Quotes of the Day:

"Responsible decision makers and researchers cannot afford the luxury of denying the existence of agonizing questions. The public, whose lives and freedom are at stake, expects them to face such questions squarely and, where necessary, the expert should expect little less of the public."

– Herman Kahn

“The thinking man must be against authoritarianism in any form, because it shows its fear of thoughts which do not suit momentary authority.”

– B.H. Liddell Hart, Why Don't We Learn from History?

“Some ideas are so stupid that only intellectuals believe them.” 

– George Orwell

On July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom, ending three years of fighting on the Korean peninsula that killed an estimated 4 million people.

1. Breathing New Life into US Policy on North Korean Human Rights

2. S. Korea introduced as N. Korea during opening ceremony

3. Kamala Harris’s Foreign-Policy Views on China, Israel-Hamas War, Ukraine

4. U.S. ambassador to South Korea says 'all' American assets available to deter North

5. Kim Dae-jung and the Quest for the Nobel: How the President of South Korea Bought the Peace Prize and Financed Kim Jong-il’s Nuclear Program

6. North Korea’s economy grows 3.1% in 2023 ending 3-year contraction BOK report

7. U.S. expert stresses need to target N.K. overseas workers through secondary sanctions

8. Military vetting info leak of agents spying on N. Korea

9.  N.K. leader says 'kindred' ties with China to be 'firmly' carried forward

10.  NIS to replace over 100 managers from next month

11. Letters by Korean independence fighter to go on exhibit

12. North Korea to sell gambling rights at vacant 105-floor Ryugyong Hotel in Pyongyang

13. S. Korea's top diplomat calls for sending 'united message' against N.K. nukes at ASEAN-led gathering

14. US-ROK IAMD Tabletop Academy 2024

15. Japan and South Korea top diplomats pledge even stronger cooperation

16. South Korea's Hanwha shows off prototype aircraft engine, says could enter service in 9 years

17. Moving Past the Kim-Putin Summit: Eyes on the Party Plenary Meeting for Cues

1. Breathing New Life into US Policy on North Korean Human Rights

Gumhyok Kim: "Change is coming."

Members of our North Korean Young Leaders Assembly continue their engagement in Washington this week (meetings with the NSC staff, State Departm (AMb Turner and staff), HRNK, Brookings, Hudson, ROK Ambassador, Korean American community and more. Tomorrow they will present a wreath at the Korean War memorial for the Armistice ("WIth Gratitude for those who gave their lives for Korean Freedom").  Then they are going to Philadelphia to learn about the Great American Experiment and the NY City (and the ROK and US UN delegations) and then West Point.

Please consider taking one hour of your valuable time to watch this video. Olivia Enos from the Hudson Institute hosted 3 escapees from north Korea: Hyunseung Lee, a North Korean escapee and human rights advocate and Fellow, Global Peace Foundation; Seohyun Lee, Consultant & Human Rights Activist; and Gumhyok Kim, Government Advisor & Media Commentator to discuss human rights in north Korea. They provided valuable insights and commentary that should help all of us to understand the situation in north Korea better. More importantly they provided ideas and recommendations for moving forward particularly about information in north Korea.

If you do not have time to watch the entire forum please go to the 57 minute mark. I asked them how we as Americans (and South Koreans and the international community) help them as changemakers for the north. All three provided three different responses that are very much worth listening to. Gumhyok emphasized that change is coming and we should be ready for it.

Breathing New Life into US Policy on North Korean Human Rights

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNbd-CGUkOQ

227 views Streamed live 8 hours ago

The North Korean people continue to endure immense suffering at the hands of the Kim regime. Post-COVID-19 indicators suggest that conditions inside the country are worsening. Heightened state-imposed isolation has cut off the North Korean people from critical lifelines like the use of informal markets for livelihood and sustenance, as well as from outside information. Even fewer North Koreans are making it to freedom beyond the country’s borders than before the pandemic.

But the lucky few who escape are forging new lives for themselves and identifying new lines of effort to bring freedom and human rights to the North Koreans who were left behind. Join Hudson for a conversation with the new generation of North Korean refugees on the future of American and South Korean policy to address the North Korean human rights challenge.

Learn more at: https://www.hudson.org/events/breathi...

2. S. Korea introduced as N. Korea during opening ceremony

Sigh... I am sure someone asked is that the good Korea or the bad Korea?  

The only way to solve these continued gaffes (and they almost always happen at these huge international events) is by establishing a free and unified Korea. It is time for a One Korea Policy (per Grace Kang) that leads to a One Korea reality.

S. Korea introduced as N. Korea during opening ceremony

The Korea Times · by 2024-07-27 03:55 | Sports · July 27, 2024

Korea's delegation sails on a boat in the Seine River during the opening ceremony of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games in Paris, France, July 26. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul

In an embarrassing misstep during the opening ceremony of the Paris Olympics, South Korea was introduced to tens of thousands spectators as North Korea.

In the first Summer Games opening ceremony to take place outside a stadium, athletes floated down the iconic Seine River on boats. South Korea shared its boat with delegations from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Cook Islands, Costa Rica and Ivory Coast.

Based on alphabetical order in French, South Korea, by its official name, "Republique de Coree," was the 48th nation in the parade.

And as the South Korean delegation came into the spotlight, the French-speaking announcer said through the PA system, "Republique populaire democratique de Coree," followed by the English announcement, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," which is the official English designation of North Korea.

'Games wide open': 33rd Summer Olympic Games kick off in Paris

The subtitle on the broadcast feed, shown on giant screens set along the river and on television for international viewers, correctly showed "Republic of Korea" in English.

North Korea was the 153rd nation to join the opening ceremony.

After learning of the gaffe, the Korean Sport & Olympic Committee (KSOC), South Korea's national Olympic body, convened an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss a possible response.

"We found out about the incident during the ceremony and have informed the sports ministry of the situation," a KSOC official said. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · by 2024-07-27 03:55 | Sports · July 27, 2024

3. Kamala Harris’s Foreign-Policy Views on China, Israel-Hamas War, Ukraine

Topics:

China

India, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific

Trade Policy

Russia-Ukraine and NATO

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Africa

Immigration

​Korea (north) is only mentioned in passing in the China context within the trade policy section (and South Korea is not mentioned at all). Korea is not a significant foreign policy issue among the experts at Foreign Policy. 

