Quotes of the Day:

“All of us have in our minds a cartoon image of an autocratic state. There is a bad man at the top. He controls the army and the police. The army and the police threaten the people with violence. There are evil collaborators, and maybe some brave dissidents. But in the twenty-first century, that cartoon bears little resemblance to reality. Nowadays, autocracies are run not by one bad guy but by sophisticated networks relying on kleptocratic financial structures, a complex of security services—military, paramilitary, police—and technological experts who provide surveillance, propaganda, and disinformation.”

– Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World by Anne Applebaum

"None of Ho Chi Minh's colleagues was as dedicated to the use of political struggle, psychological warfare, and diplomatic means as he was."

– William J. Duiker

“Today is a wonderful day, I have never seen this one before!” 

-Maya Angelou

1.  Submission to the Commission on the Status of Women (UN Women) containing information relating to violations of human rights affecting the status of women in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

2. Children 'born without limbs' as mystery disease sweeps North Korea

3. N.K. leader expresses gratitude for Putin's offer of help with rain damage recovery

4. Defense minister to issue apology over 'Silmido unit' for 1st time in 53 years

5. S. Korea, Poland to establish air force consultative body

6. China reclaims top spot of S. Korean products amid rising chip demand: data

7. Exports of kimchi hit record high in H1 amid rising popularity of Korean food

8. S. Korea's "Golden Week" in Olympics: A Tale of Bows, Guns, and Swords

9. Bringing Japan and South Korea together as U.S. security partners

10. Kim Jong Un Now has a Cyber Army of 8,400 Hackers, South Korean Intelligence Reportedly Said

11. Will North Korea accept external aid for flood disaster?

12. Germany Joins UN Command in South Korea To Signal ‘Our Strong Commitment to the Indo-Pacific Strategy’

13. Ukraine Will Freak: North Korean Armored Vehicles Now Being Used by Russia

14.  Addressing the hidden nuclear threat: North Korea’s role in Israel's security apparatus - opinion

15. What Would a Unified Korea Actually Look Like?

16. How Did South Korea Pull Off Its Economic Miracle?

1. Submission to the Commission on the Status of Women (UN Women) containing information relating to violations of human rights affecting the status of women in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

HRNK is a leading organization that brings attention to the tragic human rights situation in the north by documenting abuses and crimes against humanity and providing credible evidence to the UN and the US State Department.

Note the amount of information that is derived from the incredible research conducted by Robert Collins and his recent seminal report, "Slaves to the Bomb," which can be accessed here: https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/STTB_web.pdf.

As an aside this is why the ROK/US alliance together and both countries individually need a human rights upfront approach.

HRNK's Submission to the Commission on the Status of Women

Posted by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea  

https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2024/08/hrnks-submission-to-commission-on.html

Submission to the Commission on the Status of Women (UN Women) containing information relating to violations of human rights affecting the status of women in the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 1, 2024

Full credit for this submission goes to HRNK team members Diletta de Luca, Rick Herssevoort, Damian Reddy, Begüm Tiritoglu, SoEun Park, and Suha Choi. HRNK is grateful for their terrific contributions to our work and mission.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the worst human rights offenders in the world. Ten years ago, in February 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) found that the DPRK was responsible for ongoing crimes against humanity. The gravity, scale, and nature of the DPRK’s violations of human rights reveal a state that has no parallel in the contemporary world. The DPRK’s systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations are thoroughly documented, including its imposition of arbitrary detention, arbitrary death penalties, political prison camps, slave labor, violence and discrimination against women, the absolute monopoly of information, and total control of all organized social life under the hierarchical system of songbun. Under Kim Jong-un’s rule, the scale and scope of these violations have worsened and intensified. HRNK’s research activities provide evidence of the intensification of a crackdown on human rights in the DPRK. Moreover, the situation in the DPRK remains dire and has been exacerbated within the past four years by excessive restrictions imposed under the pretext of the COVID-19 pandemic. In her report of March 9, 2023 (A/HRC/52/65), the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Elizabeth Salmón, reiterated longstanding concerns of the international community, with particular attention to the chronic abuses and discriminatory conditions that are imposed upon women and girls.

Additionally, the international community has been increasingly recognizing the nexus between the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development and its widespread human rights abuses.[1] This growing attention stems from the recognition that the regime’s systematic repression and control over its population are essential mechanisms that enable the continued prioritization of nuclear weapons development over the welfare of its citizens. This connection was underscored in January 2013 by the then High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, who expressed concerns that the focus on nuclear and missile advancements was overshadowing severe human rights violations in the country.[2] The UN COI further highlighted the prioritization of the DPRK on military spending over humanitarian needs, exacerbating the human rights crisis.[3] Additionally, by abusing the human rights of its citizens, the DPRK is able to extract resources to fund its nuclear development program. One example includes the dispatch of North Korean workers abroad, a systematic practice tightly controlled by the DPRK which sends its citizens to work in various countries under conditions that violate international labor laws and human rights standards.[4] Through their exploitation, the DPRK manages to obtain fundamental resources to fund its nuclear weapons program. Consequently, addressing human rights abuses inside the country remains crucial for any effective strategy aimed at halting the nuclear weapons program of the DPRK. Sustainable denuclearization efforts must therefore include a focus on improving human rights within the country, as one is intrinsically tied to the perpetuation of the other. This submission focuses on the impacts of the DPRK’s nuclear program on the human rights and human security of North Korean women.

Gender-based violence in North Korea is influenced by the broader socio-political and economic landscape of the DPRK regime; the allocation of already scarce resources to the nuclear program, coupled with international sanctions, exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and heightens women’s vulnerability to gender-based violence. This diversion of resources leads to scarcity of essential goods and services, placing women, who are often responsible for securing food and resources for their families, in precarious situations such as exploitative labor or transactional sex.

Nuclear testing leads to severe environmental degradation affecting agricultural production where women are often primary workers, thereby impacting food security.

The nuclear development program generates significant negative externalities and health risks for the North Korean population. While it remains challenging to determine the exact impact of nuclear weapons development inside the country, some sources have been documenting and estimating their effect by analyzing different sources. It has been determined that hundreds of thousands of people residing near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site face risks from the leakage and spread of radioactive materials through water.[5] According to a human rights advocacy group based in Seoul, the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG),[6] the “radioactive materials could have spread in a radius of 25 miles around the site, where more than 1 million people live and rely on groundwater for many of their daily activities”.[7] This indicates that the sphere of influence may have even extended not just to North Korean residents, but to people in neighboring countries such as the Republic of Korea, China, and Japan. Moreover, Lee Shin-wha, ROK Ambassador-at-large for North Korean human rights, recognized the potential for radioactive leakage that has been affecting North Korean residents, noting that over 1,000 defectors had lived near nuclear test sites.[8] Additionally, information published by the ROK Ministry of Unification in 2017 revealed abnormalities in “9 out of 40 North Korean escapees from the areas near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site (22.5 percent) in 2017 and 2018”.

Additionally, a recent HRNK-published report – Slaves to the Bomb: the Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists – provides information on the neglect of nuclear safety and the radiation exposure and sickness among North Korean nuclear scientists, with a significant impact on women.[9] Radiation exposure at various nuclear sites in the DPRK has not only had significant general health impacts on the wide population but also disproportionately threatens the human security and human rights of North Korean women. Women working at the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex have faced severe reproductive health issues, as escapees have testified that they have been unable to conceive children. This points to severe reproductive health consequences due to radiation exposure, which fundamentally violates their rights to health, reproductive rights, and the right to life. Furthermore, the impact on women’s health is not limited to those directly working in such hazardous environments. Locals in Bungang, near Yongbyon, remain aware of radiation risks, including birth defects, and cases of bribery for the relocation of children in safer areas are common. This highlights the intergenerational health impacts on women who have been exposed to radiation indirectly through environmental contamination.

The severe health issues faced by women in these regions additionally extend beyond reproductive health. Chronic illnesses, cancers, and radiation-induced mental health problems further diminish their quality of life. At the Pyongsan Uranium Mine, the lack of adequate protection against radiation exposure has led to severe health consequences, including lung cancer among miners, which indirectly affects women who live in these communities and care for sick family members.[10] This scenario underscores the broader societal and familial burdens placed on women, exacerbating their vulnerabilities and limiting their opportunities for economic and social participation.

