Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Nothing truly stops you. Nothing truly holds you back. For your own will is always within your control.”

– Epictetus

“… What about the main thing in life, all its riddles? If you want, I'll spell it out for you right now. Do not pursue what is illusionary -property and position: all that is gained at the expense of your nerves decade after decade, and is confiscated in one fell night. Live with a steady superiority over life -don't be afraid of misfortune, and do not yearn for happiness; it is, after all, all the same: the bitter doesn't last forever, and the sweet never fills the cup to overflowing. It is enough if you don't freeze in the cold and if thirst and hunger don't claw at your insides. If your back isn't broken, if your feet can walk, if both arms can bend, if both eyes can see, if both ears hear, then whom should you envy? And why? Our envy of others devours us most of all. Rub your eyes and purify your heart -and prize above all else in the world those who love you and who wish you well. Do not hurt them or scold them, and never part from any of them in anger; after all, you simply do not know: it may be your last act before your arrest, and that will be how you are imprinted on their memory.”

– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956

"Violence begins where knowledge ends."

– Abraham Lincoln

1. Commission on the National Defense Strategy (report released)

2. The Top International Relations Schools of 2024, Ranked

3. War is Not Just

4. Head of Project 2025 Steps Down Following Trump Criticism

5. Hamas operates ‘massive’ U.S. influence network, former FBI counterterror expert says

6. State Dept's Campbell: Gap between US, China shipbuilding is 'deeply concerning'

7. Acting Secret Service Chief Admits Security Failures Before Trump Shooting

8. Would the U.S. Consider Assassinating Putin?

9. Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy

10. Henry Huiyao Wang: China More Open is More Secure

11. US needs to double down on directed energy weapons

12. Army’s second-largest post to have its first female commander

13. Can Donald Trump really build an Iron Dome over America?

14. The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile

15. How Do You Train Five Thousand Future Army Officers for a Rapidly Changing Battlefield?

16. The UAE’s Secret War in Sudan

17. Is this unit the future of Army combat formations?

18. American Fury (political violence)

1. Commission on the National Defense Strategy (report released)

The report that we have seen referenced the last two days has been released.

The 132 page report can be accessed here:

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds_commission_final_report.pdf

The testimony of Senator Harmon and Ambassador Edelman can be viewed here:

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-findings-and-recommendations-of-the-commission-on-the-national-defense-strategy

I went right to my two biases: Special Operations (Special Forces) and Korea/Northeast Asia.

Here is the Special Operations main entry. There are other references to SOF as well but this is the most substantive entry.

Special Operations

During the Global War on Terrorism, the special operations community was at the forefront of the U.S. military response. The strategic environment has shifted, but special operations forces remain an essential tool of military power, both for their contributions to the remaining threat from violent extremists and because special operations forces have a vital role in great power competition—particularly in building influence with allies and partners and countering gray- zone threats.

Therefore, the Commission recommends preserving the special operations force structure and funding. However, we recommend that Army Special Forces in particular shift resources from counterterrorism and direct action to unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, and

foreign internal defense.

Although General Fenton was listed as appearing before the committee, I can find no one else listed on the commission or as members of the commission staff, or anyone else appearing before the committee with any substantive special operations expertise let alone Special Forces. If there had been, the report would not have included the last sentence highlighted in the paragraph abvet. Instead a Special Forces experienced staffer would have written "We recommend Special Forces sustain as its primary operations and strategic focus unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense which are its traditional and foundational missions because these are the most relevant missions to addressing the full range of threat from violent extremist organizations to support to large scale combat operations and to the political and irregular warfare requirements in support of strategic competition in the gray zone." While CT, DA, and SR are special operations activities that Special Forces have conducted or supported, they have never been the main Special Forces activity even during the Global War on Terrorism. It is Unconventional Warfare that informs and provides the foundation for all other activities that Special Forces may be called upon to conduct, from foreign Internal defense to counterterrorism.

Korea. The commission recognizes north Korea's malign activities and that it is part of the axis of revisionist and rogue powers and mentions it about 20 times throughout the report, mostly in lists of China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea (aI ma gratified to see recognized at least in this way).

Thi is the single most substantive entry in the report regarding north Korea.

In North Korea, Kim Jong Un remains committed to expanding the country’s nuclear weapon arsenal,20 estimated to consist of 30 or more nuclear warheads.21 North Korea remains aggressive in conducting missile launches and military demonstrations, including a successful space launch vehicle in 2023. The country has “raised military tensions with South Korea to an unprecedentedly high level”22 and, in at least some analysts’ view, has made a strategic decision to go to war.23

I would have recommended a succinct statement of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and described more than just the nuclear issue and the recent reports that some believe Kim has made the strategic decision to go to war. I would have described the "Korea question" and and I would have recommended that a new strategy is required that focuses on more than just denuclearization and employs a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea as the only path to denuclearization and ultimately peace and security in Northeast Asia.

And the Marine Corps gets high praise here:

U.S. Marine Corps

Of the services, the Marine Corps deserves the most credit for embracing the 2018 NDS’s direc- tion to refocus on great power competition and the nature of future warfighting. Despite the controversy, the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 offers a coherent way for the Marine Corps to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.16 The service deserves high marks for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves. As the United States confronts an increasingly tumultuous and unpredictable world, the Marine Corps’ role remains as important as ever, and the service needs to preserve its ability to respond quickly outside the

Indo-Pacific as the need arises.

Commission on the National Defense Strategy

https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html

Images by Adobe; Design by RAND

Congress established the Commission on the National Defense Strategy by statute to examine and make recommendations with respect to the National Defense Strategy. As part of the Commission's role, it conducted a review of the "assumptions, strategic objectives, priority missions, major investments in defense capabilities, force posture and structure, operational concepts, and strategic and military risks" associated with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (PDF). The Commission called on RAND to provide administrative and analytic support.

Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy

An "All Elements of National Power" Approach to Defense

The United States confronts the most serious and the most challenging threats since the end of World War II. The United States could in short order be drawn into a war across multiple theaters with peer and near-peer adversaries, and it could lose. The current National Defense Strategy (NDS), written in 2022, does not account for ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East and the possibility of a larger war in Asia. Continuing with the current strategy, bureaucratic approach, and level of resources will weaken the United States’ relative position against the gathering, and partnering, threats it faces. In its report, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy recommends a sharp break with the way the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) does business and embraces an “all elements of national power” approach to national security. It recommends spending smarter and spending more across the national security agencies of government.

The United States was slow to recognize the threat of terrorism before 2001 and late to understand the rising strength of China and the renewed menace posed by Russia. According to the Commission, the time to make urgent and major change is now. That change will mean fundamental alterations to the way DoD operates, the strategic focus of other government agencies, and the functionality of Congress, as well as closer U.S. engagement with allies and mobilization of the public and private sectors. The Commission presents its unanimous conclusions and recommendations on how to accomplish these changes in its report.

Commission Findings and Recommendations for Policymakers

In its report, the Commission makes the following findings and recommendations for DoD and Congress:

The United States faces the most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications since the end of the Cold War. The trends are getting worse, not better.
DoD cannot, and should not, provide for the national defense by itself. The NDS calls for an “integrated deterrence” that is not reflected in practice today. A truly “all elements of national power” approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DoD, the rest of the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.
Fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental change in how DoD functions. DoD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat is approaching wartime urgency.
The NDS force-sizing construct is inadequate for today’s needs and tomorrow’s challenges. We propose a Multiple Theater Force Construct—with the Joint Force, in conjunction with U.S. allies and partners—sized to defend the homeland and tackle simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.
U.S. industrial production is grossly inadequate to provide the equipment, technology, and munitions needed today, let alone given the demands of great power conflict.
The DoD workforce and the all-volunteer force provide an unmatched advantage. However, recruiting failures have shrunk the force and raise serious questions about the all-volunteer force in peacetime, let alone in major combat. The civilian workforces at DoD and in the private sector also face critical shortfalls.
The Joint Force is at the breaking point of maintaining readiness today. Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild readiness will cause it to break.
The United States must spend more effectively and more efficiently to build the future force, not perpetuate the existing one. Additional resources will be necessary. Congress should pass a supplemental appropriation to begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial base. Additionally, Congress should revoke the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act spending caps and provide real growth for fiscal year 2025 defense and nondefense national security spending that, at bare minimum, falls within the range recommended by the 2018 NDS Commission. Subsequent budgets will require spending that puts defense and other components of national security on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.

Source: Commission on the National Defense Strategy

For questions or further information, please email NDSInquiries@rand.org.

2. The Top International Relations Schools of 2024, Ranked

Georgetown remains consistently near the top of all categories (undergraduate and graduate - masters and PhD) and remains the number one masters program in all three categories: International relations faculty, Policymakers, Think tank staffers

See the categories and lists at this link: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/30/international-relations-school-rankings-university-undergraduate-masters-phd-programs/#anchor-4

The Top International Relations Schools of 2024, Ranked

Foreign Policy · by Irene Entringer García Blanes, Susan Peterson, Michael J. Tierney

The Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute has long partnered with Foreign Policy to create a reputational ranking of academic programs in international relations. Over the past two decades, our process has remained simple and consistent: We ask IR professionals what they think are the five best places to study for an undergraduate, terminal master’s, and doctoral degree.

In our most recent survey on the topic, conducted from October 2022 to January 2023, we received responses from 979 IR scholars across the United States, 294 staff affiliated with U.S. think tanks, and 291 policymakers who worked in the U.S. government during the George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. For the first time, we also asked respondents which Ph.D. programs are best for a student interested in a policy career, rather than an academic one. As the number of tenure-track positions in universities declines and the demand for expertise within the policy community increases, this question is more relevant today than ever before.

JUMP TO CATEGORY

Undergraduate Programs

These results should look familiar to those who follow national undergraduate rankings. Ivy League schools, Stanford University, the University of Chicago, and a few large public universities were favored across the board. But a handful of outliers punched well above their weight: Georgetown University, American University, George Washington University, Tufts University, and William & Mary all placed much higher here compared with their rankings in U.S. News & World Report, widely considered the most influential college ranking in the United States. In fact, Georgetown stands out as the top undergraduate choice among policymakers and think tank staff.

Master’s Programs

For master’s students hoping to pursue a policy career, all three groups we surveyed expressed a preference for programs on the East Coast. Only a few schools located west of the Rocky Mountains made the top 20 in each list. Respondents also highlighted several options outside the United States in the top 20: IR faculty included four international programs, while policymakers included five—all located in Europe—and think tankers included eight, one of which is in Asia.

Ph.D. Programs for Academics

IR faculty members’ rankings of Ph.D. programs have proved remarkably stable over the years. Between our 2017 survey and our most recent one, no top 15 program has moved more than one spot in either direction; in fact, most held the same rank. Additionally, policymakers and think tank staff appeared to value academic Ph.D. programs located in Washington, D.C., and outside the United States much more than U.S.-based IR scholars did.

Ph.D. Programs for Policymakers

When asked about doctoral students pursuing a policy career, all three groups we surveyed showed a preference for institutions with strong connections to Washington. Schools such as George Washington University, Georgetown University, and American University are ranked higher for students pursuing policy careers than for those hoping to enter academia. Conversely, institutions such as the University of Chicago and Massachusetts Institute of Technology are ranked lower for policy careers than academic ones. This shift highlights the importance of proximity to policy centers and the availability of practical engagement opportunities in shaping perceptions of a program’s value for a policy-oriented career in IR.

Advice to Prospective Students

Prospective students would do well to explore the specific features of various programs rather than focusing solely on a broad reputational ranking, which tells us little about a program’s regional, functional, or methodological strengths. For example, both academic and policymaker respondents who specialize in international political economy and/or trade policy ranked the London School of Economics master’s program higher than respondents who focus on security policy. Similarly, academics who specialize in the study of Latin America ranked the University of California, Berkeley Ph.D. program higher for an academic career than their non-Latin Americanist colleagues.

Still, prospective students should keep in mind that reputation matters. Although reputation may be an imperfect indicator of quality, it is a strong indicator of perceived quality within the field. A program’s standing can have conscious and unconscious effects on graduate school admissions committees, scholarship committees, and hiring managers in the public, private, and higher education sectors. For this reason, our ranking provides a systematic measure of these perceptions to assist prospective students in making informed choices as they plan for their future.

Advancing a Global Affairs Career

The intersection of large-scale challenges and technological advancements demands a broader range of knowledge and skills from international relations professionals. Learn about the impact this is having on employment trends in the latest FP Graduate School Guide.

Foreign Policy · by Irene Entringer García Blanes, Susan Peterson, Michael J. Tierney

3. War is Not Just

A thought provoking essay that I think should generate some important discussion.

Tue, 07/30/2024 - 4:00pm

War is Not Just

By L. Lance Boothe

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/war-not-just

Let us discuss war as it is, not as we would like it to be. Regulating war is pointless, and our time and energy would be better spent fighting war quickly, decisively, and with single-minded ruthlessness rather than fretting over ethics. Acting as if law applies to war is a foolish hinderance on its conduct. War drives toward extremes. War should go to these extremes as quickly as possible where it is fought in such a vicious manner that it persuades enemies and neutrals alike that war with us is not worth waging. After all, the victor writes history – “What I have written I have written,” the infamous Pontius Pilate declared[1] – and in so doing the narrative is established.

The justness of the cause in war depends on perspective. As the Athenians told the Melians in 416 B.C. according to Thucydides, “justice is only a factor in human decisions when the parties are on equal footing. Those in positions of power do what their power permits, while the weak have no choice but to accept it.”[2] Melian independence meant nothing to Athens. The Athenians pursued their own interests. They were justified in their own eyes. Subsequently, Athens made quick work of Melos, killing every man on the island and enslaving the rest. “History teaches us what human beings are like in reality rather than what we would like them to be,”[3] affirming Niccolo Machiavelli’s observation that “a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous.”[4] Likewise, “history shows that some men are willing to do evil in order to accomplish good”[5] – good, certainly as they see it, whether in pursuit of self-interest (defensive, economic, or ideological), dominating the uncivilized (bringing order to chaos), or just not being afraid to do the Lord’s work (ensuring others reap what they sow). That post-modern man[6] cannot seem to come to grips with the paradox of doing evil to achieve good demonstrates a failure in appreciating the human condition. Thus, betraying a profoundly anti-human sentiment, which seeks to alter our nature – selfish and cruel, yet altruistic and just. And when we think we are better than our ancestors and making high-minded ethical progress to alter human nature through law and social contract, the verdict of history says we are not.

Carl von Clausewitz, the West’s foremost apostle of war, claims “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”[7] The “continuation of policy” part from his most famous aphorism means pursuit of power. As Clausewitz elaborates, the object of war is to impose one’s will on the enemy – thus the realization of power. [8] The “by other means” part is euphemism for using violence to achieve the “policy,” or stratagem, to gain power. Clausewitz expounds on this point with unerring logic throughout the rest of his work – a book oft cited, yet seldom read (particularly by those who claim soldiering as their profession). His logic: the end in war is power over one’s enemy; to achieve that end, one uses unmitigated violence; therefore, the end is not justified by the means, power is its own justification. War is about power. Let us hold that thought for now.

Back to Niccolo, when but a young lad under the tutelage of the Dominican firebrand Girolamo Savonarola and on his way to a privileged position in the clerisy, an abrupt lesson in power at the hands of the Pope and the Florentine establishment forever altered Niccolo’s course. Thus, opening his eyes to the world as it really is, not as he thought it to be. After watching his mentor, the moral crusader Savonarola, put to death by the Grandees of Florence, it dawned on Machiavelli that the establishment is not interested in morality, only power. When morality became inconvenient to their ends, it was swept aside. And a poor, austere, and pious monk went to the gallows for the inconvenience of his sanctimony. Machiavelli looking on wept. Thereafter, Machiavelli put away childish things as St Paul admonishes,[9] and Niccolo sought to understand and explain how power and its corollary war works.

Machiavelli is best known for his opus magnum The Prince, a work generally considered amoral. Many readers assume The Prince provides a window into Niccolo’s soul. Perhaps. Though such perceptions do the man and realpolitik little justice. But of more interest and less renown than The Prince are Machiavelli’s writings on the art of war.[10] Once the reader gets beyond the dialogue format and anachronism of 16th Century and ancient warfare, Machiavelli’s insistence on the superiority of the Roman way of war reveals much. For Machiavelli war is amoral. War is an endeavor only taken out of necessity “for the acquisition of glory.”[11] The ancients found glory necessary. Glory conveys power. The ambition of the powerful drives societies to excel through violence (a truth Machiavelli discovered at the end of Savonarola’s rope). And this brings us back to the cold, hard logic of war.

When we last left Clausewitz, a Machiavellian adherent, his most famous aphorism was invoked. Let us summarize his logic in a few simple syllogisms. Power is to impose one’s will on another. In war, combatants seek to impose their will on each other, ergo the objective of war is power. Violence is used to obtain power. In war, violence is killing. Killing breaks the will of one’s enemy to resist. Therefore, killing is war. In war, violence occurs to impose will, ergo war is killing to attain power.

Killing has precious little to do with morality. In fact, by the commands of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, killing is forbidden. Thou shall not kill.[12] This command is unequivocal, literally written in stone. To look to the Judeo-Christian ethos for justification in killing is a fool’s errand. Regardless, in some military and policy circles this errand has become a Grail Quest; enter “Just War Theory.”

The twin pillars of the theory are jus ad bellum and jus in bello – a right to war and the right conduct of war. Accordingly, for a war to be “right” it must be waged by legitimate authority for a true cause and with right intentions, which, of course, conveys the “right” on one participant (or group thereof) to slaughter their opponent(s). As to the second pillar, the slaughter must be governed. After all, let us not be the base creatures that we are. The brutality of war must be mitigated; therefore, war should and must be governed by rules.

Where did all this high-mindedness originate? Stepping back in time, again, we come to the 5th Century A.D. and the diocese of St Augustine of Hippo. In his opus magnum, The City of God, Book XIX, Chapter 7 to be exact, the regal St Augustine declares,

the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will rather lament the fact that he is faced with the necessity of waging just wars; for if they were not just, he would not have to engage in them, and consequently there would be no wars for a wise man. For it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars; and this injustice is assuredly to be deplored by a human being, since it is the injustice of human beings, even though no necessity for war should arise from it.

For St Augustine, war is necessary, but not, and you are making it necessary for me to fight you because you are unjust! In fact, your injustice compels me to a duty to wage war against you, ergo you are forcing me to slaughter you against my better nature; such is the wisdom of St Augustine. Machiavelli and Clausewitz would find this reasoning specious. Julius Caesar would smile.