Kamala Harris’s Foreign-Policy Views on China, Israel-Hamas War, Ukraine

Everything we know about the presumptive Democratic nominee’s foreign-policy views.

JULY 26, 2024, 3:07 PM

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By FP Staff

Foreign Policy · by FP Staff

Now that U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris has seemingly all but locked up the Democratic nomination for the 2024 presidential race, one of the biggest questions swirling around Washington and foreign capitals is what a Harris foreign-policy doctrine would look like if she is elected in November.

Now that U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris has seemingly all but locked up the Democratic nomination for the 2024 presidential race, one of the biggest questions swirling around Washington and foreign capitals is what a Harris foreign-policy doctrine would look like if she is elected in November.

Pinpointing the distinctions between U.S. President Joe Biden’s foreign-policy views and Harris’s is no easy task, given that the two have sought to present themselves as being in total lockstep on foreign-policy and national security issues for nearly four years. But she has run for president once before, albeit briefly, and she served as a U.S. senator from 2017 to 2021, so she’s not a blank slate, either.

In addition to reviewing her record and past statements, Foreign Policy spoke to over a dozen current and former U.S. officials, congressional staffers, experts, and former aides to Harris to learn more ​​about where she stands on the key regions and foreign-policy issues in which the United States is involved—from China to the Russia-Ukraine war to the Middle East and beyond. Here’s what we found out.

China

Kamala Harris puts her hand to her chest as she speaks surrounded my members of the media holding microphones, phones and cameras. They stand on board a ship with the ocean in the background.

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris speaks to members of the media after delivering remarks on a Philippine Coast Guard ship at Puerto Princesa Port on Nov. 22, 2022. Haiyun Jiang/AFP via Getty Images

Harris’s China track record is relatively limited compared to Biden, who even as a candidate in 2020 could boast that he’d spent extensive time with Chinese President Xi Jinping as vice president. Harris has only a brief moment of face time with the Chinese leader on record, when she “greeted President Xi” heading into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok in 2022.

Harris’s strongest China experience may be the time she has spent trying to shore up U.S. alliances in the broader Indo-Pacific region as vice president. She has traveled three times to Southeast Asia as VP, visiting Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Her visit to the Philippines included a stop in Palawan, an archipelago in the South China Sea; during the trip she underscored the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to its ally in a meeting with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. She has often stood in for Biden at meetings in the region as well, including at the U.S.-Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Jakarta last September.

The position she put forward on China as a 2020 presidential candidate aligns closely with White House policy over the past four years—pursuing competition and cooperation simultaneously. In a September 2019 primary debate, she said of China, “They steal our products, including our intellectual property. They dump substandard products into our economy. They need to be held accountable,” while adding that the United States should cooperate with China on key issues like climate change.

However, her vision did differ from current policy in one respect: She criticized then-President Donald Trump’s China tariffs and had previously said she wasn’t a “protectionist Democrat.” However, the Biden administration has largely maintained the Trump tariffs, and many Democrats who were previously anti-tariff, including Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, have supported them in the wake of the pandemic and rising competition with China.

Human rights stand out as an area of focus for Harris both as a senator and a presidential candidate. She and 55 other senators co-sponsored the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which imposed sanctions on officials for violating human rights in Hong Kong during the mass protests against a controversial extradition bill.

The following year she co-sponsored a law applying a similar playbook to China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. She also called for then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to take further action in a subsequent letter after reports came out detailing the Chinese government’s efforts to restrict birth rates in Xinjiang. Her views have been reflected in the Biden administration’s policies, which have been tough on human rights issues in China.

Overall, experts said, her approach to China policy is unlikely to diverge significantly from Biden’s.

“Biden’s China policy in a way is a reflection of Democratic consensus,” said Rick Waters, managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice who formerly served as the first head of the Office of China Coordination at the State Department. “I don’t expect dramatically different China policies out of Kamala Harris. I really do think that the architecture is pretty much set.”

—Lili Pike 

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India, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific

Harris (center) waring a dark suit shakes hands with Modi, wearing glasses and a blue tunic. At right is Biden in a blue suit. Emhoff and Sullivan wear dark suits behind her. All smile in greeting.

Harris shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as he arrives with U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House in Washington, D.C., on June 22, 2023. Behind her are her husband, Doug Emhoff (left), and national security advisor Jake Sullivan.Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

India has been one of the brightest spots in the Biden administration’s bilateral relationships, with Washington increasingly seeing it as a pivotal counterbalance to China and a key partner in the United States’ wider Indo-Pacific strategy. Defense and technology have been particularly strong pillars of the U.S.-India relationship, with several deals and initiatives announced during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington, D.C., last year.

As with other partnerships and regions, experts said Harris’s India policy is unlikely to diverge significantly from Biden’s. The U.S.-India relationship has had reliably bipartisan support for decades, including under Trump, and remains too important on both sides to significantly shake up.

Harris does have a more personal connection to India than any U.S. presidential candidate has ever had—her mother, Shyamala Gopalan, immigrated to the United States from India, and Harris has repeatedly cited her mother’s influence on her life and her views. Politically, however, it’s unlikely to play much of a role. “Certainly, Harris’s ancestral ties to India are something she would likely leverage to convey her own affinities for India,” said Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center and writer of Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. “But in terms of India policy, there really wouldn’t be any daylight between her and Biden.”

Harris has actually been tougher on India than Biden in the past, criticizing the country’s human rights record under Modi—particularly on Kashmir—when she was a senator and also in a more subtle way during multiple engagements with Modi in Washington during her vice presidential tenure. Should she become president, however, that criticism may well be tempered. “I don’t expect her to be tougher than Biden on rights, or at least not tougher than U.S. strategic interests would allow,” Kugelman said.

At the same time, Harris’s age and her younger, chronically online support base could make her more willing to have those uncomfortable conversations. “She’s also from the next generation of Democratic politicians; she’s not from President Biden’s generation,” said Aparna Pande, director of the India Initiative at the Hudson Institute, adding that younger Americans who form a large part of the party’s future base put far more stock in religious freedom and global injustices. There’s also Harris’s own political bent. “She comes from the left side of the Democratic Party to some extent, the progressive side, and so democracy matters, democratic values matter,” Pande added.

