Quotes of the Day:

"Truth exists, only lies are invented." 

– Georges Braque

"There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind."

– Bonaparte

"In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon."

– Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. Conflict in the Gray Zone: A Prevailing Geopolitical Dynamic Through 2030 

2. Updated IC Gray Zone Lexicon: Key Terms and Definitions

3. Secretary Austin Signs Memo Withdrawing From the Pre-Trial Agreements in the 9/11 Military Commission Cases

4. Defense Secretary Revokes Plea Deal for Accused Sept. 11 Plotters

5. jaw jaw or war war – reflections on the recent prison exchange

6. Kissinger vs. Blinken: A Synthetic Foreign Policy Debate

7. Russia’s top spymaster falsely claims Kremlin does not interfere in other countries’ affairs

8. Chinese communist, military writings reveal plans for strategic influence operations through TikTok

9. Community engagement can mitigate disinformation. Here’s how a Dallas editor is leading the way.

10. Airstrikes, Artificial Intelligence, and Sabotage Drive Russian Psyops

11. Russia vs Ukraine: the biggest war of the fake news era

12. Annexation of Taiwan: A Defeat From Which the US and Its Allies Could Not Retreat

13. South China Sea row high on Quad agenda with ‘message’ aimed at Beijing

14. How Disney’s Deadpool Danced Around China’s Censors—Cocaine, F-Bombs and All

15. ‘We lost sight of him’: Radio traffic shows failed search for Trump rally shooter

16. Tech Failings Plagued Secret Service at Trump Rally

17. Autocrats Wield Hostage-Taking as Potent Weapon Against West

18. Army’s long-range tiltrotor aircraft moves to next development phase

19. Why Ukraine is obsessed with the U.S. sitcom 'Friends'

1. Conflict in the Gray Zone: A Prevailing Geopolitical Dynamic Through 2030  

It is good to see the acknowledgment of the Gray Zone as the prevailing dynamic by the IC.

The one page PDF can be downloaded at this link:  https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Unclassified-Conflict-In-The-Gray-Zone-July2024.pdf

Conflict in the Gray Zone: A Prevailing Geopolitical Dynamic Through 2030 

July 2024          NIE 2024-16734-A

 Key Takeaways                                                                                                                                      

Through 2030, great power competition and international relations generally will increasingly feature an array of hostile “gray zone” activities as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia seek to challenge the United States and gain advantage over other countries through deliberate campaigns, while also trying to avoid direct war. The IC defines the gray zone as a realm of international relations between peaceful interstate diplomacy, economic activity, and people-to-people contact on one end of the spectrum, and direct armed conflict on the other. Gray zone campaigns are likely to increase and diversify because of more enabling technologies, the erosion or absence of accompanying norms, challenges with attribution, and perceptions of their advantages.

•    This greater use and diversity of gray zone activities will create both concrete and intangible threats to the United States and its partners, US commitments, and the international order. The IC assesses that raising costs for gray zone activities, improving US and partner resilience, and adapting the rules of accepted state behavior are most likely to counter these threats.

•    The IC has moderate confidence in most of the judgments in this NIE because of the volume and consistency of information on the goals and calculations of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, the benefits they perceive from gray zone campaigns, and their intent to continue such activities.

Key Judgment 1: The geopolitical landscape through 2030 is likely to feature more frequent, diverse, and damaging acts of coercion and subversion—particularly by China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea—below what constitutes armed conflict but outside the bounds of historically legitimate statecraft, a realm of international relations known as the gray zone. Gray zone campaigns are steadily becoming more invasive and tailored as geopolitical opponents of the United States employ well-honed tactics and exploit new domains within which attribution is more difficult and for which norms of behavior and accountability have not been sufficiently established or enforced.

Key Judgment 2: The threat perceptions of US challengers, their desire to alter international dynamics in their favor, and their preference to avoid a war with the United States will motivate them to expand their gray zone campaigns during the rest of the decade. Although most current gray zone campaigns are unilateral, a convergence of worldviews and deepening ties among US geopolitical opponents are creating a foundation for more direct collaboration.

Key Judgment 3: The growing prevalence, diversity, and intensity of gray zone campaigns and activities will pose increasing threats to the US Homeland, US resources and commitments, and the international order.

Key Judgment 4: The weakness of established norms and accountability mechanisms for gray zone activities, as well as uncertainty about US actions, provide an opening for the United States, its partners, and non-state actors to deter and mitigate the threat from gray zone campaigns by raising their perceived costs, improving US and partner defenses, and strengthening international rules governing these domains.

2. Updated IC Gray Zone Lexicon: Key Terms and Definitions

Will this become the baseline (authoritative, definitive) terminology for the Gray Zone? Will these terms be adopted and accepted by the military and the other agencies of government?

Maybe instead of COngress authorizing the John H. McCain Center for the Irregular Warfare Security Studies it will instead authorize a Center for Interagency Gray Zone Strategy and Policy.

Note the reference to George Kennan and his influential policy memorandum on political warfare and the most important assessment - "Old Concept, New Name."

I was personally called out by a Pentagon official this week at a conference who mentioned my affinity for Political Warfare. He went on to say that this term will never be used or accepted in the Pentagon or the interagency.

But after reading the Gray Zone NIE and the Lexicon I feel slightly vindicated for my unwavering stance on the importance of political warfare. My long standing views are here:

Political warfare is the action of the whole of government in the Gray Zone of strategic competition. Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare.  

Key point: We should stop the proliferation of terminology (which I think causes intellectual paralysis) and adopt Irregular Warfare as the military contribution to Political Warfare. Political warfare is how we should describe the competition space between peace and war (Gray Zone) and is the defining element in Strategic Competition (SC). While state on state warfare is the most dangerous threat or course of action in SC and why we must absolutely invest in deterrence and defense, political warfare is the most likely threat course of action.  

My view: I am a great believer in the contributions that unconventional warfare can make to US national security when employed appropriately. I believe irregular warfare is the military contribution (the whole of the military and not SOF alone) to political warfare. Political warfare (George Kennan and Paul Smith) is the way I think we should characterize strategic competition in the gray zone below the threshold of war. And I believe that SOF's contribution to irregular warfare is through the application of its special warfare capabilities, primarily and broadly best described as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, psychological operations, and civil affairs operations. And yes, counterterrorism against violent extremist organizations is still a major component as well. (as is crisis response). And I would add that some elements of unconventional warfare (working through, by, and with indigenous forces to create dilemmas for our adversaries), psychological operations, civil affairs, special reconnaissance, and direct action will play important supporting roles to the joint force in large scale combat operations. Irregular warfare will always be an element of large scale combat operations in the rear area of friends and enemies, on the periphery, and in adjacent and offset locations that affect the parties to the conflict, and in post conflict operations.

The 11 page PDF can be accessed here: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Unclassified-Updated-IC-Gray-Zone-Lexicon-July2024.pdf

Updated IC Gray Zone Lexicon: Key Terms and Definitions

Key Takeaways

Scope Note: This standalone graphic responds to the requirement in Public Law 117-103 that “The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall develop a lexicon of common terms (and corresponding definitions for such terms) for concepts associated with gray zone activities.” This lexicon provides a common reference guide of country-agnostic terms and is intended to standardize terminology used by IC components, particularly analytic components. Terms contained in this lexicon do not supplant US authorities, policies, operations, or other actions, and they do not supersede any US legal definitions, for which individual agencies should consult their respective Offices of General Counsel.

The IC defines the gray zone as a realm of international relations between peaceful interstate diplomacy, economic activity, and people-to-people contact on one end of the spectrum and armed conflict on the other, and gray zone activities as coercive or subversive actions to achieve objectives at the expense of others in contravention or in the absence of international norms. We assess that gray zone activities and campaigns are likely to increase in the coming years and become a dominant feature of great power competition and international relations more broadly because of eroding or nonexistent norms; emerging, evolving, and expanding domains; and perceptions of their comparative advantages.

• The IC previously has not agreed upon definitions for the gray zone or for all associated concepts. To develop this lexicon, the NIC reviewed a range of academic research and all-source intelligence, consulted with leading external researchers, and led structured analytic exercises with IC experts to establish a baseline and scope.
• This lexicon is intended to add precision to IC analysis and provide a common foundation for debate, analysis, and messaging. It prioritizes clarity, consistency, and universality but does not cover all terms associated with states’ and non-state actors’ international behavior, including technical terms or those commonly understood. Unless there are substantive divergences, this lexicon complements other US Government lexicons. The inclusion of a term does not indicate that the IC necessarily classifies it as a gray zone activity, a determination dependent on circumstances; some terms are included for context.

During the past 15 years, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia increasingly have sought to achieve strategic objectives by concerted action against others in areas considered the “gray zone”—a term popularized in the 2010s by Western researchers. The IC assesses that in the coming years, these gray zone campaigns and activities are likely to increase and become a dominant feature of great power competition and international dynamics generally because of the combination of eroding or non-existent international norms; emerging, evolving, and expanding international domains; and authoritarian leaders’ perception of their comparative advantages and fewer risks. In particular, recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated, particularly for revisionist foreign leaders, that gray zone campaigns can be both a complement and a viable alternative to armed conflict and diplomacy. The IC assesses that some US partners and non-state actors also are likely to employ gray zone activities. In some instances, states will employ such activities outside of discernable campaigns, further complicating both analysis and policy responses. Because of the covert nature of many gray zone activities, intelligence collection and analysis provide unique insights into actors’ intent and enable attribution.

•   Old Concept, New Name. The use of coercive or subversive instruments of power—beyond diplomacy and in lieu of war—to achieve objectives has been a feature of statecraft since Chinese and Greek theorists described it in the fifth century BCE. During the Cold War, US diplomat and strategist George Kennan predicted that long-term competition would be characterized by “an extension of armed conflict by other means,” which he described as an enduring norm of international relations. He used “political warfare” to describe “the employment of all means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”

•   Routine Behavior. Kennan’s influential policy memorandum on political warfare focused on institutionalizing overt and covert US efforts to contain and weaken the USSR. Current PRC, Iranian, North Korean and Russian leaders view some of their actions now described as “gray zone” activities as routine and legitimate tools of statecraft, and publicly and privately ascribe similar behavior to the United States. PRC and Russian strategists, whose translated theories were interpreted by Western researchers in the 2010s as reflecting official gray zone doctrines, focused instead on perceived Western strategies and advocated potential counters. PRC and Russian leaders, in particular, continue to believe that Washington is threatening their states by supporting proxies, conducting provocative military and information operations, and using economic coercion, and they often consider their actions to be mimicking or countering US gray zone activities.

•   Broad but Differentiated. Theorists and practitioners have used the term “gray zone” to describe diverse activities ranging from Iran’s targeting of US officials for assassination, to Russia’s election disinformation, and China’s militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. However, we consider the “gray zone” distinct from related terms such as hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, and strategic competition.

3. Secretary Austin Signs Memo Withdrawing From the Pre-Trial Agreements in the 9/11 Military Commission Cases

The short memo can be accessed here: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Aug/02/2003517325/-1/-1/1/Secretary-of-Defense-Memorandum-for-Convening-Authority-for-Military-Commissions.PDF

Secretary Austin Signs Memo Withdrawing From the Pre-Trial Agreements in the 9/11 Military Commission Cases

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3860710/secretary-austin-signs-memo-withdrawing-from-the-pre-trial-agreements-in-the-91/

Aug. 2, 2024 |   

Today, Secretary Austin signed a memo reserving for himself the specific authority to enter into pre-trial agreements with the accused in the 9/11 military commission cases. In addition, as the superior convening authority, the Secretary has also withdrawn from the pre-trial agreements that were signed in those cases. The memo can be found here.

4. Defense Secretary Revokes Plea Deal for Accused Sept. 11 Plotters

The easy wrong was to probably just let this ride. The question is, will the government lose the case in court due to the treatment of the defendants early on in the GWOT? Or does the government have sufficient evidence to convict without using the confessions from their time of "enhanced interrogation?"  

We have to stand for the rule of law regardless of the outcome. The number one priority must be to stand up for American judicial principles and American values that include the rule of law versus our natural desire for vengeance and retribution for their actions on 9-11.

Defense Secretary Revokes Plea Deal for Accused Sept. 11 Plotters

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III assumed direct oversight of the case and effectively put the death penalty back on the table.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/02/us/politics/911-plotters-plea-deal.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

Because of the stakes involved, the “responsibility for such a decision should rest with me,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said in an order.Credit...Pete Marovich for The New York Times

By Carol Rosenberg

Reporting from Guantánamo Bay, Cuba

Aug. 2, 2024

Updated 8:41 p.m. ET

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III on Friday overruled the overseer of the war court at Guantánamo Bay and revoked a plea agreement reached earlier this week with the accused mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and two alleged accomplices.

The Pentagon announced the decision with the release of a memorandum relieving the senior official at the Defense Department responsible for military commissions of her oversight of the capital case against Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and his alleged accomplices for the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York City, at the Pentagon and in a Pennsylvania field.

The overseer, retired Brig. Gen. Susan K. Escallier, signed a pretrial agreement on Wednesday with Mr. Mohammed, Walid bin Attash and Mustafa al-Hawsawi that exchanged guilty pleas for sentences of at most life in prison. In taking away the authority, Mr. Austin assumed direct oversight of the case and canceled the agreement, effectively reinstating it as a death-penalty case. He left Ms. Escallier in the role of oversight of Guantánamo’s other cases.

Because of the stakes involved, the “responsibility for such a decision should rest with me,” Mr. Austin said in an order released Friday night by the Pentagon.

“Effective immediately, in the exercise of my authority, I hereby withdraw from the three pretrial agreements that you signed on July 31, 2024.”

Ms. Escallier’s approval of the agreement that was reached between prosecutors and the defendants over two years of negotiations had appeared to resolve the case, which had been mired in pretrial hearings since 2012.

Mr. Austin was traveling abroad and returned to the United States later that day.

By then, prosecutors in the case had alerted the decision to family members of those killed in the attacks, some of whom expressed disappointment and anger that a death sentence was no longer possible. So did Republican leaders.

Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the longtime Republican leader, called the plea agreement “a revolting abdication of the government’s responsibility to defend America and provide justice.”

Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas called the deal “disgraceful and an insult to the victims of the attacks,” and introduced legislation intended to nullify it.

But Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois and the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, hailed the plea agreement as a “small measure of justice and finality to the victims and their loved ones.”

A senior Pentagon official said that the decision was the secretary’s alone, and that the White House had no involvement. The official said Mr. Austin had never supported a plea deal and wanted the military commission trials to proceed.

Mr. Austin’s action was met with disbelief by lawyers at Guantánamo Bay who were preparing for a hearing, possibly as soon as Wednesday, for the judge in the case, Col. Matthew N. McCall, to question Mr. Mohammed about whether he understood and voluntarily agreed with the plea.

“If the secretary of defense issued such an order, I am respectfully and profoundly disappointed that after all of these years the government still has not learned the lessons of this case, and the mischief that results from disregarding due process and fair play,” said Gary D. Sowards, Mr. Mohammed’s lead defense counsel.

Carol Rosenberg reports on the wartime prison and court at Guantánamo Bay. She has been covering the topic since the first detainees were brought to the U.S. base in 2002. More about Carol Rosenberg

5. jaw jaw or war war – reflections on the recent prison exchange

jaw jaw or war war

reflections on the recent prison exchange

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/jaw-jaw-or-war-war?utm

Cynthia Watson

Aug 02, 2024

2

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U.S. citizens tend to advocate for military prowess as the answer to everything because we have had more power back to World War II. Hard power, as we like to call it, certainly led to victory in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters in 1945. Military power still provides a nuclear umbrella over dozens of allies as it has for 75 years, preventing a Soviet, then Russian attack in western Europe. It was crucial to forcing Saddam Hussein to reverse his seizure of Kuwait forty-five years later. Using military power was essential to forcing the North Koreans back north of the 38th Parallel after their 1950 aggression. Sustained military presence is deterring the PRC from forcibly reuniting Taiwan with the mainland. No question of its role in any of those cases.

However, if military power is a pivotal instrument in any nation’s kit, so is the ability to persuade or cajole others, also known as diplomacy. Our instruments are not either diplomacy or military power because both are vital and reinforce each other.

The photograph above the fold of today’s Wall Street Journal, showing three people Vlad the Impaler exchanged for his thugs and murderers incarcerated abroad, are evidence of the imperative diplomacy provides in concert with several instruments of national power.

We in this country don’t tend to like diplomacy sometimes, for several reasons. First, the public often buys the tired idea that Foreign Service Officers are all white men in pinstriped suits who shop at Barney’s in New York or were born on Beacon Hill in Boston. Sure, men, particularly Ivy Leaguers, dominated the field for generations as service academy graduates overwhelmingly received flag officer ranks instead of their fellow officers from civilian universities.

With the advent of law suits forcing reform in the late 1970s and early 80s, women make up about forty percent of the Foreign Service Officers, that extraordinarily select cadre who represent us as diplomats. They serve at all levels. Attempts to expand minority representation was a major consideration for incoming personnel for most of the past thirty years, although less so under the tenure of Secretary Tillerson who was hostile to his own department’s professionals altogether anecdotally. A more representative face of this country to the world gives us advantages as the world itself changes by seeing us at times.

