Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Nothing truly stops you. Nothing truly holds you back. For your own will is always within your control.”

– Epictetus

“… What about the main thing in life, all its riddles? If you want, I'll spell it out for you right now. Do not pursue what is illusionary -property and position: all that is gained at the expense of your nerves decade after decade, and is confiscated in one fell night. Live with a steady superiority over life -don't be afraid of misfortune, and do not yearn for happiness; it is, after all, all the same: the bitter doesn't last forever, and the sweet never fills the cup to overflowing. It is enough if you don't freeze in the cold and if thirst and hunger don't claw at your insides. If your back isn't broken, if your feet can walk, if both arms can bend, if both eyes can see, if both ears hear, then whom should you envy? And why? Our envy of others devours us most of all. Rub your eyes and purify your heart -and prize above all else in the world those who love you and who wish you well. Do not hurt them or scold them, and never part from any of them in anger; after all, you simply do not know: it may be your last act before your arrest, and that will be how you are imprinted on their memory.”

– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956

"Violence begins where knowledge ends."

– Abraham Lincoln

1. The US election and North Korean denuclearization

2. [Exclusive] Kim Jong-un: "Don't worry about China"... No. 1 instruction to diplomats after meeting Putin

3. China, Russia vying for influence over N. Korea: Campbell

4. North Korean officials seek medicine for Kim's health problems related to obesity, Seoul says

5. State Dept's Campbell: Gap between US, China shipbuilding is 'deeply concerning'

6. Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy

7. North Korean Bulsae-4 Missile System Reportedly Spotted in Ukraine for First Time.

8. NIS closely watching N.K.-China ties amid signs of rift

9. Vice defense chief, U.S. Army secretary urge N. Korea to stop trash balloon launches

10. S. Korea, U.S. holding live-fire drills near inter-Korean border

11. S. Korea puts focus on lasers to take out N. Korean drones

12. Photos of Sue Mi Terry's notes: FBI surveillance or NIS mole's leak?

13. S. Korea, Philippines stage friendship flight during multinational drills in Australia

14. N. Korean leader sacks public security minister for damage from downpours in border areas

15. Dokdo: A historical and sovereign territory of Korea

16. Military to launch 'strategic command' around October (South Korea)

1. The US election and North Korean denuclearization

Deterrence, pressure, and keeping the door open are important components of a sound policy and strategy. But they are likely insufficient.

As Kim Gumhyok said last week at the Hudson institute, "change is coming" and we must be ready for it. He wants us to ensure we make north Korean human rights a number one priority and that we do not become disappointed with Korean issues because we have failed to denuclearize the north for the past 30 years. He wants us to focus on helping the Korean people create change in the north.

To that end we need to add a human rights upfront approach, employ a sophisticated and comprehensive public diplomacy/information campaign targeting the elite, second tier leadership, and the people.

Kim Jong Un is facing immense pressure and in 2023 and 2024 has implemented major policy changes due to his failed promises to the Korean people in the north. His nuclear weapons have not brought peace and prosperity, so he has declared the Republic of Korea (ROK) its enemy and has excised peaceful unification as the regime’s strategic objective. However, Kim still seeks to dominate the peninsula under his rule to ensure survival of the regime. He continues to use political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies while preparing for the possible use of force to achieve his objectives.

The standout, but too often overlooked, success of the past seven decades has been deterrence. The ROK/US alliance has prevented the resumption of war on the Korean peninsula, and it must continue to do so as the number one priority. However, nearly three decades of a denuclearization policy have failed despite several agreements that among normal states would have resulted in significant diplomatic breakthroughs. The failure is not due to the U.S. and ROK efforts. It is due solely to the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

Given the changes evident in North Korea, it is the proverbial inflection point that requires examination of new policy options and strategy that can drive change or transformation. Kim Jong Un has the option to change his behavior and policies. If Kim does not change, the Korean people in the north need the opportunity to transform their situation and seek an end to the human rights abuses by achieving a free and unified Korea. Now is the time to begin to truly help them. The world cannot no longer admire this problem.

The U.S. and its allies must stop worrying about what North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is doing or will do. Instead, make the North Korean regime worry. Focus on human rights, information, cyber, sanctions, military readiness, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. Present Kim with a broad effort to bring peace, prosperity, and stability to the Korean peninsula by showing the Korean people in the North that their sacrifice and suffering is the result of Kim Jong Un's failed policies, promises, and strategy. Create conditions that will cause Kim to change his behavior or be faced with change from within.

The US election and North Korean denuclearization - Asia Times

The ball remains in Pyongyang’s court as current US policy is the best possible policy given all the factors

asiatimes.com · by Syd A. Seiler · July 30, 2024

To no one’s surprise, 2024 is turning out to be a unique US election year in which speculation about changes in US foreign policy under each of the two candidates if elected far exceeds actual comments or insights provided by either camp.

Candidate Trump has, not surprisingly, left options open and spoken more in terms of where President Biden allegedly failed.

Meanwhile, the Biden-Harris team [as of this writing, before President Joe Biden’s July 21 withdrawal from the race and endorsement of Vice President Kamala Harris as his successor] has defended its current policy and avoided suggestions that fundamental changes are necessary.

Filling the vacuum of substantial policy debate thus far are experts across the political spectrum. There is much rumination about possible new policy directions regarding North Korea and its growing nuclear weapons program.

There is universal consensus that North Korea’s nuclear capability poses a growing, dangerous threat that will challenge the winner of this year’s election for the coming four years. The foundational questions being asked boil down to two: “Do the Democrats have any North Korea Plan B for the next term?” and “What would a resumed Trump-Kim Jong Un relationship yield?”

There is a predictable claim that Washington’s current policy toward Pyongyang failed and that the status quo is unacceptable. It’s predictable since this is what foreign policy wonks are paid to do – not necessarily because there exist alternative policies, superior to those in place now, that would have a better chance of success.

There are growing calls for shifting away from the goal of complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea to an allegedly more reasonable arms control approach that would accept the reality that North Korea has nuclear weapons and find ways in which the threat those weapons posed might be mitigated or at least controlled.

Other critics focus on the need for Washington to somehow identify the right incentives that would bring Pyongyang back to the table. They assume that Washington is largely to blame for the stand-off while asserting, despite evidence to the contrary, that somehow Pyongyang is ready to talk in a way that it so far has refused to do under the current Biden administration.

Missing or marginalized as distant, secondary considerations are Pyongyang’s agency, what its current diplomatic goals might be and whether Kim Jong Un will ever envision the need to put all or part of his nuclear program on the table.

If these questions are considered at all, the discussion is usually accompanied by the claim that North Korea wants nothing more than dialogue with the United States, is frustrated with US policy inaction and will continue to build its arsenal until it has Washington’s attention.

It has been hard for such commentators to accept that – to borrow from the movie title – Pyongyang is just not that into us.

All that said, January 20, 2025, will be upon us before we know it and it is worth examining what Pyongyang might be looking for over the coming four years. The US election results (hopefully) will be final, additional North Korea missile launches and other shows of force will have taken place and an authoritative statement of some type from Kim Jong Un will have been issued around New Year’s Day that will fuel even more discussion about possibilities for dialogue going forward.

Examining the past history of North Korea policy shifts tied to the US election cycle can provide insights into how the current situation unfolded over the past years, and how much skepticism – or, on the contrary, how much optimism – is warranted regarding any change going forward.

Lessons of the recent past

Having been the Korea director on the National Security Council staff during the transition from Obama term one to Obama term two in 2013, I can understand the optimistic view, even if guarded, holding that presidential transitions provide new opportunities for change with North Korea.

Candidate Obama had promised he would reach out his hand to adversaries who would unclench their fists. This openness to dialogue extended to Pyongyang throughout the first term – despite the response to it with:

North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009; and
Pyongyang’s abrogation of the modest but important February 2012 Leap Day Understanding with the United States, which had sought to lay the groundwork for improving US-DPRK ties while opening a path back to multilateral Six-Party Talks that had closed in late 2008.
a Taepo Dong-2 long-range rocket launch in April 2009;

Those actions did not discourage the administration in the last half of 2012 from exploring how it might use a second term to work with Pyongyang to move diplomacy forward. What the United States sought from North Korea in terms of a phased approach to denuclearization was quite clear, as were the political economic, diplomatic, and security benefits to Pyongyang for moving down the path.

How would North Korea greet Obama in term two? It did not take long to find out. Just after the November 2012 election, North Korea

again – in December 2012 – launched a Taepo Dong-2 long-range rocket;
conducted, in February 2013, its third nuclear test; and
shortly thereafter, declared that it was going to expand its nuclear program even further as it pursued its so-called byungjin policy of parallel pursuit of both nuclear and economic development.