In Kilju County, near the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, women have been found to have significant levels of radiation exposure, leading to health issues such as hair loss, severe headaches, and joint pain. These health problems hinder their ability to perform daily activities, work, and care for their families, thus infringing upon their basic human rights and freedoms. Moreover, the DPRK’s attempts to restrict the movement of Kilju residents to Pyongyang after the nuclear tests suggest a deliberate effort to hide the health impacts, leaving these women without adequate medical care or the ability to seek justice and compensation for their suffering.[11]

The broader implications of radiation exposure for North Korean women include compromised health, reduced life expectancy, and significant psychological stress. The lack of transparency and accountability from the DPRK prevents these women from seeking justice and support, perpetuating a cycle of neglect and abuse. Their fundamental rights to health, security, and a safe environment are continuously violated, underscoring the need for urgent international attention and intervention. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for improving the health and well-being of North Korean women but also for ensuring that their rights are recognized and protected in the face of ongoing human rights abuses and their interrelation to the country’s nuclear program.

To enhance the status of women in the DPRK, especially regarding the severe impact of radiation exposure from nuclear activities, the international community should undertake a multi-faceted approach. Increasing diplomatic pressure on the DPRK remains essential, alongside advocating for human rights through global platforms such as the CSW and the HRC. Additionally, the strategic use of economic sanctions targeting specific entities within the DPRK that perpetuate gender-based discrimination and expose women to hazardous conditions can help dismantle the structures that enable the perpetration of these human rights abuses.

Ten years after the UN COI and following a post-COVID reset involving the dramatic worsening of the human rights situation in North Korea, the need for an updated investigation appears evident. Moreover, in the aftermath of a March 28, 2024 Russian Federation veto of a UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) tasked to monitor compliance with the UNSC sanctions regime on North Korea, it is significantly more difficult for UN Member States to receive updates on North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and its linkages to human rights and humanitarian issues, including the human rights and human security of North Korean women.

HRNK recommends that the UN General Assembly (UNGA) should consider commissioning an impartial and independent expert team on the DPRK to highlight both security and human rights issues, including linkages between the nuclear program and the human rights and human security of North Koreans, paying special attention to the health and human rights of women. The proposed expert team would report annually to UN Member States and assist the UN General Assembly and UNSC in executing their mandates. The expert team’s work would complement, without duplicating or overlapping, the work of the OHCHR’s North Korea mandate, which does not extend to covering linkages between human rights violations and the nuclear program.

HRNK is the leading non-partisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, based in Washington, D.C. Since our inception in 2001, we have sought to raise international awareness of the human rights situation in the DPRK through the publication of well-documented reports and outreach activities in support of the recommendations made in those publications. We have published sixty-six reports so far, investigating the DPRK’s vast system of unlawful imprisonment, the Kim regime’s policy of human rights denial, and vulnerable groups, especially women, children, and people in detention. HRNK received UN ECOSOC consultative status in April 2018. Ever since, we have been proactively representing civil society at the UN. By participating in the Universal Periodic Review and organizing online and in-person international conferences, seminars and meetings with Permanent Missions, UN agencies, and other offices in Geneva, New York City, Brussels, and Seoul, HRNK continues to disseminate the findings and recommendations put forth in our reports.

Thank you very much for the invitation to submit an advisory opinion. Should you be interested in a virtual meeting to further discuss the information provided, please feel free to contact me directly at executive.director@hrnk.org. I would greatly appreciate an opportunity to continue this conversation and share more details about our work and mission.

Thank you very much for your time and kind consideration.

[1] For instance, the UN Security Council meeting 15726 discussing the human rights situation in the DPRK.

[2] United Nations, 2013, “Top UN official calls for international inquiry into human rights abuses in DPR Korea,” https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/01/429762.

[3] United Nations General Assembly, 2014, Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/63, para 51.

[4] Greg Scarlatoiu, 2022, “North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia,” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.

[5] Kim Arin, 2023, “Potential radiation exposure to North Koreans near nuclear test site overlooked: report,” The Korea Herald, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230221000740. 

[6] Transitional Justice Working Group, 2023, “Mapping the Risk and Effect of Radioactive Contamination of Groundwater Sources From the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in North Korea,” https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea/.

[7] Thomas Meresca, 2023, February 21, “Report: North Korean nuclear tests pose radiation risk to region,” UPI, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2023/02/21/North-Korea-radiation-nuclear-test-Punggye-ri-TJWG/9491676975342/.

[8] Yuchan Kim, 2023, November 7, “Opinion – North Korea’s Nuclear Tests and Potential Human Rights Violations,” E-International Relations,  https://www.e-ir.info/2023/11/04/opinion-north-koreas-nuclear-tests-and-potential-human-rights-violations/.

[9] Robert Collins, 2024, “Slaves to the Bomb: the Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists,” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/STTB_web.pdf.

[10] Robert Collins, 2024, “Slaves to the Bomb: the Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists.”

[11] Robert Collins, 2024, “Slaves to the Bomb: the Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists.”

2. Children 'born without limbs' as mystery disease sweeps North Korea

A sensational headline but radiation poisoning is no mystery.

Children 'born without limbs' as mystery disease sweeps North Korea

Children are being born without anuses, toes, or hands after falling victim to mystery 'ghost disease' near new King Jong-un's nuke testing site, North Korean deserter claims

• Mrs Lee said her son died after contracting a mystery disease in North Korea 

By Michael Havis

Published: 09:28, 2 August 2024 | Updated: 09:44, 2 August 2024

Daily Mail · by Michael Havis · August 2, 2024

North Korean children are being born without anuses, toes, or hands, as a mysterious illness dubbed 'ghost disease' spreads near Kim Jong-un's nuke testing site, according to a North Korean defector.

Youngran Lee, who lived near the Punggye-ri test site before she escaped in 2015. said in a chilling first-hand testimony that a horrifying disease has swept the region, killing and deforming infant children with doctors powerless to diagnose or treat it.

Mrs Lee said: 'In Kilju County, civilians are suffering from diseases, not knowing why. In hospitals, doctors cannot diagnose it, and the patients are dying slowly with lingering illness.

'It is not too drastic to say that having a child without an anus, toes, or hands was normalised in Kilju. There are patients with various cancers in every other house.'

The defector shared rare insight into life inside the 'Hermit Kingdom', expressing concerns about living so close to a nuclear testing zone. She described her house shaking, furniture falling from the walls as the military tested its weapons.

Youngran Lee (pictured) gave rare insight into life near a North Korean testing site

She said her son (pictured) was one of the people affected by a mystery disease

A guard stands at the entrance of the north tunnel at the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, 2018

The purported demolition of the Punggye-ri nuclear testing site in 2018

Mrs Lee counts her only son among the victims of ghost disease.

She said that in North Korea, medication supplied by the UN is hoarded by senior government officials, and despite the promise of free healthcare, 'the shelves are empty in pharmacies'.

Read More

North Korea publicly executed six-months pregnant mother, carried out human experiments and forced women from 'list of dwarfs' to undergo hysterectomies, human rights report claims

So when her son developed a mild fever in October 2014, aged 27, she turned to black market medication, smuggled in from China.

But it failed to help and she took him to hospital.

She said: 'A tuberculosis doctor told us that my son had holes in his lungs, measuring as big as 1.5cm and 2.7cm.

'He also said he did not know why an increasing number of young adults were coming to the hospital.

'I could not understand why this had happened to my son, and felt so helpless.

'Furthermore, he had eight close friends, and they were all diagnosed with tuberculosis one by one from 2012, and died within four years.'

Mrs Lee spent her life-savings buying medications for her son, before fleeing to China in February 2015, hoping to find work to send more money home.

By August of that year, she'd arrived in South Korea, where she underwent mandatory training to prepare her for life in a free society.

She said: 'As soon as I was released, I contacted my son to tell him to go to Pyongyang Hospital.

'But the next day, he called back and said there had been official instructions to stop Kilju County tuberculosis and hepatitis patients from entering Pyongyang.

'The only reason given was that this was for Kim Jong-un's safety, and there was no proper explanation.'

She continued: 'For two years, I transferred money to my son through brokers, believing that he was getting adequate care.

'However, in May 2018, I lost my boy, my pride and joy.

'My son died without ever reaching the hospital to receive a proper diagnosis.'

Mrs Lee said she had lived near a nuclear testing site before its demolition in 2018.

She said: 'On the day the third nuclear test took place, a wall clock fell, and light bulbs shook. I thought it was an earthquake and ran outside.