St Augustine is considered the greatest mind of Christianity. According to eminent scholars, an incalculable intellectual and moral debt to St Augustine has incurred as the man who is “the true creator of Western theology,” laying “the foundation of Western culture” and standing “between the ancient world and the Middle Ages as the first great constructive thinker of the Western Church, dominating like a pyramid antiquity and succeeding ages.”[13] For Eduard Norden, the foremost Latinist of his time, “[St Augustine’s] philosophic-historical work remains one of the most imposing creations of all time; it posits a capacity and originality of mind which none other possessed either in his own day or for a thousand years after.”[14] High praise, indeed, coming from the esteemed Norden. So, upon a few sentences from St Augustine, and the magnificent edifice of his creation, hangs all the law and the prophets for “Just War” theorists.

Surely, there is more than an appeal to the authority of a great theologian upon which to concoct an elaborate schema to moralize the immoral and govern the ungovernable that is war? Unfortunately, no. Tossing around a couple Latin phrases and attaching self-serving criteria to them no matter how voluminous, erudite, and pious, does not a valid construct make. A few sentences penned over 1500 years ago from a great man, and far be it for us to cast judgement on either the man or his work, do not make war just, nor explain who has legitimate authority to wage it. Inferring, as St Augustine does, that only the proper authorities should have a monopoly on violence does not make it so, much less confer on them an exclusive right to war – jus ad bellum.

What constitutes legitimacy? Ink on paper? Perhaps 535 + 1 self-serving politicians as found in our res publica? Or is it a potentate ennobled as First Citizen? Or the Pope in Rome? Or a shaman blowing sounds of the rainforest onto the heads of silly rich people at Davos? Speaking of Davos, perhaps just being fabulously wealthy conveys legitimacy. After all, he who has the gold, makes the rules. If none of this seems terribly legitimate, then maybe legitimacy can be found in We the People. Of course, that can never go off the rails – recall the Melian Dialogue mentioned previously? Let us consider something a bit more recent like Gaza. There a terrorist organization gets voted into power through the people exercising democracy in true Islamic fashion – one vote, one time, one way. Hamas terrorists then proceed to murder any opponents to their rule and go on to commit the most horrific atrocities in recent memory; all with the acquiescence of Palestinians living in Gaza who – of their own volition – put Hamas in power. The uncomfortable truth, which we need to get comfortable with, is that everyone is justified in their own eyes. This is nowhere more apt than with Hamas in specific and with governments in general, elected or not. Those in power are going to do whatever they want to do, and under the color of law (or not), calling it legit. As the Athenians explained to the Melians, “we…know that people always seek to rule whenever they can. It is in their very nature.”[15] We would do best before appealing to the authority of a mob to remember Oliver Cromwell’s rebuke to the Rump Parliament (ironically, that he installed): an immovable legislature is more obnoxious than an immovable king; “you have sat too long for any good you have been doing ... In the name of God, go!”[16] The last time our Congress bothered to abide by the Constitution and issue a declaration of war was 11 December 1941, yet how many wars have we fought since? Like Cromwell’s Rump Parliament, the incumbents of our Congress have sat too long for any good they have done, so in the name of God, do go. We can lie to ourselves but let us not lie to each other. The legitimacy of Congress is but a veneer, and a weak one at that, and the imprimis of its members who too often demonstrate scant willingness to be ruled by law, the very law they make, hardly confers on them a right to war through resolutions authorizing the use of force.

As if the first pillar of Just War Theory was not questionable enough, the second stands in the realm of delusion compounded by hypocrisy. Clausewitz exposes it best:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of intellect. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war.

This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile – even wrong – to try and shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality…To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdly.[17]

Before fixating on Carl’s reference to “limiting factors” from the “counterpoises inherent in war,” know that he is talking about the physical limitations of muzzle loading firearms and operations at the speed of foot and galloping horse on the conduct of war, not high-minded constraints imposed on combatants by some council, synod, or convention. Declarations from these assemblies seeking to govern war are the naïve constructs of sincere men with misplaced sensibilities, most of whom would not know war if they found themselves in one. The counterpoises inherent to modern warfare are far different in speed, scope, autonomy, and lethality than whose of the 19th Century, and the tender sensibilities of well-intentioned people reflected in conventions or treaties are not going to limit them. Their counsel in matters of life and death need not be countenanced. For as Clausewitz points out, in war, their type of folly is the worst.[18] To overcome war’s peril requires us to be clear eyed, calculating, ruthless, and lucky.

Unilaterally constraining our actions and prohibiting the use of certain weapons in the face of enemies who employ all means at their disposal in war and operate without constraint courts disaster and invites defeat. Does any serious American citizen believe Hamas acts with restraint? Or Vladimir Putin? How about the Communist Chinese when they decide to invade Taiwan? Do we really believe that Iran will not use nuclear weapons, if they had them? Who do we believe they would target, just combatants? Of course not, so let us put away ill-conceived notions about fair play and rules in war. It is important, nay, essential to our survival, to see our adversaries as they really are, and accept that they will do their worst, forcing us to up the ante.

In battle, reality reigns supreme. War is an act of force, and there is no limit to its application.[19] Our policymakers and military leaders must stop acting as if the battlefield (or target area) is inundated with innocents to be avoided. As the Hamas-Israel War is exposing, this perception is unmoored from reality – 75% of Gazan Palestinians support Hamas (up 5% since the war began) and “more than 90% believe that Hamas did not commit any atrocities against Israel civilians during its October the 7th offensive.”[20] History shows that war has always been the nation, tribe, or clan in arms. Clausewitz proves right again. We fool ourselves to believe otherwise. Such cognitive dissonance is particularly pernicious in the danger to which it exposes our soldiers. When policymakers and military leaders become preoccupied with collateral damage (euphemism for killing the “wrong” people), rules of engagement, and unrealistic convention prohibitions, they mire soldiers in a Sisyphean feat. This wastes lives and ordnance and compounds the task at hand, risking mission failure, or at best, garnering inconclusive results. This seems all too often the point. Utopians seek to ban mankind’s most brutal manifestation by making war too hard to wage as they suppose. Disabusing Utopian notions and exposing their pusillanimity is a topic for another time. Suffice it to say, the human experience is tragic, and no amount of regulation will change this fact – a Hobbesian world it is, and a Hobbesian world it shall remain[21] – and power accepts no challenge to it, discarding any rule which stands in its way. Nowhere is power more manifest than in war. Nor is war a court of law with due process governing its administration. There is no presumption of innocence on the battlefield and no protection of rights. There are those doing the fighting (that is to say the killing), those in the way, and those supporting the combatants either directly or indirectly, tacitly or otherwise, and everyone is fair game – welcome to the jungle.

The hard truth is despite our best intentions and efforts to mitigate war’s savagery, we will always be compelled to apply greater force. War is a zero-sum game as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur reminds us. “In war there is no substitute for victory.”[22] If the worst general in American history can figure it out, we have no excuse. We knew this at one time. It led our forefathers to firebomb cities, culminating in two atomic strikes to end the most destructive war in world history. These men did what had to be done so that we could enjoy liberty and prosperity today, establishing the United States as the most powerful country on earth. Let us be thankful that they were willing to do evil to accomplish good.

Also, let us be honest. Those who would impose restrictions on war, with few exceptions, endanger someone else’s kid or spouse. Their hypocrisy is deplorable. And when the chips are truly down and their power (or life) is at stake, whatever piques of conscience they may have had that led to their remonstrations on war and somber calls for restraint are conveniently discarded in the name of expediency. Black sites, drone strikes on US citizens (their constitutional rights be damned!), indefinite incarceration with imperceptible due process for those captured abroad, and “righteous” strikes on those who are merely suspect, producing collateral damage within sovereign nations where no war is declared as our Constitution mandates, smacks of such hypocrisy and conceit of power that any pretext to the rule of law is appalling and darkly comical. Power is capricious and arbitrary indeed. War is dangerous and ugly enough. Let us not compound it with hypocrisy.

For the moralists of jus ad bellum et jus in bello doctrina, put away the sanctimony. While no doubt St Augustine had the solace of his conscience as he starved to death under Vandal assault on his beloved Hippo Regius, had it been within his power and ability at the time to carpet bomb the invaders, collateral damage within Numidia would have been the last thing on his mind. Lacking power to save himself, St Augustine perished, and with him the way of life he cherished. War is a rough schoolmaster indeed.[23] The US military is not composed of theologians or warrior monks, nor would we want it to be. The men and women in service to our country are ordinary people placed at times into the extraordinary circumstance of war where they are called upon to do evil to accomplish good. St Augustine would appreciate the paradox and so ought we.

Power respects power, and in war, might is right. Fight war quickly and ruthlessly, as it will devolve into brutality anyway, and in the process the message will be sent to adversaries, neutrals, and even friends alike that war with us is not worth waging.

[1] John 19:22 (KJV)

[2] Thucydides, How to Think About War, selected, translated, and introduced by Johanna Hanink (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), pg. 169.

[3] Ibid., pg. 276.

[4] Arthur Herman, The Cave and the Light (New York: Random House, 2013), pg. 261.

[5] Ibid., pg. 277.

[6] Post-modernism is characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power. “In postmodern times…humans turned their gaze inwards, looking at themselves in the mirror: in there, inside the subjective experience of reality, the constructed Truth was created. They renounced the metaphysical, the objective and even Truth with a capital T altogether: the time of Great Narratives ended, and individual freedom, creativity and self-fulfillment became the new Holy Grail.” https://thecorrespondent.com/343/post-postmodern-human-aware-of-everything-willing-to-change-nothing

[7] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pg. 87.

[8] Ibid., pg. 75.

[9] 1 Corinthians 13:11 (KJV)

[10] Machiavelli wrote his political treatise The Prince in 1513 as a guide on how to acquire and keep power based on his experience as foreign secretary in Florence during the Medici dynasty. His work The Art of War written in 1521, one of the few published during his lifetime, is presented as a dialogue between humanists regarding war. The Roman Army is deemed the model of military excellence to be emulated if warfare is to be successful. Clausewitz considered Machiavelli’s The Art of War authoritative, and it has since achieved a prominent place in writings on the theory and conduct of war.

[11] Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, translated by Neal Wood (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1965), pg. 19.

[12] Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17; Matthew 5:21; Mark 10:19; Luke 18:20; Romans 13:9; James 2:11 (KJV)

[13] Hugh Nibley, The World and the Prophets (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1987), pg. 80.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Thucydides, How to Think About War, pg. 185.

[16] https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentaryauthority/civilwar/overview/rump-dissolved/

[17] Clausewitz, On War, pg. 75-76.

[18] Ibid., pg. 75.

[19] Ibid., pg. 77.

[20] https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/969; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/03/22/poll-hamas-remains-popular-among-palestinians/; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/poll-over-70-palestinians-still-maintain-hamas-correct-to-commit-oct-7-atrocities/; https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/mar/22/over-70-palestinians-say-oct-7-hamas-attack-israel/; https://allarab.news/over-70-of-palestinians-approve-of-hamas-invasion-on-oct-7-recent-poll-shows/

[21] Thomas Hobbes is a 17th Century philosopher, scientist, and historian who is best know for his treatise on political philosophy Leviathan in which he argues the main purpose of government is to provide security for society. Social contract between government and the governed is the best way to regulate liberty to ensure domestic tranquility and order. Men are selfish and debased creatures whose existence would descend into the chaos of anarchy without the constraints of government (and religion). Hobbes contends that life for most of humanity without peace and order is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” deriving the term Hobbesian world or existence. His decidedly negative view of mankind and how government should be organized to avoid civil war and guarantee order is shaped by his experience with the English Civil Wars and subsequent Long Parliament of which he wrote a history. Hobbes concludes that war comes more naturally to humans than political order.

[22] MacArthur, Douglas. Farewell Address to Congress, 19 April 1951; https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm

[23] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by C. F. Smith (Cambridge: Loeb Classic Library Harvard University Press, 1920), III:LXXXII.

About the Author(s)

Lewis Lance Boothe

Lewis Lance Boothe is a specialist in Field Artillery weapon systems, munitions, organization, and operations and the senior Concepts Developer in the Concepts Development Division of the US Army Fires Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Mr. Boothe is a retired Field Artillery Officer and veteran of Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, and Bosnia.

4. Head of Project 2025 Steps Down Following Trump Criticism

As I look at Project 2025 and some of the techniques that are being employed by supporters, I see some ironic parallels to Saul Alinsky's Rules for Radicals which of course are usually associated with the radical left, not the radical right.

"Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have."

"Never go outside the experience of your people."

"Whenever possible go outside of the experience of the enemy."

"Make the enemy live up to its own book of rules."

"Ridicule is man's most potent weapon. There is no defense. It is almost impossible to counterattack ridicule. Also it infuriates the opposition, who then react to your advantage."

"A good tactic is one your people enjoy."

"A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag."

"Keep the pressure on."

"The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself."

"The major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain a constant pressure upon the opposition."

"If you push a negative hard and deep enough it will break through into its counterside; this is based on the principle that every positive has its negative."

"The price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative."

"Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it."

Head of Project 2025 Steps Down Following Trump Criticism

The group had set an agenda for a second Trump term but was criticized by the former president

https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/project-2025-head-steps-down-89cba52b?mod=latest_headlines

By Andrew Restuccia

and Vivian Salama

Updated July 30, 2024 3:54 pm ET

Paul Dans, director of the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 PHOTO: DOMINIC GWINN/ZUMA PRESS

WASHINGTON—The Heritage Foundation official who leads Project 2025, the conservative road map for the next Republican administration, is stepping down after former President Donald Trump and his aides publicly criticized the group and Democrats decried its proposals as radical and dangerous.

Paul Dans, the group’s director, informed Heritage Foundation staff this week of his decision to step down, according to people familiar with the discussions. Dans didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Trump campaign senior advisers Susie Wiles and Chris LaCivita pounced on the news. “Reports of Project 2025’s demise would be greatly welcomed and should serve as notice to anyone or any group trying to misrepresent their influence with President Trump and his campaign—it will not end well for you,” they said in a statement.

In recent weeks, Wiles made calls to Heritage officials asking them to lower Project 2025’s profile, according to people familiar with the discussions. LaCivita made his distaste for the group known at the Republican National Convention this month when he called Project 2025 a “pain in the ass.”

With the departure of Dans, a significant component of Project 2025—its policy-focused work—will soon come to an end, according to Heritage Foundation officials. But Project 2025 won’t be disbanded. Instead, the group will now largely focus on its efforts to build a personnel database of conservative officials who are seeking jobs in government.

“The work of this project was due to wrap up with the nominating conventions of the political parties,” Dans wrote in a note to staff, according to a copy of the document reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. “Our work is presently winding down, and I plan later in August to leave Heritage.”

Project 2025’s Key Architect on Its Radical Vision for Trump’s Second Term

Play video: Project 2025’s Key Architect on Its Radical Vision for Trump’s Second Term

The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 is a radical blueprint for a future Republican administration. Here’s an inside look at its most controversial policy proposals and how it could transform the American government. Photo: Annie Zhao

Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts will take over Project 2025’s operations. “We are extremely grateful for his and everyone’s work on Project 2025 and dedication to saving America,” Roberts said of Dans. “Our collective efforts to build a personnel apparatus for policymakers of all levels—federal, state, and local—will continue.” The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, spearheaded Project 2025, but the effort was endorsed by more than 100 right-leaning groups.

Democrats have aggressively targeted Project 2025, picking apart the group’s 900-plus-page book of policy proposals. The book lays out a sweeping governing agenda based on the input of hundreds of conservative leaders. Policy proposals the group have put forward include: eliminating or significantly shrinking the Education Department; ending diversity, equity and inclusion programs; imposing additional restrictions on abortion, including by undoing the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the abortion pill Mifepristone; and imposing tougher work requirements for food stamps.

Trump has taken steps to distance himself from Project 2025, which isn’t part of the campaign, as Democrats gained traction in raising public awareness about the agenda.

During a rally in Grand Rapids, Mich., in July, Trump said the project was drafted by “some on the right—severe right,” and that he knew some of the people involved but not all of them. In an earlier social-media post he described some of the things the group proposed as “absolutely ridiculous and abysmal.”

Trump has criticized Project 2025, but many of his former staff are involved with it. PHOTO: ANNA MONEYMAKER/GETTY IMAGES

Trump has privately expressed annoyance that Project 2025 has received so much attention, and he resents the notion that the group is ghostwriting his policies and choosing candidates to fill the top ranks of his administration, according to associates.

Though Trump has criticized Project 2025, many of his former staff are involved with it. Some—but not all—of the ideas the group has embraced echo policies Trump has endorsed on the campaign trail or promoted while he was in the White House.

“Project 2025 is on the ballot because Donald Trump is on the ballot. This is his agenda, written by his allies, for Donald Trump to inflict on our country,” said Julie Chavez Rodriguez, Vice President Kamala Harris’s campaign manager. “Hiding the 920-page blueprint from the American people doesn’t make it less real.”

Project 2025 started in April 2022, before any candidate had formally launched a 2024 presidential campaign. It is is composed of four parts: the 900-plus-page book, which is called “Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise”; the personnel database that collects résumés from conservatives around the country who want to serve in the next administration; a training academy that prepares potential political appointees to work in government; and a series of 180-day policy plans for every federal agency.

Alex Leary contributed to this article.

Write to Andrew Restuccia at andrew.restuccia@wsj.com

5. Hamas operates ‘massive’ U.S. influence network, former FBI counterterror expert says

An interesting thesis and allegation. Any hostile organization would be foolish not to attempt to infiltrate and influence.

More broadly as the article notes, they use multiple groups to try to influence what is arguably the most vulnerable country in the world to influence operations, the U.S.

Hamas operates ‘massive’ U.S. influence network, former FBI counterterror expert says

Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian militants infiltrate and influence federal government

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

Premium

By - The Washington Times - Tuesday, July 30, 2024

The Palestinian militant group Hamas operates an extensive network of supporters in the U.S. linked to the international Muslim Brotherhood jihadist group, according to a report by a former federal counterterrorism expert.

John D. Guandolo, a former FBI agent and former Pentagon counterterrorism strategist who has studied the global Islamist movement extensively, stated in a new report that both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) are engaged in ideological attacks on the U.S. system and pose major internal security threats.

Hamas influence operations can be seen throughout the U.S. in the spate of anti-Israel protests following the group’s Oct. 7 terrorist attack in Israel that killed some 1,200 people and ignited a war in the Gaza Strip.

One key feature of the Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood activities is a close alliance with Marxist and communist groups in the U.S., the report contends. It report said recent pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations in cities and on college campuses across the country should serve as a warning.

“The recent protests across college campuses and U.S. cities by communists and jihadis highlight the need for communities to identify and root out these hostile elements,” Mr. Guandolo said in an interview. “All of the jihadi attacks in the United States since and including Sept. 11, 2001, have been perpetrated with the direct help and involvement of organizations easily identifiable in this hostile U.S. Islamic movement.”