This file picture taken by North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on December 12, 2012, shows North Korean rocket Unha-3, carrying the satellite Kwangmyongsong-3, lifting off from the launching pad in Cholsan county, North Pyongan province in North Korea. Photo: KCNA vis KNS / FILES

From that point onward, Pyongyang rejected denuclearization talks, ignoring repeated calls from both Washington and Seoul for dialogue, and rejecting Beijing’s efforts to coax Pyongyang back to negotiations on its nuclear program.

Despite South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s assertion to the contrary, although Kim Jong Un put the “denuclearization” word back into play in 2018 there was little optimism at the time among experts that Kim was prepared to move beyond Pyongyang’s definition of “denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula.”

First and foremost in Pyongyang’s view was the elimination of the threat posed by the United States to North Korea – in other words, the removal of the US security commitment to the Republic of Korea.

Ultimately, the Trump administration’s efforts elicited the same response of Pyongyang engaging, probing possibilities for exacting concessions and then walking away when it was clear that nothing more was to be gained through the process.

Lessons learned: (1) Expect the worst

There are two important lessons learned through these experiences.

First, North Korea was not bluffing when it repeatedly stated it did not intend to surrender nuclear weapons as the cost for either normalized relations with the United States or for economic assistance. We should not anticipate that Kim Jong Un is waiting to engage either of the two potential US counterparts in 2025 with a desire to improve relations with the United States while finding relief from his current economic hardships.

This is often difficult to understand or accept even for those who follow North Korea for a living – let alone for casual observers inclined to say, “How could a good relationship with the United States and a path to economic prosperity not motivate Kim to walk away from his nuclear weapons?”

Difficulties in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue do not result from either the United States not knowing what Kim wants or Kim not knowing what the United States wants and what we are prepared to offer through the process.

Understanding why this is the case is key to understanding why every package of incentives put before North Korea by the United States has failed to motivate Pyongyang to move forward with sustained denuclearization.

(2) But keep trying

The second lesson is that the US remains undeterred in its pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the nuclear issue. The Obama team – as with the Trump team and later the Biden team facing the same dire assessment – did not respond by closing the door to diplomacy and negotiations. This is an unfair and under-informed accusation designed to blame the incumbent administration for Pyongyang’s recalcitrance.

The good news is that assessments of the likelihood of success in any negotiation can help inform diplomatic strategies while not becoming obstacles preventing leaders from leaving the door open to negotiations. On the North Korea nuclear issue, no US leader over the past 30 years has said “This is too difficult, let’s quit.”

In short, Pyongyang has remained committed to its nuclear program despite the availability of multiple available off-ramps, and consecutive US administrations have kept those off-ramps available while seeking to find a way back to negotiations.

What about a Kim-Trump redux?

The Trump years, as unique as they were in terms of US interaction with North Korea, proved ultimately to follow the typical pattern. Increased pressure was made possible by Pyongyang’s unprecedented missile launches of 2016-2017, and Kim’s pivot to diplomacy on the occasion of the 2018 Winter Olympics spelled the beginning of the end to that pressure.

Kim’s inflexibility in Hanoi and Pyongyang’s disinterest in picking up the pieces throughout the remainder of the Trump term proved the skepticism about Kim’s posture toward denuclearization to have been correct.

What options remain?

Although policy options are limited, a handful remain.

Deterrence: First, a deterrence strategy is required that is flexible and expanding to match the quantitative and qualitative growth of the North Korean nuclear program.

Long gone are the days when the North Korea nuclear threat could be characterized as just a negotiating tool or just a last-resort weapon of survival that Kim would never dare use. The partially declassified National Intelligence Estimate published by the National Intelligence Council in 2023 provides some scenarios through 2030 and beyond in which North Korea might leverage nuclear weapons, to include possible limited-use options.

Military planners must continue to prepare for such scenarios, while policymakers and diplomats consider strategies to complement deterrence and help shape North Korean behavior to prevent a “sum of all fears” scenario from unfolding. North Korea’s recent drumbeat of authoritative threats to South Korea needs to be taken seriously.

Pressure to slow and impede: Pressure continues to have an important role to play in North Korea strategy.

While threats to the traditional sanctions system grow, there is still value in creative and aggressive diplomacy to encourage other countries to join our efforts at

curtailing revenue that funds the DPRK’s nuclear program,
enforcing export controls on materials that could find their way into North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons and
imposing reputational costs on Pyongyang for its unwillingness to engage in denuclearization negotiations.

Included here is pressure directly applied on Moscow – and also, importantly, indirectly on Moscow through Beijing – to halt the growth of Russia’s security and economic ties with North Korea.

Amid denials from both Moscow and Pyongyang about weapons transfers, and hollow promises that Russia will continue to work within the parameters of current sanctions on North Korea, a constant messaging effort that builds upon what has already been done concerning developments in Russia-North Korea relations will keep the issue on everyone’s mind, enabling our diplomats to expand the diplomatic consensus increasingly so as to pressure Moscow.

North Korea’s diplomatic strategy is designed to lock in the inevitability of its nuclear status with one country at a time. We must counter such efforts to discourage Pyongyang from believing it will succeed.

Keeping an open door: Finally, the door to negotiations must be left open, but not recklessly so. Pyongyang will continue to message, echoed by Beijing and Moscow, that the current stand-off in dialogue is entirely attributable to US hostile policy.

Their goal is clear: to get the United States to grant sanctions relief, renounce pressure as a diplomatic tool and reduce military extended deterrence actions. Over time, the temptation to give consideration to these options and chase after Pyongyang can overwhelm even the most principled policymaker or diplomat. That temptation must be resisted.

The limited levers the United States wields that contribute to deterrence and threat reduction – such as military exercises, extended deterrence demonstrations, pressure and sanctions enforcement, etc – must not be preemptively sacrificed in the name of creating an environment conducive to dialogue when there is no indication such talks would succeed in anything but the short-term appearance of tension reduction.

There is still value in creative and aggressive diplomacy to encourage other countries to join our efforts at curtailing revenue that funds the DPRK’s nuclear program and imposing reputational costs on Pyongyang for its unwillingness to engage in denuclearization negotiations.

Phased approach/arms control: Advocates of a phased, interim, step-by-step approach – whether or not such advocates are among those who call for an open declaration of accepting North Korea as a nuclear power and moving on to arms control – are well-intentioned but fall short on several fronts.

Christopher Hill of the US and other top negotiators at the sixth round of Six Party Talks in Beijing, September 30, 2007. Photo: Xinhua

A phased approach is not a new idea.

A step-by-step approach was the foundation of the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and its initial two action statements of 2007, as well as of the 2012 Leap Day Understanding.

It was also essentially the approach of the Trump Administration, as well.

At no time has the United States made “preemptive complete denuclearization” a prerequisite for agreeing to talks with North Korea. Our pursuit of complete and verifiable denuclearization has not caused us to miss opportunities, when they existed, for interim progress.

Pyongyang has a long record of rejecting – or accepting and subsequently rejecting – phased approaches toward denuclearization. There is no current sign that it would be any more receptive.

An authoritative statement in January 2024 bemoaning “wasted time” in allowing then-ROK President Moon Jae-in to seek to mediate US-DPRK talks likely signals that Pyongyang may no longer see a need for, or value in, charm offensives during which negotiations resume and nuclear and missile testing subsides.

Why go through the motions, in other words, when there are missiles to be tested, threats to be made and work- arounds with Russia and other countries to circumvent pressure?

Peace-enabled denuclearization – or denuclearization-enabled peace?

Some have argued that the situation on the ground has become so tense that it warrants putting peace ahead of denuclearization. That is not so easy, since it is the North’s nuclear program that has been far and away the greatest threat to stability since the early 1990s.

That is why the principle guiding the sequencing of actions in the Six-Party Talks process

was that only demonstrated progress in denuclearization would enable progress on the peace and security, economic and diplomatic fronts. Peace talks would only be meaningful

if denuclearization were making clear progress.

DPRK-US and DPRK-Japan normalization would be possible as a denuclearizing Pyongyang turned to address the various issues of concern to Washington and Tokyo. Large-scale economic and energy assistance led by South Korea would be made possible by the rapprochement and long-term improvement of the security situation on the Peninsula that denuclearization would enable.

Without denuclearization, any actions limiting the US-ROK military posture, providing economic benefits to North Korea or reducing diplomatic pressure risks empowering and enabling North Korea and its WMD program even further, thus resulting in reduced security and stability. Saying no to short-term, mostly symbolic feel-good agreements can be difficult, but is crucial to avoid weakening the limited levers and tools that we have.

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This is not a mere theoretical or academic discussion: Whether peace on the Peninsula, inter-Korean rapprochement and normalization of relations with Washington and Tokyo are imaginable without denuclearization is a question that will shape policy for years to come, particularly as Pyongyang’s diplomatic objectives are to eventually have Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington move beyond the nuclear issue and accept the DPRK for what it is.

