Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“All of us have in our minds a cartoon image of an autocratic state. There is a bad man at the top. He controls the army and the police. The army and the police threaten the people with violence. There are evil collaborators, and maybe some brave dissidents. But in the twenty-first century, that cartoon bears little resemblance to reality. Nowadays, autocracies are run not by one bad guy but by sophisticated networks relying on kleptocratic financial structures, a complex of security services—military, paramilitary, police—and technological experts who provide surveillance, propaganda, and disinformation.”

– Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World by Anne Applebaum

"None of Ho Chi Minh's colleagues was as dedicated to the use of political struggle, psychological warfare, and diplomatic means as he was."

– William J. Duiker

“Today is a wonderful day, I have never seen this one before!”

-Maya Angelou

1. U.S. Military Lacks Capability to Deter War or Prevail in Combat!

2. Get Over Yourself -- Everything We Do is Influence.

3. As recruiting rebounds, the Army will expand basic training to rebuild the force for modern warfare

4. Aircraft Carriers: 2 Words That Mean the U.S. Navy Is Untouchable

5. X.5: Data Informed Operations

6. Addressing the hidden nuclear threat: North Korea’s role in Israel's security apparatus - opinion

7. ‘Everything Is Collapsing’: Israeli Reservists Confront Toll of Protracted War

8. Why RMB internationalization is neither easy nor urgent

9. Chinese Migrants Rush to Find Way to U.S. Border Before Doors Close

10. Opinion | Business leaders think Trump is all bluster. They’re badly mistaken.

11. Former Global Times top editor Hu Xijin goes dark on social media after now-deleted article on China’s economic strategy

12. 'Like being served a sentence': Youth discontent flares as China puts renewed work into raising retirement age

13. Great Hostage Deal, But Where's Austin Tice?

14. Hamas May Emerge Battered, but Not Beaten, From Israel’s Latest Blows

15. For Israelis, Jittery Wait for Retaliatory Strikes Stretches Into a New Week

16. Identity Politics Loses Its Power

17. Will Kinmen Be Taiwan’s Crimea?

18. Paul Bucha, Medal of Honor recipient in fierce jungle battle, dies at 80

19. Why We’re Banning Phones at Our School

1. U.S. Military Lacks Capability to Deter War or Prevail in Combat!

If you cannot demonstrate that you will prevail in combat it is hard to create a deterrent effect. The "capability" to deter comes from the capability to defeat the enemy in combat (or destroy the enemy and its capability and will to fight, especially with nuclear weapons).

Note the criticism of "integrated deterrence" which is of course the heart of the current National Defense Strategy and has been criticized by maniy and seems to be losing support these days. The shininess of the shiny new thing is wearing off. As an aside I think we should keep in mind that integrated deterrence is a product of academia and the theories of professors (primarily Colin Kahl) and not of tested military doctrine. That said, integrating all military capabilities and all elements of national power to support deterrence is simply common sense. Just saying.

We should keep in mind what Clausewitz said:

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

Instead, the American Way of War is to first come up with a pithy new name for concepts and strategy. We need to spend more time on understanding (as Frank Hoffman might say); e.g., appreciating the context, understanding the problem, and developing an approach BEFORE we come up with the pithy new name. "Threats and the Words We Use: A Thought Experiment" (https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/)

Excerpt from below:

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

Instead, the American Way of War is to first come up with a pithy new name for concepts and strategy. We need to spend more time on understanding (as Frank Hoffman would say); e.g., appreciating the context, understanding the problem and developing an approach BEFORE we come up with the pithy new name. "Threats and the Words We Use: A Thought Experiment" (https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/)

Excerpt from below:

The Committee finds that the NDS’s emphasis on integrated deterrence is laudable in theory but lacks practical cohesion. The failure to synchronize efforts across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains reveals a vulnerability that adversaries could exploit. This disjointed approach is compounded by inadequate interagency and allied coordination, which is essential for a comprehensive deterrence strategy. Without seamless integration, the U.S. risks presenting a fragmented defense posture that could embolden opponents and leave gaps to be exploited.

U.S. Military Lacks Capability to Deter War or Prevail in Combat!

Findings of the 2024 Committee on The National Defense Strategy

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/u-s-military-lacks-capability-to-deter-war-or-prevail-in-combat?utm_source=pocket_shared

Strategy Central - By Practitioners, For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth, August 4, 2024

Task Force Smith Retreating in Korea, 1950.

Introduction

A bipartisan panel reviewing U.S. defense strategy found that America's odds of fighting a major war are the highest in 80 years, and its military isn't prepared. The most damning sentence in the Committee’s report is that the “U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.”[i]

The 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy assessed the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in a nearly 100-page report criticizing the Pentagon for being slow, Congress for partisanship, and multiple administrations for complacency towards threats from China, Russia, and the Middle East. The report released in July, produced with the help of outside experts, underscores the urgent need for public awareness and readiness, comparing the current deficit of preparedness to post-Vietnam, Cold War-era readiness.

The report emphasizes the urgency of modifying the U.S. defense strategy to better address significant global threats, such as the ongoing war in Europe and potential conflicts in the Pacific with peer adversaries. It suggests implementing an "all elements of national power" approach, restructuring the Department of Defense's operations, boosting industrial production, resolving workforce shortages, and increasing defense spending. The Commission points out that the United States was slow to recognize the threat of terrorism before 2001 and was late in understanding the growing strength of China and the renewed threat posed by Russia. Despite this recognition, the response has been uneven, slow, and inadequate across government agencies and Congress. The report underscores the necessity for fundamental changes to enable the U.S. to tackle current security challenges effectively.

In another harsh rebuke of the Department of Defense (DoD), The Commission demanded a significant departure from the current bureaucratic practices. Bloated, slow, and unresponsive won’t work against more agile, focused peer competitors. Even with a nimbler bureaucracy, the defense department cannot do it all or without the interagency. Integrated deterrence is impossible without facilitating a more achievable and comprehensive "all elements of national power" approach to national security. The report also recommends Congress allocate resources wisely and increase spending across various national security agencies.

The Bottom Line: The Commission emphasizes a revised NDS and that substantial changes are needed immediately to alter the operations of the DoD, transform the strategic focus of other national security agencies, and improve the functionality of Congress. Additionally, it calls for closer U.S. engagement with allies and the mobilization of the public and private sectors.[ii]

Commission Findings and Recommendations for Policymakers

In its report, the Commission makes the following findings and recommendations for DoD and Congress:

Strategic Environment. The United States faces the most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications since the end of the Cold War. The trends are getting worse, not better.

DoD. The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot and should not solely be responsible for national defense. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes the need for an "integrated deterrence," which is not currently being implemented effectively. A comprehensive approach that involves all elements of national power is necessary to coordinate and utilize resources across the Department of Defense, the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.

Technology. Fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental changes in how the DoD functions. When the threat approaches wartime urgency, the DoD operates at the speed of bureaucracy.
Force Size. The NDS force-sizing construct is inadequate for today’s needs and tomorrow’s challenges. We propose a Multiple Theater Force Construct—with the Joint Force, in conjunction with U.S. allies and partners—sized to defend the homeland and tackle simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

Production. U.S. industrial production is currently insufficient to meet the needs for equipment, technology, and munitions, especially in the event of a major conflict between world powers.

Readiness. The Joint Force is currently struggling to maintain readiness. Adding more responsibilities without providing the necessary resources will only lead to further breakdown.

Interagency. DoD should seek to better align its concepts with other parts of the interagency to better coordinate military tools and other instruments of national power in pursuit of integrated deterrence.

Congress. The United States needs to spend its resources more effectively and efficiently to build a future force rather than maintaining the existing one. Additional resources are required, along with greater wisdom on where to place investments. Congress should approve a supplementary budget to kickstart a multiyear outlay in national security innovation and the industrial base. Furthermore, Congress should remove the spending caps outlined in the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act and ensure real growth in national security spending for both defense and nondefense in fiscal year 2025, at least in line with the recommendations of the 2018 NDS Commission. Future budgets must allocate funds to support defense and other national security efforts to a level similar to the U.S. national effort during the Cold War.

The Key Flaw In The NDS: Integrated Deterrence

The 2024 Congressional Committee on the National Defense Strategy highlighted several deficiencies with integrated deterrence. Their findings pointed out the following key issues:

Coordination and Integration: The committee noted that there were significant challenges in achieving seamless coordination and integration across different domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber). This lack of cohesion was a vulnerability in the deterrence strategy.

Resource Allocation: There were concerns about the adequacy and allocation of resources necessary to support integrated deterrence. The committee emphasized that the effectiveness of deterrence efforts could be compromised without proper funding and resource management.

Technological Gaps: The committee identified technological gaps that could hinder the implementation of integrated deterrence. These gaps included outdated systems and the slow pace of adopting new technologies, which could leave the U.S. at a disadvantage against more technologically advanced adversaries.

Interagency and Allied Coordination: The report highlighted deficiencies in interagency and allied coordination. Effective integrated deterrence requires close collaboration with allies and other government agencies, and the committee found that existing mechanisms were insufficient to ensure this level of cooperation.
Strategic Communication: The committee pointed out that strategic communication efforts were not robust enough to support integrated deterrence. Clear and consistent messaging is crucial to deter adversaries, and the current communication strategies were found lacking.

These findings underscore the need for a more cohesive, well-resourced, and technologically advanced approach to integrated deterrence to effectively address the evolving security challenges.

How An Old Cold Warrior Might Critique The New Cold War Strategy

The DoD stands accused of being ill-prepared to defend the nation. The Commission makes clear and striking findings and recommendations that the DoD, the interagency, and Congress must follow to best prepare our national defense. Given the Committee’s description of the environment, a Cold War perspective might be useful. There are similarities between the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and our current withdrawal from the war on terror. In that vein, what might a Cold War strategist conclude about the 2022 NDS, and what recommendations might he have?

Henry Kissinger, renowned for his Cold War diplomacy, strategic insight, and historical perspective, would likely offer a nuanced critique of the 2022 NDS and its implementation by Secretary Lloyd Austin. His analysis might focus on several key areas, as imagined by Strategy Central’s StratBot, to play the role of Kissinger. StratBot was asked to examine the Commission’s findings and the 2022 NDS and explain how Kissinger would view both documents and make recommendations.

Kissinger might begin by diplomatically by commending the NDS for its clear prioritization of threats, particularly the emphasis on the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. However, he could argue that the strategy needs to better articulate how to balance these priorities without overextending U.S. resources, a concern he has historically emphasized. Kissinger might be less kind in scrutinizing the concept of integrated deterrence, questioning whether the current implementation effectively synchronizes efforts across all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber or even attempts to incorporate allies. He might point out deficiencies in interagency and allied coordination, stressing the importance of a cohesive but attainable approach to deterrence.

Much like the Committee, Kissinger would critique the adequacy of resource allocation, emphasizing that without sufficient funding and rapid technological advancements, the U.S. might struggle to maintain a credible deterrent posture. He has often highlighted the need for a sustainable defense budget that supports long-term strategic goals. A strong military threat is necessary, but well-reasoned and funded actions are the heart of the game in great power competition.

Lastly, Kissinger might address the importance of strategic communication, noting that clear and consistent messaging is crucial for effective deterrence. He could argue that current efforts are insufficient and must be bolstered to ensure adversaries understand U.S. resolve and capabilities.

It seems very likely Kissinger would advise Secretary Austin to revise the NDS to better articulate an integrated, well-resourced, achievable, and clearly communicated strategy. Synthetic Kissinger complains that the current NDS is somewhat muddled. Secretary Austin would be wise to heed Congress and “Synthetic Kissinger’s” advice to address the deficiencies in the 2022 NDS. The new version should incorporate the findings of the Committee and be accompanied by a plan to revise the ossified DoD bureaucracy.

Conclusion

If Congress finds that the “U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat,” there ought to be a surge in concern by voters, lawmakers, and the military. Defense remains one of the largest government outlays and is the key to our national defense. So far, the response has been muted.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) presents a robust framework for addressing the multifaceted threats posed by global adversaries such as China and Russia. However, despite its clear threat prioritization, the document falls short in several critical areas that undermine its effectiveness. The Committee’s critique underscores the need for a more integrated and well-coordinated approach to deterrence, highlighting deficiencies in resource allocation, interagency collaboration, and strategic communication.

The Committee finds that the NDS’s emphasis on integrated deterrence is laudable in theory but lacks practical cohesion. The failure to synchronize efforts across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains reveals a vulnerability that adversaries could exploit. This disjointed approach is compounded by inadequate interagency and allied coordination, which is essential for a comprehensive deterrence strategy. Without seamless integration, the U.S. risks presenting a fragmented defense posture that could embolden opponents and leave gaps to be exploited.

Furthermore, the strategy’s resource allocation is a significant concern. Cold War National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Kissinger has long advocated for a sustainable defense budget that supports long-term strategic goals. The current NDS, however, does not adequately address the need for rapid technological advancements and sufficient funding, leaving the U.S. potentially ill-prepared to maintain a credible deterrent posture. This gap between strategic ambitions and resource commitments could severely handicap the U.S. in a protracted conflict.

Strategic communication is another area where the NDS falters. Clear and consistent messaging is vital for effective deterrence, ensuring that adversaries understand U.S. resolve and capabilities. The current communication efforts, however, are insufficient and must be bolstered to project a unified and strong stance. The Committee emphasized the importance of strategic narratives reinforcing U.S. commitments and deterring adversarial actions through psychological and informational superiority.

While the 2022 NDS sets a strategic direction for addressing contemporary threats, it requires significant refinements to be truly effective. A more integrated, well-resourced, and clearly communicated strategy is essential to navigate the complex global security landscape. By addressing these critical areas, the U.S. can enhance its defense posture and effectively counter the evolving threats from global adversaries. The path forward necessitates a recalibrated approach that combines strategic clarity with practical execution, ensuring that the U.S. remains a formidable force in the face of emerging challenges.

[i] Congressional Committee on the National Security Strategy. 2024 Report on the National Security Strategy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2024.

[ii] https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html

2. Get Over Yourself -- Everything We Do is Influence.

A good response to the recent article in the Modern War Institute. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/us-military-doctrine-treats-information-and-influence-as-the-same-thing-and-thats-a-problem/

I actually think both authors are mostly right in their own ways.

This excerpt gets to the heart of the issue. If influence is "simply" a subset of the information function and if so it is diluted because of the other critical elements of information. Or is influence so important that it should stand alone as a function? Or is everything influence (we can make a strong logical argument that everything is in fact influence, right down to the 5.5mm from an M4 rifle).

Excerpt:

Yes, there are a lot of pieces to the information joint function, including communication, decision-making, knowledge management, and more. Which is why it’s divided into core tasks, one of which is “leveraging information” (also unmentioned by the author). Everything that falls under this task is, in fact, influence in the broader sense. It is not called influence because certain formations like Pysop and Public Affairs want to protect their sacred cows. But if the PAO is not releasing information to actually change people’s minds, and thus their behavior, why do they bother?

The bottom line is we need to "do influence" better.

But I think the author below is wrong in one way: I do not think the current PSYOP professionals are stuck in the past. It is many outside the PSYOP community and in critical leadership roles who are keeping PSYOP stuck in the past or relegating PSYOP to the dustbin of history, though perhaps not deliberately.

The real issue is that we need professionals to work the influence piece but we need all leaders and planners and strategists to have a sufficient understanding of the influence functions, make influence a priority, to call on the professionals to execute influence, and fully short them doing so.

Conclusion:

I chose a leaflet drop as the image for this article because I know how much it triggers my Psyop brethren. But I think they will also agree it represents a current mentality that is stuck in the past. The author is right that there needs to be a paradigm shift in the joint force. That shift has already been written, but many are still ignorant or reluctant to accept the path laid before us.

As another aside I taink the author for including the link to the DOD Strategy for Operaitons In the Information Environemnt. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/17/2003342901/-1/-1/1/2023-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-FOR-OPERATIONS-IN-THE-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT.PDF?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block

I missed this when it was apparently released last November. It is important for us outside of official channels to refer to this document because Joint Pub 3-04 "Information in Joint Operations" is not publicly available to those of not in the military or government

Get Over Yourself -- Everything We Do is Influence.

Justin Malzac

Senior Information Planner (Joint) | National Security Law Scholar | Historian | Writer, Editor, and Publisher | Public

linkedin.com · by Justin Malzac

A response to a recent article published by the Modern Warfare Institute at Westpoint (https://mwi.westpoint.edu/us-military-doctrine-treats-information-and-influence-as-the-same-thing-and-thats-a-problem/).

I’m sorry to say, but I fundamentally disagree with almost everything this author has to say here. It reflects the same wide-spread ignorance related to the joint force’s new (and valid) approach to information. It also hints at the current sacred cow mentality in Psychological Operations formations that is starting to feel like old Marines clutching to their tanks. The fact is, the information joint function already fully accounts for influence in the way the author envisions, and much more. The influence equates to pysop mentality is actually a narrow view of a much larger problem.

If we use a common-sense definition of “influence” as actions that are designed to drive the behavior of others (which is also in the definition for MISO), then everything the joint force does is influence. As laid out in the DOD OIE Strategy (not referenced by the author), the joint force must get to the point where all objectives and activities “are focused on affecting the drivers of relevant actor behaviors.” The author references many terms and definitions in doctrine, but misses the ones that actually matter. This reflects an ignorance of what joint information doctrine actually represents.

Yes, there are a lot of pieces to the information joint function, including communication, decision-making, knowledge management, and more. Which is why it’s divided into core tasks, one of which is “leveraging information” (also unmentioned by the author). Everything that falls under this task is, in fact, influence in the broader sense. It is not called influence because certain formations like Pysop and Public Affairs want to protect their sacred cows. But if the PAO is not releasing information to actually change people’s minds, and thus their behavior, why do they bother?