The report author, a graduate of the Naval Academy, was a Marine Corps combat officer in the first Persian Gulf war. He was an FBI special agent from 1996 to 2008 and worked from 2001 as a counterterrorism specialist focused on the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic doctrine and the global Islamist movement. He was designated a subject matter expert by the FBI in 2006 and implemented a government-wide program of counterterrorism training.

In 2008, he joined the Pentagon as a strategic analyst on the global Islamic movement. He left government in 2012 and created Understanding the Threat, a counterterrorism analysis firm.

Based on his research, Mr. Guandolo said Hamas and MB have been using both nonviolent and violent protests, along with intelligence-gathering and influence operations in effort spanning more than 60 years of covert operations, to shape government policy and public opinion in the U.S.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a shadowy international organization created in Egypt in 1928. It defines itself as a global revolutionary Islamic movement working to establish an Islamic state or caliphate under Islamic law.

Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, was created in 1987 by the Muslim Brotherhood as a political movement with an armed wing that opposes Israel and refuses to recognize the Jewish state’s legitimacy.

Both groups to date have successfully deflected counterterrorism restrictions and law enforcement action by claiming to pursue nonviolent yet potentially illegal methods, the report states.

“Where ’the rubber meets the road’ in towns all around America, communist and MB/Hamas organizations and leaders work to undermine liberty, erode effective security measures, and destroy the republican form of government demanded by the U.S. Constitution,” the report said.

Islamist radicals often have positioned themselves as exclusive advisers to federal and state agencies responsible for protecting Americans at home and abroad.

“This is extremely dangerous and problematic for U.S. national security since the vast majority of Muslims working inside the U.S. government and/or providing guidance and influence can easily be identified as leaders or members of Hamas/Muslim Brotherhood entities, or possessing an ideology consistent with them,” the report said.

Those sympathetic to Hamas within the government can exercise influence over U.S. foreign policies, domestic counterterrorism strategies, and military war-fighting training and strategies regarding Islamic adversaries, the report said. The influence networks can pressure government officials against speaking out regarding the Islamic political movement.

“This danger is further exacerbated by the fact military and civilian leaders in the United States have little understanding of this network, the doctrine driving it, and its modus operandi,” the report said.

Midwest roots

In the U.S., elements of the Muslim Brotherhood or its ideological sympathizers are based in Illinois, Indiana and Michigan, with Hamas having a headquarters in Chicago, the report said. The report identifies 29 Muslim Brotherhood groups that were created in the U.S. since the 1960s.

Details in the report on Hamas activities and supporters were derived from court case filings and prosecutions of terrorists and groups over the past two decades.

One key case was the 2008 prosecution of the Dallas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. Five former leaders of the Muslim charity were convicted in 2008 of funneling more than $12 million to Hamas.

According to the report, the Muslim Brotherhood, while amorphous in structure, is leading the Islamic movement in the U.S. It has branches in some 70 countries, some of which have been officially designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. government.

This movement “is well entrenched in American society, operating in the open, and waging total war along multiple lines of operation against the United States,” the report said.

“Without immediate and significant action taken at the state and local levels against the intensive, continuous, and withering attacks being waged by the jihadis, there is little chance for victory,” Mr. Guandolo said.

The 33-page report, “The Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood Network in the United States,” was published on July 4 and was produced in response to Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack. It is available at JohnGuandolo.com.

The report lists numerous cases of Hamas-linked influence agents including several in the U.S. government.

They include Maher Bitar, the current White House National Security Council intelligence director. Mr. Bitar is identified in the report as a Palestinian who at one time worked with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, known as UNRWA.

Mr. Bitar did not immediately respond to an email request for comment.

Israeli military leaders say their operations in Gaza since Oct. 7 have uncovered records showing that some UNRWA personnel actively collaborated with Hamas terrorists.

Mr. Guandolo’s report identified the Council on American Islamic Relations as a “leading Hamas organization” in the U.S. CAIR has worked with numerous leftist and communist groups “to advance their objectives and create instability inside U.S. communities and local and state governments,” the report said, including sponsoring anti-war rallies and pro-Hamas, anti-Israel protests.

CAIR also worked with the Marxist group ANSWER in the past. ANSWER, short for Act Now to Stop War and End Racism, sponsored the protests last week near Union Station that included burning a U.S. flag and raising a Palestinian flag in its place. Anti-Israel protesters supporting Palestinians defaced statues last week to protest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Congress.

ANSWER describes itself as an anti-imperialist organization made up of socialists, communists, civil rights advocates, and left-wing organizations from the Muslim, Arab, Palestinian, Filipino, Haitian, and Latin American communities.

CAIR on its website denies involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood or that it seeks to subvert the Constitution. The group dismissed its inclusion on a list of unindicted co-conspirators that funded Hamas in the 2008 Holy Land Foundation trial.

“The Muslim Brotherhood affects CAIR the way a dust storm on Mars impacts the weather in Washington, D.C.,” CAIR said on its website. “The two might exist in the same solar system, but neither has any impact on or relationship with the other.”

CAIR stated that labeling the group one of a large number of unindicted co-conspirators in the 2008 case was an attempt by “Islamophobic groups” and “anti-Muslim extremists” to smear its reputation.

CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad in November expressed support for the Hamas Oct. 7 attacks against Israel, according to the Middle East translation group MEMRI.

“The people of Gaza only decided to break the siege, the walls of the concentration camp, on Oct. 7,” Mr. Awad said in a speech. “And yes, I was happy to see people breaking the siege and throwing down the shackles of their own land, and walk free into their land, which they were not allowed to walk in.”

Information warfare

Mr. Guandolo’s critique said another failure of the U.S. government is the fact that the government is focused mainly on violent extremism when dealing with the challenge posed by radical Islamist groups.

Most Muslim Brotherhood activities are nonviolent and focused on the information sector, the report said. That includes propaganda, espionage, counterintelligence, psychological operations, economic warfare and the subversion of key institutions, including religious, media, education, political and other organizations.

Without clearly understanding the U.S. Islamic movement “America will lose this war because leaders have failed to do their most basic job when it comes to security matters — identifying the enemy and why the enemy is fighting,” the report said.

In the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood directed all its units to create a Palestine Committee to recruit members, raise funds and promote propaganda for Hamas.

The U.S. Palestine Committee was created in 1988 according to one internal MB document quoted in the report. Its leader was Mousa Abu Marzook, who is currently a senior Hamas leader based in Qatar.

The U.S. committee set up three groups to promote its mission, including the Islamic Association for Palestine, the United Association for Studies and Research, and the Occupied Land Fund which evolved into the now-disbanded Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development.

A fourth front group — CAIR — was created in 1994.

Mr. Guandolo argues that the most important feature of the Muslim Brotherhood-Hamas movement is deception.

“Deception is used to gather intelligence and misinform key U.S. leaders and components of government about Islam to confuse and disorient them — and the American people — to render them unable to identify them as an enemy until it is too late,” the report said.

The plan calls for convincing U.S. leaders to support Muslim Brotherhood policies and goals that will require deceiving them, building relationships and then seek policy, laws and executive decisions that support their goals, the report said.

Within the U.S. military, those who have sought to sound the alarm on jihadist subversion have been forced out of the services as extremists. The report attributed the expulsions to misinformation provided by Islamic advisers.

“These efforts by the U.S. Hamas/Muslim Brotherhood operatives are much more espionage- and counterintelligence-oriented than violently oriented, which is why solutions to these threats focused solely from a military, law enforcement, and/or prosecutorial perspective may give the impression of short-term victories, but will always lead to defeat in the long-term,” the report said.

The report provides details on what it says are more than a dozen instances of Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas infiltration and influence within government. Among them is the case of Abdurahman Alamoudi — a senior U.S. Muslim Brotherhood leader and a key financier of al Qaeda in the U.S.

Alamoudi created or led about two dozen Islamic organizations in North America, including the Muslim chaplain program at the Pentagon. He was an adviser to President Bill Clinton and also worked in the George W. Bush presidential campaign. He pleaded guilty to financial and conspiracy charges in 2004 and was sentenced to 23 years in prison.

The report stated that the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Violent Extremism Working Group includes four Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood members, who are identified as subject matter experts, the report said.

The report concludes with a “campaign plan for victory” that urges defeating the Islamic ideological subversion threat at the federal, local and county level, and warns that senior U.S. government officials in security agencies and in Congress have little or no appreciation of the power and influence of jihadist networks in the U.S.

The campaign to counter the threat should include a national effort to identify elements of the Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood network and greater education of the Islamist networks at the secondary school and university level.

“It is important for citizens to understand the breadth of the jihadi and communist movements in America, and how significantly these elements have penetrated the key institutions of the U.S. federal government,” the report said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Click to Read More and View Comments

Click to Hide

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

6. State Dept's Campbell: Gap between US, China shipbuilding is 'deeply concerning'

How can we overcome this gap? Can our allies help? Look at ROK shipbuilding capabilities. Can we overcome legislative obstacles to work with our allies to overcome such a gap?

State Dept's Campbell: Gap between US, China shipbuilding is 'deeply concerning' - Breaking Defense

"We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century," Kurt Campbell told lawmakers today.

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 30, 2024

Kurt Campbell, Deputy Secretary of State, speaks on China at the Stimson Center in Washington. (Screenshot from Stimson Center)

WASHINGTON — The shipbuilding capacity of the United States when compared against China is “deeply concerning” and reflective of a need for the US Navy to “step up” as it prepares for a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, a senior State Department official told lawmakers today.

“Look at the difference in shipbuilding between the United States and China. Deeply concerning. We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century,” Kurt Campbell, a deputy secretary of state and former senior National Security Council official, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during a hearing about assessing the United States’ ability to compete with China.

Campbell, who played a critical role in the development of AUKUS while he was at the NSC, acknowledged both the workforce capacity issues American industry faces as well as the challenges in working with allies.

He also said that investment in ground forces during the past 20 years of conflict in the Middle East were “appropriate.” But nonetheless, any conflict in the Indo-Pacific, he argued, will put the spotlight back onto the Navy and Air Force.

“Now is the Navy and the Air Force’s time,” he said. “They have to step up. They have to invest more, they have to be more innovative, they have to be more intrepid. And they’ve got to understand that the Indo-Pacific arena requires the most capable naval and advanced long range air capabilities that the United States has ever needed before.”

At the same hearing, Campbell was also questioned about the relationship China has been building with Russia. The senior diplomat echoed concerns many Pentagon officials have aired, including Chinese aid for Russia to continue its war in Ukraine as well as assisting them in accessing natural resources in the arctic.

But Campbell cautioned lawmakers not to downplay “Russian agency” in the relationship, despite the growing narrative that Moscow is becoming more dependent on Beijing.

“China and Russia are competing now for influence in North Korea. China is anxious about some of the steps that Russia has taken with North Korea,” he said. “China is competing with Russia in the Arctic. … It doesn’t mean that there’s a division or gulf, but it just means that there is a complex diplomacy among these various countries.”

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 30, 2024

7. Acting Secret Service Chief Admits Security Failures Before Trump Shooting

Excerpts:

Ultimately, Mr. Rowe said, the events of July 13 were a result of “a failure of imagination” to see that “we actually do live in a very dangerous world where people do actually want to do harm to our protectee.”

“But we didn’t challenge our own assumptions,” he said. “We assumed that someone is going to cover that.”

His comments were sure to rankle some of the officers who assisted at the rally. Details about what happened have been inconsistent and confusing, as the multiple federal, state and local law enforcement agencies involved have offered their own accounts, leading to a dizzying array of finger-pointing.

In Butler, Mr. Rowe said, two local countersnipers were in one of the warehouses, watching the crowd from windows at the time the shooter, later identified as Thomas Crooks of Bethel Park, Pa., ascended to the roof of the adjacent warehouse. He said that, in his view, the countersnipers would have been able to see Mr. Crooks on the roof if they had looked left out the window.

“We are looking at this, and they should have been on the roof, and the fact they were in the building is something I’m still trying to understand.” Mr. Rowe said, adding that in the future, the Secret Service would ensure that local and state law enforcement are on roofs.

Acting Secret Service Chief Admits Security Failures Before Trump Shooting

Ronald Rowe Jr. said communications problems between the Secret Service and local law enforcement led to a failure to protect former President Donald Trump during a shooting on July 13.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/30/us/politics/secret-service-trump-shooting-senate.html?fbclid

Director Testifies on ‘Failure of Imagination’

Ronald L. Rowe Jr., acting director of the U.S. Secret Service, pointed to problems with communications between law enforcement agencies and the Secret Service as the root cause of the failure to protect former President Donald Trump during the shooting on July 13.

One of my first actions as acting director was traveling to the Butler farm show site to better understand how our protection failed. I went to the roof of the AGR building where the assailant fired shots and I laid in a prone position to evaluate his line of sight. What I saw made me ashamed. As a career law enforcement officer and a 25-year veteran with the Secret Service, I cannot defend why that roof was not better secured. Neither the Secret Service countersniper teams nor members of the former president’s security detail had any knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the AGR building with a firearm. It is my understanding those personnel were not aware the assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots. Prior to that, they were operating with the knowledge that local law enforcement was working an issue of a suspicious individual prior to the shots being fired. I think this was a failure of imagination, a failure to imagine that we actually do live in a very dangerous world where people do actually want to do harm to our protectees. I think it was a failure to challenge our own assumptions, the assumptions that we know our partners are going to do everything they can. And they do this every day. But we didn’t challenge our own assumptions of we assume that someone’s going to cover that. We assume that there’s going to be uniform presence. We didn’t challenge that internally during that advance.

00:00

1:39

Secret Service Acting Director Testifies on ‘Failure of Imagination’1:39

By Eileen Sullivan and Luke Broadwater

Reporting from Washington

July 30, 2024

Updated 5:45 p.m. ET

On the day that a 20-year-old man tried to assassinate former President Donald J. Trump in rural Pennsylvania, the Secret Service expected that local countersnipers would protect the warehouse roof where the gunman was able to take aim. They did not.

“They should have been on the roof,” the acting director of the Secret Service, Ronald L. Rowe Jr., told senators on Tuesday.

But Mr. Rowe also acknowledged to lawmakers that it was the Secret Service’s responsibility to make that expectation clear to the local countersnipers there that day and that his agency might have failed to do so.

It was the most straightforward explanation yet of what led to the glaring security failure that allowed a would-be assassin to fire eight shots at Mr. Trump, injuring him and others and killing a rally attendee, at the Butler Farm Show grounds on July 13. Yet Mr. Rowe often acknowledged to lawmakers that he was baffled by some of the decisions made before and on the day of the shooting, including some by his own agency.

His testimony about the delineation of responsibility for protecting a roof that was within a rifle bullet’s range of Mr. Trump highlighted a weak link in the protection of the country’s leaders. While the Secret Service relies on local law enforcement agencies for assistance, these officers are typically not experienced in the requirements of protective operations and therefore need detailed instructions from the federal agency.

“We need to be very direct to our local law enforcement counterparts that they understand exactly what their expectation is,” he said.

Ultimately, Mr. Rowe said, the events of July 13 were a result of “a failure of imagination” to see that “we actually do live in a very dangerous world where people do actually want to do harm to our protectee.”

“But we didn’t challenge our own assumptions,” he said. “We assumed that someone is going to cover that.”

His comments were sure to rankle some of the officers who assisted at the rally. Details about what happened have been inconsistent and confusing, as the multiple federal, state and local law enforcement agencies involved have offered their own accounts, leading to a dizzying array of finger-pointing.

In Butler, Mr. Rowe said, two local countersnipers were in one of the warehouses, watching the crowd from windows at the time the shooter, later identified as Thomas Crooks of Bethel Park, Pa., ascended to the roof of the adjacent warehouse. He said that, in his view, the countersnipers would have been able to see Mr. Crooks on the roof if they had looked left out the window.

“We are looking at this, and they should have been on the roof, and the fact they were in the building is something I’m still trying to understand.” Mr. Rowe said, adding that in the future, the Secret Service would ensure that local and state law enforcement are on roofs.

Local law enforcement officials have previously said the countersnipers were given permission from the Secret Service to surveil the fenced-in grounds from the warehouse windows because of the heat that day.

Richard Goldinger, the Butler County district attorney who oversees the local countersnipers who were at the rally, issued a statement previously saying that the Secret Service never told his agents to cover the roof that Mr. Crooks used. “I stand by my prior statement that that was not part of their duties that day,” Mr. Goldinger said Tuesday.

During the three-hour joint hearing before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Judiciary committees, Mr. Rowe offered more details about the sequence of events on July 13 than his predecessor, Kimberly A. Cheatle, did a week ago, drawing bipartisan outrage from House lawmakers. Ms. Cheatle resigned the following day.

Mr. Rowe described problems with communications among law enforcement agencies that delayed critical information from being relayed to the Secret Service. There was a 30-second window between when local law enforcement saw Mr. Crooks with a firearm and when Mr. Crooks started shooting. It would have been enough time for a Secret Service countersniper to react, Mr. Rowe said, but only if the countersniper had received that information contemporaneously.

“It appears that that information was stuck or siloed in that state and local channel,” Mr. Rowe said, drawing questions from lawmakers about why the various law enforcement agencies could not communicate with one another better.

All the Secret Service knew, he said, was that local law enforcement was working on an issue regarding a suspicious person. While the Secret Service received a photograph of Mr. Crooks about 30 minutes before the shooting, he was one of several who had drawn the eye of local law enforcement that day.

The agency also had plans to use equipment that would have detected the gunman’s use of a drone hours before the shooting. But problems with the local cellular service delayed that from happening. Mr. Rowe said this is one issue that he has lost sleep over.

“I have no explanation for it,” Mr. Rowe said. “We could have maybe stopped him.”

Multiple investigations are underway into what happened on July 13 and what led Mr. Crooks to try to kill Mr. Trump.

Mr. Trump has complimented his Secret Service detail for its bravery. But overall, he said, there were holes.

“Nobody on that roof and, and no coordination with the police, it seems to be coming out that there was absolutely no coordination,” Mr. Trump said Tuesday during an interview with a New York radio station. “And that’s, that’s a pretty bad thing, when you think of it.”

In some instances on Tuesday, Mr. Rowe had the same questions as lawmakers.

Senator James Lankford, Republican of Oklahoma, asked why the Secret Service did not use a surveillance drone.

Mr. Rowe replied, “It appears there was an offer by a state or local agency to fly a drone on our behalf, and I’m getting to the bottom as to why we turned that down.”