Recent reports speculating about a possible DPRK-Japan summit quickly raised concerns about the benefits Pyongyang would accrue from a breakthrough on the abductee issue that would result in significant rewards from Japan without progress on the nuclear issue.

Would restored efforts at peace talks such as those discussed toward the end of the Moon Jae-in administration be worth pursuing as the DPRK flagrantly grows its nuclear and missile capabilities and threatens Seoul with being the target of a potential first use by North Korea?

What would renewed inter-Korea dialogue look like with North Korea as the clear dominant power given its nuclear status and stated policy of seeking the subjugation of South Korea?

Conclusion

Over the past 30 years, the United States has had multiple opportunities to test North Korea, and Pyongyang has had many chances to consider the potential benefits of denuclearization.

During this period, none of the agreements reached – the Agreed Framework (1994), the Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks (2005), the Leap Day Understanding (2012) or the US-DPRK Singapore Joint Statement (2018) – was inherently flawed. All were good agreements negotiated by talented US negotiators achieving as much as possible given the circumstances they faced.

Those agreements did not fail due to incomplete preparation by the United States, bad-faith US responses to denuclearization steps taken by North Korea, an inflexible “all or nothing” approach or a flawed understanding of DPRK intent.

It is North Korea and its sustained, unchanging commitment to a nuclear weapons program that eventually doomed each of these agreements and made future agreements – or even negotiations to potentially generate such agreements – increasingly less likely over time.

There are no easy answers, but then again, these are not new questions or challenges. I do not think it would be overly generous to say that our current policy toward the Korean Peninsula is the best possible given all the factors described above. The ball remains in Pyongyang’s court. Wishing that it were different does not make it so.

Syd Seiler worked for over 42 years in the US government focused on Korean Peninsula issues as a senior policymaker, negotiator, executive manager and intelligence officer. He was the US national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2020 to 2023. From 2016 to 2020 he was the senior analyst for the commander of US Forces Korea. Before that, he served as the US special envoy for Six-Party Talks, responsible for North Korea-related diplomacy and strategy while acting as the US side of the New York channel for dialogue with North Korea.

This article was originally published by the Institute for Korean Studies (GWIKS) at George Washington University and the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University. It is republished with permission.

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asiatimes.com · by Syd A. Seiler · July 30, 2024

2. [Exclusive] Kim Jong-un: "Don't worry about China"... No. 1 instruction to diplomats after meeting Putin

This is a Google translation.

[Exclusive] Kim Jong-un: "Don't worry about China"... No. 1 instruction to diplomats after meeting Putin

https://n.news.naver.com/article/025/0003376836?cds=news_edit

Entered 2024.07.31. 5:00 AM Last modified 2024.07.31. 8:25 AM Original article

Reporter Jeong Yeong-gyo

Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea. Rodong Sinmun = News 1

As China is distancing itself from the close relations between North Korea and Russia, and an unusual mood is being detected in North Korea-China relations, it has been found that North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un has given instructions to North Korean diplomats working in China to "not be concerned about China's feelings." There is also an atmosphere of blatantly expressing opposition to China through actions such as restricting the movement of overseas Chinese within North Korea. Some experts say that this could be seen as Kim Jong-un personally giving permission to engage in aggressive activities without regard for friendly relations with China in the future. This means that the main tasks of North Korea's overseas missions, such as illegal smuggling, procurement of cash and luxury goods, and gathering intelligence, could become more active. The unusual atmosphere between North Korea and China has been steadily detected since Kim Jong-un visited Russia in September of last year, held a summit with Putin, and agreed to drastically strengthen cooperation between the two countries. China's position on the honeymoon between Kim Jong-un and Putin centered around illegal military deals is closer to "not wanting to appear as part of a North Korea-China-Russia alliance." This is also in line with China's efforts to improve relations with South Korea and Japan by participating in trilateral summits such as the South Korea-Japan-China summit while agreeing to manage tensions with the United States.

Multiple North Korea sources told JoongAng Ilbo on the 30th, "Recently, a notice was sent to North Korean embassies in China containing Kim Jong-un's instructions that 'there is no need to worry about China'," and "there is an interpretation on the ground that the conflict between North Korea and China will deepen for the time being." It is said that the ' No. 1 notice' with this content was sent this month. This measure was taken after Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea and signed the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty' with Kim Jong-un on the 19th of last month.

In relation to this, China reportedly removed the "footprint plaque" that was installed to commemorate Kim Jong-un's walk and friendship with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Dalian, China in May 2018. (JoongAng Ilbo, June 11, pages 1 and 5) Earlier this month, it is said that China demanded the repatriation of all North Korean workers in China, one of North Korea's main means of earning foreign currency.

When the South Korea-Japan-China summit adopted a joint declaration that included the expression "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" on May 27, North Korea also launched Military Reconnaissance Satellite 2 in protest that night.

Chairman Kim Jong-un supervises the construction of the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone on the 16th. Rodong Sinmun, News 1

There is also a trend of strengthening control over overseas Chinese who have served as a "private bridge" between North Korea and China. A source said, "Recently, North Korean authorities have been restricting overseas Chinese from leaving their residences and cracking down on North Korean residents' entry into overseas Chinese homes." It is also said that There is also talk that North Korean authorities, who have been actively blocking residents' contact with the Korean Wave in order to prevent the inflow of external ideas, have recently expanded the scope of their crackdowns to block even the middle class. Another source said, “North Korean authorities have banned citizens and soldiers from watching Chinese movies for the past several months,” and “I’ve heard that they’ve even confiscated storage media containing Chinese movies.”

It is said that some payments in Yuan, which are used in North Korea, have also been blocked. A high-ranking defector who wished to remain anonymous said, “In the past, Yuan payments were possible in Pyongyang’s markets, but now they are no longer possible.” According to the “North Korean Economic and Social Status Report” published by the Ministry of Unification in February, the Yuan accounted for 68.4% of the currency circulated in markets from 2016 to 2020, more than double the North Korean Won (25.7%).

In fact, the proportion of Chinese films shown in foreign currency corners on North Korean state-run broadcasting stations, including Korean Central TV , has sharply decreased. This is in contrast to the intensive broadcasting of Russian films produced during the former Soviet Union before and after Putin’s visit to North Korea last month.

The Rodong Sinmun reported on the 28th that General Secretary Kim Jong-un of the Workers' Party of Korea participated in the commemorative march of symbolic corps of the Fatherland Liberation War (Korean War) held in Pyongyang on the evening of the 27th to mark the 71st anniversary of Victory Day (the anniversary of the signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement). News 1

Even at official events, the two sides do not seem to be hiding their discomfort with each other. NK News, an American media outlet specializing in North Korea, reported on the 29th (local time) that the absence of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun from the Korean War symbolic parade event held by North Korea on the night of the 27th at the Pyongyang Stadium Square to commemorate the 71st anniversary of the armistice agreement drew attention. NK News analyzed that it was "highly unusual" for the Chinese ambassador, a close ally of North Korea and a participant in the Korean War, to not be seen at an event attended by diplomatic envoys from various countries. Earlier, there was an interpretation that this was an intentional downgrade of the attendance of Kim

Seung-chan, president of Kim Il-sung University and chairman of the North Korea-China Friendship Delegation, at a banquet commemorating the 63rd anniversary of the North Korea-China Friendship Treaty held in Pyongyang on the 11th. This is because Kang Yun-sok, vice chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea's equivalent of the National Assembly, attended last year.

The sharp decline in trade between North Korea and China is also noteworthy. According to China's General Administration of Customs, North Korea imported $5,713,000 worth of rice from China in the first half of this year, which is about one-tenth of the $53,392,000 worth of rice imported in the same period last year, Voice of America ( VOA ) reported today.

The North Korea-China Friendship Bridge connecting Sinuiju, North Korea, and Dandong, Liaoning Province, China. JoongAng Photo

A similar phenomenon occurred in 2016 when China supported the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against North Korea and participated in the implementation of the sanctions in response to North Korea’s repeated high-intensity strategic provocations, such as nuclear tests and long-range rocket launches, and showed a tone of pressure on North Korea. At that time, North Korea also restricted the issuance of travel permits to overseas Chinese in the country. In fact, the two countries, which had grown estranged during the sanctions period in 2016 and 2017, became close again in 2018 when the North Korea-US summit took place. Before meeting with then US President Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un held several summits with President Xi Jinping, and President Xi also quickly recovered high-level exchanges, such as his first visit to North Korea in June 2019.

to overseas Chinese in the country. Oh Kyung-seop, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, "Unlike Russia, which is under Western sanctions due to the Ukraine War, China's strategic interests do not completely coincide with North Korea's anti-American stance," and "Until China accepts North Korea's demands, such as the nullification of sanctions against North Korea or military technology support, the relationship

between the two countries is likely to remain distant for the time being." However, if the strategic interests of North Korea and China align, the relationship between the two countries can rapidly recover at any time. The prevailing analysis is that China is trying to "tame" North Korea, but has no intention of giving up its influence over North Korea as its biggest patron.