Second, critics charge diplomats spend much of their careers representing us overseas so they likely become prone to “clientitis”: privileging the interests of the country where they are stationed over that of the United States. Some of the people who have read this column over the past 670 days since I started writing have disdained diplomats as “weak” or “useless”.

Associated with this is the unspoken assumption that diplomats are the cause of “foreign aid”, another instrument Americans see as “throwing money down a rat hole” as the late aid-hating North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms used to say.

In my years teaching these professionals along side military officers, I can name a single “soft” or unrealistic diplomat. FSOs are far more “realist”—meaning they count raw power as the coin of the realm—than the overwhelming majority of military officers. The difference is that FSOs recognize other incentives to change the mind of a peer or an adversary may be much less costly, if not as immediate, but sometimes we have to go in big with hard power in the eyes of diplomats when other things fail. But theFSO often believes issues can tolerate, painful as it may be, more time to work them out. But I have not heard FSO opt for an option which won’t work at all (though it happens, I am sure). FSOs knew that ousting Saddam by military invasion in 2003 meant a whole additional level of effort that we were not ready for—and the military officers generally paid the price for their own naïvete about changing a society.

Third, Americans tend to privilege action over the value of talking because the use raw power will surely get our way. Discussing an issue ad nauseum supposedly leaves us weaker and more vulnerable.

Certainly talking with no end in sight is a recipe for problems at times but diplomats are exquisitely sensitive to feasibilities and build on minuscule steps to build momentum in negotiations. FSOs recognize the power of iterative work rather than “one and done” but challenges are not all amendable to a single approach. Plus, the negotiator requires some empathy for the position the other side confronts. Who wants to be weak all of the time as the government ruling on behalf of its people? It’s not a successful position so harsh pressure often creates wedges rather than concessions needed to accomplish something like a prisoner exchange.

But diplomacy and those conducting it are different today in many ways from the stereotypes. The Diplomatic Corps, known as the Foreign Service, has roughly 8,000 members broken into general jobs in political, public diplomacy, economic, or consular “cones”. Beyond that number, embassies almost invariably have other functions requiring specific tasks such as foreign commercial operations but those technically are not FSOs. The Armed Forces, on the other hand, have 1.29 million active duty personnel, just under 750,000 in the reserves/National Guard, and three quarters of a million civilians supporting efforts, a far cry from the tiny FSO corps.

Diplomats discuss. That is their jobs, listening at least as much as they talk. Listening is actually an active verb requiring a shrew ability to hear with incredible precision an interlocutor‘s positions while passing it with our policy goals. The positions also mandate knowledge of the other side’s perspectives, history, aspirations, language, and overall context because misconstruing any of those will often trash hopes of progress on negotiations.

Not all diplomats, however, are FSOs. Heads of state function in that capacity as well but their role is somewhat different. Of course the commitments any FSO makes on behalf of the United States must include an iron clad ability to deliver or that individual’s and nation’s credibility craters. This is why the Foreign Service does not have too many rogue actors signing us up for something we can’t do. Occasionally political ambassadors, those named to a post as reward for a financial contribution or campaign, get into trouble when they act on their own but not often.

The value heads of state bring to negotiations is a Rolodex of links to world leaders. It is here that a president can play an extraordinary role as seems to have occurred yesterday with Joe Biden, the subject of so much hyperbole about his age, cognitive skills, and energy. While he is now out of the presidential fray for the last time as he enters his final five months in the Oval Office, Biden’s half century in foreign relations came into its own.

Knowing who to approach in a problem is far from obvious at times. Biden obviously is on a first name basis with hundreds of senior foreign leaders. He is generally, I would imagine, respectful of their time, their positions, their experiences (with Vlad in this case), their equities, and the leverage we might have to incentivize them working to achieve our goals. Repeat: getting the other guy to do our job makes negotiations go far more effectively.

And it is that little piece at the end of the last sentence so central to diplomacy but antithetical to our national increased sense of fractiousness and entitlement over the past few years. We succeed most effectively and expeditiously when we induce others to do what we want (or need) as their first priority. Inducing sounds a bit more positive as it means offering a positive idea worth pursuing.

Biden, like George H.W. Bush four decades ago, built a foreign policy career seeing who, why, what, where, and when matter in foreign policy. He applied that knowledge and experience to seeing what would incentivize others to provide Vlad with something to satisfy him in exchange for the four Americans. It required patience, energy, readdressing questions from multiple sources several times, and adjusting our conversations with our interlocutors—pleasant and annoying ones—to achieve the goal.

Sometimes those choices are extraordinarily distasteful, such as releasing an assassin in this deal. The Kremlin is now admitting some of the exchanged prisoners were their spies who had operated in the west, indeed disappointing. But the ultimate objective—for us, releasing multiple people held unjustly for up to six years—outweighed the distasteful. The Chinese have a wonderful phrase for this: eating bitter fruit. We may have ingested bitter fruit but believed the outcome merited the sourness. That shot of Ella Milman swinging in her son’s arms yesterday attested to her willingness to eat bitter fruit to reach bigger joy. The families in Israel still awaiting their hostage family members are willing to do the same.

The real world in 2024, however, behooves us to make these choices and to pursue these negotiations. Ironically, Biden was amid his most intense period of self-reappraisal and hosting a major NATO summit as he met with family members, his German and other European counterparts, and our won national security team while tooling and retooling the talks to reach the finish line.

As I have said, governing (or diplomacy) is not for the faint of heart or those who don’t do detail. It’s not a handwave but it’s a messy, iterative, rigourous, sometimes mind numbing process of weighing options, consequences, objectives, costs, and everything else as is strategy; it must feel boring at times as it works its way through the wants on all sides of the talks. Perhaps Jimmy Carter was too involved in details but a successful negotiator must confidently understand the context, then incentivize the change in someone else’s behavior that will get that country to release our hostages in this case.

Americans too often fall back on threats, intimidation, and hard power as if there were no alternatives. Occasionally there are not alternatives but much of the time it’s knowing how to build a diplomatic package with sufficiency to satisfy the players that matter. It’s always the case that studying the case to understand the ins, outs, and actors is the predicate to doing anything rather than blustering our way with proclamations of what we don’t accept because we are the United States.

Taking that time may appear weakness to some but it’s actual a manifestation of the strength of our national reputation, our aspirations, our commitments and our role in the world. Thank goodness Biden understood that in this case; I hope successors for decades learn from this experience. His record is not perfect but no president’s ever was or will be. Whether you like him or abhor him, we will miss his experience and studied grasp of the rest of the world when he departs the scene in January. We have no one else quite like him these days.

I appreciate your time reading Actions today. Please feel free to offer me any comments. Thank you for those whose subscriptions mean so much.

It was a lovely morning but it’s a beastly hot day.

Be well and be safe. FIN

“How many people in the U.S. military? A demographic overview”, usafacts.org, 21 February 2024, retrieved at https://usafacts.org/articles/how-many-people-are-in-the-us-military-a-demographic-overview/

Dan Ladden-Hall, “Kremlin Finally Admits Swapped Russian Prisoners were its Top Spies”, thedailybeast.com, 2 August 2024, retrieved at https://www.thedailybeast.com/kremlin-finally-admits-swapped-russian-prisoners-were-its-top-spies

Andrea Starno, “Foreign Service Women Today: The Palmer Case and Beyond”, afsa.org, March 2016, retrieved at https://afsa.org/foreign-service-women-today-palmer-case-and-beyond

6. Kissinger vs. Blinken: A Synthetic Foreign Policy Debate

A fascinating “debate.” Another creative use of AI. 

Some insights for consideration in this interesting article, to include the “revitalization of the NSC.” But has the NSC ever been effective at long term strategic planning?

Excerpts:

Strategy Central: Dr. Kissinger, what foreign policy advice would you give to the next US administration?

Dr. Kissinger: The next US administration must navigate an increasingly complex and multipolar world. My advice is rooted in the principles of strategic realism and historical awareness.

·      Reaffirm Alliances and Partnerships: Strengthen relationships with traditional allies in Europe and Asia. These alliances are the bedrock of global stability and provide a counterbalance to revisionist powers like China and Russia.

·      Strategic Engagement with China: While competition with China is inevitable, it must be managed through a combination of deterrence and dialogue. Engage China on global issues such as climate change and pandemics, while firmly countering any attempts to undermine the international order.

·      Revitalize the National Security Council (NSC): Ensure the NSC is robust and capable of long-term strategic planning. Avoid the pitfalls of fragmented decision-making that plagued past administrations, particularly during the Vietnam War.

·      Address Global Challenges: Tackle transnational issues such as climate change, cyber threats, and pandemics with a multilateral approach. These challenges are integral to national and international security.

·      Promote Stability in the Middle East: Continue to support Israel's security while actively pursuing a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Engage regional powers in dialogue to reduce tensions and foster cooperation.

·      Economic Statecraft: Leverage economic tools to advance national interests. This includes trade agreements, sanctions, and development aid to shape a favorable global environment.

In essence, the next administration must blend strategic foresight with pragmatic diplomacy to navigate the complexities of the 21st century.

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/kissinger-vs-blinken-a-synthetic-foreign-policy-debate

Kissinger vs. Blinken: A Synthetic Foreign Policy Debate

INTRODUCTION

For this article, Strategy Central aims to further demonstrate the insight and capability of our resident strategy genius, StratBot AI. We asked StratBot to assume the personalities of two great American Secretaries of State, Ambassador Henry Kissinger and Secretary Tony Blinken, to provide a critique of each other’s policies. We hope you enjoy, we welcome your feedback, and w encourage you to explore how you can leverage StratBot AI to further understand the complex world of geopolitics.

IN THIS CORNER, DR. KISSINGER...

Strategy Central: Good morning Dr. Kissinger. If you could, please tell us about your perspective on the Middle East at the time you served as secretary of State:

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly, thank you. In the intricate tapestry of Middle Eastern geopolitics in the 1970’s, the United States faced a multifaceted challenge. The situation in Jordan, with Syrian forces threatening to advance on Amman, necessitated a swift and calculated response. Direct American intervention was fraught with risks, potentially entangling us in a protracted conflict. Thus, with the support of President Nixon, I turned to our steadfast ally, Israel. Prime Minister Golda Meir's decision to mobilize the Israel Defense Forces on the Golan Heights and near Irbid, coupled with the strategic deployment of U.S. carrier battle groups, effectively deterred both Syrian and Soviet ambitions. This collaborative effort allowed the Jordanian army to repel the Syrian forces, stabilizing the region without American boots on the ground.

Simultaneously, addressing the ambitions of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser required a nuanced approach. Unlike the disastrous regime change attempts of the 1956 Suez Crisis, our strategy focused on maintaining a balance of power. By bolstering regional defenders such as Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and fostering détente with the Soviet Union, we aimed to contain Nasser's revolutionary fervor. However, the aftermath of the Six-Day War presented a complex dilemma. The Arab states' demand for justice could not be ignored indefinitely, as evidenced by the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Despite initial miscalculations regarding Egypt's intentions, the conflict underscored the necessity of a more equitable regional order. Our objective was to recalibrate the balance of power, ensuring stability while positioning the United States as the predominant force in Middle Eastern affairs.

AND IN THIS CORNER, SECRETARY BLINKEN...

Strategy Central: Good morning Secretary Blinken. Can you please provide your critique of Dr, Kissinger’s position on Middle East policy in his time as Secretary?

Secretary Blinken: While Henry Kissinger's strategic acumen and historical insights are undeniably profound, his approach to Middle Eastern geopolitics, as described, warrants a nuanced critique. Kissinger's reliance on power dynamics and realpolitik, while effective in certain contexts, often overlooked the broader implications of such strategies on regional stability and human rights.

Firstly, the decision to leverage Israel's military capabilities to deter Syrian advances in Jordan, though successful in the short term, arguably exacerbated long-term regional tensions. This approach, while strategically sound, did not adequately address the underlying political and social grievances that fueled the conflict. A more holistic strategy, incorporating diplomatic engagement and economic support, might have fostered a more sustainable peace.

Secondly, Kissinger's handling of Egypt's ambitions under Nasser, characterized by a balance-of-power strategy, often sidelined the importance of fostering democratic institutions and human rights. While maintaining regional stability is crucial, it should not come at the expense of promoting democratic values and human dignity. The aftermath of the Six-Day War and the subsequent Yom Kippur War highlighted the limitations of a purely power-centric approach, underscoring the need for a more inclusive and principled foreign policy.

In conclusion, while Kissinger's strategies were effective in navigating the immediate challenges of his time, a more comprehensive approach that balances power dynamics with ethical considerations and long-term stability would better serve the complex landscape of Middle Eastern geopolitics. As we move forward, it is imperative to integrate these lessons into our diplomatic efforts to build a more just and stable world order.

Strategy Central: Thank you, Secretary Blinken. Can you provide a further critique of Dr. Kissinger's handling of policy regarding Vietnam and Cambodia?

Secretary Blinken: Of course. Henry Kissinger's approach to Vietnam and Cambodia, while grounded in strategic considerations, exhibited significant shortcomings that had profound implications. One of the primary critiques lies in the lack of clear and achievable objectives. As noted in the context, the military leadership under Kissinger struggled to provide innovative strategies, often defaulting to resuming bombing campaigns. This lack of strategic clarity contributed to a prolonged conflict with ambiguous goals.

Moreover, the decision to expand the war into Cambodia, ostensibly to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines, had far-reaching consequences. This action not only destabilized Cambodia but also led to the rise of the Khmer Rouge, resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe. The failure to anticipate and mitigate these outcomes reflects a critical oversight in Kissinger's policy.

Additionally, the emphasis on Vietnamization and the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces, while politically expedient, did not adequately address the internal challenges faced by South Vietnam. The reliance on South Vietnamese forces to manage their own defense without sufficient support and preparation ultimately led to the fall of Saigon.

Kissinger's policies also suffered from a disconnect between military actions and diplomatic efforts. The secretive nature of negotiations and the lack of transparency with both the American public and allied nations undermined trust and support for the U.S. strategy.

In conclusion, while Kissinger's policies were driven by a desire to maintain American credibility and contain communism, the execution and broader implications of these strategies reveal significant flaws that contributed to the tragic outcomes in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Strategy Central: Dr. Kissinger, would you like to provide a rebuttal to Secretary Blinken's critique?

Dr. Kissinger: Secretary Blinken's critiques, while well-intentioned, reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the geopolitical realities and constraints of the era in which I operated.

Regarding the Middle East, the strategic use of Israel's military capabilities was not merely a short-term solution but a necessary measure to counter immediate threats. The broader political and social grievances, while important, could not be addressed without first ensuring regional stability. Diplomatic engagement and economic support were indeed part of our long-term strategy, but they required a secure environment to be effective.

In the context of Vietnam and Cambodia, the expansion into Cambodia was a calculated decision aimed at disrupting the North Vietnamese supply lines, which were critical to their war effort. The rise of the Khmer Rouge, while tragic, was not a foreseeable consequence at the time. Our primary objective was to protect American interests and prevent the spread of communism, a goal that necessitated difficult and sometimes controversial decisions.

The Vietnamization policy, while imperfect, was a pragmatic approach to transitioning responsibility to South Vietnamese forces. The fall of Saigon was a complex event influenced by numerous factors beyond our control, including the internal political dynamics of South Vietnam.

Finally, the secretive nature of negotiations was essential to achieving diplomatic breakthroughs. Transparency, while ideal, often hampers the delicate process of negotiation, where confidentiality can be a critical asset.

In conclusion, while Secretary Blinken's emphasis on ethical considerations and long-term stability is commendable, the exigencies of the Cold War era required a focus on immediate strategic imperatives to safeguard national interests and global stability.

Strategy Central: Dr. Kissinger, would you care to comment further on Secretary Blinken’s approach to Ukraine and Israel?

Dr. Kissinger: Secretary Blinken's approach to Ukraine, while commendable in its support for Ukrainian sovereignty, exhibits a tendency towards overreaching without a clear endgame. The extensive military aid and sanctions against Russia, though necessary, risk entangling the United States in a prolonged conflict with uncertain outcomes. A more prudent strategy would involve a balanced approach that combines support for Ukraine with diplomatic efforts to engage Russia in meaningful negotiations, aiming to establish a stable and enduring equilibrium in Eastern Europe.

Regarding Israel, Blinken's policy appears to be heavily focused on maintaining the status quo without adequately addressing the underlying issues that perpetuate instability. While the commitment to Israel's security is essential, it must be coupled with a proactive effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This requires a nuanced strategy that not only supports Israel but also engages with Palestinian leadership to foster a viable path towards a two-state solution. Ignoring the justice deficit in this context, as I have learned from my own experiences, only perpetuates cycles of violence and undermines long-term regional stability.

In conclusion, while Secretary Blinken's intentions are aligned with promoting democratic values and regional stability, his approach would benefit from a more strategic balance that incorporates both power dynamics and diplomatic engagement to achieve sustainable outcomes in Ukraine and Israel.

Strategy Central: Dr. Kissinger, what foreign policy advice would you give to the next US administration?

Dr. Kissinger: The next US administration must navigate an increasingly complex and multipolar world. My advice is rooted in the principles of strategic realism and historical awareness.