'All my neighbours were out as well. Shortly after that, at midday, the main broadcasting system announced that the third nuclear test was successful.

'Then we realised that the military-controlled area in Punggye-ri was a test site.'

Locals danced in the street in celebration, but they would be among the first victim's of North Korea's nuclear programme.

The nuclear testing site was purportedly destroyed in 2018

Kim Jong Un meets soldiers during a visit to a western operational training base in North Korea

Kim Jong Un inspecting a major operational training base at an undisclosed location in March

Experts believe that radiation is the true cause of what's been called ghost disease.

Nuclear scientist Joohyun Moon of Dankook University, in South Korea, described how radiation from the underground blasts could reach local communities.

Read More

Up to 500,000 young women and children as young as 12 at risk of 'systematic rape', forced pregnancy and sexual slavery, on the Chinese border fleeing North Korea

He said: 'As shock waves travel, they break the layers of the earth or create cracks.

'After a while, a mixture of melted rock and radioactive material will cool down and solidify.

'Radioactive materials contained in this compound can infiltrate into gaps or cracks caused by the explosion and flow to the surface, soil or groundwater.

'If it rains near the test site, the rain can carry these radioactive materials into the groundwater.

'Groundwater is connected to rivers, streams and surface water, releasing these radioactive materials into the outside world.

'As it is part of natural circulation, it is very difficult to intervene and prevent it.'

Dr Moon said there were a number of ways for radioactive materials to then infiltrate the food chain.

People could drink the irradiated water or eat seafood from it, eat crops grown with the water, or consume milk or meat from cattle fed by contaminated grass.

The nuclear test site sits on the banks of the Changhung River, which itself feeds the Namdae River – the main water source for Kilju County.

'Every household in Kilju gets their water supply from there,' said Mrs Lee.

Dr Moon estimated over a million residents within a 40km radius of the test site could be affected.

He said: 'It is safe to say that the residents near the test site will be under the influence of radiation for about 200 years.

'The time period will increase if more nuclear tests are conducted in the same location.'

He added: 'If the situation continues without adequate protection, these people will have a higher chance of having cancer, leukaemia, chromosomal aberration etc. than people in other regions.'

Youngran still lives with the damage in South Korea.

The Korean People's Army conducts an artillery firing drill in March

She was one of five North Korean defectors from Kilju County tested for radiation in the South in 2016.

She said: 'The test showed that the exposure level was very high, and the white blood cells were very low.

'One of the group had an unbearable headache – they could not even lift their head, but in every test carried out in A&E, no cause was found.'

Her own situation is no better.

She continued: 'I feel aches everywhere and cannot walk very well due to pain in my legs, and I was hospitalised six times in a year because of headaches.

'The hospital could not find any reason behind it, but I cannot even open my eyes when I have a headache; I feel restless and suicidal.

'I know many people from Kilju who are experiencing the same symptoms as me.'

Daily Mail · by Michael Havis · August 2, 2024

3. N.K. leader expresses gratitude for Putin's offer of help with rain damage recovery

But the regime says that claims of humanitarian disaster is fake news by South Korea.

N.K. leader expresses gratitude for Putin's offer of help with rain damage recovery | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 4, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 4 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has expressed gratitude for Russian President Vladimir Putin's offer of assistance with rain damage recovery, saying that he will seek Russia's help when necessary, the North's official news agency said Sunday.

The previous day, Putin sent a message of sympathy to Kim regarding the recent serious damage caused by floods and rainfall in parts of North Korea, expressing his willingness to provide immediate humanitarian support for recovery, according the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

In response, Kim "expressed sincere thanks" to Putin and said he "could deeply feel the special emotion towards a genuine friend in the most difficult period."

North Korea plans to pursue the rehabilitation work according to the already-established plan as state measures were taken at the present stage to immediately repair the flood damage, Kim said.

"If aid is necessary in the course, he would ask for it to the truest friends in Moscow," the KCNA reported.

The exchange between Kim and Putin came as the North has yet to respond to South Korea's proposal of humanitarian aid for the flood damage, which was offered last Thursday.

The North's border city of Sinuiju and Uiju County in North Phyongan Province were recently pummeled by heavy rains. South Korean media outlets have reported that the number of those who died or went missing could exceed about 1,000.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 31, 2024, shows leader Kim Jong-un inspecting a North Korean region submerged due to the latest downpours. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 4, 2024

4. Defense minister to issue apology over 'Silmido unit' for 1st time in 53 years

Little known dark history. Certainly terrible mistakes were made but no one should forget the reason why this unit was established.

Excerpts:

The Silmido unit, also known as Unit 684, was named after the island off the west coast where it was secretly based. It was established in 1968 by the South Korean government following North Korea's failed attempt to attack the presidential office in Seoul that year.

Silmido commandos underwent intense training with the goal of assassinating Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader at the time, but their existence soon became useless for Seoul amid the rising mood for reconciliation between the two Koreas.

Defense minister to issue apology over 'Silmido unit' for 1st time in 53 years | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · August 4, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 4 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense minister plans to issue an apology over the country's past secret program around training commandos for North Korean infiltration during the Cold War era, considered one of the darkest chapters in the South's military history, according to officials Sunday.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik plans to issue a letter of apology for the so-called "Silmido unit" program during an excavation ceremony set to be held between September and October for the yet-recovered remains of four unit members who were executed and secretly buried in 1972.

The ceremony will take place at a cemetery in Goyang, northwest of Seoul, where the remains are presumed to be buried.

The Silmido unit, also known as Unit 684, was named after the island off the west coast where it was secretly based. It was established in 1968 by the South Korean government following North Korea's failed attempt to attack the presidential office in Seoul that year.

Silmido commandos underwent intense training with the goal of assassinating Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader at the time, but their existence soon became useless for Seoul amid the rising mood for reconciliation between the two Koreas.

The then Park Chung-hee government ordered the elimination of the Silmido unit in 1971, but its commandos escaped and headed to the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae. Confronted with the army in Seoul, most of the commandos blew themselves up with hand grenades, and the surviving four members were executed the following year.

The existence of the anti-communist unit was denied by the government until its story became a huge hit with the movie "Silmido" in 2004. Compensation suits were filed and some were settled in favor of the victims' families.

In 2022, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended an investigation into the burial sites and the excavation of the remains of the former members, as well as an apology to the victims.

Guards carrying a portrait and the remains of the deceased secret commandos trained to infiltrate North Korea during the Cold War era leave a funeral hall in Goyang, northwest of Seoul, after their joint funeral in this file photo taken Aug. 23, 2017. (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · August 4, 2024

5. S. Korea, Poland to establish air force consultative body

The ROK is a global pivotal state and a partner in the arsenal of democracy.

S. Korea, Poland to establish air force consultative body | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 4, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 4 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Poland have agreed to establish a consultative body between their air forces to strengthen bilateral military cooperation following the European country's adoption of Korean fighter jets, sources said Sunday.

The air forces of South Korea and Poland recently reached the agreement and are currently discussing the specifics of the establishment, including the timing of the launch, the military sources said.

Once established, the body will serve as a venue for discussing cooperation on various military issues, including strategies, tactics and the defense industry.

In recent years, Poland has emerged as one of the largest buyers of South Korea-manufactured defense goods, purchasing FA-50 fighter jets, K9 self-propelled howitzers and K2 battle tanks in 2022.

Through the envisioned body, the air forces of the two countries are expected to share operational know-how regarding the FA-50 fighter jet and consider a pilot exchange program.

It is also likely that the two sides will discuss the potential export of the advanced KF-21 Boramae multirole fighters to Poland, which South Korea has recently begun mass-producing.

This image, provided by Korea Aerospace Industries, shows FA-50GF fighter jets at a base in Poland. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

This image, provided by Korea Aerospace Industries, shows FA-50GF fighter jets during the first test flight in Poland on Aug. 15, 2023, marking the country's Armed Forces Day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 4, 2024

6. China reclaims top spot of S. Korean products amid rising chip demand: data

Excerpts:

As a result of this substantial increase in July, China has reclaimed its position as the top buyer of South Korean goods based on cumulative data from January to July.

During this period, shipments to China totaled $74.8 billion, surpassing the $74.5 billion worth of exports to the United States.

China had long been the largest purchaser of South Korean products before the United States took over this position in the second quarter of last year.

The shift back to China is largely attributed to a significant rise in South Korean semiconductor exports.