Reporters Jeong Yeong-gyo and Park Hyeon-ju chung.yeonggyo@joongang.co.kr

3. China, Russia vying for influence over N. Korea: Campbell

And the regime will play each off against the other. This is the nature and history of the Kim family regime dating back to Mao and Stalin.

China, Russia vying for influence over N. Korea: Campbell | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 31, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, July 30 (Yonhap) -- China and Russia are competing for influence over North Korea while Beijing is "anxious" over Moscow's steps to deepen cooperation with Pyongyang, a senior U.S. diplomat said Tuesday, touting America's "deeper" partnerships with its allies and partners.

During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell juxtaposed the "complex" nature of diplomacy among China, Russia and their close partners and the relatively robust partnerships among the United States and its allies based on shared values and people-to-people ties.

"China and Russia are competing now for influence in North Korea, and China is anxious about some of the steps that Russia has taken with North Korea. China is competing with Russia in the Arctic in the stance," Campbell said during the hearing,

"It doesn't mean that there is a division or gulf, but it just means that there is a complex diplomacy among these various countries that are aggrieved by us, and we have to keep that in mind as we construct our own diplomacy towards them," he added.

This photo, taken on July 11, 2024, shows U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell speaking during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at the State Department in Washington. (Yonhap)

Speculation has lingered that a deepening military alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow could lead to a relative lessening of Beijing's influence over Pyongyang though China and Russia have boasted about their "no-limits" partnership.

Following North Korea's weapons support for Russia amid the war in Ukraine, Moscow is alleged to have provided refined petroleum, food and other items -- a transaction that observers said might have lessened the need for Pyongyang to rely heavily on Beijing for economic and other purposes.

Campbell made a clear comparison between the group of China, Russia, North Korea and other partners and that of the U.S. and its partners.

"The relationship between these authoritarian countries is very complex, and (what) I would only offer to you is don't underestimate Russian agency here. Putin is a master at even playing the weak hand ... He has been very effective at maneuvering China in this respect," he said.

"For the United States, we need to realize that our associations are deeper. They are based on democracy largely people-to-people, a large consensus of the people that elected the leadership. These countries are animated by leaders who are distrustful, often deeply distressful."

Campbell went on to say that China, Russia and others in their association are "often suddenly maneuvering against each other."

The deputy secretary also pointed out that the association between China, Russia, North Korea and Iran is "increasingly purposely" challenging the United States "everywhere" as he stressed the importance of security cooperation with allies and partners.

"What countries are supporting Ukraine to the hilt now -- Japan, South Korea and Australia. This is unprecedented and that's largely through the support and encouragement of the United States," he said.

"I would simply say that I think the best remedy to the challenges that you accurately described is our ability to work with allies and partners."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 31, 2024

4. North Korean officials seek medicine for Kim's health problems related to obesity, Seoul says

This begs a few key questions:

1) What will we do when we learn that Kim Jong Un is dead? (Have we thought this scenario through? Have we wargamed it?)

2) Have we conducted the necessary information preparation of the environment to influence potential successors or those who might oppose potential successors?

3) Who is developing the strategy for addressing this potential scenario?

We were unprepared in 2011. Maybe governments by nature of the bureaucracy will always be unprepared for the catastrophic event. But that does not mean we should not try.

North Korean officials seek medicine for Kim's health problems related to obesity, Seoul says

South Korea's spy agency says North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has regained weight and has obesity-related health problems, including high blood pressure and diabetes

ByHYUNG-JIN KIM Associated Press

July 29, 2024, 7:06 AM

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

SEOUL, South Korea -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has regained weight and appears to have obesity-related health problems such as high blood pressure and diabetes, and his officials are looking for new medicines abroad to treat them, South Korea’s spy agency told lawmakers Monday.

The 40-year-old Kim, known for heavy drinking and smoking, comes from a family with a history of heart problems. Both his father and grandfather, who ruled North Korea before his 2011 inheritance of power, died of heart issues.

Some observers said Kim, who is about 170 centimeters (5 feet, 7 inches) tall and previously weighed 140 kilograms (308 pounds), appeared to have lost a large amount of weight in 2021, likely from changing his diet. But recent state media footage show he has regained the weight.

On Monday, the National Intelligence Service, South Korea’s main spy agency, told lawmakers in a closed-door briefing that Kim is estimated to weigh about 140 kilograms (308 pounds) again and is in a high-risk group for heart disease, according to Lee Seong Kweun, one of the lawmakers.

Lee said the NIS told lawmakers that Kim has shown symptoms of high blood pressure and diabetes since his early 30s. Another lawmaker, Park Sunwon, said the NIS believes Kim’s obesity is linked to his drinking, smoking and stress.

Lee and Park quoted the NIS as saying it obtained intelligence that North Korean officials have been trying to get new medications abroad for Kim's suspected high blood pressure and diabetes.

North Korea is one of the most secretive countries in the world, and there is virtually no way for outsiders to know Kim's exact health conditions. The NIS also has a spotty record in confirming developments in North Korea.

Kim's health is the focus of keen attention outside North Korea since he hasn't formally anointed a successor who would take charge of the country's advancing nuclear arsenal targeting the United States and its allies if he was incapacitated.

The NIS in its Monday briefing maintained its assessment that Kim's preteen daughter, reportedly named Kim Ju Ae, is bolstering her likely status as her father's heir apparent. But the NIS said it cannot rule out the possibility that she could be replaced by one of her siblings because she hasn't been officially designated as her father's successor.

Speculation about Kim Ju Ae, who is about 10 or 11 years old, flared when she accompanied her father at high-profile public events starting in late 2022. State media called her Kim Jong Un's “most beloved” or “respected” child and churned out footage and photos proving her rising political standing and closeness with her father.

The NIS told lawmakers that at least 60% of Kim Ju Ae's public activities have involved attending military events with her father.

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

5. State Dept's Campbell: Gap between US, China shipbuilding is 'deeply concerning'

How can we overcome this gap? Can our allies help? Look at ROK shipbuilding capabilities. Can we overcome legislative obstacles to work with our allies to overcome such a gap?

State Dept's Campbell: Gap between US, China shipbuilding is 'deeply concerning' - Breaking Defense

"We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century," Kurt Campbell told lawmakers today.

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 30, 2024

Kurt Campbell, Deputy Secretary of State, speaks on China at the Stimson Center in Washington. (Screenshot from Stimson Center)

WASHINGTON — The shipbuilding capacity of the United States when compared against China is “deeply concerning” and reflective of a need for the US Navy to “step up” as it prepares for a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, a senior State Department official told lawmakers today.

“Look at the difference in shipbuilding between the United States and China. Deeply concerning. We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century,” Kurt Campbell, a deputy secretary of state and former senior National Security Council official, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during a hearing about assessing the United States’ ability to compete with China.

Campbell, who played a critical role in the development of AUKUS while he was at the NSC, acknowledged both the workforce capacity issues American industry faces as well as the challenges in working with allies.

He also said that investment in ground forces during the past 20 years of conflict in the Middle East were “appropriate.” But nonetheless, any conflict in the Indo-Pacific, he argued, will put the spotlight back onto the Navy and Air Force.

“Now is the Navy and the Air Force’s time,” he said. “They have to step up. They have to invest more, they have to be more innovative, they have to be more intrepid. And they’ve got to understand that the Indo-Pacific arena requires the most capable naval and advanced long range air capabilities that the United States has ever needed before.”

At the same hearing, Campbell was also questioned about the relationship China has been building with Russia. The senior diplomat echoed concerns many Pentagon officials have aired, including Chinese aid for Russia to continue its war in Ukraine as well as assisting them in accessing natural resources in the arctic.

But Campbell cautioned lawmakers not to downplay “Russian agency” in the relationship, despite the growing narrative that Moscow is becoming more dependent on Beijing.

“China and Russia are competing now for influence in North Korea. China is anxious about some of the steps that Russia has taken with North Korea,” he said. “China is competing with Russia in the Arctic. … It doesn’t mean that there’s a division or gulf, but it just means that there is a complex diplomacy among these various countries.”

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 30, 2024

6. Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy

Seth Cropsey answers my previous questions. We need allied help.

Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy

But it can be done with the help of shipbuilding allies and more money to train defense-industry workers.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/rebuilding-the-u-s-navy-wont-be-easy-defense-ships-national-security-4d470f12?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Seth Cropsey

July 30, 2024 5:27 pm ET

An Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer transits the Suez Canal, Dec. 18, 2023. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGE

The U.S. Navy is a ship without a rudder. The longer the service is allowed to decay, the more precarious America’s strategic situation will become. Turning things around won’t be easy. The best solution would be to retain every combat ship in the current fleet and encourage allies to pitch in with their own industrial bases. This expansion will require substantial funding, particularly in the workforce.

