been in charge of the garrison since July 2022. A German speaker, he is perhaps best-known for his candid, off-the-cuff updates to the force on radio and social media.

He was recognized Tuesday for supporting the training of Ukrainian troops and NATO allies, improving infrastructure and quality of life for soldiers and their families and helping to facilitate a billion-dollar training complex, which broke ground last year.

Col. Stephen Flanagan, left, accepts the U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria colors during a change of command ceremony at Tower Barracks in Grafenwoehr, Germany, on Aug. 6, 2024. (Matthew M. Burke/Stars and Stripes)

Stars and Stripes · by Matthew M. Burke · August 6, 2024

8. Pentagon planning huge experiment for its connect-everything concept

As a contrarian, I would say that the more connected that we become the more training we need to conduct on how to operate when that connectivity is interrupted. 

We cannot pay lip service to mission command and the use of traditional mission types order and training in how to operate when communications are cut off.

How do we operate when we no longer have access to the data?

We have to remember that our strengths lie in initiative by leaders at all levels and having a deep understanding of the mission and commander's intent. I would argue that as we become more dependent on data that mission and commander's intent and the ability to execute based on those two with little to no follow up communication are as important as ever.  

And, oh by the way, emphasizing training to operate effectively based on the mission and commander's intent will allow us to operate even more effectively when we do have that connectivity and access to data.

Pentagon planning huge experiment for its connect-everything concept

“We see significant progress,” in opening up DOD data, one observer said. But a bigger, multinational test is coming.

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

August 6, 2024 10:37 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

In this 2020 photo, Jason Davis, a cyber technician from the 2nd Audiovisual Squadron, monitors the live feed inside a production truck during a JADC2 experiment at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. U.S. Air Force / Senior Airman Daniel Hernandez

“We see significant progress,” in opening up DOD data, one observer said. But a bigger, multinational test is coming.

|

August 6, 2024 10:37 PM ET

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

August 6, 2024 10:37 PM ET

• JADC2
• Cloud
• Cyber
• Pentagon

The Pentagon is about to launch one of the biggest tests yet of its joint, all-domain command and control, or JADC2, concept, this time seeking to bring multiple nations together to test how well the Defense Department can rapidly share very sensitive information with foreign militaries that aren’t traditional partners, DOD CIO Daniel Holtzman said Tuesday during the Defense One Cloud Workshop.

The exercise will be part of the Defense Department’s Global Information Dominance experiments, or GIDE.

“The next series coming up in the next couple of months is building up to a worldwide joint activity where we're going to have a carrier strike group that the Brits are going to take across three different U.S. [combatant commands] and [ports across] four different international partners on the trip out, and then three [combatant commands] and three different international partners on the trip back,” Holtzman said.

The military works across different combatant commands and foreign countries all the time, but this carrier strike group exercise, scheduled for the end of 2025, will feature unprecedented data and information sharing, using data bridges the military will have to create quickly.

“What we are doing in the next GIDE is a series of experiments that all lead up to that activity,” Holtzman said. “We're connecting international partners—the UK, Australia and others—in ways in the cloud that we've prototyped that are pushing the bounds on certain things.”

Holtzman called it the “ultimate example of JADC2, to how do we sail that fleet through this partner that wasn't a partner yesterday, [where] there's now a partner who needs to connect to us. And we don't have a year and a half to build the new [cross-domain solution] and get it installed and get it authorized and put a U.S. person there.”

The experiment will test new communications strategies, but also how well the Defense Department can adjust its procedures and policies for information sharing, a long-time obstacle to faster operations.

Holtzman said the creation of his position has been critical for that information sharing, as he answers directly to the Deputy Defense Secretary and that allows him to get around rules that other offices or commands might put in the way.

“The challenge, I think, is everybody's trying to do the right thing. Their motive is right,” he said of mid-level officials and officers who inhibit the free flow of data. “Their desire is right. But their goal is, the most important thing is to protect the data. Don't share. Protect. When our goal is the mission. And that shift in thinking is what we're trying … through GIDE to show, how does the warfighter get to vote? How do they practice and train and do inventive things if you don't give them the opportunity to do that? That's really what GIDE is about.”

Tara Murphy Dougherty, the CEO of decision-science company Govini, which works with Defense Department data, said that while there is still a lot of work to do to free up data silos in the Pentagon, there has been some notable progress.

“We see significant progress…and it's [the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office], their [Open Data and Applications Government-owned Interoperable Repositories] initiative, and what they're leaning into with GIDE and JADC2, and the direction that CDAO is going where it's trying to be very thoughtful about the infrastructure that DOD has to own in order to ensure interoperability of systems. But opening things up as much as possible to be able to bring lots of different commercial companies and products into play is, I think, arguably, a very good model for the department,” she said. “It mandates the movement of data, not just within DOD and across services, but also between government and the commercial companies that are coming in to support them. And that's a really important exchange.”

9. Palantir sends AI-fueled TITAN prototype to Army

Palantir sends AI-fueled TITAN prototype to Army

https://www.axios.com/2024/08/07/palantir-titan-army-jblm?mc_cid=ab5fbd7a30&mc_eid=70bf478f36

• Colin Demarest
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A Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node, or TITAN, prototype. Photo: Courtesy of U.S. Army

The first Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node was delivered to a base in Washington state, just months after Palantir Technologies won a $178 million contract to build prototypes.

Why it matters: TITAN is key to the U.S. military's connect-everything-everywhere campaign and is a dramatic move away from spreadsheets and sticky notes of the past.

• TITAN lets troops hoover up data from space, air and land and employ artificial intelligence to quickly and accurately parse it, ultimately reducing the time it takes to pull the trigger.

Context: Palantir is expected to build 10 prototypes after besting RTX in a yearslong faceoff.

• Palantir's subcontracting team includes heavyweights Northrop Grumman, Anduril Industries and L3Harris Technologies.

What they're saying: "Having a software prime win a hardware contract, I think, has not gone unnoticed, both from the existing industrial base but also the defense-tech players, as a signal of how serious the department is about doing these things differently," Shyam Sankar, Palantir's chief technology officer, told me.

What's next: Soldiers will put TITAN prototypes through rigorous testing. Feedback will shape how the project proceeds.

10. Austin: USAF Will Increase Bomber Deployments to Australia

Austin: USAF Will Increase Bomber Deployments to Australia

airandspaceforces.com · by Unshin Harpley · August 7, 2024

Aug. 6, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

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ANNAPOLIS, Md.—The U.S. is finalizing an agreement to increase its aircraft presence, particularly its bombers, in Australia, part of a raft of developments the two countries discussed during the U.S.-Australia Ministerial Consultations on Aug. 6.

“We’re … increasing the presence of rotational U.S. forces in Australia,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said at a joint press conference following the meeting. “All this will mean more maritime patrol aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft operating from bases across northern Australia. It will also mean more frequent rotational bomber deployments.”

The U.S. Air Force has regularly deployed bombers and fighters to Australia’s northern bases, including RAAF Tindal and Darwin, for joint training with Australian jets and regional exercises with other partners across the Indo-Pacific. It has been two years, however, since the last USAF Bomber Task Force deployment to Australia.

Earlier this year, Reuters suggested the Pentagon is constructing infrastructure in Australia to project power into the South China Sea amid rising tensions from Beijing. The report stated that documents for a U.S. military tender at RAAF Tindal include plans for facilities to house six B-52 bombers and refueling aircraft.

“The presence of American force posture in our nation provides an enormous opportunity to work with our neighbors in the region,” Australian Minister for Defense Richard Marles said at the press conference. “What this is doing is allowing us to do a much greater range of activities and operations and exercises with our partners, and we spoke about that today—with Japan, for example—where we’ve committed to doing a much greater amount of trilateral exercises between our three countries.”

Austin and Marles met with Japanese defense minister Minoru Kihara in May to announce plans to extend the three nations’ joint F-35 exercises including Bushido Guardian in Japan and Pitch Black in Australia, from 2025 to 2026. The trio agreed to conduct the first combined live-fire air-and-missile exercise in 2027, along with developing a joint air defense architecture to counter growing air and missile threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

Australian and American officials also discussed munitions during the consultations, specifically building and acquiring additional U.S.-manufactured precision-guided weapons, including the Army missiles previously supplied to Ukraine to enhance its long-range attacks.

“We’re doubling down on our defense industrial base cooperation, and this includes supporting Australia’s guided weapons and explosive ordinance enterprise,” said Austin. “By the end of the year, we’re aiming to sign two memorandums of understanding on critical munitions.”