The author states: “There are many ways to influence human behavior, information being one means to do so.” This is wrong on many levels. Influence does not exist without information. A person cannot change their mind, and thus their behavior, without being exposed to stimuli that trigger that change. That stimuli is, and always is, a form of information. And that information is delivered by a wide variety of means, not just MISO. The leverage information task makes clear that every activity the joint force does (OAIs) has informational aspects that must be exploited to drive behavior. Whether that is a messaging campaign, a training activity, or a use of force—these are all forms of influence. The author states: “An important outcome of clear terms would be a sharp distinction between information-focused activities and influence-focused activities.” This is wrong. All influence-focused activities are a subset of information activities, not something fundamentally separate. And influence activities are wholly dependent on how the joint force obtains, exploits, and delivers information, which is why information is a joint function.

Joint functions encompass more than a single activity the joint force does. A concept becomes a joint function not simply because of isolated significance. A warfighting function must be a broad concept and also deeply interrelated with the other functions. Leveraging information is one task of the joint function for information, just like achieving a position of advantage over an enemy is one of many tasks for the maneuver function. Information writ-large is a joint function because it is deeply integrated in the process of intelligence, the planning and movement of forces, and the delivery of fires, among other things. Influence is simply one aspect of how the joint force employs information.

As the author is a doctrine writer for John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, I cannot help but see this author's argument as directly tied to the current debates around the future of Psychological Operations forces. It is time to fundamentally rethink the role of psyoppers. While they do represent a level of expertise in influence and behavior change, they are no longer a unique capability. Their uniqueness dates back to a time when the rest of the joint force was not thinking about leveraging information. Now we all participate in influence. I love my psyoppers, but many seem more concerned with protecting the superiority and prestige of their branch, rather than helping the joint force evolve as it needs to.

The author’s criticism of the change to MISO is reflective of this entrenched mentality. The change from psyop to MISO was more than just avoiding the negative sentiment of the former. It reflects the fact that MISO planners do much more than just manipulate information to drive the behavior of audiences (i.e., influence in the classic psyop sense—propaganda). They still do this, sure, but as OIE Toolbox in the back of JP 3-04 shows with its selection of action verbs for MISO, these planners also amplify, clarify, counter, educate, inform, mitigate, persuade, and reinforce. In fact, MISO has more action verbs than any other information force, and four of them are the same as PAO. MISO is psyop, but it is much more than pysop, and it is being held back by traditionalists still upset by a decades-old name change.

With regard to the role the Army’s 37-series community needs to take on moving forward, I have a specific recommendation. Army Psyoppers are no longer unique, nor the only ones in the joint force planning influence, let alone MISO. The service components of the geographic combatant commands are in the MISO game now, whether they like it or not. Moreover, other elements in the joint headquarters, from COMMSRAT to FUOPS are engaged in planning designed to influence. The overly broad definition for MISO as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior” is no longer valid. As stated in the OIE Strategy, this constitutes everything the joint force does. Instead of cordoning off influence planning to one of the most under-manned, under-resourced, and in-demand elements of the DOD, we need to find a way to empower the rest of the headquarters to pick up the slack.

In this sense, we need to move away from deploying 37-series folks as dedicated and isolated planning cells for MISO (such as MSEs or MISTFs). Instead, we should distribute psychological operations professionals broadly across the global force and across the joint force headquarters. There should be a 37-series in the FUOPS cell and the STRATCOMM cell. Engagement planners should have a psyopper supporting them as they design KLEs to influence partner audiences. If there are only 5-10 operators that can support a given headquarters, each should be an advisor to a different cell or process, rather than having them all in one room doing isolated MISO planning.

I chose a leaflet drop as the image for this article because I know how much it triggers my Psyop brethren. But I think they will also agree it represents a current mentality that is stuck in the past. The author is right that there needs to be a paradigm shift in the joint force. That shift has already been written, but many are still ignorant or reluctant to accept the path laid before us.

linkedin.com · by Justin Malzac

3. As recruiting rebounds, the Army will expand basic training to rebuild the force for modern warfare

Recurring rebounds? What about the effects of "wokeness" which I hear everyone say is why we cannot reach our recruiting targets? I guess the anti-woke will say that we are now recruiting only woke young people. (note my sarcasm - I do think there are plenty of motivated, patriotic, selfless young people who support the dignity of all people to recruit).

As recruiting rebounds, the Army will expand basic training to rebuild the force for modern warfare

The Army will expand its basic combat training for newly enlisted soldiers

By LOLITA C. BALDOR Associated PressAugust 3, 2024, 8:15 AM ET

• 5 min read

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

WASHINGTON -- Buoyed by an increase in recruiting, the Army will expand its basic combat training in what its leaders hope reflects a turning point as it prepares to meet the challenges of future wars.

The added training will begin in October and comes as the Army tries to reverse years of dismal recruiting when it failed to meet its enlistment goals. New units in Oklahoma and Missouri will train as many as 4,000 recruits every year.

Army leaders are optimistic they will hit their target of 55,000 recruits this year and say the influx of new soldiers forced them to increase the number of training sites.

“I am happy to say last year’s recruiting transformation efforts have us on track to make this year’s recruiting mission, with thousands awaiting basic training” in the next year, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said. Adding the two new locations, she said, is a way to get the soldiers trained and into units quickly, “with further expansion likely next spring if our recruiting numbers keep improving.”

The expanded training is part of a broader effort to restructure the Army so it is better able to fight against a sophisticated adversary such as Russia or China. The U.S. military spent much of the past two decades battling insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than fighting a broader war with another high-tech, more capable nation.

Brig. Gen. Jenn Walkawicz, head of operations for the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, said there will be two new training companies at Fort Sill in Oklahoma and two at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri.

Driving the growth is the successful Future Soldier Prep Course, which was created at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in August 2022 as a new way to bolster enlistments. That program gives lower-performing recruits up to 90 days of academic or fitness instruction to help them meet military standards and move on to basic training.

Created two years ago, the program has been cited as a key reason Army leaders expect that this fall they will reverse several years of recruiting shortfalls. In the budget year that ended Sept. 30, the Army brought in a bit more than 50,000 recruits, falling far short of the publicly stated “stretch goal” of 65,000.

The Army has 151 training companies overall that work with recruits at Fort Jackson and Fort Moore, Georgia, in addition to the 15 training companies assigned to the prep course. Army leaders have expanded the prep course, which is expected to bring in nearly 20,000 recruits this budget year and that total is expected to spike in 2025.

Due to the Army's recruiting struggles, the number of recruits going through basic training dropped in recent years. As a result, the 15 training units, which total 27 soldiers each, including 16 drill sergeants, were available for the prep course. But as the prep course grows, those units are not available to do basic training.

“We don’t want to mess with that because right now that formula’s working and it’s provided a lot of value for the Army," Walkawicz said. So, the Army is creating the four new companies and has developed plans for more if needed.

She added that Fort Sill and Fort Leonard Wood have the infrastructure, the barracks and the room to accommodate the new units and could take more if needed. The costs of the program are limited because the Army already had the equipment and rooms required, but there will be maintenance, food, staffing and other costs. Army officials did not provide a total price.

The move to add units is the latest change in what has been a tumultuous time for the Army. Coming out of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, when the service grew dramatically to fill the nation's combat needs, the U.S. military began to see recruiting dip.

Unemployment has been low, corporate jobs pay well and offer good benefits, and, according to estimates, just 23% of people age 17 to 24 are physically, mentally and morally qualified to serve without receiving some type of waiver. Moral behavior issues include drug use, gang ties or a criminal record.

Those problems were only amplified as the coronavirus pandemic took hold, preventing recruiters from meeting with students in person at schools, fairs and other public events.

In 2022, the Army fell 15,000 short of its enlistment goal of 60,000, and the other services had to dig deep into their pools of delayed entry candidates in order to meet their recruiting numbers. Then in 2023, the Army, Navy and Air Force all missed their recruitment targets. The Marine Corps and the tiny Space Force have consistently hit their goals.

Partly in response to the recruiting shortfalls, Army leaders slashed the size of the force by about 24,000, or almost 5%. They said many of the cuts were in already vacant jobs.

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

4. Aircraft Carriers: 2 Words That Mean the U.S. Navy Is Untouchable

I look forward to reading the debate among naval experts over this assessment.

Aircraft Carriers: 2 Words That Mean the U.S. Navy Is Untouchable

The National Interest · by Sarah White · August 3, 2024

Summary and Key Points: The debate over the relevance of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in modern warfare has persisted for decades, with concerns that they may become obsolete against advanced threats from nations like China.

-However, aircraft carriers remain a vital part of U.S. naval strategy, offering unmatched lethality, versatility, and survivability.

-These floating, nuclear-powered airbases can project power globally, sustain long-term operations, and withstand significant attacks.

-Despite their high costs, carriers are a long-term investment essential for U.S. defense. With advancements like the F-35C and MQ-25 drone, carriers will continue to play a crucial role in maintaining U.S. military dominance.

The Ongoing Debate: Are U.S. Aircraft Carriers Still Essential in Modern Warfare?

There has been a debate going on for decades about whether the mighty U.S. Navy aircraft carrier would get wiped out in a great power war against Russia or China. The truth is the U.S. Navy needs aircraft carriers, and they are still a vital weapons platform.

The Aircraft Carrier Debate

There is a school of thought in academic circles that aircraft carriers may soon become obsolete due to the nature of the threat posed by China. The long-range reconnaissance systems and missiles being developed by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are believed to be accurate and destructive enough to disable an aircraft carrier, and taking out even one of them would have a devastating effect on the U.S. defense posture in the Pacific theater.

Thus, continuing to develop new aircraft carriers has been seen by some as a situation of “too many eggs in one basket.”

Aircraft Carriers Have a Future

But where this argument breaks down is when the available alternatives are considered. What other option does the Navy have than what an aircraft carrier essentially is, a floating, mobile air base? Where are the better options?

Because the Navy is not dependent on land bases, it is not vulnerable to attack the same way the Air Force would be. Along with allowing the Navy not to be tied to land bases, aircraft carriers play a role that a fleet of smaller ships could never fulfill, at least for the foreseeable future. Here are a few reasons that their role is so indispensable.

Lethality

Large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers go a long way in making an adversary think twice before launching an attack. They sustain the Navy’s deterrent strategy, sending the message to potential aggressors that the U.S. is equipped to defeat them in an actual war.

The lethality of aircraft carriers derives from the type of weapons they carry. The Nimitz- and Ford-class carriers are armed with dozens of strike fighters, mostly F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornets, and are further equipped with anti-aircraft and missile defenses. The other part of carriers’ lethality is their stamina in sustaining attacks. Aircraft carriers’ weapons systems have the capacity to pummel hundreds of targets on land or at sea every day during a conflict.

Versatility

A large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is inherently versatile. It can accomplish power projection, sea control, air defense, and various other missions simultaneously. Aircraft carriers also have an unlimited range with nuclear power, so they never need to be refueled at sea. This allows them to move about 700 miles in a single day. Without carriers, sustaining operations against distant adversaries would be extremely difficult.

Aircraft carriers’ versatility is also a matter of convenience: nothing else can provide a similarly capable floating mobile sea base. When the Navy has everything it needs to prepare for conflict in one place, it makes much less sense to consider switching to dependence on a series of smaller, scattered vessels in combination with bases in allied countries. That situation would create an immediate logistical tangle that would be to the Navy’s disadvantage if and when conflict in the Pacific, especially with China, breaks out.

Cost

Aircraft carriers are expensive: a carrier strike group probably costs a billion dollars per year to own and operate. That is less than ten percent of what the federal government spends every day. One day’s worth of federal government spending comes out at about $16 billion, which is the same amount that it costs to build and equip one new Ford-class carrier. The yearly sustainment costs are probably less than one day’s worth of federal spending for all ten U.S. carriers. Operating costs after construction is about $800 million per year for the 50-year lifespan of a carrier. If destroyer escorts are added to the bill, that adds an additional $200 million.

Ultimately, the expense of carriers is a long-term investment that exists to make sure the Navy can accomplish its objectives at sustained levels when war breaks out. It is not likely that smaller warships could operate week after week at the intensity that carriers are capable of. How long is it plausible to sustain an alternative option, given the pace at which surface combatants might expend their missiles in major conflicts?

Survivability

Compared to any alternatives, large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are much more resilient in withstanding potential attacks. Their size, flexibility in movement, and level of protection makes them formidable targets for adversaries. Sinking or disabling just one is thought to be nearly impossible—except through the use of a nuclear weapon. That is why there is debate over whether the PLAN’s latest weapons are actually able to take a carrier out.

Growth

There is no reason to believe that aircraft carriers are entering obsolescence when the carrier air wing is entering a new stage of evolution.

In the next 40 years, the Navy will complete the transition from the Nimitz to the Ford classes of aircraft carriers.

For the first time, the U.S. will have carriers equipped with the stealthy F-35C (the carrier-based version of the cutting-edge F-35 fighter jet) plus the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, a radar plane that can track scores of targets from many miles away, and the CMV-22, a flexible tilt-rotor for resupplying carriers.

In the future, the Navy will also be able to add unmanned aircraft to the carrier airwing. The most critical hardware at this stage will be the MQ-25 drone, essentially an unmanned tanker.

These advancements all but guarantee that U.S. aircraft carriers will remain the preeminent geopolitical weapon of war for decades to come, both as an instrument of deterrence and as a tool for defeating aggression.

Author Biography: Sarah White

Sarah White is a Senior Research Analyst at the Lexington Institute: Prior to joining Lexington, Sarah held internships at the Albright Stonebridge Group and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She earned an M.A. in Latin American Studies in 2019 from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, and a B.A. in political science and Spanish from Wake Forest University in 2017. Sarah is fluent in Spanish, proficient in Portuguese, and conversational in French. She is a native of McLean, Virginia.

All images are from U.S. Navy/Creative Commons.

The National Interest · by Sarah White · August 3, 2024

5. X.5: Data Informed Operations

Will this contribute to or inform the commission looking at lessons from Afghanistan?

Before "data informed operations" became popular I had a boss who taught us to make effective use of data based on his experiences in Haiti and the Philippines. We had to do everything manually by spreadsheet. With today's tools we could have done what we did so much more easily but despite the manual analysis it was very much worth it.

Graphics/charts at the link.

Excerpt:

Conclusion

In hindsight, it is clear now that the ANA was not fully ready to own the security situation in all of Afghanistan. But I think the data we collected still clearly showed that even back in 2018 there were pockets of success within the ANA and ANASOC.

In 2019, I deployed again to Afghanistan as the operations officer for Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (SOTF-A). By then, we shifted completely away from enabled operations, and were back to conducting exclusively advised operations. This was primarily due to their effectiveness in achieving higher EKIA goals. I think if we could have continued to collect data on the effectiveness of enabled operations, we likely would have seen higher improvements in the capabilities of our partners.

X.5: Data Informed Operations

Guest post by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Horrigan

Erik Davis

Aug 03, 2024

substack.com · by Erik Davis

https://downrangedata.substack.com/p/x5-data-informed-operations?utm

Commandos conduct operations with local police and Afghan National Army (ANA). Author’s photo.

Before our deployment in 2017, we realized two things: 1 - we needed to better enable our Afghan partners to conduct independent operations and 2 - we needed more data to demonstrate their effectiveness.

Introduction

In 2017, I was the Commander of Advanced Operating Base (AOB)-North, stationed at Mazar-e Sharif International Airport in northern Afghanistan. Our company had just returned from an especially difficult deployment to the same area, less than nine months prior, and we were looking for better ways to enable the Afghan Special Operations. Although our AOB was focused on improving and measuring the capabilities of our Afghan partners, there were some leaders at the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) headquarters that saw this as incongruent with the overarching political guidance “to pressure the Taliban to the negotiating table.” We decided that a data informed approach to tracking Afghan independent operations would be the best way to make our case to higher.

Data Framework

We knew it would be critical to understand the capabilities of our Afghan partners, so we developed a framework to carefully measure and record their ability to conduct collective tasks at the Kandak (battalion) level. Unlike US evaluations, which we conducted during training, these evaluations would take place during combat, with life-and-death consequences.

We based the metrics system for the evaluations around three different types of operations: advised, enabled, and independent.

Advised operations: Special Forces teams conducted combat operations alongside partners. Although the Afghans were technically in the lead, if a situation became unmanageable or risks to US forces were too high, US teams would take more control.
Enabled operations: Afghan forces conducted operations without US forces on the ground with them. These operations had significant US support, such as infiltration aircraft, ISR, MEDEVAC, and aerial fires.
Independent operations: Afghan forces planned and executed operations without US support. We closely monitored them, though, to allow for US support if needed.

We divided these metrics into the tangible and the intangible. Tangible metrics to evaluate Afghan partner capabilities included many of the typical counterterrorism measures: high-value individuals (HVIs) captured or killed, total enemy killed in action (EKIA), sensitive equipment recovered, friendly wounded or killed in action, structures and areas cleared, and local leader meetings or shuras conducted.

Additional tangible metrics assessed partner force management capability, such as force size, the ability to infiltrate/exfiltrate independently, the use of Afghan Tactical Air Controllers (ATAKs), support provided by Afghan artillery and mortars, and the use of Afghan ISR and electronic warfare.

Intangible metrics included command and control, integration with other Afghan forces, and logistical capabilities. Although I no longer have the specific data or framework we used, the below chart roughly captures the methodology we used to evaluate the combat capabilities of our Afghan Special Operations partners.

Planning

In early 2017, the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) created the 1st Special Operations Brigade (SOB), which was co-located with our AOB. Our mission was mentoring the SOB leadership, as it took command of the Special Operations Kandaks (SOK) in the northern provinces. This presented an opportunity to work collaboratively on data fusion and be more methodical in our efforts across northern Afghanistan.

When we arrived, the focus was distinctly on advised operations. This plan was in line with higher guidance and was seeing dividends. Even the increase in insider attacks was seen as an indication that the Taliban were less effective on the battlefield and were shifting to unconventional tactics. My goal was to understand which tactics were working during these advised operations and find ways to get the same results while focusing on Afghan independent operations.