The Suez Canal is one of the world’s busiest maritime highways, connecting the Mediterranean and Red seas and creating a shortcut for ships sailing from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This route is the center of the broader Eurasian trade system on which American power relies. It has helped the U.S. become one of the wealthiest, most powerful nations in the world. It has also enabled the construction of alliances across Eurasia, as powers ranging from Germany and Poland to South Korea and Japan are far less threatened by a U.S. that seeks commercial access and upholds freedom than by a China or Russia that demands a monopoly on commerce.

Since 2023 the Houthis have harassed ships exiting and entering the Suez Canal but sunk few vessels. Well-trained American and allied surface combatant crews have intercepted scores of missiles and drones, and U.S. Navy strike fighter squadrons have bombed Houthi missile launch sites. Nevertheless, insurance premiums for the Suez route have increased, and the Suez Canal Authority has lost almost 70% of its shipping traffic despite lower transit fees.

Countering the Houthis would take several months of intense pressure. The U.S. would need to deploy a surface action group of up to five warships, alongside a Marine expeditionary unit. Ideally a Wasp or America class “lightning carrier,” a flat-decked amphibious assault ship with a squadron of Marine F-35s, would work alongside a maritime patrol squadron and Navy SEAL units supported by U.S. Air Force and Space Force reconnaissance and communications.

The campaign would take about six months, considering the dispersion of Houthi assets, the Houthis’ ability to redeploy launchers, and the limitations White House casualty sensitivity would impose on operations. Interdiction, search and seizure of Houthi-bound shipping would prevent weapons smuggling from Iran. The U.S. warships could intercept missiles launched at commercial shipping, provide convoy escorts, and strike Houthi command-and-control sites.

The issue is that the U.S. Navy can’t spare these ships.

The number of ships in the Navy has shrunk since its Trump administration high of 296 and, as per construction and procurement funding, won’t reach more than 300 ships until 2032. Maintenance and repair delays have piled up rapidly. Only 60% of the attack submarine fleet is deployable at any given time. The rest is tied up in maintenance. Two supercarriers are out for an additional year-plus due to unspecified turbine damage. The U.S. is retiring surface warships faster than it can build them. Its new ships, most notably the Constellation class frigates, carry half the firepower of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer at around two-thirds of the price. The Navy has also struggled in vain for nearly two decades to retain talent.

Sea control is nonnegotiable for a dominant maritime power. The U.S. needs to deploy its forces from North America and shift them between different parts of Eurasia. If it can’t maintain a strong naval presence, it will be forced to follow the British rental-cum-alliance model, and its credibility across Eurasia will decline rapidly.

This decline comes at the worst possible geopolitical moment. Russia continues to prosecute its war of conquest against Ukraine, hoping to alter dramatically the European balance of power and shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Iran and its proxies are mounting attacks on Israel as China prepares for war. Beijing is pursuing the largest military buildup since World War II. Its navy already outnumbers ours. It has gone from fielding one experimental carrier to multiple purpose-built carriers in under 15 years and will soon deploy its first catapult-equipped carrier. It is also expanding its nuclear arsenal and improving its submarine capabilities.

America’s response to these worrying global developments should be a revitalization of American shipbuilding, aided by cooperation with allies. South Korea has several high-quality naval yards that produce top-line small and medium-size warships, along with submarines. Though U.S. Navy requirements differ from those of other countries, there is much to gain from contracting with yards that can deliver warships on time and at or under budget.

The U.S. will still have to build some of its own ships. Foreign firms can’t supply the missile-armed surface combatants, submarines, amphibious warships and carriers that are required to project power. Accomplishing a large-scale naval expansion will require an enormous workforce training program that brings in a new class of technicians. Without this, the naval industrial base workforce will shrink to ineffectiveness and desuetude in another 15 years, given its ageing personnel. I have been hearing this concern from companies in the naval shipbuilding industry for well over a decade. Training takes time, as does the construction of new yards and equipment.

In the interim, the U.S. can turn to its more robust aerial industrial base, using a flood of new maritime patrol aircraft to maintain maritime awareness and heavy bombers to conduct strikes. This will mean negotiating with allies to ensure use of air bases—a difficult, but worthwhile step.

Finally, and most important, strong U.S. naval leadership is needed to explain the causes of the navy’s sinking fortunes, detail its consequences for American prosperity and security and argue forcefully for remedies—beginning with a strategy to deter war in the Pacific. From the White House to the Pentagon, such leadership is critical to retaining a strong U.S. position in the world.

Mr. Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as a deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of “Mayday” and “Seablindness.”

7. North Korean Bulsae-4 Missile System Reportedly Spotted in Ukraine for First Time.

An ATGM.

https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/north-korean-bulsae-4-missile-system-reportedly-spotted-in-ukraine-for-first-time

North Korean Bulsae-4 Missile System Reportedly Spotted in Ukraine for First Time.

30 Jul, 2024 - 12:52 Defense News Army 2024

As the war in Ukraine continues, Ukrainian forces have reported the first appearance of the North Korean long-range anti-tank missile system, Bulsae-4 M-2018 NLOS ATGM, in the Kharkiv region, as reported by the Telegram channel @KUPua01. This system, classified as a Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) missile, allows targeting without a direct line of sight.

Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link

The vehicle identified by Ukrainian forces is believed to be the North Korean Bulsae-4 M-2018 NLOS ATGM (Picture source: Telegram channel @KUPua01)

The Bulsae-4 M-2018 NLOS ATGM (Non-Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank Guided Missile) from North Korea is a fiber-optic guided missile system capable of engaging rotary and armored targets at extended ranges of 15 to 25 km. Production and acquisition of this missile began around 2018, although exact details remain unclear due to the secretive nature of North Korea's military program. The Bulsae-4 was publicly revealed by North Korean state television in June 2016, showing an anti-tank missile launched from a Mi-2 helicopter, confirming its entry into service in the following years. The exact number of Bulsae-4 systems in service is unknown but is presumed to be substantial to bolster North Korea's military capability.

The Bulsae-4 M-2018 is distinguished by its ability to transmit real-time video data to the operator, allowing for precise targeting adjustments during flight. It follows a non-ballistic trajectory, reducing radar detection risks and increasing crew survivability. The missile is carried on a North Korean M-2010 armored vehicle in a 6x6 configuration, equipped with eight launch containers. Compared to similar systems like the Israeli Spike-ER, the Bulsae-4 uses an electro-optical guidance head combined with fiber-optic cable guidance. This technology allows the missile to maneuver around obstacles to hit hidden targets, significantly enhancing North Korea's ability to engage distant and fortified targets.

Relations between Russia and North Korea are marked by strategic cooperation that has grown over the years, especially amid rising international tensions. Moscow and Pyongyang share common interests in foreign policy, particularly their opposition to Western sanctions and U.S. influence in the region. This alliance has strengthened as Russia seeks ways to mitigate the economic and military impacts of sanctions imposed following its intervention in Ukraine. Pyongyang, in turn, benefits from Russia's diplomatic and material support, enabling it to continue developing its military capabilities despite international isolation.

North Korea's military support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine has become increasingly visible, notably with the appearance of North Korean missiles and artillery ammunition on Ukrainian soil. This presence confirms that Russia has received significant munitions deliveries, highlighting a deep strategic partnership. The exact nature and extent of these deliveries remain difficult to quantify due to the opaque nature of military transactions between these two nations.

The identification of the first North Korean vehicle in Ukraine marks a turning point in Pyongyang's involvement in the conflict. This more direct involvement implies substantial North Korean support, raising important logistical questions regarding the transportation and distribution of these vehicles in the war zone. Transport routes, delivery methods, and the security of these supplies become crucial issues for Russia, requiring close coordination and effective management to avoid disruptions and ensure continuous military support.

For North Korea, the deployment of these vehicles in Ukraine serves as a practical test of their capabilities in real combat conditions. This deployment allows Pyongyang to gather valuable data on the performance of its military equipment, identify necessary improvements, and strengthen its reputation as an effective arms supplier. This situation, while beneficial for North Korea's military experience, also exposes Pyongyang to increased international scrutiny and potential criticism, exacerbating existing tensions with nations opposed to its arms program.

8. NIS closely watching N.K.-China ties amid signs of rift

Is there really a rift? I am skeptical.

NIS closely watching N.K.-China ties amid signs of rift | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 31, 2024

SEOUL, July 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's intelligence agency is closely watching relations between North Korea and China, amid increasing signs of the two countries growing apart, officials said Wednesday.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) said it is monitoring any unusual moves after learning that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has apparently instructed his diplomats stationed in China "not to mind Beijing" when they are on the job.