One of the agreements will allow Australia to begin locally manufacturing Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, or GMLRS, by 2025. Earlier this year, the Australian Defense Ministry signed a $37.4 million AUD ($24.3 million USD) contract with Lockheed Martin Australia to start production of these precision-guided missiles next year.

Another MOU expected to be signed by December will cover the “co-production, co-sustainment, and co-development” of Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM). The ammunition represents the Army’s next-generation precision fires weapon, with initial deliveries starting at the end of last year.

“And as we accelerate altogether on PrSM, we agreed to stand up a joint program office in early 2025,” said Austin, without specifying the planned location of the JPO. “Together, these efforts will help ensure that we have the capability and the capacity that we’ll need for decades to come.”

“These are important milestones which will see Australia gain the technology we need to establish a sovereign industry, providing opportunities for a highly-skilled workforce,” Marles said about the U.S. produced weapons back in January.

Air

airandspaceforces.com · by Unshin Harpley · August 7, 2024

11.  Army plans to complete new air and missile defense strategy by October ‘25

Arguably, air, missile, and drone defense is more important to the future than it has ever been for our Army.

Army plans to complete new air and missile defense strategy by October ‘25 - Breaking Defense

“We are using what we've learned from previous years in the current conflicts to design the type of force we'll need to assure, deter and, if necessary, fight to win on tomorrow's battlefield," said Lt. Gen. Sean Gainey.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · August 6, 2024

The US Army announced on Nov. 16, 2023, that the Search, Track, Acquire, Radiate, Eliminate Project Office executed a missile flight test against a cruise missile threat surrogate at White Sands Missile Range. (DVIDS)

SMD 2024 — Eyeing a host of new weapons and the 2040 battlefield, the US Army is revamping its air and missile defense strategy for the first time in five years, according to a three-star general helping the change.

“As we look at the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, it’s…easy to see the challenges that are out there that we must face moving forward,” Army Space and Missile Defense Command head Lt. Gen. Sean Gainey told an audience today.

“It’s time to look even further into the future” and develop a new air and missile defense (AMD) strategy, he separately said. “We are using what we’ve learned from previous years in the current conflicts to design the type of force we’ll need to assure, deter and, if necessary, fight to win on tomorrow’s battlefield.”

Gainey kicked off the Space and Missile Defense symposium in Huntsville, Ala., in part, with news of the strategy revamp he aims to have completed by October 2025. The plan, he added, is to work with a host of offices including the Army Fires Center of Excellence and the Army Futures Command on a new “integrated approach” that pushes the existing AMD 2028 strategy [pdf], published in 2019, further into the future.

While he did not detail the precise questions he and other leaders are seeking to answer or the potential implications, the assumption is that the AMD force of 2040 will need to be prepared to operate under constant observation while continuously fighting, requiring 360-degree coverage — “a non-negotiable,” Gainey said — and better use of artificial intelligence.

“This strategy is going to allow us the opportunity to lay a foundation with how we move forward with capability development, to be able to address that future threat, leveraging the studies and analysis that’s being done by the Army’s Futures Command [AFC],” he told reporters after the speech.

Since Gen James Rainey took the AFC’s reins nearly two years ago, the four-star general has been focusing on what the future force will look like, including a not yet released tactical fires study and a new operating concept that could, in part, change formations.

At the same time, the service is preparing for a host of new capabilities to come online including in the AMD arena like the Patriot radar replacement called Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense System, the Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 (IFPC Inc 2), the Integrated Battle Command System and more.

Between the looming force structure changes and new AMD capabilities, Gainey, Rainey and other leaders will have a host of topics to explore in the updated strategy.

“This team recognizes that now is the time to take on these issues: AMD is always at the forefront of our minds, forefront of our partners, forefront of our senior leaders,” Gainey told the audience.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · August 6, 2024

12. Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu: Back to the Future

History is always instructive and useful (if properly understood).

Excerpts:

Goodman sees China’s “gray zone” moves as more sophisticated and more likely to succeed than Mao’s attacks in the 1950s. Kinmen’s residents support greater links to the mainland, and the CCP has proposed Kinmen’s inclusion in a “special economic zone” and has discussed building a bridge to connect Kinmen with PRC-held Xiamen. Kinmen also is dependent on China for 68 percent of its water via the “Kinmen-China water pipeline.” Goodman expects that the CCP will use “disinformation” and “political interference” to attempt to separate Kinmen from Taiwan. Goodman warns that “[a]ny attempt by Beijing to annex Kinmen and destabilize the status quo would make the possibility of the PRC invading or embargoing Taiwan even more likely.”

...

In the 1950s, we had leaders of the caliber of Eisenhower, Nixon (who was Vice-President) and Dulles, China lacked atomic weapons, and we had nuclear superiority over China’s Soviet allies, and our military forces were superior to China’s in the western Pacific. Deterrence worked. Today, we have a president who is cognitively impaired, a vice-president who has zero experience in foreign policy, and a secretary of state who has yet to inspire confidence. Today, China has a sizeable inventory of nuclear weapons that is growing every day, naval and conventional superiority in the western Pacific, and an immense geographical advantage vis-a-vis the United States. With Kinmen and Matsu, we are back to the future--but that future looks increasingly bleak.

Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu: Back to the Future

By Francis P. Sempa

August 07, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/08/07/kinmen_quemoy_and_matsu_back_to_the_future_1050002.html?

Writing in The Diplomat, Sam Goodman, senior policy director at the China Risks Institute, worries that China may attempt to annex the Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands, which are part of the Republic of China (Taiwan) but are geographically located just a few miles from the People’s Republic of China. Goodman reminds readers that Mao Zedong “long viewed Kinmen and Matsu as a noose with which to bind Taiwan to mainland China and prevent Taiwan from declaring its independence.” Goodman, citing a paper by Andrew Yeh, characterizes such a move as part of China’s “gray zone” tactics that would fall short of an invasion or blockade of Taiwan and, therefore, might not produce a strong response from the United States and its allies, but which would have significant long-term consequences for America’s position in the western Pacific.

We have been here before. Twice in the 1950s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shelled and bombed Kinmen (then called Quemoy) and Matsu in what became known as the first and second Taiwan Strait Crises. In 1954-55, Chinese communist forces seized some offshore islands, tried to invade Big Kinmen Island, began to shell Quemoy and Matsu, and called for the “liberation” of Taiwan (then commonly called Formosa). The CCP leadership viewed (and still views) Taiwan’s de facto independence as the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower successfully urged Congress to pass the Formosa Resolution, which stated in part that it was in the vital interests of the United States that Taiwan and its smaller islands remain in control of governments friendly to the United States. The resolution cited the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of China (ROC)--which is still in effect today. The resolution authorized the president “to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Far East Commander Gen. John Hull and the Pacific Commander Adm. Felix Stump that U.S. air and naval units should be prepared if necessary to participate with Republic of China (ROC) forces to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores, and “some of the offshore islands.” In January 1955, Ichiang island fell to communist forces. U.S. Navy ships evacuated about 40,000 ROC soldiers and civilians from the Tachen islands. U.S. air squadrons were sent to Taiwan. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned China that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan. The Chinese Communists ended the shelling of the islands.

Three years later in August 1958, the CCP shelled Quemoy and Matsu again (firing more than 40,000 artillery rounds), used its warplanes to strafe and bomb the islands, and imposed a naval blockade. The Soviet Union publicly pledged to help Beijing liberate Taiwan. Secretary of State Dulles warned Beijing not to attempt to seize the islands. Eisenhower sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, increased the number of warships in the region (including the aircraft carriers Essex and Midway and their destroyer escorts), and again threatened to use nuclear weapons against China. U.S. air forces were instructed to be prepared to strike Chinese coastal air bases. They were also told to be prepared, if authorized by the president, to make atomic strikes deep into mainland China.

Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration-imposed restraints on Chiang Kai-shek’s government. There were air-to-air clashes between PRC and ROC forces. There were clashes at sea between PRC and ROC forces as the Nationalists attempted to break through the PRC blockade. Ultimately, the PRC backed down again. Deterrence had worked both in 1954-55 and in 1958.

Goodman sees China’s “gray zone” moves as more sophisticated and more likely to succeed than Mao’s attacks in the 1950s. Kinmen’s residents support greater links to the mainland, and the CCP has proposed Kinmen’s inclusion in a “special economic zone” and has discussed building a bridge to connect Kinmen with PRC-held Xiamen. Kinmen also is dependent on China for 68 percent of its water via the “Kinmen-China water pipeline.” Goodman expects that the CCP will use “disinformation” and “political interference” to attempt to separate Kinmen from Taiwan. Goodman warns that “[a]ny attempt by Beijing to annex Kinmen and destabilize the status quo would make the possibility of the PRC invading or embargoing Taiwan even more likely.”