We decided to conduct a mix of short-duration raids and major clearing operations to evaluate the leadership’s ability to command and control various sized operations. The chart below shows the increasing number of enabled and independent operations interspersed with the major clearing operations.

We slowly increased enabled operations, while decreasing advised operations. We also conducted one major advised operation per month to observe the increasing capability of the 1st SOB to command and control its subordinate elements.

Testing the Hypothesis

While initially maintaining the tempo of advised operations, we began planning for the first major operation. It was to be a week-long clearance involving the 10th SOK and 215th Corp, and was tactically advised by two US Special Forces Detachments and an AOB advisory element. This was a highly successful operation, but relied heavily on support from US Special Forces teams at the tactical-level..

10th SOK Commander directs operations in Kunduz. Photo by combat cameraman Tech. Sgt. Sean Carnes.

Subsequent major operations continued monthly, each growing the number of Afghan forces involved. By the final major operation in mid-2018, we’d grown to over 3,000 Afghans, and the leadership successfully integrated Afghan artillery, armor, ISR, and close air support.

Near the end of our deployment we analyzed the gathered data to compare the success of the enabled and independent operations. The data indicated that while we were now conducting almost exclusively enabled operations, we were still achieving 80% of the EKIA each month, but with no US forces on the ground for any of these missions. Other measures of success were almost unchanged: no drop in HVIs captured or killed and a slight increase in sensitive equipment removed. Notably we also had no US wounded or killed during any operation conducted in AOB-North. (Our company did suffer several casualties while supporting other AOB’s outside our Area of Responsibility).

Over the six month deployment we increased the number of enabled and independent operations by over four times. At the same time we only saw a reduction in EKIA of ~20%.

Outbrief

Near the end of the deployment, we were told that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) would be coming to visit our base, and so we prepared to tell this data-driven story. Internal to the team, it was clear to us that the Afghan SOF were now fully capable to conduct operations. With limited support, our Afghan partners could accomplish comparable performance without any US partners on the ground. The critique I received from SOJTF-A was 180 degrees from what I expected.

After seeing the data, a senior officer at SOJTF-A replied with: "all I want is to see that line higher," referring to the EKIA line on the graph above. He continued with “the partners are not capable enough on their own,” and “your grandchildren will still be coming back to support them.” He fixed atthe political necessity to “force the Taliban to the negotiating table,” and was of the mind that only additional EKIA would force the issue.

Despite the clear rebuke of our efforts, I believed our data showed the Afghans were capable as long as we provided them the support they needed (ISR and fires). Because of my faith in our partners, and my faith in the data that proved their effectiveness, I decided that the data should speak for itself. A few weeks later I presented this same data to the Chairman, senior leaders from Washington, and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) leadership. As I sat between the two 4-star Generals, I was praying for a better reaction. After finishing the report, the Chairman's smile and evident satisfaction with our direction validated our approach. This positive response not only affirmed our strategy but also highlighted the power of data-driven decision-making in shaping military operations and policy at the highest levels.

Conclusion

In hindsight, it is clear now that the ANA was not fully ready to own the security situation in all of Afghanistan. But I think the data we collected still clearly showed that even back in 2018 there were pockets of success within the ANA and ANASOC.

In 2019, I deployed again to Afghanistan as the operations officer for Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (SOTF-A). By then, we shifted completely away from enabled operations, and were back to conducting exclusively advised operations. This was primarily due to their effectiveness in achieving higher EKIA goals. I think if we could have continued to collect data on the effectiveness of enabled operations, we likely would have seen higher improvements in the capabilities of our partners.

Afghan Army conducting clearance operations along Tajikistan border. Author’s Photo.

Addressing the hidden nuclear threat: North Korea’s role in Israel's security apparatus - opinion

North Korea's nuclear ambitions pose urgent threats globally, but their implications for Israel are often overlooked. Let's find out what they entail.

By LOUIS RENÉ BERES

AUGUST 3, 2024 20:15

Updated: AUGUST 4, 2024 06:52

Jerusalem Post

North Korea represents the world’s most time-urgent nuclear threat, especially for the United States and some of America’s Asian allies. Assorted dangers of a North Korea-related nuclear war also lie latent in the Middle East. These perils are generally ignored or overlooked, and pertain most ominously to Israel.

What are the relevant scenarios and specific issues? Though Israel has no direct adversarial connections to North Korea, this already-nuclear Asian state does have variously tangible ties to Syria and remains a close ally of not-yet-nuclear Iran.

Jihadist Iran is also the primary patron of anti-Israel terrorism, both Sunni (Hamas) and Shi’ite (Hezbollah, Houthis). This means, inter alia, that Israel’s ongoing struggles against Iran-supported terrorism could soon bring the Jewish state into direct and protracted conflict with the Islamic Republic.

If that should happen, both Israel and Iran would strive for “escalation dominance,” an unstable and unpredictable competition in which a still pre-nuclear Iran would struggle for supremacy at evident strategic disadvantage. Ironically, such an Iranian disadvantage could worsen Israel’s security situation.

Iranian centrifuges are seen on display during a meeting between Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and nuclear scientists and personnel of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), in Tehran, Iran June 11, 2023. (credit: VIA REUTERS)

There are multiple and bewildering details. Depending on Iran’s intra-war willingness to accept existential risks, Jerusalem could sometime find itself in “active belligerent status” with Pyongyang. In turn, that unprecedented and worrisome status (a sui generis status in the rarefied language of logic) could take the form of direct military engagement with Iran’s designated nuclear proxy; or with North Korea’s nuclear and/or non-nuclear assets previously placed in the decision-making ambit of Tehran.

Two wicked kids trying to play with fire

Whatever North Korea’s policy disposition on nuclear surrogacy for Iran, prospects for a widening conflict would be “high.” To be sure, because all pertinent scenarios would lack historical precedent, there could exist no science-based method of assigning numerical or statistical probabilities.

At the same time, in axiomatic principles of logic and mathematics, there would still remain certain reliable ways of conflict estimation. Here, prima facie, the outbreak of a direct nuclear belligerency between Israel and North Korea could involve the United States, Russia, and/or China; and the precise forms of any such superpower involvement would be indeterminable.

For Israel, the threats from Iran/North Korea are existential and palpable. What should Israel do now? Not much could be gained via direct diplomacy with Iran or North Korea, but there could still be more-or-less calculable benefits in gaining supportive policy guarantees from Washington.

In the final analysis, even such seemingly persuasive guarantees could fail altogether; Jerusalem would then have to plan urgently for a uniquely complex set of decisional options. In these scenarios, even decipherable success in keeping Iran non-nuclear could provide Israel no assurances of national safety; and presumptively, complete Israeli success would be sorely problematic.

Further clarifications will be needed. By definition, an accidental nuclear war between Israel and North Korea would be unintentional, but an unintentional nuclear war need not be the result of an accident. To wit, an unintentional nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang could represent the outcome of decision-making miscalculation or irrationality by one or both adversaries. Such a distressing understanding is realistic and potentially probable.

What is being done about all this in Israel? Though unverifiable, the likelihood is that neither Jerusalem nor Pyongyang are likely paying sufficient attention to the intersecting risks of an unintentional nuclear war. In theory, at least, each side would expectedly assume the other side’s decision-making rationality. After all, if there were no such mutual assumption, it could make no sense for one or the other competitor to seek “escalation dominance” during an actual crisis or war.

There is more. At some point, Israel’s survival could come to depend on viable combinations of ballistic missile defense and defensive first strikes. However, settling upon such untested combinations would necessarily lack critical input from any material or quantifiable historical evidence and would present at the highest imaginable levels of existential risk. In a worst-case scenario, the offensive military threat to Israel would warrant some form of situational preemption. At that late stage, however, there would remain no “ordinary” circumstances wherein a defensive strike against a nuclear North Korea could still be presumed rational.

There are additional nuances. For the moment, it seems likely that Kim Jong Un would value his own life and the lives of his family above any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. In all corresponding scenarios, Kim could be presumed rational and would remain subject to Israel/US nuclear deterrence. Still, it could be important for a negotiating Israeli leadership team to distinguish between authentic instances of enemy irrationality and ones of feigned or pretended irrationality on the part of the enemy. Also worth noting is that actual negotiations or bargaining with North Korea would likely be led by the United States and/or actual diplomacy would be conducted with Iran.

On a cyber knife edge

There is more to assess concerning an inadvertent nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang. Such a dizzying conflict could take place not only as the result of misunderstandings or miscalculations between fully rational national leaders (Israeli, North Korean, Iranian, and/or American), but as the unintended consequence (single or synergistic) of mechanical, electrical, and computer malfunctions (hacking). These last interventions could include substantially perplexing intrusions of cyber mercenaries.

Always, regarding Iranian nuclear surrogate North Korea, Israel’s strategic policies should emphasize maintenance of stable intra-war nuclear thresholds. Among other things, this would mean a refined focus on the expected rationality or irrationality of key decision-makers in North Korea; the cumulative requirements of escalation dominance; the always-important distinctions between intentional, unintentional, and accidental nuclear war; and Israel’s animating or core conflict with Iran.

This last focus should serve as a reminder that Israel’s actual war would be against Iran, and that North Korea would be operating against Israel solely as an Iranian nuclear surrogate. Accordingly, Israel’s best path to nuclear war avoidance/limitation with North Korea should always involve prior strategic understandings with – or military actions against – Iran.

Although the above-examined connections may, at first, seem implausible or “absurd” (What could possibly cause rational Israeli decision-makers to wage war against an already-nuclear North Korea?), they are plausibly credible.

Jerusalem ought to take immediate note of the Roman philosopher Tertullian’s ironic but still-galvanizing declaration: “Credo quia absurdum,” (“I believe because it is absurd.”) In this context, the declaration fits perfectly. For Israel to argue against certain existential security threats because they first appear illogical or preposterous would reveal a lethal error in strategic reasoning. In its rapidly escalating struggle against Iran and terrorist proxies, Israel could ultimately have to face a nuclear North Korea as Iran’s state proxy. While the outcome of such a confrontation might be “absurd,” it could still prove injurious beyond any historical measure.

The writer is an emeritus professor of international law at Purdue University and the author of many books and scholarly articles on international law, nuclear strategy, nuclear war, and terrorism. His 12th and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; second edition, 2018).

Jerusalem Post

7. ‘Everything Is Collapsing’: Israeli Reservists Confront Toll of Protracted War

I do not mean to be flippant or simplistic but Sun Tzu did say:

"There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare."

I think the soldiers know this but do the political leaders?

Unfortunately as the article notes there are only impossible choices and no easy answers.

‘Everything Is Collapsing’: Israeli Reservists Confront Toll of Protracted War

As Gaza conflict drags on, reservists are exhausted, constraining Israel’s options as it weighs war with Hezbollah

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/everything-is-collapsing-israeli-reservists-confront-toll-of-protracted-war-430811e4?mod=hp_lead_pos6

For Israeli reservist Adi Hazan, a long deployment has come at a steep cost to his business and personal life. Tanya Habjouqa/NOOR for WSJ

By Carrie Keller-Lynn and Dov LieberFollow

Aug. 4, 2024 5:30 am ET

A day after Hamas attacked Israel and sparked war on Oct. 7, Adi Hazan drove to a rally point in southern Israel and began what he thought would be one or two months of emergency military-reserve service.

Nearly 10 months later, the machine-gunner is still deployed—and the rest of his life is in shambles. His construction business is failing, he is sinking into debt, and his family relies on handouts from friends and charities. And he doesn’t see an end in sight.

“I don’t know what will happen,” said Hazan, 41, who first served in Gaza and now is in the West Bank, where Israel has funneled troops to clamp down on tensions exacerbated by the war. “No one knew this situation would continue for so long.”

A small nation with fewer than 10 million people, Israel relies heavily on reservists such as Hazan to keep its military functioning in times of crisis.

But now, with the war in Gaza heading into its 11th month, and long-running exchanges of fire with regional militias such as Hezbollah heating up, many of those fighters are close to a breaking point. Exhausted and in some cases demoralized, they are struggling to balance family and work with military service, while the economic toll from their absences mounts.

The aftermath of an Israeli strike Friday in southern Lebanon. Photo: Mahmoud Zayyat/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The strain on military manpower is one reason Israeli officials are hesitant to launch an all-out war against Hezbollah, which would require the same cohort of weary reservists to fight against a military power far superior to Hamas.

It is also exposing longer-term vulnerabilities for Israel as it confronts the possibility of conflicts with hard-to-conquer militias on its borders for years to come.

“Israel did not prepare itself for a long war; we thought about a big strike of the air force and then a fast maneuver by the ground forces,” said former Israeli National Security Council head Yaakov Amidror. “The longer the time, the more problematic it is to maintain the support and the readiness” of the fighting forces.

Built for speed

Historically, Israel has thrived at fighting short wars, during which it can rely on reservists and its overwhelming technological advantages, with firepower such as its squadron of F-35 jet fighters procured from the U.S. It defeated four Arab armies in six days in 1967 and, six years later, needed less than three weeks to repel attacks by Egypt and Syria.

This time is different. Armed militias, funded and trained by Iran, now control swaths of territory neighboring Israel’s. Dislodging them could take years, if it is possible at all. Hamas and Hezbollah have powerful missiles, tens of thousands of trained fighters and significant infrastructure, including tunnel networks, while Iran-backed militias in Yemen, Iraq and Syria also pose threats.

Israeli jet fighters fly near the Israeli-Egyptian border during the Six-Day War of 1967. Photo: AFP/Getty Images

While Israel says the war in Gaza is shifting into a lower-intensity phase, the enclave is expected to be mired in violence and instability for the foreseeable future.

Even if Israel reaches a cease-fire deal with Hamas, it also faces the potential for full-blown war with Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, on its northern border with Lebanon. Israel said it killed one of Hezbollah’s top military leaders in late July in an airstrike in Beirut intended as retaliation for an earlier attack on the Israel-controlled Golan Heights that killed 12 young people.

Exhaustion in the ranks

Rather than develop a professional army of paid volunteers, Israel requires all Israeli Jews to serve in the military, usually upon completing high school. In practice, however, less than half of draft-age Israelis serve. Many Jews secure exemptions for family or religious reasons, and some Arab minorities are also exempted.

That has left the military heavily dependent on reservists, who outnumber full-time soldiers by more than two to one. Typically, they are former conscripts who continue to train and serve about one month annually until they are 40, or 45 for officers.

At the height of the war in Gaza, about two-thirds of Israel’s fighting power was drawn from reservists—some 300,000 drafted reserve personnel, compared with a standing army of around 150,000, security analysts estimate.

Israel’s military would face further strain if its cross-border fight with Lebanon-based Hezbollah spirals into all-out war. Photo: dpa/Zuma Press

Although official figures on current deployments aren’t publicly available, security analysts say the number of reservists deployed has come down significantly. Even so, thousands are still engaged and others say they have been told to be ready to be recalled at a moment’s notice.

Unlike conscripts, reservists are regular citizens who have jobs and are raising families. Many have now served multiple rounds and faced fierce fighting. More than 300 soldiers have been killed and over 4,000 have been injured since Israel started its ground war in Gaza, according to Israel’s military, which doesn’t break out figures for conscripts versus reservists.

Impossible choices

Many reservists have had to shut businesses and delay investments. Nearly 150,000 have missed work days, including many in Israel’s crucial tech sector.

With so many disruptions, the Bank of Israel forecasts that the country’s economy will grow only 1.5% in 2024, after contracting 5.7% in the last quarter of 2023. It says growth should rebound to 4.2% in 2025—but only if the war ends by early next year.

Assaf Mor, 45, says he rushed into action when he was called for reserve duty on Oct. 7. While he fought for 100 days in Gaza, his holistic-medicine business bled cash, teetering on collapse.

During the evening, he would run logistics convoys into Gaza with his unit. In the morning, he would open his laptop at his base and try to work out financing options with his accountant to keep his clinic afloat. Balancing the two ran him ragged.

Assaf Mor says he had to choose between returning to military service as a reservist and keeping his holistic-medicine business afloat. Photo: Tanya Habjouqa/NOOR for WSJ

Some reservists are simply refusing to show up when called. Although that can lead to punishments, including jail time, Israel hasn’t been prosecuting them, because commanding officers are familiar with the stress reservists are under and typically don’t press the matter.

When the army called up Mor again in April, he declined. While he worried he was letting his unit down, he felt like he had no choice but to stay home and fight for his family’s financial survival.

“It’s unbearable, one of the hardest crises I’ve had in my life,” said Mor, who is relying on grants from civil-society organizations as he tries to rebuild his business.

No easy answers

Israeli lawmakers generally agree a fix is needed to meet the military’s needs. Israel’s Defense Ministry is promoting legislation to extend mandatory military service to 36 months from 32, increase annual reserve-duty commitments by 45 days a year and raise the age of obligatory reserve duty by up to five years, and in some cases, to age 52.

But some lawmakers have debated how much to ask from reservists, especially amid concerns that taking people out of work for longer periods would hurt the economy. Israel’s parliament is still debating the proposal.

The potential new demands have also angered Israel’s serving public. Many Israelis would rather see the country expand the pool of people who serve as conscripts. Yet the most obvious way to do that, by forcing ultra-Orthodox Israelis to serve, is potentially explosive.

A recent Supreme Court ruling found there was no legal basis for exempting ultra-Orthodox Israelis, a policy established decades ago to let such men focus on preserving Jewish traditions. The Defense Ministry started sending initial draft notices in July. Ultra-Orthodox Jews are expected to account for 41% of potential draftees by 2050.

For most ultra-Orthodox, however, military service is a threat to their cloistered way of life. Thousands have attended protests against serving. Their political leaders, key to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition, say they could bring down the government rather than accept mandatory draft quotas.

A funeral ceremony for Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, whose killing in an Israeli strike in Beirut last month raised the risk of a new war. Photo: Khaled Desouki/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

While that drama plays out, Hazan, the reservist now in the West Bank, said he is feeling more trapped by circumstances.