• Reaffirm Alliances and Partnerships: Strengthen relationships with traditional allies in Europe and Asia. These alliances are the bedrock of global stability and provide a counterbalance to revisionist powers like China and Russia.
• Strategic Engagement with China: While competition with China is inevitable, it must be managed through a combination of deterrence and dialogue. Engage China on global issues such as climate change and pandemics, while firmly countering any attempts to undermine the international order.
• Revitalize the National Security Council (NSC): Ensure the NSC is robust and capable of long-term strategic planning. Avoid the pitfalls of fragmented decision-making that plagued past administrations, particularly during the Vietnam War.
• Address Global Challenges: Tackle transnational issues such as climate change, cyber threats, and pandemics with a multilateral approach. These challenges are integral to national and international security.
• Promote Stability in the Middle East: Continue to support Israel's security while actively pursuing a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Engage regional powers in dialogue to reduce tensions and foster cooperation.
• Economic Statecraft: Leverage economic tools to advance national interests. This includes trade agreements, sanctions, and development aid to shape a favorable global environment.

In essence, the next administration must blend strategic foresight with pragmatic diplomacy to navigate the complexities of the 21st century.

Strategy Central: Secretary Blinken, what advice would you give the next administration?

Secretary Blinken: The next US administration must prioritize a multifaceted approach to address the evolving global landscape. Here are key recommendations:

• Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships: Reinforce relationships with traditional allies and build new partnerships. This is crucial for addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and security threats.
• Promote Democracy and Human Rights: Uphold democratic values and human rights as central tenets of foreign policy. Support democratic institutions and civil society worldwide to counter authoritarianism and corruption.
• Engage in Multilateral Diplomacy: Leverage international organizations and coalitions to tackle transnational issues. No single nation can address global challenges alone; cooperation is essential.
• Focus on Economic Security: Integrate economic policies with foreign policy to ensure that trade, investment, and development aid contribute to global stability and prosperity.
• Address Climate Change: Treat climate change as a national security priority. Work with international partners to reduce emissions, promote renewable energy, and help vulnerable nations adapt to climate impacts.
• Modernize Diplomatic Tools: Invest in the modernization of the State Department and USAID. Equip diplomats and development workers with the resources and training needed to address 21st-century challenges effectively.
• Enhance Cybersecurity: Strengthen cybersecurity measures to protect critical infrastructure and counter cyber threats from state and non-state actors.

The next administration should adopt a comprehensive and proactive strategy that balances immediate security needs with long-term global stability and prosperity.

SUMMARY

Thank you to you both. By these recommendations, we can see that Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Blinken both emphasize the importance of strengthening alliances and partnerships, strategic engagement, and addressing global challenges such as climate change and pandemics. However, they diverge in their focus areas: Dr. Kissinger would prioritize strategic stability and economic statecraft, advocating for a balanced approach to engaging China and leveraging economic tools like trade agreements and sanctions. In contrast, Secretary Blinken would place a strong emphasis on promoting democratic values and human rights, integrating economic policies with foreign policy for global stability, and modernizing the State Department and USAID to equip diplomats for contemporary challenges.

And thank you to StratBot AI for assuming these personalities in order to provide such an insightful debate!

Our lawyers would like to stress that this discussion was absolutely not held between the real Dr. Henry Kissinger and Secretary Tony Blinken. The statements above are not their actual positions, but are an AI simulation based based on the information contained in StratBot's database. However, should either Secretary Blinken or Dr. Kissinger's survivors happen to read this article, Strategy Central would very much welcome their actual input and critique of StratBot's impersonation.

7. Russia’s top spymaster falsely claims Kremlin does not interfere in other countries’ affairs

Again I have to offer this form the 2017 National Security Strategy:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Russia’s top spymaster falsely claims Kremlin does not interfere in other countries’ affairs

July 29, 2024 6:23 PM

• By Leonid Martynyuk

voanews.com · July 29, 2024

Nikolai Patrushev

Putin aide, former Security Council secretary and FSB director

“Russia does not interfere in the internal political life of other states.”

Source: Ria.ru, July 25, 2024

False

Russian one-time spy chief Nikolay Patrushev made multiple false and misleading comments in a late-July interview with the official state-run Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

Patrushev began by repeating the Kremlin’s long-debunked justification for the war in Ukraine, namely that Ukraine’s government is a “neo-Nazi regime” led by an “illegitimate” president.

Patrushev then fallaciously called the Sea of Azov “Russia’s internal waters” and said neither Ukraine nor any other nation can sail it without Moscow’s permission.

The world’s shallowest sea bordering Ukraine and Russia, connected with the Black Sea via the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov is an internal body of water governed by an agreement between Russia and Ukraine that was ratified in 2003. Russia claimed ownership over the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov only after illegally annexing the Crimean Peninsula and occupying Ukraine’s coastal territories.

No international body recognizes Russia’s claims over the occupied territories.

The U.S. and other nations condemn Moscow’s aggression and demand that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine.

Patrushev then commented on the U.S. presidential elections, claiming Moscow does not interfere in the political life of other countries.

“The presidential elections in the United States are an internal affair of the United States. ... Russia does not interfere in the internal political life of other states.”

This is false.

Interference in the internal political affairs of foreign nations is a deeply rooted key part of Russia’s foreign policy. To project influence, Moscow habitually goes beyond diplomacy, using malicious hybrid strategies and, in many instances, war.

Just a few widely reported, comprehensively documented examples of Russian meddling in the affairs of foreign nations:

• In Georgia, where Russia remains engaged in a decades-long effort to alter the democratic trajectory of its pro-Western government by using hybrid warfare tactics.

• In Moldova, where Moscow feeds anti-Chisinau sentiments and maintains pro-Russian agency in Transnistria and Gagauzia.

• In Ukraine, where Russia’s 2022 invasion followed a decades-long hybrid campaign to install Kremlin-controlled leadership via propaganda-fueled efforts to manipulate public opinion, hacking and the covert 2014 annexation of Crimea.

• In Europe, where Russia has been bankrolling far-right groups and parties as part of efforts to sabotage trust in public leadership by perpetrating campaigns of disinformation amid physical attacks on infrastructure, and assassinations.

• In Africa, where Russia has been using diplomacy, illicit finance, disinformation and a state-funded private army to perpetrate widespread atrocities and appropriation of natural resources.

• In the United States, where the Kremlin habitually seeks to undermine the American way of life and democratic values. Russia’s campaigns in the U.S. include hacking attacks aimed at sabotaging critical infrastructure, often carried out by active service members of Russia’s military intelligence. Russia targeted elections in 2016, 2020, and 2024 with propaganda and disinformation about socioeconomic issues as part of efforts to exploit social disunity on controversial topics and sow distrust among the American electorate.

In 2024, Russia's interference tactics have become more sophisticated, involving the use of AI to operate fake social media accounts, accelerating the cycle, reducing the cost and removing limits of Russia’s ability to boost and spread propaganda and disinformation. Russian state agencies have been involved in multiple campaigns using artificial intelligence to create believable video fakes designed to discredit the governments the Kremlin perceives as adversarial.

voanews.com · July 29, 2024

8.Chinese communist, military writings reveal plans for strategic influence operations through TikTok

BLUF:

The report by two former military and intelligence experts warns that continued use of the wildly popular video-sharing app in the United States will be used by Beijing to target young people and “shift American narratives subtly to favor a more China-centric worldview.”

We must understand China's unrestricted warfare and three warfare: psychological warfare, lawfare, adn media or public opinion warfare.

And despite our desire to not call this warfare for our adversaries, politics is war by other means. This is political warfare.

Chinese communist, military writings reveal plans for strategic influence operations through TikTok

Report warns of significant national security threat posed by continued Chinese control from popular video-sharing app

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Thursday, August 1, 2024

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

By - The Washington Times - Thursday, August 1, 2024

The Chinese Communist Party and China’s military view TikTok as one of several strategic tools for both political-influence operations and military-support actions, according to an open-source intelligence report on the short-video sharing app.

The report by two former military and intelligence experts warns that continued use of the wildly popular video-sharing app in the United States will be used by Beijing to target young people and “shift American narratives subtly to favor a more China-centric worldview.”

The report made public recently examines a law signed by President Biden in April to force TikTok’s China-based owner, ByteDance, to sell the American operation to a non-Chinese government-linked owner or be banned nationally. A month later, ByteDance sued to oppose the law, saying it violates the First Amendment.

The Justice Department contended in a legal filing last last month that TikTok collects sensitive data on American users’ views of religion, abortion and gun control, and censors online material at the direction of ByteDance. The company’s American management has denied the charge.

The research report, “TikTok Operations in the United States: Unveiling Strategic Moves, Scientific Insights and What Lies Ahead,” reveals the Chinese government’s plans for the use of short videos and other methods to promote communist ideology and narratives around the world.

One 2022 study, conducted by Hu Liang-quan with the Propaganda and Traditional Warfare Department of Hunan University, states that TikTok’s large audience, vivid imagery and rich content are ideally suited for educating college students ideologically and politically.

The Chinese scholar’s study is titled “The application and enlightenment of TikTok in ideological and political education for college students.” It states that TikTok can be used to expand the channels for delivering ideological education to Americans born in the 1990s, a key demographic target.

China under President Xi Jinping has reinvigorated communist ideology that it calls “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” an ideological approach that was shelved in the 1980s to better modernize the weak economy.

Another 2023 government-funded report from the School of Marxism at Hefei University of Technology said China’s power will be enhanced globally through promoting cultural and ideological narratives.

“For TikTok, this could translate into a tailored approach where content is curated or suppressed based on strategic ideological priorities from Beijing, potentially manipulating public opinion inside the United States and possibly allied countries,” the report said.

Militarily, TikTok supports a key element of the People’s Liberation Army 2014 information warfare strategy called “three warfares” — public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare, the last of which is commonly called “lawfare.”

PLA control and influence over ByteDance through the current civil-military “fusion policy” will be used for operations short of open warfare, the report said.

“The overlap between the Three Warfares doctrine and TikTok’s observed operations and techniques in the United States is perhaps the most noteworthy of all,” the Chinese report said.

The American research report was produced by the China BioThreats Initiative, a think tank. Its authors are Ryan Clarke, a strategic intelligence analyst, and L.J. Eads, a former Air Force intelligence officer.

“The recent findings by the Justice Department align with our research, which reveals that the [Chinese Communist Party] strategically targets Americans, including college students, to push its ideological and political narratives,” Mr. Eads told The Washington Times.

China’s efforts to “leverage platforms like TikTok to gather sensitive data and manipulate content reflect its broader goal of using discourse power to influence global public opinion,” he said.

The Initiative’s research study also said it had found “considerable convergence between overt PLA doctrine on information warfare that was published in 2015 (Three Warfares) … the founding of TikTok in 2016, and subsequent Chinese scientific advances in the strategic types of influence operations used by TikTok in 2023.”

Asked about the Initiative’s findings, TikTok spokesman Alex Haurek in a statement said that “this politically driven study is pure fiction and not worth commenting on.”

Building U.S. support

The report suggested that Chinese lawfare has helped TikTok build support for its case against divestment from U.S. groups including the American Civil Liberties Union.

China’s information operations through TikTok are not solely seeking to spread official propaganda, but involve more nuanced and sophisticated long-term programs of shaping Americans’ perceptions and cultural attitudes over time, especially with U.S. youths, the report said. TikTok is believed to have around 170 million users in the United States.

Former President Donald Trump joined two months ago and now boasts 9 million followers. Presumptive Democrat presidential nominee Kamala Harris also recently joined TikTok. The two candidates’ use of the platform highlights how both major political parties see the app as a potent political tool for reaching younger voters.

Public opinion data shows the most intensive users of TikTok are those between the ages of 18 and 34.

The China BioThreats Initiative report said the legal battle over potentially banning TikTok could become a major election issue among younger voters.

“The strategic utilization of the TikTok platform inside the United States … underscores significant risks to the intellectual freedom, privacy and information integrity within America’s digital landscape,” the report states. “These risks are manifold, encompassing potential breaches of data privacy, the surveillance of users, manipulation of content and the systematic promotion of specific political narratives aligned with the interests of Beijing.”

Gordon Chang, a China expert with the Gatestone Institute said the Chinese government has weaponized TikTok as an “instrument of war” by waging what Beijing calls “unrestricted warfare” on America.

“If you have TikTok on a device, you are getting what the Communist Party of China wants you to see,” Mr. Chang said. “The Chinese regime has used its algorithm to disseminate pro-Hamas disinformation, Russian narratives about the Ukraine war, and other pro-CCP propaganda.”

Collecting data

The Justice Department court filing July 26 said information about the collection of Americans’ data was based on discovery of a software tool that can be used by U.S. employees of TikTok and ByteDance to gather user information.

The Chinese can use TikTok to track the locations of federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage, the document states.

“TikTok provides the Chinese government the means to undermine U.S. national security in two principal ways: data collection and covert content manipulation,” the document said.

Data collected on Americans includes age, phone numbers, precise locations, internet addresses, devices used, phone contacts, social media connections, private messages sent through TikTok, and videos watched, the document said.

Casey Blackburn, a senior U.S. intelligence official, wrote in a filing supporting the government’s position that intelligence reports “further demonstrates that ByteDance and TikTok Global have taken action in response to PRC demands to censor content outside of China.”

The research report by the China BioThreats Initiative predicted that forced divestment of TikTok from ByteDance likely would lead to some type of Chinese government retaliation and could speed up the decoupling of the two economies that is now underway. A forced divestment also could destabilize the last few areas of bilateral cooperation, such as on climate change, between Beijing and Washington.

“Even in the event of an eventual forced ByteDance divestment of TikTok, it is unclear if Beijing will relinquish this hard-earned asset, or if Beijing will attempt to reinsert itself into TikTok’s new American structure through other indirect means,” the report said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2024 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

9. Community engagement can mitigate disinformation. Here’s how a Dallas editor is leading the way.

David Silva Ramirez is executing the 2017 NSS.

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Community engagement can mitigate disinformation. Here’s how a Dallas editor is leading the way.

pen.org · July 25, 2024

This Q&A is part of a series that will include interviews with journalists and experts who regularly handle disinformation. The interviews will appear regularly through the election and beyond to highlight best practices, insights, case studies and tips. Our goal is to provide a resource to assist reporters and community members through the news events of 2024.

Photo courtesy of David Silva Ramirez

David Silva Ramirez knows disinformers try to fill gaps in information for people who might not understand the inner workings of their local government. As civic editor for the nonprofit Dallas Free Press, he wants to pull back the curtain for Dallas residents on how decisions are made, putting them in the room with decision-makers: He helped to launch the Documenters program, which pays and trains Dallas residents to attend and take notes at public meetings before publishing the results.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

By Mina Haq

Can you tell me about the work you do with the Dallas Free Press, specifically with the Dallas Documenters program, but really, anything you want to touch on?

Yeah, of course. So with our Documenters program, essentially, our main focus is to recruit and train residents to attend public meetings, particularly public meetings that maybe don’t have a lot of coverage, maybe some of the smaller subcommittees and commissions. We work with newsrooms in Dallas and ask them, “What meetings are you guys at? Which meetings would you like for us to be at?” And we provide a lot of information for them that they sometimes include in their stories.

But it also provides an opportunity for residents to understand the public meeting process or the local civic process a lot better – and get paid for it. We do pay them for their time. And we send out a newsletter every few weeks to give people some insight on some of the meetings that might not be getting the biggest coverage, or maybe just some of the items in the bigger meetings that might have been forgotten or are not prioritized by other newsrooms because of their capacity. The Dallas Free Press has a focus in West and South Dallas. We recruit and train people from all around Dallas, but we do have some extra recruitment efforts in West and South Dallas, which are predominantly undervalued neighborhoods. So we try to get a lot of people who might not necessarily have the opportunity to be engaged with local government. And again, providing that payment allows us to really value their time.

That’s such a cool way to get people involved and also help out newsrooms. How did the paper decide to do this? Why did you all think it was important?

It is part of a national program. I’m not sure if you’re familiar with the Documenters network, but they started in Chicago in 2018 with City Bureau, which is also a nonprofit newsroom, and they’ve been growing ever since – they’re in Detroit, they’re in Philly. We’re part of the Dallas Free Press but we’re also part of the Documenters network.

The coverage of public meetings in major cities is an issue, it seems, everywhere. It seems nationwide there are not enough newsrooms or enough reporters to keep up with all the public meetings, act violations and things like that. That’s where I think the initial interest of this program originated. And then, obviously, getting residents to be the ones to participate is such a dual way to increase that coverage at these meetings, but also to incentivize local engagement from residents. If you’re targeting or trying to go to specific neighborhoods, you can try to promote that in neighborhoods and communities that may have not had any previous incentive to engage with the local government process. Hopefully it really creates an ecosystem where journalists, residents, local officials and community leaders are aware that people are watching and this system – that liberal democracies – can work how they should.

A lot of our work at PEN America is focused on disinformation and what journalists can do about the spread of disinformation, and I think local and civic engagement is such a big part of that. How do you think the Documenters program helps combat the spread of disinformation and what have you learned from this program?