When it comes to the broader region, Harris has made multiple trips to Southeast Asia and been one of the prominent faces of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. But it remains to be seen how much she is weighed down during the presidential campaign by one of Biden’s lowest foreign-policy moments as president: the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan that brought the Taliban back to power. Trump repeatedly used that episode as a cudgel against Biden during their first debate, and he may do the same against Harris, though experts say it might not land with the same effect.

“I think it’s going to be difficult for Republicans to tar Kamala Harris with the Afghanistan brush,” said Lisa Curtis, a former White House, CIA, and State Department official who is now director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “It was fairly clear that it was Biden’s personal decision to fully withdraw in the disastrous manner that we did,” she added.

Should Harris become president, however, Afghanistan presents her with an opportunity to really have a strong foreign-policy impact. “As a woman, hopefully we could expect Kamala Harris, if elected, to focus more on supporting Afghan women,” Curtis said. “As somebody who’s fighting for women’s rights in the United States, I think it would be hard for her to ignore what is happening to women in Afghanistan—the fact that that is the only country in the world that denies education to women and girls.”

—Rishi Iyengar

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Trade Policy

Harris, wearing a lavender suit and heels, walks across a factory floor trailed by a man in a blue suit. Wires and equipment are seen behind them.

Harris tours LA Cleantech Incubator with President and CEO Matt Petersen in Los Angeles on March 17, 2023.Robert Gauthier/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

Harris was never a trade wonk, either in the Senate or as vice president. But broadly speaking, from her time in the Senate and her 2020 presidential run, Harris has advocated for a worker-centric, green-friendly, economically literate vision of trade that fits fairly comfortably into today’s Democratic Party and contrasts evidently with the positions of Trump and his running mate, Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance.

Harris consistently criticized Trump’s tariffs during his term in office, correctly identifying them as additional taxes on U.S. businesses and consumers that led to backlash from trading partners and more economic pain at home.

But Biden said much the same at the time—and went on to maintain many of Trump’s original tariffs before adding new ones of his own, even if they were more targeted and strategic duties meant to protect critical sectors. Perhaps the protectionist bug has spread far enough into both parties that even self-defeating ideas like import duties are hard for any candidate to shake off.

When it comes to trade deals, Harris is a little harder to figure out. She says she would have voted against the original North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a Reagan-Bush-era Republican brainchild that has now become a Republican bogeyman, as well as Trump’s NAFTA 2.0. She said she opposed the revised trade deal with Canada and Mexico because it did not go far enough on labor and environmental protections. She had similar objections to former President Barack Obama’s signature Trans-Pacific Partnership, which soon became toxic for both parties and was killed in Trump’s first week in office.

Like almost all U.S. politicians, Harris blasts China for stealing intellectual property and cheating on trade, but like establishment politicians for decades, she has also insisted that regional and global issues including North Korea and climate change require a working relationship with Beijing.

—Keith Johnson

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Russia-Ukraine and NATO

Harris and Zelensky smile as they shake hands in front of flags of their countries on stands behind them.

Harris shakes hands with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the Ukraine peace summit near Lucerne, Switzerland, on June 15. Alessandro Della Valle/AFP via Getty Images

Biden has sent Harris to represent him at many of the biggest international conferences, including the Munich Security Conference and the Ukraine peace summit.

Harris doesn’t have Biden’s trans-Atlantic record, but three years in a row at Munich, one of Europe’s top talking shops and a place where officials go to calm their nerves on U.S. policy, she’s hit all the expected notes as America’s reassurer-in-chief.

America’s commitment to NATO is “unwavering” and “ironclad,” she said in a February 2022 speech in Munich, just five days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. She also said that NATO’s Article 5 self-defense pledge—which Trump has threatened not to honor for allies who aren’t meeting the alliance’s 2 percent of GDP spending mark—is “sacrosanct.”

In 2023, she returned to Munich with similar talking points on NATO but tougher language about Russia’s invasion, then a year old. The Biden administration had concluded that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in the war, she said.

And about two weeks before the debate that would effectively end Biden’s presidential campaign, Harris filled in as Biden’s surrogate at the Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland, where she called for a “just and lasting peace.”

The Kremlin has stayed mostly quiet on Harris’s presidential bid so far, with presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noting the vice president’s “unfriendly rhetoric” but adding that Russia could not yet formally assess her candidacy.

Russian state media, however, immediately began to attack the Democratic Party’s new standard-bearer. “Kamala with the nuclear button is worse than a monkey with a grenade,” said Andrei Sidorov, Moscow State University’s dean of global politics, speaking on Russian state TV’s weekly talk show.

—Jack Detsch

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Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Harris and Emhoff, both wearing dark suits, look forward with serious faces as they sit in front of the flags of the United States and Israel.

Harris and Emhoff attend Israel’s Independence Day Reception to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel at the National Building Museum in Washington, D.C., on June 6, 2023. Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images

Perhaps the highest-profile foreign-policy crisis Harris will inherit if she wins in November is the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, and the vice president’s track record on Israel and the war is being closely scrutinized for signs of continuity or divergence from Biden.

As with foreign-policy issues across the board, Harris’s history with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is thinner than Biden’s, who had an unusual degree of foreign-policy experience by the time he entered the Oval Office. But a close reading of Harris’s voting record and public speeches suggests that she is unlikely to preside over any significant changes in the U.S. approach to the war in Gaza or the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.“Given what she has said, it seems like continuity,” said David Makovsky, a former senior advisor to the U.S. special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

In June 2023, Harris spoke at a reception in Washington to mark Israel’s independence day in which she touted the United States’ “unwavering” commitment to Israel and her Senate track record of voting in support of security assistance for the country as well as warned against the singling out of Israel because of anti-Jewish hatred. Harris’s husband, second gentleman Doug Emhoff, is Jewish and has played a prominent role in the administration’s efforts to address antisemitism. During her speech, Harris spoke of her pride in hosting the first-ever Passover seder at the vice presidential residence.

Since the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, Harris has largely stuck by the Biden administration’s policy, which has affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself while slowly dialing up its criticism of the unsparing nature of Israel’s military campaign and pushing for a cease-fire deal that would also secure the release of hostages. But there have been a few moments of at least rhetorical divergence. “From time to time, she has stepped out and been more critical of the Israelis than the president,” said Steven Cook, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and an FP columnist.

