Quotes of the Day:

He who seeks wisdom is a wise man; he who thinks he has found it is mad."

– Seneca

"Forgive him. for he believes that the customs of his tribe are the laws of nature."

– George Bernard Shaw

"Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed and some few are to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be ready only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few are to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention." 

– Francis Bacon

1. Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") (Japan and US)

2. 'The Boiling Moat' argues U.S. should prepare to help Taiwan defend against China (Matt Pottinger)

3. Quad foreign ministers decry dangerous South China Sea actions

4. Beijing calls foul as US and Japan bolster alliance, take aim at China 'challenge'

5. Gunman at Trump Rally Was Often a Step Ahead of the Secret Service

6. Failed North Korea satellite launch engine points to Russian role, say South Korean lawmakers

7. China calls on Asean to resist US, Nato moves in ‘zone of peace, freedom, neutrality’

8. U.S., Japan take 'historic' steps to deepen military ties amid China threat

9. Jon Stewart pushes VA to cover troops sickened by uranium after 9/11. Again, they are told to wait

10. Two former Marines to serve prison time for neo-Nazi power grid plot

11. More Russian warships dock in Havana port

12. National Defense Commission: Pentagon has 'insufficient', forces 'inadequate' to face China, Russia

13. SEALs Hunting New Tech for Maritime Missions

14. Memo on AI's national-security implications heads for Biden's desk

15. Japan to create island missile range as next step in standoff defense strategy

16. Send private-security contractors into Gaza? That’s a terrible idea

17. Why the China model is failing

18. A More Normal Iran?

19. Turbulence Ahead: The Maintenance Workforce Dilemma Threatening the Future of Airpower

20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2024

21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, July 28, 2024

1. Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") (Japan and US)

Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852169/joint-statement-of-the-security-consultative-committee-22/

July 28, 2024 |   

Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Minister for Foreign Affairs KAMIKAWA, and Minister of Defense KIHARA (referred to collectively as "the Ministers") convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Tokyo, Japan, on July 28, 2024.

Recognizing the profound level of global threats to our Alliance's shared vision and common values, the Ministers affirmed the enduring U.S. and Japanese commitment to stand shoulder-to-shoulder in upholding and protecting the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and to redouble our work with allies and partners in furtherance of this goal. The Ministers reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The Ministers confirmed steady progress in implementing both countries' national strategic documents and in holding intensive consultations on Alliance roles and missions to further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities. The Ministers reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives following Prime Minister KISHIDA's historic Official Visit with State Dinner on April 10, with the vision to build a global partnership for the future, including upgrading Alliance command and control (C2), deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and enhancing cross-domain operations.

Given the increasingly severe security environment caused by recent moves of regional actors, the United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. Japan reaffirmed its steadfast dedication to reinforce its own defense capabilities and to enhance its close coordination with the United States. In line with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, Japan reaffirmed its role in maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region by seamlessly responding to any situation from peacetime to contingencies. This has been further enabled by Japan's 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, which enhances U.S.-Japan Alliance deterrence and response capabilities. The United States welcomed Japan's reinforcement of its defense capabilities, including the sustained increase in its defense budget, the creation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Operations Command (JJOC), the focus on cybersecurity, and the possession of counterstrike capabilities.

Acknowledging the evolving security environment and the challenges posed to the Alliance today and in the future, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The Ministers concurred that the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order for its own benefit at the expense of others. They highlighted that the PRC employs political, economic, and military coercion of countries, companies, and civil society, as well as facilitates its military modernization through the diversion of technology to achieve these objectives. Such behavior is a serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community and represents the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to the PRC's intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding and peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands, as well as escalatory behavior around the Southwest Islands. The United States reaffirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Senkaku Islands. They shared their continuing concerns regarding the PRC's ongoing and rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal, which continues without any transparency regarding its intent and which the PRC refuses to acknowledge, despite publicly available evidence.

The Ministers reiterated their strong objections to the PRC's unlawful maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features, and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea. The PRC's destabilizing actions in this region include unsafe encounters at sea and in the air, efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resources exploitation, as well as the dangerous use of Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels. The Ministers reaffirmed full respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea as reflected in the relevant provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). They emphasized that the July 12, 2016, Award in the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The PRC), constituted under UNCLOS, is final and legally binding on the parties to that proceeding. The Ministers reaffirmed their serious concern over the PRC's repeated obstruction of Philippine vessels' exercise of high seas freedom of navigation and the disruption of supply lines to Second Thomas Shoal, which constitute dangerous and destabilizing conduct. The Ministers resolved to work with partners in Southeast Asia, based on their unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity, to support regional maritime security and uphold international law.

The Ministers stated that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community. They encouraged cross-Strait issues be resolved peacefully. The Ministers emphasized Taiwan's political transition period should not be used as a pretext for provocative actions across the Taiwan Strait.

They expressed serious concerns about the dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms as well as the PRC's human rights issues, including in Xinjiang and Tibet.

The Ministers strongly condemned North Korea's continued conduct of reckless ballistic missile launches, alarming in number, in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and at the cost of the welfare of people in North Korea. The Ministers also condemned North Korea's continued nuclear weapons program and nuclear rhetoric and reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, urging North Korea to abide by all its obligations under relevant UNSCRs and engage in substantive dialogue. The Ministers urged all UN Member States to ensure full and effective implementation of all UNSCRs related to North Korea, and reaffirmed close cooperation in exploring ways to ensure implementation. The Ministers confirmed the need for an immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

The Ministers strongly condemned Russia's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. They recognized that Russia's violation of the UN Charter and its attempts to unilaterally change borders by force through its ongoing aggression against Ukraine present a clear challenge to the international order, with global impacts including on the Indo-Pacific. The Ministers condemned Russia's reckless nuclear rhetoric and its attacks against critical infrastructure, and they reiterated the need for Russia to be held accountable for its atrocities in Ukraine. They also highlighted with concern Russia's growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with the PRC, including through joint operations and drills in the vicinity of Japan, and the PRC's support for Russia's defense industrial base. The Ministers strongly condemned deepening Russia-North Korea cooperation, exemplified by Russia's procurement of ballistic missiles and other materiel from North Korea in direct violation of UNSCRs for use against Ukraine, and expressed deep concern about the potential for transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic missile-related technology and expertise to North Korea, which would deteriorate regional stability and further undermine the global non-proliferation regime. They underscored that Russia's and North Korea's actions have a destabilizing impact on global and Indo-Pacific security. The Ministers underscored that the outcome of the recent Russia-North Korea Summit, including the signing of the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," should be of grave concern in the interest of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, upholding the global non-proliferation regime, and supporting the people of Ukraine as they defend their freedom and independence against Russia's brutal aggression.

The Ministers shared the recognition that instability in the Middle East reverberates across the international community, impacting Indo-Pacific security and economies. They condemned Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waterways that threaten the regional and global economy and cause delivery delays and price increases for badly needed food and medicine. The Ministers remained committed to seeing a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza, and a negotiated two-State solution that resolves the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict with an independent Palestinian state with Israel's security guaranteed, enabling both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a just, lasting, and secure peace.

U.S.-Japan Deterrence and Response Capabilities

Building upon the past year's achievements and the unprecedented alignment of both countries' national strategic documents, the Ministers emphasized the United States and Japan will further enhance Alliance deterrence and response capabilities to meet the challenges posed by the evolving security environment, focusing on the following areas:

1. Upgrading Alliance Coordination, Command and Control

The Ministers affirmed the need to strengthen Alliance policy and operational coordination at all levels through exercise and discussion, and to foster a shared understanding of Alliance processes from peacetime through contingencies. To facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies, the United States intends to reconstitute U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) reporting to the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). This reconstituted USFJ is intended to serve as an important JJOC counterpart. Through a phased approach, USFJ would enhance its capabilities and operational cooperation with the JJOC, as well as assume primary responsibility for coordinating security activities in and around Japan in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In coordination and consultation with the U.S. Congress, the Department of Defense intends to reconstitute USFJ, in parallel with the development of the JJOC. The United States and Japan will closely consult and establish working groups to further develop bilateral aspects of this proposal, building upon the following shared C2 principles.

• In line with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the United States and Japan will upgrade respective C2 frameworks in support of the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
• The United States and Japan will enhance interoperability at the policy-level by coordinating respective decision-making processes, and at the operational-level by coordinating plans, capability development and employment, posture, resource allocation, and exercises. This includes facilitating greater interoperability on joint bilateral operations, such as: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, training and exercises; operational planning; contingency planning; and logistics.
• The United States and Japan will clearly define relationships between U.S. and Japanese C2 structures, taking into account Japan's establishment of the JJOC, with a focus on aligning missions, capabilities, and responsibilities between counterparts.
• In line with the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the United States and Japan will ensure that the existing Alliance Coordination Mechanism remains the mechanism that facilities bilateral policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the United States Armed Forces and the Self-Defense Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.
• The United States and Japan recognize the importance of strong cyber and information security, as well as information sharing, for realizing deeper interoperability, and will consider enhancing information sharing opportunities; further improving cyber, data, and information security; and enhancing communications and physical security.

2. Improving Alliance stand-off defense capabilities

The Ministers welcomed Japan's advances in developing stand-off defense capabilities and highlighted progress on U.S.-Japan cooperation towards the effective operation of Japanese counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate cooperation on Japan's acquisition of Tomahawk, including on ship refurbishment and personnel training, to support Japan's operational capability. The Ministers also highlighted cooperation on stand-off missile procurements, including Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER). They welcomed further cooperation on Japan's development of its indigenous stand-off missiles, including the provision of U.S. materiel and technological support.

3. Bolstering Alliance activities in Japan's Southwest Islands

The Ministers welcomed Japan's efforts to improve JSDF capabilities in the Southwest Islands by deploying additional units. To demonstrate Japan's resolve to strengthen its own defense capabilities and their mutual commitment to the security of Japan, the Ministers reaffirmed the Alliance's goal to increase bilateral presence in Japan's Southwest Islands. Japan's own efforts in the Southwest Islands, combined with Alliance exercises, training, posture, and other defense-related activities, enhance Alliance deterrence and response capabilities in this critical region. The Ministers underscored the importance of continued coordination with local communities of the region for these efforts, including support for strong relationships with them through enhanced communication about the importance of Alliance activities.

4. Strengthening bilateral exercises, readiness, and operations

To maintain and enhance Alliance readiness, which underpins the credibility of Alliance deterrence, the Ministers affirmed bilateral efforts to advance planning for contingencies, as well as improve and expand the scope of realistic cross-domain training, tabletop exercises, and exercises, such as Resolute Dragon, Orient Shield, Yama Sakura, Keen Edge, Keen Sword, and Resilient Shield. The Ministers underscored the importance of continued discussion to improve the resiliency and smooth deployment of U.S. and Japanese defense assets, as well as their operational effectiveness during disaster responses and during a contingency, including through flexible access to air and seaports, and other operational foundations. They supported exploring further opportunities for Alliance exercises and joint/shared use of facilities throughout Japan, including in the Southwest Islands. The Ministers also welcomed the establishment and first meeting of Working Group for Future Fighter Training and Readiness (WG-FFTR), which will explore opportunities for future fighter pilot training and readiness, including AI and advanced simulators, and co-development and co-production of cutting-edge technologies such as common jet trainers to maintain combat-ready next-generation fighter airpower.

5. Enhancing extended deterrence

As the Alliance faces a severe strategic and nuclear environment, the Ministers stressed the critical importance of continuing to enhance U.S. extended deterrence, bolstered by Japan's defense capabilities, as well as strengthening cooperation on extended deterrence and escalation management primarily through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. Signifying the commitment to deepen substantive strategic-level discussions, the Ministers held the first ministerial-level meeting on extended deterrence.

6. Deepening ISR Cooperation

The Ministers confirmed steady progress in ISR cooperation, which improves bilateral maritime domain awareness, facilitates timely information sharing and intelligence collection, bolsters Alliance deterrence, and provides the foundation for effective Alliance coordination, command, and control. In this context, they welcomed achievements of the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) and concurred to enhance and expand the BIAC through continued discussion on future cooperative efforts. They reiterated the importance of the U.S. MQ-9 deployment to Kadena Air Base to support Alliance ISR cooperation.

7. Expanding cooperation on cross-domain operations, information warfare, and artificial intelligence (AI)

The Ministers committed to strengthening bilateral coordination on cross-domain operations, including cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), recognizing the importance of all these domains to future concepts of deterrence and response capabilities. The Ministers welcomed cooperation on space capabilities, including a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) detection and tracking constellation for strategic threats such as long-range missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, as well as bilateral and multilateral space cooperation including within the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative since December 2023. They also highlighted deepening discussions on EW between the U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense, and welcomed the establishment of the EW Working Group between the U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense. Recognizing the threats to global stability via malign influence operations and grey zone activities, the Ministers supported the addition of information warfare as a topic for further cooperation to counter these looming threats and welcomed the establishment of the Information Warfare Synchronization Working Group between the U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense. On AI, the Ministers underlined the critical bilateral work to promote the responsible use of AI in the military domain, particularly through the AI Partnership for Defense (AIPfD) and the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.

8. Strengthening cyber and information security

The Ministers emphasized the foundational importance of cyber and information security for the Alliance and its ability to develop future-oriented capabilities, as well as stay ahead of growing cyber threats. They committed to deep cooperation on cyber and information security through incorporating Zero Trust Architecture to build resilience in the information and communication technology domain. The Ministers concurred on the importance of enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, and discussed promoting closer cooperation in U.S.-Japan defensive cyberspace operations to respond to threats for further strengthening alliance deterrence. The United States welcomed Japan's efforts to bolster its national cybersecurity posture, including Japan's steady implementation of its Risk Management Framework, which will help realize better network defense for information sharing with Japan. The Ministers discussed increasing opportunities for incorporating cyber defense concepts in future exercises. They applauded significant progress made through bilateral cyber and information security consultations.

9. Realizing shared goals with likeminded allies and partners

The United States and Japan are leveraging our global partnership to network with likeminded countries that share the Alliance's goal to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific and uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law. The Ministers reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan Alliance is at the core of both countries' efforts to deepen and expand multilateral cooperation on posture, capabilities, exercises, maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and other areas to enhance regional deterrence.

The Ministers renewed their commitment to further advance the Alliance's partnership with Australia, leveraging the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and in line with recent commitments at the May 2024 Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (TDMM). The Ministers discussed key areas of cooperation, including on reciprocal deployments of U.S., Japanese, and Australian F-35s; ISR capabilities and exercises; increasing Japan's participation in U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation activities; pursuing networked air and missile defense architecture and exercises; and technology development through the recently signed trilateral Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) Memorandum of Arrangement. The Ministers welcomed the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partners' consideration of cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects and looked forward to further discussions.

The Ministers emphasized the critical importance of deepening cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to maintaining regional peace and stability, underpinned by the leadership commitments at the 2023 Camp David Summit and respective trilateral foreign and defense ministerial-level meetings this year. In support of these commitments, the Ministers hailed successful execution of the first iteration of the new, multi-domain trilateral exercise, FREEDOM EDGE, and the continued operation of a trilateral real-time Democratic People's Republic of Korea missile warning data sharing mechanism.

The United States welcomed the signing of the Japan-Philippines RAA, and the Ministers looked forward to greater trilateral and multilateral cooperation on shared areas of interest, including maritime domain awareness and security, training and exercises with our respective forces, cooperation between our respective coast guards, capacity building, and HA/DR. They noted additional multilateral efforts including between the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia to support capacity building for the Philippines. They lauded the April 2024 U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippines and the June 2024 U.S.-Japan-Canada-Philippines maritime cooperative activities in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone to strengthen the interoperability of our defense/armed forces' doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and uphold high seas freedoms in a manner consistent with the international law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS.

The Ministers underscored their strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality. They also emphasized their support for the Pacific region's unity and its priorities as articulated through the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. They supported further cooperation with partners in Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries through joint training, capacity building, and assistance initiatives. Relatedly, the United States welcomed Japan's decision to establish the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework to strengthen the security capacities and improve the deterrence capabilities of third countries, including the provision of coastal radar systems to the Philippines. The Ministers noted bilateral efforts to align U.S. initiatives with Japan's OSA. The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of the Quad, and their commitment to furthering the public goods Quad partners deliver to the region through the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) and other initiatives.