In the 1950s, we had leaders of the caliber of Eisenhower, Nixon (who was Vice-President) and Dulles, China lacked atomic weapons, and we had nuclear superiority over China’s Soviet allies, and our military forces were superior to China’s in the western Pacific. Deterrence worked. Today, we have a president who is cognitively impaired, a vice-president who has zero experience in foreign policy, and a secretary of state who has yet to inspire confidence. Today, China has a sizeable inventory of nuclear weapons that is growing every day, naval and conventional superiority in the western Pacific, and an immense geographical advantage vis-a-vis the United States. With Kinmen and Matsu, we are back to the future--but that future looks increasingly bleak.

Francis P. Sempa is a regular contributor to RealClearDefense and writes the Best Defense column each month. Read his latest: "Border Crisis is a National Security Issue."

13. Resource Wars: How Climate Change is Fueling Militarization of the Arctic

Excerpts:

While China has strategically refrained from openly articulating its military interests in the Arctic, it nevertheless aims to position itself as a global power with considerable maritime strength capable of exerting influence over the region's norms of engagement. Its investments in building its navy and leadership in resource extraction, scientific research, commercial fishing, shipping, and maritime infrastructure aim to consolidate a viable foundation for its Arctic Silk Road and thus integrate the region into Beijing’s broader geopolitical and military strategy. Those do not inherently contradict Russia’s aspirations but neither do they complement them. Moscow is weary of China’s potential dominance in the region; however, in the name of pragmatism, both sides are eager to benefit from their mutual yet complex economic relationship and potential for joint investments and resource development.

Diplomatic frictions will likely pave the way for pronounced regional and international instabilities — or resource wars — between major Arctic powers and their allies. The victors in the scramble for the Arctic, or the race to become the next great Polar power, will have the authority to unilaterally define territorial boundaries and establish new rules of engagement in the region. Time will tell if the Arctic Council will play a significant role in promoting cooperation and mitigating the threat of overt militarization of the region. With significant governance gaps in its mandate, which explicitly excludes military security matters, and legal ambiguities within international treaties and agreements, the Arctic security dynamics will undoubtedly become a subject of considerable contention in the coming years.

Resource Wars: How Climate Change is Fueling Militarization of the Arctic

By Joanna Rozpedowski

August 07, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/08/07/resource_wars_how_climate_change_is_fueling_militarization_of_the_arctic_1050051.html?

As the Russo-Ukrainian conflict continues to redefine the international security landscape, more sources of dispute among rivals are emerging. New outbreaks of mass violence in the Middle East and Africa, struggles over drinking water from Afghanistan to Niger, ethnic cleansings, simmering conflicts, unrests, insurgencies, and civil wars in the earth’s poorest countries, and endless flows of migrants and refugees into Europe and the United States are only a few yet concerted and unabating forces reorganizing the geo-economic, geopolitical, and social landscape which deepen social cleavages and increase prospects for conflict.

The appreciation of the multifaceted threat vectors arising from localized environmental degradation and resource and food scarcity presents one of the more compelling challenges for policymakers. In his 2012 book Climate Wars: What People Will be Killed in the 21st Century, Harald Welzer argued that the consequences stemming from the relationship between violence and climate change will “establish different social conditions from those we have known until now” which will “spell the end of the Enlightenment and its conception of freedom” resulting in the decline of the Western social model based on democracy and liberalism. Resource scarcity and relative economic deprivation will lead to violence, and violence, Welzer contends, is always highly adaptive and “innovative” as it develops “new forms and new conditions” for the use of force. The twentieth-century wars may well have been driven by conflicts over land, religion, and economic interests but the wars of the 21st century will in no insignificant measure be fueled by the multipronged environmental crises leading to a potential state failure contagion, water and food shortages, and a brutal scramble for resource dominance in strategic areas of the globe. The world’s rapacious appetite for natural resources and rare earth minerals will open new theatres of potential conflict ranging from outer space to the Arctic.

The Arctic’s Military Landscape

Melting ice in the Arctic is unlocking a valuable natural resource base, oil and gas deposits, and minerals necessary for fueling “green” economic growth already pushing countries to jostle over territorial claims and control of the region’s shipping routes and navigation rights. The world’s insatiable hunger for the vast Arctic deposits of oil, gas, nickel, copper, lead, zinc, diamonds, gold, silver, manganese, titanium, and abundant fisheries worth trillions of dollars present a substantial incentive for cooperation and an even stronger propensity toward conflict.

The militarization of the Arctic is escalating, with contiguous and non-contiguous states attempting to secure their claims through the reopening of Cold War-era military sites, airfields, nuclear and submarine facilities, deep-water ports, military exercises, and testing of logistically relevant assets and new weapon systems. Since 2005, Russia has significantly modernized its navy and invested in hypersonic missiles capable of evading U.S. sensors and compromising undersea cables and communication infrastructure. It is also developing and leveraging its icebreaker fleet to ensure year-round navigability of the Northern Sea Route, which runs along Russia’s Arctic coast and offers reduced transit times between Europe and Asia.

The Arctic holds significant strategic value for China — a self-declared “near-Arctic” nation, as it offers access to new shipping routes and vast resources. China, too, harbors strategic ambitions as it attempts to incorporate the Polar Silk Road into its wider Belt and Road Initiative and develop Arctic trade routes.

Through Sino-Russian cooperation initiatives, China and Russia are keen on securing maritime power and economic interests in the High North, while the NATO pact members seek to cement their strategic presence qua influence through NATO’s Arctic Command, a deterrent coordination and cooperation measure aimed at consolidating and preparing joint naval assets for the requisite force projection and prospective combat operations in challenging polar conditions. NATO’s Regional Plan North aims to equip the Alliance with adaptive capabilities that anticipate challenges, protect the freedom of navigation, and equip its members with interoperable surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. After Sweden and Finland joined the Alliance in 2024, NATO is well placed to enhance its deterrence posture and surveillance capabilities in the region as seven out of eight of the Arctic countries are now members.

The United States is investing heavily in new air stations and naval base installations above the Arctic Circle through the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement signed with Norway in April 2021 all in the name, as the U.S. 2022 Arctic Strategy contends, of ensuring the region remains “peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative.” To maintain competitive advantage in the region, the U.S. military has expanded its presence in the Arctic by establishing Alaskan Command and increasing investments in icebreakers, surveillance systems, and cold-weather training. U.S. outer space assets prove consequential in this endeavor as they provide the necessary space-situational awareness capabilities that inform operational readiness and report on weather conditions. Yet, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the balance of power remains at present tilted in favor of Russia.

According to experts, increasing cooperation between China and Russia does not necessarily signify the formation of an anti-Western alignment and a “coordinated revisionist strategy” in the Arctic. Western states, however, must address the challenges posed by Arctic near-peer competitors bent on undermining their assets and adapt to the changing Arctic geopolitical landscape as tensions in the region rise and threaten to spill over into yet another potentially perilous armed confrontation.

While China has strategically refrained from openly articulating its military interests in the Arctic, it nevertheless aims to position itself as a global power with considerable maritime strength capable of exerting influence over the region's norms of engagement. Its investments in building its navy and leadership in resource extraction, scientific research, commercial fishing, shipping, and maritime infrastructure aim to consolidate a viable foundation for its Arctic Silk Road and thus integrate the region into Beijing’s broader geopolitical and military strategy. Those do not inherently contradict Russia’s aspirations but neither do they complement them. Moscow is weary of China’s potential dominance in the region; however, in the name of pragmatism, both sides are eager to benefit from their mutual yet complex economic relationship and potential for joint investments and resource development.

Diplomatic frictions will likely pave the way for pronounced regional and international instabilities — or resource wars — between major Arctic powers and their allies. The victors in the scramble for the Arctic, or the race to become the next great Polar power, will have the authority to unilaterally define territorial boundaries and establish new rules of engagement in the region. Time will tell if the Arctic Council will play a significant role in promoting cooperation and mitigating the threat of overt militarization of the region. With significant governance gaps in its mandate, which explicitly excludes military security matters, and legal ambiguities within international treaties and agreements, the Arctic security dynamics will undoubtedly become a subject of considerable contention in the coming years.

Dr. Joanna Rozpedowski is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University. X: @JKRozpedowski

Dr. Joanna Rozpedowski is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy and an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University, Schar School of Policy and Government. Twitter @JKRozpedowski. 