In her public statements, Harris has placed more emphasis on—and shown more empathy toward—Palestinian suffering in Gaza. That is consistent with media reports starting late last year that she has pushed the White House to express more concern about the humanitarian crisis. The Biden administration has disputed those reports.

During a speech in Dubai in December, she revisited the brutal nature of the Hamas attacks that sparked the war, but she also urged Israel to do more to protect civilians in Gaza. In a speech in Selma, Alabama, in March, she called for an immediate cease-fire to allow for the release of hostages and for aid to flow into Gaza. Though her remarks were consistent with the administration’s diplomatic efforts to broker a cease-fire deal, they were met with thunderous applause from the crowd due to her impassioned delivery.

While her policy on the conflict is largely likely to be one of continuity, she may strike a different tone than Biden, said Frank Lowenstein, the former special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at the State Department. This perception has been echoed by those who have spoken to her personally about the war.

During a meeting with Muslim community leaders at the White House on April 2 to discuss the administration’s Gaza policy, Zaher Sahloul, a Syrian American physician who worked in Gaza on a medical mission earlier this year, said that Harris was moved by their presentation about the impact of the war on people in Gaza and approached him after the meeting to ask for more reports from the ground about the humanitarian situation. “I felt that she projected empathy,” Sahloul said. “She clearly cared about the civilian plight in Gaza.” And while she didn’t diverge from Biden on policy, her articulation of the U.S. approach to the conflict was clearer and more detailed, he said.

In public remarks following her meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday, Harris struck a forceful tone. Although she reiterated the Biden administration’s stance that Israel has the right to defend itself, she said that how it does so matters. Speaking about Gaza, she said, “We cannot allow ourselves to become numb to the suffering and I will not be silent.”

Should Harris win the election, she won’t take office until January, and a lot could change in the war between now and then. While the situation in Gaza remains bleak, the nature of the war has already changed from one of large-scale maneuvers to more targeted—though still deadly—operations. “The war is not going to be like it was in the last nine months, so I don’t know if she would face the same kinds of choices that Biden has,” Makovsky said.

—Amy Mackinnon

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Africa

Harris stands in front of a lectern in a high-angle view that shows the grounds of a castle with cannons facing outward. Behind the wall is the rocky shore of Ghana with security officers on the rocks and small boats in the ocan in the distance.

Harris speaks at the Cape Coast Castle in Ghana during a three-nation African tour, as Washington looks to strengthen diplomatic ties on the continent, on March 28, 2023. Nipah Dennis/AFP via Getty Images

In 2022, at a major U.S.-Africa leaders summit in Washington, Biden vowed to visit Africa the following year. He never did. During Kenyan President William Ruto’s state visit to Washington in May, Biden vowed to visit Africa next February if reelected. Now he’s dropped out of the race.

African leaders have long decried how their engagement with Washington has taken a back seat to other geopolitical priorities, and the sting of Biden’s conspicuous no-show followed Trump’s failure to ever set foot in sub-Saharan Africa as president, after infamously referring to some African nations as “shithole countries.”

Team Biden sought to distinguish itself from Trump by organizing the U.S.-Africa leaders summit and dispatching Biden cabinet secretaries to the continent at a regular tempo. Harris was the seniormost administration official to visit the continent, traveling to Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia last year.

A Harris White House would likely take a similar tack to Biden’s approach to Africa, current and former administration officials said: keeping up a steady drumbeat of cabinet-level visits, talking big on boosting democracy and rule of law as the continent faces a dismal downturn in democratic progress, and competing with Russia and China for geopolitical influence.

But a Harris administration would likely face steep uphill battles in convincing African leaders and populations that the United States’ stated commitment to U.S.-Africa cooperation and democracy is more than just rhetoric. Some critics view the Biden administration’s talk of promoting democracy in Africa as hollow, after the administration followed a long and less-than-proud U.S. foreign-policy tradition of prioritizing short-term security partnerships with brittle autocratic regimes over backing real democracy movements. A spate of coups in West Africa and failed U.S. counterterrorism campaigns have left the Sahel region more autocratic, vulnerable to terrorism, and open to partnering with rivals like Russia than ever before.

Despite the baggage, a Harris administration would have some good things going for it on U.S.-Africa engagement. The Biden administration’s emphasis on expanding business and infrastructure ties have led to some $14.2 billion in new two-way trade and investments, and U.S. direct investments in Africa are back on the rise after a sharp downturn during the global coronavirus pandemic.

The Biden team is also throwing a Hail Mary to kick-start peace talks for the war in Sudan in the final stage of the administration—a war that erupted after Washington played a hand in botching Sudan’s transition to democracy—but it’s unclear how those talks will pan out. All the while, a Harris administration would need to balance competing with Russia and China on the continent without treating African governments like pieces on a geopolitical chessboard of great-power competition.

—Robbie Gramer

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Immigration

Harris, wearing a plaid suit, points as she talks with two young people in front of her. Aroound her are other people, some taking photos on their phones.

Harris, then a senator and candidate for president, as she visits the outside of a detention center for migrant children in Homestead, Florida, on June 28, 2019. Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Immigration is one of the foreign-policy issues where it’s perhaps easiest to gauge what a potential Harris strategy would look like, since it has been a key part of her portfolio as vice president.

Republicans have labeled Harris as the Biden administration’s “border czar” and attacked her for her supposed failures in accomplishing one task: to “fix the border,” as former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley put it. But immigration experts stress that her mandate was far more limited in scope—and she was never appointed as the Biden administration’s “border czar.” (Homeland Security chief Alejandro Mayorkas and Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra are responsible for the border.)

In reality, Harris was charged with spearheading the Biden administration’s efforts to engage with three Central American countries—Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador—and help tackle the “root causes” of migration such as economic hardship, violence, and political repression. Harris was given the responsibility “to lead an initiative that had to do with private investment in those countries, in order to try to mitigate root causes,” said Doris Meissner, the former commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service who is now at the Migration Policy Institute.

As part of this effort, Harris announced more than $5.2 billion in private-sector commitments in the three countries. The pledges come from more than 50 companies and organizations, according to the White House, and include Meta; El Salvador’s second-biggest bank, Banco Cuscatlan; and Target.