Highlighting the interconnected nature of security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, the Ministers supported Japan's increased multilateral cooperation with NATO and cooperation throughout Europe. They confirmed efforts to align U.S. and Japanese strategic and diplomatic approaches toward each region through the recently launched U.S.-Japan Strategic Diplomacy and Development Dialogue.

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

The Ministers reiterated the President and Prime Minister's aim to maximally align our economic, technology, and related strategies to advance innovation, strengthen our industrial bases, promote resilient and reliable supply chains, and build the strategic emerging industries of the future. They reaffirmed the importance of defense equipment and technology cooperation in enhancing Alliance capabilities, which underpins the Alliance's ability to support regional peace and stability. Through this cooperation, the United States and Japan are connecting acquisition, science, and technology ecosystems to maintain the technological edge, and cooperating on economic security measures to counter the weaponization of economic dependencies.

The Ministers welcomed high-priority efforts to pursue mutually beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) and meet critical demand for such advanced systems, address timely procurement and readiness requirements, and deter aggression. This includes the U.S. Interagency Missile Co-Production Working Group, led by the Deputy Secretary of State and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, which will inform the U.S.-Japan Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS). DICAS will focus on advancing missile co-production efforts as well as building supply chain resilience and facilitating ship and aircraft repair. Further, the Ministers supported senior U.S. and Japanese leadership attendance at the upcoming September 2024 Industry Day organized by Japanese Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, which will provide opportunities to advance discussions on these key efforts. DICAS, in updating the SCC, and the U.S. Interagency Missile Co-Production Working Group will communicate with industry stakeholders to create the conditions required to co-produce advanced defensive systems. DICAS Missile Co-production Working Group participants will submit action plans for accelerating responsible technology release, promoting a viable business case, establishing programmatic timelines and required procurement quantities, and identifying funding mechanisms to the second DICAS meeting to be organized by the end of 2024.

The Ministers further highlighted major arrangements signed recently, including the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) Project Arrangement, the Overwhelming Response through Collaborative Autonomy (ORCA) Project Arrangement, the High-Powered Microwave (HPM) Project Arrangement, and the Testing and Evaluation Program (TEP) Memorandum of Understanding. They echoed the role of the Defense Science and Technology Cooperation Group (DSTCG) in the bilateral technology cooperation and welcomed its second meeting this summer. The United States also commended Japan's future establishment of its new institute for defense innovation technology. Furthermore, they emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral cooperation on uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), especially joint research on RTA (runtime assurance) technology scheduled to start in the first half of 2025. The United States reiterated support for Japan's cooperation with like-minded countries on defense equipment and technology, including the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with the United Kingdom and Italy, and the Ministers supported cooperation to ensure interoperability between GCAP and U.S. aircraft and uncrewed systems.

The United States welcomed Japan's revision of its Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines, which supports efforts to leverage our respective industrial bases to meet the demand for critical capabilities. Under this revision, the United States further welcomed progress in transferring Japan's Patriot interceptor missiles to supplement U.S. stocks.

To support further cooperation in the above areas, the United States welcomed Japan's efforts to bolster its defense industrial security base with the publication of the first Defense Industrial Security Manual, as well as Japan's participation in the Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) as the first Asian country to become an official member, and Japan's passage of the Act on the Protection and Utilization of Important Economic Security Information.

Alliance Force Posture

The Ministers emphasized the importance of optimizing Alliance force posture to address increasing security challenges in the region and be better postured to meet these challenges in the future. To this end, they welcomed the U.S. plan to modernize its tactical aircraft laydown across Japan. The modernization plan reflects capability investments to enhance the U.S.-Japan Alliance and bolster regional deterrence. The Ministers celebrated the U.S. redesignation of the 12th Marine Regiment to the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), and the steady implementation of the MLR reorganization toward initial operational capability by 2025. They welcomed the forward deployment and return of the USS George Washington to Japan, and its critical role in supporting Alliance deterrence.

To maintain deterrence and mitigate impact on local communities, the Ministers reiterated their firm commitment to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa. Following the progress of construction in the Oura-wan area, the Ministers underlined the importance of accelerating bilateral work toward the total return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma as early as practicable including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers confirmed the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Ministers highlighted progress on development of the SDF facility on Mageshima. They underscored the importance of continued bilateral coordination for sharing timely information on incidents and accidents. In the spirit of alliance cooperation, the Ministers welcomed the efforts to be implemented by USFJ to prevent unacceptable incidents and behavior.

The Ministers affirmed their commitment to the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) in accordance with Japan's national laws and regulations. This includes both countries' commitment to implement FIP lines of effort during the duration of the 2022 Special Measures Agreement and to take all appropriate initiatives with the aim of further ensuring timely and effective implementation of the 164.1 billion yen budget, which was reaffirmed in the Joint Statement of the SCC in 2022.

Coordination on Environmental Issues and Humanitarian Assistance

In line with President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida's Joint Leaders Statement in April to respond more rapidly to climate change-related and other natural disasters by establishing a HA/DR hub in Japan, the Ministers decided to convene a task force for the operational requirements to move in an expedited manner. The Ministers discussed enhancing bilateral environmental cooperation, including on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) issues, in compliance with the Status of Forces Agreement and related arrangements.

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)

The Ministers underscored that cooperation on WPS will uphold our global partnership goals of advancing the empowerment of women and girls, achieving gender equality, and including diverse perspectives in national security activities. The Ministers affirmed that realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific requires the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in leadership positions as well as their contributions toward conflict prevention, reconstruction, and peacebuilding. The Ministers welcomed efforts, including ongoing U.S. Forces commitment to recurring WPS symposiums, Japanese participation at the USINDOPACOM Regional Military Gender Advisor Course, bilateral cooperation under ASEAN working groups, Japan's continued engagement and leadership with the WPS Focal Points Network, integration of WPS into disaster risk reduction policies and efforts, and bilateral support for the regional WPS Center of Excellence. The Ministers confirmed they will further explore cooperation by continuing to promote participation in U.S. and Japanese-led WPS activities, as well as through incorporating WPS considerations in regular bilateral training, exercises, and other activities.

Investment in People for the Alliance

The strong bonds of friendship between our peoples anchor and sustain our growing global partnership. Further strengthening these bonds, including through cultural and educational exchanges, are the most effective way to develop future stewards of the U.S.-Japan relationship. The Ministers emphasized the importance of building new and expanding existing exchange opportunities, such as Think of Okinawa's Future in the U.S. (TOFU) and Student Educational Exchange and Dialogue (SEED), to create a diverse pipeline of future U.S.-Japan experts who support the Alliance. Our peoples form the core of our Alliance, and we reaffirm our commitment to forge ever-closer bonds for generations to come.

2. 'The Boiling Moat' argues U.S. should prepare to help Taiwan defend against China (Matt Pottinger)

This is very much worth the 6 minutes to listen to. I just listened to it this morning.

Matt Pottinger talks deterrence, conventional and nuclear, with China.

 I will send the transcript when it is published. (probably tomorrow)

https://www.npr.org/2024/07/29/nx-s1-5013620/the-boiling-moat-argues-u-s-should-prepare-to-help-taiwan-defend-against-china

'The Boiling Moat' argues U.S. should prepare to help Taiwan defend against China

JULY 29, 20243:20 AM ET

HEARD ON MORNING EDITION

Steve Inskeep

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NPR's Steve Inskeep talks to Matt Pottinger, editor of "The Boiling Moat," about the U.S. protecting Taiwan from an ever-encroaching China. Pottinger is a former deputy national security adviser.

3. Quad foreign ministers decry dangerous South China Sea actions

Excerpts:

The joint statement came after talks between the so-called 'Quad' countries in Tokyo, attended by Australia's Penny Wong, India's Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Japan's Yoko Kamikawa and Antony Blinken from the U.S..

In security talks between the U.S. and Japan on Sunday, the two allies labelled China the "greatest strategic challenge, opens new tab" facing the region.

Quad foreign ministers decry dangerous South China Sea actions

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/quad-foreign-ministers-meet-tokyo-talks-maritime-security-cyber-2024-07-29/?utm

By Simon Lewis and Rocky Swift

July 29, 20245:08 AM EDTUpdated 2 hours ago

Item 1 of 5 U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa pose as they attend a Quad Ministerial Meeting at Iikura Guest House in Tokyo, Japan July 29, 2024. REUTERS/Issei Kato

[1/5]U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa pose as they attend a Quad Ministerial Meeting at Iikura Guest House in Tokyo, Japan July 29, 2024. REUTERS/Issei Kato Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

TOKYO, July 29 (Reuters) - Foreign ministers from Australia, India, Japan and the United States said on Monday they were seriously concerned about intimidating and dangerous manoeuvres in the South China Sea and pledged to bolster maritime security in the region.

The joint statement came after talks between the so-called 'Quad' countries in Tokyo, attended by Australia's Penny Wong, India's Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Japan's Yoko Kamikawa and Antony Blinken from the U.S..

In security talks between the U.S. and Japan on Sunday, the two allies labelled China the "greatest strategic challenge, opens new tab" facing the region.

"We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion," the ministers said in the statement, which did not directly mention China.

They also expressed serious concern about the militarization of disputed features and coercive and intimidating manoeuvres in the South China Sea, including dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels.

Asked about the statement at a regular news briefing on Monday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said the Quad was "artificially creating tension, inciting confrontation and containing the development of other countries".

Chinese vessels have repeatedly clashed with Philippine ships seeking to resupply its troops on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in recent months, although the two countries in July reached a provisional agreement that aims to ease tensions.

The Quad group said they were working on a series of initiatives to maintain "the free and open maritime order" including helping partners improve domain awareness via satellite data, training and capacity building. They also announced a plan to set up a new maritime legal dialogue.

"We are charting a course for a more secure and open Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean region by bolstering maritime security," Blinken said in remarks to reporters after the meeting.

"In practical terms what does this mean? It means strengthening the capacity of partners across the region to know what's happening in their own waters," he added.

He said the U.S. would continue to work with its partners to ensure freedom of navigation and the unimpeded flow of lawful maritime commerce.

The U.S. announced plans on Sunday for a major revamp of its military command in Japan. It was among several measures announced by the allies to address what they said was an "evolving security environment", noting various threats from China including its muscular maritime activities.

"Uncertainty surrounding the international order as well as the international situation has been increasing with Russia continuing its aggression in Ukraine, attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea," Japan's Kamikawa said after the talks.

The Quad ministers also pledged to advance cooperation in cybersecurity to protect supply chains and critical infrastructure, including undersea cables.

After leaving Tokyo, Blinken and Austin will hold security talks with another Asian ally, the Philippines, as the Biden administration seeks to counter an increasingly bold China.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here.

Reporting by Simon Lewis and Rocky Swift in Tokyo; Writing by John Geddie; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan

4. Beijing calls foul as US and Japan bolster alliance, take aim at China 'challenge'

Excerpts:

The move is likely to stoke the ire of Beijing, which has watched warily as the US has bolstered ties with regional allies in a part of the world where observers say China seeks to be the dominant power – and where it’s accused the US of fostering a Cold War-style bloc mentality.

Under the new plan, US forces in Japan would be “reconstituted” as a joint force headquarters reporting to the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command to “facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies,” according to the statement.

US to revamp military forces in Japan in ‘historic’ move as regional tensions mount | CNN

Beijing calls foul as US and Japan bolster alliance, take aim at China 'challenge'

CNN · by Simone McCarthy, Philip Wang · July 28, 2024

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin attend a ministerial meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara (not pictured) in Tokyo on July 28, 2024.

Issei Kato/Reuters

CNN —

The United States will overhaul its military forces in Japan as the two countries move to deepen defense cooperation, Washington and Tokyo said Sunday, in a sweeping step to modernize their alliance in the face of mounting security threats in Asia.

The announcement comes as Japan and the US warily eye a region where China is seen as increasingly aggressive in asserting its disputed territorial claims and North Korea continues its illegal weapons program – while both tighten ties with Russia as it wages war in Ukraine.

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and their Japanese counterparts Minoru Kihara and Yoko Kamikawa announced the plan in a joint statement following a meeting in Tokyo, where they also called China’s “political, economic, and military coercion” the “greatest strategic challenge” in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

The move is likely to stoke the ire of Beijing, which has watched warily as the US has bolstered ties with regional allies in a part of the world where observers say China seeks to be the dominant power – and where it’s accused the US of fostering a Cold War-style bloc mentality.

Under the new plan, US forces in Japan would be “reconstituted” as a joint force headquarters reporting to the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command to “facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies,” according to the statement.

In a press conference following the meeting, Austin hailed the countries’ move to “modernize” their alliance command and control as an “historic decision.”

“This will be the most significant change to US Forces Japan since its creation, and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years,” Austin said.

He pointed both to the “upgrade” of US Forces Japan with “expanded missions and operational responsibilities,” announced Sunday, and Japan’s new Joint Operations Command, saying that the countries were reinforcing their “combined ability to deter and respond to coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”

The announcement follows an April summit in Washington between US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, where the two vowed to upgrade their respective command-and-control framework “to strengthen deterrence and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific in the face of pressing regional security challenges.”

Details of the implementation would be figured out in working groups led by US Indo-Pacific Command, a senior US defense official said ahead of Sunday’s announcement, adding that there is no intention to integrate Japanese forces into the US commands.

CNN interview with Japanese PM Kishida

CNN

Related article Japan’s Kishida warns world at ‘historic turning point’ as he touts US alliance ahead of Biden summit

US Forces Japan (USFJ), whose headquarters is Yokota Air Base, consists of approximately 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan under a 1960 mutual cooperation and security treaty.

The expected reconfiguration comes as Japan shifts its defense posture, veering away from the pacifist constitution imposed on it by the United States in the aftermath of World War II, with a plan to boost defense spending to about 2% of its GDP by 2027 and acquire counterstrike capabilities.

These changes have cemented Japan’s centrality to Washington’s regional security strategy and its push for increasing coordination with allies and partners amid rising regional tensions – and as it increasingly sees security in Europe and Asia as intertwined in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

The latest move also comes months ahead of the US presidential election, which American allies around the world have been watching closely, as Republican candidate and former President Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned the cost of US alliances.

When asked whether the elections could impact US-Japan relations, Blinken said the long-standing alliance “was stronger than it’s even been” and would be “sustained irrespective of the outcome of elections in either of our countries.”

“The reason for that is because it’s manifestly in the interests of our people, the Japanese people, the American people, and people well beyond our countries,” he said.

Rising regional tensions

China was repeatedly mentioned with pointed language in the joint statement, with the ministers outlining shared concerns including what they described as Beijing’s “intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo” in the East China Sea, its “threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea,” and its “support for Russia’s defense industrial base.”

China has been aggressively asserting its claims in the contested waters of the South China Sea and maintaining an extended presence near Japanese-controlled islands Beijing claims in the East China Sea. Western leaders have accused Beijing of “enabling” Moscow’s war in Ukraine through the provision of dual-use goods, a charge Beijing denies.

The ministers also said Taiwan’s “political transition period should not be used as a pretext for provocative actions across the Taiwan Strait,” a statement that follows Chinese military drills encircling the self-ruled democracy Beijing claims just days after Taiwan swore in a new president in May.

When asked during the press conference about the relationship between the new command and concerns about China, Austin said the decision to strengthen the command was “not based upon any threat from China.” “It’s based on our desire and our ability to work closer together and to be more effective,” the defense chief said.

In the statement, the ministers also condemned North Korea’s missile testing and nuclear weapons programs, and condemned deepening Russia-North Korea cooperation, including Russia’s “procurement of ballistic missiles and other materiel from North Korea” for use in Ukraine.

The meeting follows a trilateral meeting earlier Sunday between defense chiefs from the United States, Japan and South Korea, the first of its kind in Tokyo – and yet another sign of the tightening coordination of regional US allies.

That came nearly one year after a landmark summit between the three countries held by Biden at Camp David. The burgeoning trilateral coordination between the US, Japan and South Korea marks a shift in regional relations, with Seoul and Tokyo – both long-standing US allies – widely seen as working to put aside historic animosity and mistrust to better address shared security threats.