South Korea's JoongAng Ilbo newspaper reported earlier in the day that Kim had given the directive to North Korean diplomats in China, quoting unidentified sources.

If true, it would add to the growing speculation that a rift is growing between Pyongyang and Beijing, in contrast to the North's deepening ties with Moscow that became more evident after Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Pyongyang last month.

The possibility of Pyongyang and Beijing drifting apart has gained traction after China removed a footprint plaque installed on a road in Dalian in May. The road was where Kim and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had taken a walk together during Kim's visit to Liaoning Province in 2018.

Following a trilateral summit among South Korea, China and Japan in May, North Korea strongly denounced their joint statement, a highly unusual reaction from Pyongyang to the outcome of a diplomatic meeting involving Beijing, its traditional ally and longtime economic benefactor.

Some North Korean defectors have claimed that North Korean authorities began to limit Chinese yuan-based transactions at markets.

This file photo printed in the Jan. 10, 2019, edition of North Korea's Rodong Sinmun shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R, front), accompanied by Chinese President Xi Jinping (L), inspecting an honor guard during a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Jan. 8, 2019. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 31, 2024

9. Vice defense chief, U.S. Army secretary urge N. Korea to stop trash balloon launches

Vice defense chief, U.S. Army secretary urge N. Korea to stop trash balloon launches | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 31, 2024

SEOUL, July 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's vice defense chief and the U.S. Army secretary on Wednesday urged North Korea to stop launches of trash-carrying balloons as they met for talks on security cooperation in Seoul, the defense ministry said.

Vice Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho and Christine Wormuth, secretary of the U.S. Army, made the call in the wake of the North's launches of thousands of trash balloons into the South since late May.

"The two sides made clear that such provocative acts by North Korea will create the opposite effect and strongly urged an immediate halt," the ministry said in a release.

The North has staged the balloon campaign in a tit-for-tat move against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent across the border by North Korean defectors and activists in the South via balloons.

During the talks, the two officials also expressed "deep concern" over the potential impact by growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea on regional and global security, it said.

Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" agreement that includes a mutual defense clause during their summit in Pyongyang.

Kim and Wormuth agreed to continue strengthening joint exercises to further develop the allies' combined operational capabilities.

Separately, Wormuth also met Gen. Park An-su, the South Korean Army's chief of staff, on Wednesday and discussed ways to deepen cooperation in logistics and advanced technologies, according to the ministry.

Vice Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho (L) meets Christine Wormuth, secretary of the U.S. Army, at his office in central Seoul on July 31, 2024, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 31, 2024

10. S. Korea, U.S. holding live-fire drills near inter-Korean border

Here is a my response to a query from a VOA journalist:

This is important training. We should always keep in mind that training is perishable. Training once is not enough. It must be sustained. Just as a world class soccer or football team must continually practice and train, so must militaries if they are going to be ready for game day or if there is a war.

This is the culmination of numerous smaller experiences at the squad and platoon. The company level combined arms exercise will include the integration of fires, mortars, artillery, and air support combined with mechanized infantry and armor and it is also a combined exercise in that it includes ROK and US military forces.

It is the training that enhances readiness and it is the high level of combat readiness that supports deterrence. Kim Jong Un may be many things but he is not stupid. Unless absolutely desperate he knows that it is folly to attack into strength and exercises like this demonstrate the strength and resolve of the ROK/US alliance military forces.

S. Korea, U.S. holding live-fire drills near inter-Korean border | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 31, 2024

SEOUL, July 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have been staging a combined live-fire exercise near the inter-Korean border, involving a rotational U.S. Stryker combat vehicle unit, the U.S. Army stationed in the South said Wednesday.

The two-week exercise began July 22 at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, about 30 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas and will run until Saturday, according to the 8th Army.

The drills, involving the rotational unit, a South Korean tank platoon, and others, were staged with the aim of evaluating the rotational unit's company-level combat capabilities.

The latest exercise marked the first one to take place as a combined exercise as they have previously been staged solely by the U.S. military.

"This training enhances the rotational brigade's ability to adapt to the terrain and weather of the Korean Peninsula and incorporates Korean military equipment and tactics into small unit tactics," the 8th Army said in a release.

The U.S. Army has rotated the Stryker combat vehicle unit every nine months in South Korea since 2022, when it transitioned from a rotating armored unit that operated M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles.

This photo provided by the U.S. 8th Army on July 31, 2024, shows a U.S. Stryker combat vehicle (R) and other military assets taking part in a live-fire combined exercise at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, about 30 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, on July 29. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 31, 2024

11. S. Korea puts focus on lasers to take out N. Korean drones

I hope the ROK can make this cutting edge technology work on a wide scale.

(Yonhap Feature) S. Korea puts focus on lasers to take out N. Korean drones | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 31, 2024

By Chae Yun-hwan

TAEAN, South Korea, July 31 (Yonhap) -- A small multi-rotor drone hovered over the waters off a western coastal town, flying just a kilometer away from what appeared to be an imposing dark-green container installed at a major weapons test site.

Within seconds, flames suddenly ignited on the unmanned aircraft, as it shook uncontrollably and plummeted 20 meters onto a rooftop of a seaboard building with a loud thump.

On Tuesday, the state arms agency demonstrated the strike capabilities of the country's newly developed laser weapon designed to take down enemy drones for a group of reporters for the first time.

In all three live-fire demonstrations at the test site in Taean County, 108 kilometers southwest of Seoul, the weapon system, similar in size to a shipping container, successfully downed targets with an invisible directed-energy beam.

A drone falls from the sky after being struck by a laser beam during a demonstration of South Korea's newly developed laser weapon system at a testing facility in Taean County, 108 kilometers southwest of Seoul, on July 30, 2024, in this photo provided by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

In a stark contrast to sleek, sci-fi laser weapons seen in movies, the fixed steel block, operated by three people inside, did not fire colorful beams of light or produce any sound. But its strike capabilities were evident as the DJI Phantom 4s crashed helplessly after being struck by the laser.

The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced earlier this month that South Korea would mass produce the laser system to begin deployment this year. Then, the country will join a small group of countries pushing to operate laser weapons, such as the United States, Israel and Britain.

The system uses a laser beam generated using fiber optics and heats up target surfaces to temperatures of over 700 C to disable internal components, such as batteries, according to DAPA.

Officials declined to offer exact specifications of the weapon but said that it has an output of less than 100 kilowatts and a range of less than 10 kilometers.

Seo Yong-seok, a chief principal researcher at the Agency for Defense Development, told reporters that the system has reached an output of 30 kilowatts during testing, making it capable of striking down drones but not rockets or artillery shells.

South Korea's military has recently been redoubling efforts to advance counter-drone capabilities following a major border breach by five North Korean drones in late 2022.

Despite the mobilization of fighter jets and helicopters, the military failed to shoot down any of the drones, including one that entered Seoul, exposing a lack of readiness to such incursions.

South Korea has poured 87.1 billion won (US$63 million) into developing the laser weapon system since 2019, assessing it as being combat suitable in April last year. The country plans to spend 127.7 billion won through 2026 to mass produce an unspecified number of units.

South Korea's newly developed laser weapon system is seen at a testing facility in Taean County, 108 kilometers southwest of Seoul, on July 30, 2024, in this photo provided by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

During the demonstration, Seo explained the system is mainly composed of target detection equipment made up of radar and optical sensors, a laser generator that internally combines multiple beams into one for a larger output, and a laser launcher that fires the single beam.

As long as the system is plugged in, the weapon is able to conduct precision strikes once a target is detected, he said.

DAPA has said a single laser shot is expected to cost about 2,000 won, but Seo clarified that the figure is a rough estimate based on the output, which can vary.

While touting the weapon's capabilities, the researcher also acknowledged inherent limitations of laser systems.

"It is extremely sensitive to atmospheric conditions. Its performance worsens in severe weather," he said.

During one of the demonstrations, the system failed to immediately identify and track the drone as clouds covered the skies, far surpassing the target time of just a few seconds. Seo blamed poor weather conditions for the delay.

The system is also capable of only firing one beam at a time, making it unsuitable for situations where a large number of drones are deployed.

The mass production also takes place amid renewed concerns over North Korea's aerial threats as Pyongyang has launched thousands of trash-carrying balloons across the border since late May.

When asked whether the laser system could strike down such balloons, Seo declined to comment. The military has so far decided against shooting down the balloons in midair as the intercepted debris could possibly lead to even more damage.

South Korea plans to continue developing the laser weapon to improve its capabilities, such as making it mobile and have higher output.

Research is under way for a new laser weapon with an output of 100 kilowatts to intercept rockets, artillery shells and mortars, Seo said.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 31, 2024

12. Photos of Sue Mi Terry's notes: FBI surveillance or NIS mole's leak?

Photos of Sue Mi Terry's notes: FBI surveillance or NIS mole's leak?