Senator Roger Marshall, Republican of Kansas, asked why the building Mr. Crooks was on, about 450 feet from Mr. Trump’s podium, was not included in the Secret Service security zone in the first place.

“That’s a question that I’ve asked, senator,” Mr. Rowe said. “I’ve been there and walked it. I had a hard time understanding why.”

In one of his first actions as acting director, Mr. Rowe said, he went to the site of the shooting and specifically to the warehouse roof that the gunman used. Mr. Rowe climbed onto the building and lay on the roof so he could see the direct line that the shooter had to Mr. Trump.

“What I saw made me ashamed,” Mr. Rowe said. “As a career law enforcement officer and a 25-year veteran with the Secret Service, I cannot defend why that roof was not better secured.”

Kate Kelly and Jeanna Smialek contributed reporting from Washington, and Michael Gold from New York.

Eileen Sullivan covers breaking news, the Justice Department, the trials against Donald J. Trump and the Biden administration. More about Eileen Sullivan

Luke Broadwater covers Congress with a focus on congressional investigations. More about Luke Broadwater

A version of this article appears in print on July 31, 2024, Section A, Page 15 of the New York edition with the headline: Acting Chief Cites Poor Communication. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

8. Would the U.S. Consider Assassinating Putin?

Excerpts:

There are also significant bureaucratic hurdles to lethal operations. For the moment, at least, the U.S. practice of covert action is dictated by the rule of law. These are primarily executive orders rather than public laws, like EO 12333, which ironically forbids assassination, and the various presidential memos issued by Barack Obama in 2013, Donald Trump in 2017, and Joe Biden in 2022 guiding the use of “direct action,” the euphemism for drone strikes and other kinetic operations, against terrorist targets outside of conflict zones. But while the United States killed Suleimani as a terrorist who fit these guidelines, killing foreign leaders based on credible intelligence reflecting their ongoing efforts to do harm to the United States would reasonably still meet the legal bar for preemptive self-defense.

When it comes to killing Putin or any prominent adversary, the biggest challenge is not necessarily if it can be done, but whether it should be done. Openly killing Suleimani posed risks, of course, but ultimately, Iran is not an existential threat. Its retaliation could have been more costly, had Tehran chosen escalation, but still manageable.

Russia, on the other hand, as Putin frequently reminds the West in his saber-rattling speeches threatening nuclear war, is another matter. What happens if you fail? As The Wire’s Omar Little said, paraphrasing Ralph Waldo Emerson, “When you come at the king, you best not miss.”

Would the U.S. Consider Assassinating Putin?

When and why intelligence agencies target foreign leaders—and how it often backfires.

JULY 30, 2024, 5:00 AM

View Comments

(2)

By Douglas London, a former CIA operations officer, and the author of The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence.

Foreign Policy · by Douglas London

Russia

Russia’s War in Ukraine

Understanding the conflict two years on.

Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy

But it can be done with the help of shipbuilding allies and more money to train defense-industry workers.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/rebuilding-the-u-s-navy-wont-be-easy-defense-ships-national-security-4d470f12?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Seth Cropsey

July 30, 2024 5:27 pm ET

An Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer transits the Suez Canal, Dec. 18, 2023. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGE

The U.S. Navy is a ship without a rudder. The longer the service is allowed to decay, the more precarious America’s strategic situation will become. Turning things around won’t be easy. The best solution would be to retain every combat ship in the current fleet and encourage allies to pitch in with their own industrial bases. This expansion will require substantial funding, particularly in the workforce.

The Suez Canal is one of the world’s busiest maritime highways, connecting the Mediterranean and Red seas and creating a shortcut for ships sailing from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This route is the center of the broader Eurasian trade system on which American power relies. It has helped the U.S. become one of the wealthiest, most powerful nations in the world. It has also enabled the construction of alliances across Eurasia, as powers ranging from Germany and Poland to South Korea and Japan are far less threatened by a U.S. that seeks commercial access and upholds freedom than by a China or Russia that demands a monopoly on commerce.

Since 2023 the Houthis have harassed ships exiting and entering the Suez Canal but sunk few vessels. Well-trained American and allied surface combatant crews have intercepted scores of missiles and drones, and U.S. Navy strike fighter squadrons have bombed Houthi missile launch sites. Nevertheless, insurance premiums for the Suez route have increased, and the Suez Canal Authority has lost almost 70% of its shipping traffic despite lower transit fees.

Countering the Houthis would take several months of intense pressure. The U.S. would need to deploy a surface action group of up to five warships, alongside a Marine expeditionary unit. Ideally a Wasp or America class “lightning carrier,” a flat-decked amphibious assault ship with a squadron of Marine F-35s, would work alongside a maritime patrol squadron and Navy SEAL units supported by U.S. Air Force and Space Force reconnaissance and communications.

The campaign would take about six months, considering the dispersion of Houthi assets, the Houthis’ ability to redeploy launchers, and the limitations White House casualty sensitivity would impose on operations. Interdiction, search and seizure of Houthi-bound shipping would prevent weapons smuggling from Iran. The U.S. warships could intercept missiles launched at commercial shipping, provide convoy escorts, and strike Houthi command-and-control sites.

The issue is that the U.S. Navy can’t spare these ships.

The number of ships in the Navy has shrunk since its Trump administration high of 296 and, as per construction and procurement funding, won’t reach more than 300 ships until 2032. Maintenance and repair delays have piled up rapidly. Only 60% of the attack submarine fleet is deployable at any given time. The rest is tied up in maintenance. Two supercarriers are out for an additional year-plus due to unspecified turbine damage. The U.S. is retiring surface warships faster than it can build them. Its new ships, most notably the Constellation class frigates, carry half the firepower of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer at around two-thirds of the price. The Navy has also struggled in vain for nearly two decades to retain talent.

Sea control is nonnegotiable for a dominant maritime power. The U.S. needs to deploy its forces from North America and shift them between different parts of Eurasia. If it can’t maintain a strong naval presence, it will be forced to follow the British rental-cum-alliance model, and its credibility across Eurasia will decline rapidly.

This decline comes at the worst possible geopolitical moment. Russia continues to prosecute its war of conquest against Ukraine, hoping to alter dramatically the European balance of power and shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Iran and its proxies are mounting attacks on Israel as China prepares for war. Beijing is pursuing the largest military buildup since World War II. Its navy already outnumbers ours. It has gone from fielding one experimental carrier to multiple purpose-built carriers in under 15 years and will soon deploy its first catapult-equipped carrier. It is also expanding its nuclear arsenal and improving its submarine capabilities.

America’s response to these worrying global developments should be a revitalization of American shipbuilding, aided by cooperation with allies. South Korea has several high-quality naval yards that produce top-line small and medium-size warships, along with submarines. Though U.S. Navy requirements differ from those of other countries, there is much to gain from contracting with yards that can deliver warships on time and at or under budget.

The U.S. will still have to build some of its own ships. Foreign firms can’t supply the missile-armed surface combatants, submarines, amphibious warships and carriers that are required to project power. Accomplishing a large-scale naval expansion will require an enormous workforce training program that brings in a new class of technicians. Without this, the naval industrial base workforce will shrink to ineffectiveness and desuetude in another 15 years, given its ageing personnel. I have been hearing this concern from companies in the naval shipbuilding industry for well over a decade. Training takes time, as does the construction of new yards and equipment.

In the interim, the U.S. can turn to its more robust aerial industrial base, using a flood of new maritime patrol aircraft to maintain maritime awareness and heavy bombers to conduct strikes. This will mean negotiating with allies to ensure use of air bases—a difficult, but worthwhile step.

Finally, and most important, strong U.S. naval leadership is needed to explain the causes of the navy’s sinking fortunes, detail its consequences for American prosperity and security and argue forcefully for remedies—beginning with a strategy to deter war in the Pacific. From the White House to the Pentagon, such leadership is critical to retaining a strong U.S. position in the world.

Mr. Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as a deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of “Mayday” and “Seablindness.”

10. Henry Huiyao Wang: China More Open is More Secure

We were able to engage with henry in Mongolia at the Mongolia Forum earlier this month. For a member of the CCP he makes some provocative comments.

Henry Huiyao Wang: China More Open is More Secure

The President of CCG urges further reform and opening up, visa-free travel for Americans

https://ccgupdate.substack.com/p/henry-huiyao-wang-china-more-open?utm

JIAOYANG DU, YUXUAN JIA, AND ZICHEN WANG

JUL 31, 2024

The 15th annual Aspen Security Forum, hosted by the Aspen Strategy Group, was held in Aspen, Colorado from July 16-19, 2024. Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang, President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), and Dr. Mabel Lu Miao, Secretary-General of CCG were the only Chinese representatives invited to participate. Over the four-day event, they engaged in face-to-face exchanges with many prominent figures from the U.S. government, strategic community, think tanks, diplomatic delegations, NGOs, businesses, and media, promoting China-U.S. people-to-people and think tank exchanges.

During the forum, Henry Huiyao Wang gave an exclusive interview with Phoenix News. The original text is accessible online.

Sticking to the "small yard, high fence" Strategy: Anti-China Sentiment as American Political Correctness?

Phoenix: At this year's Aspen Security Forum, you mentioned that China is not just a topic but has become a backdrop—almost every panel touches on China to some extent. What impressed you the most at this forum? How do you think the Aspen Security Forum differs from the Munich Security Conference or other security forums you have attended?

Henry Huiyao Wang: The Aspen Security Forum is probably the most high-end forum on international relations in the U.S. The attendees include key officials from the U.S. government and military, as well as media, think tanks, and major enterprises. The forum focuses on various aspects of international security, including military, economic technology, and strategic security. Although there are participants from other countries, the majority are still Americans. The forum involves U.S. policymakers, strategic decision-makers, and think tank experts, giving it a distinctly official U.S. stance.

Phoenix: Under the tight schedule, the first session was focused on addressing the "China Challenge." This session did not mention much traditional international relations theories but emphasized economic security and the U.S.-China tech competition. Several speakers mentioned the "small yard, high fence" strategy. It seems that the U.S. political and academic circles are quite satisfied with this strategy as well as its resulting measures, such as sanctions on Huawei and restricting Chinese access to advanced chips. What is your view on their perspectives?

Henry Huiyao Wang: The incumbent U.S. administration views its series of policies against China as effective, including the initial “decoupling,” the later “de-risking,” the CHIPS and Science Act, and the “small yard, high fence” strategy. However, the American business community does not entirely agree with this opinion. Some in the forum questioned whether the U.S. should focus more on introspection, think more about how to enhance its competitiveness rather than shifting the blame onto others; they also mentioned the need for more engagement, communication, and even cooperation between the U.S. and China.

I believe that while the “small yard, high fence” strategy aligns with the current bipartisan consensus on China, it faces many challenges in implementation. Many businesses are not enthusiastic about it, and it has affected economic and trade exchanges between China and the U.S.

Nevertheless, I believe that China needs to further open up, attract more American businesses to China, and "retain" U.S. companies within China to prevent the complete decoupling caused by the “small yard, high fence”strategy. Such decoupling would be detrimental to both the U.S. and China.

Phoenix: You mentioned the attitudes of businesses. Some companies have said that due to the “small yard, high fence” strategy, they are unable to achieve significant profits in China, which impacts their subsequent technological investments. However, some panelists have argued that this is not the case and that companies operating in China are doing well. As you have had contact with many foreign enterprises in China, what is their true attitude towards this situation?

Henry Huiyao Wang: The primary attitude of foreign-invested, especially American companies in China, is to focus on “quietly reaping profits.” When it comes to political statements, such as those concerning the strategic consensus of the U.S. Congress and administration towards China, they often avoid taking a stance or do so only superficially. This is because they have to deal with American public opinion, the U.S. stock market, and American media. If they show favor towards China, they may face political pressures.

Students from Sidewell Friends visiting the Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

China somehow shows more openness in this regard. CCG recently hosted a delegation from a private high school in Washington, which included the children of many State Department officials. They found that what they saw in China was quite different from what they had been told.

I think the same applies to the business community. China needs to attract more American companies, as their prospects in China are promising. For example, I have just met with a MasterCard executive at the forum who mentioned that MasterCard has received more support in China than in India now. Companies can establish themselves in China, whereas entering the Indian market still poses many challenges. He hopes that China will continue to open its door wider, as attracting American businesses and providing level plain field could indirectly influence American policymakers.

Phoenix: The U.S. government seems to think that it can set clear boundaries to the "small yard, high fence" strategy or U.S.-China trade, and that they believe the “yard” within the boundaries can remain the same size. However, in reality, the “yard” keeps expanding and the “fence” keeps rising. For instance, Chinese private companies collaborating with researchers with military backgrounds will be quickly labeled as military technology by U.S. think tanks, making those companies prone to be blacklisted. Do you think there are boundaries to the slippery slope of the "small yard, high fence" strategy?

Henry Huiyao Wang: Since the Biden administration took office, it has aligned with bipartisan consensus and has been even more confrontational towards China than the Trump administration. A series of measure including the "small yard, high fence" strategy, the CHIPS and Science Act, and increased tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles have surpassed the measured taken during the Trump administration, causing significant negative impacts on US-China trade relations.

The "small yard, high fence" only consists of a yard and a fence without any boundaries, making it so general that almost any technology could be placed in the "yard." Therefore, the best way to counteract this is to continually expand China's openness, making the scope of its open areas broader and the thresholds for access lower, thereby offsetting the so-called "small yard, high fence" approach from the U.S. While the U.S. is building fences and imposing restrictions, China should go against this trend by expanding its openness and removing the barriers of these "fences."

Phoenix: China should build more bridges and attract others like a stronger magnet.

Henry Huiyao Wang: Exactly. To cater to mainstream American political correctness, those who are at this forum were all spreading unfavorable narratives about China. However, to influence or change their misconceptions about China, we need more openness, as mentioned in the Third Plenum, which calls for building a higher level of open economic system.

How to Address the Chokepoints in Cutting-edge technology? What is the Relationship Between Openness and Security?

Phoenix: The issue of chips is a major concern. The U.S. strategy involves leveraging its alliances; for example, it tries to control China's access to photolithography machines and raw materials through its close partnerships with Japan, South Korea and the Netherlands, so as to create a chokepoint. How do you assess the effectiveness of this strategy in practice? Can the development of China's "neck-choking" industries, especially the chip sector, be better promoted through foreign talent recruitment or other methods?

Henry Huiyao Wang: After several days of meetings, I observed a clear trend in the U.S.: there is a strong desire to avoid direct conflict with China despite a clear intention of restricting China’s development. The aim is not necessarily to plan for a hot war against China but to use various indirect methods to contain China's growth. This has already become a consensus in the U.S. The "small yard, high fence" strategy and the CHIPS and Science Act all serve this purpose. The CHIPS and Science Act, in particular, is not a unilateral action by the U.S.; it involves a coalition with the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to jointly contain the Chinese mainland. To address this, China needs to intensify its efforts in independent R&D and production, and it must also maintain international cooperation. China should strengthen collaboration with other countries and regions to circumvent the so-called "small yard, high fence."

Given the impending U.S. election, the duration of these measures is still uncertain. Therefore, it is all the more important for China to strengthen international cooperation. For American chip companies, the inability to sell more than half of their chips to China represents a significant loss and negatively impacts their R&D. This situation provides China with a chance to expand its development further.

Regarding talent, the meeting highlighted that half of the AI talent in the U.S. comes from China, which is a significant number. Representatives from OpenAI also mentioned a desire to strengthen the attraction of Chinese talent. I believe the same applies to China; China needs to attract talent from around the world, especially returnees from studying abroad and IT professionals from countries like the U.S., EU, Japan and India, to enhance China's technological innovation capabilities.

President Xi has emphasized the importance of attracting talent extensively. China can do more in this area. Recently, China has opened up visas-free travels for many EU countries, and I believe it would be beneficial to also open up visa-free travels for U.S.citizens and improve the domestic "green card" system to attract more foreigners to China.

Phoenix: Anja Manuel, the Executive Director of the Aspen Security Forum, said that areas of intense competition between China and the U.S., such as high technology, will gradually experience “De-Risk,” while economic, agricultural, and cultural exchanges will become more “entangled.” Do you think this approach is feasible? Will decoupling in some areas impact mutual trust and cooperation in others?

Henry Huiyao Wang: Anja Manuel's explanation of the "small yard, high fence" strategy is to control America's cutting-edge technology, but to encourage as much cooperation as possible in other areas, such as with companies like Coca-Cola, Starbucks, or McDonald's and Walmart etc.. I think that makes certain sense. The expansion of cooperation in non-security sectors, profitable for American companies, can help garner more public support for China-U.S. relations.

The economic losses in high-end industries, already significant despite being in their early stages, have sparked strong opposition from companies in the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea,even in Taiwan. As related American companies face increasing losses, opposition to business decoupling is likely to grow. Currently, American companies in China, including Apple and Tesla, are making substantial profits, and these major firms will also voice their concerns. Therefore, the duration of the current government's "small yard, high fences" strategy will depend on its effectiveness.

More importantly, it is essential to enable American investments become deeply embedded in the vast sea of China's economy, making it impossible for decoupling. If they attempt to decouple, China should strengthen the ties; if they sever connections, China should build bridges. By fostering a community with closely intertwined interests, greater conflicts can be avoided.

Phoenix: As you mentioned, China should build a higher level of open economic system. If the U.S. uses measures like "chokepoints" to influence us, will this lead to insecurity on the Chinese part and affect China's openness to the outside world?

Henry Huiyao Wang: Indeed, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China emphasized balancing development and security, but it also introduced a new concept -- "promoting reform through opening up." This means that the more open the country is, the greater the impetus for reform and, consequently, the greater the security. Therefore, the more open China is, the more secure China becomes. The Third Plenum is a real revelation to me as it points out that despite the complex and high-pressure international situation, the country is still emphasizing opening up, development, and the market economy,not on self-reliance or isolated, domestic circulation. This has surpassed my expectations.

Given the complex and adverse external environment, the country should have focused more on self-reliance. However, the current discourse emphasizes increased openness, reform, and market-driven policies. The notion that "the more open China is, the more secure China becomes"highlights how security serves openness. This is crucial. As the Chinese saying goes, one should not give up eating for fear of choking; instead, China should continue opening up, which is key to addressing various security threats.

What Does People-to-People Exchange Mean for China-U.S. Relations?

Phoenix: I attended a book launch at this forum. There is still some debate in the U.S. about whether a "Cold War" exists between China and the U.S. Some argue that a "Cold War" is already a clear reality, while others believe that interdependence precludes such a situation. Joseph Nye believes that China and the U.S. are in a state of “cooperative rivalry” rather than a “Cold War.” What is your opinion?