He initially expected to close his construction business east of Tel Aviv only briefly when he was called up to serve in a unit responsible for evacuating casualties in Gaza.

As his duties have stretched on, he has been unable to resurrect his business. It relies on a staff of 13 Palestinians from the West Bank who were all blocked from entering Israel when the country tightened its borders after the outbreak of war.

Wrapping up his service could bring its own headaches, forcing him to deal with creditors, to whom he says he owes $250,000. He is currently covered by protections afforded to people who are serving.

“I feel that everything is collapsing,” he said. “At the end of the day, I also need to deal with life. I’m not a conscripted soldier—I am a soldier with a family.”

Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com

8. Why RMB internationalization is neither easy nor urgent

For the economic experts to discuss.

Why RMB internationalization is neither easy nor urgent

Capital account liberalization and market-oriented reforms must come first, Professors Yu Yongding and Pan Yingli say.

https://www.eastisread.com/p/why-rmb-internationalization-is-neither?r=7i07&utm

Yixuan Molly Wang, BU, Xiaoqing, Yuxuan JIA, and Zichen Wang

Aug 04, 2024

The internationalization of the RMB and its perceived challenge to the USD's dominance have been hotly debated topics. However, two prevalent misconceptions persist. The first is an underestimation of the obstacles, and the second is an overestimation of the priority Beijing assigns to this endeavor. These misconceptions are interlinked. While Beijing is undoubtedly interested in elevating the yuan to a global reserve currency, this is not a unilateral decision—even for a powerhouse like China. Moreover, the necessary steps to internationalize the currency involve policies that are not feasible in the short term due to various constraints. Therefore, experts such as Professors Yu Yongding and Pan Liping understand that Chinese policymakers have not truly prioritized dethroning the USD.

Below is a recent interview of the two economists published by Southern Weekly, a Chinese newspaper, on the complexities and challenges of elevating the RMB's global status, reducing China's USD holdings, and challenging the USD as the world’s reserve currency.

Yu Yongding is a former director-general of the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People's Bank of China, the central bank. He says that RMB internationalization should be approached as a long-term objective rather than an urgent task, and China’s central bank, in his observation, agrees with that. While the "weaponization of the USD" has created a demand for a bigger role of RMB, Yu cautioned against overly aggressive efforts. "It is not that it cannot be pursued, but it is essential to understand the extent to which it can be achieved," he said, highlighting the importance of maintaining realistic expectations.

Pan Yingli, Professor at Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, said that China’s market-oriented reforms are incomplete and its institutions often distort the market, making it difficult to internationalize the RMB through market forces alone. China’s issuance of RMB has long been anchored in the USD and, in its transition to issuing RMB based on Chinese government bonds, the key, according to Pan, remains domestic reforms so that the money raised from the bonds float efficiently to job-creating causes and promote consumption.

专访余永定、潘英丽：大国博弈中，人民币国际化何以突围？

Exclusive Interview with Yu Yongding and Pan Yingli: RMB Internationalization Breakthrough in the Great Powers Game?

Capital account liberalization is the precondition

Southern Weekly: You previously highlighted the risks of holding extensive U.S. dollar assets. What were your considerations? Does the risk persist today?

Yu Yongding:

China is one of the world's largest holders of U.S. dollar assets, especially Treasury and U.S. agency bonds. This poses two problems: 1. significant risks; 2. cross-border resource misallocation.

First is the financial risk. Two key figures warrant attention. In 2006, the U.S. current account deficit to GDP ratio reached 6%, and the U.S. NIIP (net international investment position, which is a country’s foreign assets minus its foreign liabilities) was -$1.8 trillion, accounting for 12%-13% of its GDP. Around 2006, the increasing U.S. current account deficit sparked a global debate on "global imbalances." There were concerns that the excessive U.S. current account deficit might lead to a sudden halt in foreign capital inflows, causing USD depreciation and its difficulties in meeting debt obligations.

Currently, although the U.S. current account deficit to GDP ratio has improved compared to 2006, the U.S. net foreign debt (negative NIIP) to GDP ratio has surged to 70%-80%, with the net foreign debt skyrocketing from $1.8 trillion in 2006 to nearly $20 trillion. Projections suggest further deterioration of the U.S. NIIP in the future.

Since 2023, the Big Three credit rating agencies have downgraded the U.S. sovereign debt's credit rating. Although the U.S. government has never defaulted, China should remain vigilant as one of the largest holders of U.S. debt. In fact, in 2009, the U.S. agency debt—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds—almost defaulted, and China held $300 to $400 billion in these bonds.

Southern Weekly: There were proposals in the international community to replace the U.S. dollar with SDRs (Special Drawing Rights). Why did this fail, and how did the path to RMB internationalization emerge?

Yu Yongding:

The former governor of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), Zhou Xiaochuan, advocated for using Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to replace the U.S. dollar as the international reserve currency, a proposal that had a significant impact.

At the time, France and Russia were the only major countries that supported this proposal. French President Nicolas Sarkozy even traveled to Nanjing for a seminar on the issue. After the financial crisis, the United Nations established the Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, known as the Stiglitz Commission. The Commission’s agenda was to explore using SDRs to replace the U.S. dollar. However, due to the lack of support from major countries, the committee disbanded.

The SDR scheme requires global coordination, especially U.S. support.

The RMB internationalization scheme proposed by the PBOC aims first to establish the RMB as an international currency and ultimately as an international reserve currency.

However, China faces two challenges. First, as a trade surplus country, the initial step towards internationalization is sending RMB abroad. Previously, China earned USD and then spent it. Switching to spending RMB would mean that the U.S. dollars earned would have no place to be used except to buy U.S. Treasuries again, which contradicts the original goal of de-dollarization.

The second issue is capital controls. To become an international reserve currency, capital account liberalization is a prerequisite. This process is not an all-at-once liberalization but a gradual one. Each major step towards RMB internationalization is conditioned on corresponding capital account liberalization. Thus, promoting RMB internationalization has largely become synonymous with promoting capital account liberalization.

Pan Yingli:

Most countries in Asia still primarily use the U.S. dollar, and within the global U.S. dollar system, China has effectively played the role of the third pillar. The first pillar is oil priced in dollars, the second is the support of the dollar system by the security alliance backed by U.S. military bases, and the third pillar is China's participation in the global division of labor through the dollar system, stabilizing it by using and reserving dollars.

Before 2014, the issuance of RMB was mainly through the settlement of foreign exchange, meaning China bought U.S. dollars to issue RMB, with dollars as reserves. Hong Kong has a similar system, where currency issuance is anchored to the dollar.

During the 2008 financial crisis, the dollar assets China held as reserves faced significant risks of depreciation or loss, leading to a strong desire for the country to promote RMB internationalization.

The Weaponization of the U.S. Dollar Presents Opportunities

Southern Weekly: What problems emerged during the process of RMB internationalization? Why has this term become popular again in recent years?

Yu Yongding:

After the RMB began to depreciate in 2015 [The People's Bank of China devalued the yuan by nearly 3 percent against the US dollar over two days], RMB internationalization faced significant challenges. In Hong Kong, the largest offshore market of RMB, enthusiasm for holding RMB deposits and assets diminished, leaving the RMB internationalization dormant for a considerable period.

Recently, however, the RMB has regained popularity, with cross-border RMB transactions reaching 42 trillion yuan in 2022, experiencing rapid growth. Over 57% of these transactions were conducted under capital and financial accounts. Initially, China aimed to promote the RMB through trade settlements, but cross-border RMB payments in trade have not significantly changed between 2012 and 2022. The major shift has come from capital account transactions, indicating that the recent surge in cross-border RMB transactions is primarily due to capital account liberalization.

Furthermore, the weaponization of the dollar has provided new impetus for RMB internationalization.

Reforming the international monetary system requires network effects. The credibility of the dollar is the most critical factor in its role as the international reserve currency.

Recently, there has been a global trend of de-dollarization, with countries in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East seeking alternatives to the dollar. This trend presents opportunities for promoting RMB internationalization.

Southern Weekly: With the issuance of ultra-long special treasury bonds, has the "anchor" for RMB issuance shifted from dollar reserves to government bonds? What is your interpretation?

Pan Yingli:

To achieve decoupling between RMB and USD, or advance RMB internationalization, several core steps are essential.

The first concerns the issuance of RMB, or the currency issuance mechanism and the cost of issuance. China needs to transition from a dollar-based reserve system to a Chinese government bond-based issuance mechanism, thereby lowering the cost of issuance through national credit support.

Since 2014, the PBOC has used tools such as the Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF) and the Standing Lending Facility (SLF), along with other pledged financial assets, to support currency supply. However, this approach has limited the effective expansion of the PBOC's balance sheet since 2014. Therefore, reforming the currency issuance system requires the central government to issue bonds and the central bank to purchase them, establishing a routine operation mechanism. The issuance of ultra-long special treasury bonds alone does not signify a change in the PBOC's monetary mechanism.

While the current trend of issuing ultra-long special treasury bonds does not indicate any immediate issues, two aspects need attention: first, strengthening the market foundation for issuing and trading government bonds within an improved currency issuance framework and regulation; and second, enhancing the efficiency of fiscal expenditure to promote a virtuous cycle between supply and demand.

The focus should be on how supply creates demand. First, the government must provide essential services such as pensions and education. Second, investments should create employment opportunities.

Data from China’s publicly traded companies show that the wage share in revenues is 2%-5% for heavy industries, 20%-30% for high-tech industries, and around 40% for consumer services. If investments do not create jobs, only 2% to 3% of the investments translate to wages/labor income, which is insufficient to stimulate consumption and hinders internal circulation. Government fiscal expenditure essentially consumes the purchasing power generated by citizens' current and future taxes and must, therefore, be directed toward projects that create jobs and meet public demand.

When China issues RMB based on government bonds, the core issue is how these bonds are used to promote China’s internal economic circulation.

Southern Weekly: How can RMB internationalization be achieved while ensuring the pricing power of RMB?

Pan Yingli: The pricing power of the RMB involves establishing international pricing authority for Chinese industries and finance.

Despite the U.S. being heavily indebted to the world, the dollar continues to appreciate because the most valuable international goods and assets are valued in dollars. To purchase them, one must first obtain USD. Therefore, a key aspect of RMB internationalization is ensuring that basic global goods and high-quality assets can be valued in RMB. China needs to expand the market for overseas goods and assets priced in RMB, allowing the RMB to gain support from more global high-quality resources and prominent enterprises.

In 2014, the UK government issued a RMB 3 billion bond as a gesture of goodwill to the Chinese government. This also suggests the strategic significance of the international pricing function of a currency. Unfortunately, China later focused on the technical cooperation between publicly listed companies in China and the UK, losing the opportunity to promote the internationalization of the RMB.

To leverage the RMB's pricing function, it is currently feasible to explore the establishment of an RMB-denominated segment in the Hong Kong stock market and introduce foreign oil and rare metal or mineral enterprises, and high-tech enterprises to list on the main board of Hong Kong or the mainland. Additionally, promoting the Chinese stock market to cultivate excellent enterprises and orderly increasing the efforts of opening up is essential.

The RMB cannot be internationalized for the sake of internationalization. Simply pursuing the indicators of RMB internationalization may lead the effort away from the ultimate goal. China's economic system has not yet completed market-oriented reform, and its institutions tend to distort the market. It is almost impossible to promote the internationalization of the RMB by market forces alone. In a government-led economy, it is essential to first straighten out domestic institutions through government-led reforms and eliminate distorting factors to allow the market to function effectively.

Good things come to those who adopt the pace of nature

Southern Weekly: Can RMB internationalization start with regionalization? For example, relying on ASEAN to realize RMB internationalization first in the Asian region, or relying on the BRICS system to realize RMB internationalization among member countries?

Yu Yongding:

Asian regional currency cooperation was first proposed by Japan in 1997 but later stalled. Subsequently, many East Asian countries signed the Chiang Mai Initiative for multilateral currency swaps, which made some progress but had little practical use during critical times.

Currently, some Arab countries have proposed pricing oil in RMB, and Russia has suggested settling trade in RMB. These proposals are also possible steps, but any moves must not go beyond China’s responsibilities. The internationalization of the RMB is a long-term goal, not an urgent task. It is not that it cannot be pursued, but it is essential to understand the extent to which it can be achieved. The internationalization of the RMB cannot solve the problem of the safety of China's overseas assets, and excessive efforts may backfire. For instance, previous attempts to settle imports in RMB inadvertently strengthened the dollar's hegemony instead of weakening it.

Yi Gang, former PBOC Governor, emphasized that the issue of promoting RMB internationalization and enhancing the influence of the RMB should be 心平气和approached with calmness. He said that the internationalization of the RMB is a market-driven process that will succeed at "the pace of nature," and that 人民银行没有特别急切地推进 "the PBOC is not particularly eager to promote it." I very much agree with his perspective.

Southern Weekly: In recent years, the foreign exchange market has fluctuated significantly. Is it necessary for the Chinese government to intervene?

Yu Yongding:

I have always advocated for minimal intervention in the foreign exchange market. Historically, the RMB faced appreciation pressure, but since 2014, it has been under pressure to depreciate. In 2015, the Chinese government intervened in the market. At that time, my team at the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences recommended widening the RMB exchange rate's floating range and devaluing the currency. Devaluation can slow foreign exchange outflows, as a higher cost of converting RMB to dollars reduces the incentive for exchange, thereby mitigating depreciation. Exchange rate fluctuations themselves serve as an automatic stabilizer.

Unless under very special circumstances, such as combating international speculators systematically shorting the RMB, the government should generally refrain from intervening and instead allow the exchange rate market to function as an automatic adjustment mechanism.

I believe the current exchange rate policy of the PBOC is appropriate, adhering to the principle of "benign neglect" while remaining open to intervention if necessary.

Pan Yingli:

Currently, the RMB has not depreciated against a basket of currencies. Compared to a few years ago, the RMB has appreciated against the euro and yen but has depreciated against the dollar. Suppose the RMB exchange rate is set at 6.9 yuan as the mid-range, with fluctuations between 6.55 and 7.25, this should be considered normal without requiring special intervention. Additionally, considering the signs of a potential economic recession in the United States and the Federal Reserve's lowering of interest rates, there is a possibility that the RMB may appreciate in the second half of this year.

From a policy perspective, the effects of RMB depreciation and the export rebate policy on exports have been exhausted. Appreciation would be more beneficial for attracting capital inflows, and assisting Chinese enterprises in overseas investments, and overseas resources at a lower cost. Therefore, a strong RMB could be a viable policy option for the PBOC in the future.

Southern Weekend: Why does the U.S. stock market continue to rise despite consistently high Federal Reserve interest rates?

Pan Yingli:

This can be attributed to a certain bubble in the market. The U.S. stock market is buoyed by a few high-tech companies that leverage industry monopolies to achieve rapid profit growth. The ongoing U.S. technological competition with China aims to create favorable conditions for American companies to dominate international markets, such as by establishing import barriers in the new energy sector.

First Solar, a listed company in the U.S., is currently the world's largest photovoltaic company by market value, and its shipments rank 10th globally. However, its photoelectric conversion efficiency is less than 20%, compared to an average efficiency of 25% among Chinese counterparts. The rapid growth of First Solar's profits can be attributed to U.S. restrictions on the new energy market, enabling it to achieve a domestic market monopoly.

The development of AI technology has significantly increased computing power consumption, providing green energy companies with opportunities to drastically increase profits and share prices. Meanwhile, China's photovoltaic manufacturing industry is experiencing widespread negative net income, a situation that warrants reflection.

The market is also skeptical of U.S. government statistics. For instance, the positive U.S. nonfarm payroll employment figures are partly due to an increase in the number of people taking second jobs to cope with inflation. However, there has been a sharp decline in medium and long-term job opportunities.

Yu Yongding:

From the second half of 2023 to the present, the U.S. federal funds rate has remained unchanged, and the inflation rate has also been stable. Theoretically, the federal funds rate and the inflation rate should be negatively correlated, meaning that as the federal funds rate rises, the inflation rate should decrease, and vice versa. However, the U.S. stock market has experienced a significant surge. This recent rally can only be explained by other factors, such as continued technological breakthroughs by a few high-tech companies or speculation. Let's wait and see.

Southern Weekly: Why has the dollar been so strong in recent years? How will the dollar fare in the future?

Pan Yingli:

The main reason for the relative strength of the U.S. dollar since 2017 is that the global economy has entered an era where each economy is performing worse than the next.

As far as the world's major economies are concerned, Japan's performance is unimpressive. Europe recovered from the European debt crisis in 2010, but fell into an economic downturn due to the outbreak of COVID-19 and Russia-Ukraine conflicts, driving massive safe-haven assets into the United States. Meanwhile, China's economy is also facing numerous challenges.

While the United States talks down China, it is also short-selling China. Additionally, high inflation in the United States led the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, attracting massive capital inflows for arbitrage and promoting a soaring stock market. The profits made in the U.S. market encouraged further capital inflows, all of which have boosted the strength of the dollar.

However, the dollar may be a spent force as the U.S. real economy faces a recession and can no longer support high interest rates and a strong currency. Federal government debt is growing rapidly, with the U.S. national debt climbing from $20 trillion to $35 trillion during the Trump and Biden administrations, and it may continue to grow at a rate of $2 trillion per year. Under high interest rates, the cost of interest payments will rise sharply as the U.S. secures new debts to repay old ones.

If Donald Trump wins the U.S. presidential election this year, there is a high probability that the dollar will depreciate. Trump's economic policy focuses on rebuilding manufacturing and expanding employment, and a strong dollar is not conducive to exports and the real economy. His main economic policies include raising tariffs on products from China, accelerating decoupling from the Chinese economy, devaluing the dollar, and requiring allies to implement export restrictions to cede a portion of their market share to the United States.

Therefore, the dollar will remain relatively strong and volatile in the short term but is expected to decline in the medium and long run. A more favorable scenario for China would be a gradual decline in the dollar rather than an uncontrolled one. Given the economic interdependence between the U.S. and China, China does not want to witness an uncontrollable depreciation of the dollar.