The Korea Times · July 30, 2024

The redacted copies of Sue Mi Terry's handwritten notes she brought from a private meeting between the U.S. secreatary of state and five Korea experts, including Terry, held on or around June 17, 2022 in the department's building in Washington D.C. Yonhap

Editor’s note

This is the second and last in a two-part article series about the indictment of Sue Mi Terry and its impact on South Korea’s intelligence community—ED.

By Kang Hyun-kyung

A question has remained unanswered regarding the U.S. prosecution’s indictment of Sue Mi Terry for her alleged role as an unregistered agent for South Korea.

How did the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtain the two photos that captured notes taken by Terry during, or prior to, the private and undisclosed meeting between the U.S. Secretary of State, senior State Department staff, and five Korea experts, including Terry, held on June 22, 2022, at the State Department building?

Those two photos were taken by an unnamed South Korean intelligence officer working with the National Intelligence Service (NIS) identified as the “NIS handler-3” in the indictment document.

According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, NIS handler-3 took the photos of the two-page notes with his smartphone in a car with diplomatic license plates registered to the South Korean embassy in Washington D.C. after the private meeting. The redacted copies of those photos were included in the indictment document.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office presented the photos as evidence supporting the allegations that Terry worked for the South Korean government without registering as a foreign agent, claiming she violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Terry, however, denied the allegations. In an interview with the Chosun Ilbo, Terry’s attorney claimed that she wrote the notes “before” attending the meeting and that they were about her “talking points,” not what she wrote during the private meeting with the U.S. secretary of state.

The timing of when the notes were taken appears to be a critical factor in determining Terry’s motive. If the notes were written before the meeting and included her talking points, as Terry claimed, it would weaken the allegation that she shared undisclosed information about the U.S. government with South Korean intelligence officials. However, if the notes were made during the meeting and summarized what was discussed, which was expected to be off-the-record, it would raise suspicions about Terry’s motive.

Another critical issue that needs to be clarified to assess how the Sue Mi Terry indictment will affect South Korea and its intelligence community is how the FBI obtained the photos. Were they taken by FBI agents or secret agents working with U.S. intelligence agencies? Or did the FBI acquire them from sources outside the U.S. government?

These questions have been raised because the indictment document did not specify the source of the photos.

In South Korea, the “missing photo credit” has sparked a heated debate about the sources of those pictures. Pundits argue that if individuals outside the U.S. government were involved in the FBI’s acquisition of the photos, it could have a significant impact on South Korea’s intelligence community.

Opinions are divided about the sources, and two schools of thought present different interpretations about the missing photo credit and its potential impact on the NIS.

Rep. Park Sun-won of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) claimed that the photos likely resulted from the FBI’s cyber activities.

“If true, this is a serious issue,” he said during a KBS radio show on July 19. “(As stated in the indictment document), those photos were taken by an NIS agent and stored on his smartphone. The fact that the FBI secured that secret information which was on the NIS agent’s smartphone could indicate that information about all NIS agents and South Korean diplomats based in the U.S. and their smartphones were compromised.”

Park had worked for four years at the National Intelligence Service (NIS) under three different roles during the previous Moon Jae-in administration. He initially joined the NIS as a foreign policy and security advisor to then-NIS Director Seo Hoon. He was later promoted to deputy director, overseeing planning and coordination, and ultimately served as first vice director in charge of overseas operations before leaving the NIS.

Inside the National Assembly, Rep. Park is concurrently serving as a member of two committees, the National Assembly National Defense Committee and Intelligence Committee.

He was elected in Incheon’s Bupyeong B electoral district on the DPK’s ticket at the National Assembly elections held in April.

Sue Mi Terry, left, and an intelligence officer identified as "NIS handler-3" in the indictment document walk toward a car with diplomatic license plates registered to South Korean embassy in Washington D.C. after shopping a Louis Vitton handbag in a store in Washington D.C. on April 16, 2021. Yonhap

NIS moles?

While the DPK lawmaker suggested that the FBI’s cyber surveillance might be the source of Terry’s photographed notes, another intelligence expert, who previously worked at the NIS for 20 years, said the possibility of intentional insider information being leaked to the FBI cannot be ruled out.

Choe Su-yong, a former NIS agent who worked on covert operations about North Korea, alleged that the photos of Terry’s handwritten notes could have been passed to the FBI by a "double agent" inside the NIS.

“I believe it could have been an act of a mole inside the NIS,” he told The Korea Times. Moles are espionage agents who infiltrate a target intelligence agency with the objective of selling its secrets from within to a foreign intelligence agency.

As seen in the intelligence agencies of other countries, Choe alleged that there are almost certainly moles within the NIS.

Choe claimed that moles are working for foreign intelligence agencies and this time, it could be the one operated by North Korea. He added the indictment of Sue Mi Terry might have been the result of a covert operation by North Korea sympathizers from within.

Even if the allegation is true, a question remains unanswered: For what purposes would the moles engage in such activities? In other words, how could North Korea benefit from the Terry indictment?

Choe said North Korea would certainly benefit if its harsh critic, Terry, was removed.

Some intelligence experts shared a view similar to Choe’s regarding the possible existence of moles within the NIS.

"Beyond Utopia" film poster

Citing a source with insider knowledge of North Korea, Choe said Terry became a prime target for removal after the release of the 2023 documentary film "Beyond Utopia." The film, which features Terry, depicts the perilous journeys of North Korean escapees, highlighting the harsh living conditions and severe human rights abuses they face.

“I heard that the film infuriated North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and he directed his deputies to do whatever they can to remove Terry,” Choe said.

In an interview with the Chosun Ilbo newspaper, several unnamed sources suggested that the NIS may be seeking to identify the mole from within to determine if any insiders leaked related intelligence to foreign governments. One unnamed source was quoted as saying, “When an agent’s covert operation is exposed to a foreign country, intelligence agencies typically conduct an internal investigation to detect if anyone from within assisted in leaking information. The NIS would follow the same protocol, as searching for moles is a standard procedure in such situations.”

If their allegation is proven true, the NIS, already under pressure to reform, will face even greater demands for transformation. This will likely lead to significant reshuffles within the agency.

Rumors are circulating due to the missing photo credits in Terry’s photographed notes, following media reports about her indictment for violations of the FARA.

In the indictment document, the U.S. Attorney’s Office said that the NIS official identified as handler-3 photographed two pages of handwritten notes that Terry brought from her meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State.

“The notes were written on the letterhead of Think Tank-2 where Terry had recently worked,” it said, presenting redacted copies of the photos. The attorney's office did not specify the source of those photos.

Other photos included in the indictment document have clear origins, as specified by the attorney's office. For example, the photos showing NIS handlers 2 and 3 purchasing luxury bags were accompanied by a disclaimer indicating that the images were sourced from the stores' respective surveillance cameras.

There is one more photo for which the U.S. Attorney’s Office did not clarify the source. It features Terry dining with NIS handler-2 and his successor, NIS handler-3, at a Greek restaurant in Manhattan in August 2022. Unlike the other photos included in the document, this image lacks specific information about the date it was taken.

The Korea Times · July 30, 2024

13. S. Korea, Philippines stage friendship flight during multinational drills in Australia

South Korea demonstrates that it is a global pivotal state.

S. Korea, Philippines stage friendship flight during multinational drills in Australia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 31, 2024

SEOUL, July 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the Philippines conducted a friendship flight during a major multinational exercise in Australia on Wednesday, the South's Air Force said.

South Korean F-15K fighter jets and FA-50PHs of the Philippines took part in the friendship flight conducted near an air base in Darwin in northern Australia where the biennial Exercise Pitch Black is under way, according to the Air Force.

The Air Force attached significance to the event, noting that it was conducted in a year marking the 75th anniversary of bilateral ties between the two nations. Manila acquired 12 South Korea-built FA-50PHs in 2014.

Stephen Parreno, commanding general of the Philippine Air Force, visited the South's Air Force facilities Monday at the Australian air base.

Calling the FA-50PH a "core asset" of his country's Air Force, the commander said that strengthening ties between the Air Forces of the two nations is "essential" for regional security and mutual growth and expressed his intent to expand drills and exchanges based on their partnership, according to the South's Air Force.

Exercise Pitch Black, which involves 20 countries and over 140 aircraft this year, kicked off July 12 and will run through Aug. 2. South Korea has dispatched six F-15K fighters and some 100 troops for the exercise.

A South Korean F-15K fighter jet takes part in the Australia-led biennial Exercise Pitch Black on July 29, 2024, in this photo provided by the South's Air Force two days later. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 31, 2024

14. N. Korean leader sacks public security minister for damage from downpours in border areas

Perhaps he is being blamed for not developing a weather control machine. (Note sarcasm)

But the fact is that some of the flood related problems are related to the policy decisions of the regime that have led to conditions that exacerbate the effects of flooding

N. Korean leader sacks public security minister for damage from downpours in border areas | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 31, 2024

SEOUL, July 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has dismissed the public security minister and chiefs of provincial committees to hold them responsible for severe damage from the recent downpours in the northern border areas along the Amnok River.