14. Warily, US companies eye co-production deals in Ukraine

Warily, US companies eye co-production deals in Ukraine

Industry is taking a “crawl, walk, run” approach to making weapons in Ukraine, State Department says.

By Audrey Decker

Staff Writer

August 6, 2024 05:42 PM ET

Industry

Ukraine

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

FARNBOROUGH, UK—Several U.S. defense companies are considering joint production inside Ukraine, but questions remain about the safety of doing business in a war zone, the persistence of corruption, and the long-term business case.

The Pentagon has been pushing American defense contractors to increase collaboration with their Ukrainian counterparts, but U.S. firms have been slower to ink deals than European companies.

“I think our industry is really eager, but at the same time, [it] has to make sense from a business case, right? And financing is an issue too, how you can actually pay for this stuff,” a State Department official told Defense One on the sidelines of the Farnborough air show.

The official pointed to last month’s announcement from Northrop Grumman that it will make ammunition inside Ukraine. It’s the first public deal between a U.S. company and Ukraine to produce weapons inside the country, and “there are other companies that are looking at what they can do next.”

But American companies have a lot to consider before they sign up for co-production in a war zone; no one wants their facilities blown up or employees getting hurt, the official said.

Some Western companies also might be concerned about corruption in Ukraine’s defense industrial base.

“Clearly, corruption is a concern,” the official said, but noted that Ukraine is making progress, and that Ukrainian officials have acknowledged the situation must improve for U.S. industry to confidently team up with the country.

Companies are also trying to gauge what kind of local or regional markets might outlast the war, since it would take years to get a new production line up and running, the official said.

“It has to be a business case for what they're trying to do, and so looking at maybe starting off with a maintenance, repair, and overhaul type stuff, spare parts production, so kind of starting a crawl-walk-run-type philosophy, before you actually get to the more advanced stuff,” the official said.

Another sticking point for U.S. companies is whether they have political risk insurance—essentially, financial protection for their investment in Ukraine.

“U.S. companies or European companies, if they're going to make these investments in those countries, they’ve got to have confidence that political risk insurance is in place, and they get the financing, stuff like that,” the official said.

But broadly, the U.S. government wants companies to do more with Ukraine. The official noted the United States has a “Ukraine deal team,” which is tasked with giving guidance on potential U.S-Ukraine agreements, to answer questions and concerns.

“We're definitely open for dialogue,” the official said. “If we can leverage Ukrainian industry to help satisfy requirements, either it's repairing stuff that's donated from Western allies or to produce spare parts or whatnot, that's a win-win for both governments, and potentially a win-win for industry on both sides.”

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

15. DoD Innovation Fact Sheet

Download the 5 page fact sheet in PDF at this link: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Aug/07/2003519333/-1/-1/0/DOD-INNOVATION-FACT-SHEET-AUGUST-2024.PDF

The title is: 

STRUCTURING CHANGE TO LAST: An Update on Innovation at the Department of Defense

DoD Innovation Fact Sheet

Aug. 7, 2024

A fact sheet detailing updates on innovation at the Defense Department.

VIEW PUBLICATION

​

16. USAA to Pay $64.2 Million to Service Members in Settlement over Improper Bank Fees, Interest

​Uh oh.

Excerpts:

In a statement provided to Military.com, Roger Wildermuth, USAA's director for public relations, said the company "strongly disagrees" with the charges but decided to settle "in the best interest of our membership" and to avoid lengthy, "expensive litigation so we can focus on providing exceptional service."

According to Wildermuth, after realizing the issue, USAA had "already compensated members for errors that may have occurred related to the allegations" before the lawsuit was filed.

"Roughly half of the announced settlement amount is simply reissuing checks we had previously mailed that our members never cashed," Wildermuth said.

The lawsuit alleged, however, that those checks were sent with correspondence that "misleadingly stated that the recipient 'may have' been entitled to 'benefits and/or protections'" and were printed in a way that would prompt recipients to toss them.

USAA to Pay $64.2 Million to Service Members in Settlement over Improper Bank Fees, Interest

military.com · by Patricia Kime · August 6, 2024

USAA has agreed to pay $64.2 million to settle a class-action lawsuit alleging that its banks improperly charged fees and high interest rates that violated federal protections for service members who held loans.

Under the agreement released Friday, defendants USAA Federal Savings Bank and USAA Savings Bank -- the company's credit card subsidiary that is now part of USAA Federal Savings Bank -- did not admit any wrongdoing but agreed to pay roughly 210,000 members to settle a case filed in November 2021.

In the suit, four plaintiffs alleged the banks did not lower interest rates or fees in compliance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), causing improper inflation of customers' principal balances and resulting in calculations of compound interest based on the higher balances.

The banks then "concealed their overcharges from thousands of military families," according to the claimants in Bulls et al. v. USAA Federal Savings Bank et. al.

"Despite their representations to plaintiffs and other class members, defendants failed to comply with the SCRA and the terms of its USAA Military Benefits Program," the lawsuit read.

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, passed in 2003 in its current form, is designed to protect troops from financial burdens while they are serving in the U.S. military by suspending, postponing or reducing obligations like loans, rent or insurance costs under certain circumstances.

According to the lawsuit, the U.S. Treasury's Office of the Comptroller of the Currency found 546 violations of the SCRA and 54 violations of the Military Lending Act during a March 2019 performance evaluation of USAA Federal Savings Bank, including failure to protect military reservists from high fees and wrongful repossession of vehicles.

The office issued a cease-and-desist order and required the bank to begin remediation to customers. In 2020, it fined the bank $85 million for failing to implement or maintain an effective program to monitor for compliance or measure information technology risk regarding the laws.

In a statement provided to Military.com, Roger Wildermuth, USAA's director for public relations, said the company "strongly disagrees" with the charges but decided to settle "in the best interest of our membership" and to avoid lengthy, "expensive litigation so we can focus on providing exceptional service."

According to Wildermuth, after realizing the issue, USAA had "already compensated members for errors that may have occurred related to the allegations" before the lawsuit was filed.

"Roughly half of the announced settlement amount is simply reissuing checks we had previously mailed that our members never cashed," Wildermuth said.

The lawsuit alleged, however, that those checks were sent with correspondence that "misleadingly stated that the recipient 'may have' been entitled to 'benefits and/or protections'" and were printed in a way that would prompt recipients to toss them.

"The correspondence was often sent in a nondescript envelope that appeared to many service members as a solicitation or junk mail," according to the complaint.

The settlement, which still requires a judge's approval, could result in each plaintiff receiving slightly more than $200, with the four named plaintiffs -- all former members of the Army Reserve or Army National Guard -- getting an estimated $20,000 each.

The attorneys for the plaintiffs, with Seattle-based firms Smith & Lowney PLLC and Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, have requested 27.5% of the settlement, or more than $17 million, for legal fees and expenses.

Members of the class include troops who had a credit card account or loan with a USAA bank while actively serving any time after May 4, 2009, and who would have been subject to interest rate reduction protections under the SCRA and the Military Lending Act.

The settlement does not say whether all affected will be notified, but the only troops included are those who received and deposited a check from a USAA bank as a result of the correction or were identified as being eligible for one.

If approved, details on the settlement, including paperwork to opt out, will be posted on www.USAABankClassAction.com.

USAA is a San Antonio-based insurance company, which serves roughly 14 million service members, retirees, veterans and their families. USAA Federal Savings Bank had roughly 9 million members in 2022.

"USAA is committed to serving our members by going beyond minimum requirements through industry-leading SCRA benefits, such as offering interest rates lower than the law requires and automatically applying benefits for eligible members," Wildermuth said.

military.com · by Patricia Kime · August 6, 2024

​17. NATO Missed a Chance to Transform Itself 

Conclusion:

Now is the time for Americans to become the “best Europeans” again. Washington should use its influence to call for the formation of the European pillar and push the Europeans to get on with the long generational slog of defense integration. As former Clinton administration officials Ron Asmus, Antony Blinken, and Philip Gordon wrote in 2005, “Washington needs to get over its current ambivalence about European integration and adopt a new strategy overtly supporting the EU.” That remains the case today. U.S. policy should be to seek to turn NATO into a true partnership between the United States and Europe so that on the alliance’s 100th birthday we can truly say it is stronger than ever.

NATO Missed a Chance to Transform Itself - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Max Bergmann · August 7, 2024

Apart from the heat, the NATO summit went off without a hitch. Yes, Washington was consumed with the political whirlwind surrounding President Joe Biden. But for NATO, and the Biden administration, this was a mission accomplished: a no drama summit. NATO was back, returning to its Cold War roots deterring the Russians, adding new members, and seeing major increases in European defense spending. Nothing transformative was announced but not much was fought over, enabling the occasion to focus on celebrating NATO’s 75 years.