Henry Huiyao Wang: The concept of a new Cold War is subject to differing opinions, and it’s noteworthy that in the U.S., there was even a book launch event discussing the Cold War narrative. Some attendees at the event questioned this narrative, noting that today’s era is fundamentally different from the Soviet era. Unlike that time, there are now extensive people-to-people, trade, and investment exchanges between countries, as well as online interactions through the internet, information, and the digital economy. The level of exchange today far surpasses that of the Soviet period.

In my opinion, the notion of a new Cold War is incorrect. While there may be a Cold War mindset and actions reminiscent of the Cold War, achieving a true Cold War state is very difficult in reality. Therefore, it is necessary to oppose the Cold War narrative and strengthen people-to-people exchanges and interactions. For instance, CCG recently hosted students from Sidewell Friends from Washington, DC. Opening up tourism and relaxing by giving visa-free travels for U.S. citizens are also necessary. These means can uncover elements to build a community with a shared future for all, identify commonalities among people, and focus on all human security rather than just national security.

Joseph Nye and Anja Manuel with Henry Huiyao Wang and Mable Lu Miao at Aspen

Phoenix: Some former military personnel and experts in the U.S. have made many comments on security issues in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. How do you view their perspectives? What are their stereotypes, or are there any positive signals?

Henry Huiyao Wang: That's a great question. This morning we attended three sessions where Charles Q. Brown Jr., U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, and Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor of the U.S., were present to interpret U.S. policies.

I can sense that there has been some policy shift during this administration over the past three and a half years. When the administration first came into office, U.S. officials, such as those in Alaska, were talking about confronting China if necessary. However, this morning, Sullivan said that conflict across the Taiwan Strait must be avoided at all costs, and that such a conflict would be a disaster for the entire world. This indicates a positive shift in the U.S. stance, as they are now aiming to avoid conflict.

Of course, the U.S. still hopes to restrict China through policies like the "small yard, high fence," and there are many incorrect judgments or statements about China regarding the Ukraine crisis. However, after the San Francisco summit, the frequency of high-level U.S. officials visiting China has increased. For example, this morning, Blinken mentioned that Yellen, Raimondo, and himself have all visited China, and Sullivan also frequently communicates with Chinese officials. Their voices tend to be more rational and objective, reflecting the necessity of high-level dialogue and communication between China and the U.S.

This morning, three senators and some officials also mentioned that the U.S. need to strengthen cognitive warfare, including support for Voice of America, and so on. Government officials, due to their frequent visits to China, are more cautious about their statements and emphasize the need to avoid conflict. I believe this is an improvement compared to the statements made three years ago in Alaska.

After the meeting between President Xi and President Biden, China and the U.S. resumed official military-to-military dialogues and strengthened cooperation and communication on issues like climate change, fentanyl, and artificial intelligence. American officials who frequently visit China often provide positive and constructive evaluations. However, those who have not visited China, such as some members of Congress, tend to have more negative views of the country. I believe it's crucial to engage these congresspeople more and encourage more U.S. legislators to visit China personally. After coming and seeing for themselves, I believe they will have different impressions about China.

So, the relationship between China and the U.S. involves not only government efforts but also the exchanges and cooperation among Congress, media, think tanks, business and other sectors. This is very necessary and urgent.

Phoenix: I have heard different viewpoints before, suggesting that cultural exchanges have a very slow impact or are hard to break through existing stereotypes. How do you view the role of people-to-people exchanges?

Henry Huiyao Wang: I think maintaining dialogue and communication is extremely important. For example, at this conference, I didn't see any Russian There are two Chinese participants, but not many. I believe it's essential to keep communication channels open. I mentioned to Jake Sullivan that we hosted students from Sidwell Friends and he said that it's a very prestigious school with many officials' children attending. He was quite interested in such exchanges, so it is crucial to continue these interactions. Of course, the process of exchange should aim to achieve the purpose of communication.

Both Trump and J.D. Vance spoke at the Republican National Convention, and I noticed that Vance’s remarks about China were very negative. There seems to be a political correctness emerging where being anti-China could lead to nominations, more attention, and a perception of being tougher, which is very detrimental. I believe it's crucial to expand exchanges, increase visits, and enhance dialogue and communication at all levels. Maintaining contact is very important.

How Should China Respond to the Many Variables in the U.S. Election?

Phoenix: In light of the numerous uncertainties in this year's U.S. election, including the assassination attempt on Trump, Biden’s COVID-19 diagnosis, and Vance’s strong nationalist stance, how should China respond to these uncertainties?

Henry Huiyao Wang: The U.S. election reflects its political complexity, and the challenges faced by American democracy. From China's perspective, it does not interfere in the U.S. election, but it should be well-prepared. Regardless of who is in power next, China should stick to its principles, which means adhering to reform and opening-up, following the spirit of the Third Plenum, and maintaining dialogue and communication, thus occupying a moral high ground through external openness.

Moreover, China can also strengthen communication and exchanges, such as increasing interactions with various political parties. Trump said that if he wins the presidential election, he will end the Russia-Ukraine war before taking office, and Vance has also mentioned the need to end the Russia-Ukraine war.

In resolving the War in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, China can be the backbone and a decisive force. Regardless of who becomes the next U.S. president, they will face the task of addressing regional conflicts and bringing peace to the world. China can play a significant role in this regard. If the new U.S. president can see China as a balancing force in resolving conflicts such as the war in Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or the North Korea issue, it would help ease China-U.S. relations and highlight China as a leading force in promoting peace.

China and the U.S. can enhance mutual trust and cooperation through these methods to dispel the so-called "China threat theory." As a peace-loving country, China can offer new opportunities for global governance and find ways to cooperate in a multipolar world, which is also a problem the U.S. hopes to address.

Phoenix: Thank you, Dr. Wang. It is indeed a very good perspective to have US and China work together.

11. US needs to double down on directed energy weapons

Let's get to it.

US needs to double down on directed energy weapons - Asia Times

Technology is proven and best defense against new-age drones and missiles but needs significantly more funding to be a viable deterrent

asiatimes.com · by Michael Hochberg · July 30, 2024

In the 1980s, the United States faced a profound challenge: winning a conventional war in Europe against a numerically superior Soviet army.

Technological innovation – most notably the development of smart, precision munitions – provided a solution. Instead of needing tens or even hundreds of unguided munitions to hit a target, one smart munition would often suffice.

This meant that a single plane could destroy a whole series of Russian tanks in a single mission, or strike a series of logistics and infrastructure targets, with the expectation of hitting nearly every one.

This produced a revolutionary asymmetry and made huge Soviet investments obsolete. Precision provided a way to defeat scale.

Today, the US faces a similar situation: its adversaries are mass-producing drones and missiles at enormous scale. A revolutionary new technology is desperately needed in order to make this investment obsolete.

Today, China controls 70% of the world’s production of enterprise drones and 90% of the commercial drone market. They supply technology and components to Russia for its war on Ukraine. Russia uses hundreds of drones and missiles every day to attack civilian and infrastructure targets in Ukraine.

Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, has an estimated stockpile of 150,000-200,000 rockets and missiles, more than enough to overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome defenses. The defensive munitions for Iron Dome cost around US$40,000 per missile while the offensive munitions can, in many cases, cost much less.

SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, used to intercept ballistic missiles, cost between millions and tens of millions of dollars each. Drone and missile-based air war is currently offensive-dominant.

To stop China from invading Taiwan, Russia from destroying Ukraine and Iran and its proxies from ravaging Israel requires the establishment of uncontested air superiority over these territories. Creating even small bubbles of safety around cities and critical infrastructure could be revolutionary.

Though the defense against seaborne surface and underwater drones would remain a problem, the creation of bubbles of safety over critical maritime choke points for air defense of commercial shipping could be impactful. And the ability to arm commercial ships with anti-missile defenses at modest cost would be revolutionary.

The United States now faces the possibility of a four-front war launched by Eurasian autocratic regimes. However, the US industrial base is simply not tooled up to provide surge capacity or build the relevant munitions. Even if it were, the economics of defending against sophisticated airborne threats en-masse would be prohibitive with existing technology.

But there is a technological solution: directed energy weapons. Directed energy systems already work – the Royal Navy has demonstrated their Dragonfire system working in the field and the US Navy is about to demonstrate a 300KW system. Israel has demonstrated Iron Beam, which is expected to have a range of over 10 kilometers and can defeat missiles, mortars, drones and aircraft.

Estimates show that these systems will take seconds to defeat incoming munitions from miles away at a very modest cost-per-shot with an infinite magazine capacity limited only by power generation capability.

This will shift air war – and drone, missile, and mortar attacks in particular – from offensive to defensive dominance. To break through a dense directed-energy defense, enormous numbers of munitions would need to be fired simultaneously.

Hezbollah and Iran are almost certainly looking at Israeli development and upcoming deployments of the Iron Beam system and considering the possibility that their immense investment in missiles could become obsolete. They could thus perceive a “use it or lose it” situation for their missile arsenal.

Most current drones rely on GPS or human guidance for navigation and targeting, making them vulnerable to electronic jamming. But future drones will be fully autonomous, meaning that to achieve mission kill, either the sensors (i.e. cameras) or the drone itself will need to be disabled. For that, laser-based directed energy systems are the best solution.

Today, the United States spends around a billion dollars per year on directed energy. This is nowhere near enough. Instead, multiple, competing efforts need to occur in parallel using a diversity of technical approaches – and on a much larger scale.

Lasers need to be developed at multiple wavelengths to directly defeat munitions and to achieve mission-kill by destroying sensors. Radio frequency and microwave-directed energy to disrupt electronics is also a useful and potentially critical technology.

Spending needs to focus on systems that can be brought rapidly to production, not just on demonstrators or technology development, while the ecosystem for building these systems in large quantities needs to be built out rapidly.

Critically, component technologies need to be sourced in the United States and in closely allied states in order to ensure that the supply chain for these systems is secure.

The challenges in making directed energy into a practical warfighting technology relate to engineering, not basic science. Unlike during the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) era of the 1980s, the technological improvements that are needed are comparatively straightforward.

Contract vehicles with commercial terms, based on payment on delivery, can be deployed to bring commercial players to the table to deliver systems quickly and at low risk to the government. Semiconductor lasers already improve by a factor of 10x every eight years. With money and effort, this can be accelerated dramatically.

Multiple alternative laser architectures are already available that can be pursued in parallel. The same goes for bulk optics, feedback systems and thermal dissipation tools, as well as the systems integration. A diversity of systems needs to be built for different applications, from squad-level protection of infantry, to city- and theater-level protection against ballistic missiles.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

One of the key impediments – atmospheric propagation – is absent in space: Revisiting the idea of space-based systems for anti-ballistic missile applications is worthwhile, especially in the context of SpaceX’s dramatic reduction in launch costs.

Directed energy weapons have the potential to revolutionize warfare by providing a cost-effective and efficient way to defend against drones, missiles and aircraft.

The United States needs to make a significant investment in directed energy research, development and production in order to deter potential adversaries and protect both America and its allies.

By leveraging commercial technologies and adopting a rapid, commercial contract-based acquisition process, the US can quickly field directed energy systems that will provide a decisive edge on the battlefield. Doing so will be every bit as disruptive as the development of precision munitions was in the 1980s.

Michael Hochberg earned his PhD in Applied Physics from Caltech. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University and the President of Periplous LLC, which provides advisory services on strategy, technology and organization design.

He co-founded four companies, representing an exit value over a billion dollars in aggregate, spent some time as a tenured professor and started the world’s first silicon photonics foundry service.

His publications include a co-authored, widely used textbook on silicon photonics and his articles have appeared in Science, Nature, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, Fast Company, Naval War College Review, etc. Michael’s writings can be found at longwalls.substack.com, and his twitter is @TheHochberg.

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

asiatimes.com · by Michael Hochberg · July 30, 2024

12. Army’s second-largest post to have its first female commander

Will we ever get to the point when a female commander is no longer news? It seems we look for every opportunity to tout the "first." (even when it is the second largest installation.). Does all this reporting continue to highlight the gender divide?

Army’s second-largest post to have its first female commander

armytimes.com · by Todd South · July 30, 2024

The Army’s home for intelligence and cyber operations will welcome its first female garrison commander in a change-of-command ceremony next week.

Col. Yolanda Gore will be the 89th garrison commander of Fort Meade, Maryland, when she takes command from Col. Michael Sapp on Aug. 6.

Gore recently served as the former strategic initiative chief for the Army’s deputy chief of staff over personnel at the Pentagon.

West Point to honor first female 4-star general

The first woman to become a four-star general in the U.S. military will be honored with an award at West Point.

“I’m excited about the prospect of meeting new people and taking on the challenges this role will bring. It’s an exciting feeling to envision what lies ahead,” Gore said in an Army release.

In an interview with Army Public Affairs in early July, Gore noted her experience working closely with the office of the Secretary of the Army and was deeply involved in Medals of Honor ceremonies.

“Dealing with personnel matters has been central to my career so far,” she said. “Now, as a Garrison Commander, I’ll be immersed in the operational aspects of running an installation.”

Fort Meade is the Army’s second-largest installation by personnel. It contains more than 120 organizations, including U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Media Activity, Architect of the Capitol and the Environmental Protection Agency, according to the release.

Fort Leonard Wood’s first female commander wants women to know what’s possible when serving in the military

Maj. Gen. Donna Martin is the first woman to lead Fort Leonard Wood since it opened in 1941. She's also one of few African-Americans to do so.

By Jesse Bogan, St. Louis Post-Dispatch via AP

Fort Meade, which also houses various Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy units, is the largest employer in Maryland, according to the service.

Located approximately 30 miles north of the Pentagon, Fort Meade is a 107-year-old Army installation named for Union Gen. George S. Meade, who served as commander of the Army of the Potomac, according to the installation’s website.

Originally called Camp Annapolis Junction, the fort opened in 1917 and served as an Army training camp. It later served as both a recruit training post and a prisoner of war camp during World War II.

Beginning in the 1950s, the installation housed a series of radar and air defense systems during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Its current mission, housing much of the nation’s intelligence assets, began in the 1970s.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

13. Can Donald Trump really build an Iron Dome over America?

Can Donald Trump really build an Iron Dome over America?

In a word, no. The president-turned-candidate is still selling the same old missile-defense snake oil.

BY JOE CIRINCIONE

JULY 29, 2024

defenseone.com · by Joe Cirincione

“We will replenish our military and build an Iron Dome missile defense system to ensure that no enemy can strike our homeland,” Donald Trump promised at the recent Republican Party convention. “Israel has an Iron Dome. They have a missile defense system,” he said. “Why should other countries have this, and we don’t?”

For one thing, it is technically impossible to build a system that can protect the United States from ballistic missile attack.

It is not for lack of trying. Since President Ronald Reagan announced his ambitious Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, the country has given more than $415 billion to our best military contractors, employed tens of thousands of workers and the best scientists in the effort. Nothing has worked.

All we have to show for the effort is a basic system of 44 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska and California. Under ideal test conditions they have been able to hit a target only half of the time. The program is essentially on hold while a new interceptor is designed.

Trump may mean that we can simply deploy a U.S.-built version of Israel’s Iron Dome. That system works fairly well; why not simply build an American version?

Because Iron Dome is designed to intercept short-range rockets, not intercontinental ballistic missiles. Each Iron Dome system can defend an area of roughly 150 square miles. We would need to deploy more than 24,700 Iron Dome batteries to defend the 3.7 million square miles of the continental United States. At $100 million per battery, that would be approximately $2,470,000,000,000.

Still, it might be worth $2.5 trillion if the system could truly defend the country. But it can’t. Iron Dome is designed to intercept relatively primitive rockets and mortars that travel under 44 miles. That is fine if you want to defend San Diego from rockets launched from Tijuana, some 35 miles away. But the system couldn’t even protect Mar-a-Lago from missiles fired from the Bahamas, some 80 miles away.

That is because long-range missiles pose a fundamentally different, more complex threat than short-range missiles.

We now have—after decades of effort—systems that can reliably intercept short- and medium-range missiles that travel tens or even hundreds of miles. These missiles are relatively slow, large, and hot targets. They travel mostly through the atmosphere, preventing them from deploying any kind of decoys against the interceptors.

Reliably intercepting long-range missiles that travel thousands of miles and are fast, small, and cold as they speed through outer space has proved impossible, particularly if the adversary deploys countermeasures like decoys, chaff, and jammers. The interceptors can’t see the target and even when the warhead enters the atmosphere, stripping away the decoys deployed in space, it is traveling so fast (around 4 miles per second) and is so small that it is an extraordinarily difficult target. Add in the ability of the adversary to simply overwhelm defensive systems with more warheads than there are interceptors, and the defense has insurmountable problems.

Ronald Reagan sought to solve this dilemma by deploying laser weapons in space. These, theoretically, could overcome the built-in advantage the offense enjoys. It was a fantasy. The American Physical Society—the country’s premier association of physicists—concluded in 1987 that it would take decades simply to determine whether such technologies were even feasible.

This sent the program away from “Star Wars” laser weapons back to kinetic-kill weapons. After several years of pursuing impractical “Brilliant Pebbles” schemes that would house thousands of interceptor rockets in huge space “garages,” the program was forced to go back to ground-based systems, even with their inherent limitations.

Has the technology improved? Trump thinks so. “Ronald Reagan wanted this many years ago, but we really didn’t have the technology many years ago. Remember, they called it starship, spaceship, anything to mock him,” he said at the convention. “But now we have unbelievable technology. And why should other countries have this, and we don’t? No, no, we’re going to build an Iron Dome over our country, and we’re going to be sure that nothing can come and harm our people.”

While short-range directed energy weapons are now feasible, scientists are nowhere close to achieving the kinds of power, beam control and precision tracking require for space weapons. Nor have engineers overcome the substantial cost, maintenance and operational difficulties of putting dozens or hundreds of weapons in space. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Washington, warned in a comment on Trump’s 2019 Missile Defense Review, “a space-based interceptor layer…has been studied repeatedly and found to be technologically challenging and prohibitively expensive.”

Even with the science and technology against him, Trump believes so strongly in this vision that he has made it the one defense plank in the new Republican Party platform other than “strengthen our military.” There are 20 points in the official GOP agenda. Number eight is: “PREVENT WORLD WAR THREE, RESTORE PEACE IN EUROPE AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND BUILD A GREAT IRON DOME MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD OVER OUR ENTIRE COUNTRY — ALL MADE IN AMERICA.” (All caps in the original.)

Similarly, Project 2025 calls for making missile defense “a top priority.” It treats the problem as if it were just a lack of political will, arguing that we must “abandon the existing policy of not defending the homeland against Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles.” It returns to the “Star Wars” vision: “Invest in future advanced missile defense technologies like directed energy or space-based missile defense that could defend against more numerous missile threats.”