Southern Weekly: Is now a good time for China to reduce dollar holdings?

Yu Yongding:

As early as 2013, British economist Martin Wolf warned that in the event of a conflict between China and the United States, the U.S. could confiscate a significant portion of China's overseas assets. The freezing of over $300 billion of Russia's dollar reserves by Western countries during the Russia-Ukraine conflict served as a warning to China that national credit sometimes yields to political considerations. From an economic standpoint, in addition to risks related to resource allocation, China now faces significant geopolitical risks.

Currently, many countries are consciously reducing their holdings in dollars. In the past, when everyone was buying, reducing holdings wasn't a major problem, as asset prices didn't incur losses. However, if everyone starts selling now, losses will occur. Reducing holdings of assets such as U.S. Treasuries is a step in the right direction, but the optimal time has passed. A better approach might be to increase imports, including purchasing more American products, to spend dollars.

There are other options, such as not purchasing new U.S. Treasuries upon maturity, adjusting the maturity and type mix of the U.S. Treasuries held, allocating more dollars to multilateral organizations, and decentralizing U.S. Treasuries custodians. However, these involve numerous highly technical issues that make it difficult for outsiders to make decisions. Whether and at what pace to reduce dollar holdings has now become more of a geopolitical question.

9. Chinese Migrants Rush to Find Way to U.S. Border Before Doors Close

Escape or infiltration?

To complement the Wall Street Journal article below, these reports from Channel News Asia are very much worth reading and watching. We watched an abridged version of the documentary and listened to the producers at a recent Channel News Asia event in DC (they opened a new office here).

Must-watch: Chinese migrants are entering US illegally. We follow their perilous odyssey

The Chinese are the fastest-growing migrant group at the US’ southern border. The CNA documentary Walk The Line tells their stories as they attempt one of the world’s most dangerous migration routes, starting in South America.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/cna-insider/documentary-walk-line-chinese-migrants-united-states-illegal-border-4337811

Producers of Walk The Line reveal what it took to film Chinese migrants going to US illegally

Late last year, a CNA crew travelled to North and South America to document the journeys of Chinese citizens crossing borders as illegal immigrants. The team behind Walk The Line now shares how the series was made.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/cna-insider/producers-walk-line-film-chinese-migrants-united-states-illegally-4360771

Chinese Migrants Rush to Find Way to U.S. Border Before Doors Close

Possibility of Trump’s return piles pressure on those fleeing life under Xi Jinping as Bolivia becomes new jumpoff point for 7,000-mile trek

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinese-migrants-rush-to-find-way-to-u-s-border-before-doors-close-82d54871?mod=latest_headlines

By Wenxin FanFollow

Updated Aug. 4, 2024 12:01 am ET

New measures to stem the flow of Chinese migrants into the U.S. over the southern border have set off a scramble of would-be asylum seekers from the world’s second-largest economy, with many spurred to take new risks by the possibility of a second Trump presidency.

Some are now attempting to start their overland journeys from as far away as La Paz, Bolivia, roughly 7,000 miles and nine border crossings from Tijuana, the final stop in Mexico for many trying to make it into the U.S.

The government of Ecuador suspended visa-free arrivals for Chinese nationals on July 1, closing the most popular access point for Chinese migrants hoping to reach the border. The move was welcomed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which two days later deported 116 Chinese migrants on a charter flight from Texas to the northeastern Chinese city of Shenyang.

Chinese officials, meanwhile, have been making examples of those caught and punished for the attempt.

In recent years, tens of thousands of Chinese people have attempted to enter the U.S. by first journeying to Mexico through the treacherous Darién Gap that connects South and Central America, typically after flying into Ecuador.

Speaking from Mexico City, a 37-year-old Chinese man who sold betel nut, a mild stimulant, in southern China, said he rushed to leave home in June and arrived in Ecuador days before visa-free arrivals were suspended. The man, who gave only his surname Zhou, said he hoped to reach the U.S. border by motorbike.

“Oppressive governments are more terrible than tigers,” he said, citing a line by Confucius in explaining his willingness to risk the journey.

Zhou’s complaints about life in China mirror those of many others—most of them poor, some in the middle class—who have taken desperate measures to flee their homeland in recent years. Under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the country’s economic growth has slowed, leading to layoffs and increased competition. Meanwhile, blanket surveillance and censorship have created an atmosphere of fear that some find unbearable.

Some Chinese migrants attempt to enter the U.S. by journeying to Mexico through the Darién Gap that connects South and Central America. Photo: Natacha Pisarenko/ AP

Roughly 2,000 Chinese nationals passed through the Darién Gap each month over the first five months of this year, down slightly from the monthly average in 2023, a year of record migration, according to data from Panamanian authorities.

Those yet to make the journey are now caught up in a crackdown on migration controls emanating from Washington as illegal immigration features prominently in the 2024 presidential election.

Public pressure in the U.S. to reduce the flow of immigrants, paired with Ecuador’s decision to suspend visa-free arrivals, threatens to all but eviscerate the main route to the U.S. for average Chinese people, said Li Xiaosan, a New York-based Chinese migrant whose crossing into the U.S. last year was chronicled by The Wall Street Journal. “Now 99% of the people won’t be able to come,” he said.

In its statement announcing the change, Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility said roughly half of Chinese nationals arriving in recent months had failed to legally exit the country. The decision came amid pressure from the Biden administration, which is providing critical security assistance in Ecuador’s efforts to fight drug trafficking and was quickly affirmed by Beijing, which vowed to crack down on human smuggling.

An empty pack of Chinese cigarettes lies along a dirt trail along the U.S.-Mexico border. A migrant from China holds his passport for inspection.

RETUERS; ALLISON DINNER/EPA-EFE/SHUTTERSTOCK

Confronting new barriers, some Chinese migrants have given up on getting to the U.S., though many others remained determined to find new routes.

In chat rooms dedicated to the endeavor, some users floated the idea of entering from Suriname, which would require a dangerous journey via Guyana and Venezuela, or even trying to take a boat from Cuba—options that other users dismissed as fanciful.

Others contemplated trying to fly into Mexico from a third country, though Mexican authorities have tended only to accept Chinese travelers who can show they have multi-entry visas in a developed country such as Japan or Canada.

One traveler told the Journal that he had arrived in Mexico from Japan via Istanbul, but was denied entry. After spending almost a day in detention, he was put on a plane back to Japan. The person said having a visa for Japan and speaking English didn’t help his case.

“I had thought Mexico wouldn’t be too difficult. Then I figured that I would try again and start from South America instead,” he said when reached by the Journal a day after he said he was back in Japan. “But now my plan is to go home. The U.S. has more or less closed the door to ordinary people.”

For most migrants, the most tangible alternative is now Bolivia, which still offers visas on arrival to Chinese citizens. To avoid drawing attention from Chinese border agents, most travelers fly indirectly through third countries in Africa or Europe.

From Bolivia, a Gantlet of Borders

A new, longer route takes China’s would-be asylum seekers through 10 countries before they reach the U.S. southern border.

Potential routes

Entire route

TEXAS

Brownsville, Texas

Tijuana

Monterrey

Matamoros

Darién Gap

Area of detail

Quito

Part of new route

San Luis Potosí

Tampico

La Paz

New starting point

Mérida

MEXICO

GULF OF MEXICO

To Tijuana

Mexico City

Veracruz

Coatzacoalcos

Acayucan

Oaxaca

Juchitán

GUATEMALA

Boat ride

Tapachula

PACIFIC OCEAN

Source: Staff reports

Emma Brown/WSJ

An agent who operates guesthouses in Cairo and Istanbul for Chinese migrants looking to enter the U.S. said he had helped two dozen clients get to the Bolivian capital of La Paz in the first two weeks of July. From there, they aim to cross into Peru near Lake Titicaca, then on through Ecuador to Colombia and into Central America.

But he’s had less luck lately, said the agent, who is known to migrants by the name Anthony Park. Eight of the 10 clients he tried to send to La Paz from Cairo in the third week of July weren’t allowed on their flights, Park said, after airline staff questioned the validity of their hotel reservations or demanded to see invitation letters from a Bolivian host.

The two that landed in La Paz were sent back after local authorities said their hotel reservation was invalid, he added, sharing a screenshot of text messages from the clients asking for help. “It’s becoming problematic under my eyes. It’s becoming ruthless,” Park said.

Many Venezuelan migrants who crossed the Guatemala-Mexico border in mid-July said they saw groups of Chinese nationals along the jungle paths of the Darién Gap, suggesting Chinese migrants are continuing to push toward the U.S. border.

Among those who reached Mexico before the old route closed down, some are optimistic about being able to make new lives in the U.S. despite news of the DHS deportation flight out of Texas.

Speaking from a hotel near Mexico’s border with Guatemala, an investor in his 30s from western China’s Ningxia region said he began his journey with his wife and 3-year-old son in Quito in June, paying someone to carry the toddler through the Darién Gap.

He said money made from investing, first in internet companies, later in factories and bars, had afforded him a middle-class lifestyle that included winter skiing holidays and sightseeing in Southeast Asia, but his wealth was virtually wiped out in the pandemic.

A group of Chinese migrants at a temporary camp near the border. Photo: LI QIANG/ The Washington Post via Getty Images

He said competition in China has since grown too fierce, making it impossible to rebuild his life there. “I’ll start over in a new place,” he said.

Zhou, the betel nut seller, said he had grown disillusioned in China as the economy deteriorated. He said he decided to brave the journey to the U.S. after he got in trouble for criticizing Chinese leaders on social media.

“It is full of challenges,” he said. “But I have to take it.”

Park, the agent, said more than 10,000 migrants had passed through his guesthouses or consulted him for routes, mostly in 2023, but he expected the business to dry up if Donald Trump returns to the White House next year and revives his hard-line stance on immigration.

“Some people would still be able to sneak their way through,” he said. “But the scale would go down to a point that agents will no longer be interested.”

Santiago Perez and Juan M. Forero contributed to this article.

Write to Wenxin Fan at wenxin.fan@wsj.com

10. Opinion | Business leaders think Trump is all bluster. They’re badly mistaken.

Excuse the partisan polemic from Fareed Zakaria but these excerpts caught my eye, regarding both the American Revolution and the US led "revolution" in international affairs following World War II.

Excerpts:

Trump’s is an ideological view that facts and evidence can do little to dissuade. He insists, for example, that his tariffs are not paid by Americans, but rather by China and other nations.

It’s worth pointing out that if that were the case — if Trump is right — then the American Revolution was a big mistake. Recall that the colonists were enraged by tariffs the British imposed on imported goods. If only the colonists had known they were not paying those taxes, they might not have rebelled against British rule. But no: Even with 18th-century economics, they knew that they were paying the taxes.

There is a broader point to make here. The United States did something truly revolutionary after World War II. It understood that by underwriting international stability and helping other nations get rich, it would create a zone of peace and prosperity in which it, too, would thrive. That vision of enlightened self-interest has been at the heart of America’s engagement with the world for almost eight decades. Trump and JD Vance utterly reject it, choosing instead a dark, narrow and selfish vision that would turn its back on one of America’s greatest and most enduring achievements.

Opinion | Business leaders think Trump is all bluster. They’re badly mistaken.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · August 2, 2024

The conventional wisdom about Donald Trump is that he has no coherent policy agenda. He is transactional, impulsive and narcissistic. The 140 of his former staffers who worked on the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 discovered this recently when Trump abruptly disavowed their effort because it became controversial.

But Trump does have an ideological core, and it’s one that dates back a long way.

In 1987, when Trump was merely a New York developer, he spent almost $100,000 to take out a full-page ad in the New York Times. It was an open letter “To The American People,” and its basic message should by now be familiar. It began, “For decades, Japan and other nations have been taking advantage of the United States.” The thrust of the letter is that the United States is crippling itself by spending on the defense of its allies while those allies prosper. His solution? Make “Japan, Saudi Arabia, and others” pay America to protect them and “tax” these nations, by which he means impose tariffs.

This is the core of Trump’s worldview. In this campaign, he has announced that he would impose 10 percent tariffs on all imported goods and 60 percent tariffs on those from China. As for America’s defense commitments, Trump threatened he would not defend NATO countries that have not “paid their bills” — by which he means met their defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP. In fact, he said, he would encourage the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want” with such countries.

I’ve asked businesspeople who support Trump how they could be in favor of an agenda that was so obviously anti-markets, anti-growth and anti-stability. They reply that it’s all bluster, that Trump’s bark is always worse than his bite. But hostility to America’s allies and a fascination with protectionism are constants in Trump’s ideology.

Trump’s dark vision from the 1980s did not pan out. Japan and Europe stagnated, China rose, and through it all, the United States stayed remarkably strong, maintaining its share of global GDP at 26 percent from 1990 to today. American wages, once very similar to Europe’s, are now about 30 percent higher. They are even higher compared with Japan. The U.S. average wage is $77,000; Japan’s is around $43,000. Countries such as France protected their workers, while Japan and Germany practiced industrial policy. But it was America that surged ahead in the information age.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Reagan and Clinton administrations tried all kinds of measures to stop Japan’s advance. They amounted to costly failures (and Japan missed the information revolution anyway). Undeterred by that record of failure, Trump wants to try it all again, this time with China, which now seems to be entering a period of slower growth itself, caused by its own mistakes.

So far, the record has been clear. By Trump’s own key measure — the trade deficit — the tariffs against China (extended by President Biden) have failed. Since the imposition of the tariffs, the trade deficit has expanded rather than contracted. Many studies have shown that these measures have cost American consumers tens of billions of dollars and have not altered China’s policies. A recent study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics concluded that Trump’s new tariffs would cost American consumers $500 billion annually, or around $1,700 for a typical middle-income family every year. In other words, they would stoke inflation.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · August 2, 2024

11. Former Global Times top editor Hu Xijin goes dark on social media after now-deleted article on China’s economic strategy

Former Global Times top editor Hu Xijin goes dark on social media after now-deleted article on China’s economic strategy

At the heart of the matter is a now-deleted article by Mr Hu, weighing in on the outcomes of the recent third plenum. He had written that the omission of a phrase long enshrining the role of the state sector in China’s economy showed that the country hoped to “achieve true equality between the private and the state-owned economy”.

02 Aug 2024 04:53PM

(Updated: 02 Aug 2024 05:14PM)

channelnewsasia.com

SINGAPORE: Prolific Chinese nationalistic commentator Hu Xijin has gone silent on social media after publishing an article analysing China’s economic strategy, in an indication of the heightened sensitivity around discussions on the country’s economy.

The former editor-in-chief of the state-run Global Times was banned from posting on social media after he wrote controversial comments about the world's second-largest economy, Bloomberg reported on Thursday (Aug 1), citing a “person familiar with the matter”. Neither the entity behind the purported ban nor its length was specified.

At the heart of the matter is a now-deleted article Mr Hu posted on his WeChat account on Jul 22, weighing in on the outcomes of the third plenum, a reform-focused meeting by the upper echelons of China’s Communist Party (CCP).

The top-level gathering took place last month, yielding a resolution document that was long on commitments but short on specifics, although analysts singled out hints that President Xi Jinping is seeking a fourth term as China’s helmsman.

According to the South China Morning Post (SCMP), Mr Hu wrote that the resolution left out a phrase that had long enshrined the role of the state sector in the country’s economy.

He argued that the omission of the phrase “public ownership playing a dominant role” was a “historic change” that showed China hoped to “achieve true equality between the private and the state-owned economy”.

“Chinese society’s understanding, attitude and narrative of various ownership relations will have a big step forward,” Mr Hu wrote.

ANALYSIS TRIGGERS BACKLASH

SCMP reported that Mr Hu’s interpretation triggered fierce criticism from local conservative bloggers, who accused the former Global Times editor of “blatantly violating the political discipline of the party” because the “dominant role” of public ownership was enshrined in the constitutions of both the ruling party and the country.

People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP, also published a front-page commentary on Tuesday, stating that China’s basic stand on the state and private sectors “hasn’t changed and won’t change in the future”.

While the commentary did not make any reference to Mr Hu’s piece, the article stated that the plenum’s resolution emphasised “upholding and improving the basic socialist economic system”, SCMP reported.

This encompassed the party’s stance that public ownership was the mainstay of China’s economic system, which allowed diverse forms of ownership to develop together, the article wrote.

A check by CNA on Friday (Aug 2) showed that Mr Hu’s social media accounts - Weibo, WeChat and X, formerly known as Twitter - have been silent since last Saturday. Mr Hu has more than 24 million followers on Weibo and over half a million on X, while WeChat does not show his follower count.

Both Bloomberg and SCMP were unable to reach Mr Hu for comment. However, Mr Hu was quoted by Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tao Daily on Jul 30 as saying: “I personally don’t want to say anything. You can just read things online. Please be understanding.”

Mr Hu retired from the Global Times in late 2021. He said then that he would stay on as a commentator for the paper, and had been active on social media up till this latest development.

While not an official government spokesman, Hu has been one of the loudest pro-China voices on X, which is blocked in the country, defending the party line on subjects from handling COVID-19 to disputes with Australia and the United States.

His online comments and regular newspaper column "Hu Says" have reflected what is widely perceived to be increasingly strident Chinese nationalism, and he is frequently quoted in foreign media.

In 2022, Mr Hu remarked on then-US House Speaker Nancy’s Pelosi Taiwan visit, tweeting that China’s military should take down her plane if she was escorted by American fighter jets on arrival.

More recently, Mr Hu waded in on nationalistic attacks against Nobel laureate Mo Yan and drinks giant Nongfu Spring. He defended Mo Yan, accusing naysayers of “using the banners of patriotism” as a scapegoat to criticise people and issues.

The latest incident has highlighted increasing sensitivity within China over discussion of the economy, which is facing strong headwinds.

International media outlets like The Guardian and Financial Times reported last year that China had censored financial bloggers, amid a crackdown on negative economic commentary.