Yet for all the good vibes, there was also a dissonance to the summit. Biden’s commitment to NATO was clearly rock solid but the question of what comes next consumed the summit as much as Washington’s July humidity. All the lyrical tributes to the strength of NATO papered over the current brittleness at the heart of alliance: Europe’s security 75 years later still remains deeply dependent on the United States. It is not simply the potential for another Trump presidency that is keeping Europe awake at night, but also the broader embrace of isolationism on the American right, the loss of a clear bipartisan consensus in favor of the alliance, and Washington’s intense prioritization of the Indo-Pacific. Now with Biden leaving the stage, there is also the potential for a generational shift, producing a new U.S. leadership with likely less attachment to NATO and Europe. While Europe has often fretted about U.S. commitment, this is coming at a time when Europe is deeply fearful for its security.

The result is a nervous do-something energy in Europe that has revived the notion of building a “European pillar” of NATO, with many European leaders inserting the phrase into their talking points. Think tanks have been active trying to flush out the concept and laying out recommendations. But European governments have yet to translate their talking points into a plan of action.

What has been missing is direction from Washington. Given America’s central role in European security, Europe is unlikely to act unless Washington points the way. The problem is that the United States, since the end of the Cold War, has not wanted Europe to act as Europe. It has not wanted a European pillar. The United States has wanted more defense spending to be sure, but in furtherance of a U.S.-dominated alliance. What should be evident, especially now that Europe is indeed spending a lot more on defense — collectively $300 billion — is that dependence on the United States is not ultimately a spending issue. It is structural. Since no European country can play the role that the United States plays in the alliance, the only way for Europe to reduce its dependence is to act more as Europe.

The United States has lost sight of its core goal in creating NATO 75 years ago: not just to protect Europe but to build a new Europe in its image. The current moment thus presents a unique opportunity to not just make the alliance stronger and more resilient, but also to transform Europe. NATO has been the great facilitator of European integration, protecting Europe from external threats, allowing it to integrate internally. But by largely walling off defense as a sector off limits for the European Union, the United States and NATO have deprived the European Union of the fuel that has historically driven state-formation. NATO has been standing in the way of what could be a major advance of the European project, whose goal — despite Europeans almost never saying it out loud — is ultimately to build a federal European state. Defense, in many respects, represents the final frontier of European integration. A Europe integrating on defense would trigger broader fiscal, foreign policy, and democracy reforms within the European Union.

A highly symbolic summit in Washington, with an American president who is deeply committed to the alliance and carries tremendous influence in Europe, would have been a remarkable opportunity to plot a new and more sustainable course for NATO by defining such a pillar. Instead, the concept of a European pillar was ignored. The summit instead sought to perpetuate a status quo of American leadership that may not be sustainable.

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From Transforming Europe…

NATO’s first Secretary-General Hastings Ismay famously, if apocryphally, said that NATO was formed to keep “the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” Both the United States and Europe agreed on keeping the Russians out and the Germans down. But the goal of keeping the Americans “in” was ultimately a European, not an American, objective. The United States sought an alliance with Europe, not to serve as its indefinite security crutch.

While the United States recognized that Europe was so weak it could not realistically stay out, the goal of U.S. policy was not simply to stay in. Instead, the United States sought to in essence build a European pillar. In keeping the Russians out, a new, stronger, and united Europe could be constructed in America’s own image. NATO ultimately succeeded in keeping the Soviets out but ultimately “keeping the Germans down” was not so much NATO’s role but Europe’s. The idea was not actually to keep Germany down but to enmesh Germany into a rebuilt Europe. For the Europeans, giving up sovereign control was always difficult. This made the U.S. role essential, as Washington not only strongly backed European integration, but insisted upon it. This led West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to quip that “Americans are the best Europeans.”

The Marshall Plan was not just about kick-starting a European economic revival — it also demanded that Europe begin to integrate and break down economic barriers between countries. This was followed by the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (the forerunner to the European Community and European Union), which in 1951 integrated the sectors critical to waging war and was strongly backed by Washington. Perhaps America’s “best European” of the era was Dwight Eisenhower. As NATO’s supreme allied commander and as president, Eisenhower strongly backed the creation of an integrated European army. In 1956, Eisenhower called for a “United States of Europe,” describing “European Union, one of the greatest dreams of Western man.” Jean Monnet, one of Europe’s leading founding fathers, assessed U.S. post-war policy as “the first time in history that a great power, instead of basing its policy on ruling by dividing, has consistently and resolutely backed the creation of a large Community uniting peoples previously apart.”

… to Staying In

NATO and the European Community proceeded on separate tracks during the Cold War, with NATO organizing Europe’s defense and the European Community integrating Europe’s economies. But following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the European Community took the step to form the European Union in 1993. The formation of the European Union triggered a more than decade-long treaty or constitutional reform effort on how it would function. While this would leave the European Union far short of a federal state, it did mean that the union, as scholars have noted, became more and more state-like. The European Union bestowed a common European citizenship, sought to forge a common foreign and security policy, would eventually establish its own diplomatic service with an E.U. “high representative” or a foreign and defense minister, and undertook military missions in the Balkans and to combat piracy and terrorism. Thus, the European Union from a U.S. and NATO perspective was starting to impinge on NATO’s turf.

The Clinton administration supported the European Union’s creation but was uneasy about the future of NATO and the broader role of the United States in European security. The Clinton administration ultimately doubled down on NATO, seeing it as means to stabilize Europe and nervous an untethered European Union would go in a Gaullist direction. NATO’s eastward expansion paved the way for the European Union to expand as well, allowing it to become a colossus, taking on a true continental scale. But the United States also effectively came out against the European Union becoming an independent defense actor. The pivotal turn happened in the run up to the Washington summit 25 years ago. At St. Malo in December 1998, French President Jacques Chirac and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair had agreed on a historic new path for E.U. defense to create a 60,000 strong E.U. force. Just days later, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed U.S. concerns in a speech at NATO, now known as the “3 Ds,” declaring there should be “no duplication” with NATO. While Albright’s policy left some room for the European Union on defense and likely was not intended to be interpreted rigidly, after 9/11, U.S. policy became set in stone — Europe’s future received little attention from senior policy makers and essentially any E.U. defense effort was interpreted by U.S. officials as amounting to “duplication.”

Given the dependence of Europe, especially eastern Europe, on the U.S. security guarantee, the United States could divide and rule, cajoling certain states to block efforts at the E.U. level. Rarely did the United States have to say anything. Its opposition was known and that created a general chilling effect on E.U. defense proposals.

Ultimately, U.S. opposition to European defense integration represented a reversal of its post-war strategy toward Europe and Eisenhower’s vision. America’s priority with NATO ultimately became to stay in. The United States has wanted to preserve its influence, which meant instead of “keeping the Germans down,” NATO was in the position of de facto keeping “Europe” down. Yes, the United States wanted individual European states to do more on defense, but not “Europe.” As a result, while the European Union has been able to advance certain defense initiatives such as research and development, ultimately all of its efforts are quite limited in scope and funding and thus quite marginal to broader European defense efforts. European integration has taken great leaps in just about every area except defense.

This has created an odd situation. Europe is increasingly consolidating, operating more and more as one, but not in defense. European defense today no longer makes much sense as currently structured. From a pure military perspective, Europe is a fragmented mess, largely held together by the U.S. role. With 30 bespoke militaries, operating all sorts of different kit, it is highly questionable whether a collection of European countries could deploy together to defend Europe without the United States. Europe is now dramatically increasing spending but this is not focused on addressing collective European gaps and reducing Europe’s reliance on the United States. In other words, it is not focused on building a European pillar.

The Appeal of the European Pillar

Washington, however, has much to gain from a strong European pillar, and it is past time for the United States to start supporting it. Why?

The first reason is practical. European defense integration would produce tangible benefits to the NATO alliance. The way E.U. integration works is not by setting an end goal, such as creating an army. Instead, it works to solve tangible problems and fill clear gaps. Europeans for instance procure all different military equipment — the European Union could mobilize funds more effectively to make joint procurements. Few, if any, E.U. member states can afford the big-ticket enabling systems on their own that are essential to any fight — instead, the European Union could provide funds and make those procurements. Perhaps it could even operate its own fleets of air tankers, building on the European Defence Agency’s Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet initiative, and transport planes. European militaries need to rebuild ammunition stockpiles — the European Union could pay for more of that, building on the European Commission’s €500 million Act in Support of Ammunition Production program designed to stimulate the production of critical ammunition. Furthermore, with NATO focused on Russia, the European Union would keep its out-of-area focus, dealing with neighborhood problems where the United States, and therefore NATO, has little interest in acting. That creates some duplication but ultimately would leave the European Union as the backbone of a European pillar within NATO.