On Sunday, the three defense chiefs vowed to strengthen cooperation to deter “nuclear and missile threats” from North Korea and formalized a trilateral agreement that reaffirms the “unwavering nature of the new era of trilateral cooperation,” according to a joint statement.

This would “institutionalize” trilateral security cooperation among their countries’ defense authorities, including senior-level policy consultations, information sharing, trilateral exercises, and defense exchange cooperation.

Correction: This article has been updated to reflect that this is the first meeting on its kind in Tokyo

CNN · by Simone McCarthy, Philip Wang · July 28, 2024

5. Gunman at Trump Rally Was Often a Step Ahead of the Secret Service

More fascinating but very troubling revelations.

The gunman's close target reconnaissance was superior to the Secret Service's pre-event reconnaissance.

The gunman's planning and preparations as well as actions on the objective (and the failures of the Secret Service and law enforcement) will be studied for a long time.

Gunman at Trump Rally Was Often a Step Ahead of the Secret Service

Text messages, obtained exclusively by The Times, indicate that some law enforcement officers were aware of Thomas Crooks earlier than previously known. And he was aware of them.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/28/us/politics/trump-shooting-thomas-crooks-secret-service.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

The Trump rally site, showing the warehouse area off to the right where the gunman was first spotted — and eventually fired from.Credit...Kristian Thacker for The New York Times

By Haley WillisAric TolerDavid A. Fahrenthold and Adam Goldman

The reporters analyzed video clips, photos and law enforcement documents to supplement key interviews for this article.

July 28, 2024

Nearly 100 minutes before former President Donald J. Trump took the stage in Butler, Pa., a local countersniper who was part of the broader security detail let his colleagues know his shift was ending.

“Guys I am out. Be safe,” he texted to a group of colleagues at 4:19 p.m. on July 13. He exited the second floor of a warehouse that overlooked the campaign rally site, leaving two other countersnipers behind.

Outside, the officer noticed a young man with long stringy hair sitting on a picnic table near the warehouse. So at 4:26 p.m., he texted his colleagues about the man, who was outside the fenced area of the Butler Fair Show grounds where Mr. Trump was to appear. He said that the person would have seen him come out with his rifle and “knows you guys are up there.”

The countersniper who sent the texts confirmed to The New York Times that the individual he saw was later identified as the gunman.

Image

A countersniper with local law enforcement first noticed Thomas Crooks nearly 100 minutes before the shooting and texted two colleagues about his presence.Credit...Beaver County E.S.U., via Senator Charles E. Grassley

By 5:10 p.m., the young man was no longer on the picnic table. He was right below the countersnipers, who were upstairs in a warehouse owned by AGR International. One of the countersnipers took pictures of him, according to a law enforcement after-action report, which along with the texts from the Beaver County Emergency Services Unit was provided to The Times by the office of Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa. The text messages were independently verified by The Times.

At 5:38 p.m., the photos were shared in a group chat, and another text went out among the officers, saying they should inform the Secret Service. “Kid learning around building we are in. AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a range finder looking towards stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him.”

Image

At 5:38 p.m., another countersniper sent photographs of Mr. Crooks outside the AGR International building to a group of local law enforcement officers.Credit...Beaver County E.S.U., via Senator Charles E. Grassley

By 6:11 p.m., the “kid” would be dead on the roof of a warehouse connected to the one the countersnipers were stationed in, after having been shot by the Secret Service for trying to kill a former president.

AGR

INTERNATIONAL

Primary

position of

local snipers

5:14 p.m.

Gunman

photographed

6:11 p.m.

Gunman

fires

4:26 p.m.

Gunman first

spotted

RALLY

SITE

Trump

speaking

Secret

Service

snipers

200 feet

Sources: Pennsylvania Spatial Data Access (imagery); Beaver County ESU After Action Report via Senator Charles Grassley and Times reporting (locations)By Scott Reinhard

Taken together, the text messages provide the most detailed picture yet of the hours before the assassination attempt. They reveal that the gunman, later identified as Thomas Crooks, 20, of Bethel Park, Pa., aroused police suspicion more than 90 minutes before the shooting, rather than about 60 minutes, as has been previously discussed in congressional hearings.

The messages also add to the evidence that the would-be assassin was often one step ahead of security forces, and in particular the Secret Service.

Mr. Crooks scoped out the rally site a day before the Secret Service did. He used a drone to survey the site while the Secret Service did not seek permission to use one for the rally. He researched how far Lee Harvey Oswald was from John F. Kennedy when he fatally shot the president in 1963 — the answer is about 265 feet — and managed to climb onto a roof that was about 400 feet from Mr. Trump at its closest point. The Secret Service left that roof unmanned.

And while countersnipers were assigned to surveil the rally, Mr. Crooks was also in a position to watch them.

Even after the episode ended, the police seemed confused about what Mr. Crooks had done and how.

“So, on TV, they’re saying Trump was shot at, and he got hit, but I don’t believe that,” one local police officer said to another 17 minutes after the shooting, in a conversation captured on a body-worn camera.

As the officers in the video walk toward the warehouse on which Mr. Crooks’s lifeless body lay, one can be heard saying, “I’m trying to figure out how this guy got here.”

Investigators are still trying to determine Mr. Crooks’s motivations and his actions in the days before the rally, in part from what they have found on his personal devices. But the texts and footage, combined with interviews by The Times and public testimony by investigators, have filled in some of the answers.

Mr. Crooks already had the AR-15-style semiautomatic rifle he brought to the rally. He purchased it in October from his father, who had acquired it legally in 2013.

He began to receive packages at his house in the Pittsburgh suburbs, including fertilizer pellets and radio devices. He would later use some of this material to build rudimentary bombs, two of which were found in his vehicle after the shooting and another in his home.

Mr. Crooks had started searching online for information on famous people, including the F.B.I. director, Christopher A. Wray, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland, President Biden and Mr. Trump. He also looked up “major depressive disorder.”

On July 3, Mr. Trump’s campaign announced the rally in Butler for 10 days later, and Mr. Crooks narrowed his focus to the former president — and to past assassinations.

On July 6, Mr. Crooks typed in an ominous phrase.

“He did a Google search for ‘How far away was Oswald from Kennedy?’” Mr. Wray told a congressional committee last week.

Image

Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director, offered new details about the assassination attempt on former President Donald J. Trump to a congressional committee last week.Credit...Maansi Srivastava for The New York Times

The next day, Mr. Crooks drove to the farm show grounds, about an hour from his home. He spent 20 minutes there, investigators said. He also registered to attend the rally.

Secret Service agents would not hold their first walk-through until the following day, July 8, joined by law enforcement officials from several local and state agencies.

It was then that the Secret Service decided to exclude the entire warehouse complex owned by AGR, including Building No. 6, which Mr. Crooks would later use, from its inner security perimeter. This meant that on the day of the rally, Mr. Crooks was able to approach the building without passing through security screening.

There is still confusion about which agency was supposed to oversee the roof. Kimberly A. Cheatle, then the director of the Secret Service, told a House committee on Monday that she did not know whose job that was. She resigned the next day.

After their walk-through, the Secret Service had asked local agencies to provide more help. Text messages show that Beaver County struggled to find enough volunteers to cover the 12-hour shift. A leader says that one of the available snipers could arrive at 8 a.m. but would need to leave by 4 p.m.

“That works,” another leader responded in the texts.

On Thursday, July 11, the Secret Service returned to the site for a final walk-through with its local partners.

The next day, Mr. Crooks made his own final preparations. He went to a shooting range, the Clairton Sportsmen’s Club, around 2:30 p.m., and practiced with his AR-15-style rifle.

On Saturday morning, July 13, the timelines of the security personnel and the would-be assassin converged.

Officers from several local law enforcement agencies were scheduled for a briefing at 9 a.m. at the Brady Paul Lodge in Butler, according to a plan shown in the text messages. The after-action report indicates the Secret Service was not in attendance.

At the same time, Mr. Crooks was at the Home Depot in Bethel Park purchasing a ladder. A bloody receipt, found in the shooter’s pocket after he was killed, showed he bought it around 9:30 a.m.

Then Mr. Crooks drove to the rally site, reaching the show grounds by around 10 a.m. and staying about 70 minutes — even as the local countersnipers were arriving.

When Mr. Crooks left, he drove back to his hometown and bought 50 rounds of ammunition at Allegheny Arms & Gun Works. Then he returned to Butler, arriving at the farm show grounds in his Hyundai Sonata at about 3:35 p.m., according to geolocation information from one of his cellphones. About 15 minutes later, he flew his drone over the site for 11 minutes, including in a path about 200 yards from Mr. Trump’s podium.

He finished using his drone and sat at the picnic table, where the countersniper spotted him.

Mr. Crooks walked to his car, left the drone inside and was soon hanging around the warehouse complex.

Unlike the other visitors, he was not trying to enter the rally site through the security checkpoints, a fact that attracted the attention of the local countersnipers inside the warehouse. One of them took photos of him at 5:14 p.m.

Col. Christopher Paris, the Pennsylvania State Police commissioner, testified in a congressional hearing on Tuesday that officers were busy that day, responding to more than 100 heat-related emergencies. There were also other suspicious people whom security officials were trying to assess at the rally, which is not unusual for such events, Colonel Paris said.

But then, Mr. Crooks did something that alarmed the police. They saw him using the range finder.

A Beaver County countersniper shared two photos of Mr. Crooks with his colleagues at 5:38 p.m., which were then relayed to the Secret Service, through a series of steps in the command center.

One of the two remaining countersnipers “ran out of the building attempting to keep eyes on Crooks until other law enforcement arrived,” according to a statement by Richard Goldinger, the Butler County district attorney, who supervises some of the law enforcement units.

But Mr. Crooks ran off, taking a backpack with him, Mr. Goldinger said. When the officer was unable to find Mr. Crooks, he returned to his post.

Four Butler Township police officers who had been directing traffic joined the manhunt.

At 6 p.m., one officer in the group texts guessed that Mr. Crooks was moving toward the back of the complex of AGR buildings, “away from the event.” Instead, Mr. Crooks clambered onto the low-slung building in the complex closest to the stage.

Mr. Trump took the podium at 6:03 p.m., to a roaring crowd.

Six minutes later, rally attendees began pointing to someone on the roof of the warehouse. Either through luck or preparation, Mr. Crooks had found a place on the roof that let him see Mr. Trump clearly, but also seemed to keep him somewhat hidden from the Secret Service countersnipers.

Though Mr. Crooks did not bring his newly purchased ladder, he managed to climb onto the roof and walk across a complex of interconnected roofs, Mr. Wray testified.

The Butler Township officers had no ladder themselves, so one officer boosted up another, who grabbed the roof and pulled himself up — to find Mr. Crooks pointing a gun at him. With no hands left to pull his own gun, the officer dropped.

At 6:11 p.m., Mr. Crooks let loose his first rounds.

In the end, Mr. Trump was spared not by the vast law-enforcement contingent protecting him, but by chance. He turned his head, and Mr. Crooks’s first bullet whizzed by close enough to graze his ear.

The former president dived to the ground, and Mr. Crooks sent off another round. The second Secret Service sniper team fired back, and killed Mr. Crooks.

Image

Law enforcement officers gathered on the warehouse rooftop near the body of the gunman after the assassination attempt.Credit...Beaver Co. Emergency Services Unit, via Chuck Grassley

The body-camera footage shows officers climbing a ladder to find Mr. Crooks lying dead on the roof: a slight man, wearing black sneakers, a T-shirt and cargo shorts. His backpack and rifle lay nearby. A long trail of blood ran from his body down to the roof’s gutter.

“Looks like, what, at least eight,” one of them says, counting shell casings around him. “One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight. At least eight.”

Campbell Robertson, Jeanna Smialek, Malachy Browne and Glenn Thrush contributed reporting.

Haley Willis is a Times reporter with the Visual Investigations team, covering conflict, corruption and human rights. More about Haley Willis

Aric Toler is a reporter on the Visual Investigations team at The Times where he uses emerging techniques of discovery to analyze open source information. More about Aric Toler

David A. Fahrenthold is an investigative reporter writing about nonprofit organizations. He has been a reporter for two decades. More about David A. Fahrenthold

Adam Goldman writes about the F.B.I. and national security. He has been a journalist for more than two decades. More about Adam Goldman

See more on: U.S. Politics, U.S. Secret Service, Donald Trump

READ 616 COMMENTS

Our Coverage of the Trump Rally Shooting

• The Investigation: F.B.I. officials told Congress that the 20-year-old gunman who tried to kill Donald Trump used his cellphone and other devices to search for images of Trump and President Biden.
• Secret Service Director Resigns: Kimberly Cheatle gave up her post after security failures surrounding the Trump assassination attempt and calls for her to step down from lawmakers in both parties.
• Congress Forms Task Force: The top Republican and Democrat in the House have struck a deal to form a bipartisan task force to lead congressional investigations into the shooting.
• Security Blind Spots: Even as investigators continue to examine what happened at the Trump rally, it is already clear that there were multiple missed opportunities to stop the gunman before the situation turned deadly.
• The Gunman: In interviews, former classmates of the suspect described him as intelligent but solitary, someone who tried to avoid teasing by fellow students.

6. Failed North Korea satellite launch engine points to Russian role, say South Korean lawmakers

Failed North Korea satellite launch engine points to Russian role, say South Korean lawmakers

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/daughter-north-koreas-kim-being-trained-next-leader-media-report-says-2024-07-29/?utm

By Hyonhee Shin

July 29, 20246:09 AM EDTUpdated an hour ago

Item 1 of 3 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae visit the Ministry of National Defense on the occasion of the 76th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, North Korea in this picture released on February 9, 2024 by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS/File Photo

[1/3]North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae visit the Ministry of National Defense on the occasion of the 76th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, North Korea in this picture released on February 9, 2024 by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via... Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab Read more

SEOUL, July 29 (Reuters) - North Korea appears to have received assistance from Russia for its failed attempt in May to launch a reconnaissance satellite, South Korean lawmakers said on Monday, citing the country's spy agency.

North Korea had said it used a new "liquid oxygen and petroleum engine" in the satellite, which exploded minutes after lift-off.

But Seoul's National Intelligence Service (NIS) told lawmakers that there were no signs of North Korea having developed such an engine, and it was possibly from Russia.

"Given that liquid oxygen and kerosene were used in the engine for the first time, they had likely received Russian support," Lee Seong-kweun, a member of the parliamentary intelligence committee, told reporters after being briefed by the NIS.

The agency had said Moscow also helped with Pyongyang's successful, first launch of a reconnaissance satellite last November, two months after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's rare trip to Russia, during which President Vladimir Putin promised to help him build satellites.

Putin reciprocated with a visit to Pyongyang in June, during which the two sides signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" pact. Russia and North Korea have denied arms transactions but have vowed to intensify military cooperation.

Lee also said Kim's daughter, Ju Ae, was being trained to become the next leader, citing the NIS. North Korea's state media has reported on her public activities, but not on her political future.

Park Sun-won, another member of the committee, said the NIS told them the recent indictment in the United States of Sue Mi Terry, a foreign policy expert who once worked for the CIA and on the White House National Security Council, had no impact on intelligence cooperation between Washington and Seoul.

Terry was indicted early this month on charges that she worked as an unregistered agent of South Korea's government in exchange for luxury goods and other gifts.

The indictment came as a surprise to many Seoul officials at a time when Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol have been ramping up security partnerships.

"The NIS said they're working hard to learn a lesson from this," Park said. "But there are no major problems with intelligence cooperation between the two countries, and it is actually expanding."

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here.

Reporting by Hyonhee Shin Editing by Bernadette Baum and Ros Russell

7. China calls on Asean to resist US, Nato moves in ‘zone of peace, freedom, neutrality’

"Zone of peace."