China reclaims top spot of S. Korean products amid rising chip demand: data | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · August 4, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 4 (Yonhap) -- China has once again become the leading destination for South Korean products in the first seven months of this year, driven by increasing demand for semiconductors, data showed Sunday.

Exports to China surged 14.9 percent year-on-year to $11.4 billion in July, marking the highest monthly total in nearly two years since October 2022, according to data from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and the Korea International Trade Association.

As a result of this substantial increase in July, China has reclaimed its position as the top buyer of South Korean goods based on cumulative data from January to July.

During this period, shipments to China totaled $74.8 billion, surpassing the $74.5 billion worth of exports to the United States.

China had long been the largest purchaser of South Korean products before the United States took over this position in the second quarter of last year.

The shift back to China is largely attributed to a significant rise in South Korean semiconductor exports.

In the first 25 days of July, semiconductor exports to China soared by 25.9 percent on-year, outpacing the overall increase of 10.4 percent in South Korea's total exports to China during the same period.

This file photo shows a container yard in South Korea's southeastern port city of Busan on Jan. 1, 2024. (Yonhap)

brk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · August 4, 2024

7. Exports of kimchi hit record high in H1 amid rising popularity of Korean food

Exports of kimchi hit record high in H1 amid rising popularity of Korean food | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · August 4, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 4 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's exports of kimchi hit a fresh record high in the first half of this year, driven by the growing global popularity of Korean cuisine, particularly in North America and Europe, data showed Sunday.

Outbound shipments of kimchi, a traditional Korean side dish typically made from fermented cabbage, reached 23,900 tons during the first six months of the year, up 4.8 percent from a year earlier, according to the data compiled by the Korea Customs Service and the Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corp.

The half yearly figure has been on a steady rise over the past 10 years, up from 11,500 tons in 2015 and 11,900 tons in 2016 to 20,300 tons in 2020 and 22,200 tons in 2022.

In terms of value, kimchi exports came to US$83.8 million for the first half, marking the second highest following $86.7 billion in 2021.

The increase in kimchi exports is attributed to rising demand from North America and Europe.

Exports of kimchi to the United States jumped 20 percent on-year to 6,600 tons in the six-month period through June, while those to Canada soared 34 percent on-year to 900 tons.

Overseas sales of Korean kimchi in the Netherlands also vaulted 34 percent on-year to 1,300 tons in the first half.

By value, kimchi exports to the U.S. reached a record $24.1 million, up 18.9 percent from a year earlier, followed by the Netherlands with $5.6 million, Britain with $4.2 million and Canada with $3.8 million.

Japan, the biggest buyer of South Korean kimchi, bought 9,600 tons of Korean kimchi, or $28.3 million, over the past six months, down 11.9 percent from a year ago.

Meanwhile, South Korea's imports of kimchi came to $83.4 million in the first half, down from $78.8 million a year ago.

Packaged kimchi products are displayed at a supermarket in Seoul, in this file photo taken Jan. 22, 2024. (Yonhap)

brk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · August 4, 2024

8. S. Korea's "Golden Week" in Olympics: A Tale of Bows, Guns, and Swords

A cool headline. We have lawyers, guns, and money (Warren Zevon) and the ROK has bows, guns, and swords.

S. Korea's "Golden Week" in Olympics: A Tale of Bows, Guns, and Swords

https://www.chosun.com/english/kpop-culture-en/2024/08/04/UODOIGWXTZBR7PKXBCQN5ESXVU/

By Jang Min-seok (Paris),

Lee Jung-soo

Published 2024.08.04. 11:13

Updated 2024.08.04. 17:18

Yang Ji-in of the shooting team is celebrating after securing the gold medal in the women's 25m pistol final at the 2024 Paris Olympics, held at the Châteauroux National Shooting Center in France on Aug. 3, 2024. / Joint Olympic Photo Coverage Team

South Korea is jokingly said to be ‘at war’ in the Paris Olympics. There’s a lighthearted joke that South Korean athletes can’t win gold medals without ‘weapons.’ These ‘weapons’ refer to bows, guns, and swords (fencing).

On July. 3 (local time), Yang Ji-in won the gold medal in the women’s 25m pistol shooting final after a shoot-off at the Châteauroux Shooting Centre in France. This was Korea’s 8th gold medal of the competition and the 3rd in shooting. Later, Lim Si-hyeon won the 9th gold medal in the women’s individual archery event, kicking off the “Golden Weekend.”

As of the 8th day of the competition, S. Korea has steadily collected gold medals in shooting, archery, and fencing. They have won 4 in archery, 3 in shooting, and 2 in fencing.

Out of a total of 21 medals of the country, 13 have been won with bows, guns, and swords, making up nearly two-thirds of the total. The rest came from judo (2 silver, 3 bronze), badminton (1 silver), swimming (1 bronze), and table tennis (1 bronze).

The first gold medal for Korea was won with a “sword.”

On July. 27, Oh Sang-uk won the men’s individual sabre fencing event, achieving a “Grand Slam” (winning at the World Championships, Asian Games, Asian Championships, and Olympics).

Lim Si-hyeon, who won the gold medal, and Nam Soo-hyun, who won the silver medal in the individual archery event at the 2024 Paris Olympics, are greeting the spectators on Aug. 3, 2024. /Newsis

The next day saw victories with a “gun” and a “bow.” On July. 28, Oh Ye-jin won an unexpected gold medal in the women’s 10m air pistol, and the women’s archery team, consisting of Lim Si-hyeon, Jeon Hun-young, and Nam Su-hyun, achieved their 10th consecutive win in the team event.

On July. 30, Ban Hyo-jin became the youngest gold medalist in Korea’s Summer Olympic history by winning the women’s 10m air rifle shooting event.

That same day, Kim Woo-jin, Lee Woo-seok, and Kim Je-deok led the men’s archery team to their 3rd consecutive team event win.

The following day, July. 31, Oh Sang-uk, Gu Bon-gil, Park Sang-won, and Do Gyeong-dong defeated Hungary in the men’s team sabre fencing final, securing Korea’s 3rd consecutive Olympic victory in this event.

The 7th gold medal also came from archery. On Aug. 2, Kim Woo-jin and Lim Si-hyeon won the mixed team event, each becoming double gold medalists.

The next day, Yang Ji-in secured Korea’s 8th gold medal in the women’s 25m pistol shooting final. On the same day, Lim Si-hyeon claimed 1st place in the women’s individual archery event, earning Korea’s 9th gold medal of the Olympics and achieving her third gold in archery.

9. Bringing Japan and South Korea together as U.S. security partners

Excerpts:

Perhaps the best way to solidify the current three-way cooperation in the security sphere is for Washington to press for closer ties between Seoul and Tokyo in areas other than the military. This would call for a true whole-of-government effort, what the Biden administration has termed “integrated deterrence.”

Yet as the National Defense Strategy Commission has pointed out, “recent administrations of both political parties have not pursued a comprehensive approach to national security.” In particular, the commission report notes that “there is no coordinated U.S. economic agenda for the Indo-Pacific to accompany the military strategy.” The report adds, only by having “an interagency planning process that complements military operation plans with diplomatic, economic, and communications tools in conjunction with allies and partners,” can integrated deterrence truly succeed.

Surely these observations offer a prescription for both overcoming the mutual suspicion that both populations, especially in South Korean, still harbor. Only when that suspicion is fully overcome can the security partnership among the three allies endure, regardless of whatever future governmental changes in any or all of them might bring.

Bringing Japan and South Korea together as U.S. security partners

by Dov S. Zakheim, opinion contributor - 08/02/24 8:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4805648-bringing-japan-and-south-korea-together-as-u-s-security-partners/

Earlier this week, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and his ministerial counterparts, Kiharu Minoru of Japan and Shin Won-Sik of South Korea, jointly announced a new agreement titled, in rather wordy fashion, “Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework.”

The agreement represents yet another major step in realizing Washington’s long-standing goal to secure a closer security relationship between America’s two powerful East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea.

The announcement focuses on the threat from North Korea, and in that regard includes a reference to the ministers’ “grave concern over the increasing military and economic cooperation commitment between the Russian Federation and [North Korea].”

On the other hand, the release makes no mention of China and only indirectly alludes to the threat it poses. All the three ministers were prepared to publicize was that “they shared assessments of recent maritime and air military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China Sea…they strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the waters of the Indo-Pacific…[and they] stressed the importance of fully respecting international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight.”