12. 'Like being served a sentence': Youth discontent flares as China puts renewed work into raising retirement age

Charts and data at the link. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-raise-retirement-age-youth-backlash-pension-population-4518951

Is social unrest ahead in China?

'Like being served a sentence': Youth discontent flares as China puts renewed work into raising retirement age

Set in the 1950s, China’s retirement age was a product of the times - when life expectancies were shorter and conditions were vastly different. Fast forward to now and a recalibration appears firmly on the cards, but analysts warn that the government needs to move carefully lest unhappiness over the move boils over.

Bong Xin Ying

03 Aug 2024 06:00AM

(Updated: 03 Aug 2024 07:44AM)

channelnewsasia.com · by Bong Xin Ying

SINGAPORE: When Ms Jasmine Chen first heard that China was making a fresh push to raise the retirement age, her initial response was unlike many of her peers.

“I’m not angry,” the 36-year-old Shanghai native who works as a financial analyst at a Chinese e-commerce platform told CNA.

“I've always been optimistic, and I believe there's always opportunity in a crisis … this is the point in time that has forced me to think ahead about retirement,” she added.

At 36, Ms Chen sits squarely in the centre of China’s working-age population - defined as between 16 and 59 - which at about 61 per cent makes up close to two-thirds of the country’s 1.4 billion people, according to official data.

But that number is set to shrink rapidly as a fast-ageing population, longer life expectancies, and a plummeting birth rate bite.

Coupling this with one of the lowest statutory retirement ages in the world, it essentially means more elderly Chinese dipping into a dwindling pension pot - spelling stark economic implications not just for the world’s second-largest economy, but potentially the wider region as well.

Analysts point out the growing concern from the Chinese leadership, evidenced by the outcomes of a recent reform-focused meeting of China’s Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee.

Among the raft of pledges was one stating that reforms would be advanced to gradually raise the retirement age, as laid out in the resolution document of the third plenum.

The pronouncement has received fierce backlash online - particularly from young people. Still, observers that CNA spoke to say raising the retirement age is more necessary for China now than ever.

Dr Xiujian Peng, senior research fellow with the Centre of Policy Studies at Victoria University in Australia, warned that if action isn’t taken now, “(the government) may not have enough (of a) window of opportunity to increase it when the time comes, and ageing will become a very serious problem”.

Elderly people exercise at a park in Beijing, China January 16, 2024. (Photo: REUTERS/Tingshu Wang)

WORKING TOWARDS LATER RETIREMENT

China has one of the lowest retirement ages in the world.

It’s set at 60 for men, while for women it’s 55 for white-collar workers and 50 for the working class. In comparison, the average for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in 2022 was 64.4 years for men and 63.1 for women.

China’s retirement ages were established in the 1950s when the national life expectancy was shorter and hovering below 50. The average life expectancy rate has skyrocketed since, hitting 78.2 as of 2021, higher than the United States, and is projected to exceed 80 years by 2050, according to a 2023 report by international medical journal The Lancet.

Through the years, the country’s retirement ages have stayed the same. One consequence has been the growing strain on the pension system as the workforce shrinks and payouts are made to more retirees.

Against this backdrop, China watchers have singled out the mention of raising the retirement age in the recently concluded third plenum, as a signal that Beijing is taking action to arrest the trend.

“In line with the principle of voluntary participation with appropriate flexibility, we will advance reform to gradually raise the statutory retirement age in a prudent and orderly manner,” stated the resolution document, without specifying any implementation details.

China has indicated a deadline, stating that all 300-odd reform tasks in the document should be completed by the time the People’s Republic of China marks its 80th anniversary in 2029.

While the document did not specify what the retirement age would be revised to, hints have previously emerged. A report published in December by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a leading state-run think tank, estimated that everyone would eventually retire at 65.

Mr Huang Tianlei, research fellow and China programme coordinator at Peterson Institute for International Economics, told CNA it suggests the government is “making a compromise”.

“It's basically letting people decide if they want to retire later. If they do decide to retire later, they will probably receive a higher pension; and if they decide to receive (the pension) on time or even early, they will get less,” he said.

“It’s to provide an incentive of sorts for people to retire a bit later.”

RILING UP THE YOUTHS

The plans have struck a nerve in the country - particularly among young people, with many expressing unhappiness online.

“Those who want to retire are those working in miserable conditions, and those who don’t want to retire are working in high-paying jobs while doing much less. How can young people live?” lamented one user on Chinese social media platform Weibo.

Another had concerns about job security. “As long as the government creates a good working environment for the ordinary people, we are all willing to work for a few more years, and earn our own keep without letting our children worry too much.

But the question is, can a person in his 50s or 60s find something to do in this era of involution?”

Ms Chen, the financial analyst, is similarly concerned, citing “challenging” prospects due to factors like the rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and the possible displacement of jobs.

She is mulling multiple backup plans instead of relying on one job.

“We have to adapt to change. I am thinking of starting first by investing and then upgrading my skills. Or I could take on a coaching role to help others pass the certified public accountant exams,” she told CNA.

Referring to the likelihood of later retirement, 24-year-old logistics supervisor Woody Zhu told CNA it feels like he is being served a “sentence”.

“I'd say even if it's voluntary, maybe at most 10 per cent would actually do that on their own will,” he said.

Mr Zhu pointed out how many of his friends have turned to humour to channel their frustrations, and one way is through the sharing of memes on WeChat.

A meme that's being circulated online, poking fun at China's plan to raise its retirement age. The caption reads: "Corporate team building group photo in 2060". (Photo: WeChat)

A meme that's being circulated online, poking fun at China's plan to raise its retirement age. The caption reads: "At 61, I had to fight for a shared wheelchair with ten others early in the morning. I'm going all out for work". (Photo: Weibo/@温柔碎片)

A meme that's being circulated online, poking fun at China's plan to raise its retirement age. The caption reads: "64 and eating at the work canteen. The food is too hard to even chew, had to drink some rice porridge to satisfy my hunger". (Photo: Weibo/@sssgenius)

A meme that's being circulated online, poking fun at China's plan to raise its retirement age. The caption reads: "At the age of 63 and forgetting to bring hearing aids to work. Was scolded behind the back by the 30-year-old leader for two hours and not knowing it". (Photo: Weibo/@sssgenius)

“PEOPLE MUST ACCEPT THIS PEACEFULLY”

Mr Huang feels that the uproar among youths is “understandable”.

“Many young people are struggling to find work. Keeping older people in the market will inevitably mean fewer opportunities for younger people who are desperately looking for jobs,” he said.

“My guess is that the policy will continue to face huge obstacles from the people and may not become a reality anytime soon. Even if it becomes actual policy, people may not be as responsive as the government expects them to be,” he added.

The national jobless rate for the 16-24 age group - excluding students - was at 13.2 per cent last month, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, which noted that it was the third straight month of improvement.

But that’s against a sharper-than-expected growth slowdown in the second quarter of this year.

Beijing has also been under pressure to create more jobs, with more than 11.7 million new university graduates set to enter the labour market this year.

Victoria University’s Dr Peng said while the latest push by China to raise the longstanding retirement age sends a “very positive signal”, she cautioned that the issue remains very sensitive, highlighting it as a reason why the government has hesitated to do so for “many, many years”.

China raised the prospect of raising retirement ages as far back as 2013. Then, a report by the state-run Global Times quoted officials as saying it would be done “in progressive steps”. Also, that the public would be notified “a few years prior to the actual implementation”.

More recently in 2021, Chinese authorities said they would delay the legal retirement age over the next five years, but offered no further details.

“This reform is not as easy and is very complicated. The government needs to consider all the people's thinking and prevent any potential trouble. People will need to accept this peacefully,” said Dr Peng.

She brought up what happened in France as an example. Early last year, a government proposal to increase the retirement age to 64 from 62 sparked nationwide protests, paralysing public transport and municipal services.

Heaps of garbage in the streets of the capital Paris became a protest symbol. Despite vehement opposition, the reforms were eventually pushed through by French President Emmanuel Macron.

Dr Peng referred to Australia’s model as one that China could potentially take notes from. Australia does not have a set retirement age. Rather, citizens can get access to their pension upon hitting a stipulated age, which was raised to 67 from 65 last year.

“(Australia) also said they would do this gradually, and based on the people’s willingness.

“In Australian universities, if the professors would like to stay on for longer, they can, and not be forced to retire. I believe China can learn from this,” Dr Peng said, highlighting that her PhD supervisor is still working at the age of 78 - for six days a week, no less.

Here in Southeast Asia, countries are also taking action as the region faces the tough challenge of a fast-greying population.

Since 2021, Vietnam has been gradually raising its retirement ages, targeting 62 for men and 60 for women. Meanwhile, Singapore’s retirement age will go up by one year to 64 in 2026, as part of a progressive approach to raise it to 65 by 2030.

PENSIVE OVER PENSIONS

Online critics of a potential raising of the retirement age have also brought up the prospect of delayed access to their pensions.

While analysts point out that details are vague, with no specifics about implementation, they note that raising the retirement age would go some way in taking some heat off China’s buckling pension system.

“Because (China has) a fast-ageing population, the pension fund could run a deficit and the deficit will grow larger with the current pension system. This will put a high pressure on the government. This is not sustainable,” said Dr Peng.

State-run think tank the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences said in 2019 that the country’s main state pension fund would run dry by 2035. The estimate came before the COVID-19 pandemic, which exacted a heavy toll on China’s economy.

Raising the retirement age would mean that fewer people can dip into the pension pot while simultaneously having more worker contributions, Dr Peng pointed out.

“It’s good for the sustainability of the pension system, reducing the financial pressure on the government.”

Even so, not all analysts are convinced that raising the retirement age will be a game changer as they pointed out the raft of challenges confronting the world’s second-largest economy.

While Dr Peng believes it will be a “very effective policy” over the short to medium term, she noted that for the longer term, “the government must increase the fertility (rate), to work hand-in-hand with this move.”

Referring to the recent third plenum, Mr Huang pointed out that the resolution document is “very much focused on tech, self-sufficiency, indigenous technology, supply chain resilience and national security”, which he believes is “just the wrong approach”.

“It does not seem to place households, employment front and centre, and that, frankly, should be the strategy of the Chinese state in dealing with its current economic challenges.”

Mr Huang also noted that China, like other major economies such as the United States, is entering the age of AI, something he believes the country is not prepared for as the technology replaces “a lot of jobs”, and lower-skilled workers could potentially get pushed out.

“Among all policy options, if you think of the cost-benefit analysis, I don't think (raising the retirement age) is the most effective solution to deal with the slowing economy,” he said.

“Maybe they want to put this out and see how the public will respond, and if the public doesn't like it, they'll just forget about it.”

Regardless of what’s decided at the top, Ms Chen and Mr Zhu are focused on best playing with the cards they’re dealt - later retirement or not.

“Everyone should start having their own plans for their futures now,” said Ms Chen.

As for Mr Zhu, he’s taking a sanguine view of the road ahead.

“If I can't find any decent job, I can just teach guitar as a part-time job to survive…(but) my company currently supports me, and I think I can sustain a steady career for as long as I want,” said the 24-year-old.

“In China, we have such fierce competition, and as a rather young guy, I accept that, because having a job matters more than the stress that comes with it. So I’m now working with my 120 per cent effort.”

His father, just one year shy of the retirement age, has these words for him: “Break a leg, young man, the future is yours.”

channelnewsasia.com · by Bong Xin Ying

13. Great Hostage Deal, But Where's Austin Tice?

Let us never forget Austin.

Great Hostage Deal, But Where's Austin Tice?

military.com · by SpyTalk | By Jonathan Broder Published August 02, 2024 at 10:20am ET · August 2, 2024

While the Biden administration trumpeted the release Thursday of four Americans, a dozen Germans and one Russian-British dissident in one of the most complex prisoner swaps with Russia since the Cold War, U.S. officials were conspicuously silent about the fate of Austin Tice, the freelance journalist who disappeared in Syria in 2012 while covering the civil war there.

Both National Security Council officials and the office of Roger Carstens, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, did not respond to queries asking whether Tice’s release was included in the negotiations for the U.S.-Russia prisoner swap, which involved five different countries and were in the works for more than a year. Spokespersons for the congressional intelligence and foreign affairs committees also declined to comment on Tice’s situation.

Russia is a close ally of Syria, wielding considerable influence with its leader, President Bashar al-Assad, since the military assistance it provided him during the country’s civil war is widely credited with saving his regime, and arguably, his life.

But press freedom advocates took note of Tice’s absence from the list of Americans released by Russia , which included journalists Evan Gershkovich of the Wall Street Journal; Alsu Kurmasheva, an editor at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian-British scribe whose work for The Washington Post won a Pulitzer Prize earlier this year for commentary.

“We’re very grateful that there are journalists among those who are coming home, but we’re disappointed that Austin Tice was not among them,” said Bill McCarren, who recently stepped down after serving for 15 years as the executive director of the National Press Club and now works as a consultant on press freedom issues.

“Although we understand this was primarily a U.S.-Russia arrangement, there were many other nations involved,” he added in a phone interview. “We would also note that President Assad of Syria was in Russia just last week when this [prisoner swap] was all being planned. We hope that may mean there’s something in the future. We continue to press for Austin’s release.”

According to the FBI, he was kidnapped while reporting in Daraya, a suburb of Damascus.

President Biden has said that he knows “with certainty” that the Syrian regime has held Tice, a Marine Corps combat veteran, since his disappearance and has pledged his administration will work tirelessly to bring him home. “We are extensively engaged with regard to Austin, engaged with Syria, engaged with third countries, seeking to find a way to get him home. And we’re not going to relent until we do,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in remarks last year on World Press Freedom Day.

Though Washington severed diplomatic relations with Damascus in 2012 to protest its brutal crackdown on domestic opponents, it has worked through leaders in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and other friendly Arab countries to arrange quiet meetings with Syrian officials to learn the fate of Tice and other Americans who went missing during the war.

The most recent reported talks took place last year, when U.S. officials met with senior Syrian intelligence and political officials in Muscat, the capital of Oman, according to the Wall Street Journal, which cited Middle East officials familiar with the efforts. The Biden administration has refused to confirm the talks, and Syrian officials have said repeatedly they are not holding Tice—who remained in the Marine Corps reserve as a captain after his service in Iraq and Afghanistan—thwarting U.S. efforts to get proof from the Syrians that Tice is still alive.

Such efforts go back to the Trump administration. In September 2020, Kash Patel, a senior official on Trump’s National Security Council, and Roger Carstens, the president’s special envoy for hostage affairs, made a secret visit to Damascus for talks with top Syrian intelligence officials aimed at securing the release of Tice and another U.S. citizen, Majd Kamalmaz, a 62-year-old clinical psychologist from Virginia, who disappeared in 2017 and is believed to be held in a Syrian government prison. That mission produced no results.

At one point, Trump relied on Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, the head of Lebanon’s General Security Directorate, to help arrange talks for Tice’s release. The Lebanese spymaster had successfully arranged the release of Sam Goodwin, a U.S. citizen who was detained at a Syrian government checkpoint in 2019, as well as Canadian Kristian Lee Baxter, an “adventurer” and “world traveller,” according to his mother, who had crossed illegally into Syria from neighboring Lebanon. But Ibrahim also failed to win Tice’s release.

In the past, countries or groups that have taken U.S. citizens hostage haven’t released them unless they won something of value in return. If Tice and the other Americans that Syria is holding are still alive, Syria’s price for their freedom would be steep, former diplomats say.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford told SpyTalk that Assad has set a high bar for freeing Tice.

“What Assad wants is an end to U.S. sanctions and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from eastern Syria,” where some 900 American soldiers, including Special Forces, maintain a base to assist local Kurdish forces in preventing any resurgence of ISIS militants in the area.

In May, Debra Tice, Austin’s mother, said that reliable contacts in the Middle East—whom she declined to identify for fear of losing their cooperation—have assured her that her son is indeed alive and being held in a government prison in Damascus. She also said the Biden administration was prolonging Austin’s imprisonment by refusing to negotiate seriously with Syria for his release.

“I don’t understand what the issue is with the United States government engaging with Syria,” she told CBS’ Margaret Brennan.

Mrs. Tice has argued the efforts of U.S. officials to gain her son’s release had “lost their strength,” adding the administration could negotiate without changing its policy toward Damascus. She noted the Biden administration had successfully conducted a prisoner swap with Russia for the release of American basketball player Brittany Griner without softening its policy toward Moscow.

But she also sounded a note of optimism, noting that during a brief audience with Biden at the White House at the end of April, she urged him to arrange another meeting with Syrian officials to pursue Austin’s release.

“He said, ‘I think that’s a good idea,’ so we’ll see where that goes,” she said.

Marc and Debra Tice, the parents of Austin Tice, speak during a press conference, at the Press Club, in Beirut, Lebanon, Tuesday, Dec. 4, 2018. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

Over the last several weeks, Mrs. Tice has declined to comment on the situation, even as press freedom organizations have continued to run full-page newspaper ads urging her son’s release.

Relevant U.S. officials also have been extremely tight-lipped about his situation, raising hopes that their silence, as with the quiet runup to the complex Russian hostage deal, could mean something’s afoot with Syria.

Another agonizing anniversary of Tice’s capture, meanwhile, arrives on August 14.

This article first appeared on Spytalk.co.

military.com · by SpyTalk | By Jonathan Broder Published August 02, 2024 at 10:20am ET · August 2, 2024

14. Hamas May Emerge Battered, but Not Beaten, From Israel’s Latest Blows

Military operations are successful when you achieve the political object.

What is the political object in Gaza?

Hamas May Emerge Battered, but Not Beaten, From Israel’s Latest Blows

The assassinations of two Hamas leaders may be a short-term setback, analysts say, not enough to prevent the group from re-emerging intact — and possibly more radicalized.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/04/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-gaza-future.html

Hamas supporters parading with empty coffins in a symbolic funeral for Ismail Haniyeh, a top Hamas leader, on Friday in Beirut, Lebanon.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

By Erika Solomon

Aug. 4, 2024

Updated 11:37 a.m. ET

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Follow our latest updates on the Middle East crisis here.