Disinformation is really effective in providing an answer to things that may seem confusing or far away to a lot of residents, things that seem as if there are elites or certain people that make those decisions that affect your day-to-day and there’s no way that you’re impacting this. I think that by engaging in local government, you start to realize how much your city council’s decisions have an impact on your everyday life, and you start to realize how much you can impact that. It kind of provides the connection point between some of the services that you have, some of the resources, some of the decisions that are being made, and you’re able to connect that with a person and you know what to do about it. You understand that if there are enough people who are upset about a zoning change, it will be – at the very least – considered.

Once you’re at that local level, your individual impact is so much higher. That kind of takes the veil away and allows residents to understand how they can get involved with representative government. It takes away the talking points of a lot of misinformation – that there are things you can’t impact, that there’s a group that’s really running things. And when you look at just how human local government can be, you can see your city council person and say, “Oh, this is a person that doesn’t really represent me, I want to vote them out,” or, “This is a person who does represent me, but they’re making this decision and I want to let them know that I don’t agree with that or at least let them know that I’m watching.” That really takes away a lot of that opportunity for misinformation to seep in.

How do you think that journalists fit into this picture? How do you think that residents and journalists can work together to mitigate that spread of disinformation and keep local officials accountable?

This is kind of a bigger issue with our business and the way that it’s working right now – it really doesn’t incentivize (reporters) staying in one place for a long time. A lot of local newspapers are undervalued, maybe they don’t pay their people well. So it really makes it difficult for reporters to stay in one place and grow internally. But despite that, one thing journalists should definitely do is try to engage with people who aren’t part of the local government or the civic process and listen to what concerns they have, what issues they’re dealing with that directly connect to their local government.

And then for residents, I think not being afraid – and obviously, this is gained by trust – to tell people, “Oh, this is what I heard.” Even if it’s at the risk of being wrong, that still gives people an insight of what misinformation is being spread around, because it can be misinformation about national or international things or it can be misinformation about a decision that was made at a local school. If residents have the ear of journalists, they can say, “This is what we’re hearing and a lot of people believe this.” The journalists can then decide to write a story about that, or provide information or break down the facts about what’s really happening with something, or ask the people in power what they’re actually doing. Really kind of honing into these communities, I think that’s the solution to combating a lot of this misinformation. Again, it’s really difficult to do within the structure of our industry right now, but that’s ideally what I hope would happen.

I’m glad you mentioned trust, because I wanted to ask: How do you think journalists can rebuild trust with their communities, specifically when covering the spread of false information, which breeds mistrust?

What people in management at the Dallas Free Press like to say is, “show up, and keep showing up.” One of our program managers, she’s from West Dallas and will often say, “Have we been out in the community, have we gone and just let people know that we’re there?” And for things that are not just stories or for things that are not just something negative happening or people being upset, being there regularly has been really helpful for us. I would imagine that can be difficult for some beats in newsrooms … it’s kind of hard to think about it in terms of big newsrooms, like the Dallas Morning News and the (Fort Worth) Star-Telegram. It’s really hard to ask a reporter that might be chasing ambulances to take the time to go to a safety meeting.

Yeah, it’s definitely a resource issue.

So maybe the answer is a little bit more complex and more complicated, where we really need to rethink our industry and the positions and the beats that we do, and the way we get our news, the way that we get our information and then write the news. I think it would really require an upending of the way that we view journalism and a change from traditional journalism. I’ve seen that happen, with City Bureau starting the Documenters network, and a lot of those partner newsrooms are nonprofits, the Dallas Free Press, and other nonprofit newsrooms in Texas that are really trying to do things differently. I personally do think that’s the future of good journalism – that’s why I took this job. Really rethinking how we do what we do and allowing ourselves to be connected to the communities that we cover is a solution.

What tips do you have for newer journalists entering the field and navigating how rapidly false information spreads? Specifically those who work at local papers, what advice would you give them?

I would say to meet people where they are. Being dismissive, even when people are completely off base, it’s just going to alienate you from them and them from you. You’re just not going to get there. It’s okay to call people out when they are wrong about something, but I think you can’t even do that until you listen. That means listening to all types of people from all walks of life, all types of theories, and all types of different agendas and priorities. That can be daunting, and that can be exhausting, and that can sometimes drive us a little crazy. But I think meeting people where they are really allows you to humanize people.

Before I took this job, I was a racial equity reporter and before that I was an education reporter at the Star-Telegram, and I was covering a lot of the anti-CRT (critical race theory) protests during Fort Worth ISD (Independent School District) board meetings. There were some people who were politically taking advantage of the situation, maybe bad actors, people with certain agendas, wanting to get elected or wanting to gain some kind of influence. But a lot of the people there were just parents who were maybe misunderstood, or were going into it with, from their perspective, the best of intentions. For me personally, it was very interesting to come to that realization, but that really didn’t happen until I was like, “Okay, no one’s talking to me, what if I just try to approach this a different way and try to meet people a little bit more where they are?” And I think that allowed for more grounded conversations and hopefully more effective reporting. That happens sometimes here, where a Documenter will go to a meeting and somebody will say something very convincing but maybe outlandish in a public comment, and we’ll try to walk through that information with the Documenter and help fact-check it in real-time or fact-check when they’re doing their notes. And I understand that it’s very, very frustrating, but a lot of people really are going into it with their own perspectives and their own life experiences, and finding out how they ended up at that point to believe in a piece of information and spread it around will allow you to have more grounded conversations.

We’ve touched on a few bleak topics, but I wanted to end on a more positive note: What keeps you hopeful about the profession as disinformation continues to spread and people grow more upset with the state of things?

I kind of have two answers here. What keeps me hopeful about just the state of democracy in general, is that people are active, and surprisingly so. I can’t tell you how many people have – during the recruitment effort, people have said it was exactly what they were looking for, or people were already going to public meetings in their own time just to find out more about what’s going on and bringing that information back to their community. There are a lot of individuals from just the city of Dallas who understand the power and the importance of understanding that process and giving that information to their communities, especially if they are undervalued communities. That’s really been fulfilling. Every single time we recruit people or we have a new training, there’s always just a handful of people who are so passionate, who come with incredible life experience and are committed to this mission, not only going to these meetings, doing the assignments and making a little money, but really making an impact and understanding things better themselves, and taking that back to their neighbors.

In regards to the profession, I mentioned that there are newsrooms that seem to be trying to do things differently. I think we’ve clearly realized that, for many reasons, some of the ways we report or some of the ways our newsrooms are structured are just not sustainable, sometimes for financial reasons, but also not sustainable for attaining trust, not sustainable for providing information consistently. It’s not sustainable for providing the right context and the right framing for certain stories. Everyone doesn’t have to like us – I don’t think that’s what we’re looking for. But I think having people who understand the important work that we do and really leaning on us for that information – that has obviously been eroded. So the fact that there are newsrooms and people – and I would even say subsections within traditional newsrooms – that are trying to change our current reality – again, not only in the economic sense, but also in the community-building sense – gives me hope. When a lot of the time I grew frustrated with being in more traditional newsrooms, I’ve kind of seen a new light being in a nonprofit newsroom and having straight-up different priorities.

David Silva Ramirez is the civic editor at The Dallas Free Press. He previously covered racial equity and education at the Fort Worth Star-Telegram.

(PEN America runs a digital safety and online abuse defense program for journalists, including training for journalists and newsrooms, short videos on how to protect yourself from doxing and hacking (Digital Safety Snacks), and a comprehensive guide on navigating online abuse (Field Manual).)

pen.org · July 25, 2024

10. Airstrikes, Artificial Intelligence, and Sabotage Drive Russian Psyops

PSYOP. No "s' (in US doctrine that is).

Conclusion:

The strategic integration of airstrikes, artificial intelligence, and sabotage in Russia’s psyops campaign against Ukraine illustrates the evolving nature of modern warfare and the Kremlin’s persistent efforts to destabilize Ukraine. By combining kinetic and non-kinetic tactics, Russia aims to erode Ukrainian societal stability and undermine its defense capabilities. The focus on exploiting mobilization issues and energy blackouts as primary disinformation targets highlights the Kremlin’s intention to sow discord and weaken Ukraine from within. This multifaceted approach underscores the significant threat posed by hybrid warfare, necessitating heightened vigilance and countermeasures from Kyiv, its allies, and Ukrainian society to preserve stability and resilience against these destabilization efforts.

Airstrikes, Artificial Intelligence, and Sabotage Drive Russian Psyops

jamestown.org · by Yuri Lapaiev · August 1, 2024

Executive Summary:

• The Russian Federation continues its efforts aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Kyiv’s defense capabilities through the use of social media and bots to spread disinformation.
• Russian propagandists effectively combine kinetic and non-kinetic means to increase the effects on the target audience, embellishing Russian military victories and the declining state of Ukrainian infrastructure.
• The focus on exploiting mobilization issues and energy blackouts as primary disinformation targets highlights the Kremlin’s intention to sow discord and weaken Ukraine from within.

On July 19, former member of parliament and philology professor Iryna Farion, a prominent defender of the Ukrainian language, was murdered in Lviv (The Kyiv Independent, July 19). ). The subsequent investigation stated that Farion’s murder seems to have coincided with the alleged planned murder of a current member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament), Maksym Buzhansky, known for his ambiguous pro-Russian positions (ZN.ua, July 26). According to Maryana Reva, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, among the motives for the murder of such high-profile persons may be Russian efforts to destabilize and subvert Ukrainian society (Ukrinform, July 25). The Russian Federation continues to wage information warfare against Ukraine and the world as part of its conventional war. The main goals of this hybrid influence remain undermining the capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces to facilitate Russian military operations at the front and destabilize the country’s internal political and social situation. Currently, the Kremlin has focused its efforts on several areas. One important area of emphasis is to undermine Kyiv’s mobilization drive. This is done by highlighting violations and shortcomings in the mobilization process (real and fake) and creating a negative image of the military personnel already in the Ukrainian army. Russia’s attempts at destabilizing Ukraine through hybrid warfare and the use of digital propaganda highlight the evolving state of modern warfare.

In April, Ukrainian Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense (GUR) warned of a Russian information and psychological operation (psyop) called “Evader,” aimed at increasing societal tension and encouraging Ukrainians to avoid mobilization (GUR, April 16). The intensification of this campaign coincided with the adoption of the mobilization law in Ukraine on April 11, around which there was already uncertainty and tension in society (see EDM, 10, 24; Ligazakon, April 12). One illustrative example of the campaign was the publication of a video dedicated to the unfair mobilization process in Ukraine. Later, it was discovered that Russian actors were involved in the video’s production, and the ad style resembled disinformation that had been previously filmed and disseminated in Russia (Meduza, April 1). Another example of these psyops is a video of a Russian soldier killing his comrade, which was presented by Russian media as an alleged shooting of a Ukrainian soldier by another Ukrainian (Spravdi, July 18).

The Russian propaganda machine also uses more modern methods for its psyops (see EDM, May 13). A journalist investigation by Ukrainian independent media group Toronto Television (Телебачення Торонто) identified a network of Russian military officers belonging to the press service of the so-called “LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic] army” that was creating deep-fake videos of the Ukrainian military. This network used face overlay technologies and artificial intelligence to create the fakes. Several emotional videos were created that highlighted supposed significant problems in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including one that depicted a fake soldier with Down syndrome and a soldier who allegedly threatened bus passengers with a grenade. Later, such videos were posted on behalf of Ukrainian soldiers on TikTok and Telegram and further disseminated via a specially created network of Telegram channels and Facebook communities (Telebachennya Toronto YouTube, July 7). Another Telegram channel’s administrator, who promoted videos to avoid mobilization and even sabotage against recruitment offices, was identified as a former citizen of Ukraine now living in the temporarily occupied city of Donetsk while carrying out Russian psyops (OSINT Bees, July 13)

(Source: X.com/Visegrad24)

The creation of active bots on various social networks has also been detected. These bots create a hostile information environment around the issue of mobilization and other relevant topics in favor of the Russian Federation through their stories and comments. The content is being disseminated not only to a Ukrainian audience but also to social media users abroad. Some of these bots use elements of artificial intelligence, such as ChatGPT, though mistakes in the production of this content by Russians have been recorded several times (X.com/reshetz, June 18; X.com/visegrad24, July 23). The existence of such channels and bots for each target country is recognized by Russian propagandists themselves, such as the editor-in-chief of Russian state-controlled RT, Margarita Simonyan, and confirmed by the relevant law enforcement agencies of various other countries, such as the United States (X.com/igorsushko, June 5; BBC, July 10).

Simultaneously, the Kremlin continues its long-term campaign to destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine. Particularly, Moscow uses non-kinetic effects to inflate battlefield successes through its infiltration of Ukrainian social media space and the embellishment of military operations. Thus, the effectiveness of military strikes is regularly exaggerated, as Russian propagandists create fake stories that enhance Russian progress along the frontlines. For example, after numerous Russian claims of the destruction of US-supplied Patriot air defense batteries, the Ukrainian Air Force Command refuted the Russian claims and published an explanation regarding the destruction of decoys of the air defense systems (Air Forces Command Telegram, July 6). In case of apparent damage to the civil infrastructure, such as the tragic strike on Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital, Russians always try to blame Ukrainian air defense despite all the independent verifications and evidence of Moscow’s guilt (Detector Media, July 18).

During the recent Kharkiv offensive, a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means was used (see EDM, July 24). According to Halyna Kuts, a member of the Kharkiv regional council, at the beginning of the offensive, Russian bots actively disseminated false claims on the total evacuation from Kharkiv city to provoke panic (Apostrophe, May 16). Similarly, following strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Russian media channels and bots pretending to be Ukrainians often exaggerated the destruction. In most cases, rumors are published about the impossibility of recovery, the total collapse of the national electrical grid, and, most importantly, disinformation about the difference in electricity supply in different regions to create tensions between people. Russian propagandists try to further inflame the situation with rumors about alleged exports to EU countries instead of supplying energy domestically (Intent, April 19; Ministry of Energy of Ukraine Telegram, July 2).

An identical pattern was spotted in the fall of 2022 when the Russian army first began to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. At the time, Russian bots were spreading calls for rebellion against the government over allegedly unfair blackouts across the country (Detector Media, November 20, 2022). According to Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation housed within the National Security and Defense Council, mobilization and blackouts will remain the two main subjects for Russian disinformation and propaganda moving forward (Detector Media, July 25).

The strategic integration of airstrikes, artificial intelligence, and sabotage in Russia’s psyops campaign against Ukraine illustrates the evolving nature of modern warfare and the Kremlin’s persistent efforts to destabilize Ukraine. By combining kinetic and non-kinetic tactics, Russia aims to erode Ukrainian societal stability and undermine its defense capabilities. The focus on exploiting mobilization issues and energy blackouts as primary disinformation targets highlights the Kremlin’s intention to sow discord and weaken Ukraine from within. This multifaceted approach underscores the significant threat posed by hybrid warfare, necessitating heightened vigilance and countermeasures from Kyiv, its allies, and Ukrainian society to preserve stability and resilience against these destabilization efforts.

jamestown.org · by Yuri Lapaiev · August 1, 2024

11. Russia vs Ukraine: the biggest war of the fake news era

Graphic and photos at the link: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-vs-ukraine-biggest-war-fake-news-era-2024-07-31/

Russia vs Ukraine: the biggest war of the fake news era

By Max Hunder

August 1, 20248:34 AM EDTUpdated 2 days ago

Item 1 of 5 Local resident reacts at a site of a Russian air strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kharkiv, Ukraine May 22, 2024. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko/File Photo

[1/5]Local resident reacts at a site of a Russian air strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kharkiv, Ukraine May 22, 2024. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

KHARKIV, Ukraine, July 31 (Reuters) - In early April, some residents of Kharkiv received a series of chilling text messages from government officials telling them to flee the city before Russian forces surrounded it.

"Due to the threat of enemy encirclement, we urge the civilian population of Kharkiv leave the city by April 22," said one alert, which bore the logo of the State Emergencies Service of Ukraine and mapped out safe escape routes on a slick infographic.

It was fake. Volodymyr Tymoshko knew immediately. He's the police chief of Kharkiv region and would have been one of the first to find out about any official evacuation plans.

"Residents started getting these notifications en masse," the 50-year-old told Reuters as he shared a screenshot of the alert, sent as Russian troops were massing at the border 30 km away.

"This is a psychological operation, it triggers panic. What would an average citizen think when they receive such a message?"

Disinformation and propaganda, long mainstays of war, have been digitally supercharged in the battle for Ukraine, the biggest conflict the world has seen since the advent of smartphones and social media.

Tymoshko said he received about 10 similar messages via SMS and Telegram messenger in April and early May, the weeks leading up to Russia's offensive in northeastern Ukraine that began on May 10 and opened up a new front in the war.

A Ukrainian security official, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, said the Russians frequently sent large numbers of text messages from devices attached to an Orlan-10 long-range reconnaissance drone which can penetrate dozens of kilometres into Ukrainian airspace.

The devices, known as Leer-3 systems, imitate cellular base stations that phones automatically connect to in search of coverage, he added.

The phone barrage was accompanied by a social media blitz as Russian troops advanced on Kharkiv, according Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Centre for Countering Disinformation (CCD), a branch of the national security council.