The second reason is more geopolitical. The European Union ultimately needs defense to accelerate the European project. This would potentially give the United States a much stronger European partner. Europe’s former great-power states, especially the United Kingdom and France, are not the powers they were in the 20th century. But the European Union, when it acts as one, is incredibly powerful. It has an economy equivalent in size to the United States and China and 450 million people. Just as major advances in the American federal project occurred when the United States had to mobilize for war, such as during the Civil War, World War I, or World War II, similar advances would inevitably occur in Europe. As scholars R. Daniel Keleman and Kathleen R. McNamara argue, “historically, political projects centralizing power have been most complete when both market and security pressures are present to generate state formation.”

If the European Union became a more prominent defense actor that might promote a significant evolution in the union. Defense requires money. Adopting a bigger a defense role would require the European Union to develop its fiscal tools and capacity. This would involve, say, leveraging its currency to borrow on capital markets or increase the size of the E.U. budget from national contributions, or even expanding its “own-resources” such as E.U. taxation.

Defense also requires greater foreign policy alignment and a more robust foreign policy apparatus. The European Union already is a foreign policy actor in the economic realm, fighting trade wars, sanctioning countries, and providing foreign aid. This has made it a more prominent global actor and partner, especially in an era of geoeconomic competition with China. A greater E.U. role in defense would link the union’s immense economic power with a hard power component. It would require faster and more stream-lined decision-making, requiring the European Union to move away from unanimity amongst countries on foreign policy decisions. All of this would make the European Union a more impactful global actor and potential partner to the United States.

Finally, building an E.U. defense pillar would require the European Union to evolve politically and enhance its democratic legitimacy. With more money and potentially more E.U.-designated forces, the union’s Byzantine structure — involving two essentially co-equal presidents — would need to evolve. While concerns about the European Union’s “democratic deficit” are overstated, a European Union with more federal resources and more involvement in defense would likely need to develop a more direct democratic connection with voters. This could involve an expansion of powers to the European Parliament or reform of European parliamentary elections to make them less focused on the politics of a national capital and more on Brussels.

The Time Is Now

Today defense integration is both necessary and popular. For decades, it has been cliche in Europe that defense is a “national” responsibility. There has been an assumption that defense might be the “third rail” of the European project. But public opinion data demonstrates overwhelming support for E.U. defense initiatives, as high as 80 percent. One academic study found that the bolder the approach, the more support it received from Europeans. This was also borne out in the European parliamentary elections, where Ursula von der Leyen’s victorious center-right European Peoples Party ran on a strong E.U. defense platform, establishing a defense commissioner and mobilizing massive funding for E.U. defense efforts. Most astonishing, there was no counter-reaction from the far-right. For most Europeans there is a clear understanding that the threat is not to their nation but to Europe and therefore a greater E.U. role is obvious.

The main obstacle to a major push for significant European defense integration is bureaucratic path-dependency, both at NATO and at the 27 different mini-Pentagons and defense-industrial complexes within E.U. member states. The result is a deeply entrenched status quo within European countries that Europe has to overcome.

Europe will find it next to impossible to change this without a solid push from Washington. This can either come in the form of a shock, a sudden shift in Washington or a new and concerted U.S. policy. Some imagine that the United States pulling back abruptly might shock Europeans into getting their act together. It might. But by then it might also be too late. There is no quick fix to Europe’s dependence on the United States, and any sudden reduction in U.S. support would leave a gaping hole in European security for some time.

What makes this summer’s NATO summit such a missed opportunity is that the Biden administration has overseen a dramatic transformation of U.S.-E.U. relations. There has been a clear recognition of the European Union’s growing global importance under Biden, with the European Union becoming an essential partner on China, economic security, and sanctions. The close relationship between Biden and von der Leyen is unprecedented. Importantly, the Biden administration has also stopped opposing E.U. defense proposals, whether on joint E.U. ammunition purchases, the European Union training and arming Ukrainians, or borrowing on defense.

But the United States also has not vocally encouraged these efforts either. For instance, the United States spent immense diplomatic effort cajoling Europe at the G7 in June to undertake a highly complicated effort to leverage frozen Russian assets to borrow $50 billion for Ukraine. But when, later that month, E.U. leaders met at a European Council summit to discuss issuing over $100 billion in Eurobonds to finance Ukrainian aid and European rearmament, the United States stood silent as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz blocked E.U. action that would have enabled a dramatic step up in European defense production.

Now is the time for Americans to become the “best Europeans” again. Washington should use its influence to call for the formation of the European pillar and push the Europeans to get on with the long generational slog of defense integration. As former Clinton administration officials Ron Asmus, Antony Blinken, and Philip Gordon wrote in 2005, “Washington needs to get over its current ambivalence about European integration and adopt a new strategy overtly supporting the EU.” That remains the case today. U.S. policy should be to seek to turn NATO into a true partnership between the United States and Europe so that on the alliance’s 100th birthday we can truly say it is stronger than ever.

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Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center on Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously served as a senior advisor in the State Department from 2011 to 2017.

Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Max Bergmann · August 7, 2024

18. Depth of magazine: Preparing the joint force for protracted conflict

Depth of magazine: Preparing the joint force for protracted conflict

militarytimes.com · by Gen. Christopher Mahoney · August 6, 2024

“Mars must be fed. His tools of war demand huge quantities of fodder, fuel, ammunition, and food.” — John A. Lynn, Feeding Mars

The enduring conflicts in Ukraine, the Levant and Red Sea underscore the tumultuous nature of the global security environment. The United States’ adversaries and challengers are growing increasingly aligned in their efforts to undermine the international order and disrupt global stability. A coercive and aggressive Chinese Communist Party is militarizing at a wartime pace. The U.S. and our European allies face depleted arsenals while tensions in the Middle East continue to boil, increasing concerns that these challenges will require the joint force to make trade-offs between competing defense priorities. Herein lies the central defense challenge of today: ensuring the joint force has the requisite capabilities and capacity — the depth of magazine — to support U.S. allies and partners and sustain a protracted campaign of its own.

Depth matters

The depth of our nation’s magazine extends beyond ammunition storage and weapons. It encompasses our munitions, fuel and food stockpiles, and prepositioned inventories. It also includes the resiliency of our supply chains and the strength and depth of our industrial capacity. Additionally, it requires a deep bench of reserve and rotational forces that can relieve, reinforce and enable rapid reconstitution. Most importantly, it must effectively meet the needs of a short- and long-term time horizon.

While the joint force is postured to meet defense requirements now, the uncertainty of the future operating environment and the unpredictability of our adversaries heighten the risks associated with a shallow magazine. For example, an insufficient supply of aircraft, ammunition or aviators could limit our strike warfare operational tempo in the Indo-Pacific.

In the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian leadership failed to plan for the resources required to sustain their formations beyond the opening stages while limited inventories likely constrained the scope of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. While Ukraine registered an operational demand for 250,000 artillery rounds per month in the lead-up, they were limited to approximately 90,000 artillery rounds per month at the height of the counteroffensive.

Domestic drone manufacturers in Ukraine have surged from seven to over 300 in 18 months to meet the country’s demand for unmanned platforms. (Roman Chop/AP)

Ukraine has recognized it cannot solely rely on allies and partners and is working to expand the capacity of its industrial base. These efforts are proving fruitful, particularly in drone production. The number of domestic drone manufacturers has grown from seven to over 300 within the last eighteen months to keep pace with the Ukrainian armed forces’ consumption of over 10,000 unmanned platforms per month. However, production capacity takes time.

The clear lesson here is that limited capacity could force the U.S. to limit the scope of its military objectives or operational force employment if it is determined that a long-duration, high-tempo campaign is unsustainable. Most importantly, it could undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrence and embolden our adversaries.

The short, sharp illusion

Cathal J. Nolan systematically examines the Second Punic War, the Hundred Years’ War, the War of Spanish Succession, the Napoleonic Wars and the world wars in his 2017 book, “The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost.” He underscores that great power warfare is a society-encompassing affair that uses the full extent of a nation’s industrial capacity and political will. Major wars are most often won by the state with greater long-term capability and capacity.