The reluctance of the three parties explicitly to call out China’s behavior contrasts sharply with the language that appears in the report of the congressionally mandated Commission on the National Defense Strategy. That report appeared one day after the agreement was announced. Although it “strongly praises U.S. diplomatic and defense efforts to strengthen partnerships in Asia,” it states that these efforts are “driven in response to Chinese provocations.” 

That the ministers did not go as far as the commission report reflects an ongoing divergence of views among them regarding relations with Beijing. Washington has taken a tough stance against China, one that has bipartisan domestic support. Although Tokyo and Seoul likewise have come to regard China as a major security threat, China (including Hong Kong) is the leading export market for both Japan and South Korea. Not surprisingly, they are somewhat reticent about following Washington’s lead in explicitly singling out Beijing as the major threat they both know it to be.

Despite their military cooperation, and despite Tokyo’s formal apology for the treatment of South Korean “comfort women,” the two nations have yet to resolve their differences over the history of the 35 years (1910-1945) when South Korea was under Japanese control. Indeed, the history of Japanese domination over Korea extends at least as far back as 1876, when Tokyo forced Korea to sign the Treaty of Kanghwa, which opened Korean ports to Japanese ships and, more importantly, forced Korea to pull out of its tributary relationship with China. 

It is therefore not surprising that while polls taken in late 2023 show the Japanese public to have a more favorable view of South Korea, South Korean public attitudes have not changed, despite the government’s efforts to improve relations with Japan. Moreover, not all Koreans see China as a security threat. 

It is also worth recalling that in December 2015, Seoul and Tokyo reached an understanding that was meant to settle the comfort women issue “finally and irreversibly.” Japan apologized and committed to pay some $8 million to victims. Four years later, Seoul effectively nullified the agreement, in part due to public demands that Japanese companies had exploited the women, and that they, not just the government, must provide compensation to the victims. Indeed, in November 2023 the High Court in Seoul rejected Japanese claims of sovereign immunity and upheld the right of the women to sue the Japanese government; in January, the court ordered Japanese companies to compensate the women. 

Given ongoing public hostility toward Japan — there are those who still consider Japan a more dangerous enemy than North Korea — and the politically-driven fluctuations in relations with both the U.S. and Japan depending on which Korean party is in power, there is no guarantee that the new security agreement would survive a future change of government in Seoul.

Perhaps the best way to solidify the current three-way cooperation in the security sphere is for Washington to press for closer ties between Seoul and Tokyo in areas other than the military. This would call for a true whole-of-government effort, what the Biden administration has termed “integrated deterrence.”

Yet as the National Defense Strategy Commission has pointed out, “recent administrations of both political parties have not pursued a comprehensive approach to national security.” In particular, the commission report notes that “there is no coordinated U.S. economic agenda for the Indo-Pacific to accompany the military strategy.” The report adds, only by having “an interagency planning process that complements military operation plans with diplomatic, economic, and communications tools in conjunction with allies and partners,” can integrated deterrence truly succeed.

Surely these observations offer a prescription for both overcoming the mutual suspicion that both populations, especially in South Korean, still harbor. Only when that suspicion is fully overcome can the security partnership among the three allies endure, regardless of whatever future governmental changes in any or all of them might bring.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.

10. Kim Jong Un Now has a Cyber Army of 8,400 Hackers, South Korean Intelligence Reportedly Said

The all purpose sword is the most critical regime capability and may even be superior to its nuclear capability. It is certainly more practical because it can be employed ona. daily basis across the spectrum of conflict.

We need to be more than vigilant. We need to go on the offensive aggressively against the Kim family regime and all the malign actors in the cyber domain.

Excerpts:

As North Korea continues to invest heavily in its cyber capabilities, the international community must remain vigilant. Developing robust cybersecurity defenses, sharing intelligence, and imposing stricter sanctions on the regime are essential steps in mitigating this growing threat.

Kim Jong Un Now has a Cyber Army of 8,400 Hackers, South Korean Intelligence Reportedly Said

Kim is also allegedly collaborating with his northern Russian friend to further develop their joint malware arsenal

thecyberexpress.com · by Mihir Bagwe · July 31, 2024

North Korea’s cyber capabilities are expanding at an alarming rate, posing a significant threat to global security. Local media in South Korea citing a recent intelligence report, confirmed that the reclusive nation has bolstered its cyber workforce by 20% in just two years, bringing the total number of hackers to a staggering 8,400. This number stood at 6,800 personnel, as per the Defense Whitepaper 2022.

This rapid growth, fueled by economic desperation and Kim Jong Un’s strategic vision, has transformed cyber warfare into a cornerstone of the regime’s ambitions.

North Korea’s ‘Hacker University’

The Reconnaissance General Bureau, the regime’s intelligence arm, is at the heart of this cyber expansion. Operating under the direct supervision of Kim Jong Un, the bureau has established a “hacker university” to cultivate a new generation of cyber talent. By relaxing strict social hierarchies, North Korea has opened up opportunities for individuals from all walks of life to join the program, creating a deep pool of potential recruits.

Jong Un reportedly instructed to not consider background while training hackers and select only talented individuals. In North Korea, social status, such as residence and occupation, is usually strictly determined based on bloodline, but he declared that exceptions would be made for only those who join the hacking training program. Pyongyang’s leadership is on the lookout of young math and computer talents to lead them down the path of cybercrime.

The regime’s motivation is clear: financial gain. With international sanctions crippling the North Korean economy, cybercrime has emerged as a critical revenue stream. Hacking groups such as Lazarus and Kimsuky, linked to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, have become notorious for their audacious attacks, targeting everything from cryptocurrency exchanges to government agencies. The proceeds from these cyberheists are funneled directly into the regime’s nuclear and missile programs.

A senior intelligence source referring to the mount of money that hacking can bring, assessed that “the North Korean leadership has high expectations [from these hackers].”

Developing Malware with Russia?

The burgeoning partnership between North Korea and Russia is another cause of serious concerns. The recent signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, which includes provisions for cooperation in information and communications technology security, suggests a formal framework for cyber collaboration. The intelligence authorities believe that the two have already laid the foundation for joint research and mutual education on hacking technology through this treaty.

A government source said, “It appears that North Korea and Russia are jointly developing or sharing core malware used in hacking.” This alliance could lead to a dangerous exchange of expertise and resources, potentially elevating the threat level posed by both nations.

Experts warn that North Korea’s cyber tactics are becoming increasingly sophisticated and aggressive. The regime is no longer content with targeting specific, high-value targets. Instead, it is adopting a broader, more indiscriminate approach, casting a wider net in search of vulnerable systems. This shift in strategy, coupled with the rapid growth of its cyber workforce, makes North Korea a formidable and unpredictable adversary in the digital realm.

As North Korea continues to invest heavily in its cyber capabilities, the international community must remain vigilant. Developing robust cybersecurity defenses, sharing intelligence, and imposing stricter sanctions on the regime are essential steps in mitigating this growing threat.

Related

thecyberexpress.com · by Mihir Bagwe · July 31, 2024

11. Will North Korea accept external aid for flood disaster?

Perhaps only from Putin.

Note the photo on the link. Some on social media have pointed out that Kim in the small rubber boat requires three Koreans from the north to sit on the other side to counter balance his weight.

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/08/103_379922.html

Will North Korea accept external aid for flood disaster?

The Korea Times · August 4, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, visits a flood-affected area in North Pyongan Province, in this photo released Wednesday by the North's state media Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap

Pyongyang open to Moscow’s aid proposal, likely to reject Seoul’s offer: experts

By Lee Hyo-jin

North Korea has not officially accepted any external aid — not even offers from its closest ally, Russia — as it grapples with the fallout from a massive flood in its northwestern region. This approach aligns with its leader Kim Jong-un's apparent strategy to emphasize self-reliance and project an image that "everything is under control," according to observers, Sunday.

Nevertheless, Pyongyang has kept the door open to Moscow's aid proposal, while de facto rejecting Seoul's offer, the experts noted, reflecting North Korea's preference for recovery assistance from strategic allies.

Recent heavy rains have inundated North Korea, flooding over 4,000 homes and isolating approximately 5,000 residents in North Pyongan Province. Thousands were rescued by airlift and other methods last Friday, under a rescue mission overseen personally by the North Korea leader, according to the North's state media Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The KCNA reported, Sunday, that Kim received a message of sympathy from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who expressed willingness to provide immediate humanitarian support for recovery efforts.