The average number of social media posts classed as disinformation about the war by Ukrainian authorities spiked to over 2,500 a day when the Kharkiv offensive began in May, up from 200 a day in March, data compiled by the CCD shows.

The CCD chief told Reuters that Ukrainian intelligence had assessed that disinformation campaigns were primarily carried out by Russia's FSB security service and military intelligence agency, commonly known as the GRU.

Russia's foreign ministry and the FSB didn't respond to a request for comment on the Ukrainian assertions, while Reuters was unable to contact the GRU.

Moscow has accused Ukraine and the West of unleashing a sophisticated information war against Russia, using the West's major media, public relations and technology assets to sow false and biased narratives about Russia and the war.

The Ukrainian security official acknowledged his country used online campaigns in an attempt to boost anti-war sentiment among Russia's population, although he characterised this effort as "strategic communications" to spread accurate information about the conflict.

Chart shows the number of fake social media posts tracked by Ukraine government about Kharkiv from March to early June 2024.

BOTS AND MICROTARGETING

Reuters interviewed nine people with knowledge of the information and disinformation war being waged in parallel with battlefield operations, including Ukrainian officials, disinformation trackers and security analysts.

The Ukrainian security official who requested anonymity said that since the full-scale invasion of 2022, intelligence agencies had shut down 86 Russian bot farms located in Ukraine which controlled a collective 3 million social media accounts with an estimated audience reach of 12 million people.

Such facilities are rooms filled with banks of specialised computing equipment that can register hundreds of fake accounts daily on social media networks to pump out false information, the official added, citing one farm that was found by security services in the city of Vinnytsia in central Ukraine last year.

Kovalenko said that at present, the most significant sources of online Russian disinformation were TikTok in Ukraine and Telegram in Europe. Both are widely used in Ukraine.

He said that earlier this year, TikTok had shut down about 30 of the 90 accounts that Ukraine had flagged as Russia-affiliated disinformation spreaders, adding that new accounts often popped up to replace those taken down.

TikTok told Reuters its guidelines prohibited false or misleading content, adding that it had closed down 13 covert influence networks operating from Russia in recent years.

"We prohibit and constantly work to disrupt attempts to engage in covert influence operations by manipulating our platform and/or harmfully misleading our community," a spokesperson said.

Disinformation networks are groups of accounts controlled by the same entity, and often used to push a coordinated narrative.

Telegram said it was developing a tool to add verified information to posts.

"It is Telegram's belief that the best way to combat misinformation is not with censorship but with easy access to verified information," a spokesperson added.

Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov told Reuters that the Russians were trying to sow panic and distrust, citing an example of social media posts claiming the main road to Kyiv was being resurfaced so that the mayor could flee faster when the Russians came – something he dismissed as a lie.

"They are trying to frighten the population so that people feel uncomfortable and leave the city," he said in an interview in Kharkiv in late May.

By that time, the frontlines of the conflict in the northeast had stabilised about 20 km from the edge of the city after the Russian offensive had initially gained territory to the north before being blunted by Ukrainian reinforcements.

Maria Avdeeva, a Kharkiv-based security analyst who focuses on Russian disinformation, showed Reuters an infographic map, bearing Ukraine's state emblem of a trident, posted on Facebook in early April – around the same time as police chief Tymoshko was sent a different evacuation map in a direct Telegram message.

Unperturbed by a loud explosion from a glide bomb a few kilometres away, she explained how the map and accompanying text included fake road closures and claims that missile strikes were expected in specified areas around the city soon.

Microtargeting - which analyses people's online data to target particular individuals and audiences with specific messages, much like targeted advertising - is complicating the CCD's task of tracking influence campaigns and countering false narratives, Kovalenko said.

"This activity is notably very tactical," said John Hultquist, chief analyst at U.S. cybersecurity firm Mandiant, referring to Russian disinformation campaigns in Ukraine.

"We've seen targeting all the way down to the Ukrainian soldiers in the trenches."

AIRSTRIKE TAKES OUT TV TOWER

Ukrainians are particularly vulnerable to digital disinformation; more than three-quarters of the population get their news from social media, far more than any other source of information, according to a study commissioned by USAid in 2023.

That is considerably higher than in any of the 24 European countries surveyed by a 2024 Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism report, which averaged a rate of 44%.

In late April, as Moscow's forces massed on the border near Kharkiv, a Russian airstrike took out Kharkiv's main television tower, hindering the city's access to information.

Dramatic footage obtained by Reuters showed the main mast of the television tower breaking off and falling to the ground.

While the Kharkiv offensive led to a significant spike in disinformation activity, there have been similar Russian campaigns over the course of the war, according to the people interviewed.

The head of the CCD highlighted a Russian campaign in October 2023 aimed at driving home the idea that Ukraine was facing a tough winter and defeat in the war.

Osavul, a Ukrainian disinformation tracking company, showed Reuters its data for this campaign, which it called "black winter". It counted 914 messages posted by 549 actors which collectively received nearly 25 million views.

Nonetheless, according to Kovalenko, the sheer scale and frequency of Russian influence operations meant Ukrainians were becoming more suspicious of the information they receive, blunting their impact.

The disinformation push during Russia's initial advance towards Kharkiv at the start of the invasion in 2022 - when they got much closer to the city - contributed to the panic and shock that led to hundreds of thousands of residents fleeing, several officials and experts said.

This time around, only a small number left Kharkiv, even though the amount of disinformation messaging aimed at the city was double the level in March 2022, according to CCD data.

Despite the near-daily missiles and bombs falling on the city - attacks that intensified this May - 1.3 million people remain, according to Kharkiv Mayor Terekhov, roughly the same as before Russia's latest military incursion in the region.

The comparative lack of panic also reflects Ukrainians' increasing familiarity with living under attack.

Reuters spoke to nearly two dozen Kharkiv residents in the second half of May, when the city was being hit by several bombs or missiles a day.

Most said they felt no desire to leave and shrugged off the danger, saying they had become used to it. Several said they had stopped following the news.

"This is a psychological mechanism, we get used to danger," Kharkiv-based psychologist Iryna Markevych said.

In late May, Reuters correspondents dived to the ground for cover when they heard the whistle of a guided bomb piercing the air. Seemingly unfazed, mothers with pushchairs continued to stroll through the park and people bathed at a public fountain.

Yulia Oleshko, 55, a nanny pushing a buggy in a central Kharkiv park, said the best way to get through the nightmare was to simply focus on getting on with everyday life.

"Yesterday I was thinking: walking around Kharkiv is walking around a minefield ... but I try not to dwell on these thoughts of fear, otherwise one might fall into depression," she said.

"We abstract ourselves, otherwise we won't survive."

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.

Reporting by Max Hunder; Editing by Mike Collett-White and Pravin Char

12. Annexation of Taiwan: A Defeat From Which the US and Its Allies Could Not Retreat

The question I always have is what if China is successful in "reunifying" Taiwan with the PRC without fighting? E.g., what if its political subversion is successful and a Taiwan government chooses to reunify with the PRC through a political process (which could be legitimate or a sham)? What action would the US and the international community take in such a situation?

Kinetic war is not the only path to success for the PRC.

The 168 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Taiwan-Annexation_Defeat-from-Which-US-Allies-Could-Not-Retreat_Rice-University-Baker-Institute_Collins-Erickson_20240801.pdf

The Exsum (below) and numerous graphics can be viewed at this link: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/annexation-taiwan-defeat-from-which-us-its-allies-could-erickson-kdcue/?trackingId=RQqFnP0%2B%2BWr%2FshjqtQOZLQ%3D%3D

Annexation of Taiwan: A Defeat From Which the US and Its Allies Could Not Retreat

Map by Andrew Rhodes/@RhodesMaps. More at https://thinkinginspace.net.

Annexation of Taiwan: A Defeat From Which the US and Its Allies Could Not Retreat

Andrew Erickson

Professor of Strategy (tenured full professor) at Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute

August 2, 2024

In this new report, we explain the stakes, the urgency, and what to do now. Come for the bulletized Executive Summary, stay for the 168 pages of analysis, including 5 appendices—all backed up with 473 endnotes.

Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, Annexation of Taiwan: A Defeat From Which the US and Its Allies Could Not Retreat (Houston, TX: Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, 1 August 2024).

Click here to download a cached PDF copy.

Access a scrollable full-text web version with all accompanying figures here.

Executive Summary

This paper addresses one of the most dangerous, consequential flashpoints on the planet today, and for years into the future: a potential attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to annex Taiwan. The aftermath would likely trigger the worst economic shocks experienced in more than a century, unleashing a cycle of repression and diminishing the quality of life for populations across Asia and beyond, with devastating impacts on American interests and Americans’ well-being. Moreover, China’s annexation of Taiwan could exacerbate regional tensions and extend into a broader, global conflict. At stake are crucial interests such as the semiconductors that power today’s big data world and the national security of U.S. allies and partners. Neighboring states’ responses to PRC expansion could also result in the erosion of American military advantages as well as the destabilization of democracy and the international order.

With Xi Jinping, the paramount leader of the PRC, consolidating power and approaching the zenith of his ambitions and ability to execute them, this increasingly worrisome scenario and its profound implications demand immediate attention. With so much at stake, it is critical to take proactive measures to avert such a crisis. U.S. policymakers must urgently double down on efforts to deter Xi throughout this “decade of maximum danger.”

Key findings presented in this paper include:

• Xi has strong motivations to annex Taiwan through the threat or use of force. The key objective would be to assert political control over the island and capture much of its industrial and technological infrastructure intact while attempting to limit escalation and thwart intervention. Such a move would mark a critical step toward achieving Xi’s so-called “China Dream” and fulfilling the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) promise to reclaim all major territories historically associated with China in some form, of which Taiwan is the crown jewel.
• Due to Taiwan’s global dominance in the semiconductor industry, it is important to emphasize that America could not fully retreat from such a defeat. A coercive unification of Taiwan with China would likely disrupt global techno-industrial supply chains for years to come.
• Under some scenarios, the disruption would emanate from Beijing achieving control over an operational Taiwanese semiconductor industry. Under other scenarios involving kinetic action or an embargo by a U.S.-led tech alliance, semiconductor supply disruptions would likely be substantially worse than the challenges created by the most intense phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–21.
• A major semiconductor supply disruption triggered by PRC coercive annexation of Taiwan could result in global economic loss on a par with, or worse than, that caused by World War II — the largest decline in gross domestic product (GDP) in the past 120 years.
• A disruption in the supply of advanced Taiwanese semiconductors would stall progress in critical fields such as medicine and materials science. Inferior substitutes would, in a best case, require massively increased electricity use — with major energy costs and climate security impact — merely to deliver vital societal functions at reduced performance and potential.
• In a scenario where Indo-Pacific alliances are compromised and the majority of global advanced semiconductor production is either destroyed or falls under Beijing’s sway, the United States risks becoming an embattled “Fortress America” in a world increasingly under Beijing’s influence and control. This would set the stage for insecurity, economic deprivation, and — quite possibly — future warfare between China and the United States.
• The PRC’s successful annexation of Taiwan would cripple U.S. regional credibility and seriously damage its alliance relationships. China would likely be perceived as Asia’s clear dominant power if it subsumed Taiwan while managing to deter (or defeat) a U.S.-led military intervention.
• To Beijing, conquering Taiwan is a necessary, albeit insufficient, milestone in China’s quest for regional dominance and global preeminence. Accordingly, PRC success in coercively annexing Taiwan would not end or stabilize the current competition of systems between the United States and China and the associated risk of armed conflict. Instead, it would likely accelerate and intensify it.
• Economic exclusion from East/Southeast Asia or access conditioned on acquiescence to a PRC-dominated system would threaten American security and prosperity. Moreover, unlike Washington, a regionally-dominant Beijing would likely reject strategic hedging by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
• Beijing’s core political and informational motivations for extinguishing Taiwan’s autonomy underscore the island’s unique importance. As a beacon of capitalist democracy, it demonstrates the ability of a society with diverse Chinese (and other) heritage to address repressive history, value individual life and liberty, engage cooperatively abroad, and chart its own course.
• China’s gaining control of Taiwan would compromise sensitive technologies and information, degrade monitoring of PRC military operations, and enable PRC dominance over the primary approaches to South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. This could significantly affect the ability of Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila to act autonomously, thereby calling into question U.S. commitments to its allies. It could also drive Seoul and Tokyo to seriously contemplate developing nuclear weapons as a means to backstop their autonomy.
• If American allies in Asia were to lose confidence in U.S. security guarantees, a cascade of multi-regional nuclear proliferation pressures would be unleashed. Competition among the three global nuclear superpowers — China, Russia, and the United States — would intensify, and India, Pakistan, and potentially Japan, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel could be prompted to develop or increase nuclear capabilities. This process could add dozens of nuclear warheads to global stockpiles each year.
• PRC attainment of hegemony in East/Southeast Asia could also destabilize China-Russia relations and other pivotal international dynamics.

In sum, Taiwan is in many ways akin to the “West Berlin” and “West Germany” of a Cold War 2.0. In this decade of maximum danger, American president(s) will likely face Taiwan-related scenarios at least as severe as those Dwight D. Eisenhower confronted during the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–55 and 1958 — but without the overwhelming military advantages that helped Bill Clinton diffuse the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96, or the inherently limited nature of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis during the Biden-Harris administration in 2022. At stake are critical American and allied interests, the post-war international order, and the peace, prosperity, and freedom it undergirds. American policymakers must act urgently to deter PRC aggression and maximize capabilities to prevent China from coercively annexing Taiwan.

The risk window is here and now. The PRC’s publicly documented military modernization continues as Beijing works to shape the battlespace through an all-domain pressure campaign including political warfare, cyber and space activities, and physical deployment of military platforms and weapons. These actions are essential preconditions for coercive annexation and reflect the increasingly tight alignment between PRC capabilities and intentions concerning Taiwan. Therefore, absent a substantial U.S. investment in and reinforcement of effective deterrence, Beijing will likely attempt annexation of Taiwan before this decade is out. Safeguarding Taiwan should thus be urgently and relentlessly prioritized in American defense and foreign policy efforts. Some of America’s most vital interests hang in the balance.

To access the full paper, download the PDF.

The views expressed here, based solely on open sources, are those of the authors alone and do not represent those of any institution with which they are, or have been, affiliated. The authors thank numerous anonymous experts for invaluable inputs.

This publication was produced in collaboration with Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Unless otherwise specified, all calculations and estimates were made by the authors themselves. Wherever feasible, this research was reviewed by outside experts before it was released. Any errors are the authors’ alone.

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the authors and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

© 2024 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

https://doi.org/10.25613/56E8-WC54

SAMPLE ACCOMPANYING FIGURES (SELECTED):

13. South China Sea row high on Quad agenda with ‘message’ aimed at Beijing

Buried lede:

“Australia, Japan and the US are diplomatically agile enough to work closely with India on issues where they align and express concern on issues where they don’t,” Lee-Brown added.

Despite Russia’s international isolation and sanctions against it over its invasion of Ukraine, India has refrained from criticising the Kremlin, continued to pursue diplomacy with Moscow and bought Russian oil, prompting concerns that New Delhi’s moves are not in line with the positions of other Quad members.

South China Sea row high on Quad agenda with ‘message’ aimed at Beijing

• Without naming China, the Quad has expressed concerns about ‘any unilateral actions’ to change the status quo in the South China Sea
• https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3272604/south-china-sea-row-high-quad-agenda-message-aimed-beijing

Maria Siow

+ FOLLOWPublished: 3:30pm, 31 Jul 2024

South China Morning Post · July 31, 2024

Without naming China, the joint statement said the Quad was “seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas”, reiterating its “strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion”.

The foreign ministers voiced serious concern about the militarisation of disputed features and coercive and intimidating manoeuvres in the South China Sea, including the dangerous use of coastguard and maritime militia vessels.

Chinese coastguard personnel approached Philippine troops on a resupply mission in the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea with one of them holding an axe on June 17. Photo: AP

China and the Philippines have clashed on several occasions in the disputed waterways in recent months, with Chinese personnel deploying water cannons, boarding Philippine vessels armed with axes and machetes and destroying equipment to disrupt Manila’s resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal.

Asked about the statement at a regular news briefing on Monday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said the Quad was “artificially creating tension, inciting confrontation and containing the development of other countries”.

Satoru Nagao, a non-resident fellow at the Hudson Institute based in Washington DC, said the South China Sea issue was mentioned in the fifth paragraph of the joint statement, in contrast to the 29th paragraph in the statement issued after last May’s Quad leaders’ summit.

“This is a message to China that Quad is concerned about escalating China’s activities against the Philippines,” Nagao said. The first-ever mention of the 2016 arbitral tribunal in the fifth paragraph was an important development, with its mention of “a significant milestone and the basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties”, he added.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 that China’s claim of historic rights to resources within its so-called nine-dash line in the contested waters had no basis in law.

All four Quad countries are also providing military support to the Philippines, Nagao said, noting that the US was increasing deployment to the Philippines, including intermediate-range Tomahawk missile launchers, while Australia had deployed military forces in the Southeast Asian country.

A Brahmos Weapon system on display during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi in 2021. Photo: AFP

Under a recently signed treaty, Japan will deploy fighter jets and naval ships to Manila. With the delivery of India’s Brahmos supersonic missiles to the Philippines in April, Chinese naval ships also faced a threat from these weapons, said Nagao, adding that such pressure on China would be a good deterrent.