First came the death of its top leader abroad, Ismail Haniyeh, by a bomb planted in Tehran. Then came Israel’s announcement that, only weeks earlier, it had killed Hamas’s most elusive and revered military leader. All of this as Israel continues to wage the deadliest war Palestinians in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip have ever faced.

At first tally, the latest score in the 30-year struggle between Israel and Hamas looks like a devastating one for the Islamist movement, one that throws its future into question. Yet the history of Hamas, the evolution of Palestinian militant groups over the decades and the logic of insurgencies more broadly suggest that not only will Hamas survive, it may even stand to emerge politically stronger.

Analysts and regional observers in contact with Hamas leaders see the latest blows it has suffered — including Mr. Haniyeh’s assassination, widely believed to be at Israel’s hand — as offering Israeli forces a short-term victory at the cost of long-term strategic success.

“Instead of creating the disconnect they’d hoped for, one that would make people fearful or completely defeated, this will have the opposite effect,” said Tahani Mustafa, a senior Palestine analyst at the International Crisis Group, which provides policy analysis on ending conflicts. “Israel just dealt them a winning hand.”

Image

Pro-Palestinian demonstrators gathered on Wednesday in Istanbul to protest Mr. Haniyeh’s assassination.Credit...Kemal Aslan/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The military campaign Israel has waged in retaliation for Hamas’s Oct. 7 attacks has displaced some 90 percent of Gaza’s two million residents, razed swaths of the enclave’s cities and killed 39,000 people, according to Gaza’s health ministry, which does not distinguish between civilians and combatants.

Despite that, Hamas not only remains operational, but is recruiting new fighters both in Gaza and beyond, local residents and analysts say. Militants have also begun to re-emerge in areas that Israel had driven them out of months before.

For Hamas, the logic of insurgency means that simply surviving in the face of a far more powerful military provides a symbolic victory. With that comes a chance at staying power that outlasts any pain Israel has inflicted.

On Wednesday, Israel’s military said that a strike it conducted on July 13 had killed Muhammad Deif, the head of Hamas’s military wing, who is seen as an architect of the Oct. 7 attack on Israel. Hamas has yet to confirm the killing. Mr. Deif’s death, however, would represent the end of a yearslong Israeli effort to kill the man who is effectively the second-most senior leader after Israel’s most-wanted man, Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza.

Image

Palestinian militants of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades moving toward the Erez crossing between Israel and the northern Gaza Strip on Oct. 7.Credit...Mohammed Abed/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Israel’s announcement of Mr. Deif’s killing came on the day that mourners were gathering to bid farewell to Mr. Haniyeh, who was killed while on a visit to attend the inauguration of Iran’s new president. Both Iran and Hamas have accused Israel, with a long history of assassinating its foes, of being behind his death.

His loss, too, will be difficult for Hamas. Mr. Haniyeh was seen by regional analysts as a more moderate figure within the Islamist movement, acting as a bridge between its rival factions. He was also seen as a leader willing to push for mediation — including the continuing, if faltering, cease-fire talks with Israel.

“You take him out and the message is: Negotiations don’t matter,” said Khaled Elgindy, an expert on Palestinian affairs at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

“I don’t see a reason to conclude Hamas could become irrelevant,” he said. “The question is: How does Hamas change after this? And I think there is a very strong argument to be made that the leadership becomes more hard-line."

Mr. Deif himself replaced Ahmed al-Jabari, the military leader Israel killed in 2012 with a targeted strike on his car. At the time, he was leading Hamas’s side in a mediation effort to reach a long-term cease-fire with Israel.

Israel’s decades-long targeted killing campaigns against its Palestinian and regional rivals have a contested record: Critics have long argued the tactic has simply created room for new parties or leaders to emerge as Israel’s main foes — often with ever more radical forces replacing them.

Image

A billboard showing portraits of Mohammed Deif and Ismail Haniyeh with the word “assassinated” in Hebrew in Tel Aviv on Friday.Credit...Oren Ziv/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

In the 1970s, Israel killed Wadi Haddad, the military leader of the communist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which led to that group’s collapse. A decade later, a new Palestinian foe had replaced it: Yasser Arafat’s nationalist force, Fatah. Israel killed its popular military leader, Khalil al-Wazir, but failed to cripple the group.

Hamas, founded in 1987, has intently studied the history of Palestinian militant groups in the hopes of avoiding their fates.

Since the early 2000s, Hamas has become the group seen by Palestinians as taking up the mantle of armed resistance to Israeli occupation while other groups’ military abilities have faded — or, in the case of Fatah, abandoned militancy as its primary strategy in favor of negotiations.

As peace talks broke down in the early 2000s, Hamas’s potency grew. Several Israeli assassinations of its leaders, including its co-founders, failed to derail the group.

Mr. Haniyeh’s life story provides a different lesson in the unintended consequences of some of Israel’s attempts to incapacitate Hamas. He was among 400 Palestinians expelled by Israel from Gaza to southern Lebanon, then under Israeli military occupation. Instead of being sidelined, figures like Mr. Haniyeh gained further popularity — and a broader regional reach.

Perhaps the most important principle for Hamas’s survival, Ms. Mustafa, the analyst, said, is not being overly reliant on material support from its foreign backers — a dependency that allowed Israel to deplete the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1970s and 1980s, she said.

Hamas so far appears to have maintained that self-reliance even amid Israel’s tightened siege on Gaza. Iran is a major source of Hamas’s money and weapons — its attack drones were used by Hamas on Oct. 7. But now Iran is also struggling to keep itself from being dragged into a regional war.

Image

A member of Hamas’s bomb squad collecting unexploded shells near the border between Israel and southern Gaza during a temporary cease-fire last year.Credit...Mohammed Talatene/Picture Alliance, via Reuters

Hamas militants have their own engineers who know how to make use of whatever they can find on the ground — from supplies looted from Israeli bases or ambushes on Israeli vehicles, or from extracting materials from unexploded ordnance and fallen drones.

“They got a lot of external support in terms of finance and training, but in terms of their logistics, a lot of that is homemade,” Ms. Mustafa said. “Which is why, even now, almost 10 months in, you haven’t seen the resistance wane.”

Not all Hamas observers believe that Hamas can survive the current pressures. Some analysts, like Michael Stephens at the London-based research group the Royal United Services Institute, believes the strikes will cause enough temporary damage to force Hamas into more concessions.

Akram Atallah, a Gazan political analyst at the Arabic newspaper Al-Ayyam, said Hamas would emerge from this war badly damaged — not only militarily, but in terms of support in Gaza, the region that “has always been its center of gravity.”

Much of the popularity Hamas is perceived to have gained, he said, has come from outside Gaza — such as from fellow Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.

“That is understandable for one obvious reason: It’s the residents of Gaza who are paying the price,” he said.

Hamas, he said, will never be able to lead the Gaza Strip after Israel’s offensive ends. Not only Israel and its main backers in Washington would reject this, he said, but Gazans themselves as well.

Image

Palestinians returning to the eastern side of Khan Younis after Israeli forces pulled out from the are of southern Gaza on Tuesday.Credit...Hatem Khaled/Reuters

Yet even with that resolve, Hamas’s opponents have done little to ensure that anyone could replace Hamas, Mr. Stephens said.

“No one wants to go there, because no one wants to own that problem. Who is going to own the Palestinian question?” he said. “It looks bad for Hamas right now — but then, what exactly are the alternatives?”

Ms. Mustafa predicts an extended period in which Gaza is trapped in a power vacuum, with Israel entering and withdrawing from pockets where Hamas militants re-emerge and disappear.

Even if Israel were to ultimately deal a decisive blow against Hamas, Mr. Atallah said, the only question would be who emerged next.

“As long as there is an occupation, Palestinians will keep fighting,” he said, “whether there is still a Hamas, or there isn’t.”

15. For Israelis, Jittery Wait for Retaliatory Strikes Stretches Into a New Week

The LatestUpdated

Aug. 4, 2024, 12:15 p.m. ET15 minutes ago

Middle East Crisis

For Israelis, Jittery Wait for Retaliatory Strikes Stretches Into a New Week

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/08/04/world/israel-hamas-hezbollah-iran-gaza

Image

Projectiles fired from the Israeli Iron Dome air defense system intercept missiles fired from southern Lebanon in northern Israel early Sunday.Credit...Atef Safadi/EPA, via Shutterstock

Israel’s prime minister said it was already ‘in a multi-front war against Iran’s evil axis.’

Israel went into a new workweek in a state of deep uncertainty on Sunday, with the potential for attacks by Iran and the militant groups it supports already causing disruptions for many.

A number of international airlines have suspended flights to and from Israel pending expected retaliation against the country by Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. That has left tens of thousands of Israelis unable to come home, according to an Israeli official who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to discuss the matter.

Delta, United, the Lufthansa group and Aegean Airlines were among those that suspended services to Israel after the assassination of a senior Hezbollah commander, Fuad Shukr, in a strike in Beirut on Tuesday, and the killing early Wednesday of the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran. The fear is that the responses to the killings could be the start of a wider regional war.

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is asking citizens traveling abroad to fill out an online survey to help the government map where they are and try to organize solutions, including alternative commercial flights. Most are believed to be stuck in Europe and the United States.

Israel’s national carrier, El Al, and its subsidiaries are trying to add more flights to ferry Israelis home, but their ability to do so is limited: At the height of the summer, with school out, the Israeli airlines were already operating at full capacity.

Many Israelis were abroad on what they assumed would be short vacations and will be eager to get back to their families, jobs and lives in Israel, despite the looming danger. Officials were recommending that they make their way to nearby hubs such as Athens and Cyprus, a relatively short flight away.

Over the weekend, amid fears of a broadening conflagration, Britain, Canada, France and the United States were among the countries urging their citizens to leave Lebanon immediately. Noting that several airlines had suspended or canceled flights to and from Beirut, and that many flights were sold out, the American Embassy in Beirut said on Saturday: “We encourage those who wish to depart Lebanon to book any ticket available to them.”

France also urged its citizens in Iran to leave as soon as possible.

For Israel, the travel disruptions added to the sense that it was no longer in control of its own fate and had no clear plan for quieting its many conflicts.

Analysts said the Israeli government was waiting, instead, to see how much damage might be inflicted by any Iranian and Hezbollah retaliatory action. Only then, they said, would Israel decide on the strength of any subsequent response, and whether to work to contain the situation or risk further escalation that could spiral into an all-out regional war.

Almost 10 months since the Hamas-led assault on southern Israel that prompted the war in Gaza, “the predicament in which Israel has found itself is far from being resolved,” Amos Harel, the military affairs analyst for the left-leaning Haaretz newspaper, wrote on Sunday.

“Strategies that Iran and its proxies had been working on for years went into high gear, presenting Israel with unprecedented challenges,” he wrote, adding that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “hasn’t presented, much less formulated, a clear strategy to his subordinates.”

After a weekend of continued tit-for-tat clashes over the border with Lebanon, fighting with the Iran-backed group Hamas in Gaza and deadly Israeli airstrikes against Palestinian fighters in the occupied West Bank, Mr. Netanyahu said on Sunday that Israel was already “in a multi-front war against Iran’s evil axis.”

“We are striking every one of its arms with great force. We are prepared for any scenario — both offensively and defensively,” Mr. Netanyahu said in broadcast remarks at the beginning of his weekly cabinet meeting. “I reiterate and tell our enemies: We will respond and we will exact a heavy price for any act of aggression against us, from whatever quarter,” he said.

But many Israelis noted that Iran and Hezbollah were already benefiting by taking their time and keeping the country on tenterhooks in the four days since the assassinations.

Israel claimed responsibility for killing Mr. Shukr but it has neither acknowledged nor denied responsibility for killing Mr. Haniyeh. Iran and Hamas have blamed Israel for his death.

— Isabel Kershner reporting from Jerusalem

16. Identity Politics Loses Its Power

I know this will update some with preconceived notions about identity politics and BLM but this is a thought provoking essay. If identity politics can fade away perhaps there is some hope.

My assumption also was that BLM would come out immediately and strongly for the VP. I was surprised to read this and the rationale behind it.

Excerpt:

Now BLM is weighing in on the candidacy of Vice President Kamala Harris. One might assume, based on the group’s foundational emphasis on identity politics, that its support for a liberal Black woman would be full-throated. Instead, I was surprised to see it release a statement last week that was strikingly critical of the Democratic Party’s decision to elevate Harris without a primary.

Identity Politics Loses Its Power

Black Lives Matter’s statement on Kamala Harris seems to signal a shift.

By Thomas Chatterton Williams

The Atlantic · by Thomas Chatterton Williams · August 1, 2024

Black Lives Matter’s persuasive power and influence climaxed in 2020, in the reckoning that followed the murder of George Floyd. It was a time of rare consensus, when some two-thirds of Americans expressed support for the cause, according to the Pew Research Center. But by last year, only half of Americans continued to support BLM, and less than a quarter did so strongly. “A majority of Americans say the increased focus on issues of race and racial inequality in the past three years hasn’t led to changes that have improved the lives of Black people,” Pew found.

Now BLM is weighing in on the candidacy of Vice President Kamala Harris. One might assume, based on the group’s foundational emphasis on identity politics, that its support for a liberal Black woman would be full-throated. Instead, I was surprised to see it release a statement last week that was strikingly critical of the Democratic Party’s decision to elevate Harris without a primary.

“Democratic Party elites and billionaire donors are attempting to manipulate Black voters by anointing Kamala Harris and an unknown vice president as the new Democratic ticket without a primary vote by the public,” the statement reads. “While the potential outcome of a Harris presidency may be historic, the process to achieve it must align with true democratic values. We have no idea where Kamala Harris stands on the issues.” The group called for a “virtual snap primary” that would give voters a chance to voice their preferences and concerns. Bernie Sanders famously argued that “it is not good enough for somebody to say, I’m a woman; vote for me.” Now Black Lives Matter seems to be arguing that it is no longer good enough to say: I am a Black woman; vote for me.

From the November 2023 issue: The Kamala Harris problem

Refreshingly, Harris herself has not relied on this argument, focusing instead on uniting liberals and their allies to defeat Donald Trump. At her first rally after President Joe Biden left the race, Harris vowed to protect reproductive rights, strengthen the middle class, and fight for a future “where no child has to grow up in poverty.” Still, her candidacy immediately inspired waves of identitarianism among various Democratic constituencies. Hundreds of thousands of Democratic voters segregated themselves by race and gender to attend fundraising calls on Zoom, as if preemptively highlighting superficial differences could somehow help them come together at a later date. Such tactics don’t reflect the fact that many voters are rejecting identity politics, which have only exacerbated the divisions they purported to heal. Coming at a time when Trump has been entrenching counterintuitive gains among Black voters and other minority groups, Democrats’ emphasis on race and identity risks undermining Harris instead of helping her.

There will be no snap primary: With three months until the election, the Democratic Party is saying that it’s already too late. But Black Lives Matter’s intervention will have been a deeply patriotic and beneficial one if it forces Democratic elites to take seriously the reality that the country is no longer interested in checking boxes and marking “firsts” only for the sake of it, and if it signals a correction to the excesses and miscalculations of the past few years.

When I reached out to ask Black Lives Matter whether this was an accurate read of the group’s intentions, a spokesperson did not follow up after several back-and-forths. I posed the question instead to a few scholars of BLM. Those I spoke with said they did not see an ideological about-face.

“BLM centers Black lives because they see these lives as an exemplary case of the denial of democratic freedoms and rights,” the Brown University political scientist Melvin Rogers told me: BLM’s “identity-based politics are not about identity for identity’s sake but about addressing systemic inequities and ensuring that marginalized communities have a voice in shaping democratic institutions. Given the historical context of exclusion in the United States, they elevate identity as a means of self-affirmation, but they frame this within a larger commitment to democratic engagement, process, and reform.” He thought the call for snap primaries was, in part, a matter of strategic influence—“a tactical move” to try to ensure that BLM would have an “impact in shaping the Democratic platform.”

But whether BLM intended to signal a departure from the lockstep ideology of the past few years, or whether Rogers is right that it’s been asking Americans to think beyond the narrow confines of race all along, the statement is a stark reminder of the limits of identity politics.

Black Lives Matter was founded in 2013, after George Zimmerman was acquitted in the killing of the teenager Trayvon Martin. Through the decade that followed, BLM, as both a movement and an organization, forced Americans to examine complex social, cultural, and political questions through the flattening lens of group identity and race. It was not at all sufficient, activists organized under its banner argued, to view what happened to Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, or to Floyd in Minneapolis, only in terms of police brutality or the precarity of the lower classes. A few years before Floyd was asphyxiated by a police officer who kneeled on his neck while other officers milled about refusing to intervene, Tony Timpa, an unarmed white man, was killed in Texas in near-identical circumstances. But that connection was rarely drawn. In some quarters, it was tantamount to an expression of anti-Blackness to point out any equivalence.

David Frum: The Harris gamble

After Hillary Clinton’s unexpected loss to Trump in 2016, the intellectual historian Mark Lilla posed what at the time seemed a controversial question: How should America’s unique and beautiful diversity shape our politics? “In recent years American liberalism has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender and sexual identity that has distorted liberalism’s message and prevented it from becoming a unifying force capable of governing,” he wrote in a viral New York Times op-ed. “One of the many lessons of the recent presidential election campaign and its repugnant outcome is that the age of identity liberalism must be brought to an end.” That two election cycles hence, even a constituency founded on race-first activism such as Black Lives Matter has come to echo a version of that moderating sentiment should register not merely as an indictment of the Democratic Party’s history of simplistic thinking about race; it should serve as an emergency wake-up call.

Harris—much like J. D. Vance—is particularly vulnerable to the liabilities of appealing to identity over substance. Trump has already tried to challenge Harris’s racial authenticity, suggesting that she positioned herself as Black only when it became politically expedient to do so: “She was Indian all the way, and then all of a sudden she made a turn and she became a Black person,” he said on Wednesday, during a simultaneously ingratiating and contentious appearance in front of the National Association of Black Journalists. The best way to undermine this kind of cheap rhetorical gambit is to eschew arguments based on identity in the first place.