In response, Kim "expressed sincere thanks" to Putin and acknowledged feeling a "deep sense of gratitude towards a genuine friend in the most difficult period."

Kim also stated that "rehabilitation work would proceed according to the already-established plan," with state measures currently focused on repairing the flood damage. He added that if aid became necessary, he would request it from "the truest friends in Moscow," the KCNA reported.

"Although Pyongyang did not immediately accept Moscow's aid offer, it did not reject it either. It appears that North Korea is more inclined to accept assistance from Russia rather than other countries or international organizations," said Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies.

Yang explained that in the event of a natural disaster, North Korea typically emphasizes self-reliance before seeking external help. It usually turns to allies before approaching international organizations, with South Korea and the U.S. considered as a last resort — though this scenario remains unlikely given the current tensions between the two Koreas.

The KCNA's Sunday edition did not address South Korea's recent proposal to provide relief supplies for the flood damage.

Instead, it included a statement from North Korea's foreign ministry condemning a first-ever tabletop exercise integrating Seoul's advanced conventional forces with Washington's nuclear capabilities. This exercise, dubbed Iron Mace 24, took place last week at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un poses with troops during his visit to a helicopter unit dispatched to rescue isolated residents in flood-hit areas, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency, Saturday. Yonhap

Lim Eul-chul, an expert on North Korea at Kyungnam University, anticipated that Seoul's aid proposal will likely be ignored.

On Thursday, the South Korean Red Cross proposed humanitarian assistance for the flood damage and offered to discuss details through the Red Cross societies. This marked Seoul's first offer of flood relief to Pyongyang since 2012.

This was the second such proposal under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which has maintained a tough stance on Pyongyang. The first proposal, made on May 16, 2022, shortly after Yoon's inauguration, offered food and medical supplies to help North Korea cope with the COVID-19 pandemic. The North did not respond to that offer.

"Given that the North has been stepping up its antagonism toward South Korea, describing it as an enemy state and using this rhetoric to unite its people, it makes little sense for Kim's leadership to accept Seoul's aid proposal. Plus, accepting external aid at this stage would undermine his message that everything is under control," Lim said.

In recent days, Pyongyang's main newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, has highlighted "collectivism" among North Koreans in the rescue efforts and distribution of relief materials to the flood-hit regions. On Saturday, the newspaper reported that Kim made a congratulatory visit to the helicopter unit of the Air Force of the Korean People’s Army, which had conducted the air rescue operations.

During a speech at the helicopter unit, Kim described South Korea as an "unchangeable enemy," just two days after Seoul's aid offer.

"The enemy’s rubbish media are spreading a false rumor that the number of casualties in our flood-hit areas is expected to be over 1,000 or 1,500 and that several helicopters are believed to have fallen on the rescue mission. Clear is the sinister purpose of those in Seoul obsessed about such a smear campaign," the North Korean leader was quoted as saying by the Rodong Sinmun.

Buildings are submerged in flood waters in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on July 29. Yonhap

Meanwhile, China, North Korea’s traditional ally, has yet to extend an official offer of aid.

The latest flooding along the Amnok River and areas near the Chinese border may have been worsened due to China's elevated river embankments, observers noted, which indicates a lack of timely flood prevention cooperation between North Korea and China.

"Whether China swiftly offers assistance to North Korea, and Pyongyang's subsequent reaction, will serve as a test of the current state of relations between the two nations," Lim said.

Relations between North Korea and China have noticeably strained since the Kim-Putin summit in June, with some observers pointing to Beijing’s discomfort on being perceived as part of a three-way bloc with the increasingly isolated Pyongyang and Moscow.

The Korea Times · August 4, 2024

12. Germany Joins UN Command in South Korea To Signal ‘Our Strong Commitment to the Indo-Pacific Strategy’

A strong statement from Germany.

Germany Joins UN Command in South Korea To Signal ‘Our Strong Commitment to the Indo-Pacific Strategy’

‘Our two nations are linked by the experience of a nation divided by an iron curtain,’ says Germany’s defense minister.

https://www.nysun.com/article/germany-joins-un-command-in-south-korea-to-signal-our-strong-commitment-to-the-indo-pacific-strategy

DONALD KIRK

Friday, August 2, 2024

17:26:36 pm

America has a potential new ally in the Indo-Pacific. In an elaborate ceremony at Camp Humphreys, the huge American base south of Seoul, the German defense minister, Boris Pistorius, implanted the German flag among those of the 17 other nations in the United Nations Command in Korea.

Germany has no troops in South Korea. Its joining the UN Command is being characterized by Germany as “evidence of our strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific strategy” in which Washington is tightening defenses throughout the region.

Mr. Pistorius placed Germany’s role in the context of the American-led alliance network against the People’s Republic of China as well as North Korea and Russia. Germany’s membership signifies “our accession to the international order,” he said, implying that Germany stands firmly with America’s historic allies, South Korea and Japan, plus Aukus, formed three years ago of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Germany owes its membership in the UN Command, more than 70 years after Germany sent a medical unit to the southeastern port of Busan near the end of the Korean War, in part to the hardening of South Korean policy toward North Korea under the South’s conservative president, Yoon Seok-yul.

Mr. Yoon’s liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in, had blocked Germany for fear of upsetting North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un, with whom he fantasized making a treaty in place of the truce that ended the Korean War on July 27, 1953.

The fact that Germany shares with South Korea the legacy of a divided nation that only reunited after the fall of Communist rule over East Germany in 1989 clearly played into South Korea’s decision to approve Germany as a formal ally.

“Our two nations are linked by the experience of a nation divided by an iron curtain,” said Mr. Pistorius, promising “We will share responsibility for defending your borders with North Korea.”

nysun.com

13. Ukraine Will Freak: North Korean Armored Vehicles Now Being Used by Russia

The ultimate "proxy war?" South and north Korean military equipment face off using Ukrainian and Russian soldiers.

If that were to happen when South Korean military equipment is shown to be so far superior it could be useful for influence operations.

Ukraine Will Freak: North Korean Armored Vehicles Now Being Used by Russia

The prospect of South Korean and North Korean military platforms facing off in Europe is becoming increasingly likely as South Korea's K2 Black Panther tanks have been adopted by NATO member Poland, and North Korean-made weapons are now appearing in Ukraine.

The National Interest · by Peter Suciu · August 2, 2024

Summary and Key Points: The prospect of South Korean and North Korean military platforms facing off in Europe is becoming increasingly likely as South Korea's K2 Black Panther tanks have been adopted by NATO member Poland, and North Korean-made weapons are now appearing in Ukraine.

-North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia with the Bulsae-4 M-2018, a self-propelled long-range anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) mobile launcher.

-This vehicle, based on the chassis of the M-2010 APC, was recently spotted near Kharkiv.

North Korean Weapons in Ukraine: Pyongyang’s Bulsae-4 ATGM Debuts on the Battlefield

Even if a "Second Korean War" doesn't break out on the Asian peninsula, it is increasingly likely that the latest military platforms developed by the two respective Korean nations could face off – but in Europe. In recent years, South Korea has emerged as a military hardware exporter, developing everything from small arms to the K2 Black Panther main battle tank (MBT), which has already been adopted by NATO member Poland.

North Korea's arms industry isn't quite as robust as that of its southern neighbor, yet, it is now reported to be supplying weapons to Russia. That fact serves to highlight both the strides Pyongyang has made with its domestic military capabilities and also the Kremlin's desperation.

For decades, North Korea relied on Soviet and Chinese military hardware, with some of it dating back to just after the Korean War. Now, it is North Korea that is aiding Moscow as Russia continues to be bogged down in its ongong war in Ukraine.

It was just this week that Ukrainian forces reported spotting the North Korean-made Bulsae-4 M-2018 in the Kharkiv region. The self-propelled long-range anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) mobile launcher is noted for employing the chassis of the M-2010 2+4 all-wheeled drive armored personnel carrier (APC), a North Korean variant of the Soviet-designed BTR-80. The rotating launcher is equipped with eight missile containers, and is reported to be able to engage targets at distances beyond 10 km (six miles) – while its maximum range could be upwards of 25 km (15 miles).

"(The Bulsae-4) is powered by a gutsy diesel engine which, combined with its unusual wheel layout, gives it relatively good cross country and rough terrain capability. It is said to have a maximum road speed of approximately 90 kph (55 mph) and an operational range of around 500 kilometers (310 miles)," explained Steve Brown, a retired British Army officer writing for the Kyiv Post.