The myth of the short, sharp conflict does not reflect the historical record, nor does it serve as a prudent planning factor for future conflict. Regardless of theater, joint and coalition forces need a depth of magazine that can last years — not months. China is increasing its weapons inventory five to six times faster than the United States while building multilayered antiaccess, area-denial defenses. Any conflict with China would produce an insatiable appetite for resources.

Not easy work

During the recent NATO summit in Washington, D.C., NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the alliance has failed to keep up with the demands of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Whether hampered by policy, politics or production capacity, NATO is not matching Russia’s renewed wartime production. Building and maintaining a depth of magazine requires proactive decision-making.

Closer coordination and teaming between government, defense and commercial industry will be required to meaningfully accelerate and scale critical capabilities in areas where industry is clearly in the lead. The U.S. should pursue procurement solutions and block buys of exquisite weapons, platforms and munitions while leveraging allies’ and partners’ ability to manufacture high quantities of defense commodities to focus on the capabilities that will be needed in a future high-end, high-intensity conflict. Ultimately, depth of magazine, along with a strategy to win beyond the opening stages of a conflict, should be carefully planned for and initiated well prior to the onset of conflict. That time is now.

Mars must be fed

History tells us that great power conflict comes with a high likelihood of protraction. If the U.S. is to maintain a credible deterrent and prevent the outbreak of a protracted war, the U.S. and its allies and partners must have deep enough magazines to sustain military operations in a long, high-intensity conflict. An insufficient inventory risks limiting the operational tempo and scope of military objectives or undermining our ability to sustain a protracted conflict. Ultimately, the depth of our magazine will determine the credibility of U.S. deterrence and our ability to protect national security.

Gen. Christopher Mahoney is the assistant commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

19. The Taiwan Fallacy

Excerpts:

The U.S. Navy can help deliver this message—and underscore Washington’s advantage—by shifting away from deploying its surface fleet and aircraft in the immediate theater around Taiwan. The Navy could instead concentrate more on its vital role in day-to-day operations around the world, such as its current mission against the Houthis in the Red Sea. In a conflict, it could pivot more to threatening Chinese interests in the Indo-Pacific outside of Taiwan, as well as in the Persian Gulf. China is the world’s largest trading state, and it imports most of its oil and gas by sea. If Beijing believes that invading Taiwan will be costly in and of itself, weaken it more broadly, and force it to immediately fight the United States in more hostile terrain further from home, it may think twice about trying to seize its neighbor.

Or it may not. Chinese leaders have spent decades promising to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. In recent years, the government appears to have become especially fixated on taking what it views as a renegade province. Xi has even said that the “great rejuvenation” of his nation will not be complete until Taiwan is under Beijing’s command.

But if China truly wants to eclipse the United States as the world’s most dominant country, it will need to be able to coerce Japan and the Philippines and project power worldwide. It will need to control, or at least contest, the global commons. China probably believes that the absorption of Taiwan is the necessary first step. Yet when push comes to shove, it may decide otherwise. And even if Beijing’s assessment is right, it does not mean that defending Taiwan is the most important way for the United States to stymie China’s larger agenda. Washington should invest in military tools that can defend Taiwan, but only if they also enable the American military to continue the fight elsewhere.

The Taiwan Fallacy

American Power Does Not Hinge on a Single Island

By Jonathan D. Caverley

August 7, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan D. Caverley · August 7, 2024

To hear many tell it, the future of the United States’ security—and, indeed, the world’s—rides on Taiwan. “A self-governing Taiwan anchors Japan’s defense and denies China a springboard from which it could threaten U.S. allies in the western Pacific,” wrote a collection of authors in Foreign Affairs, including Matt Pottinger, former U.S. President Donald Trump’s deputy national security adviser. Speaking before Congress in 2021, Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, described Taiwan as “critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests.” Ratner also testified that defense of Taiwan is his department’s “pacing scenario,” or the primary guide for U.S. military planning and operations. On the topic of Taiwan, contemporary analysts often invoke General Douglas MacArthur’s description of the island as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” and “submarine tender.” Others have cited Admiral Ernest King—the World War II U.S. chief of naval operations, who said Taiwan was a “cork in the bottle”—to suggest that it geographically contains China’s ambitions.

There are many reasons to help defend Taiwan: its significant economy, its microelectronics prowess, its mature democracy, the effect its seizure might have on U.S. credibility. But keeping China’s military in check is not one of them. Taiwan is a small, 90-mile-wide island just off China’s vast coast. If it became a fully armed Chinese province, the difference in military power between Beijing and Washington would barely shift.

China already possesses formidable space, land, air, sea, and cyber systems designed to detect and destroy U.S. and allied naval and air platforms far from the mainland. It does not need the island to menace the United States. Taiwan would give China a new place to base its systems, but the advantages that come from putting its weapons on the island versus the mainland are marginal.

Beijing, however, could derive one major military benefit from invading Taiwan. The wrong U.S. military response would provide Beijing with the chance to destroy many American ships, planes, and troops in terrain favorable to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The U.S. military would likely come away greatly weakened, even if it ultimately prevailed. The wrong defense of Taiwan, in other words, would be a cure worse than the disease.

If, as many hawks suggest, China’s ultimate aim is to become the world’s dominant country, then Washington should prepare to wage and win a wider and lengthier conflict, rather than obsessively structuring the U.S. military to directly counter China in the Taiwan Strait. A conflict starting with a Chinese invasion would almost certainly grow protracted and expand. U.S. forces, therefore, need to focus on protecting regional allies—Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea—and, indeed, the rest of the world from Chinese coercion.

That is not to say the United States should abandon the island. A properly calibrated defense of Taiwan would force Beijing to continue concentrating more of its resources on a very challenging objective and away from missions that more directly threaten American global interests. It is helpful for Washington if China is preoccupied with Taiwan: in other words, to keep the island as Beijing’s pacing scenario. Washington should continue loading the country up with drones, mines, and other relatively inexpensive defensive weapons, turning it into what military planners call a “porcupine” that China would struggle to digest. American officials could also employ some U.S. jets, ships, and submarines to help the country directly in the event of an attack. But positioning significant, vulnerable U.S. forces near the island in the name of deterrence risks too much military power for too little military gain. Taiwan is not the be all and end all of the Indo-Pacific, and so the U.S. armed forces cannot make the island its primary focus.

STRONG ENOUGH

Not long ago, China’s military was vastly inferior to the United States’. In 2012, at the beginning of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s tenure, the PLA was dominated by its ground forces and focused on local and internal conflicts. Beijing lacked a serious navy, a strong air force, or a powerful array of missiles. It did not have an expansive satellite system to help it identify and strike targets. As a result, Beijing could barely project power beyond its own coastline, much less pretend to track and attack bases and ships deep in the Pacific.

This is no longer true. Today’s PLA appears more formidable and focused. A 2014 change to China’s official strategy document exhorted the military to focus on “informatized” wars beyond its borders, with a large emphasis on “preparations for maritime military struggle.” Today, the PLA boasts the world’s largest navy (by most metrics) and is producing fifth-generation fighter jets and upgraded bomber aircraft.

But its most important capability is a weapon that was unavailable to MacArthur and King: the long-range missile. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, China has quadrupled its missile inventory over the past five years, and now possesses hundreds of mobile launchers. They are equipped with more than 1,000 medium- and 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, capable of traveling up to 1,800 miles and 3,400 miles, respectively. These weapons can threaten bases and ships in every part of Japan, the Philippines, and the Philippine Sea. According to publicly available Defense Department maps, they can reach most places in the Indian Ocean, any part of the Arabian and Red Seas, and even the eastern Mediterranean.

The wrong defense of Taiwan would be a cure worse than the disease.

The PLA has worked hard to ensure that if it decides to launch these missiles, they will hit their targets. China now has a huge network of satellites designed to detect and track American platforms with great precision. These satellites could target aircraft carriers, which are visually distinct from other ships, have high heat signatures, emit lots of radar and communications energy, and leave a distinctive wake. The satellites can sweep across the entire Pacific and Indian Oceans around the clock. For example, the recently launched Yaogan-41’s high-resolution optical system and Ludi Tance-4’s synthetic aperture radar—which works at night and in cloudy conditions—can each continuously survey a third of the earth’s surface from their geosynchronous orbits. And as with the U.S. Space Force, China’s military satellites are complemented by commercial ones (although Chinese commercial satellites are often government-owned). China’s Chang Guang Satellite Technology Company alone has more than 100 satellites in orbit and plans to triple that number by 2025. According to the firm, it will soon be able to take photos of any place on earth at high resolution within ten minutes of a request.