China calls on Asean to resist US, Nato moves in ‘zone of peace, freedom, neutrality’

• Top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi hammers home message at foreign ministers’ forum in Laos, as bloc gets caught up in deepening US-China rivalry

Shi Jiangtao

+ FOLLOWPublished: 11:00pm, 28 Jul 2024

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3272218/china-calls-asean-resist-us-nato-moves-zone-peace-freedom-neutrality

US ‘has no right to intervene’: China urges Asean to resist ‘external’ meddling

South China Morning Post · July 28, 2024

Caught up in the deepening US-China rivalry for regional dominance, the 10 Asean member states expressed their “concerns” in a joint statement at the end of the three-day gathering on Saturday.

Observers said the statement underlined deep divisions within the grouping.

Maria Thaemar Tana, a non-resident fellow at the Stratbase ADR Institute in Manila, said China’s assertive behaviour has strained relations with Southeast Asian neighbours, which remained deeply divided over how to cope with an increasingly confident Beijing.

“Some countries are cautious about directly opposing China but are also wary of becoming too dependent on it. This situation forces these countries to carefully balance economic ties with China while preventing its dominance,” she said.

Wang on Saturday singled out Washington and the US-led Nato as top threats to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, urging the Asean to remain “alert to and oppose [Nato] intervention in the region”, according to a readout from state news agency Xinhua.

“The US-led ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ exacerbates security dilemmas and runs counter to the vision of long-term peace and prosperity in the region,” Wang told an Asean Regional Forum meeting attended by 27 foreign ministers, including US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Nato intervention in the region was bound to “trigger confrontation and escalate tensions,” Wang was quoted as saying.

Blinken in turn hit out at China’s “escalating and unlawful actions” in the South China Sea.

Wang and Blinken also held bilateral talks on Saturday, discussing issues of mutual concern including South China Sea and Taiwan.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken ahead of their meeting on Saturday in Vientiane, Laos. Photo: AP

Foreign ministers gathered in Laotian capital Vientiane for three days of Asean and related meetings included those from Russia, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, the European Union and North Korea.

“Asean’s status as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality should be respected” in a world of “turbulence and chaos”, Wang told the regional forum. “An Asean-centred, open and inclusive regional architecture [should] be supported,” he added.

Beijing insisted on “managing differences [over the South China Sea] properly through dialogue and consultation with parties involved”, he said, while urging regional countries to reject “external interference, confrontation and pressure”.

Wang also denounced Manila’s much-rumoured attempt to file a second international arbitration case against Beijing’s expansive claims to the disputed waters, following its landmark victory in the first such case eight years ago.

China claims almost the whole of the South China Sea under what is calls its historic “nine-dash line”. Neighbours including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei contest those claims.

A 2016 international tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines but Beijing refused to participate in the case and rejected the ruling.

Wang said the 2016 arbitral case “had substantial flaws in law and fact, and was politically motivated”.

“China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea will not be affected by this illegal ruling under any circumstances,” he emphasised.

Wang also lashed out at the deepening US-Philippine security alignment under President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr, including deploying the Typhon US missile system.

“Certain external countries stirred up trouble and created disruptions, and even attempted to deploy an intermediate-range missile system in the region, provoked confrontation, that is the biggest disruptive factor to peace in the South China Sea,” he was quoted as telling the East Asia Summit, also held on Saturday.

02:49

China, Philippines differ over deal to stop clashes at fiercely disputed shoal

China, Philippines differ over deal to stop clashes at fiercely disputed shoal

During a string of bilateral meetings with his regional counterparts, including South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, Wang also stressed the importance of avoiding interference from external factors, in a thinly-veiled reference to the US.

But Cho shot back, saying that both the rules-based order and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait were crucial for South Korea’s national security.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also warned of “a troubling trend of ‘great powers dominating the smaller ones’, reflecting a hegemonic tendency that should belong to the past”, though she did not name China or the US.

“We are witnessing rising rivalries, increasing distrust, and the potential for dangerous miscalculations,” she told the East Asia summit, according to a readout from her ministry.

Carl Thayer, emeritus professor of politics at the University of New South Wales in Australia, also warned the global order was becoming increasingly polarised into two opposing blocs, with the close Russia-China partnership pitted against the US and its allies.

“In other words, tensions in the South China Sea will be viewed as systemic rather than regional. This will lead to increased cooperation among the United States and its allies Japan, Australia and South Korea and an increase in European naval presence in the South China Sea than heretofore,” he said.

“Asean’s much vaunted centrality in regional affairs will be undermined due to internal divisions.”

The Philippines had tried to include a June 17 collision – the worst clash with China in months near the disputed Second Thomas Shoal – in the joint Asean communique, but this was blocked by Cambodia and Laos, according to the Associated Press.

Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, who also met Wang, expressed concerns about the rising tensions between Beijing and Manila and the deepening US-China feud, saying “the fundamental problem is a lack of trust between two superpowers”.

He admitted in a group interview on Saturday that Asean’s unity was facing major challenges. Unlike Europe and the Middle East, Southeast Asia should be “an oasis of peace”, without “a line to divide us”, or being “forced to choose sides”, he said.

South China Morning Post · July 28, 2024

8. U.S., Japan take 'historic' steps to deepen military ties amid China threat

U.S., Japan take 'historic' steps to deepen military ties amid China threat - UPI.com​

By Darryl Coote

 JULY 28, 2024 / 10:50 PM

upi.com

Japan and the United States on Sunday took steps to deepen their military alliance. From left to right, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko of Japan and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara of Japan. Photo courtesy of Japan Ministry of Defense/X

July 28 (UPI) -- The United States and Japan on Sunday announced "historic" wide-ranging steps to deepen and modernize their military alliance, amid growing threats in the Indo-Pacific from primarily China, but also North Korea and Russia.

Washington during the Biden administration has sought to bolster military ties with Tokyo, along with other Asian partners, as part of a deterrence strategy focused on Beijing, which is attempting to exert its influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

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Steps announced Sunday to bolster that deterrence strategy include the reconstitution of U.S. Forces Japan as a joint force headquarters that would report directly to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. According to a statement from the Pentagon, doing so will enhance USFJ's capabilities and operational cooperation as it assumes primary responsibility for coordinating security activities in and around the Asian nation.

The Pentagon framed the move as "historic," and the expansion of USFJ's mission and operational responsibilities as "the most signifiant change" since its creation in the late 1950s.

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"Today, we unveil some of the most important advances in the U.S.-Japan defense ties in the history of our alliance," U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said during a press conference held in Tokyo on Sunday with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and their Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara.

The announcements came as Blinken and Austin were in Japan for their so-called 2+2 ministerial dialogue, during which the two nations' diplomats and defense leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a free Indo-Pacific region while acknowledging "the evolving security environment and the challenges posed to the alliance."

The foreign and defense leaders of both nations stressed the threat China poses in the region, agreeing in a statement that Beijing "foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order for its own benefit at the expense of others."

The officials said their governments reiterated their "strong opposition" to China's intensifying efforts to "unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion."

The statement is lined with concerns about Beijing, including over its growing nuclear arsenal, its destabilizing aerial and maritime actions, its dismantling of freedoms in Hong Kong, human rights abuses committed in Xinjiang and Tibet and its harassment of Filipino vessels in the South China Sea.

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While China may be at the forefront of concerns, North Korea and Russia, whose relationship has deepened amid the Kremlin's war in Ukraine, have also been a cause for concern for Japan and the United States as well as South Korea.

Pyongyang has continued with its flurry of ballistic missile launches into the East Sea in violation of United Nation Security Council resolutions, and Russia has also sought to deepen its military cooperation with both North Korea and China.

"They also highlighted with concern Russia's growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with the PRC, including through joint operations and drills in the vicinity of Japan, and the PRC's support for Russia's defense industrial base," the ministers of Japan and the United States said Sunday.

The People's Republic of China is China's official name.

The announcement comes nearly a month after the Pentagon announced it will deploy dozens of advanced fighter jets to multiple bases in Japan as part of a modernization plan.

There has been much emphasis placed on the United States' military presence in the region during the Biden administration, which has actively fostered growing trilateral military ties with Japan and South Korea.

In April of last year, the United States and South Korea signed what is known as the Washington Declaration, which has been viewed as a recommitment from Washington to protect Seoul from any North Korean nuclear attack.

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It also established the Nuclear Consultative Group, which experts say gives Seoul more say over the use of the United States' nuclear arsenal.

In recognition of these growing relations, President Joe Biden has hosted both South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to state visits.

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9. Jon Stewart pushes VA to cover troops sickened by uranium after 9/11. Again, they are told to wait

Probably the majority of the 5th Special Forces group who were deployed to K2 were exposed.

Jon Stewart pushes VA to cover troops sickened by uranium after 9/11. Again, they are told to wait

BY  TARA COPP AND MIKE PESOLI

Updated 8:41 PM EDT, July 26, 2024

AP · by TARA COPP · July 27, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — Comedian Jon Stewart and troops sickened by uranium ended a meeting Friday at the Department of Veterans Affairs angry that once again they have been told they will have to wait to see whether the VA will connect their illnesses to the toxic base where they were deployed shortly after 9/11.

The denied claims were supposed to have been fixed by the PACT Act, a major veterans aid package bill that President Joe Biden signed in 2022 and said is one of his proudest accomplishments in office. For many veterans it has made access to care much easier.

But the bill left out the the uranium exposure that’s still hurting some of the very first troops deployed in response to the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.

Just weeks after the attacks, special operations forces were sent to Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan, or K2, a badly contaminated former Soviet base that was a strategic location for launching operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

But K2 was a former chemical weapons site and was littered with yellow powdered uranium that was kicked up in the dust and moved throughout the base when the military pushed up a protective earth berm. The radiation levels were as much as 40,000 times higher than what would have been found naturally, according to a nuclear fusion expert who has reviewed the data.

Two decades later, troops who served there are still fighting to get radiation-exposure illnesses recognized by the VA. Many have died young.

That the VA continues to tell the K2 veterans it has not decided yet whether to cover their illnesses has infuriated Stewart, who is a vocal advocate for all of the 9/11 first responders.

Stewart and the veterans were at the VA this spring to press their case, and were told the VA was working with the Pentagon to identify what radiation was at the base. Friday’s meeting was with VA Secretary Denis McDonough, which had raised hopes for a resolution. But they heard something else.

“The secretary today said he has the authority statutorily to make the change, to make sure the K2 veterans are covered presumptively,” Stewart said. But McDonough instead told them they were still waiting for additional information. “I believe punting is the correct term for what happened.”

In a statement VA spokesman Terrence Hayes said there are more than 300 conditions covered already by the PACT Act and that the agency is working on the specific K2 illnesses and radiation exposure.

“We continue to urgently consider every option to further assist these veterans and survivors, and we will keep them apprised every step of the way,” Hayes said.

“It felt like groundhog day,” said Kim Brooks, whose late husband was one of the first troops who served at K2 to die.

Lt. Col. Tim Brooks was one of the first soldiers to deploy to K2 in 2001 and served with the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Anaconda against the Taliban in early 2002.

When his unit returned to Fort Drum, New York, in the spring of 2002, Brooks wasn’t himself. He was suffering debilitating headaches and became unexpectedly irritable, his wife said. Then his unit was called into a briefing, to sign paperwork about the toxins they were exposed to, she said.

“He came home from that briefing and told me about it in our kitchen,” said Kim Brooks, who joined Stewart at the VA meeting. “He was incredibly upset and worried and then became more and more exhausted and did not feel or look well leading up to his collapse.”

Kim Brooks has tried to obtain the form her husband signed from his military records, but has not been successful and thinks it might have been removed. Other K2 veterans who were in the special operations forces have also struggled to get documents from their medical records because their missions and roles were classified.

In 2003 Tim Brooks collapsed during a Fort Drum ceremony as his unit was preparing to go to Iraq. Doctors diagnosed brain cancer, and he died a year later at age 36.

Having still to fight to get the Pentagon and VA to recognize uranium exposure at the base has left Kim Brooks “angry and dismayed and sad,” she said. “Denial in 2003 and denial in 2024. When will they own it and take care of these men and women?”

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was serving as the commanding general of Fort Drum’s 10th Mountain Division in 2004 when Brooks died there.

Sabrina Singh, deputy Pentagon press secretary, said in a statement Friday that the Defense Department is “aware of the health issues and associated claims of veterans” who served at K2 and is “working with the Department of Veterans Affairs on a way forward.”

The presence of uranium on the base has been known since November 2001 — just a month after troops arrived there — and is documented on multiple Army maps, in memos and VA briefings. But it was labeled in different ways — as enriched, low-level processed or depleted uranium. The base and the radiation and other contaminants there was the subject of congressional hearings in 2020.

The confusion about what kind of uranium was there has been one of the holdups to veterans getting care.

But radiation levels documented at K2 in November 2001 were so elevated — as much as 40,000 times what would have registered if the uranium was just naturally occurring — that the specific type does not matter because exposure would have been harmful, said Arjun Makhijani, a nuclear fusion specialist and president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, who reviewed the K2 radiation data.

Radiation exposure from uranium can damage kidneys, create a risk for bone cancer and also affect pregnancies because it crosses the placenta, among other harmful effects, said Makhijani, who previously worked with “atomic veterans” who were sickened by radiation after working at the Bikini Atoll during nuclear weapons tests in the 1940s.

More than 15,000 troops were deployed at K2 from 2001 to 2005. While the VA does not have statistics on how many are sick, the veterans’ grassroots organization has contacted about 5,000 of them and more than 1,500 are reporting serious medical conditions, including cancers, kidney and bone problems, reproductive issues and birth defects.

Getting the VA to recognize their radiation-related illnesses is about more than medical coverage, said former Army Staff Sgt. Mark Jackson, a K2 veteran who has sought treatment for severe osteoporosis, had to have a testicle removed and had his entire thyroid removed — none of which has been covered by the VA.

“It’s the recognition of the exposure,” Jackson said.

Austin was the Combined Joint Task Force commander for Afghanistan when Jackson was deployed to K2. His unit would use K2 to go in and out of Afghanistan on missions. It’s not lost on either Jackson or Kim Brooks that Austin now leads the agency they need finally to recognize the radiation exposure at K2.

“He was there when I was there,” Jackson said. “Hell, Austin signed my Bronze Star. I look at his signature almost everyday.”

AP · by TARA COPP · July 27, 2024

10. Two former Marines to serve prison time for neo-Nazi power grid plot

I am sure certain factions will minimize this threat.

Two former Marines to serve prison time for neo-Nazi power grid plot

marinecorpstimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · July 26, 2024

Two former Marines were sentenced to prison Thursday for their participation in a plot to attack the U.S. power grid, the Justice Department said.

A judge sentenced Liam Collins, 25, of Johnston, Rhode Island, to 10 years in prison. Justin Wade Hermanson, 25, of Swansboro, North Carolina, received a prison sentence of one year, nine months. Both men were part of a neo-Nazi group that sought to destroy transformers, substations and other components of the power grid at about a dozen locations across Idaho and its surrounding states.

“As part a self-described ‘modern day SS,’ these defendants conspired, prepared, and trained to attack America’s power grid in order to advance their violent white supremacist ideology,” Attorney General Merrick B. Garland said in a statement. “These sentences reflect both the depravity of their plot and the Justice Department’s commitment to holding accountable those who seek to use violence to undermine our democracy.”

A third man was also sentenced Thursday. Paul James Kryscuk, 38, of Boise, Idaho, was sentenced to six years, six months in prison. Collins and Hermanson both pleaded guilty to federal firearms charges, while Kryscuk pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to destroy an energy facility.

Two other men were previously convicted in the plot. Joseph Maurino, a member of the New Jersey Army National Guard, and Jordan Duncan, a Marine veteran, pleaded guilty to weapons charges. Neither men have received their sentences.

RELATED

Marine veteran pleads guilty to federal weapons charge in neo-Nazi plot

All five co-defendants — which include three Marine veterans and one Army National Guard veteran — have pleaded guilty to firearms-related charges.

Collins was the leader of the neo-Nazi group, which communicated through the now-defunct web forum Iron March. He described the group as a “modern day SS” that went hiking and camping together, did gym sessions and performed live-firing training exercises, according to federal indictments. Collins reportedly added that the group had planned to “buy a lot of land,” and posted that all members would be required to have served in the military.

Collins joined the Marine Corps in 2017 with the intention of gaining experience and training to benefit his group, according to his indictment. He was stationed at Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina, where he allegedly stole body armor and rifle magazines and delivered them to other neo-Nazi members, according to federal prosecutors.