Serial production is believed to have begun in 2018, but the total number built to date is unknown.

North Korean Platform in Ukraine

The presence of a Bulsae-4 near Kharkiv was noted by open-source military watchers on social media on Tuesday. It is unclear when, or even how many of the vehicles have been provided to Moscow. While it is unlikely to be a significant game changer, it could certainly help the Kremlin's war effort – as there have been reports Russia is scraping the bottom of the barrel of its Cold War-era tanks and other vehicles.

"If North Korea really is providing armored vehicles to Russia, it might help solve one of Russia's biggest battlefield problems as its wider war on Ukraine grinds toward its 29th month: a shortage of purpose-made combat vehicles," wrote David Axe for Forbes, adding, "A Bulsae-4 performs the same mission that Ukraine and Russia's dismounted anti-tank missile teams perform­defeating enemy tanks­but does it with greater speed, mobility and protection."

It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that Pyongyang provided just a handful for testing in battlefield conditions.

"This would enable Pyongyang to obtain data on any necessary improvements and for Russian forces to assess its potential on the Ukrainian battlefield," Brown added.

It will be only a matter of time to see whether the Bulsae-4 performs any better than other APCs in Ukraine.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: [email protected].

Main image is of a North Korean tank. All images are Creative Commons.

The National Interest · by Peter Suciu · August 2, 2024

14. Addressing the hidden nuclear threat: North Korea’s role in Israel's security apparatus - opinion

Scholars (the author below) and the media are finally looking at north Korea's role in the Middle East (taking it somewhat seriously). They should be paying attention to Dr. Bruce Bechtol's research which has long demonstrated the north Korean role.

But is there the potential for an Israel - north Korea conflict?

I think it is quite a reach to talk about an Israeli strike against Pyongyang. Is it absurd.....?

Conclusion:

Jerusalem ought to take immediate note of the Roman philosopher Tertullian’s ironic but still-galvanizing declaration: “Credo quia absurdum,” (“I believe because it is absurd.”) In this context, the declaration fits perfectly. For Israel to argue against certain existential security threats because they first appear illogical or preposterous would reveal a lethal error in strategic reasoning. In its rapidly escalating struggle against Iran and terrorist proxies, Israel could ultimately have to face a nuclear North Korea as Iran’s state proxy. While the outcome of such a confrontation might be “absurd,” it could still prove injurious beyond any historical measure.

Addressing the hidden nuclear threat: North Korea’s role in Israel's security apparatus - opinion

North Korea's nuclear ambitions pose urgent threats globally, but their implications for Israel are often overlooked. Let's find out what they entail.

By LOUIS RENÉ BERES

AUGUST 3, 2024 20:15

Updated: AUGUST 4, 2024 06:52

Jerusalem Post

North Korea represents the world’s most time-urgent nuclear threat, especially for the United States and some of America’s Asian allies. Assorted dangers of a North Korea-related nuclear war also lie latent in the Middle East. These perils are generally ignored or overlooked, and pertain most ominously to Israel.

What are the relevant scenarios and specific issues? Though Israel has no direct adversarial connections to North Korea, this already-nuclear Asian state does have variously tangible ties to Syria and remains a close ally of not-yet-nuclear Iran.

Jihadist Iran is also the primary patron of anti-Israel terrorism, both Sunni (Hamas) and Shi’ite (Hezbollah, Houthis). This means, inter alia, that Israel’s ongoing struggles against Iran-supported terrorism could soon bring the Jewish state into direct and protracted conflict with the Islamic Republic.

If that should happen, both Israel and Iran would strive for “escalation dominance,” an unstable and unpredictable competition in which a still pre-nuclear Iran would struggle for supremacy at evident strategic disadvantage. Ironically, such an Iranian disadvantage could worsen Israel’s security situation.

Iranian centrifuges are seen on display during a meeting between Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and nuclear scientists and personnel of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), in Tehran, Iran June 11, 2023. (credit: VIA REUTERS)

There are multiple and bewildering details. Depending on Iran’s intra-war willingness to accept existential risks, Jerusalem could sometime find itself in “active belligerent status” with Pyongyang. In turn, that unprecedented and worrisome status (a sui generis status in the rarefied language of logic) could take the form of direct military engagement with Iran’s designated nuclear proxy; or with North Korea’s nuclear and/or non-nuclear assets previously placed in the decision-making ambit of Tehran.

Two wicked kids trying to play with fire

Whatever North Korea’s policy disposition on nuclear surrogacy for Iran, prospects for a widening conflict would be “high.” To be sure, because all pertinent scenarios would lack historical precedent, there could exist no science-based method of assigning numerical or statistical probabilities.

At the same time, in axiomatic principles of logic and mathematics, there would still remain certain reliable ways of conflict estimation. Here, prima facie, the outbreak of a direct nuclear belligerency between Israel and North Korea could involve the United States, Russia, and/or China; and the precise forms of any such superpower involvement would be indeterminable.

For Israel, the threats from Iran/North Korea are existential and palpable. What should Israel do now? Not much could be gained via direct diplomacy with Iran or North Korea, but there could still be more-or-less calculable benefits in gaining supportive policy guarantees from Washington.

In the final analysis, even such seemingly persuasive guarantees could fail altogether; Jerusalem would then have to plan urgently for a uniquely complex set of decisional options. In these scenarios, even decipherable success in keeping Iran non-nuclear could provide Israel no assurances of national safety; and presumptively, complete Israeli success would be sorely problematic.

Further clarifications will be needed. By definition, an accidental nuclear war between Israel and North Korea would be unintentional, but an unintentional nuclear war need not be the result of an accident. To wit, an unintentional nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang could represent the outcome of decision-making miscalculation or irrationality by one or both adversaries. Such a distressing understanding is realistic and potentially probable.

What is being done about all this in Israel? Though unverifiable, the likelihood is that neither Jerusalem nor Pyongyang are likely paying sufficient attention to the intersecting risks of an unintentional nuclear war. In theory, at least, each side would expectedly assume the other side’s decision-making rationality. After all, if there were no such mutual assumption, it could make no sense for one or the other competitor to seek “escalation dominance” during an actual crisis or war.

There is more. At some point, Israel’s survival could come to depend on viable combinations of ballistic missile defense and defensive first strikes. However, settling upon such untested combinations would necessarily lack critical input from any material or quantifiable historical evidence and would present at the highest imaginable levels of existential risk. In a worst-case scenario, the offensive military threat to Israel would warrant some form of situational preemption. At that late stage, however, there would remain no “ordinary” circumstances wherein a defensive strike against a nuclear North Korea could still be presumed rational.

There are additional nuances. For the moment, it seems likely that Kim Jong Un would value his own life and the lives of his family above any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. In all corresponding scenarios, Kim could be presumed rational and would remain subject to Israel/US nuclear deterrence. Still, it could be important for a negotiating Israeli leadership team to distinguish between authentic instances of enemy irrationality and ones of feigned or pretended irrationality on the part of the enemy. Also worth noting is that actual negotiations or bargaining with North Korea would likely be led by the United States and/or actual diplomacy would be conducted with Iran.

On a cyber knife edge

There is more to assess concerning an inadvertent nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang. Such a dizzying conflict could take place not only as the result of misunderstandings or miscalculations between fully rational national leaders (Israeli, North Korean, Iranian, and/or American), but as the unintended consequence (single or synergistic) of mechanical, electrical, and computer malfunctions (hacking). These last interventions could include substantially perplexing intrusions of cyber mercenaries.

Always, regarding Iranian nuclear surrogate North Korea, Israel’s strategic policies should emphasize maintenance of stable intra-war nuclear thresholds. Among other things, this would mean a refined focus on the expected rationality or irrationality of key decision-makers in North Korea; the cumulative requirements of escalation dominance; the always-important distinctions between intentional, unintentional, and accidental nuclear war; and Israel’s animating or core conflict with Iran.

This last focus should serve as a reminder that Israel’s actual war would be against Iran, and that North Korea would be operating against Israel solely as an Iranian nuclear surrogate. Accordingly, Israel’s best path to nuclear war avoidance/limitation with North Korea should always involve prior strategic understandings with – or military actions against – Iran.

Although the above-examined connections may, at first, seem implausible or “absurd” (What could possibly cause rational Israeli decision-makers to wage war against an already-nuclear North Korea?), they are plausibly credible.