In 2021, when Harris traveled to Guatemala on the first foreign trip of her vice presidency, she made waves for issuing a sharp warning to potential migrants: “I want to be clear to folks in this region who are thinking about making that dangerous trek to the United States-Mexico border: Do not come, do not come.” The statement was criticized by some progressives and immigrant advocacy groups.

The Biden administration’s broader approach to the southern border offers a window into what a potential Harris strategy would look like. Illegal crossings dropped to a three-year low in June after Biden signed a controversial executive order that blocks migrants from seeking asylum during high levels of crossings. Advocacy groups condemned the executive order, which “is the most restrictive border policy instituted by President Biden and echoes an effort in 2018 by former President Trump to cut off migration,” the ACLU said. Crossings had previously surged to record levels: Last year, the Department of Homeland Security logged the highest monthly number of migrants at the border since 2000.

The Biden administration “has tried very hard to put policies in place that are effective enforcement policies but that at the same time recognize that we are a country of immigration, and that they want to have policies that make it possible for immigration to continue,” Meissner said. “What that balance is, is still unclear.”

As a Californian, a former attorney general, and a child of immigrants, Harris’s own background has shaped her perspective on the issue—and is certain to continue doing so if she is elected president. “California, of course, is completely shaped by migration today and into the future,” Meissner said. “She certainly has a strong grasp of these issues out of her own experience, both personally as well as professionally.”

—Christina Lu 

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Foreign Policy · by FP Staff

4. U.S. ambassador to South Korea says 'all' American assets available to deter North

Security is job one.

Excerpt:

Asked to reflect on his most memorable moment of the past two years, Goldberg cited the Korean president's state visit to the United States in April 2023 that led to the Washington Declaration rather than any event in Seoul. It is very rare for a foreign ambassador to accompany a Korean president on visits for multilateral meetings, but Goldberg also accompanied Yoon to the Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii and the NATO summit earlier this month.

Published: 27 Jul. 2024, 09:00

U.S. ambassador to South Korea says 'all' American assets available to deter North

​'https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-07-27/national/diplomacy/US-ambassador-to-South-Korea-says-all-American-assets-available-to-deter-North/2099367

U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg speaks during an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo, an affiliate of the Korea JoongAng Daily, at his official residence, the Habib House, in central Seoul on Tuesday. [JEON MIN-GYU]

[INTERVIEW] 

U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Philip Goldberg highlighted the readiness of “all” American strategic assets for deployment to the Korean Peninsula, in consultation with South Korea’s president.

“What I think is important is that all of our assets could be called into use by our president in conjunction, and in discussions, with the Korean President [for deterrence reasons or for a crisis],” Goldberg said during an exclusive interview with the JoongAng Ilbo, an affiliate of the Korea JoongAng Daily, at his official residence, the Habib House, in central Seoul on Tuesday.

The assurance follows an agreement between South Korea and the United States on the Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula, signed on July 11, after the two countries established the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) last year. The guidelines were a key task after the NCG, a bilateral consultative body to bolster extended deterrence, was established through the Washington Declaration adopted by the two countries' leaders during their summit in April 2023.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol explained that the agreement involves the special assignment of missions for America's nuclear assets to the Korean Peninsula during both wartime and peacetime. 

Although specific details regarding the Korean Peninsula mission have not been disclosed, this marks the first time that a U.S. senior official has clarified that “all U.S. assets” are available — indicating that all types of American assets, including nuclear submarines, strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, can be deployed to the Korean Peninsula to deter North Korean nuclear threats.

Goldberg, who also served as ambassador to Colombia during the Donald Trump and Joe Biden presidencies, addressed concerns about the continuity of extended deterrence agreements should Trump be reelected, stating that these agreements benefit both countries and will remain intact regardless of the November election's outcome.

When asked about the intent behind North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's severance inter-Korean relations, Goldberg responded, “I don't think that anyone knows except Kim Jong-un,” explaining that “it's a dictatorship where one person decides all these things.” 

Regarding Kim's daughter, Kim Ju-ae, Goldberg noted, “I'm more concerned about what he does when he brings her to a particular event, which is showing off weapons and missiles. I think that is something that we need to be more concerned about than whether she is going to be the future leader.”

Before coming to his current role in 2022, Goldberg served as ambassador to Colombia, acting ambassador to Cuba, ambassador to the Philippines and ambassador to Bolivia.

President Yoon Suk Yeol, center, makes kimchi at a kimjang event calling for national unity through goodwill and sharing at Kintex in Goyang, Gyeonggi, on Monday. Goldberg stands to the left of Yoon. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

Asked to reflect on his most memorable moment of the past two years, Goldberg cited the Korean president's state visit to the United States in April 2023 that led to the Washington Declaration rather than any event in Seoul. It is very rare for a foreign ambassador to accompany a Korean president on visits for multilateral meetings, but Goldberg also accompanied Yoon to the Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii and the NATO summit earlier this month.

Praising Seoul as a city of “real dynamism,” Goldberg also shared his appreciation for Korean cuisine, mentioning sundubu jjigae (soft tofu stew) and bibimbap as his favorites. When asked to name food he wouldn't want to try again, Goldberg mentioned “live small octopus,” or sannakji. 

Below are edited excerpts from the interview. 

질의 :

How does the integrated deterrence mentioned in the NCG guidelines work?

응답 :

What it means is that the Republic of Korea will be definitely involved through our planning, through our sharing of the information on the nuclear forces, our strategic assets. It means that South Korea will be involved in the decision-making process, of course. And the Nuclear Consultative Group [NCG] is a planning exercise and will help share the information on our thinking. South Korea will be involved in the planning and, for deterrence purposes, any possible deployment of nuclear assets.

질의 :

Are specific assets prioritized for the Korean Peninsula mission?

응답 :

We have strategic assets that are here all the time. What I think is important to keep in mind is that all of our assets could be called into use by our president in conjunction, and in discussions with, the Korean President. So I think your question was, are there certain assets? I'm saying all the assets are available.

질의 :

What is your view on South Korea's resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts in response to North Korea's sending of waste balloons?

응답 :

The Republic of Korea and the Yoon government are fully within rights to respond, in some way, to provocative actions that really are quite disturbing, and in some cases quite disgusting, if you hear what they may be putting in those balloons.

질의 :

What is your stance on the increasing public support in South Korea for the country's development of its own nuclear armament in response to North Korean provocations and closer North Korea-Russia ties?