Collins was kicked out of the Marine Corps in 2020. The nature of his discharge is not included in court documents. Hermanson served in the Marines as part of the same unit that Collins was last assigned.

“I’ll be in the USMC for 4 years while my comrades work on the groups [sic] physical formation,” Collins posted on Iron March in 2016. “It will take years to gather all the experience and intelligence that we need to utilize — but that’s what makes it fun.”

In addition to the weapons charge, Collins was accused by federal authorities of threatening to shoot Black Lives Matter protestors and conspiring to destroy government-owned energy facilities. Investigators said Collins asked group members to purchase thermite, a powdered mixture used in incendiary bombs. The group had discussed using the substance to burn through transformers.

On Iron March, Kryscuk shared his ideas for the group, which included buying property in “predominantly white and right leaning” locations, where they could recruit residents and stockpile weapons to take over local governments and industries.

While Collins was serving in the Marine Corps, Kryscuk manufactured firearms, and Duncan gathered a library of information, including some military-owned information, regarding firearms, explosives and nerve toxins.

The group created propaganda video montages of their live-fire training. In one video obtained by federal authorities, the participants are seen firing assault-type rifles. The video showed four group members wearing masks with a symbol of the neo-Nazi Attomwaffen Division and giving the “Heil Hitler” sign. An image of a black sun, a Nazi symbol, was pasted above them.

This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism. Please send tips to MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.

About Nikki Wentling

Nikki Wentling covers disinformation and extremism for Military Times. She's reported on veterans and military communities for eight years and has also covered technology, politics, health care and crime. Her work has earned multiple honors from the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the Arkansas Associated Press Managing Editors and others.

11. More Russian warships dock in Havana port

More Russian warships dock in Havana port - UPI.com

JULY 28, 2024 / 4:46 PM

By Mark Moran

upi.com

Cuban solders welcome Russian warships docked in the Havana port. The ships are expected to remain in port until July 30, 2024. Courtesy of Russian Foreign Ministry/Facebook.

July 28 (UPI) -- Three Russian warships are docked in Cuba, showing strengthening ties between the two countries. The ships are expected to remain in port through Tuesday, officials said.

A training ship, patrol frigate and refueling tanker are moored in the Havana port usually occupied by cruise ships, the Russian Embassy in Havana said in a statement on Facebook.

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It's the latest in a series of vessels, including a nuclear-powered submarine, that have visited Havana in recent months, as ties between the two countries have grown increasingly stronger.

The ties are becoming ever more important to Cuba as the country has become increasingly dependent on Russian oil and has welcomed Russian warships into its port.

The island nation near Florida has long been strategically important for Russia. The former Soviet Union created military installations around the country in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis.

Cuba has said none of the ships carry nuclear weapons and their presence does not represent a threat to the region.

"Visits by naval units from other countries are a historical practice of the revolutionary government with nations that maintain relations of friendship and collaboration," a statement from the Cuban government said.

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12. National Defense Commission: Pentagon has 'insufficient', forces 'inadequate' to face China, Russia

"Multiple Theater Force Construct?" 

Excerpts:

Beyond laying out an alarming picture of America’s national security landscape, the 114-page report offers a number of recommendations to policymakers in the White House, strategists in the Pentagon and to lawmakers — largely taking an aggressive, more-of-everything approach. Boldest among the proposals is calling for a “Multiple Theater Force Construct” to fix the current, “out-of-date” version.

“The Commission believes the United States needs a force-planning approach that is both global and prioritized. … An exclusive focus on a single adversary or single region, as some have suggested, is a fundamentally flawed response to the global nature of challenges posed by such adversaries as China and Russia and to the growing cooperation between adversaries across regions,” the report says. “That said, the United States’ force-planning approach must be prioritized to effectively and efficiently allocate finite resources, address threats of varying scope and scale, and ensure a mix of U.S. instruments of national power that are tailored to specific strategic objectives.”

National Defense Commission: Pentagon has 'insufficient', forces 'inadequate' to face China, Russia - Breaking Defense

Boldest among the report's recommendations is a proposal for what it calls a new "Multiple Theater Force Construct" to fix the current, "out-of-date" version.

breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · July 29, 2024

Airmen assigned to the 34th Fighter Squadron and Fighter Generation Squadron perform pre-flight checks on F-35A Lightning IIs at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, March 28, 2024. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman Keagan Lee)

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon’s current National Defense Strategy is out of date, America’s military inappropriately structured and the US industrial base is “grossly inadequate” to confront the dual threats of Russia and China, according to a new, high-powered formal review.

“The U.S. public are largely unaware of the dangers the United States faces or the costs (financial and otherwise) required to adequately prepare” for a global conflict, reads an early page from the final report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, published today. “A bipartisan ‘call to arms’ is urgently needed so that the United States can make the major changes and significant investments now rather than wait for the next Pearl Harbor or 9/11. The support and resolve of the American public are indispensable.”

The Commission was created by the fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act to review that’s years NDS. Chaired by former Rep. Jane Harman, a previous ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, the bipartisan committee’s report will likely be wielded — perhaps literally, as former Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Jim Inhofe regularly held up the 2018 version of the commission’s report at hearings — by supporters on the Hill who seek increased defense spending.

In a factsheet accompanying the report, Harman said, “DoD’s defense strategy was written before the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and doesn’t account for the partnership between China and Russia. It is insufficient to meet the threats. We recommend a new approach, combining the U.S. military with the ingenuity of the tech sector; our influence through diplomacy and investment; and the resilience of the American people.”

Beyond laying out an alarming picture of America’s national security landscape, the 114-page report offers a number of recommendations to policymakers in the White House, strategists in the Pentagon and to lawmakers — largely taking an aggressive, more-of-everything approach. Boldest among the proposals is calling for a “Multiple Theater Force Construct” to fix the current, “out-of-date” version.

“The Commission believes the United States needs a force-planning approach that is both global and prioritized. … An exclusive focus on a single adversary or single region, as some have suggested, is a fundamentally flawed response to the global nature of challenges posed by such adversaries as China and Russia and to the growing cooperation between adversaries across regions,” the report says. “That said, the United States’ force-planning approach must be prioritized to effectively and efficiently allocate finite resources, address threats of varying scope and scale, and ensure a mix of U.S. instruments of national power that are tailored to specific strategic objectives.”

The Commission’s solution is “distinct from the two war construct designed after the Cold War for separate wars against less capable rogue states — essentially, one in northeast Asia and one in the Middle East” and “reflects the partnership of U.S. peer or near-peer adversaries, the U.S. system of alliances, and the need to engage globally.”

From there the report dives into changes it would make to the military services, including more ships and shipbuilding infrastructure for the Navy and more dispersed satellites for the Space Force. It also supports the Air Force’s pursuit of a Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter, a project with a murky future at the moment.

Regarding the Indo-Pacific theater, the Commission calls for more undersea assets — “particularly Virginia-class submarines but also large, uncrewed underwater vessels” — as well as more long-range bombers and long-range fires.

“The Commission is encouraged by recent agreements with regional allies and partners to expand U.S. access,” the report says. “But the Commission remains concerned by continued underinvestment in new and updated facilities in the First and Second Island Chains, as well as the lack of new forces postured west of the International Date Line.”

In Europe, the report says the NDS was wrong to call Russia, like many US officials have since, an “acute threat.” The term, it says, “underestimates the threat from Russia by implying it is intense but limited in duration.” Rather, the threat from Moscow is “chronic,” the report says, “ongoing and persistent.”

To counter the Kremlin in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, the Commission says the “only viable course of action is to increase the scale, capability, and freedom to use material provided to Ukraine so that it can push Russia back.”

It also calls for the US to “boost its forward presence in Eastern Europe — built around an armored corps and complete with headquarters, fires, air defenses and armored, sustainment and aviation units — to deter Russian aggression against NATO’s eastern flank.”

“Ultimately,” it says, “the goal is for Europe to take on a larger role in providing for its defense, with assured and critical support of the United States. In light of the potential for simultaneous conflicts, capability targets apportioned to European allies through the NATO Defense Planning Process should be intentionally selected to reduce overreliance on the United States for key capabilities enablers.”

Industrial Call To Action

When it comes to the US defense industrial base (DIB), the report does not mince words: “[T]oday, the United States has a DIB with too few people, too few companies, declining and unstable financial support, and insufficient production capacity to meet the needs of the joint Force in both peacetime and wartime.”

The report specifically calls out DIB weakness when it comes to shipbuilding for the Navy, saying that service’s ability to “construct, maintain and repair the maritime forces it requires is fundamentally in doubt.”

Here the report criticizes some legal and bureaucratic barriers, including “Buy American” initiatives that “directly reduce opportunities for allies and partners to participate in the defense market,” and International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) obstacles that hamper allied cooperation.

As such, among a laundry list of recommendations, the Commission asks that lawmakers work to lessen those barriers so that allies can more easily contribute to the American defense industrial base, and for the Pentagon to more aggressively reach out to friends abroad.

Also, it advises that “while continuing to expand production of existing munitions, DoD needs to invest in new munitions and weapons to keep pace with warfighter needs and expand the DIB,” the report says. It also “needs to fund the recapitalization of armories and invest in advanced manufacturing and further stockpiling of munitions.”

The report urges the Pentagon to get moving on acquiring new tech, calling out its “byzantine research and development (R&D) and procurement systems, reliance on decades-old military hardware, and culture of risk avoidance,” though it names the Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Office of Strategic Capital and the Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hick’s Replicator initiatives as examples of uncommon nimbleness.

In the factsheet, the Commission summarizes its view of how the Pentagon buys weapons: “The United States must spend more effectively and more efficiently to build the future force, not perpetuate the existing one.”

Overall, Commission Vice Chair Amb. Eric Edelman, former Pentagon undersecretary for defense policy, said the US “can’t confront the biggest threats since the height of the Cold War with the smallest military in a generation, historically low defense spending, and an atrophied industrial base.”

“Deterring our adversaries from launching a disastrous war requires investment and demonstrating the ability to mobilize at wartime speed, not the pace of bureaucracy,” he said.

breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · July 29, 2024

13. SEALs Hunting New Tech for Maritime Missions

SEALs Hunting New Tech for Maritime Missions

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/7/29/seals-hunting-new-tech-for-maritime-missions?mc_cid=d4d27394fe&mc_eid=70bf478f36

7/29/2024

By Josh Luckenbaugh

Navy SEALs conduct training with an underwater propulsion vehicle.

Navy photo

TAMPA, Florida — For years, Navy SEALs were kicking down doors in the Middle East and taking out terrorists like Osama bin Laden, but with conflict in the Indo-Pacific the main threat going forward, their teams need a mix of old tactics and new technologies to support the Joint Force.

The geographic transition from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific means Naval Special Warfare operators are “going back to [their] maritime roots,” moving away from counterterrorism missions and shifting their focus to a potential conflict with a “technically savvy” peer adversary where the battlespace will be much more contested, said Cmdr. Marty Burns, program manager for surface systems in Special Operations Command’s Program Executive Office Maritime.

“We realize we’re … becoming the supporting force” rather than the “supported force,” Burns said during a briefing at the SOF Week conference in May. The emphasis now is on “extending the Joint Force and [identifying] the challenges they have that are [special operations forces] peculiar. That’s where we’re going to make our mark and fill the niche … that they can’t really accomplish.”

In particular, “our ability to process data at the edge and turn it into usable information to the Joint Force, that will be critical,” he added.

SOCOM’s Program Executive Officer Maritime Capt. Jared Wyrick said that in a potential conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, the way SEALs will contribute to the Joint Force is by “enabling joint long-range fires.”

“We provide a unique perspective that’s not often seen with that water column height of eye,” operating between the ocean’s surface and its floor, Wyrick said. “We’ve got a lot of things that see from way up high, but we don’t have a lot from that water column level.”

Burns said the “eyes … for the fleet” is the Combatant Craft Forward Looking Infrared system, or CCFLIR. An electro-optic system, it contains a variety of sensors and allows operators “to detect, recognize, identify, range, track and highlight objects of interest in a maritime environment,” according to slides shown during the briefing.

The system “is what allows Naval Special Warfare to contribute to the fight, because that’s giving the target quality data that we can then get back to the shooters that keeps them outside of that weapons engagement zone and lets them come back home,” Wyrick said.

Fifty-eight of the infrared systems have been delivered so far by manufacturer Teledyne FLIR, and an update to the system’s capability development document increased that quantity to 109 by 2027 to support their integration “across the fleet,” Burns said. The system is currently integrated and deployed on the secretive and stealthy Combatant Craft Heavy and Combatant Craft Medium boats and will also be fielded on the Combatant Craft Assault platform, slides stated.

The system has a 10-year shelf life, and “technology in this type of apparatus is changing dramatically,” Burns said. PEO Maritime will begin to look at what the next generation of the capability might look like in 2027 and 2028, he added.

To complement the sensor and support joint fires, SEALs will also need improved communications capabilities for contested environments, Wyrick said.

“I might have the greatest data in the world, but how do I get that back out of a contested environment where the second I transmit something to a satellite I’m now lit up in a beacon and … basically a call for fire onto myself?” he said.

“There’s a lot of data we’re pulling down through our systems, whether it’s through our sonar systems, whether it’s through our FLIR systems, whether it’s through our navigation or mission planning systems,” he said. “We need help with getting this data back, keeping that data and making it useful for” the whole Joint Force.

Jim Knudson, the office’s program manager for combat diving, said one particular need is a “true” low-probability-of-intercept/low-probability-of-detection underwater communications system that can transmit data diver-to-diver and diver-to-vehicle.

The office is leaning toward a system in the “optical arena with full data download and video” that can “transport data back and forth” between unmanned underwater vehicles, SEAL Delivery Vehicles and the “swimmer in the water column,” Knudson said.

John Bailey, PEO Maritime’s technical director, said being smarter about data storage is another key goal.

“Ideally, any data that we’re capturing is on removable media, and I strongly encourage and challenge industry to look at your processes for allowing us to easily sanitize that data when we get back” from a mission, he said.

Additionally, traveling to the right area to provide critical information to the Joint Force will be much more challenging in the Indo-Pacific. SOCOM Acquisition Executive Melissa Johnson said special operators can no longer depend on helicopters or C-17 transport aircraft to carry them right to the target; they will need capabilities that allow them to infiltrate enemy lines and avoid detection.

To receive the necessary “access in a clandestine manner to the hard-to-reach places,” SEALs have traditionally used dry deck shelters attached to Navy submarines from which they can enter and exit while the boat is submerged, Wyrick said. Dry deck shelters are currently deployed on Ohio-class guided-missile submarines, which are being retired in the next two years, and the Virginia-class attack submarines meant to “pick up the slack” are facing significant delays.

However, advancements in combat diving technology, from improved dry and wetsuits to upgraded individual and collective propulsion systems and investments in surface vessels to make them the “most low observable platform out there” are giving operators “access to areas that 15 years ago would have required” a dry deck shelter and a SEAL Delivery Vehicle, he said.

Now, operators can take a Combatant Craft Medium or Combatant Craft Heavy with a “low observable profile” into the mission area, and then divers can swim underwater to the target and “take care of whatever effect they need to put out there,” he said.

While there are mission sets that “will always require us to have a submarine to support us … we’re finding ways that we can pick up a lot of other mission sets that maybe were tied” to submarines in the past “with the portfolio that we’re providing now,” Wyrick said.

Additionally, gaining the necessary access requires partnerships “both internationally and with the Joint Force, especially when we look at naval systems in the Indo-Pacific,” Johnson said during a keynote address at the conference.

Along with the investments in its surface vessels and diving gear, Naval Special Warfare Command is partnering with allies to execute operations if U.S. Navy submarines aren’t available, Wyrick said.

“We have international partners that we already have agreements with that we can say, ‘Hey, you’re working on something, we’re working on something, I think it’s mutually beneficial for us to partner together,’” he said. This not only reduces “threat in the mission set” but also provides “cost savings to folks on both sides.”

Finding ways to save time, money and — most importantly — the lives of operators is a high priority for PEO Maritime, Wyrick said.