In 1994, Rep. Newt Gingrich similarly had one and only one defense plank in his 10-point “Contract for America”: to deploy a national missile defense system. Then, too, Republican leaders arrived at their strategy by listening to conservative activists. The Heritage Foundation—the group behind today’s Project 2025—assembled a report that called for ending “the Clinton Administration's policy of intentionally leaving American cities and territory open to missile attack.” The report argued that for a few billion dollars America could develop and deploy “affordable, effective ballistic missile defenses.” All that was lacking, the report stated, was “a proper understanding of missiles defenses and the political will to build them.”

It was complete nonsense. A Republican White House and a Republican Congress spent billions but got nowhere with the scheme. Thirty years later, Donald Trump is trying to pull the same fast one, relying on the same group to sell the snake oil. It may be rhetorically appealing—Gingrich did capture the House—but it is utterly without scientific merit or strategic sense.

Let’s hope the American people have learned from the follies of the past.

defenseone.com · by Joe Cirincione

14. The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile

Conclusion:

We are in an evolutionary phase of unmanned integration, and this fact should inform the Navy’s transition to the eventual hybrid fleet. This era requires naval concepts of employment for unmanned systems that center the missile, with robotic platforms serving important but ultimately additive roles and missions. Looking through this lens, we already see the notable but caged utility of unmanned systems play out in both Ukraine’s naval battle and the Red Sea. Where unmanned systems have been strategic in creating effects in the maritime balance of power, it is often in coordination or convergence with the cruise missile. It is the partnership with cruise missiles that sets the table for unmanned system successes. It is the missile that remains the unheralded but decisive naval munition, as evidenced by these real-world operations.

In contrast with war on or from land, at sea the challenges of rearming a ship, the longer tactical distances, the larger necessary warheads, and the limitations on available size, weight, and power all create crosscutting constraints that shape drone use. The technical requirements for naval operations threaten to change the alchemy of cost and plenty that analysts find so appealing about drone use onshore. This finding obligates naval analysts to better conceptualize the value of drones in what may be the long calm preceding the coming of the swarm, that hypothesized paradigm shift that may one day supplant missiles in naval warfare. In their current iteration, however, robotic systems are an important development but so far fundamentally additive for a Navy that remains dependent on the dominant weapons system of its domain. The hybrid fleet should emerge from that central thesis: the missile still matters.

The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Joshua Tallis · July 31, 2024

We are not yet at a paradigm-shifting moment in the role of autonomous or robotic systems at sea. Nor are we likely to reach a revolutionary precipice within the period in which the U.S. Navy must begin making the transition to a truly hybrid fleet — that is, the integration of autonomous platforms designed to operate as part of an ocean-going battle force. This means the Navy’s approach to acquiring and fielding unmanned systems for deployment at sea should ultimately reinforce and support the maritime domain’s still-dominant weapons system: long-range anti-ship missiles.

We have learned a lot about the use of unmanned systems in Ukraine and the Red Sea. Yet we risk misapplying lessons from these often land-based conflicts if we do not consider the unique nature of war from the sea, where longer ranges, maneuvering targets, and weapons systems (ships and aircraft) are inherently limited in what they can carry to the fight. Naval analysts should interpret lessons on unmanned systems employment within the unique constraints of operating from the maritime domain. We can do that by looking at the intersection of cost, plenty, survivability, and reconstitution. In Ukraine and Yemen, a reliance on plentiful and cheap systems, a dearth of sophisticated weapons, relatively close quarters, and largely interior (or illicit) lines of communication all encourage combatants to prioritize the regeneration of cheap drones over weapons system survivability as the simplest pathway to combat resilience. Simply put, it is easier to acquire thousands of replacement racing drones or dozens of loitering munitions than to invest in higher-cost, more complex, less risk-worthy platforms and weapons.

Not so from the sea. There, platforms (and thus, their survivability) are much more important because of the attritional nature of missile warfare. These platforms will remain central for as long as the U.S. Navy operates large, crewed ships, which are not going away anytime soon. Naval vessels bring inherent constraints that fundamentally shape how the hybrid fleet will make use of robotic systems. Ships, crewed or not, are constrained by size, weight, and power — and operate far from logistics nodes. Moreover, rearming them can mean taking offensive power off the front lines. Such factors do not mean unmanned systems have no value at sea. But they do shape how those systems should be employed on the ocean in ways that are distinct from what we have seen in other conflicts to date.

Become a Member

The Maritime Fight Has Not Transformed

In the maritime domain, despite initial impressions from Ukraine and the Red Sea, unmanned systems are still best understood as operating in the context of an attrition-based form of missile warfare. A close reading of meaningful operational effects at sea in both cases in fact shows the centrality of long-range precision naval fires in two ways. First, traditional missiles continue to hit the hardest, creating the most impactful losses and effects. Second, as we will see below, where robotic systems have been strategically effective, it is often in tactical or operational conjunction with a missile.

Unmanned surface vessels have certainly garnered well-deserved attention through their use by the Ukrainian military. These systems have been so valuable to a ship-less Ukrainian navy that the country created a new brigade dedicated to their operations. Yet at core, cruise missiles remain elemental to the Ukrainian naval effort. After two years of war, about half of the major Russian platforms that Ukraine had destroyed were lost to long-range land-attack cruise missiles targeting vessels in port. Anti-ship cruise missiles also scored successes, not least the newsworthy sinking of the cruiser Moskva. Based on data from the open source project Oryx we assessed in spring 2024, of large Russian platforms destroyed beyond economical repair (cruisers, submarines, landing ships, and minesweepers), five of eight were the result of missile strikes. Unmanned systems had been most destructive for the smallest craft (and against fixed infrastructure).

Where unmanned surface vessels have had greatest effect, it is as part of a more complex system of capabilities that reserves a prominent place for long-range fires. Marine Corps University professor Benjamin Jensen writes that what really matters is how Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles are “combined with raids, cruise missile strikes, intelligence, deception, and electronic warfare that keep the Russians constantly guessing and wondering what will hit them next.” Indeed, it was Ukraine’s cruise missile attacks that created the tactical dilemma for Russian forces operating in the northwest portion of the Black Sea. This forced Russia to consolidate its remaining ships, as at Novorossiysk, only then exposing them to surface drone attacks and land-attack cruise missiles shot at stationary vessels in port.

A related story comes via Ukraine’s only major amphibious operation, retaking Snake Island. In that campaign, Turkish-made TB2 drones contributed to destroying Russian fast attack boats. Yet the relatively permissive environment these drones were operating within was derivative of the successful cruise missile strike on Russia’s major local air defense resource (the Moskva). The latent threat that unmanned aerial vehicles posed to near-shore vessels lacking air defenses materialized only when higher-end munitions pushed the Russian battle force out to sea, leaving small craft operating within the reach of drones. We have seen few such successes further out to sea.

Data from the Red Sea again reinforce the assessment of the underlying prominence of missiles in maritime conflict. An open source compellation of incidents assembled by Lloyd’s List suggests that the Houthis are finding much more operational success with missiles (cruise and ballistic), even as drones catch headlines and soak up defensive interceptors. Of the 20 known or suspected vessel strikes in the first (roughly) six months of Houthi aggression, four came from unidentified projectiles, two were attributed to drones, and 14 were attributed to missiles. The most damaging attacks, and the only attack to result in loss of life, all appeared to be missile strikes.

The Question of Cheap Mass

Centering the missile in war at sea helps us better understand where unmanned systems fit in the future hybrid fleet that the Navy is in the process of defining. Planners will somehow have to add more missiles to the equation, make existing missiles more effective, add additional resilience to the kill web (how missiles get to targets), or better conceal and defend crewed platforms from missile attacks. But there is one more key factor, that of cheap mass in war from the sea. This hinges on understanding naval survivability, or the fundamental nature of attrition in naval warfare.

Attrition reigns at sea because magazine constraints dictate combat potential in the maritime domain in ways that are not neatly comparable to war on land, where defense is more operationally feasible. Limitations on a ship’s total missile inventory, coupled with a platform’s exposure to detection and its distance from the resupply of friendly shores, produce a different mass-versus-precision calculus for navies than for land forces. Massed fires are clearly central to how the U.S. Navy intends to execute its Distributed Maritime Operations concept. But mass as a standalone value at sea is constrained by how much platforms can carry and their ability to survive and reconstitute combat power in the battlespace. Cost, plenty, survivability, and reconstitution offer a useful framework for thinking about how manned-unmanned conflict at sea is distinct from some of its applications on land.

Survivability and reconstitution often go hand in hand. To survive as a force is to make for more rapid regeneration and reattack. In Ukraine and Yemen, the wide scale use of low-cost systems has somewhat modified that calculus for land-based forces. As Stacie Pettyjohn observes, “drones do not have to be survivable if they are cheap and plentiful because one can have resiliency through reconstitution.” The iterative innovation in Ukraine and Yemen, then, is that these systems are abundant, expendable, and thus shift the calculus in the balance of survivability and reconstitution.

Resiliency through mass reconstitution of cheap systems is an attractive concept and one that naval analysts have an interest in pursuing. In the present moment, however, this concept is also much less obviously operative at sea given the platforms the U.S. Navy will fight with for decades to come. That is in part because “cheap” and “plentiful” mean something different for the U.S. Navy than for Ukraine, Russia, or the Houthis. This implies different kinds of unmanned systems — and different theories of employment — than those seen in Ukraine or the Red Sea.

Drones are already undoubtedly cheaper than many of the weapons systems they complement, as well as the weapons systems often used to defeat them. They may even stay cheaper, in some contexts, though that is far from a certainty. U.S. defense programs tend to send costs skyward, but not all this price hiking is simply a result of gold-plating requirements. The kinds of systems that the U.S. Navy would need to employ against an adversary like the Chinese navy demand more sophistication and hardening than those used in Ukrainian, Russian, or Houthi brute force approaches. This could include high data-rate satellite communications equipped with anti-jamming capabilities, target discrimination capabilities, and autonomous guidance and decision-making in terminal approach.

By contrast, Ukrainian, Houthi, and Russian high-density, low-cost, limited-sophistication theories of victory depend on the value of mass in war on (or from) land, where there are comparatively short supply lines and engagement ranges. This reliance on cheap electronics also means that the balance of power has equalized quickly. As Pettyjohn explains: “because most of the drones in Ukraine are commercially derived systems, the technology has quickly diffused to the enemy and has not provided an enduring advantage to either side.” Rapid iteration of cheap tech has lowered the floor or barrier to entry, but not necessarily raised the ceiling of strategic effect in either conflict.

Moreover, cheaper does not mean cheap, and we should not expect the cost predictions for systems common in a land war where both sides have internal lines of communication to hold true for the Navy’s needs at sea — doubly so as adversaries gain more expertise in countering those systems. Much of the commentary on drones downplays the expected costs imposed by future efforts to defeat them, which strikes at the very premise that they are enduringly cheap and effective.

Navies have significant constraints that are very different from combatants firing from interior lines. For decades to come, the bulk of the U.S. Navy’s force will remain crewed platforms, and there is no reconstitution without platform survival for a force like this. Consequently, versatility is king at sea. The limited launch cell space on a ship and the unpredictability of the nature of an inbound threat argue in favor of maximizing the density of the most capable interceptors onboard a vessel (many of which double as offensive missiles for the same reason). The result is a high bill and ship-imposed constraints on munitions density, which is what has fed the news cycle on the cost imbalance between a U.S. Navy missile like the SM-2 taking down cheap Houthi aerial drones. In other words, this imbalance is not simply a product of overly expensive U.S. missiles against “innovative” Houthi drones. A review of America’s own missile inventory shows that interceptors are typically about twice the price of offensive missiles because of defense’s technical demands. Precision in defensive interceptors, and the requirement to “bat a thousand” when it comes to ship self-defense, make those missiles necessarily expensive. Until we achieve breakthroughs in directed energy or other non-kinetic defeat options, missile defense will continue to be a more expensive proposition than anti-ship offense, even setting aside the underlying value of defending a $2 billion warship and its crew.

Ultimately, in a war at sea, platform survivability and munition reconstitution (how a ship gets rearmed and put back on station) are the most operationally important criteria for massing effects against the enemy. For this reason, the Navy’s requirements for small autonomous systems that take up precious space on its crewed or autonomous vessels will prioritize versatility: capable of helping the ship fend off complex multi-axis attacks and contributing to offensive multi-axis attacks, all while limited in the total number fieldable from a single platform. That basic insight underscores how the simple idea of forgoing the purchase of some multi-million-dollar missiles to buy a few hundred or thousand cheap drones to put at sea is not even math for a destroyer that may face anything from a Houthi drone to a Chinese hypersonic missile when it leaves port. The ship’s need to assure survivability is the first law of reconstituting naval combat power and will remain so for as long as the U.S. battle fleet anchors on large, crewed, missile-shooting platforms. We should be transparent in acknowledging that the path to the hybrid fleet flows through those constraints.

Conclusion

We are in an evolutionary phase of unmanned integration, and this fact should inform the Navy’s transition to the eventual hybrid fleet. This era requires naval concepts of employment for unmanned systems that center the missile, with robotic platforms serving important but ultimately additive roles and missions. Looking through this lens, we already see the notable but caged utility of unmanned systems play out in both Ukraine’s naval battle and the Red Sea. Where unmanned systems have been strategic in creating effects in the maritime balance of power, it is often in coordination or convergence with the cruise missile. It is the partnership with cruise missiles that sets the table for unmanned system successes. It is the missile that remains the unheralded but decisive naval munition, as evidenced by these real-world operations.

In contrast with war on or from land, at sea the challenges of rearming a ship, the longer tactical distances, the larger necessary warheads, and the limitations on available size, weight, and power all create crosscutting constraints that shape drone use. The technical requirements for naval operations threaten to change the alchemy of cost and plenty that analysts find so appealing about drone use onshore. This finding obligates naval analysts to better conceptualize the value of drones in what may be the long calm preceding the coming of the swarm, that hypothesized paradigm shift that may one day supplant missiles in naval warfare. In their current iteration, however, robotic systems are an important development but so far fundamentally additive for a Navy that remains dependent on the dominant weapons system of its domain. The hybrid fleet should emerge from that central thesis: the missile still matters.

Become a Member

Dr. Joshua Tallis is a senior research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses and the author of The War for Muddy Waters. From 2021–2023 he was the center’s advisor to the U.S. Sixth Fleet commander. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Stuart Phillips

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Joshua Tallis · July 31, 2024

15. How Do You Train Five Thousand Future Army Officers for a Rapidly Changing Battlefield?

How Do You Train Five Thousand Future Army Officers for a Rapidly Changing Battlefield? - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Adam Scher · July 30, 2024

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

In the middle of a patrol base before morning nautical twilight, a small group is huddled around a map with an operations order shell. The patrol base is at maximum security awaiting an early enemy attack. This is a familiar scene for every infantry officer. In fact, it is the foundational leader training experience for all junior officers across commissioning sources. The training design hasn’t changed much in the six decades since the Vietnam War—a shared experience from the chief of staff of the Army to the squad leaders of 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, which returned from Operation Inherent Resolve in April. And yet there have been sea changes to the operating environment that today’s soon-to-be officers, infantry branch or not, will soon enter—sea changes that continue to accelerate—and small-unit tactics must evolve to account for the enemy’s ability to leverage multidomain effects on friendly forces. This includes the ubiquitous presence of small, unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS), electromagnetic spectrum and signals jamming, and underground fortifications, among many other novel applications of traditional fundamentals of combined arms ground combat.

Now is the time to adapt the premier cadet training program to ensure that experiences witnessed in Ukraine and Gaza are not merely lessons observed by current leaders. Instead, the emerging trends in warfare can become an integral part of how our next generation of Army officers learn to fight, starting with their fundamental initial entry training environment. As this summer’s iteration of Cadet Summer Training (CST)—in which all ROTC cadets take part a year before commissioning—makes apparent, there is an opportunity to effect change in the way the Army prepares its future leaders now. But this cannot be a one-off improvement; it must be part of an ongoing process of continuous innovation so that CST keeps pace with the Army’s strategic vision for the application of ground combat on the modern battlefield.

Demonstrating Agility at Cadet Summer Training

CST is a crucible experience for over five thousand future Army officers each year. It is supported by almost three thousand officers and noncommissioned officers who serve as cadre in the capacity of observer-coach-trainer. CST takes place at Fort Knox, Kentucky from May through August annually and is the premier training event for cadets during their four-year ROTC career. It is the Army’s only opportunity to execute an ROTC program at scale given the disparate nature of 274 programs spread out across over one thousand colleges and universities.

Improving cadets’ warfighting skills is a top priority of Cadet Command senior leaders and helps prepare future officers to lead soldiers in combat. At the same time, a key priority for the Army chief of staff is transformation. The modern battlefield is providing unique insights into disruptive technologies that are changing the nature of small-unit combat. The infantry-based small-unit tactics that drive cadet assessments are rooted in Vietnam-era experiences. It is imperative that future officer training models integrate today’s lessons observed into adaptable training environments that more accurately mirror current conflict, without losing CST’s foundational principles of leading by example and shared hardship.

The use of platoon-sized infantry formations to assess leadership presents Cadet Command with an incredible opportunity to integrate, experiment, and expose cadets to the major evolutions on the modern battlefield. Providing this exposure as early as CST is in line with Army senior leader expectations for transformation, multidomain operations, and taking lessons observed from conflicts and turning them into lessons learned in training.

CST 24 is already adapting to ensure our tactical scenarios introduce cadets to prevailing changes of the current battlefield. This year, the designers of the training environment, Colonel Jim Horn, Lieutenant Colonel Jay Wenger, and Lieutenant Colonel Jake Phillips, identified two key areas where lessons observed from Ukraine and Gaza could be added to the environment cadets operate in during their leadership evaluations.

This is not the first time cadet training is being used to experiment with new aspects of the modern battlefield. In 2017, the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy conducted randomized controlled tests at West Point’s cadet field training with virtual reality and other advanced technologies. Their research, described in Military Review, suggested that the introduction of complex technologies at initial entry–type training caused cognitive overload and distracted or degraded leader effectiveness. Importantly, those tests involved providing cadets with complex technologies for their use in training. Based on these results, CST 24 did not seek to integrate the technologies directly into the training platoon. Instead, cadets are being exposed to sUAS and subterranean avenues of approach but are not expected to enter tunnels. We expect these methods to reduce risk of cognitive overload precisely because they do not require the training audience to employ them. We believe these applications of the multidomain complexity of the modern battlefield will help cadets mentally visualize and more creatively imagine what the enemy might bring to bear against them on a patrol, even while huddled around a two-dimensional map in a patrol base during the hot and humid summer in Kentucky.