응답 :

“Integrated manner” means that we use all of the resources at our disposal to deal with defense, and that includes the nuclear umbrella. It also involves Korea's and the United States' conventional forces, but also the strategic forces that we have and the nuclear umbrella that we offer as part of the alliance.

질의 :

Some argue that sanctions against North Korea are ineffective.

응답 :

Sanctions are a tool of policy, not a policy in itself. Sanctions are meant to dissuade but also to, in some respects, try to slow down, punish, and do things in response to what an adversary is doing. I think that sanctions have been effective against North Korea. I think the fact that they want them lifted is evidence that they don't like them and want to get out from under them. But is it enough to get him to stop building these weapons of mass destruction? Evidently, he continues to do so.

질의 :

What is being done about the dismantling of the UN Security Council's expert panel on North Korea sanctions monitoring in April?

응답 :

I would hope that there is a way to involve the UN in some way since they are UN sanctions. It may not be possible because of the obstinacy and of Russia and its cynical use of the UN system in that regard. I hope in the next a couple of months. 

질의 :

How do you view the relationship between North Korean leader Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin?

응답 :

I think that it's a relationship between two isolated leaders who find themselves to be rejected by the democratic world. I really find it hypocritical that two countries reached an agreement [on a comprehensive strategic partnership] to prevent future aggression when one is the biggest aggressor of them all, at the moment, against Ukraine, and the other one was an aggressor against South Korea, in 1950, and now just threatens and provokes it.

질의 :

In response to closer North Korea-Russia ties, South Korea is reconsidering lethal aid to Ukraine.

응답 :

We welcome the provision of assistance to Ukraine by all countries. South Korea has been a very good ally in that regard. They have provided humanitarian support, reconstruction assistance in the prospect of it. The Republic of Korea is part of the coalition of countries that oppose Russia's invasion, and we are very grateful for that.

질의 :

There are concerns that the scope of the “yard” in the U.S. “small yard, high fence” strategy toward China is expanding. What is your take?

응답 :

I often ask people and challenge audiences when this question is asked: Would you expect China to sell us their most sophisticated technology that would be used for military applications or for huge leaps in the economic area? Why would you expect the United States and its allies to sell or to trade [things] that would only advance the military capabilities of China? I don't know that the yard is expanding, I hope that the fence is very high and that [China] can't evade these kinds of guardrails and export controls.

질의 :

With U.S. President Joe Biden announcing that he will not run for reelection, there are concerns about a lame duck period. How might this impact the South Korea-U.S. alliance?

응답 :

There will be six months approximately left in [Biden's] administration, and we don't know who will replace him because we will have an election. President Biden has done tremendous things to help underpin the alliance and to make sure that it is stronger than ever, bilaterally. And also, by introducing the trilateral framework with Japan — which was, of course, a great and very brave decision taken by President Yoon to open up, again, the possibility of better relations with Japan. 

질의 :

Some analysts say South Korea is hesitant to engage with Trump's team due to its current relations with the Biden administration.

응답 :

It's very appropriate for governments to engage candidates and their staff from both sides. We did it here in Korea before the election, and Korea will do it in the United States.

BY YOO JI-HYE, PARK HYUN-JU, SEO JI-EUN [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]

5. Kim Dae-jung and the Quest for the Nobel: How the President of South Korea Bought the Peace Prize and Financed Kim Jong-il’s Nuclear Program

This should answer many questions for us (as Donald Kirk's previous book did).

This is why no one will ever win a Nobel for Korea unless perhaps if someone is responsible for peaceful unification - if a free and unified Korea meerges without war.

Kim Dae-jung and the Quest for the Nobel: How the President of South Korea Bought the Peace Prize and Financed Kim Jong-il’s Nuclear Program Kindle Edition

https://www.amazon.com/Kim-Dae-jung-Quest-Nobel-President-ebook/dp/B0D4VTD5YV?ref

by Donald Kirk (Author)  Format: Kindle Edition

5.0 5.0 out of 5 stars

    1 rating

As co-authors of what we believe is an important contribution to modern Korean history as seen

in the life of one of Korea’s best-known leaders, we wish to let readers know the ordeal to which

we were subjected over more than a decade before publication of this book.

We believe, in this centennial anniversary year of Kim Dae Jung’s birth, that this book will serve

as an important record of a pivotal period in the life of the man and the country and provide

insights into how the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded. We are glad finally, at this juncture, to bring

our book to the light of day for the benefit of those who might want to see how Kim manipulated

and maneuvered his way to Nobel glory beyond what Don, with Kisam as prime source, had

already published in “Korea Betrayed.”

Finally, we wish to express our deepest appreciation to the nameless people who made this

publication possible as well as to our patient, long-suffering wives, Sang-mi and Sung-hee, who

have offered consolation and comfort as we wound our way through this difficult process.

Kim Kisam

Donald Kirk

6. North Korea’s economy grows 3.1% in 2023 ending 3-year contraction BOK report

As I recall from Nick Eberstadt's work on the north Korean economy in the 1990's the north Korean economy contracted some 90+% and it has never fully recovered. So a 3% growth after a 90% loss is not really very helpful.

North Korea’s economy grows 3.1% in 2023 ending 3-year contraction BOK report - The Korea Times

koreatimes.co.kr

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, visits munitions factory in North Korea, in this photo released by North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency, July 3. Yonhap

North Korea’s economy grew by more than 3 percent last year, rebounding from a contraction for a third consecutive year on the back of steady improvement of the manufacturing sector and trade with its allies Russia and China, a central bank report showed Friday.

The country’s economy is estimated to have advanced 3.1 percent last year, following a 0.2 percent contraction in 2022, a 0.1 percent dip in 2021 and a 4.5 percent decrease in 2020, according to the report from the Bank of Korea (BOK).

The manufacturing sector gained 5.9 percent last year, accelerating from a 2.5 percent advance the previous year, and the agriculture industry reported a 1.0 percent rise, turning from the previous year’s 2.1 percent dip, according to the BOK.

The service sector also grew 1.7 percent last year, faster than the previous year’s 1.0 percent rise.

North Korea’s foreign trade stood at $2.77 billion last year, rising from $1.59 billion the previous year on the back of eased cross-border curbs.