“Everything we do is for an operator to go out on the front lines and take care of something that involves life and death,” he said. “We are now shifting to where we are trying to prevent the loss of life in a strategic manner with these tactical operators.” The question top of mind for PEO Maritime is, “How can we … prevent the loss of life or the loss of capital platforms that we won’t reconstitute in the next engagement through the efforts that we put into place right now?”

One of the challenges driving this new priority is reduced manpower, he said. With the Navy — along with the rest of the military — facing significant recruiting shortfalls, “that drives how we’re starting to shape our acquisition decisions. How do we reduce the number of man-hours to operate?”

The office is also looking to reduce the wear and tear on current platforms by acquiring better training and simulation systems, Wyrick said.

When funding is limited, it can be easy to scrap buying simulators in favor of operational systems, but “there’s a cost to that,” he said. “We’re seeing that in some of our surface combatant craft line. … If we don’t have our strong, robust training platform,” sailors will do their training “on the platforms themselves,” meaning those craft “are taking an extra cycle of beating that they didn’t really plan on taking because we thought we could do a little bit of that training up front on a simulated environment.”

The office needs “help with finding ways to train without putting our platforms through the paces” — and that’s not just for training on “how to drive a boat; that training’s on how to do maintenance, how to do mission planning, those kind of ideas that can help us save life on our platforms so we can extend them out if we need to,” he said. “It’s hard for me to want to get rid of a platform or to let it age out early right now knowing” there could be a major conflict in the near future.

As far as operational systems, “overlay” technologies that don’t replace those platforms but rather make them “more effective” and “more usable for the operator” are particularly attractive, Wyrick said.

“Anytime we bring something new on board, there’s also a cost to the sailors’ time and training,” he said. “Anybody that’s worn the uniform knows it’s hard to go from one platform to the other when you know exactly how to fix this one, operate this one, drive this one, plan on this one, and then you got to go learn the exact same thing again” on an entirely different platform.

“If what you’re bringing to the table actually keeps it in that same family but just makes it easier, that’s a great reduction in man-hours and time and stress on those sailors,” he said. ND

Topics: Navy News, Emerging Technologies

14. Memo on AI's national-security implications heads for Biden's desk

Memo on AI's national-security implications heads for Biden's desk

The classified memo is expected to propose rules against using AI in certain scenarios.

BY ALEXANDRA KELLEY

STAFF CORRESPONDENT, NEXTGOV/FCW

JULY 26, 2024

WHITE HOUSE

defenseone.com · by Alexandra Kelley

President Joe Biden is expected to receive a classified memo outlining AI's threats to national security and suggesting limits to its deployment, several sources with knowledge of the memorandum’s contents told Nextgov/FCW.

Ordered up by Biden’s October executive order on AI, the memo is meant to help "develop a coordinated executive-branch approach to managing AI’s security risks," and it is expected to build on last year's guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget and international commitments discussed in recent meetings at Bletchley Park and Italy.

“This [memorandum] is focused on national security systems which exist in military and intelligence agencies, but also some of FBI’s and DHS’s systems also will qualify,” a person familiar with the expected contents of the memo said.

The memo will not directly change AI procurement , but will likely carry “significant implications” for cloud service providers and frontier model developers and their understanding of how to responsibly deploy these technologies.

Securing U.S. leadership in AI innovation and standardization is also a likely focal point of the memo, which is expected to address domestic workforce challenges.

“In addition to underscoring the strategic focus on talent development as essential for maintaining technological leadership, a heavy focus will be on talent development within the United States and bringing top talent to the United States,” a second person with knowledge of the memorandum’s contents said. “This is seen as critical for enhancing the nation's competitive edge in AI technologies.”

The memo is also expected to deal with the energy demands of AI computing and how best to balance those demands with the policy push for clean energy.

The memo is expected to address how AI should not be used in government operations. The first source said that the memo will likely include a short list of “prohibited uses” of AI systems, such as using it to operate nuclear weapons and tracking constitutionally protected activity, like free speech.

The memo will also discuss “high-impact” uses that are not prohibited, but demand greater oversight—perhaps including real-time biometric tracking of individuals.

“Those high-impact uses will be subject to various governance and risk management practices that will be similar to those in the OMB memo, though depart from them in some ways,” the first source said.

Although the memo will be initially classified, the Biden administration is angling to declassify as much as it can for broader accessibility at a later date, the second source familiar with the memo said.

Experts in the national security field note that this memorandum is important in setting a tone for how the government will respond to both risks and advantages offered by AI technologies.

“What you're looking at here are government capabilities that really affect fundamental freedoms and rights: who they decide to investigate, who they decide to surveil, who they allow to come into the country, who they designated as a national security or public safety threat. So these are things that are really important to individuals and really affect their lives,” Faiza Patel, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program within New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice, told Nextgov/FCW. “So I think it's an incredibly high-stakes document which hasn't gotten as much attention, I think, as some of the other AI work.”

Patel noted that within national security organizations, internal mechanisms are often needed to enforce the implementation of safeguards. She said that bringing in more robust external oversight to ensure the safe deployment of AI technologies stands to be helpful in federal agencies working to preserve civil liberties alongside AI integration.

“I would be pleased to see strong guardrails for high-risk systems. I would be pleased to see a robust list of high-risk systems, but I do question whether there are effective mechanisms inside the government to make sure whether those rules and safeguards are actually being followed,” Patel said.

defenseone.com · by Alexandra Kelley

15.  Japan to create island missile range as next step in standoff defense strategy

Japan to create island missile range as next step in standoff defense strategy

Stars and Stripes · by Keishi Koja and Brian McElhiney · July 26, 2024

The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force plans to use inert training missiles on target vessels in waters 32 to 328 feet west of Minamitorishima, an island about 1,148 miles southeast of Tokyo. (Japan coast guard)

CAMP FOSTER, Okinawa — Japan’s army plans to build a firing range on its easternmost island for surface-to-ship missile drills, part of its military build-up to counter regional rival China.

The Ground Self-Defense Force will use inert, or nonexplosive, training missiles on target vessels in waters 32 to 328 feet west of Minamitorishima, Chief of Staff Gen. Yasunori Morishita said at a news conference Thursday, according to a Ground Staff Office spokesman Friday.

The firing range on the isolated coral atoll, less than a square mile in area and about 1,148 miles southeast of Tokyo, is expected to be available after April 2026 for drills involving Japan’s Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles, a spokesman for Ogasawara Village said by phone Friday.

Ogasawara Village consists of more than 30 islands administered by Tokyo. This includes the inhabited islands of Chichijima and Hahajima, as well as Iwo Jima, also called Iwo To, and Minamitorishima, which houses facilities for the Japan Meteorological Agency and Maritime Self-Defense Force. No civilians live on Minamitorishima.

The high-speed, truck-mounted Type 12 missile has a range of about 62 miles, and a planned upgrade under development would increase that range to about 620 miles.

The Ministry of Defense by 2026 plans to base the missiles at three Self-Defense Force bases in the Ryukyu Island chain, which includes Okinawa, and stretches to within sight of Taiwan.

The Type 12 and Tomahawk missiles Japan agreed to purchase from the United States last year are elements of a counterstrike capability unveiled in 2022 as part of the nation’s national defense strategy.

“We have been conducting the training of surface-to-ship missiles in facilities located in the U.S. and Australia, and because of this the opportunities and troops participating were limited,” Morishita said, according to the Ground Staff Office spokesman. “By having the facility in the country, we will be able to maintain a training base and secure a stable supply of training opportunities and improve proficiency.”

Some government officials in Japan may speak to the media only on condition of anonymity.

That island was chosen because of the sparse maritime and air traffic around it, Morishita said, according to the Ground Staff Office spokesman.

However, Chichijima and Hahajima are west of Minamitorishima. Morishita said missiles will not be fired toward these islands, and the ministry will check radar for civilian ships before conducting training, the spokesman said.

The spokesman for Ogasawara village, while recognizing the necessity of the training range, said he asked the Ministry of Defense to “consider the direction” of the missiles. He also asked that the ministry retrieve the roughly 30-foot-long training missiles after they are fired to preserve the environment.

“We were told that the troops and materials will be transported by ship,” the Ogasawara spokesman said. “We asked the ministry to give notice in advance if these ships are passing through Chichijima and Hahajima. We told them our concerns in August last year, but we haven’t received responses yet.”

Keishi Koja

Keishi Koja

Keishi Koja is an Okinawa-based reporter/translator who joined Stars and Stripes in August 2022. He studied International Communication at the University of Okinawa and previously worked in education.

Brian McElhiney

Brian McElhiney

Brian McElhiney is a reporter for Stars and Stripes based in Okinawa, Japan. He has worked as a music reporter and editor for publications in New Hampshire, Vermont, New York and Oregon. One of his earliest journalistic inspirations came from reading Stars and Stripes as a kid growing up in Okinawa.

Stars and Stripes · by Keishi Koja and Brian McElhiney · July 26, 2024

​16. Send private-security contractors into Gaza? That’s a terrible idea

I think Peter asks some important questions here.

Conclusion:

Post-conflict operations are complex and messy and not the place for repeatedly debunked ideas. If whoever is pushing for deploying armed American contractors to Gaza can’t answer these questions credibly, then they should be taken as seriously as that SNL sketch.

Send private-security contractors into Gaza? That’s a terrible idea

Here are some basic questions to ask before this not-even-half-baked notion becomes a policy failure.

BY PETER W. SINGER

STRATEGIST, NEW AMERICA

JULY 26, 2024

defenseone.com · by Peter W. Singer

In “Bad Ideas Jeans,” a classic Saturday Night Live sketch from the 1980s, a group of oblivious guys sit around and talk about enacting their terrible plans, from doing home renovations on a rental apartment to inviting a crack cocaine addict for a stay-over. Now it seems a new version is being filmed in Abu Dhabi—by Israeli, U.S., and UAE leaders talking up the bad idea of using private military contractors into Gaza, in contradiction of every lesson learned in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.

According to the Washington Post’s uber-connected David Ignatius, these leaders want to hire and deploy U.S.-based armed contractors, after a ceasefire, to help the wartorn enclave find its footing in the post-war future. In his July 23 column, Ignatius generously describes the idea as “potentially controversial.”

This is an understatement, given the decades of scandals that surround the private military industry. You may recall the sex-worker abuse perpetrated by Dyncorp employees in the Balkans, in which the company’s site supervisor videotaped himself raping two young women and the whistleblower was punished. Or the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq by CACI contractors. Or Blackwater’s Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad that left 17 dead. And these are the well-known ones. There are scores of lesser-remembered incidents, like the time Aegis contractors shot at civilians, made a “trophy” video, and put it on the Internet; or the time a Blackwater contractor drunkenly shot and killed a guard of the Iraqi prime minister on Christmas Eve.

If hiring armed contractors for Gaza is actually being planned, then the people behind it should answer some basic questions before it moves from a mere bad idea to a policy failure. These fall into several categories:

Money. The history of private military contractors is rife with mismanaged contracts and corruption—$31 billion to $60 billion of American taxpayer dollars was wasted or stolen in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, according to the U.S. government’s own Commission of Wartime Contracting. Who will hire the Gaza force and how will it be paid? Will U.S. taxpayer funds be used in any direct or indirect way? What will the contracting competition process be? How will contract management and supervision needs be handled? What will be acceptable costs, and, even more, the profit margins allowed? (As example of how problematic this can get, a $20.1 billion logistics contract in Iraq paid the Pakistani subcontractors 50 cents an hour.) Bonus question: Will anyone who proposed this idea or is involved in the negotiations be allowed to profit?

Screening. The long history of contractors who overpromise and underdeliver stretches at least from the age of Machiavelli to Blackwater’s Erik Prince. Indeed, Prince, who has since made a cottage industry of proposing contracting out nearly every international crisis, has at the same time violated arms embargoes, engaged in “shady” arms deals, and accepted a contract to train a security force in China. What will be the background checks for whichever company is hired, its owners, and its employees? What kind of record will disqualify them from receiving contracts, even through subcontractors, cut-outs, and shell companies?

Training and doctrine. The proposed peacekeeping and governing role in Gaza will differ from either a standard military mission or past contractor roles, which have focused on escorting dignitaries and convoys. The contract force will not just be operational virgins, but also geographic ones, with no experience in the location to which they would be deploying (unless the contractor is planning on hiring former IDF or Hamas fighters). How will the individual armed contractors be hired, trained, and equipped? How will they then be organized and prepared into a viable force? What doctrine will guide them and how will they learn it?

Legal accountability. Contractors are not subject to military law, and both international and U.S. public law on the issue remains lacking. Indeed, the questions of criminal and even civil punishment for the contractors involved in Abu Ghraib and the killings at Nisour Square took over a decade to work their way through the courts and are still effectively unresolved. What will be legal accountability mechanisms for the proposed contractor force: U.S. criminal law? U.S. civil law? The Israeli legal system? The Palestinian Authority judicial system (from the West Bank)? The parallel Hamas system legal system? None of the above?

Command and control. Contractors are not bound by military command and control nor even personal or patriotic bonds, but simply an easily breakable contract. There are multiple examples of PMC employees refusing to follow commands, including from U.S. officers. Some even refused simply to give their name to U.S. Army officers arriving at the scene of the massacre in Nisour Square. More recently, the refusal of contractors to stay in Afghanistan after U.S. forces withdrew became “a turning point” in the government’s collapse to the Taliban. Under whose command and control will the contractors operate and how will that entity have any actual authority beyond threatening paychecks?

Misaligned interests. Contractor operations have suffered from what are known as “principal agent dilemmas,” in which their goals and the goals of those who hire them can never be in perfect alignment. In Iraq, for example, contractors’ focus on force protection and their financial bottom line worked in opposition to U.S. strategic goals, such as winning local hearts and minds. What are your plans for managing this unresolvable tension?

Perception. In outsourced operations across Latin America, Iraq, and Afghanistan, neither local citizens nor the international public made much distinction between the U.S. government and its private security contractors. Why do you think that this time will be different? How will using contractors inside Gaza avoid policy complications, especially if one of them engages in violence (as they are being armed to do) or, even worse, harms a local civilian through intent or accident?

Response. After U.S. contractors were killed or captured in Iraq, policymakers felt obliged to respond with military action, due to the political outcry and pressure, perceived harm to the operation, and larger reputational concerns. These reprisals ranged from limited air strikes on Iranian-linked militias to massive operations like the one that culminated in the 2004 Battle of Falluja and left 27 U.S. soldiers dead. If an American contractor inside Gaza is wounded, killed, or even captured, will the U.S. government respond with military force? If yes, how will leaders explain why a policy of outsourcing is now putting U.S. troops in harm’s way? If no, how will leaders explain why they abandoned American citizens in a war zone?

Post-conflict operations are complex and messy and not the place for repeatedly debunked ideas. If whoever is pushing for deploying armed American contractors to Gaza can’t answer these questions credibly, then they should be taken as seriously as that SNL sketch.

P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on national security, including Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, 2003).

defenseone.com · by Peter W. Singer

17. Why the China model is failing

Excerpts:

The IMF’s forecasts suggest that China has fallen into the middle-income trap, a phenomenon in which economies rise to a certain level of development below that of advanced nations and become stuck there. At its heart, it’s failure of governance, an inability to drive institutional transitions needed to adapt to rapidly changing social and economic structures. It is not necessarily inevitable; rather, it comes from a flawed development strategy. Several economies, most notably those of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and the formerly semi-autonomous Chinese city Hong Kong, have reached a developed level.

China’s formerly fast growth and increasing innovation since 1978 was in fact based on limited liberalisation in five areas where the China model will give no more ground: marketisation of resource allocation, social freedom, individualisation of rights, some political liberalisation (at times) and exposure to international trade.

To restore confidence in the future of China, Xi needs to reduce government intervention in the market and create a level playing field in which SOEs and private businesses can compete and foreign capital can flow. The CCP needs to apply the rule of law and relax repression on civil society, thereby freeing the creativity and dynamism of the people. It should abandon ideological antagonism towards Western democracies and re-engage with the outside world. These actions will not undermine the CCP’s legitimacy to govern, which is Xi’s biggest concern. On the contrary, they will strengthen the foundation of its rule, which has been economic success.