Lessons Observed in Ukraine: Adversary sUAS

Recognizing the critical role unmanned aircraft systems are playing in the fight in Ukraine, scenario designers added sUAS to the composition of enemy assets for CST 24. Soldiers from 4th Infantry Division, tasked with supporting CST as opposing force (OPFOR) elements, accepted Colonel Horn’s request to bring their organic Black Hornet sUAS to Fort Knox. With the support of Cadet Command leadership, Major General Antonio Munera and Command Sergeant Major Roy Young, Lieutenant Colonel Phillips’s innovative approach to UAS usage opportunities resulted in deconflicted airspace between range control, the local Army airfield, and the nearby international airport in Louisville to ensure every cadet at CST 24 encountered enemy UAS during tactical training.

To ensure the OPFOR use of sUAS was not a distraction to training and was value-added to leadership decision-making, we leveraged the recently published Army Techniques Publication 3-01.81, Counter–Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) to teach cadets during their crawl phase (the first in a crawl-walk-run sequence) the fundamentals of how to respond when dealing with enemy UAS.

Cadre were directed to lead classes in a field environment that provided a philosophical background on the use of sUAS. The information included in the classes touched on the proliferation of UAS, how these inexpensive, flexible, and expendable platforms enable adversaries to observe and attack friendly forces, and that units in the path of UAS should assume they are being observed and prepare for indirect fire on their positions.

Cadets were then given a framework and a paradigm for how to process and respond to enemy use of sUAS, specifically tied to leader planning and decision-making in line with the Army leadership requirements model, instead of a how-to guide for tactical application. Cadets were taught that the platoon leader must include contingency planning and rehearsals for making unexpected contact with an enemy UAS. When operating in the vicinity of UAS, platoons should avoid open areas, increase dispersion, increase camouflage, and always consider overhead cover and concealment during all aspects of a patrol including movement, establishing objective rally points and patrol bases, and actions on the enemy objective. Specific actions on contact to help cadet leaders visualize how their formation might encounter enemy sUAS included a R3 model:

RECOGNIZE — Friendly forces encounter a UAS and identify it as a potential threat
REACT — Passive air defense measures are taken to increase survivability of friendly force (camouflage and concealment; deception; dispersion; displacement; hardening and protective construction)
REPORT — After detecting an air threat, friendly forces issue a SALUTE report to higher headquarters so other friendly units can be quickly warned

Cadre, serving in observer-coach-trainer capacity, were also given a framework for assessing cadet judgment and decision-making when making contact with enemy sUAS, which focused on three simple yes/no questions: (1) Did the platoon recognize and become aware that they are in visual or audible contact with an unidentified UAS? (2) Did the cadet leader make a decision about how to adapt or adjust movement techniques, routes, or any other aspect of the plan given the presence of an enemy sensor in the air above their platoon? And (3) did the platoon leader make an attempt to inform higher headquarters about the observed enemy activity?

At the time of this writing, over sixty cadet platoons, numbering over 2,200 cadets, have completed this training, with an additional three thousand cadets scheduled to train by the end of this summer. The feedback has been overwhelmingly positive from cadre, cadets and the 4th Infantry Division soldiers who are maximizing their opportunities to fly their newly fielded sUAS, which is a positive collateral consequence of integrating fielded force units into cadet training scenarios.

Lessons Observed in Gaza: Underground Enemy Facilities

Not unlike the lessons observed in Ukraine, observing the experience of Israel Defense Forces fighting in Gaza made apparent that ground forces are being asked to fight in increasingly urban environments and that adversaries are building tunnel networks to evade friendly surveillance and attack from the air. These subsurface areas are presenting challenges to even the most elite ground forces. While it would not make sense to ask cadets to develop spelunking skills, Lieutenant Colonel Wenger, Lieutenant Colonel Phillips, and Colonel Horn spearheaded the construction of a makeshift sewer cover to represent a larger tunnel system on the objectives that cadet platoons attack. Following the doctrinal guidance in Army Techniques Publication 3-21.51, Subterranean Operations, we developed the following training procedures to inform platoon leader decision-making.

Like the sUAS scenario, cadets received a brief explanation of how or why the enemy might choose to develop subsurface fortifications. They were instructed on how the development of infrastructure below ground adds complexity to the battlefield and how this infrastructure can be used by enemy forces to protect critical assets, store supplies and equipment, and hide and protect themselves from observation and attack. They were also taught about several of the forms subterranean spaces can take, including caves, shallow tunnels, sewers, or other underground structures.

Cadets then became familiar with how a leader might consider altering his or her unit’s task organization. The platoon leader must include contingency planning and rehearsals for making unexpected contact with enemy subterranean facilities. Platoon leaders should be prepared to engage on multiple fronts from enemy that fled the objective through subterranean egress routes. Identifying a specialty team and providing clear engagement criteria to a security squad or a follow-and-assume assaulting element to prepare for a counterattack demonstrate an understanding of the platoon leader’s role to isolate and secure entrances/exits to enemy subterranean facilities. Specific actions on contact to help cadet leaders visualize how their formations might encounter enemy subterranean spaced included the exact same R3 framework as sUAS to mitigate cognitive overload:

RECOGNIZE — Friendly forces encounter unidentified entrance/exit to subsurface
REACT — Actions are taken to isolate and secure the subterranean entrance/exit
REPORT — After detecting a subterranean threat, friendly forces issue a SALUTE report to higher headquarters so other friendly units can be quickly warned

Cadre were also given a framework for assessing cadet judgment and decision-making when making contact with enemy subterranean infrastructure, which focused on a similarly simple set of yes/no questions: (1) Did the platoon identify the enemy subterranean facilities on the objective? (2) Did the platoon take action to isolate and secure the entrance/exit to prevent the enemy from using it to surprise friendly forces? And (3) did the platoon leader inform higher headquarters about enemy subterranean facilities that require more than a single light infantry platoon to clear or control?

When a cadet platoon leader receives fragmentary orders from the platoon’s higher headquarters informing him or her that the platoon’s next objective may include tunnels, it becomes fairly straightforward for cadre to record how that platoon leader reacts during both the planning and execution phase of the training lane. Cadre listen to the cadet deliver an operations order and can quickly identify if the cadet platoon leader tasked any subordinate units to assign a team to secure any potential subterranean entrance or exits on the objective. Did cadet squad leaders incorporate this drill into their rehearsals at a patrol base or objective rally point? Once on the objective, does the platoon leader recognize a dry hole, which may indicate an immediate counterattack from the flanks by the enemy?

Further, a cadet platoon leader could decide to use one of the three maneuver squads to reinforce the shaping operation squad whose job it is to isolate the objective. Additionally, the cadet leader could choose, instead of the traditional follow-and-assume task for a second assaulting squad, to have that squad in a reserve function. This enables the platoon to maintain a maneuver element not decisively engaged on a primary objective with a subterranean layer, in the event the primary objective is a dry hole and the enemy uses its underground facilities for an attack on the cadet platoon’s flank.

The added tactical complexity is not the basis of grading. Cadets are not expected to clear tunnels or shoot down enemy UAS. Instead, the exposure of future leaders to these new aspects of a more complicated battlefield becomes the vehicle to evaluate their judgment, adaptability, and decision-making in uncertain, volatile, and ambiguous situations. How cadet platoon leaders choose to adjust their plans to new situations is a clear indication of the degree to which they exhibit the Army’s core leader competencies (lead, develop others, and achieve) and critical attributes (presence, character, and intellect).

Opportunities for CST to Remain Flexible in Support of Army Transformation

The overall purpose of CST is to assess and evaluate cadets as they enter their senior years and make decisions about what component and which branch to serve in. CST performance directly contributes to a national order of merit list that impacts these key career decisions. But beyond the grades cadets earn at Fort Knox, there is also a very important training aspect of CST that is at times overlooked and undervalued. There is a real tension between the need to score cadets and evaluate their performance to inform national order of merit lists and the opportunity to train cadets at scale on aspects of the future battlefield that are increasingly challenging to socialize in 274 different ROTC programs.

Innovation and agility can become part of the institution of CST with the appropriate process updates, and without taking away from the cadet evaluation mission. Specifically, every four years the secretary of defense publishes a National Defense Strategy. This document might trigger a review of the CST program of instruction for alignment with developments on future battlefields. Routinely challenging cadets to become more creative with how they understand, visualize, describe, and direct small-unit tactics is key to helping the Army achieve its strategic vision of incorporating lessons from the modern battlefield into the training, force structure, and equipment our future leaders use to develop.

Even without a formal review of the program of instruction every four years, near-term opportunities exist to enhance innovation and creative thinking at CST. For example, in addition to exposure to enemy sUAS, CST 24 is already planning for cadets to have access to friendly sUAS during the planning and execution of their missions. Incorporating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) via sUAS recording of the enemy objective along with full-motion video of the terrain in the area of operations will provide cadet leaders an opportunity to employ advancing sUAS technology to inform their planning processes beyond preparing to evade enemy assets. The UAS feed would help with terrain model development and scheme-of-maneuver design while cadet leaders conduct troop leading procedures and operations-order planning in the patrol base.

Offering cadet platoon leaders the option to view the full-motion video from a UAS aligns with key elements of the principles of patrolling, including planning, reconnaissance, control, and common sense. Not expecting the cadets to be responsible for the technical skills to employ the sUAS technology further avoids the cognitive overload experienced in previous attempts to enhance cadet training with advanced tech.

In line with the Army leader requirement model, a cadet platoon leader who receives a higher headquarters mission that indicates sUAS ISR is available and then makes a request to view it demonstrates intellect and presence. Furthermore, if the cadet platoon leader then coaches or directs squad leaders, forward observers, and other members of the cadet platoon to conduct some type of rehearsal, or if the terrain model or scheme of maneuver addresses some aspect of the footage observed, that cadet leader would receive high marks on the assessment of his or her ability to lead and develop others. Finally, if the coaching and directing of subordinates leads to mission accomplishment of key tasks and purpose of the operation due to the implementation of elements of the battlefield or terrain derived from the sUAS ISR footage, that cadet platoon leader would be evaluated favorably in the achieve category.

The electromagnetic spectrum infantry units are accustomed to freely controlling for command, control, and communications is now increasingly being contested by adversaries. To add an additional layer of multidomain operations to future cadet missions, cadre could program disruption into the ISR sUAS video mentioned above. As cadet leaders become comfortable and come to value the decision-making advantage afforded them by sUAS ISR, the recording could be deliberately halted (shown as static in a prerecorded video). The disruption simulation of friendly ISR would be described to cadet leaders as signal jamming by enemy electronic warfare assets, thereby introducing cadets to another domain that impacts command, control, computers, and communications on the modern battlefield. This disruption demonstrates to cadets that enemy forces are aware they are being observed by sUAS and such an electronic warfare attack degrades the ISR advantage the cadet platoon had during previous missions. It could further reduce the cadet leader’s ability to use indirect fires, since the sUAS would no longer be in a position to observe. In each of these instances, the introduction of a contested electromagnetic spectrum will help cadets avoid complacency and not take for granted unfettered access to ISR during operations in enemy territory, which is now a reality of warfare.

Another readily available innovation to consider for the future of CST is to expand schoolhouse integration and enhance the realism of new lieutenants’ training by leveraging second lieutenants at the Maneuver Center of Excellence conducting their Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). The BOLC curriculum requires these new lieutenants to produce and deliver operations orders. We could imagine a time when those lieutenants pitch the order and lead the patrol during the crawl phase of cadet summer training. Today, tactical scenarios begin with a day of classes and a day of cadre-led training lanes. Understandably, Cadet Command cadre, with seven, ten, or twenty years in the Army and from every basic branch, may not always be the best coaches and trainers for an infantry tactics–based innovation of technology on the battlefield. Integrated training between CST and infantry BOLC will enhance experiential learning for both communities.

It is important to note that there is fair and valid criticism that CST is simply initial entry training for future officers and that the addition of fires, ISR, subterranean terrain, and other flavor-of-the-day dynamics of combat only distracts from the fundamentals. Some argue that the traditional land domain battlefield is sufficient to evaluate the leadership of future officers, many of whom will not branch into combat arms. The characteristics of the offense—surprise, concentration, audacity, and tempo—can be exercised without overcomplicating the area of operations with subsurfaces and enemy or friendly air assets. The fact of the matter is that no functional higher headquarters exist for these training platoons and the burden on cadre to observe, control, and assess cadets is already challenging enough without the inclusion of complex enablers. These concerns must be addressed.

And yet, if we ignore the opportunity to expose future leaders to these dynamics, we do both them and the Army a disservice. Moreover, CST is more akin to advanced individual training because the cadet initial entry training in this analogy is the leadership lab curriculum and situational training exercises conducted at each ROTC program. The college campus is home station and cadets conduct overnight exercises once a semester and at least once a year in the spring, before arrival at CST, a combined mission rehearsal exercise with adjacent programs to provide cadets a mini-CST experience. CST is the largest, most robust single Army training activity executed in the continental United States and offers cadets an Army experience that is unmatched on the 274 disparate college campuses where they spend the school year. If CST can’t incorporate aspects of today’s operating environment, then there is nowhere in Cadet Command where it would ever be possible. Branch courses like BOLC serve their function to examine exactly how specific branches will adapt to modern warfare, but there is no other opportunity where junior leaders who will go on to represent every basic branch train together at the same scale as CST. It is not until officers make field-grade rank that we conduct professional military education in a combined arms way. CST is uniquely positioned to expand interdisciplinary understanding and set junior officers on a multidomain leadership path.

The world is watching as small units in Ukraine and Gaza employ the latest technology on the ground, in the air, and in cyberspace. I can imagine a time in the not-too-distant future when the Army’s next generation of officers are training the way we will need them to fight on tomorrow’s battlefield. It will take a lot of hard work, creativity, and commitment by smart leaders at all levels of cadet command, but the program the cadre in Task Force Tactics pioneered at CST 24 provides a timely breach that has marked a clear path to the high ground.

Lieutenant Colonel Adam Scher is the professor of military science at Seton Hall University. During CST 24 he served as the Task Force Tactics training and standards officer. His previous infantry assignments include deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan with the 101st Airborne Division, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, and 82nd Airborne Division.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: US Army Cadet Command (Army ROTC)

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Adam Scher · July 30, 2024

16. The UAE’s Secret War in Sudan

The UAE’s Secret War in Sudan

How International Pressure Can Stop the Genocidal Violence

By John Prendergast and Anthony Lake

July 31, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by John Prendergast and Anthony Lake · July 31, 2024

In the next four months, two and a half million Sudanese could die of hunger-related causes. That’s twice as many as Pol Pot’s regime starved in Cambodia over four years, and two and a half times as many as died in the 1983–1985 famine in Ethiopia that inspired the charity recording “We are the World.” As Martin Griffith, the United Nations’ top humanitarian official, recently put it: “I don’t think we’ve ever had this kind of number at risk of famine.”

The explosive expansion of graveyards in Sudan’s Darfur region and the genocidal violence marking the battles for its main cities are the visible tip of a mountain of human suffering. Even as wars rage elsewhere in the world, there is no parallel to the intensity and scope of conflict in Sudan. Since civil war erupted in April 2023, ten million Sudanese have fled their homes. One out of every eight internally displaced persons in the world is Sudanese, and more children have been displaced from their homes in Sudan than anywhere else.

And yet the world seems to hardly notice the agony of Sudan and its people. Donors have contributed only 31 percent of the $2.7 billion the UN has requested for Sudan—a shortfall that is worsening the hunger crisis. Occasionally governments will announce sanctions or world leaders and international organizations will make statements expressing concern. For the most part, however, they are not taking meaningful action to stanch the bloodshed.

No country is doing enough to end the suffering, but some countries are actively fueling and benefiting from Sudan’s civil war. Egypt, Iran, and Turkey have provided military support to Khartoum, despite evidence that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) engages in indiscriminate bombing and torture, and that it uses starvation as a weapon of war. Russia initially backed the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the other party to the conflict, which has roots in the Janjaweed militias that committed genocide in Darfur two decades ago. But Moscow is now playing both sides; in May, it entered an agreement with the SAF to establish a Russian logistical support base on the Red Sea in exchange for weapons and equipment. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which has historical links to the SAF leadership, spent months undercutting efforts to restart negotiations between the warring parties that had stalled in late 2023. It took until this July for the United States to gain Saudi agreement to restart the talks, which will take place in August in Geneva.

The outside actor that bears the most responsibility for the starvation and ethnic cleansing, however, is the United Arab Emirates. As the RSF perpetrates genocidal attacks on civilians in Darfur and other regions, Abu Dhabi is delivering arms to the militia. Meanwhile, unscrupulous companies smuggle Sudanese gold into Emirati markets, fueling the conflict. The UAE has been able to act with impunity, as its oil reserves, its strategic importance as a counterweight to Iran, and its role in diplomatic efforts to end the war in the Gaza Strip make Western leaders hesitant to lean too hard on Abu Dhabi.

Given the UAE’s large role in stoking the crisis in Sudan, it is imperative that outside actors compel the Emirati leadership to change course. Even if the United States and its partners remain unwilling to take bold action, such as by imposing sweeping network sanctions or investing in new peacekeeping forces in Darfur, public and private actors can make use of other points of leverage over the Emirati leadership, including its trade in conflict gold, its financial interests in sports teams and leagues, its purchase of U.S. weapons, and its reliance on Washington lobbyists. If it faces sufficient pressure, Abu Dhabi might conclude that its support for the RSF is more trouble than it’s worth.

CONFLICT GOLD

Gold has been a major driver of the war in Sudan. The RSF is more deeply involved in the gold trade, but both sides have smuggled and sold large volumes of gold to fuel their war machines. The UAE currently benefits from this trade. Statistics for 2023 are not yet available, but in 2022, the UAE imported 39 tons of gold from Sudan, valued at more than $2 billion, and direct shipments of Sudanese gold continue today. Bad actors also smuggle Sudanese gold into Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda—all of which end up selling much of it to the UAE. According to UN trade data, over 60 tons reached the UAE through these routes in 2022. In a May 2023 business risk advisory, the U.S. State Department noted that the UAE receives “nearly all” of the gold exported from Sudan.

The UAE is a global hub for gold laundering and by far the biggest destination for gold trafficked from Africa. A recent report from the Swiss nongovernmental organization Swissaid estimated that 405 tons were smuggled from sub-Saharan Africa to the UAE in 2022, making the UAE the biggest importer of illicit African gold that year. Industry experts say that large volumes of smuggled gold that are never declared in their countries of origin suddenly become legal when transmitted through the UAE, solidifying the nation’s leading role in gold laundering.

The UAE benefits from the conflict gold trade, a major driver of the war in Sudan.