The North’s exports more than doubled to $330 million in 2023 from $160 million a year ago. Imports stood at $2.44 billion last year, up 71.3 percent over the cited period, the BOK said.

“Despite continued global sanctions, increased trade with China and Russia, along with eased coronavirus restrictions, helped the North’s economy rebound,” the central bank said.

Bilateral ties between North Korea and Russia have been deepening since last year.

After Russia invaded Ukraine, North Korea has been accused of sending a bulk of munitions and missiles to Russia.

In 2020, the North suffered the worst economic contraction since 1997, as Pyongyang closed its borders over the COVID-19 pandemic.

The country also took a hit from tightened U.N. sanctions over its nuclear and missile programs.

The BOK’s annual report is based on data from South Korean institutions specializing in North Korea, which does not publish official economic data. (Yonhap)

koreatimes.co.kr

7. U.S. expert stresses need to target N.K. overseas workers through secondary sanctions

Good points from Bruce Klingner. His article is pasted below this one.

U.S. expert stresses need to target N.K. overseas workers through secondary sanctions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 27, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, July 26 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. expert has called for Washington to request foreign countries drive North Korean workers out to prevent their companies, government agencies and others from facing "secondary sanctions," amid concerns that Pyongyang has used the workers to secure hard currency to fund its weapons programs.

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, made the call in an article posted on The National Interest on Wednesday, noting that Pyongyang has sent its workers abroad in violation of a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution.

Adopted in 2017, UNSC Resolution 2397 calls for all U.N. member states to repatriate any North Koreans earning income in their jurisdiction by the end of 2019.

"The U.S. should target North Korean overseas workers by requesting countries eject North Korean workers lest they face secondary sanctions against their companies, government agencies, or financial institutions," Klingner said in the article.

Secondary sanctions are issued against third parties that are doing business with those subject to primary sanctions. They are meant to strengthen the effect of primary sanctions.

He noted that during their summit last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un agreed to bolster bilateral trade, which he said could lead to an increase in the "already extensive" numbers of North Korean workers in Russia.

"These workers, along with those sent to China and other countries, work in violation of U.N. resolutions," he said. "They allow the Kim regime to evade international sanctions by earning foreign currency for its prohibited nuclear and missile programs."

The expert said that despite the UNSC resolution in point, more than 100,000 North Korean laborers continue to work in 40 countries, though predominantly in China and Russia, and that they generate an estimated annual revenue of US$500 million for Pyongyang.

He also pointed out that the workers work in "highly abusive" conditions and in violation of international labor laws.

"The workers usually receive only 10 percent to 30 percent of their salary, with the rest provided directly to the North Korean government," he said. "Workers have to relinquish their passports and often work between 14 and 16 hours a day, with no holidays, except perhaps for one day a month. They can suffer confinement, beatings, and sexual exploitation."

Klingner called on Washington to "take the lead" in working with foreign governments to curb the North's use of illicit means to "finance its growing military threat to the region and to the American homeland."

This file image, captured from North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Sept. 14, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin holding a summit in Russia's Far East the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 27, 2024

Don't Let North Korea and Russia Successfully Evade Sanctions

The U.S. should target North Korean overseas workers by requesting countries eject North Korean workers lest they face secondary sanctions against their companies, government agencies, or financial institutions.

The National Interest · by Bruce Klingner · July 24, 2024

Last month’s Russia-North Korea summit was a reminder of the dangers of bilateral military cooperation between the two rogue regimes.

Pyongyang has provided millions of artillery rounds and dozens of missiles to prolong Moscow’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. In return, Pyongyang receives economic benefits and potentially high-end military technology.

Less noticed were pledges by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to augment bilateral trade. Resulting measures could increase the already extensive numbers of North Korean workers in Russia. These workers, along with those sent to China and other countries, work in violation of UN resolutions. They allow the Kim regime to evade international sanctions by earning foreign currency for its prohibited nuclear and missile programs.

North Korea, for decades, sent its citizens to work abroad for wages that benefit the regime. However, UN Security Council Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, required UN member-states to repatriate all North Korean workers within their borders by December 2019.

Despite this edict, more than 100,000 North Korean laborers continue to work in 40 countries, though predominantly in China and Russia. They generate an estimated annual revenue of $500 million for Pyongyang. They labor in factories, agriculture, construction, logging camps, and mining operations. North Korea also operates restaurants in at least five countries, generating $700 million in annual revenue for the regime.

In December 2023, a Russian Construction Ministry official announced that Moscow requested 2,000 workers from North Korea in order to address labor shortages in Siberia. In February 2024, hundreds of North Korean workers were seen disembarking from a train near Vladivostok. In April 2024, North Korea sent workers to the Russian-occupied Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine.

In 2022, Chinese officials indicated there were 80,000 North Koreans just in Dandong, a seafood industry hub. Large groups of North Koreans have been sent to work at clothing and electronics parts factories in China’s Jilin Province.

North Korean overseas workers are exploited. They work in highly abusive conditions and in violation of international labor laws. The workers usually receive only 10% to 30% of their salary, with the rest provided directly to the North Korean government. Workers have to relinquish their passports and often work between 14 and 16 hours a day, with no holidays, except perhaps for one day a month. They can suffer confinement, beatings, and sexual exploitation.

Recently, North Korean workers in China engaged in strikes and riots after not receiving wages for several years. In January 2024, some 2,000 North Korean workers occupied a factory in Jilin Province, beating to death a North Korean official in charge of managing them, to protest unpaid wages.

In addition to laborers, North Korea sends IT workers overseas for activities both illicit and legitimate (though still UN-proscribed). The North Koreans use false foreign identities to fraudulently gain employment as freelance computer engineers with technology and virtual currency companies. Thousands of highly skilled North Korean information technology workers currently operate in Belarus, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, and Singapore.

Some North Korean IT workers can earn more than $300,000 per year, with 90% of the wages going to the regime. Most of the North Korean IT workers are engaged in non-hacking computer activity, but they are often involved in virtual currency companies and are able to launder illicitly obtained funds back to North Korea. Some use their access to foreign companies to carry out malicious cyber activities.

In May 2024, the United States announced charges against an Arizona woman, a Ukrainian man, and three foreign nationals on allegations of illegally helping North Korean IT workers pose as U.S. citizens and gain employment with 300 unwitting U.S. companies. The scam provided money and proprietary information to the North Korean regime.