Why the China model is failing | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Chris Lee · July 29, 2024

The authoritarian China model under President Xi Jinping’s leadership is facing increasing failure. Its most critical flaw lies in the unconstrained power of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), arbitrarily intervening in market and social activities for the interest of itself or its leaders without robust mechanisms for accountability and self-correction.

The China model is thought to have contributed to the country’s ‘economic miracle’ in more than four decades to the early 2010s. From 1978 to 2012, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9.4 percent, rising from low-income status to become the world’s second largest. For many developing countries, this growth symbolises the success of the CCP’s authoritarianism, which they seek to emulate.

The China model, in effect, is an institutional system that combines extensive state control and ownership of resources with limited free-market activity, all led by the authoritarian CCP. A main characteristic is the CCP’s ability to mobilise organisational resources efficiently and take the actions needed to reach a specific single goal. As Xi said at a 2022 CCP Central Committee meeting, it is about ‘leveraging the notable strength of China’s socialist system in pooling resources and efforts for major undertakings’.

Believing that the China model is superior to what the capitalist West has to offer and that the Chinese path to modernisation is the way to build a stronger nation, the CCP has enhanced its control at home and its influence abroad. Economically, Xi has applied measures to enhance the strength, size and performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while imposing stricter regulation on the once-thriving private sector, especially tech businesses and finance. More than a dozen pieces of national security legislation have been passed or amended by Beijing since 2014, including anti-espionage, counterterrorism and data security laws.

Internationally, the China model is more combative, aggressive and expansionist than before. The CCP aims to reshape the world order. It presses on with the Belt and Road Initiative for involvement in foreign economies, establishes its own multilateral organisations and gets involved in geopolitical issues, including the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza conflict.

And yet, despite the CCP’s belief in the China model, the Chinese market is losing its dynamism. The combined market value of private companies, which peaked at US$4.745 trillion in 2021, had fallen below US$2 trillion by the end of 2023. Foreign direct investment was a mere US$33 billion in 2023, less than 10 percent of the $344 billion reached in 2021 and the lowest level since 1993. Due to the decline in domestic consumption and investment, the youth unemployment rate has exceeded a critical 15 percent since 2022, and the International Monetary Fund forecasts China’s annual GDP growth will be just 4.6 percent in 2024 and fall to around 3.5 percent by 2028. The West’s efforts to de-risk their economies, reducing exposure to China in manufacturing and strategic technologies, are exacerbating China’s prospects. China’s rise is losing momentum.

It is clear that the key to China’s rise was not the China model. In fact, the China model disrupts normal social behaviour, sows uncertainty for investment, consumption and governance and undermines collective confidence in its systems. This affects domestic and international perceptions of the Chinese market and its long-term stability.

The IMF’s forecasts suggest that China has fallen into the middle-income trap, a phenomenon in which economies rise to a certain level of development below that of advanced nations and become stuck there. At its heart, it’s failure of governance, an inability to drive institutional transitions needed to adapt to rapidly changing social and economic structures. It is not necessarily inevitable; rather, it comes from a flawed development strategy. Several economies, most notably those of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and the formerly semi-autonomous Chinese city Hong Kong, have reached a developed level.

China’s formerly fast growth and increasing innovation since 1978 was in fact based on limited liberalisation in five areas where the China model will give no more ground: marketisation of resource allocation, social freedom, individualisation of rights, some political liberalisation (at times) and exposure to international trade.

To restore confidence in the future of China, Xi needs to reduce government intervention in the market and create a level playing field in which SOEs and private businesses can compete and foreign capital can flow. The CCP needs to apply the rule of law and relax repression on civil society, thereby freeing the creativity and dynamism of the people. It should abandon ideological antagonism towards Western democracies and re-engage with the outside world. These actions will not undermine the CCP’s legitimacy to govern, which is Xi’s biggest concern. On the contrary, they will strengthen the foundation of its rule, which has been economic success.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Chris Lee · July 29, 2024

18. A More Normal Iran?

Excerpts:

Changing Iran’s foreign policy will be harder for Pezeshkian given that international relations are largely the domain of the supreme leader and the IRGC. Pezeshkian will certainly not be able to untangle the Gordian knot that is Iran’s nuclear policies, regional activities, and ties to China and Russia. But that does not mean that he cannot have any impact on foreign policy, especially when it comes to nuclear diplomacy. Although Khamenei has greenlit expanding Iran’s nuclear program, he is not averse to negotiations over its scope, provided they reduce sanctions pressure on Iran. A deal that would end Iran’s nuclear program may not be in the cards, but a pragmatic agreement that would trade verifiable restrictions on the program in exchange for meaningful sanctions relief is very much imaginable. Khamenei, after all, supported Raisi’s attempt at diplomacy during the Vienna talks and then forged a secret de-escalation agreement with U.S. officials in 2023. And Iran’s incoming president should have even more room to maneuver. Khamenei allowed him to run knowing what his stance on negotiations is, and his election has shown the country’s higher authorities that a wide spectrum of Iranians, including moderate conservatives, want Tehran to change course. The outcome of Pezeshkian’s possible pivot will also depend, of course, on whether the United States will agree to engage with the incoming president. It should, in part to test how much leeway Pezeshkian has and in part to see how far a nuclear agreement could go.

U.S. officials may find that Pezeshkian has more freedom than they think. By all accounts, Iran’s incoming president has Khamenei’s backing. After the election, the two men met at length and walked together in full view of cameras to a conservative religious gathering—an unusual occurrence. Khamenei has also commanded parliament to quickly approve Pezeshkian’s cabinet and to cooperate with the new government in reducing the pressure of sanctions on Iran.

Khamenei’s support, of course, also serves as a reminder that Pezeshkian is a creature of the Islamic Republic. He will not cross the supreme leader, and his stated goal is to craft a stable political center. It is therefore understandable why a large number of Iranians remain skeptical of Pezeshkian and his agenda. But change, even if not radical, can still be consequential. It could make the country more functional, more prosperous, and more peaceful—a fact that many veteran activists know well. “After the various crackdowns of the past few years in the face of protests and Iran’s growing strength in the region, we do not expect the Islamic Republic to go anywhere,” one longtime civil society organizer told us. “But we want to change the few things we can that will make our lives easier and give us room to breathe.”

A More Normal Iran?

How Masoud Pezeshkian Could Deliver Change

By Vali Nasr and Narges Bajoghli

July 29, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare · July 29, 2024

In 2021, Iran’s hard-line elites were triumphant. Their chosen candidate, Ebrahim Raisi, had won the country’s carefully staged election with more than 70 percent of the vote. Conservatives were in control of the Iranian parliament, and they had the full attention of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Their goal—controlling all of the country’s levers of power in order to make Islamist revolutionary fervor its perpetual mainstay—was within reach.

But by the end of the following year, it was clear their agenda was in trouble. The economy was in free fall, and the hardliners were failing at the basic tasks of governance. The domain in which they appeared most effective—enforcing mandatory veiling for women—was making the state deeply unpopular. When a young woman named Mahsa Amini died at the hands of the morality police in September 2022, after being arrested for not wearing her hijab properly, Iran was racked with protests. Iranian women made it clear they were tired of the state’s dress code and legal control over their bodies. Staggering inflation and shrinking economic opportunities further infuriated Iranians, young and old. The hard-liners seemed to have transformed nagging dissent into open revolt. And so in May, after Raisi was killed in a helicopter crash, Khamenei saw a chance to correct course. Unlike in 2021, Khamenei allowed a reformist, the parliamentarian Masoud Pezeshkian, to run for president. Khamenei knew that if reformists were excluded, voter turnout would be anemic, leading to another spate of unified hard-line control that would erode the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Pezeshkian then managed to secure a comfortable, if not overwhelming, victory.

Despite the failures of the Raisi years, this win came as a surprise. Most analysts expected that the supreme leader and his allies would maneuver to ensure that a conservative won office. Still, to many observers, Pezeshkian’s victory is of little consequence. Pezeshkian, they maintain, will not get far in advancing the cause of reform because he will be too weak and too constrained by the supreme leader. The U.S. State Department, for example, dismissed his victory as inconsequential. Nothing had changed, the department declared, because the elections had not been free and fair and because “a significant number of Iranians chose not to participate at all.”

In a sense, this conclusion rings true. Many candidates were barred from running. Khamenei has the final say in most of Iran’s domestic and international policies, and he appears largely committed to conservative ideals. Furthermore, the hard-liners still retain significant power in parliament, the media, and various state institutions—power they will use to resist fundamental change. Finally, the incoming president appears uninterested in radical transformation. Unlike previous reformist leaders, he has pledged fealty to Khamenei and his agenda. Without the supreme leader, Pezeshkian said, “I do not imagine my name would have easily come out of these [ballot] boxes.”

And yet future historians may still mark the 2024 election as the moment when the Islamic Republic decisively shifted—not because Pezeshkian pursued sweeping reforms but because he managed to forge a more moderate Islamist regime. By moving away from both radical reform and revolutionary idealism, Pezeshkian has shown that there is space in Iran for a governing coalition made up of moderate reformists and moderate conservatives (as opposed to hard-line conservatives), one that is anchored in pragmatic governance. In his campaign, Pezeshkian focused on small social and economic reforms designed to improve the daily lives of people—most of which are achievable. His drive for renewed diplomacy with the United States will be harder to push through, but he can persuade Khamenei to support talks and perhaps even approve a modest nuclear agreement. He could, in other words, move Iran beyond the ideological battles that have defined its post-revolutionary history.

COMPROMISE CANDIDATE

Today, Iran stands at the zenith of its international influence. The country and its network of allied militias are commanding newfound fear and respect in the Middle East. Tehran’s intense opposition to Israel is winning it political support across the region. The government’s nuclear program is at its most expansive point yet, and the state is building alliances with China and Russia to counteract the West.

These successes, however, contrast sharply with the despair felt by many Iranians. The country’s economy is flailing, plagued by U.S. sanctions, gross mismanagement, growing corruption, and inequality. The population is increasingly fed up with conservative, clerical leadership. Such discontent explains why Amini’s death prompted mass protests and why the demonstrations proved hard to subdue. People marched across the country for months on end until finally, through unremitting violence, Tehran put a stop to the uprising. Even so, people continue to rebel in smaller ways. So many women are flaunting the country’s hijab requirement, for example, that the state has found the rule almost impossible to enforce.

For Khamenei—and many in his inner circle—the protests served as a wake-up call. They illustrated that the hard-liners had failed and that their leadership was unpopular and deeply destabilizing. Allowing Pezeshkian to run, Khamenei apparently hoped, might help give the Islamic Republic a new lease on life by demonstrating a degree of openness without posing much of a threat to the ruling order. After all, few expected him to win. At the time, Pezeshkian was a relatively obscure member of parliament, even within the already somewhat marginal reformist constituency. Iran’s moderate bloc featured other, more popular candidates who wanted to run for president. But they were all disqualified by the Guardian Council, the group appointed by the supreme leader that vets candidates.

Pezeshkian proved to be the rare candidate who could unite Iranians.

Yet once the campaign began, Pezeshkian found ways to make his case to the people. He has a compelling life story that became integral to his campaign: he is a heart surgeon who never remarried after his wife died in a car crash and who raised his children alone. Pezeshkian formerly served as a university president and as minister of health before becoming a member of parliament. Yet unlike some other long-standing officials, he has a reputation for being competent, pious, and graft free. Part Kurdish and part Azeri, Pezeshkian was able to help bridge the ethnic fissures that afflict Iranian society, promising to address minority groups’ long-standing grievances. (During the 2022 protests, the Iranian provinces of Baluchistan and Kurdistan were epicenters of dissent and the scenes of some of the bloodiest crackdowns.)

Critically, Pezeshkian proved to be the rare candidate who could unite Iranians with different ideological beliefs. The titular leader of the reformists, Azar Mansoori—a veteran dissident and the first woman to serve as the director of a national political organization—had successfully led campaigns to boycott the 2021 presidential election and the 2023 parliamentary elections and had threatened to boycott this contest, as well. But she encouraged people to vote for Pezeshkian. At the same time, Pezeshkian gained traction among some conservatives by pledging allegiance to Khamenei and promising not to try to change the Islamic Republic’s fundamental identity. Instead, he said, his goal was simply to make the daily lives of Iranians better by reducing inflation, improving governance, easing Internet access, and no longer enforcing rigid strictures on women’s dress. He made a point of casting pragmatism as both a religious virtue and a political necessity.

Pezeshkian, of course, still trailed among conservatives in the contest. But he benefited from a rift between the pragmatic, moderate conservatives and the dogmatic hard-liners who had formed the Raisi government. During the election’s first round, moderate conservatives supported the candidacy of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament and a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander. A small number also backed the cleric Mostafa Pourmohammadi. The hard-liners, meanwhile, rallied to Saeed Jalili, the former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. During the first round, the clashes between the moderate conservatives and Jalili’s hard-liners were often caustic and personal. Jalili dismissed Ghalibaf as an unserious “construction contractor” (a reference to Ghalibaf’s tenure as mayor of Tehran and many involvements in construction schemes). Pourmohammadi launched stinging and damaging attacks on Jalili, arguing that his policies cost Iran billions of dollars in damages and new sanctions.

Khamenei and his IRGC allies likely wanted Ghalibaf to be president. IRGC media outlets were replete with articles playing up Ghalibaf and criticizing Jalili. They circulated photos of Ghalibaf alongside senior IRGC commanders and spoke of his close friendship with IRGC General Qasem Soleimani, who was killed in a U.S. strike in 2020 and remains a hero among conservatives. But in the first round, Ghalibaf was eliminated, as was Pourmohammadi. Instead, Jalili, relying on the hard-liner’s political machine, advanced to a head-to-head matchup with Pezeshkian. In response, many senior conservative stalwarts and former IRGC commanders openly threw their weight behind Pezeshkian’s candidacy. Iranians concluded that this public, conservative defection would not have happened without the supreme leader’s quiet assent. As a result, a sizable chunk of Ghalibaf’s and Pourmohammadi’s voters—among them Ghalibaf’s campaign manager—swung toward Pezeshkian. On July 5, he won the presidency.

REALM OF THE POSSIBLE

Pezeshkian’s victory was no romp. He defeated Jalili by ten percentage points and with record-low turnout. The low turnout was thanks in large part to disaffected Iranian women, many of whom called for election boycotts. During the first round of the election, barely 40 percent of eligible voters cast ballots. In the runoffs, just over 50 percent did.

But a win is a win, and Pezeshkian may not need a large popular mandate to advance his agenda. Since his election, he has made clear that his priorities are good governance and bridge building, neither of which requires transformative political reforms. In an effort to create greater transparency than previous administrations, for example, Pezeshkian’s transition team has established committees charged with selecting ministers based on management expertise and experience rather than loyalty. Pezeshkian's team also appears to have prioritized increasing diversity in government. According to media reports, the incoming president has set selection criteria stipulating that 20 percent of cabinet members should be women, 60 percent should be under the age of 50, and 60 percent should not have previously served as ministers. (Although, in the name of experience, he will appoint former government officials below the rank of ministers.) Finally, Pezeshkian wants his government to feature both reformists and conservatives. Fulfilling this last promise may prove to be difficult. But the fact that he is making the effort to do so is a break from Iran’s fractious politics.

Once his government is in place, Pezeshkian will be under immediate pressure to improve the economy. To do so, he has promised to change practices that have produced budget deficits, financial irregularities, economic scarcities, and aggravated shortages of water and arable land, such as subsidies that flow to certain vested interests. To this end, he has also pledged to tackle powerful networks of institutionalized corruption—which will test his mettle as a leader.

Still, domestic reforms will get Iran’s economy only so far. The country is also in dire need of investment, which is not possible unless the West relaxes its sanctions. To that end, Pezeshkian has strongly advocated for serious diplomatic engagement with the United States, arguing that a rapprochement is necessary to improve Iran’s economy.

Change, even if not radical, can still be consequential.