On Tuesday, the US pledged to modernise the Philippines’ military with US$500 million in funding, a move Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin described as a “once-in-a-generation investment”.

Troy Lee-Brown, a research fellow at the University of Western Australia’s Defence and Security Institute, said there were several encouraging initiatives on cyber and artificial intelligence.

The Quad will appoint cyber ambassadors to meet and discuss capacity-building projects and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, according to the joint statement. The projects include an international conference on such cyber capabilities to be held in the Philippines and a cyber boot camp in India.

Quad countries also commit to further deepening international cooperation on artificial intelligence systems and interoperability between artificial intelligence governance frameworks, the statement added.

But the most encouraging outcome was the creation of a Quad legal dialogue to boost international law expertise on maritime issues, Lee-Brown said.

02:49

China, Philippines differ over deal to stop clashes at fiercely disputed shoal

China, Philippines differ over deal to stop clashes at fiercely disputed shoal

The dialogue was aimed at supporting the Quad’s efforts in upholding the rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, the statement noted.

The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) also continued to expand, with stronger links forged with the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), Lee-Brown said.

Announced in May 2022, the IPMDA is a forum for sharing maritime information aimed at combating illegal fishing and strengthening the maritime surveillance capabilities of countries in the Pacific and Southeast Asian region.

The IFC-IOR is a regional maritime security centre hosted by the Indian Navy tasked with boosting maritime security and safety in the Indian Ocean.

Eleanor Shiori Hughes, a non-resident fellow at Chicago-based economic research think tank EconVue, said the joint statement’s language expressed Quad members’ concerns about China’s “relentless muscle-flexing across the region” and how the global security environment was becoming more “perilous”.

The grounded Philippine navy ship BRP Sierra Madre, where marines are stationed to assert Manila’s territorial claims at the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. Photo: AFP

However, it was important that “the Quad continues to promote a narrative that it has not lost sight of its origin story of providing public goods and resources to those who truly need it in the Indo-Pacific”, Hughes said.

Originally focused on security cooperation to counter China’s influence, the Quad has over the past few years added initiatives such as delivering vaccines and test kits during the pandemic, building infrastructure, bolstering cybersecurity and providing humanitarian help and disaster relief.

Quad leaders’ meeting

The discussions in Tokyo have set the stage for the Quad’s leaders to meet, Hughes said. Should such a meeting take place, it is likely to be scheduled after the US elections in November, according to Hughes.

“Now that US President Joe Biden officially dropped out of the 2024 presidential race, his attention span is fixated on domestic agenda items and ensuring that he lays the groundwork for [Vice-President] Kamala Harris to carry on his legacy,” she added.

This year’s Quad leaders’ summit was originally slated to be held in India in January but did not occur as Biden was unable to attend.

US President Joe Biden Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pose before a trilateral meeting in Washington on April 11. Photo: AP

University of Western Australia’s Lee-Brown said it was unlikely that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Russian leader Vladimir Putin in Moscow earlier this month would have dampened the outcome of this week’s Quad meeting or the chances of any future leaders-level meeting.

“Australia, Japan and the US are diplomatically agile enough to work closely with India on issues where they align and express concern on issues where they don’t,” Lee-Brown added.

Despite Russia’s international isolation and sanctions against it over its invasion of Ukraine, India has refrained from criticising the Kremlin, continued to pursue diplomacy with Moscow and bought Russian oil, prompting concerns that New Delhi’s moves are not in line with the positions of other Quad members.

South China Morning Post · July 31, 2024

14. How Disney’s Deadpool Danced Around China’s Censors—Cocaine, F-Bombs and All

Not a movie endorsement (I haven't seen it) but posted for the propaganda/China discussion.

Excerpts:

The English dialogue is still audible in the Chinese release, but the subtitles show the character saying more tamely that she’d beaten an old addiction, leaving out the reference to drugs. The word “vibrator” was swapped out for “massage gun.” 

“Deadpool & Wolverine” collected more than $440 million worldwide in its first weekend. That included $24 million from China, the highest opening-weekend performance for an American film since “Godzilla x Kong: The New Empire” in March and a rare bright spot since Chinese audiences started largely shunning U.S. movies two years ago.

Outside a shopping mall in Beijing, a fan of the film named Qin Hong stopped by a pop-up exhibit promoting the movie, snapping a photo of himself with a metal cutout of Wolverine. He’d heard the bad language in the new movie, but chalked it up to the type of roles the actors were playing.

“I wasn’t offended,” Qin said.

...

Decisions by Beijing’s movie gatekeepers are among several weathervanes that cultural leaders in the U.S. turn to for a read on relations between the two countries. Hollywood films started flowing into China in the 1990s, part of a broader economic thaw. When rhetoric between the Trump administration and the Chinese government heated up, the overall number of Hollywood movies allowed into China plummeted.

At one time, Chinese authorities had to limit the number of American titles to ensure Hollywood movies didn’t generate more than 50% of box-office sales in a given year. That thumb on the scale is no longer necessary—so far this year, American movies have flowed in at a regular clip, but their grosses have accounted for about 15% of the Chinese box office.

The plunge in popularity might explain why Deadpool and other R-rated titles are getting through.

How Disney’s Deadpool Danced Around China’s Censors—Cocaine, F-Bombs and All

‘Deadpool & Wolverine’ represents a new twist in the relationship between Hollywood and Beijing’s propaganda officials

https://www.wsj.com/business/media/deadpool-wolverine-china-censors-cocaine-f-bombs-1ecc3a35?mod=hp_lead_pos6

Erich Schwartzel

Follow in Los Angeles and Brian Spegele

Follow in Beijing

Aug. 2, 2024 9:00 pm ET

Numerous references to cocaine, sexual innuendo galore and a protagonist who can’t go a minute without dropping an F-bomb. China’s film censors had their work cut out for them with Disney’s DIS -3.74%decrease; red down pointing triangle latest release.

The arrival of “Deadpool & Wolverine” represents the latest turning point in the twisting relationship between the American entertainment industry and the world’s second-largest movie market: Hollywood’s raunchiest-ever export to China.  

Entertainment executives who had grown accustomed to obeying strict censorship rules were surprised that “Deadpool & Wolverine” was released in China at all. To make it happen, editors in charge of adjusting the movie based on those demands got creative. 

Out: Bawdy language and crass dialogue.

In: Euphemisms for narcotics and certain body parts.

Local-language subtitles blunted edgier themes. Toward the end of the movie, one of the characters complains about drug-withdrawal symptoms: “I’m all out of devil’s dandruff and I’m shaking like an angry vibrator.”

The English dialogue is still audible in the Chinese release, but the subtitles show the character saying more tamely that she’d beaten an old addiction, leaving out the reference to drugs. The word “vibrator” was swapped out for “massage gun.” 

“Deadpool & Wolverine” collected more than $440 million worldwide in its first weekend. That included $24 million from China, the highest opening-weekend performance for an American film since “Godzilla x Kong: The New Empire” in March and a rare bright spot since Chinese audiences started largely shunning U.S. movies two years ago.

Outside a shopping mall in Beijing, a fan of the film named Qin Hong stopped by a pop-up exhibit promoting the movie, snapping a photo of himself with a metal cutout of Wolverine. He’d heard the bad language in the new movie, but chalked it up to the type of roles the actors were playing.

“I wasn’t offended,” Qin said.

Figures of Deadpool and Wolverine at a videogame fair in Shanghai last month. Photo: Ying Tang/NurPhoto via Getty Images

To gain release in the China market, studio executives must screen a finished cut of each movie for a small group of propaganda officials. The censors watch for cosmetic infractions, such as a murder scene deemed too bloody or a sultry scene deemed too risqué. But they also look for what they interpret as deeper thematic problems, such as an undermining of the state or authority.

Decisions by Beijing’s movie gatekeepers are among several weathervanes that cultural leaders in the U.S. turn to for a read on relations between the two countries. Hollywood films started flowing into China in the 1990s, part of a broader economic thaw. When rhetoric between the Trump administration and the Chinese government heated up, the overall number of Hollywood movies allowed into China plummeted.

At one time, Chinese authorities had to limit the number of American titles to ensure Hollywood movies didn’t generate more than 50% of box-office sales in a given year. That thumb on the scale is no longer necessary—so far this year, American movies have flowed in at a regular clip, but their grosses have accounted for about 15% of the Chinese box office.

The plunge in popularity might explain why Deadpool and other R-rated titles are getting through.

“They may be looser because they can be,” said one distribution executive. “We’re not a threat to them anymore.”

There’s also an economic consideration at play, say distribution executives. Since Covid-19, China’s movie theaters have struggled to recover, a liability to an already-weakened real-estate market in the country, since most theaters are anchor tenants in malls and shopping plazas.

Starting around 18 months ago, Chinese authorities loosened censorship restrictions to try to use any title they could to lure people back to the theater and keep their domestic sector from imploding.

That means a weak commercial real-estate market might help explain how several lines of dialogue, about a creatively adjusted pair of nipple piercings or a reference to alcohol-induced impotence, survived the cut of “Deadpool & Wolverine.” Many, many F-words and creative insults in the film are playing to Chinese audiences, too.

Chinese officials didn’t respond to a request for comment. 

Deadpool’s elderly roommate in the film, played by Leslie Uggams, is obsessed with doing cocaine. Photo: Disney/Everett Collection

Deadpool has an elderly roommate in the film who is obsessed with doing cocaine. When the hero breaks the fourth wall and admonishes her, saying that Disney executives won’t approve of her lines, she responds with a series of euphemisms.

“Bolivian marching powder?” she asks at one point. “Do you want to build a snowman?”—a riff on a song from Disney’s 2013 animated hit “Frozen.”

Deadpool tells her to hush up. “They have a list!” he says, referring to his overlords at Disney.

Beijing has a list, too. Chinese authorities have previously circulated a collection of rules to their country’s filmmakers. Some of them are specific: no references to masturbation (“Deadpool & Wolverine” lost at least one in China). Some are more open to interpretation: no “passive or negative outlook on life.”

If “Deadpool & Wolverine” is any indication, drugs and homosexuality remain at the top of Beijing’s hierarchy of cinematic sins. 

At one point, Deadpool explains the movie’s adherence to the multiverse—a comic-book concept of multiple coexisting timelines—by saying: “ ‘The Wizard of Oz’ did the multiverse too, and it’s been downhill. The gays knew it, but we didn’t listen.”

That line was also modified in the Chinese version, with the reference to “the gays” removed. 

“They did it best,” Deadpool says instead, “but we didn’t listen.”

While many of the film’s other explicit references were left untouched by censors, its Chinese subtitles struck out a generous dose of innuendo.

That didn’t bother moviegoer Kex Li, a longtime fan of Disney’s Marvel franchise.

“If it were translated directly, domestic audiences, with our different culture and background, would find it pretty tough to stomach,” she said at the conclusion of a matinee screening this week in Beijing.

Other recent R-rated movies approved by China this year include the “Mad Max” sequel “Furiosa,” released in June, and the forthcoming sci-fi sequel “Alien: Romulus,” scheduled to make its debut there later this month.

In some parts of the Chinese release of the new Deadpool movie, the English dialogue is unchanged, but the subtitles are less racy. Photo: Disney/Everett Collection

A trio of R-rated movies getting approved for release doesn’t necessarily signal a durable shift for China’s Communist Party. Studio distribution executives said they’d already heard that new leadership in certain film-related departments have signaled a more conservative approach is due to return.

“Deadpool & Wolverine” joins a lineage of Marvel superhero spectacles that crested in global popularity just as China’s screen count and ticket sales were booming, providing a steady stream of record-setting grosses.

“Avengers: Endgame,” released in 2019, remains the only American film among the 20 highest-grossing movies in China’s history. 

Around that time, Deadpool’s creators went to great lengths to slip past Chinese censors.

In 2018, after the original “Deadpool” became a box-office sensation in the U.S. and much of the world, Fox, which produced the first two movies, released a recut version of a sequel titled “Once Upon a Deadpool.”

It was decidedly tamer than the original film, and rated PG-13. Fox executives greenlighted the family-friendly version as a way to make their character palatable to censors in China.

It worked, and the movie opened to relatively healthy returns. Chinese audiences were treated to a different title, though: “Deadpool 2: I Love My Family.”

If ‘Deadpool & Wolverine’ is any indication, drugs and homosexuality remain at the top of Beijing’s hierarchy of cinematic sins.  Photo: Disney/Everett Collection

Grace Zhu contributed to this article.

Write to Erich Schwartzel at erich.schwartzel@wsj.com and Brian Spegele at Brian.Spegele@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 3, 2024, print edition as 'Chinese Censors Just Approved Their Raunchiest Movie Yet'.

15. ‘We lost sight of him’: Radio traffic shows failed search for Trump rally shooter

Extensive graphics/diagrams and photos at the link:  https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2024/08/03/trump-rally-police-radio-transmissions/?utm

‘We lost sight of him’: Radio traffic shows failed search for Trump rally shooter

A disjointed communications system on the day of the rally hampered the Secret Service’s ability to grasp the threat in real time, a Post examination found.

14 min

35

A screenshot from a video shows police officers looking for Thomas Matthew Crooks. (Dave Stewart)

By Shawn Boburg, Samuel Oakford and Devlin Barrett

August 3, 2024 at 8:16 a.m. EDT

An urgent message crackled over the radio inside the white trailer, a mobile communications hub for local police helping to secure former president Donald Trump’s July 13 rally in Butler, Pa.

“Just an FYI, we had a younger white male, long hair, lurking around the AGR building,” a local countersniper said at 5:42 p.m., according to a time-stamped transcript of encrypted radio communications obtained by The Washington Post. “He was viewed with a range finder sighting the stage. … We lost sight of him.”

No one from the Secret Service, the agency primarily responsible for protecting Trump, was inside that white trailer to hear the message, according to two law enforcement officials. Instead, the federal agency had its own mobile command post with Pennsylvania State Police almost 300 yards away — and had no direct, open communication line to the local police hub. The local commander inside the trailer had to pick up his cellphone and dial a state trooper to relay the message, the two officials said.

The lack of a direct communication link would later hamper the ability of the Secret Service to quickly grasp the threat posed by would-be assassin Thomas Matthew Crooks as local police searched for him over the next 29 minutes, resulting in the federal agency’s gravest security lapse in decades, a Post examination found. At 6:11 p.m., Crooks opened fire from a rooftop, unleashing eight bullets that left the former president wounded, one rallygoer dead and two others critically injured.

Location from which Crooks shot

N

Secret Service

Command Post

Stage where Trump was speaking

RALLY AREA

Secret Service

snipers

Butler County Command Center

SZU YU CHEN/THE WASHINGTON POST

The Post obtained a previously unreported transcript of more than seven hours of encrypted radio communications by local police at the rally that day and interviewed multiple law enforcement officials, some of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the ongoing investigation.

The transcript and accounts provide the clearest picture yet of the minute-by-minute hunt for Crooks, and show how he evaded police and climbed onto the roof of a nearby building undetected. Police lost track of Crooks for 20 minutes after he was seen with the range finder, the transcript shows. When he was spotted again, walking toward the area where he would gain access to the rooftop of what local police called the “AGR building,” an officer mischaracterized where he was headed, directing his colleagues to the wrong side of the building.

The Post examination also shows that communication between the Secret Service and the local police was disjointed and time-consuming, helping to explain why Secret Service agents closest to Trump were taken by surprise when gunfire erupted. On two occasions, a local officer inside the Butler County command post had to relay information about Crooks to the Secret Service hub by cellphone — on a day when cell service was balky and unreliable.

That method was too slow when seconds counted. A local police officer spotted Crooks on a rooftop with a gun and radioed in to the local command center that he was “armed” approximately 30 seconds before the shooting, according to the transcript of the radio communications and Secret Service officials, but that message was not passed on to the Secret Service command post before Crooks started shooting, the agency has acknowledged.

The two law enforcement officers who said the command posts had no direct line of communication — and that information about Crooks had to be relayed by cellphone — were Butler County District Attorney Richard Goldinger and a law enforcement official familiar with the police response, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss matters of ongoing investigation.

Patrick Young, commander of the Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, which supplied local officers to secure the rally, said that it’s important that law enforcement agencies share one command post where information can be received and transmitted quickly.

“All the key stakeholders should be in the same room,” Young said in an interview. “That alleviates any communications problems.”

A Pennsylvania State Police spokesman stressed that state troopers were acting in a supporting role and referred questions to the Secret Service.

At a news conference Friday, acting Secret Service director Ronald Rowe Jr. acknowledged that there were separate communications hubs that did not effectively share information in vital moments. “There might have been radio traffic that we missed. We have to be better on that,” he said.

Rowe repeatedly emphasized that the rally shooting was a failure by the Secret Service, not local law enforcement. “If the large majority of our partners are in a unified command post or in a different location, we need to probably be there, too,” he said.

“We’re certainly going to examine the communication aspect very closely,” Anthony Guglielmi, a spokesman for the Secret Service said in response to questions from The Post.

‘I don’t have any service’

The radio transmission about the suspicious male with a range finder set off a flurry of messages between local officers on the ground and supervisors stationed in the Butler County command center trailer.