The United States has ways to counteract China’s space capabilities. Its ships, for example, could curtail their communications and radar use, making it harder for satellites to detect what they are doing. Washington also has various ways of degrading China’s satellite capabilities, not all of which require direct force. But these options come with drawbacks. Curtailing ship communications, for instance, makes fighting far more difficult. Destroying satellites in orbit creates space junk, which has global implications. Furthermore, if the United States disabled or destroyed Chinese satellites, China could retaliate against U.S. ones. And even if the United States eliminates China’s satellites, Beijing has other ways to track U.S. assets. The country is upgrading its bomber planes, which could help guide cruise missiles launched from distant areas. China has a large portfolio of long-range surveillance drones. And it could use its expanding navy, coast guard, and maritime militia, as well as its 187,000-vessel-strong fishing fleet, to spot U.S. carriers. Although none of these systems is invulnerable, the United States would struggle to eliminate all or even a substantial proportion of them without burning through enormous amounts of ammunition. In fact, the United States is already running low on important munitions as it tries to protect global shipping from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

China, in other words, is already a dangerous adversary. It does not need more territory to challenge U.S. forces.

LITTLE TO NOTHING

At first glance, it seems likely that absorbing Taiwan would further bolster China’s impressive armed forces. With control over the island, China’s stockpile of shorter-range missiles—cheaper and more plentiful than its medium- and long-range arsenals—would be able to reach more of Japan and the Philippines as well as each country’s waters. And, as MacArthur suggested, Taiwan could host Chinese ships, jets, and submarines. Possessing Taiwan, then, might increase Beijing’s capabilities.

But upon inspection, these claims fall flat. Taiwan, it turns out, is not a cork containing China’s ability to project power into the Pacific and beyond. The military benefits to taking it would be modest.

Consider, for example, what the island would actually do for Chinese short-range missiles. These rockets can already hit Okinawa and Luzon from the mainland. The extra 190 miles that Taiwan would afford them would not be enough to reach any more large military bases. Instead, it would mostly extend these missiles’ range to encompass a small swath of the vast western Pacific, one that is relatively easy for naval ships to avoid while executing their missions.

Some experts, such as Pottinger, have suggested that possessing Taiwan would empower China’s other military systems by affording Beijing a large naval outpost on the so-called first island chain: the ring of countries that surrounds the Chinese mainland’s eastern seaboard. After all, every state in this chain is currently either neutral or aligned with the United States. But even here, the island would be of little benefit. The vast majority of the chain’s island links belong to Japan or the Philippines. These countries bookend Taiwan, and they have growing missile capabilities themselves. They also have bases that can host U.S. forces. Two of the four new bases included in the 2023 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States and the Philippines essentially face Taiwan. Beijing could seize the island, and its troops, jets, and ships would be no safer than they are right now.

Taiwan is not a cork containing China’s power.

Even Chinese submarines would be no more useful on Taiwan than on the mainland. Yes, locating them on the island’s east coast would shorten the distance they would have to travel to their hunting grounds in the Philippine Sea. This would reduce transit times and allow for longer and stealthier operations. A RAND Corporation model, for example, suggests China would be able to shoot roughly 15 more cruise missiles in the Philippine Sea per week than it can right now. But a salvo of 12 DF-26 missiles, stationed on the mainland, can deliver the same payload to the same places within minutes. And to shoot 15 more missiles a week, China’s submarines would have to remain unscathed—and they may well not. Taiwan’s ports are easier for U.S. and allied submarines to surveil and mine than China’s existing submarine pens.

Controlling Taiwan would do little to make China’s submarines more effective. But perhaps it would help Beijing threaten Washington’s own undersea fleet. Taiwan’s east coast, after all, looks out into the deep, expansive waters of the Pacific, where U.S. submarines often hide. The island could host an acoustic surveillance system—akin to one the United States used in both the Atlantic and the Pacific during the Cold War—in order to hunt them.

Yet once again, such systems would do more for Beijing in theory than in practice. Hydrophones can detect vessels at very long distances, but they do so with scant accuracy. And the Australian, Japanese, and U.S. fleets are remarkably successful at masking their presence. The ability to detect them is far off for China, regardless of where its forces are based. As the political scientists Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge wrote in Foreign Affairs in June 2022, such a system could give China a rough location for aircraft carriers. But given China’s extensive satellite detection network, hydrophones off Taiwan would be redundant.

HIGH RISK, LOW REWARD

There are many symbolic, psychological, economic, technological, and alliance-related reasons for the United States to defend Taiwan. But preserving a favorable military balance is not one of them. The United States and its allies should, therefore, focus less on Taiwan itself and more on how to fight a wider and longer conflict with Beijing—one that requires the United States to help protect the global commons and the territorial integrity of Japan and the Philippines.

To make this shift, Washington must first acknowledge that an all-out defense of Taiwan would likely come at a very high cost. If Beijing and Washington engaged in a full-blown war over the island’s autonomy, China would probably inflict severe losses on the United States’ Pacific forces. China’s military would also likely be devastated, of course; the U.S. Navy and Air Force are still more capable and vastly more experienced than their Chinese counterparts. But Beijing is better positioned to quickly reconstitute its regional forces, meaning it could press on more easily. As U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro pointed out in February 2023, China has 13 naval shipyards, at least one of which has more capacity than the entire U.S. shipbuilding base. Analysts concerned about U.S. credibility should ask whether Japan and the Philippines would prefer a Taiwan that remains unconquered or a Seventh Fleet that remains afloat.

Once they acknowledge the full costs and benefits, U.S. and allied officials must make hard decisions about what to devote to Taiwan’s defense. A clear first step is to double down on filling the island with deadly defensive weapons that threaten to turn the Taiwan Strait into what Admiral Samuel Paparo, the United States’ Indo-Pacific commander, called a “hellscape.” The United States should, in particular, send more mines, drones, and antiship missiles to Taiwan, in addition to supporting its indigenous capability to build such weapons itself. These systems may not be enough to stop a hell-bent Beijing from getting boots on Taiwan’s shores. But they would ensure that the process of doing so, taking the rest of the island, and then holding it would be nightmarish. Such a strategy would, therefore, flip the script. Instead of Taiwan becoming a burden on the United States’ resources, it would become a massive drain on China’s. A PLA fixated on invading Taiwan would be unable to do much else.

If China truly wants to eclipse the United States, it will need to be able to coerce Japan and the Philippines.

This approach may be the best way to deter Beijing. If Washington pledges to defend Taiwan with all of its might, the message to China is that Taiwan’s conquest could provide the happy bonus of degrading U.S. combat power. But loading the island up with unpleasant weapons while keeping valuable military assets out of the immediate area tells Beijing that attacking Taiwan would leave it, and it alone, much weaker. This weakness would come at an inopportune time. Regardless of how they start, major power wars rarely end quickly, and so even if China successfully absorbed Taiwan, it would likely keep fighting against Washington elsewhere. That would mean battling in places unfavorable to Beijing. The United States may be disadvantaged in and around Taiwan, but it has vastly more capability and experience in the broader Pacific and around the world.

The U.S. Navy can help deliver this message—and underscore Washington’s advantage—by shifting away from deploying its surface fleet and aircraft in the immediate theater around Taiwan. The Navy could instead concentrate more on its vital role in day-to-day operations around the world, such as its current mission against the Houthis in the Red Sea. In a conflict, it could pivot more to threatening Chinese interests in the Indo-Pacific outside of Taiwan, as well as in the Persian Gulf. China is the world’s largest trading state, and it imports most of its oil and gas by sea. If Beijing believes that invading Taiwan will be costly in and of itself, weaken it more broadly, and force it to immediately fight the United States in more hostile terrain further from home, it may think twice about trying to seize its neighbor.

Or it may not. Chinese leaders have spent decades promising to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. In recent years, the government appears to have become especially fixated on taking what it views as a renegade province. Xi has even said that the “great rejuvenation” of his nation will not be complete until Taiwan is under Beijing’s command.

But if China truly wants to eclipse the United States as the world’s most dominant country, it will need to be able to coerce Japan and the Philippines and project power worldwide. It will need to control, or at least contest, the global commons. China probably believes that the absorption of Taiwan is the necessary first step. Yet when push comes to shove, it may decide otherwise. And even if Beijing’s assessment is right, it does not mean that defending Taiwan is the most important way for the United States to stymie China’s larger agenda. Washington should invest in military tools that can defend Taiwan, but only if they also enable the American military to continue the fight elsewhere.

• JONATHAN D. CAVERLEY is professor of strategic and operational research at the United States Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own.

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan D. Caverley · August 7, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com