Between 2020 and 2022, the London Bullion Market Association, an influential global gold-trading organization, and the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body that combats money laundering, pressured Abu Dhabi to address gold and money laundering. In response, the Emirati leadership took some steps toward reform, requiring refiners to be audited according to international standards. But important loopholes remain, particularly in the country’s gold souks, where gold is traded for cash.

Tougher action against the illicit gold trade would make it more difficult for the UAE and Emirati companies to profit from the war. The London Bullion Market Association should coordinate with other governments to push the UAE to allow independent monitoring of its gold souks—similar to the independent review missions that disrupt the trade of blood diamonds in what is known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Without independent monitoring of the gold souks, local reforms will do little to dent the trade in conflict gold.

Finally, the United States and the European Union should sanction more of the firms that buy and sell conflict gold from Sudan. In June, the U.S. Treasury Department blocked seven Emirati-based companies’ access to the U.S. financial system on the suspicion that they violated U.S. sanctions on Sudan. This is a good step, but to sway Emirati leaders’ thinking, the United States and the EU must ramp up existing sanctions, targeting the entire network of companies and individuals in the UAE involved in smuggling gold from Sudan. Because the owners frequently change the names of companies and use fake corporate directors to stand in for the individuals actually in charge, sanctions must be far-reaching to work.

FULL-COURT PRESS

Disrupting the trade in Sudanese conflict gold may be a particularly effective way for outside actors to peel the UAE away from backing the RSF, but it is not the only method at their disposal. Like Saudi Arabia, the Emirati government has invested heavily in sportswashing—laundering its reputation by financing, either directly or through private companies, sports leagues and teams around the world. Some of the biggest European soccer clubs, such as AC Milan, Arsenal, Manchester City, and Real Madrid, have received Emirati backing. So has Formula One, the international car racing league; Baseball United, a Dubai-based league whose ownership group includes former U.S. Major League Baseball players; and a number of U.S.-based sporting organizations, including the National Basketball Association, Ultimate Fighting Championship, and the U.S. Open Tennis Championships. Fans would be rightly dismayed to learn that the sponsors of their favorite athletes are also underwriting genocidal violence. If even a few sports teams, leagues, players, and fans were to use social media to call out the UAE’s contributions to Sudan’s crisis, the public embarrassment could make the UAE think twice about its policies.

The United States should also reconsider the billions of dollars in arms it sells to the UAE each year. Members of Congress and civil society groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have raised alarms about the UAE arming the RSF and urged countries that provide weapons to the UAE to do extra due diligence to make sure those shipments do not end up in Darfur. Representative Sara Jacobs, Democrat from California and the ranking member on the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a bill in May 2024 that would prohibit U.S. weapons sales to the UAE until the U.S. president certifies that Abu Dhabi has stopped arming the RSF. The ban would affect both U.S. government and private sales and would include firearms, artillery, ammunition, missiles, bombs, explosives, military vehicles, and aircraft, among other types of equipment. If momentum builds behind the bill, the signal that Washington is making this problem a priority could send a useful warning to the UAE.

Finally, U.S. congressmen, journalists, and human rights advocates should call out American firms that Abu Dhabi has hired to influence U.S. policy and shape public opinion to its liking. For example, the strategic advisory group FGS Global has two contracts with the Emirati government totaling $5.6 million, plus expenses, for 2024–2025. Likewise, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, a prominent Washington law firm, subcontracted a D.C.-based lobbying firm to advise the UAE on military sales in 2023 and itself collected $3.8 million in fees from the UAE over six months the same year. As long as the UAE aids and abets the RSF, Washington lobbyists and law firms that do work for the UAE government are helping enable atrocities.

DIAL UP THE PRESSURE

Nearly two decades ago, amid the genocide in Darfur, the global activist coalition Save Darfur set its sights on influencing policy in China, which at the time was by far the largest investor in Sudan. Save Darfur accused China of ignoring the atrocities in Darfur and launched a campaign criticizing Beijing’s lack of action as it was preparing to host the 2008 Olympic Games. In early February 2008, Steven Spielberg, who had been hired as an artistic director for the games’ opening and closing ceremonies, resigned in protest of China’s links to the genocide. Rising international condemnation had an effect: by late February, Beijing joined the international chorus pressing Khartoum to allow humanitarian aid into camps for internally displaced civilians, which prevented hundreds of thousands of deaths by starvation.

As the Spielberg episode showed two decades ago, pressure from unexpected sources can make a difference. Today, advocacy groups, companies, sports teams, athletes, policymakers, and anyone with a public platform should use all the tools available to them to prevent an escalating famine and genocide in Sudan. The UAE is deeply entangled with the RSF and bears heavy responsibility for the crisis, but this means it also has enormous leverage—if Abu Dhabi is induced to use it—to shape RSF decisions. On the other side, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have influence over the SAF, can help press for a cease-fire and an end to these forces’ obstruction of life-saving aid.

Without a lot more pressure on the warring parties and their benefactors in the region, an already dire humanitarian crisis in Sudan will only get worse. It should not take images of starving Sudanese babies filling the news for companies, athletic groups, and governments to put principle above profit or expediency.

ANTHONY LAKE served as a National Security Adviser in the Clinton administration.
JOHN PRENDERGAST is Co-Founder of the Sentry, an organization that investigates predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy.

Foreign Affairs · by John Prendergast and Anthony Lake · July 31, 2024

17. Is this unit the future of Army combat formations?

Is this unit the future of Army combat formations?

armytimes.com · by Todd South · July 30, 2024

Soldiers out of Hawaii are building a new, agile type of unit that could be the future when it comes to how the Army fields ground combat forces in far-flung West Pacific battlefields.

A “light brigade combat team” made up of soldiers from 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division recently completed a six-month rotation as part of the service’s Operation Pathways program that pairs Army units with partner forces in the region for training in the host nation.

Maj. Gen. Marcus Evans, 25th ID commander, told reporters Friday that the brigade trained, tested and used various new technologies and equipment for the first time during the tour.

Soldiers worked alongside Philippine counterparts with the 7th Infantry Division out of Fort Magsaysay, Philippines.

Evans and division Command Sgt. Maj. Shaun Curry both said some of the immediately noticeable changes came in how quickly they could maneuver large groups of soldiers and detect threats at even the lowest unit level.

Army picks deploying units to test electronic, cyber and drone warfare

The Army will select brigades to experiment with networks, cyber, electromagnetic warfare, small drones and loitering munitions while deployed.

Squad leaders had their own small drones to recon their area as far as three to five kilometers ahead. Traditionally, they would have had to rely on drones at higher-level units such as the company or battalion, all competing with demands from other squads or platoons.

That allows units to rely less on the limited number of trained forward observers needed to call in fire or direct aircraft to strike a target.

But at the same time, those drone operators require some extra considerations, according to Evans.

“Before you bring in a helicopter to a landing zone, you now have to make sure that that airspace has been cleared from the small unmanned aerial systems that maybe have been performing a reconnaissance task,” Evans said.

Platoons also had electromagnetic detection equipment to see otherwise hidden enemy communications signatures that might have gone unnoticed, such as those emitted from adversary drones.

“It is very challenging in today’s environment to hide, and so, the sooner you can identify the threat that is intended to come at you and your formations, the better able you are to position yourself to mitigate that threat,” Evans said.

Less hi-tech but just as valuable were new devices such as the Silent Tactical Energy Enhanced Dismount, or STEED.

STEED is a casualty-carrying device that works as a kind of a combination wheelbarrow/stretcher, powered with an electric motor, allowing a single soldier to transport up to three casualties or 500 pounds, rather than using an entire squad of nine or more soldiers out of the fight to move casualties.

But soldiers saw more potential for the STEED than simply carrying wounded.

The same device was used to transport a company’s worth of communication equipment, while others were used to haul cumbersome 60mm and 81mm mortar systems, easing the burden on soldiers and speeding up their movement, Curry said.

Other speed-related initiatives include experimentation back in Hawaii with newly issued Infantry Squad Vehicles, or ISVs which showed brigade and battalion planners how they could attack at comparatively lightning speed when compared with traditional foot movement, helicopters or larger trucks, Evans said.

Evans said that, with the full complement of the squad vehicles, commanders could move a company or battalion over a 300-kilometer distance without support from larger units and disperse that company or battalion across the battlespace, making it harder for an adversary to detect or defeat.

Though the 3rd Brigade did not take ISVs to the Philippines, its fellow 25th Division unit, the 2nd brigade, plans to use them at an upcoming October rotation at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, or JPMRC, in Hawaii. That rotation will be a validation event, preparing 2nd brigade for its Pacific rotation next year.

The center is one of the Army’s large-scale combat training centers. Similar to its counterparts such as the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Johnson, Louisiana, it is designed to accommodate multiple battalions or brigades for combat-like field training exercises.

A unit rotation at one of the centers is seen as the final test before an overseas deployment.

Third brigade got some early practice, as it was the first to use an exportable JPMRC west of the International Dateline, Evans said.

The exportable version uses observer controllers from the permanent training centers along with mobile equipment to track unit movements, communications and how in-field wargames play out. That setup gives units the ability to have a combat training center-like experience on any site with enough space to accommodate their units.

This mobile ability also means more partner nations, such as the Philippines, can participate on their home turf and receive the same kind of performance analysis, leaders said.

Adding new equipment and adjusting formations to use such gear more effectively is part of the Army’s overall effort, dubbed “Transforming in Contact,” by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George.

In February, George announced that the service would select several brigades to experiment with networks, cyber and electromagnetic warfare equipment and tactics during their standard rotations.

The ultimate makeup of both personnel, specialties and gear will be determined by the threats of the area and the unit’s mission. George said at the time the experimentation might show that, for example, the electromagnetic warfare needs for an artillery unit might vary from those of a cavalry squadron.

Senior leaders have emphasized a “bottom-up” feedback approach on how to equip and adjust such formations for current threats.

CORRECTION: A previous version of this article incorrectly identified the 25th Infantry Division brigade that completed the recent Operation Pathways deployment to the Phillippines.

About Todd South

18. American Fury (political violence)

Who is ready to say, "enough?"

Conclusion:

The only way to minimize further bloodshed is to choose leaders at every level of society who reject political violence unconditionally, in word and in deed. This does not mean acquiescing to both‑sidesism—you can still oppose Trump’s authoritarian impulses while condemning the attempt on his life. Making it through this dark time does, however, require articulating American values worth preserving, and building consensus toward reaching them. And it requires understanding the deleterious effects of political violence. Bloodshed begets more bloodshed, and a functioning democracy can only withstand so much of it. There are no random acts of political violence in America, or anywhere else. There will be violence in our nation until Americans come together to say “Enough.”

American Fury

For years, experts have warned of a wave of political violence in America. We should prepare for things to get worse before they get better.

By Adrienne LaFrance

The Atlantic · by Adrienne LaFrance · July 23, 2024

This article was featured in the One Story to Read Today newsletter. Sign up for it here.

Convulsions of political violence have a way of imprinting on the national memory. They become, in retrospect, the moments from which the rest of history seems to unspool. Yet they are forever intertwined with the possibility that things could have gone exactly the other way.

What if? becomes a haunting question. What if Franklin D. Roosevelt’s would-be assassin had hit his target in Miami in 1933? What if John F. Kennedy had forgone the convertible ride in Dallas in 1963? What if Martin Luther King Jr. hadn’t walked onto the balcony of the Lorraine Motel in Memphis in 1968? What if the bullet that pierced Ronald Reagan’s lung in 1981 had been an inch closer to his heart? What if Donald Trump had shifted his weight just before a gunman shot at him during a rally in Pennsylvania in July? What if?

Explore the Special Preview: September 2024 Issue

Check out more from this issue and find your next story to read.

Maybe it is the collision of malice and luck that makes the outcome of an attempted assassination seem simultaneously fated and wholly random. But political violence is rarely random. In fact, those who study the subject most assiduously have been warning Americans for years that threats of violence are escalating.

Our experience of political violence—the shock of an assassination attempt, how the smallest details suddenly burn bright with meaning—can obscure its true nature. Violence intended to achieve political goals, whether driven by ideology, hatred, or delusions, is broadly predictable. The social conditions that exacerbate it can simmer for years, complex but unmysterious. Again and again throughout history, and indeed today, periods of political violence coincide with ostentatious wealth disparity, faltering trust in democratic institutions, intensifying partisanship, rapid demographic change, an outpouring of dehumanizing rhetoric about one’s political foes, and soaring conspiracy theorizing. Once political violence becomes endemic in society, as it has in ours, it is terribly difficult to dissolve. Difficult, but not impossible.

As I wrote in “The New Anarchy,” the April 2023 cover story for this magazine, political violence is seen as more acceptable today than it was a decade ago by nearly every measure. Political conversation borrows the rhetoric of war. People build their identity not around shared values but around a hatred of their foes. A 2023 UC Davis survey found that “a small but concerning segment of the population considers violence, including lethal violence, to be usually or always justified to advance political objectives.” More Americans bring weapons to protests than they did in previous years. A growing number of elected officials face harassment and death threats, which has prompted many capable leaders to drop out of politics entirely.

From the April 2023 issue: Adrienne LaFrance on America’s terrifying cycle of extremist violence

Officials at the highest levels of the military and in the White House told me repeatedly that they believed the United States would see an increase in violent attacks as the 2024 presidential election drew near. Other experts talked about pronounced danger in places where extremist groups had already emerged, where gun culture is thriving, and where hard-core partisans bump up against one another, especially in politically consequential states such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Georgia. Clearly, they were right in their warning. They further predicted that the current wave of violence would take a generation or longer to crest.

“I don’t think it ends without some sort of cathartic cataclysm. I think, absent that, it just boils along for a generation.”

Our informational environment threatens to accelerate outbreaks of violence. Social platforms are optimized for rhetorical warfare. Their algorithms reward emotional outbursts, wild speculation, and unchecked hostility, all of which drive engagement with websites that profit off user attention but profess no real commitment to accuracy. Some of the most powerful people on the planet—the billionaire Elon Musk, various members of Congress—stoke contempt for their political adversaries, real and perceived, and encourage legions of followers to distrust the independent sources of information that try to hold them accountable.

Periods of political violence do end. But often not without shocking retrenchments of people’s freedoms or catastrophic events coming first. As I’ve written previously, governments have a record of responding to political violence brutally, and in ways that undermine democratic values and dismantle individual civil liberties. And political leaders are frequently complicit in perpetuating political violence, seeking to harness it for their own ends.

I first became interested in political violence around the time of the Waco, Texas, massacre in 1993 and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. In the years that followed, as the millennium drew to a close, the furies of that particular era appeared to cool, which I took as a sign that something had gone right. One scholar of political violence cautioned against such optimism. “The militia movement waned very quickly in the 1990s not because of anything we did, but because of Oklahoma City,” Carolyn Gallaher, who spent two years tracking a right-wing paramilitary group in Kentucky, told me. After the bombing, extremists went underground. But only for a time.

William Bernstein, the author of The Delusions of Crowds, put it in chilling terms when I asked him whether he thought January 6 would be a turning point away from violence in American politics. “The answer is—and it’s not going to be a pleasant answer—the answer is that the violence ends if it boils over into a containable cataclysm,” he said. What if, he went on—“I almost hesitate to say this”—but what if the rioters actually had hanged Mike Pence or Nancy Pelosi on January 6? “I think that would have ended it. I don’t think it ends without some sort of cathartic cataclysm. I think, absent that, it just boils along for a generation or two generations.”

These are poisonous days in our nation. It is reasonable to worry that the attempt on Trump’s life represents not the end of a cycle of violence, but an escalation in an era that has already seen a congresswoman shot in a supermarket parking lot, a congressman shot while playing baseball, and the U.S. Capitol stormed by insurrectionists. Some degree of cynicism is understandable. But too many Americans are allowing political exhaustion and despair to justify their own abstention from self-governance. Too many believe that screaming into the void, or clicking the “Like” button, amounts to political involvement.

The only way to minimize further bloodshed is to choose leaders at every level of society who reject political violence unconditionally, in word and in deed. This does not mean acquiescing to both‑sidesism—you can still oppose Trump’s authoritarian impulses while condemning the attempt on his life. Making it through this dark time does, however, require articulating American values worth preserving, and building consensus toward reaching them. And it requires understanding the deleterious effects of political violence. Bloodshed begets more bloodshed, and a functioning democracy can only withstand so much of it. There are no random acts of political violence in America, or anywhere else. There will be violence in our nation until Americans come together to say “Enough.”

This article appears in the September 2024 print edition with the headline “American Fury.” When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Atlantic · by Adrienne LaFrance · July 23, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

Commission on the National Defense Strategy

Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy

An "All Elements of National Power" Approach to Defense

Commission Findings and Recommendations for Policymakers

The Top International Relations Schools of 2024, Ranked

Undergraduate Programs

Master’s Programs

Ph.D. Programs for Academics

Ph.D. Programs for Policymakers

MORE READING FOR PROSPECTIVE STUDENTS

Advice to Prospective Students

Advancing a Global Affairs Career

About the Author(s)

Head of Project 2025 Steps Down Following Trump Criticism

The group had set an agenda for a second Trump term but was criticized by the former president

Hamas operates ‘massive’ U.S. influence network, former FBI counterterror expert says

State Dept's Campbell: Gap between US, China shipbuilding is 'deeply concerning' - Breaking Defense

"We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century," Kurt Campbell told lawmakers today.

Acting Secret Service Chief Admits Security Failures Before Trump Shooting

Director Testifies on ‘Failure of Imagination’

Would the U.S. Consider Assassinating Putin?

When and why intelligence agencies target foreign leaders—and how it often backfires.

Russia’s War in Ukraine

Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy

But it can be done with the help of shipbuilding allies and more money to train defense-industry workers.

Henry Huiyao Wang: China More Open is More Secure

The President of CCG urges further reform and opening up, visa-free travel for Americans

Sticking to the "small yard, high fence" Strategy: Anti-China Sentiment as American Political Correctness?

How to Address the Chokepoints in Cutting-edge technology? What is the Relationship Between Openness and Security?

What Does People-to-People Exchange Mean for China-U.S. Relations?

How Should China Respond to the Many Variables in the U.S. Election?

US needs to double down on directed energy weapons - Asia Times

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

Army’s second-largest post to have its first female commander

Can Donald Trump r​eally build an Iron Dome over America?

The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile - War on the Rocks

How Do You Train Five Thousand Future Army Officers for a Rapidly Changing Battlefield? - Modern War Institute

The UAE’s Secret War in Sudan

How International Pressure Can Stop the Genocidal Violence

By John Prendergast and Anthony Lake

CONFLICT GOLD

FULL-COURT PRESS

DIAL UP THE PRESSURE

Is this unit the future of Army combat formations?

American Fury

Explore the Special Preview: September 2024 Issue

Can Donald Trump really build an Iron Dome over America?