The decision was made at an emergency enlarged politburo meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) held in the border city of Sinuiju in North Phyongan Province on Monday and Tuesday, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Wednesday.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 31, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un presiding over an emergency enlarged politburo meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim visited flood-hit areas in Sinuiju and Uiju County of the province on Sunday and guided an operation to rescue around 5,000 isolated residents with the military's helicopters.

During Tuesday's meeting, North Korea appointed Pang Tu-sop, first vice director of the WPK's political leadership department over military affairs, as the public security minister. Minister Ri Thae-sop is presumed to be sacked.

It also replaced chief secretaries of the North Phyongan and Jagang provincial committees.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 31, 2024, shows flood-hit areas in Sinuiju City of North Phyongan Province due to recent downpours. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

At Monday's gathering, Kim "proposed to strictly punish those who severely neglected their responsible duties assigned by the Party and the state and thus caused even the casualty that can not be allowed," the KCNA said.

The report said public buildings, facilities, roads and railways, including more than 4,100 houses and nearly 3,000 hectares of farmlands, were flooded due to the heavy rains in Sinuiju and Uiju County.

But the North's state media did not reveal details about casualties from the latest downpours. Seoul's unification ministry said Tuesday that the country appears to have sustained "considerable" damage, citing the North's media report on the need to restore electricity and communication lines, as well as supply medicine.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 31, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un touring an area hit by floods before presiding over an emergency enlarged politburo meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 31, 2024

15. Dokdo: A historical and sovereign territory of Korea

Dokdo: A historical and sovereign territory of Korea

The Korea Times · July 30, 2024

By Kumar Bishwanath

Kumra Bishwanath

Dokdo (also known internationally as the Liancourt Rocks and in Japan as Takeshima) is an island located in the East Sea of Korea. South Korea asserts its territorial sovereignty over Dokdo through historical, legal and administrative evidence, arguing that the island has been an integral part of Korean territory for centuries, deeply rooted in historical records and continuous administrative management.

The Korean claim to Dokdo dates back to historical documents from the sixth century. The oldest reference appears in the “Samguk Sagi,” a historical record from the 918-1392 Goryeo Dynasty, which mentions the ancient state of Usan-guk, believed to include both Ulleung Island and Dokdo. The “Sejong Sillokjiriji,” compiled in the 15th century, explicitly mentions Dokdo. This document, prepared in 1454, describes the territories of the 1392-1910 Joseon Dynasty and indicates that both Ulleung Island and Dokdo were within Korean territory. Additionally, the “Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam,” a comprehensive geographical book dating to 1531, reaffirms Korea’s administrative control over Dokdo.

Over the centuries, Korea has claimed to have managed Dokdo administratively. Numerous royal decrees and maps from Joseon, such as the “Paldochongdo” (1530), include Dokdo as part of Korean territory. Korean fishermen and residents of Ulleung Island have historically used Dokdo as a base for fishing, demonstrating a continuous Korean presence and utilization of the island.

Records in the “Annals of the Joseon Dynasty” from the late 17th century document the Korean government dispatching officials to Dokdo and Ulleung Island to strengthen sovereignty and manage resources. In 1900, the Imperial Edict No. 41 of the Korean Empire placed Dokdo under the jurisdiction of Uldo County, reaffirming Korea’s administrative control.

Historical evidence also includes instances where Japan recognized Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. After a diplomatic dispute between Korea and Japan over Ulleung Island in the late 17th century, the Tokugawa Shogunate issued an order prohibiting Japanese nationals from traveling to Ulleung Island and its surrounding areas, implicitly recognizing Korean control over these territories, including Dokdo. Moreover, an 1877 directive from the Japanese government explicitly stated that Ulleung Island and Dokdo were not Japanese territories. This significant evidence is frequently cited by Korean scholars to show that Japan did not consider Dokdo as part of its territory even in the late 19th century.

Post-World War II directives from the Allied Powers, such as the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945), aimed to return territories occupied by Japan to their original owners. Korea interprets these documents as supporting the return of Dokdo, which was unlawfully annexed during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, to Korean control.

In 1946, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued SCAPIN No. 677, excluding Dokdo from Japanese administrative control. After Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, it reasserted control over Dokdo. Since 1954, Korea has maintained a small detachment of police officers on the island, further solidifying its administrative presence.

As discussed above, from the Korean perspective, the historical, legal and administrative evidence strongly supports Dokdo as an inherent part of Korean territory. The consistent documentation of Dokdo in historical records, uninterrupted administrative control, acknowledgment from Japan within a historical context and actions taken after World War II collectively reinforce Korea’s position.

For Koreans, Dokdo is more than just a disputed territory; it symbolizes national sovereignty and historical continuity. The island represents the resilience and perseverance of the Korean people in the face of historical challenges.

I learned all of this through a direct experience with the 2024 Global Peace Reporter-Dokdo Exploration program, a three-day event from July 16 to 18. The program, conducted entirely in Korean, was attended mainly by Global Korea Scholarship recipients.

On the first day, July 16, we arrived at Ulleung Island, an island I personally find special. With its beautiful natural scenery, diverse cuisine and various experiential programs, I believe Ulleung Island could become a major tourist destination in Korea within a few years if infrastructure development continues. It might even become attractive enough that Korea may have to limit visitors or impose a tourist tax. If you are planning a trip to Korea, I highly recommend adding Ulleung Island to your list.

On the second day, July 17, we headed towards Dokdo. After breakfast, we hurried to the port, which was already crowded with Koreans eager to visit Dokdo. People were dressed in uniforms, holding Korean flags, and some even adorned their heads with flag decorations, showing the strong emotions Koreans have for Dokdo. After a two-hour boat ride, Dokdo finally came into view. We were excited to see Dokdo, which we had only seen in cosmetics ads or other media. However, due to weather and sea waves, we were unable to land on the island. The group expressed disappointment, with some asking if it wasn’t possible to dock under these conditions. But safety and principles are non-negotiable. Instead, we contented ourselves with viewing Dokdo from the boat and took commemorative photos to soothe our disappointment.

There is a saying, “You haven’t truly seen Korea until you’ve seen Dokdo.” The sincere expressions and emotional reactions of the Koreans on the boat made me understand the meaning of this phrase. If you want to gain a deeper insight into the core of Korea, I strongly recommend visiting Ulleung Island and Dokdo.

Kumar Bishwanath, a Ph.D. research scholar from India at the Department of Linguistics, College of Humanities, Seoul National University, and a Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) recipient, specializes in Korean linguistics and contrastive linguistics.

The Korea Times · July 30, 2024

16. Military to launch 'strategic command' around October (South Korea)

Military to launch 'strategic command' around October

The Korea Times · July 30, 2024

This image, provided by the 35th Infantry Division of the South Korean Army, shows soldiers participating in a large-scale Field Training Exercise (FTX), June 5. Yonhap

The Cabinet on Tuesday passed a presidential decree to create a new military command in charge of strategic operations later this year to enhance deterrence against growing North Korean military threats, the defense ministry said.

South Korea has sought to establish the strategic command to serve as an overarching organ to deter and respond to a North Korean nuclear or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack by utilizing key military assets from "high-power" ballistic missiles to special operations forces.

With the approval, the unit is set to launch around October in southern Seoul, overseeing missile, cyber, drone and special operations units, as well as certain Navy and Air Force assets when needed, while leading efforts to integrate South Korea's advanced conventional forces with U.S. nuclear capabilities.

The allies have pushed to integrate such capabilities to better counter the North's evolving nuclear threats. In this vein, they signed a joint guidelines document for nuclear deterrence earlier this month.

A ministry official said the new command will serve as a counterpart to the U.S. Strategic Command in charge of America's nuclear arsenal to work together in the allies' deterrence efforts.

Soldiers participate in a large-scale Field Training Exercise (FTX), in this photo provided by the 35th Infantry Division of the South Korean Army, June 5. Yonhap

The official said the command will also focus on developing Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), an operational plan to incapacitate the North's leadership in a major conflict, and the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform — elements of the military's "three-axis" deterrence system.

The Air Force will remain in charge of the third pillar of the three-pronged system — Korea Air and Missile Defense — as the military does not want to overstretch the envisioned command's role, the official said.

"As a strategic unit to deter and respond to advancing North Korean nuclear and WMD threats, the strategic command will utilize our military's strategic capabilities and safely protect the country and the people by realizing extended deterrence between South Korea and the United States in an integrated manner," the ministry said.

Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to defending an ally with all of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · July 30, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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