Changing Iran’s foreign policy will be harder for Pezeshkian given that international relations are largely the domain of the supreme leader and the IRGC. Pezeshkian will certainly not be able to untangle the Gordian knot that is Iran’s nuclear policies, regional activities, and ties to China and Russia. But that does not mean that he cannot have any impact on foreign policy, especially when it comes to nuclear diplomacy. Although Khamenei has greenlit expanding Iran’s nuclear program, he is not averse to negotiations over its scope, provided they reduce sanctions pressure on Iran. A deal that would end Iran’s nuclear program may not be in the cards, but a pragmatic agreement that would trade verifiable restrictions on the program in exchange for meaningful sanctions relief is very much imaginable. Khamenei, after all, supported Raisi’s attempt at diplomacy during the Vienna talks and then forged a secret de-escalation agreement with U.S. officials in 2023. And Iran’s incoming president should have even more room to maneuver. Khamenei allowed him to run knowing what his stance on negotiations is, and his election has shown the country’s higher authorities that a wide spectrum of Iranians, including moderate conservatives, want Tehran to change course. The outcome of Pezeshkian’s possible pivot will also depend, of course, on whether the United States will agree to engage with the incoming president. It should, in part to test how much leeway Pezeshkian has and in part to see how far a nuclear agreement could go.

U.S. officials may find that Pezeshkian has more freedom than they think. By all accounts, Iran’s incoming president has Khamenei’s backing. After the election, the two men met at length and walked together in full view of cameras to a conservative religious gathering—an unusual occurrence. Khamenei has also commanded parliament to quickly approve Pezeshkian’s cabinet and to cooperate with the new government in reducing the pressure of sanctions on Iran.

Khamenei’s support, of course, also serves as a reminder that Pezeshkian is a creature of the Islamic Republic. He will not cross the supreme leader, and his stated goal is to craft a stable political center. It is therefore understandable why a large number of Iranians remain skeptical of Pezeshkian and his agenda. But change, even if not radical, can still be consequential. It could make the country more functional, more prosperous, and more peaceful—a fact that many veteran activists know well. “After the various crackdowns of the past few years in the face of protests and Iran’s growing strength in the region, we do not expect the Islamic Republic to go anywhere,” one longtime civil society organizer told us. “But we want to change the few things we can that will make our lives easier and give us room to breathe.”

• NARGES BAJOGHLI is an anthropologist and Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
• VALI NASR is Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
• They are the co-authors of How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.

Foreign Affairs · by How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare · July 29, 2024

19. Turbulence Ahead: The Maintenance Workforce Dilemma Threatening the Future of Airpower

Excerpts:

Air Power is built on the backs of aircraft mechanics. While the glamour goes to the pilots and operators who parachute out of them, it is the mechanic that ensures every aircraft’s reliability and readiness for the skies. As aviation technology advances, the need for experienced aircraft mechanics remains constant. Though often overlooked, the mechanic should be recognized and supported as a critical piece in military readiness.

Failure to act decisively on this issue could result in a fleet less prepared for the demands of modern warfare, potentially eroding the United States’ long-standing dominance of the skies. Policies addressing the issue must not only enhance one side of the workforce. The approach should not only boost recruitment numbers but also provide modernized support and recognition for the experienced aircraft mechanics who serve as the backbone of military readiness. Their role, often overshadowed, is crucial for maintaining the reliability and lethality of American Airpower.

Turbulence Ahead: The Maintenance Workforce Dilemma Threatening the Future of Airpower - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Joshua Morales · July 29, 2024

Amidst escalating global tensions and growing challenges in the civilian aviation sector, an aircraft maintenance shortage has emerged nationally, posing a significant threat to Air Force operational readiness. Recent incidents in the commercial airline industry, attributed to maintenance deficiencies, warn of the potential risks of not addressing maintenance recruitment and retention efforts. For the Air Force, the implications extend beyond flight delays to the possibility of compromised missions and military defeat—especially in a prolonged conflict where keeping aircraft flying will be a constant challenge. To combat this, the Air Force should implement aggressive recruitment campaigns and innovative retention strategies to ensure a robust pipeline of skilled aircraft maintainers.

To address the maintenance workforce issues, targeted recruitment campaigns in high schools and technical schools should emphasize career opportunities and benefits. Streamlined pathways for obtaining certifications such as an Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) can make the Air Force more appealing in an increasingly competitive hiring field. Tying these certification programs to service commitments can ensure a steady influx of qualified maintainers. Retention incentives similar to those offered to pilots can reflect the value of maintainers. Additionally, implementing programs to enhance cognitive and behavioral health will address stress and burnout from increased work demands. By investing in recruitment, certification, retention, and well-being, the Air Force can strengthen its current workforce while preparing it for future challenges.

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The Challenge

While the Air Force has taken steps to resolve the pilot shortage, the less visible yet equally pressing issue of aircraft maintainer recruitment looms. A 2019 study by the Government Accountability Office shed light on the decline of experienced mechanics. The Air Force took action with a focus on retention efforts and the promotion of younger maintainers to supervisory ranks. Col Hawkins, chief of the Air Force’s Military Policy Division, stated that the service was focused on promotion-focused moves to include the “up or out” rule change, to ensure experienced positions stay filled. This correction, while necessary, had the unintentional consequences of leaving the entry-level pipeline smaller and struggling to keep up as the recruitment of new maintainers has failed to keep pace with the needs of the service. Additionally, last year, the Air Force missed their recruiting goals for the first time in 25 years. These recruitment shortfalls, paired with a shrinking workforce, lead to concerns in aviation maintenance, where experience is just as critical as recruitment numbers.

The current recruitment challenge threatens to nullify corrective efforts by the Air Force to address the experience shortage. Existing personnel face increased workloads, longer hours, and stagnation in career progression as the Air Force aims to increase the number of entry-level maintainers. This may already be happening as promotion rates continue to drop to historically low levels. The increased workload and lack of career progression have forced experienced maintainers to leave the Air Force for civilian aviation careers, where bonuses and a predictable work schedule are more appealing. In 2023, the Air Force was short 1,800 maintainers, and recruiters knew the toll it would take on the workforce. A verified email from the former Air Force recruiting boss, Maj. Gen Ed Thomas, sent to recruiters, stated that “Airmen will almost certainly be asked to work longer hours, cover more shifts and make sacrifices in their personal lives to meet the mission demands…”

Fast forward to today, and the shortage has shrunk to 500 maintainers. However, the newest influx of recruits is still years away from fulfilling the experience void the maintenance field is suffering. Chief of Staff Gen. David Alvin stated, “We’re recruiting ok, but it takes a while to build a 3-level into a 5-and 7-level”. The push and pull of the workforce harms retention and morale as the Air Force’s shortage of maintainers creates an increased workload for the ones that remain. While the Air Force has exceeded its recruiting goals for maintainers for the current fiscal year by 60, the workforce demands will remain as experienced personnel will be required to train them. The recruiting crisis fix might lead to a retention crisis, although the Air Force seems to have planned for it, as 17 career fields eligible for a reenlistment bonus are maintenance-related. This leaves the Air Force in a constant balancing act of optimizing a workforce equipped to service today’s aging fleet while preparing an inexperienced workforce to transition to the more technologically advanced fleet of tomorrow.

The increased demands of the maintenance field might place the Air Force on a bumpy ride as maintenance units continue to deal with manning shortages, inexperience, and career stagnations. And this is all while the Force is still figuring out how to adjust to fulfill deployment requirements for the Force Generation cycle being implemented across the service. The Air Force experienced the highest number of maintenance mishaps in FY2023, with 21 total mishaps, which nearly doubled the previous year’s total. To address this alarming spike, the Air Education Training Command recently implemented a checklist requirement for all of its maintainers to fill out prior to performing a new task to help assess risk by identifying human factors such as inexperience or stress level.

The Civilian Angle

The challenges faced by the Air Force are not isolated to the military sector; they echo troubling issues in the commercial aviation industry. A recent industry report shows that the aircraft maintenance shortfall has reached a critical point and will worsen over the next ten years as the imbalance between supply and demand continues. This will lead to fewer flights, more delays and cancellations, or major aircraft mishaps. In Boeing’s Pilot and Technician Outlook, it said it will need 610,000 new aviation technicians globally through 2034. In the United States, the Aviation Technician Education Council (ATEC) stated that by 2027, the gap will be around 43,000—27% of the total aviation maintenance workforce. To add to these troubling forecasts, a separate report states that 80% of the existing workforce is set to retire in the next five to six years, and 27% of all Federal Aviation Administration-certified Airframe and Propulsion (A&P) mechanics are at least 64 years of age. These forecasts highlight the global challenge and call for industry-wide action to address the shortfall. If left unchecked, the shortage of aircraft mechanics could significantly undermine the integrity of the aviation industry.

The recent reports addressing maintenance experience and retention issues by the civilian industry should come as no surprise, as anyone who has flown recently knows the shortage of aircraft maintainers has led to delays, cancellations, and major mishaps. Imagine being a passenger on a flight and a door panel comes off mid-flight or a nose wheel falls off while taxiing. While the investigation results in both incidents have yet to be released, initial investigations show both incidents occurred due to maintenance issues. The increased number of aircraft maintenance mishaps has caused a spotlight on aviation industry giants such as Boeing. While these incidents may be isolated, the likelihood of them resulting from a systematic shortfall in maintenance proficiency, experience, and recruitment seems more probable. These embarrassing and nearly catastrophic incidents have impacted not only the public faith in civilian aviation but also the projection of soft power from the American industrial industry. Society relies on the trust and safety of commercial air travel, so it should not be surprising that industry leaders and stakeholders are innovating modern solutions to navigate the shortage.

The combination of troubling forecasts and maintenance-related incidents has led to an aggressive civilian industry push to fill its maintenance ranks. This leaves the Air Force competing with industry giants like Boeing and educational institutions for entry-level mechanics. The FAA recently awarded $13.5 million to 32 academic institutions to attract students to aircraft maintenance. Grant recipients can fund educational programs that offer scholarships or apprenticeships that focus on promoting careers in aviation maintenance, especially those in economically disadvantaged areas. For example, one grant recipient received a $500,000 grant to increase apprenticeships at its maintenance facilities to expand opportunities for female technicians, transitioning military personnel, high school students, and underrepresented minority groups. Industry leaders like Constant Aviation specifically target experienced military maintenance workers, offering $15K signing bonuses for mechanics with prior military maintenance experience. These efforts not only make it harder to recruit new entry-level mechanics but also create challenges in retaining the experienced mechanics that the Air Force has already trained. Society needs experienced maintenance workers, and industry leaders have responded by driving innovative initiatives aimed at recruiting, educating, and retaining them.

Next Steps

The consequences for the civil aviation field will be public scrutiny and monetary, but the mirrored shortage of Air Force maintainers risks something more valuable: military effectiveness. Take the hundreds of air refueling and recon jets that were grounded early last year after it was discovered that maintenance installed incorrect pins that could cause an aircraft’s vertical stabilizer to fall off. The downstream effect of grounding an entire air refueling fleet is enormous and one that the nation cannot afford during conflict. Consider the flight-testing phase of the B-29 during WWII when America’s industrial strength was at its peak. In Freedoms Forge, How American Business Produced Victory in World War II, the historian Arthur Herman documents how maintenance experience and issues still contributed to approximately 28 B-29 crashes, cost the lives of dozens of crew members, maintenance workers, and civilians, and delayed the delivery of the most advanced bomber of its time, the one that ended the war, by four years. The industry and military strength during WWII withstood the costly delay of the B-29 Superfortress. Still, modern issues such as the delivery of KC-46A to the DOD are alarming, considering the United States is currently in a competition phase with China. The implications of not addressing the maintenance workforce issues are clear. The Air Force risks operational readiness, accident rates, and catastrophic failures, all while weakening the United States’ strategic posture in the era of Great Power Competition.

The Air Force, while proactive in addressing its pilot shortage and experience gap, should now rally to address similar issues in the maintenance field. The potential fallout may even be coming to the surface as the Air Force struggles to meet its mission-capable rate goals. To address the shortage and experience issues, the Air Force should implement several solutions, the sooner the better.

Service leaders could benefit from examining external efforts by the civil air industry in its recruitment and retention practices and internal efforts, such as the Rated Officer Retention Program, which aims to retain experienced pilots with monetary and non-monetary options, such as an assignment preference option. In a press release, Maj. Gen Adrian Spain, the training and readiness director at Air Force headquarters, said, “the requirement to preserve critical skills in our Air Force has never been more important.” While these words were meant to address pilots, perhaps a similar message could go a long way with the maintenance community.

As a senior maintainer, I have experienced firsthand the challenges we face. Maintainers are needed, so rather than asking them to complete a checklist to perform another checklist, better avenues should be established to communicate the value and needs of the maintainer. Investment in maintenance proficiency should be started as early as possible to show how maintainers are valued and to obtain a higher return on investment when those maintainers reach the Non-Commissioned Officer tier. Certification streamlines should be adopted service-wide so that maintainers can obtain their Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) licenses early in their service commitments. Industry giants are competing to fill their ranks with licensed mechanics by offering higher wages. A competitive trend that is likely to continue, the Air Force could capitalize on a streamlined process while requiring a service commitment once it is obtained. Drawing from my time spent in Special Operations, I can attest to the benefits of initiatives like the Physiological Performance Program implemented by USSOCOM, aimed at improving the cognitive and behavioral performance of their operators. Factors such as managing stress, anxiety, and sleep can all be utilized to benefit the health and safety of one of the Air Force’s most demanding career fields – a field that has been tied to having one of the highest suicide rates in the service.

Conclusion

Air Power is built on the backs of aircraft mechanics. While the glamour goes to the pilots and operators who parachute out of them, it is the mechanic that ensures every aircraft’s reliability and readiness for the skies. As aviation technology advances, the need for experienced aircraft mechanics remains constant. Though often overlooked, the mechanic should be recognized and supported as a critical piece in military readiness.

Failure to act decisively on this issue could result in a fleet less prepared for the demands of modern warfare, potentially eroding the United States’ long-standing dominance of the skies. Policies addressing the issue must not only enhance one side of the workforce. The approach should not only boost recruitment numbers but also provide modernized support and recognition for the experienced aircraft mechanics who serve as the backbone of military readiness. Their role, often overshadowed, is crucial for maintaining the reliability and lethality of American Airpower.

Become a Member

SMSgt Joshua Morales is a Master’s student in the Defense Analysis program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is also a USAF Crew Chief with over 15 years of aircraft maintenance experience across military, civilian, and contractor workforces.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Joshua Morales · July 29, 2024

20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use nuclear saber-rattling to target Western decision-making and promote Western self-deterrence.

• Russia used Navy Day celebrations to showcase Russia's relations with a number of non-Western states as part of efforts to create a supposed Russian-led group of states to rally against the West.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian oil depot in Polevaya, Kursk Oblast on the night of July 27 to 28.

• A rebel coalition in Mali reportedly killed and wounded dozens of Russian servicemen and Wagner Group mercenaries as well as a prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger on the Mali-Algeria border on July 27.

• Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako recently announced the creation of an independent volunteer unit to police migrants as the Russian government continues efforts to expand its control over migrants in Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Siversk direction.

• Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed that the Russian military may need to accumulate up to 320,000 additional personnel in Ukraine in order to achieve its reported plans to deploy 690,000 troops in Ukraine.

21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, July 28, 2024

Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, July 28, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-28-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Rocket Attack in Northern Israel: Hezbollah likely conducted the July 27 rocket attack that killed 12 Israeli children and “youths” in Majdal Shams, northern Israel. This attack is the consequence of a long, Hezbollah-initiated campaign targeting both civilian areas and military sites in northern Israel. Hezbollah began using more advanced systems to attack northern Israel in January, which increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.

• Israeli Response to the Rocket Attack: Israeli political officials are currently weighing their response to this attack amid mounting domestic pressure to address Hezbollah’s attacks on northern Israel. Israeli military and political officials vowed to respond “harshly” to Hezbollah’s attack on Majdal Shams.

• Lebanon: Israeli artillery shelled the alleged launch site for the Majdal Shams attack in Shebaa village on July 27.

• Gaza Strip: The IDF issued evacuation orders for areas of Bureij and Shuhada in the central Gaza Strip on July 28.

• Iraq and Syria: An unspecified senior Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada official claimed on July 28 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee do not know which militia conducted the recent attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria. 

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com