Jerusalem ought to take immediate note of the Roman philosopher Tertullian’s ironic but still-galvanizing declaration: “Credo quia absurdum,” (“I believe because it is absurd.”) In this context, the declaration fits perfectly. For Israel to argue against certain existential security threats because they first appear illogical or preposterous would reveal a lethal error in strategic reasoning. In its rapidly escalating struggle against Iran and terrorist proxies, Israel could ultimately have to face a nuclear North Korea as Iran’s state proxy. While the outcome of such a confrontation might be “absurd,” it could still prove injurious beyond any historical measure.

The writer is an emeritus professor of international law at Purdue University and the author of many books and scholarly articles on international law, nuclear strategy, nuclear war, and terrorism. His 12th and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; second edition, 2018).

Jerusalem Post

​15. What Would a Unified Korea Actually Look Like?

Sigh.... simplistic analysis. I take strong exception to theories of a "federation." We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime to make informed and realistic analysis about the potential for unification. Just as denuclearization is impossible as long as the current regime is in power, peaceful unification cannot happen until there is internal transformation inside north Korea.

 I debated sending this but I am just pleased to see any talk of unification in the media.

What Would a Unified Korea Actually Look Like?

247wallst.com · by Austin Smith · August 3, 2024

Investing

24/7 Wall St

Austin Smith

Published: August 3, 2024 9:06 am

Key Points:

• A unified Korea is messy, but both want it
• The military dictatorship and export democracy would likely be managed through a loose federation
• Also: The Next Nvidia could soar soon

Summary:

Austin Smith and Michael Muir discuss the prospects of a unified Korea, considering the ongoing Korean War, which is technically only in a state of armistice. They explore the contrasting regimes of North Korea’s military dictatorship and South Korea’s export-focused democracy. North Korea envisions unification through a loose federation similar to China’s Special Administrative Regions, while South Korea favors a gradual process of reconciliation and reform. The timeline for unification is uncertain, but both Koreas ultimately aim for it. Despite the challenges, the rapid progress seen in South Korea’s adoption of democracy suggests that unification, while potentially decades away, could occur relatively quickly on the historical scale.

Transcript:

So you had mentioned earlier that the war with Korea is still ongoing.

It’s only in a state of armistice.

But we now see this incredible divergence.

We’ve got a military largely dictatorship with North Korea and an export-focused democracy in South Korea.

What would a unification actually look like?

If the Korean War is still technically ongoing, presumably it is still North Korea’s plan to unify, what would that actually look like, practically speaking?

Is it even possible?

Well, yeah, that’s a really interesting question because we tend, like in the present day, we don’t really look too far ahead.

We’re just thinking kind of next year, next quarter.

But I think unification is the ultimate goal for both North and South Korea.

They just have rather different ideas of how it should take place.

North Korea had this idea of a kind of a loose federation.

I think the nearest real-world equivalent would be something like the Special Administrative Regions of China, sort of one country, two systems.

It’s not exactly like that, but that would be the nearest equivalent.

So it would be this kind of loose federation where they both largely keep their ideologies and ways of life, but they’re under one kind of unified government, which is going to over time become more integrated.

Now, it’s not necessarily by well, at least outwardly, North Korea doesn’t suggest this unification will not be done by force, will be done peacefully.

But of course, they would say that.

But I imagine if they had the military advantage, they would pursue it and try to do so forcefully.

South Korea’s is.

They are also looking towards unification, but this is more of a gradual step-by-step process that begins with reconciliation and reform in the North.

The potential of a Korean Commonwealth I’ve seen in some literature.

I think the nearest equivalent would be something a little bit like the European Union, kind of an economic union.

of two Koreas with a very gradual process of full integration.

I think if South Korea led the unification effort, there would be a lot of friction in building up North Korea to South Korea’s level, so to speak.

So that would be really interesting.

In terms of timeline, it’s impossible to say.

Of course, a lot can happen, but I do think there is still, I think unification is the ultimate answer to the Korean question.

It’s just going to be a matter of time.

And, you know, we should remind ourselves that, you know, if this conflict is still less than 80 years old and South Korea themselves only adopted democracy in the 80s, you know, while we say it might take a long time on the spectrum of countries, that’s actually an incredible amount of progress and change that has occurred relatively quickly.

So, you know, a unification wall might take decades.

That still, you know, could be a blink of the eye.

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247wallst.com · by Austin Smith · August 3, 2024

16. How Did South Korea Pull Off Its Economic Miracle?

This author (Austin Smith) is all over the map on Korea: from the "miracle on the Han" to unification. But I bet he does not know about the "miracle on the Taedong"

How Did South Korea Pull Off Its Economic Miracle?

247wallst.com · by Austin Smith · August 3, 2024

Investing

24/7 Wall St

Austin Smith

Published: August 3, 2024 8:54 am

Key Points:

• Korea’s strategic pivot to exports saved the country
• Tech companies like LG and Samsung have made the population wealthy
• The next biggest technology is AI, and there are three stocks that will benefit

Summary:

Austin Smith and Michael Muir discuss the contrasting economic outcomes of North and South Korea since the Korean War armistice in 1953. Initially, North Korea recovered quickly and adopted a centralized economy with five-year plans, but this approach faltered by the late 1960s. In contrast, South Korea focused on an export-driven economy supported by state-backed chaebols, leading to rapid economic growth. Despite being a military dictatorship in the 1960s, South Korea’s strategic pivot allowed it to become an economic powerhouse, culminating in its eventual transition to democracy in the late 1980s. The discussion highlights how South Korea’s outward-looking policies and economic reforms contributed to its transformation into one of the world’s leading economies.

Transcript:

Lot has happened since then, but let’s now shift from military to economy.

So since that armistice, you mentioned first that North Korea was originally considered the more powerful militarily of the two.

And that appears to be the case with the three-day capture of Seoul.

But since then, we’ve had incredibly divergent economic outcomes.

We’ve not necessarily seen a military conflict, although it does seem Korea now has that advantage.

But what has happened to cause that incredible outcome of economies?

Sure. I mean, we should point out that the Korean War is still ongoing by the letter of law.

It was an armistice, not a peace deal.

And that was actually, I don’t want to get too into this, but the Republic of Korea’s president, Syngman Rhee, really did not want a settled peace deal.

He wanted to unify Korea.

So he actually sabotaged peace talks in 1953.

But fortunately for him, North Korea and the United States and basically everybody else was heavily involved, wanted an armistice.

And Rhee was able to extract a lot of concessions from the United States, which provided the building blocks, including a security pact for South Korea as it is today.

So after the war, 1953, North Korea actually recovers reasonably quickly from this conflict.

Now they’re doing that kind of classic five-year plan, highly centralized economy.

And initially, it works pretty well, but kind of sputters out around about the late 1960s.

South Korea goes in a very different direction.

So North Korea, we sort of view as very insular, inward-looking, very isolated.

South Korea is the polar opposite.

But we shouldn’t label South Korea in the 1960s as a liberal democracy because it’s anything but.

It’s actually a military dictatorship caused by the 1961 coup.

But South Korea pivots heavily to an export-focused economy.

And to compete on the global stage, they put a lot of state resources and backing into the so-called chaebol, which is the sort of family-owned mega corporations, many of which are household names today.

So at the cost of labor conditions and civil liberties, South Korea becomes an export powerhouse towards the end of the 1960s.

So that’s when that divergence between North and South Korea really begins to take off, is kind of the late 1960s, early 1970s.

And just to provide a little bit more context, you had talked about the chaebols, you know, just when you said that some of our household names, we mean literally some of the largest and most impressive companies on Earth today, like Samsung, LG, I believe Hyundai and SK Group all came out of that chaebol experiment. Am I correct?

That’s absolutely right. Yeah, they account for, even today, a staggering percentage of the Korean economy, which is something I think we’re going to cover in a bit more detail a little bit later.

But yeah, it just allows a resource-poor… I mean, South Korea’s transformation in the 1960s is remarkable.

It goes from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the richest in a single generation by pivoting heavily towards an export-focused economy.

And South Korea eventually embraces democracy.

It’s actually a little bit like Taiwan in that sense.

This occurs towards the end of the 1980s.

There’s a lot of pressure internally to democratize, which is also probably one of the reasons why North Korea is so hesitant to allow the free flow of information because they saw what happened south of the 38th parallel.

247wallst.com · by Austin Smith · August 3, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com