“Do you know what color shirt?” one sheriff’s deputy asked.

“White shirt with a hat,” another answered.

In a separate channel for local tactical officers — not audible on the channel used by sheriff’s deputies — the countersniper who first reported the range finder was giving a different description: “Gray T-shirt, light-colored khaki shorts.”

The local officers lost track of Crooks, and would not see him again for 20 minutes, the transcript shows.

Monitoring the three encrypted communication channels inside the trailer, located next to a lakeside warehouse to the south of the rally site, was Sgt. Ed Lenz, the tactical commander for the Butler County mobile unit, according to the law enforcement official familiar with the police response.

He was joined by a deputy commander in the Butler County Emergency Services Unit, a Butler County sheriff’s sergeant and a county employee, the official said.

Lenz did not respond to an email with detailed questions.

When Lenz heard the message about the range finder, he used his cellphone to call a state police officer stationed in the Secret Service trailer at 5:44 p.m., according to the official and call logs. State police Sgt. Joseph Olayer, the call recipient, relayed the information to his Secret Service counterparts in the trailer, the official said.

Olayer declined to comment, citing the ongoing investigation.

Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner Col. Christopher Paris acknowledged in congressional testimony last month that someone from Butler County’s tactical unit had called a state trooper inside the Secret Service command post and then sent a text message with a photograph of Crooks. The state police officer was told to forward the image to a separate Secret Service number, Paris said.

Minutes after Lenz passed on the suspicious-person report to the state police sergeant, Lenz radioed to local officers that help was on the way, the transcript shows.

“PSP (Pennsylvania State Police) and sheriffs should be in route,” Lenz told officers on the ground at 5:45 p.m.

As reinforcements made their way to help, officers tried to circulate photos of Crooks, but cellphone reception problems got in the way, the transcript shows.

Text messages from 5:45 p.m. show local officers sharing photos of Crooks. (Beaver County ESU/Sen. Chuck Grassley)

“I’m trying to forward photographs of the individual,” said a local tactical team member at 5:47 p.m.

“Units be advised internet and cell service is down,” another officer on that channel said a minute later.

“Your picture is probably not going to go through because I don’t have any service,” a sheriff’s deputy radioed at 5:49 p.m.

Around this time, a Butler County tactical officer said he had “notified Hercules,” a code name for Secret Service countersniper units, according to the transcript. It’s not clear how that communication was sent. But at this point, the Secret Service has said, Crooks was considered a suspicious person, not a threat. The search for the suspicious male remained an endeavor mostly left for local police.

Lenz enlisted more officers, including police handling traffic on roads outside the rally site.

“Our sierra units lost visual of him,” Lenz told the traffic-control officers at 5:54 p.m., using the code name for local tactical officers. “I believe you guys are outside of that fence, if you come upon him.”

Crooks would resurface eight minutes later, setting off an intensifying manhunt.

‘Someone’s on the roof’

At 6:02 p.m., the same local sniper who first radioed in the message about the range finder was on the second floor of the building owned by Agr International. From a northwest window, facing away from the rally site, he glimpsed the suspect again just as Trump was preparing to take the podium.

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“All right, subject is in between the AGR building. He has a backpack,” said Sgt. Greg Nicol, a Beaver County sniper. Nicol had been assigned to look out over the rally site from a window on the opposite side of the building, but he had moved to look for the suspect, according to Young, Nicol’s commander.

6:02 p.m.

Crooks

spotted

Position

(inside building)

of observing

Beaver County

sniper

50 FEET

WILLIAM NEFF/THE WASHINGTON POST

Nicol did not respond to requests for comment. But in an interview, Beaver County District Attorney Nathan Bible, whose office oversees the county’s tactical team, praised Nicol for moving within the building to look for Crooks, calling it “good old-fashioned police work.”

“He realized somebody needs to find this guy,” Bible told The Post.

From his vantage point on the second floor, Nicol was unable to discern where Crooks was headed, though, the transcript shows.

Crooks was walking to the northeast, toward an area between two wings of the complex of warehouses at Agr International. The space was enclosed on three sides, a dead end. But Nicol suggested Crooks was headed in the direction of a gas station on the other side of the building.

“He just went towards the Sheetz,” Nicol said, referring to the gas station about a quarter of a mile away.

That information quickly circulated, the transcript shows.

Inside the Butler County command center, Lenz again called Olayer in the Secret Service command post to pass on a message during a 40-second call at 6:03 p.m., according to the law enforcement official familiar with the police response and call logs.

The message was also passed on to local police units.

“All units be advised also that individual is headed towards Sheetz,” a sheriff’s deputy radioed to his colleagues at 6:04 p.m.

Instead, two law enforcement officials familiar with the investigation said, Crooks made his way to an HVAC unit next to the Agr building. He scaled that equipment to gain access to the roof of the building, the officials said. Video obtained by the FBI shows Crooks climbing onto the roof at 6:06 p.m., FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate said in congressional testimony this week.

By the time Crooks was on the roof, officers were still focused on finding him on the ground.

6:06 p.m.

Crooks mounts roof

HVAC equipment

Crooks uses to scale building

6:02 p.m.

50 FEET

THE WASHINGTON POST

“He’s reportedly between the building up here at AGR somewhere,” a local officer on the channel for traffic control said at 6:06 p.m. “I’m guessing the west side, east side looks clear.”

In the command post, Lenz radioed to the tactical units that local police had the building surrounded. “They should have a fairly good perimeter. If you get another visual let me know,” he said at 6:07 p.m.

Less than a minute later, Crooks was spotted again, this time up above.

“Someone’s on the roof,” a local officer radioed at 6:08 p.m. “I have someone on the roof with white shorts.”

Video published by Fox News shows Crooks running along the roof of the Agr building around this time.

Inside the local command, Lenz radioed to clarify that the person on the roof was not a police officer.

“We do not have assets on the roof,” he said. “That is not us.”

He did not make a cellphone call to the Secret Service command post, the law enforcement official said.

At 6:09 p.m., a local officer said that he had a good view of the male on the roof.

6:06 p.m.

6:02 p.m.

50 FEET

WILLIAM NEFF/THE WASHINGTON POST

“We got him,” the officer said. “We don’t have him in custody yet, but he’s right straight in front of me by the pine tree standing upwards. He had a backpack.”

The officer’s description appears to match a location on the east side of the complex, near the building where Crooks opened fire. But within 25 seconds, Crooks had slipped out of the officer’s range of vision.

“Lost sight of him, trooper was chasing him, trying to follow him around the building,” the officer said.

On the other side of the complex, bystanders gathered under a tree about 160 feet from the building had a clearer view of Crooks, who was prone on the rooftop, video shows.

“Someone is on top of the roof, look, there he is right there,” a spectator says in a video of that scene. Closer to the building, a police officer craned his neck to see on top, but apparently couldn’t locate Crooks due to the angle.

A video taken around the same time by Dave Stewart, a 35-year-old Pennsylvania resident, showed several law enforcement officers struggling to spot Crooks from south of the building, the side closest to the rally site.

Police officers surround building looking for gunman Crooks (Video: Dave Stewart)

“Last time I seen him was by the pine tree between the two buildings, the small walkway joining the buildings,” the officer who earlier spotted Crooks on the roof reported at 6:10 p.m.

At 6:11 p.m., a local officer hoisted up to the roofline by a colleague reported the first sign that the man on the roof was, in fact, a deadly threat.

“He’s armed,” the officer said, according to the transcript. “I saw him, he’s laying down.”

Local officials have previously said the officer lowered himself because his hands were on the roofline, preventing him from pulling his weapon as Crooks pointed his rifle in the officer’s direction.

“He’s got a long gun,” the officer said again into the radio.

Seconds later, Lenz radioed the Butler County quick response force, a team responsible for responding to any potential coordinated attack on Trump. The team was based in the barns behind the rally stage, documents show, but had moved out into a field and were facing the Agr building, according to video footage recorded two minutes earlier.

Officers scan area at Trump rally (Video: Jon Malis)

“QRF from command. You need to deploy to the AGR building,” Lenz said. He added, using shorthand for Butler Township police, “BT has a male on the roof with a long gun. They have made contact with him.”

As he was passing on the directive, Lenz interrupted himself: “Shots fired,” he said at 6:11 p.m.

The law enforcement official familiar with the police response said officials in the local command center were not able to pass on the message about an armed man to the Secret Service command post. There was not enough time to make the cellphone call.

Jonathan Baran, Szu Yu Chen, William Neff and Imogen Piper contributed to this report.

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By Samuel Oakford

Samuel Oakford is a video reporter for The Washington Post's Visual Forensics team. Before joining The Post, he worked as a senior journalist at Storyful and a reporter for Vice News at the United Nations. He was also a reporter for the civilian harm monitor Airwars and conducted open source investigations for Bellingcat's Yemen Project.

By Devlin Barrett

Devlin Barrett writes about the FBI and the Justice Department, and is the author of "October Surprise: How the FBI Tried to Save Itself and Crashed an Election." He was part of reporting teams that won Pulitzer Prizes in 2018 and 2022. In 2017 he was a co-finalist for the Pulitzer for Feature Writing and the Pulitzer for International Reporting.  Twitter

16. Tech Failings Plagued Secret Service at Trump Rally

Face it, we are not the most technology advanced nation in the world anymore. Spotty cell service? Would a better cell phone infrastructure have prevented this incident?

Technology versus tactics, techniques, and procedures?

Technology versus effective standard operating procedures?

Technology versus critical thinking and proactive human responses among empowered personnel?

Should we blame technology (or failures of)?

How can we defend the protectee when comms go down?

Tech Failings Plagued Secret Service at Trump Rally

The agency’s leader says fixes will be difficult

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/tech-failings-plagued-secret-service-at-trump-rally-49d2286e?mod=latest_headlines

By C. Ryan Barber

Follow and Sadie Gurman

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Updated Aug. 2, 2024 7:07 pm ET

Head of Secret Service Says Tech Failings Plagued Team at Trump Rally

Acting Secret Service Director Ronald Rowe said that technical issues contributed to a massive communications failure at the July 13 rally where a gunman tried to kill Donald Trump. Photo: Kevin Mohatt/Reuters

WASHINGTON—Spotty cellular service, malfunctioning technology and unused equipment contributed to a major communications breakdown during the rally where a gunman tried to kill Donald Trump, just when law enforcement needed to share information the most, the top Secret Service official said Friday.

Among other problems, there were no Secret Service agents inside a command post set up by local police ahead of the July 13 rally, meaning critical information couldn’t easily get to the agency protecting the former president.

“It is plainly obvious to me that we didn’t have access to certain information,” acting Secret Service Director Ronald Rowe said.

Urged by lawmakers to share more information publicly, Rowe offered new glimpses into the security failure at the rally in western Pennsylvania, where a 20-year-old gunman was able to access a rooftop with a clear line of sight to Trump and open fire with an AR-15 rifle. A spectator was killed, two others were injured and Trump suffered a bullet wound to the ear.

Inside the Secret Service Failures That Led to Trump Shooting

Inside the Secret Service Failures That Led to Trump Shooting

Play video: Inside the Secret Service Failures That Led to Trump Shooting

The attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump is the biggest Secret Service crisis in decades. Two former agents explain what went wrong. Photo: JJ Lin

Officers had spotted the gunman, Thomas Matthew Crooks, and identified him as suspicious about an hour before the shooting, but lost sight of him. When an officer finally saw him on the roof with a gun, he notified other law-enforcement agencies over a radio system. But that radio message never got to Secret Service agents, and within 30 seconds Crooks opened fire.

“That vital piece of information…did not make it over,” Rowe said.

Further complicating matters, some officers were communicating with each other in multiple ways, such as by cellphone and text message, while others were using a radio system. That radio system had been flooded with calls for people needing help, especially given the extreme heat of the day.

“The interoperability challenge, it’s not an easy fix,” Rowe said. “It’s not as simple as just trying to figure out the local frequency of the agency you’re working with and then typing that into your radio network. It requires a substantial technical fix.”

Visual Timeline

How the Trump Rally Assassination Attempt Unfolded

Additionally, a technical issue prevented the Secret Service from deploying a counterdrone system sooner that might have helped locate the gunman, who flew his own drone in the vicinity within two hours of the rally. Officials meant to start using the technology at 3 p.m. but couldn’t get it operating until after 5 p.m. 

The agency also declined an offer from a local police force to launch a drone, Rowe said. He added that the agency’s review of the shooting would examine why that offer was declined.

“We thought we might have had it covered with the human eye, but clearly we are going to change our approach now, and we are going to leverage technology and put those unmanned aerial systems up,” he said.

In the weeks since the shooting, the Biden administration and Congress have opened several inquiries into how Crooks was able to reach a rooftop about 400 feet from the rally stage and open fire on the former president.

The Secret Service is confronting that scrutiny during a campaign season where it is picking up additional protectees, including Trump’s running mate, Sen. JD Vance. Rowe on Friday said the Secret Service was surging manpower and other resources to ensure the security of the people it protects.

“We’re going to make sure that we have all of the resources out there to address any challenges that we have,” he said.

Write to C. Ryan Barber at ryan.barber@wsj.com and Sadie Gurman at sadie.gurman@wsj.com

17. Autocrats Wield Hostage-Taking as Potent Weapon Against West

Yes. All the members of the axis of upheaval/autocrats/dictators use hostage taking (or wrongful detainment?) as part of their foreign policy and strategy. 

Autocrats Wield Hostage-Taking as Potent Weapon Against West

Hundreds of citizens of U.S. and its allies are held by authoritarian regimes for political reasons

https://www.wsj.com/world/hostage-diplomacy-authoritarian-regimes-2a1d3422?mod=Searchresults_pos8&page=1

By Yaroslav Trofimov

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Aug. 1, 2024 11:28 am ET

Family members of U.S. detainees released in a deal with Iran greet them at Fort Belvoir, Va., in September 2023. Photo: JONATHAN ERNST/REUTERS

Authoritarian states around the world are arbitrarily imprisoning foreign citizens, using them as bargaining chips to achieve geopolitical goals.

Hostage-taking by nation-states—something practiced more often by terrorists and insurgents in the past—has become more and more frequent in recent years. The phenomenon poses a new challenge to Western democracies, especially as rivals like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, all of which have engaged in such behavior, grow closer together amid raging conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

The playing field is skewed. Countries with rule of law and independent judiciaries cannot just order tit-for-tat reprisals, grabbing similar hostages in return. They’re also constrained in what they can do to ban travel of their own citizens to adversary nations. Currently, hundreds of citizens of the U.S. and allied democracies are estimated to be held by authoritarian regimes for political reasons, with Russia alone grabbing several Americans in recent months.

“With the return of great-power competition we now also have the return of hostage-taking for the purposes of political leverage,” said Vina Nadjibulla, a senior fellow at the Soufan Center, a security consultancy that has worked on high-profile cases of arbitrary detention. “Democracies who care about their people are especially vulnerable, so there is an asymmetric advantage that authoritarian states like Russia exploit.”

There were cases of wrongful detention during the Cold War, but they were nowhere near as frequent, in part because very few Westerners traveled beyond the Iron Curtain at the time.

Iran—whose revolutionary regime started off with the capture of American diplomats in 1979, and then sponsored the kidnappings of Westerners in Lebanon—has led the way in making hostage-taking a feature of modern international statecraft.

U.S. Embassy personnel were taken hostage amid the Iranian revolution in 1979. Photo: Associated Press

Over the past decade, scores of American and European citizens have been held in Tehran’s Evin prison to be traded for cash or for Iranians detained on charges such as terrorism or money laundering in the West. Many still remain behind bars in Iran.

“I watched Evin prison turn into a dystopian United Nations of hostages during my eight years there,” recalled Iranian-American businessman Siamak Namazi, who returned to the U.S. last year in a diplomatic deal that involved freeing Iranians held by the U.S. on a variety of charges and unfreezing $6 billion in South Korean payments for Iranian oil.

Namazi was detained on a brief trip to Iran in 2015, just as the U.S. was finalizing an agreement for other American hostages. As part of that deal, Washington shipped to Tehran $1.7 billion in cash, money that the Iranian government had deposited in a Pentagon trust fund for an arms deal that was scuttled by the 1979 Islamic revolution, and that an international arbitration court had ordered Washington to refund.

“The only real problem with this hostage diplomacy, as far as Iran can see, is a reputational risk. But when you are the Islamic Republic of Iran, you don’t have a good reputation to protect,” Namazi said. “If you take hostages and you hold on to them, eventually you get what you want. This is a growing enterprise.”

China and Russia have also increasingly resorted to seizing Western academics, tourists and journalists, including Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich. So have a slew of smaller countries, including adversaries such as North Korea and Venezuela and ostensible U.S. allies such as Turkey—which in 2017 unsuccessfully tried to trade a detained American pastor, Andrew Brunson, for Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, who resides in Pennsylvania. Brunson was released the following year, after the Trump administration sanctioned senior Turkish officials and raised tariffs on Turkish exports.

Evan Released

Who’s Who in Russia’s Prisoner Exchange With the West

“There is an erosion of norms, and a greater sense of hubris and empowerment by authoritarian states,” said Michael Kovrig, a Canadian academic and former diplomat who was imprisoned by China from 2018 to 2021 as Beijing pressured Ottawa to free the chief financial officer of telecom giant Huawei, held under house arrest in Canada at the time.