It may turn out that Harris is precisely the leader this moment demands. But that cannot be assumed. “Installing Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee and an unknown vice president without any public voting process would make the modern Democratic Party a party of hypocrites,” BLM warned. “It would undermine their credibility on issues related to democracy. Imagine our first Black woman president not having won some sort of public nomination process. The pundits would immediately label it as affirmative action or a DEI move, and any progress made by a President Harris would be on shaky foundations.”

BLM understands that Harris will not become president just because she is some avatar of generic intersectional identity, and that she would have been better off if given the chance to prove herself deserving of voters’ support through a fair and transparent primary process. Put bluntly, descendants of American slaves should not feel the need to search for our redemption or sense of representation through the symbolic ascendance of a child of Indian and Jamaican immigrants merely because she listens to Beyoncé and has tan skin. The presumption that Black politics is or ought to be formed in the epidermis has always been patronizingly false. The Black voters defecting to Trump have recognized this, and the leaders of Black Lives Matter have now stated it plainly. Will the Democratic Party take note?

The Atlantic · by Thomas Chatterton Williams · August 1, 2024

17. Will Kinmen Be Taiwan’s Crimea?

Perhaps this is why the 1st Special Forces Group has soldiers in Kinmen (unconventional deterrence - the population is a risk to an occupier)

US Army Special Forces Train Taiwan Troops Near China's Coast

https://www.newsweek.com/american-special-forces-train-taiwan-soldiers-penghu-kinmen-china-coast-1868009

Excerpts:

Given Vladimir Putin’s playbook in Ukraine started with the annexation of Crimea, Western policymakers need to pay closer attention to Kinmen. They should offer material support to Taiwan to fight disinformation, ensure diplomats and officials visit Kinmen, and help Taiwan build up economic resilience in its outlying islands.

Irrespective of the differing views of Taiwanese people regarding cross-strait relations, Kimen has strategic value for the international community who concern themselves with peace in the region. According to official PRC historical accounts, Mao Zedong long viewed Kinmen and Matsu as a noose with which to bind Taiwan to mainland China and prevent Taiwan from declaring its independence.

Any attempt by Beijing to annex Kinmen and destabilize the status quo would make the possibility of the PRC invading or embargoing Taiwan even more likely. We need to do a better job of discussing the political fault lines in Kinmen and pre-empting PRC attempts at its annexation.

Will Kinmen Be Taiwan’s Crimea?

thediplomat.com

A relatively pro-China population and proximity to the mainland mean Beijing might test the waters by attempting to annex the Kinmen Islands.

By Sam Goodman

August 03, 2024

From top to bottom: Greater Kinmen Island (ROC/Taiwan), Lesser Kinmen Island (ROC/Taiwan), and Xiamen (PRC) as viewed from the air.

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The Taiwanese islands of Kinmen are just 3 kilometers away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). From Kinmen, neon signs and lit-up buildings in the PRC city of Xiamen can be seen at night across the shore, and in the daytime, you are close enough to see PRC residents sunbathing on the beach.

Kinmen, which nominally remains part of Fujian province in the Republic of China, is at the crux of cross-strait tensions. It has been bombed several times by the People’s Liberation Army in the past and was viewed historically by Chiang Kai-shek, the long-time leader of the Republic of China, as a staging post for the recapturing of China. Today, Kinmen is at the forefront of Beijing’s gray zone tactics.

For the Taiwanese residents of Kinmen, the PRC is not an abstract threat but an everyday practical reality. Kinmen welcomes around 250,000 Chinese tourists a year. Many residents have partners from the mainland and are entitled to PRC identity cards, and their children often opt to take the 30-minute ferry to Xiamen to shop and party the night away.

It is therefore not surprising that politically, Kinmen residents support the KMT, which favors closer links with the PRC. In the recent presidential election, the islanders gave 61 percent of their votes to the KMT candidate.

For its part, Beijing has pushed efforts to court Kinmen. Last year, the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office proposed the creation of a special economic zone encompassing Xiamen and Kinmen, which would involve the building of a land bridge connecting mainland China and a new offshore airport in Xiamen, and Kinmen.

The proposed bridge is reminiscent of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge, which the PRC constructed in October 2018 to bind Hong Kong and Macau closer to the other cities in the Greater Bay Area in Guangdong.

In the recent presidential election in Taiwan, the topic of the bridge was hotly debated, with the KMT’s presidential candidate, New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-ih, promising a local referendum on the bridge. Meanwhile, newly elected Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has blocked its construction on national security grounds.

The Taiwanese government’s concern is driven by the potential weaponization of strategic infrastructure by the PRC to divide Taiwanese society and force the issue of reunification through dependency. As it stands, Kinmen is already dependent on the PRC for 68 percent of its water through the Kinmen-China water pipeline (which was completed in 2018).

This is not the first time that decisions in Taipei have divided opinion on Kinmen. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the decision by the Taiwanese government on February 20, 2020, to close its borders and cut the “three links” – which had allowed travel, direct commerce, and mail service between Taiwan and the PRC – received strong support from some of the public on health grounds, but Kinmen’s only legislator initially opposed it on the grounds it would hurt the island’s economy.

More broadly, there appears to be little consensus among Taiwanese society regarding the strategic importance of Kinmen. Views are evenly divided between those who see Kinmen as “the first line of defense” or a “buffer” against the PRC and those who consider Kinmen to have little strategic value other than potentially serving as a future bargaining chip in negotiations.

This division creates a significant opportunity for Beijing to use tools ranging from disinformation to outright political interference to drive a wedge between the people of Kinmen and the government in Taipei. A part of this “gray zone” strategy might include the sowing of a misleading narrative that Lai is actively seeking to cut Kinmen off from Xiamen in the future, which would divide families and hurt the local economy.

As with Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the end goal would be to create chaos and encourage local actors to push publicly for reunification. This would create a smokescreen for the PRC to annex Kinmen in what analysts describe as a “salami slicing” approach.

Kinmen is not explicitly included in the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act, which governs relations between the U.S. and Taiwan after Washington’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1979. However, U.S. special forces were deployed on the island back in the spring of 2024. It is unclear whether the Taiwanese government or its Western allies would be willing to go to war with the PRC over Kinmen, particularly if Beijing did not then push for an invasion of Taiwan’s main island.

In a recent paper for the China Strategic Risks Institute, my colleague Andrew Yeh outlined several “gray zone” scenarios, which include the PRC taking the islands of Kinmen along with Matsu. The paper argued that in Europe, policymakers have focused too narrowly on a full PRC invasion or an embargo of Taiwan while not having adequately considered policy responses to lower-level and equally troubling military escalations in the Taiwan Strait.

Given Vladimir Putin’s playbook in Ukraine started with the annexation of Crimea, Western policymakers need to pay closer attention to Kinmen. They should offer material support to Taiwan to fight disinformation, ensure diplomats and officials visit Kinmen, and help Taiwan build up economic resilience in its outlying islands.

Irrespective of the differing views of Taiwanese people regarding cross-strait relations, Kimen has strategic value for the international community who concern themselves with peace in the region. According to official PRC historical accounts, Mao Zedong long viewed Kinmen and Matsu as a noose with which to bind Taiwan to mainland China and prevent Taiwan from declaring its independence.

Any attempt by Beijing to annex Kinmen and destabilize the status quo would make the possibility of the PRC invading or embargoing Taiwan even more likely. We need to do a better job of discussing the political fault lines in Kinmen and pre-empting PRC attempts at its annexation.

Authors

Guest Author

Sam Goodman

Sam Goodman is the senior policy director at the China Strategic Risks Institute.

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thediplomat.com

18. Paul Bucha, Medal of Honor recipient in fierce jungle battle, dies at 80

What a powerful statement he made to his men.

These kinds of stories are inspirational. I hope they help motivate young officers and soldiers.

Paul Bucha, Medal of Honor recipient in fierce jungle battle, dies at 80

"If you have your choice of company commanders, you wouldn’t pick me,” Bucha told his men. “But if I had my choice of soldiers, I’d pick you."

Posted on Aug 2, 2024 6:59 PM EDT

5 minute read

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White

The “clerks and jerks” of Delta Company were surrounded and close to being overrun. As Capt. Paul Bucha, the company commander, dodged the machine gun fire from the trees overhead and constant explosions he began to wonder if his mother would ever learn the name of the unmarked grid coordinates where he was about to die.

But as he considered those dire thoughts, a young, untested replacement soldier, with no combat experience, ran to Bucha’s position through the hail of fire,

“This young kid who’d just joined us,” Bucha remembered in an interview. “I mean we were down with fire everywhere, and we were firing what little ammunition we had left because we were trying to conserve it. All hell was raining down on us.”

The soldier looked at the captain with, shockingly, a smile: “And he says, ‘Sir! We’re kicking the hell out of them, aren’t we!’,” Bucha said.

The captain laughed and replied: “Well, I guess we are.”

In fact, the battle raged on through the night of March 16, 1968. For hours, Bucha moved between his men, created diversions and feints to confuse the larger enemy force, called in artillery and gunship fire and loaded helicopters with wounded.

Ten of Bucha’s soldiers died, with nearly all emerging wounded. Over 150 North Vietnamese were killed in the battle, a toll nearly twice the number of Bucha’s entire company.

For his leadership and valor under fire, Bucha would be awarded the Medal of Honor.

Bucha, 80, died July 31 at his home in West Haven, Connecticut, where he lived most of his life. He was the state’s last living Medal of Honor recipient. With Bucha’s passing, 60 Medal of Honor recipients remain living.

The ‘clerks and jerks’

The son of a World War II veteran, Bucha was born in Washington D.C., and moved several times as an Army brat. For college, Bucha attended West Point, where he was an All-American swimmer. After graduate school at Stanford, he was sent to Vietnam as an infantry officer in the 101st Airborne’s 187th infantry regiment.

There, his battalion commander quickly promoted him to take over a newly formed company, delta. In an interview with the Congressional Medal of Honor Society available on YouTube, Bucha said he held formations, reported accountability and marched in pass and review for early-morning battalion formations.

It was just him, alone. Bucha had no soldiers assigned to him when he took command, at least at first. But the West Point honor graduate and rule follower to-a-T still performed his duties, even if the whole company — usually 100 or more men — was just him

“Delta Company, All present and accounted for,” he reported in the formations — meaning just him.

Then soldiers started to arrive, assigned by the battalion commander.

“He started filling me up with the rejects,” Bucha said. “We were called ‘the clerks and the jerks.’ I used to think, ‘my God, I have a few very, very smart guys and a lot of really mean guys. What a great group to go to war with.’”

Most had already seen combat and many were on a second tour of Vietnam.

“I said, ‘look if you have your choice of company commanders, you wouldn’t pick me’,” Bucha told his men. “But if I had my choice of soldiers, I’d pick you.”

The clerks and jerks of Delta Company were up to 89 men when they were inserted as 3rd battalion’s reconnaissance element near the village of Phuoc Vinh, with orders to patrol to contact. Soon after a resupply drop — in which the young combat newbie joined the company — the contact came.

“The whole mountain opened up,” Bucha said.

Taking machine gun fire from both elevated positions in trees and hardened positions, Bucha crawled 40 meters with grenades to take out a bunker, taking a shrapnel wound as he moved. Ordering a retreat to a defensive position, he realized an element was separated and cut off. Bucha ordered the men to, in the words of his Medal of Honor citation, “feign death and he directed artillery fire around them.”

As helicopters arrived to take out wounded, fire reached up from the trees toward the aircraft, which, Bucha said, “is the first sign that this isn’t a small unit.”

He ordered his men to throw grenades in series, calling to them two at a time to lob them to make their own numbers seem greater. “If they knew how small we were, we’d be finished,” Bucha said.

At daybreak, Bucha led a rescue party to recover the dead and wounded of the ambushed element.

Remembering every day

Bucha left the Army in 1972, working in business and with veterans support organizations. He served on the board of directors for the Congressional Medal of Honor Society as president from 1995 to 1999 and immediate past president from 1999 to 2001. Bucha unsuccessfully ran for Congress in 1993 as a Republican but maintained a strong interest in politics and served a foreign policy advisor for President Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign.

He is survived by his wife, Cynthia, and four children.

But in later interviews, he said the final morning patrol to recover the dead and wounded of his ‘clerks and jerks’ never left him.

“Next morning, we got everybody out and I saw my first KIAs that were my men,” Bucha said. “I remember thinking, I asked them to trust me. I promised I’d bring them home. And those 10 guys did, but I didn’t,” Bucha said. “And every day of my life I think back and wonder what could I have done better to bring those 10 home?”

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White

19. Why We’re Banning Phones at Our School

Something I will discuss with our daughter. She used a phone throughout her high school years without restriction and seemed to turn out okay. Now she is a 10th grade English teacher. She told me that students have unrestricted access to their phones because the parents demand it in her school system. This should make for an interesting discussion.

Why We’re Banning Phones at Our School

Unfettered phone usage at school is hurting our kids and depriving them of connection. But it’s not too late to make a change.

By Russell Shaw

The Atlantic · by Russell Shaw · August 4, 2024

In the early 1960s, when my parents were in high school, they received free sampler packs of cigarettes on their cafeteria trays. To the cigarette companies, it made sense: Where better to find new customers than at schools, whose students, being children, hadn’t yet established brand loyalties? This is hard to fathom in 2024.

I believe that future generations will look back with the same incredulity at our acceptance of phones in schools. The research is clear: The dramatic rise in adolescent anxiety, depression, and suicide correlates closely with the widespread adoption of smartphones over the past 15 years. Although causation is debated, as a school head for 14 years, I know what I have seen: Unfettered phone usage at school hurts our kids. It makes them less connected, less attentive, less resilient, and less happy. As the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has written for this magazine, smartphone-based life “alters or interferes with a great number of developmental processes.” It is time to remove phones from schools.

Read: Get phones out of schools now

At the entrance to our high school is an indoor amphitheater we call the Forum. The space acts simultaneously as a living room, dining room, library, and town square. When making my rounds during the school day, I will often stand at the top of the Forum and observe our students in their natural habitat. A group of sophomores plays hacky sack in one corner while a lone senior leans against the wall reading Moby-Dick, highlighter in hand. Students share a pizza. A duo prepares for an upcoming chemistry quiz. It is a hive of activity—one visitor to our school described the atmosphere as having an “intellectual crackle.”

That was a decade ago. I still make my rounds, and yes, many of the above activities still unfold in the Forum, but they are being crowded out by students looking at their phones. The students are sitting next to one another. They may even be interacting. But more and more, their attention is on their screens. Watching phones take over the Forum brings to mind a beetle infestation in a forest. At first, just one or two trees show signs of damage. Then, the next thing you know, the forest is a less healthy, less vibrant place than it once was.

I’ve watched students who struggle to make friends not learn how to, because they can retreat into the short-term safety of their phones rather than tolerate the discomfort that often precedes finding one’s way into a conversation. I’ve watched some of the spontaneity that makes school fun diminish, because students are less tuned in to what’s happening around them. I’ve watched our community become weakened by the ubiquitous presence of phones.

Good conversations are hard—they are messy and complex and require attention and careful listening. Phones teach our students to abandon the eyes of the person they’re speaking to in order to glance at a newly arrived text or Snapchat message. They privilege simplistic dichotomies that can garner “likes” rather than nuanced understanding, which requires the patience to turn to a topic again and again, suspending judgment. They undermine the very skills we aim to impart: the ability to engage deeply, to hold complexity, to build meaningful community.

I am not a Luddite—I believe in the ability of technology to enrich our lives. And yet I believe that those who are responsible for the well-being of children can no longer ignore the reality that phones in schools are doing more harm than good—distracting students, isolating them, and creating unhealthy echo chambers that undermine critical thinking.

To be clear, adults are not setting a great example. In a middle-school graduation speech a few years ago, I encouraged our students to put down their phones. Their parents applauded. And then, without missing a beat, the students called out, “You put down yours!” We, too, are often glued to our devices, distracted at meals, at sporting events, while standing in line. Adults would do well to set their own limits on phone use.

Read: The schools that ban smartphones

Some people argue that phones prepare students for the pressures of our digital world—one they’ll eventually have to navigate anyway. Even if this is true—and I am not sure it is—it is an unintentional aftereffect that happens at the expense of building community. Others argue that in an age of school shootings, it’s important for parents to be able to reach their children at a moment’s notice. When we practice lockdown drills, like most other schools, our security team instructs students to sit quietly—to silence and put down their phones. School shootings are a growing and terrifying reality. At the same time, far more young people die by suicide each year than in school shootings.

While I understand the parental impulse to know you can communicate with your child instantly and constantly, protecting children’s mental health is far more urgent than keeping tabs on them. (In fact, developmentally appropriate freedom from parental oversight is vital for healthy adolescence—but that’s a topic for another day.) And giving them a respite from technology so that they can more deeply connect with themselves and with others is one crucial way to protect their mental health.

In a world in which information is readily available and AI is evolving at a stunning pace, schools must focus on teaching attention, navigating ambiguity, encouraging independent thinking, and nurturing communities. These essential tasks are hindered by phones, which fragment attention and weaken our capacity for genuine connection.

Our school already bans phones for pre-K through eighth graders, and starting this fall we will no longer allow phones in the high school. I expect that some of our students (and even some parents) will vigorously protest this change. And yet I believe that most will grow to embrace it, discovering that their experience of school takes on a new depth and vitality.

For too long, children all over the world have been guinea pigs in a dangerous experiment. The results are in. We need to take phones out of schools. Let’s reclaim our school spaces and ensure that our students learn not just from devices but from one another and the world around them. So much of the magic of childhood happens in unmediated community. We must not deprive our children of that gift.

The Atlantic · by Russell Shaw · August 4, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Get Over Yourself -- Everything We Do is Influence.

Justin Malzac

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Capital account liberalization is the precondition

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