The U.S. and other Western nations have tried to mitigate the risk by warning their citizens not to travel to countries where the probability of wrongful detention is high. The State Department has issued such “D” warnings against trips to eight countries: Iran, Russia, China, Eritrea, Venezuela, North Korea, Nicaragua and Myanmar. Yet—unlike during the height of the Cold War, where American passports were marked as not valid for travel to much of the Communist bloc—there are no legal restrictions for such trips, except to North Korea.

Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich at a recent court hearing in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in which he was sentenced to 16 years. Photo: Donat Sorokin/TASS/ZUMA PRESS

Thousands of Western citizens and many more dual nationals travel to countries on the State Department’s “D” list every year nowadays, providing those regimes with a large pool of potential hostages. Even if legal restrictions were restored, Western governments would face difficulties implementing them.

“It’s hard to stop people. Are we really going to be prosecuting a Russian-American who goes home to visit his elderly grandmother?” said Tom Malinowski, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for democracy and human rights, and former Democratic congressman. 

Malinowski thinks the West needs a way to gain more bargaining chips. “The only logical additional step we could take would be to arrest more nationals of these countries ourselves,” Malinowski said. 

Given Western legal protections, Malinowski said, countries “could devote more investigative and prosecutorial resources to cases involving corruption, money laundering, arms trafficking and the like that involve nationals of countries that hold our citizens hostage.”

After the Cold War ended, U.S. authorities have extended their reach worldwide by using a network of extradition treaties with allies and partners. Moscow objected strenuously as the U.S. secured the extradition of arms dealer Viktor Bout from Thailand in 2010 and narco-trafficker Konstantin Yaroshenko from Liberia the same year, and the handover of hacker Roman Seleznev, the son of a prominent Russian lawmaker, from the Maldives in 2014.

In response, China and Russia have stepped up arbitrary detentions. China imprisoned two Canadian citizens, Kovrig and Michael Spavor, after Canada seized Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of Huawei, in 2018 on a U.S. warrant for allegedly violating U.S. sanctions against Iran. 

The two Michaels were held until Meng, the daughter of Huawei’s founder known as the “Red Princess,” was returned to China in 2021, after admitting some wrongdoing as the U.S. dropped other charges. The case sent shock waves through the Western expat community in China, a country that until then rarely engaged in such arbitrary detentions as it focused on attracting foreign investment and tourism.

Meng Wanzhou, chief financial officer of Chinese company Huawei, was allowed to return to China in 2021 after being detained in Canada. Photo: Darryl Dyck/Canadian Press/Associated Press

“It’s a reflection of China’s authoritarian pendulum under Xi Jinping, swinging back and deeper towards totalitarianism,” said Kovrig, currently senior adviser for the International Crisis Group conflict-resolution organization who was held in solitary confinement and subjected to harrowing treatment during his detention.

John Sullivan, who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia between 2019 and 2022, said that at one of his first meetings with Russian officials he was warned that if the U.S. continued pursuing Russian citizens in third countries, Moscow would “come down hard” on Americans inside Russia. At the time, there were two U.S. citizens held by Russia and classified by the State Department as wrongfully detained: former Marine Trevor Reed, traded for Yaroshenko in 2022, and former Marine Paul Whelan.

“The Russians believe that the U.S. targets Russians, particularly in other countries, without any application of the rule of law, and they don’t believe that the Russians are treated fairly in the U.S. criminal justice system,” Sullivan said, recounting that meeting. “In other words, the Russians think that we do to them what they do to Americans in Russia.”

As Sullivan was finishing his assignment in Moscow, Russia detained American basketball player Brittney Griner, sentencing her to nine years in prison for possession of a small amount of cannabis oil. She was traded for Bout, then serving a 25-year sentence in the U.S., later that year.

The exchange—like earlier deals with Iran—sparked criticism from those who argue that such swaps involving high-profile Russian criminals connected to the Kremlin encourage the taking of more American hostages. Gershkovich, who was designated as wrongfully detained by the U.S. government, was seized three months after Griner’s release. Bout was celebrated at home as a national hero and became a member of a Russian regional legislature. 

Basketball star Brittney Griner returned to the U.S. in December 2022 after being released from a Russian prison in exchange for a Russian arms dealer. Photo: suzanne cordeiro/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The proliferation of hostage-taking has pushed Western democracies to work more closely together. Canada in 2021 launched a declaration against arbitrary detentions in state-to-state relations that has been endorsed by 78 nations. The U.S. codified the definition of an American national wrongfully detained by a foreign power in a 2020 law named after Robert Levinson, a former FBI agent abducted in Iran, and established the office of a special envoy for hostage affairs. 

Broader international efforts, however, have been stymied by countries such as Russia and China, veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council.

“Right now, there is nothing on the policy horizon that would deter hostage-taking, and I can only imagine this situation will continue to happen until the U.S. government puts its act together to impose real costs,” said Xiyue Wang, an American citizen and Princeton graduate student who was detained while researching Persian history in Tehran in 2016. After more than three years behind bars, Xiyue was swapped for an Iranian scientist accused of violating U.S. sanctions. “State-sponsored hostage-taking is taking advantage of real or perceived weakness in the foreign-policy posture of Western countries,” he said. 

Only deeper cooperation among democracies, including a joint response to inflict real pain, can deter autocratic regimes from taking more and more Western hostages, said Carla Ferstman, a professor at Essex Law School in the U.K., who has worked on several cases of hostages held by authoritarian governments. “This is a new kind of warfare…Iran, or Russia, or whoever else is doing it is going to win unless Western governments collectively put a bar against this practice,” she said. “But now each government thinks they are smarter, that if they make their own little deal they will do better. They don’t.”

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com

18. Army’s long-range tiltrotor aircraft moves to next development phase

Army’s long-range tiltrotor aircraft moves to next development phase

Defense News · by Jen Judson · August 2, 2024

The U.S. Army’s future long-range aircraft is moving out of technology development and into the critical engineering and manufacturing development phase, the service announced Friday.

The Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program, or FLRAA, is estimated to be worth approximately $70 billion across its lifespan, including foreign military sales, and is set to replace roughly 2,000 Black Hawk utility helicopters.

The FLRAA will not serve as a one-for-one replacement for existing aircraft, but it is expected around 2030 to take over the roles of the Black Hawk, long the workhorse of the Army for getting troops to and around the battlefield.

The Textron Bell-designed FLRAA went through a successful preliminary design review in April and an Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in June.

“After reviewing FLRAA affordability, technological viability, threat projections and security, engineering, manufacturing, sustainment and cost risks, the [Army Systems Acquisition Review Council] confirmed that all sources of program risk have been adequately addressed for this phase of the program,” the Army statement reads.

The service will now be able to issue a contract option to Bell as it enters the engineering and manufacturing development phase, which, combined with the low-rate production phases, could be worth roughly $7 billion.

Textron Bell won the Army’s bid to build the FLRAA in late 2022 following a competition in which it and a Sikorsky-Boeing team flew technology demonstrators for several years to evaluate aircraft capabilities and drive out risk to a future program of record.

The FLRAA program’s initial unit has already been delayed by one year due to protests by Sikorsky’s parent company, Lockheed Martin, over the service’s choice of Textron Bell’s advanced tiltrotor design. Sikorsky and Boeing’s design featured coaxial rotor blades.

The Government Accountability Office rejected Lockheed’s protest in April 2023.

The Army will now equip the first unit with the capability in fiscal 2031. A limited user test is expected sometime in FY27 to FY28.

Reaching the engineering and manufacturing development phase is “an important step for FLRAA and demonstrates the Army’s commitment to our highest aviation modernization priority,” Doug Bush, the Army acquisition executive, said in the statement. “FLRAA will provide assault and MEDEVAC capabilities for the future Army, adding significantly increased speed, range, and endurance.”

The Army’s current fleet of helicopters will be incapable of meeting future distance requirements in places like the Indo-Pacific theater. The service wants the FLRAA to be capable of traveling roughly 2,440 nautical miles — or 2,810 miles — without refueling, but also be agile enough to maneuver troops into dangerous hot spots.

“Future battlefields require expanded [maneuvers], the ability to sustain and provide command and control across vast distances, and of course, evacuate our wounded,” Maj. Gen. Mac McCurry, the Army Aviation Center of Excellence commander, said in the statement. “All of these apply to both conventional and Special Operations Forces. With roughly twice the range and twice the speed, FLRAA brings unmatched combat capability to the Joint Force.”

The contract award in 2022 includes nine options — entering the engineering and manufacturing development phase means the Army will exercise the first option, under which Bell will deliver detailed aircraft design and build six prototypes.

The first aircraft in this phase is expected to fly in 2026, with low-rate initial production slated to begin in 2028.

“The Army will continue to review and refine the schedule as necessary based on the contract award and the latest program activities,” the statement notes.

The FLRAA program has set the standard for digital engineering from the beginning and has allowed for more rapid technology development and design.

“Using digital engineering as a key part of our ‘go slow to go fast’ approach has helped to accelerate the program by investing in requirements development up front,” said Col. Jeffrey Poquette, the service’s FLRAA project manager.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

19. Why Ukraine is obsessed with the U.S. sitcom 'Friends'

And now for something completely different.

Excerpt:

The popularity of Friends shows the power of American culture abroad, and in unusual places, making the United States a beacon to the rest of the world. Ukrainians have connected with Western values and culture – and rejected Russian versions – in no small part due to the cultural products like this famous sitcom. And many also cite the show as a way they tried to learn English.

Why Ukraine is obsessed with the U.S. sitcom 'Friends'

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/why-ukraine-is-obsessed-with-the?utm=

The comedy show is a classic in the U.S. But it also has a rabid fanbase in Ukraine, more than 4,000 miles from New York City, where ‘Friends’ is set. Here’s why:

Myroslava Tanska-Vikulova and Tim Mak

Aug 03, 2024

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Editor’s Note: Where else can you get this sort of reporting, linking the Ukrainian experience with the American one? Support our work as a bridge between cultures by upgrading to a paid subscription!

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The cast of Friends in front of an iconic fountain, June 15th 1994. (Photo by Reisig & Taylor/NBCU Photo Bank/NBCUniversal via Getty Images)

Anastasiia has watched the classic American sitcom ‘Friends’ so many times that, without exaggeration, she knows every moment of every episode.

Especially during this fraught time of war, she finds tranquility in the show: after all, even the bad things on Friends generally end on a happy note. 

Anastasiia in her ‘Friends’ T-shirt.

The popularity of Friends shows the power of American culture abroad, and in unusual places, making the United States a beacon to the rest of the world. Ukrainians have connected with Western values and culture – and rejected Russian versions – in no small part due to the cultural products like this famous sitcom. And many also cite the show as a way they tried to learn English.

In the late 90s and early 2000s, Friends was one of the first American sitcoms to appear on the Ukrainian market. That’s partly because the series is almost the same age as Ukrainian independence. It was shown on six TV channels, at different times throughout the day, with Ukrainian language dubbing. 

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Soon after Friends appeared on TV screens, it won the hearts of the nineties generation of young Ukrainians. And ever since, thanks to repeats and streaming services, it has been picking up new young devotees.

That means that despite having been off the air for nearly two decades, those fans buy all sorts of Friends merchandise and gather in themed cafes in Ukraine – showing how it may be even more popular in this country than in its native United States! 

Outside the Friends cafe in Kyiv, 2024 

For example, there is a cafe for fans of the TV series Friends in Kyiv near the Obolonska embankment, not far from the center of the capital. From the outside, the cafe is rather unremarkable. It certainly doesn't impress with its grandeur, like New York City itself. 

Inside the Friends cafe in Kyiv, 2024 

But inside, there’s an orange sofa with a large table for a group of... friends. Above the sofa are the words from the familiar theme song: "I'll be there for you.”

For a moment, it seems as if you are in the center of the Friends sitcom. Directly in front of you is a television with episodes of the show playing non-stop.  

Inside the Friends cafe in Kyiv, 2024.

Anastasiia Kravets is 26, so Friends was already on TV when she was born. At school, she saw some episodes of the series, but decided to watch it in its entirety only after she started the 10th grade. 

"At that time I was a fan of Justin Bieber, so I was fascinated by American culture, and the show conveys it in full," she told The Counteroffensive. 

Anastasiia also wanted to learn English. So she watched Friends in the original language. 

"Every year I watched it, my English got better, and the jokes got funnier. When I had a chance to watch just one episode, I watched it several times in a row. I still laugh out loud at the jokes," Anastasiia said. 

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It got to the point where Anastasiia now knows by heart what, where and when things happen on the show. She doesn't even have to watch it anymore, she can just listen to it in the background and know what's on the screen. 

Anastasiia compares herself to the character of Monica, saying she has the same love of cleanliness, cooking and eating. And much like the main character, she also deals with an eating disorder, as well as anxiety and the desire to win. 

"It is interesting that before my first year I had no love or desire to clean, but over time it became my specialty. And I wouldn't be surprised if I got that trait from Monica," Anastasiia said. 

Anastasiia at a restaurant in Portugal, May 2024.

According to Anastasiia, this is what makes the show so special and relatable: you see ordinary people, growing up in their 20s and early 30s. For Anastasiia, the atmosphere of the United States and New York City itself holds a special place in the show. 

"It is something different from our everyday life, it feels like looking through a crack [in the door]," she said.

Iryna Onyshchuk feels the same way. Now 24, she also started watching Friends in high school. 

"I googled a 3D map of the world and walked around New York to be on the same page as the characters. I was 14 or 15 years old, so don't put me on the crazy list," Iryna said with a laugh.

Iryna in Kyiv, 2022 

She didn't fall in love with the show right away: when she was little, she watched it on TV all the time, but only when it was on. Finally, one cold winter, she decided to watch the entire series.

"I didn't get out much, and the series is long, so I decided it was just what I needed right now. No wonder everyone loves it, I thought," Iryna told The Counteroffensive. 

And then she got addicted. At the height of her obsession, she "woke up in the morning and watched it till evening", and now she regularly turns on random episodes in the background while doing some household chores. 

"Friends" helps both Iryna and Anastasiia distract themselves during the war. For them, it creates a special feeling of peace and home. 

Such devotion and love for the American sitcom is explained by Yurii Povoroznyk, chief content editor at Sweet TV. He says that the series has a fairly relatable story for everyone: friends hanging out at a coffee shop, enduring the ups and downs of life.

"It's a much more understandable formula than the classic sitcoms that used to be released in the U.S., where the family is in the center," Yurii Povoroznyk said.

Yurii is convinced that the main reason for the show's immense popularity is that while the American market had a huge number of comedy shows, for Ukrainians Friends was the only sitcom.

“It's very simple: it's a show that we've seen and known for a long time, that was shown on television, that was dubbed in Ukrainian, that was broadcast on many channels,” Yurii said.

FRIENDS, "The One With The Embryos", Episode 12: Matt Le Blanc as Joey Tribbiani, Matthew Perry as Chandler Bing, Jennifer Aniston as Rachel Green, Courteney Cox as Monica Geller Photo by NBCUniversal via Getty Images.

Yurii pays special attention to the Ukrainian translation. Although many people now enjoy pointing out the mistakes in it, in the early 2000s it would have been very high quality and, most importantly, recognizable.

Friends was one of the first shows dubbed in the Ukrainian language.

"At that time, Ukrainian translation was already something so impressive, it was something new and unexpected. The fact that my friends spoke Ukrainian was a big part of its success," Yurii said. 

And the enduring popularity of this American sitcom once again shows how Ukraine — and particularly its younger generation — have a strong desire to be part of the Western world — separate from Russia, and uniquely Ukrainian.

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NEWS OF THE DAY: 

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

RUSSIA: EXCHANGE WON'T END UKRAINE WAR: The complicated, multi-country swap that brought Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan, Vladimir Kara-Murza and Alsu Kurmasheva home to the U.S. won't mark the end of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, or even a new stance on negotiations with the West.

If we are talking about Ukraine and more complex international problems, this is a completely different matter,” a Kremlin spokesperson told The Washington Post. The newspaper continued that this signals how “releasing prisoners was a low common denominator of mutual interests” rather than a sign of declining tensions.

UKRAINE FRETS OVER US-RUSSIA SWAP: Ukrainian officials worried that the recent prisoner exchange between Russia and America's partners could foreshadow future negotiations that might cut Kyiv out, WaPo reports. Ukraine has insisted that they be a party to any negotiations about its future.

However, even Ukraine has negotiated with Russia, such as...

THE DEAD, RETURNED: Ukraine said that it had received some 250 dead soldiers in a swap with Russia; the deal was mediated by the International Red Cross, reports VoA. In return, Ukraine sent 38 Russian bodies as part of the exchange. Some of the bodies were from soldiers who had fallen in Mariupol in the spring of 2022.

The location of Pokrovsk, the focus of Russian combat power this week.

RUSSIA FOCUSES ON POKROVSK: The Donetsk logistics hub of Pokrovsk is the center of Russian attacks, reports The Guardian. Civilians are fleeing the city, and evacuation requests have increased 10x in the past two weeks. Russia has gained about 57 square kilometers in just a week -- its third largest advance since April.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com