Identifying and exposing North Korean violations will be harder after Russia vetoed the annual reauthorization mandate for the UN Panel of Experts created in 2009 to identify evidence of violations of UN resolutions. The panel also monitored and publicized UN member-states’ compliance with enforcing required sanctions.

Half-hearted enforcement of U.S. laws and UN sanctions by the Biden administration undermines the effectiveness of international efforts to hold North Korea, and other nations, accountable for violating those laws. The U.S. has also long refrained from going after Chinese and Russian banks and businesses assisting North Korea’s illicit nuclear and missile programs.

The U.S. should target North Korean overseas workers by requesting countries eject North Korean workers lest they face secondary sanctions against their companies, government agencies, or financial institutions.

Similarly, Washington should impose sanctions against any entity supporting North Korean cybercrimes and malicious cyber activity, including by providing technology, equipment, training, and safe haven to North Korean hackers.

Washington should take the lead in working with foreign governments to reduce Pyongyang’s use of illicit means to finance its growing military threat to the region and to the American homeland.

About the Author: Bruce Klingner

Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation. He previously served 20 years with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Bruce Klingner · July 24, 2024

8. Military vetting info leak of agents spying on N. Korea

A most important unit. This is very dangerous.

Military vetting info leak of agents spying on N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 27, 2024

SEOUL, July 27 (Yonhap) -- The military is conducting an investigation into a leak of personal information of agents assigned to an intelligence unit tasked with spying on North Korea, sources said Saturday.

The Korea Defense Intelligence Command discovered about a month earlier that classified information, including personal data of its agents stationed overseas, had been leaked, prompting an investigation by the Defense Counterintelligence Command.

The leaked information is said to have included those on official cover agents working as diplomats, as well as undercover agents, with some agents reportedly returning home due to concerns over their identities being exposed.

Military authorities have discovered that many of the agents affected by the leak were tasked with operations related to North Korea, and officials have detected signs the leaked data was directed to the North.

Authorities are investigating a civilian official at the Korea Defense Intelligence Command over the leak after discovering that classified files had entered the official's personal laptop.

Authorities believe the laptop to be the source of the leak, but the official has reportedly claimed that the computer had been hacked.

It is not the first time the Korea Defense Intelligence Command has faced such a major data leak. In 2018, authorities discovered that an official at the command had been selling classified information overseas since 2013.

This undated file photo, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows the defense ministry's emblem. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 27, 2024

9.  N.K. leader says 'kindred' ties with China to be 'firmly' carried forward

For all those who thought the regime was moving away from China and focusing on Russia. We should remember that the regime has traditionally played both sides against each other (actually sides against each other).

And let's not forget the "spirit of the martyrs:

Excerpt:

"He expressed belief that the DPRK-China friendship established as the ties of kindred would be firmly carried forward and developed along with the immortal spirit of the martyrs," the KCNA said in an English-language dispatch.

(LEAD) N.K. leader says 'kindred' ties with China to be 'firmly' carried forward | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 27, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in last 5 paras; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, July 27 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has said "kindred" relations with China will be "firmly" carried forward as he visited a monument symbolizing bilateral ties, state media reported Saturday, amid suspected signs of strain between the traditionally friendly countries.

On Friday, Kim visited the Friendship Tower in Pyongyang, which was erected to commemorate China's participation in the 1950-53 Korean War, and paid tribute to fallen Chinese soldiers during the war, a day ahead of the 71st anniversary of the armistice that ended the conflict, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"He expressed belief that the DPRK-China friendship established as the ties of kindred would be firmly carried forward and developed along with the immortal spirit of the martyrs," the KCNA said in an English-language dispatch.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visits the Friendship Tower in Pyongyang, symbolizing the friendly ties between his country and China, on July 26, 2024, one day ahead of the signing of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The Korean War, which started with an invasion by North Korea, ended in a truce, not a peace treaty, on July 27, 1953. North Korea celebrates the armistice signing date as Victory Day, claiming it won what it calls a liberation war against U.S.-led aggression.

Kim's visit came as the North has appeared to be aligning closer to Russia and away from China, with the North's leader and Russian President Vladimir Putin signing a "comprehensive strategic partnership" agreement during their summit in Pyongyang last month.

Earlier this month, the Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of the North's ruling party, did not carry any articles on the anniversary of the signing of the friendship treaty between North Korea and China as it had done so on the anniversary date in the past.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (3rd from R) visits the Fatherland Liberation War Martyrs Cemetery in Pyongyang on July 26, 2024, one day ahead of the signing of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Separately, Kim also visited a cemetery of North Korean soldiers who died during the Korean War in Pyongyang on Friday, along with elderly war veterans, according to the KCNA.

"It is the sacred mission and duty of our generation to reliably defend our ideology and social system, safeguarded by the victorious wartime generation at the cost of blood, and build a people's paradise," Kim was saying in another English-language KCNA report.

Kim has visited the Fatherland Liberation War Martyrs Cemetery every year around the time of the anniversary of the armistice signing.

The North's leader also visited the Revolutionary Martyrs Cemetery on Mt. Taesong later that day, where forces who fought against Japan's 1910-45 rule of the Korean Peninsula under his late grandfather Kim Il-sung remain buried.

It marked the first time Kim visited the cemetery on the occasion of the armistice signing anniversary, in an apparent effort to emphasize their importance.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 27, 2024

10. NIS to replace over 100 managers from next month

I do not think north Korea could do as much damage to intelligence collection as this.

But I am sure north Korea is happy about this. And we should remember that a key element of the north Korean political warfare strategy is to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. And the north needs all the help it can get. and it must be ahppy to see this kind of help Just saying.

Excerpt:

Personnel appointments at the NIS are typically carried out in June and December. However, they will be carried out in August and September this year since the last decisions were made in March. Some believe that the timing was also decided in consideration of the Sue Mi Terry issue.

NIS to replace over 100 managers from next month

donga.com

Posted July. 27, 2024 07:17,

Updated July. 27, 2024 07:17

NIS to replace over 100 managers from next month. July. 27, 2024 07:17. by Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) of South Korea is reportedly planning to replace over 100 managers above level 3 in August and September. It will be the first personnel decision that will reveal the characteristics of National Intelligence Service Director Cho Tae-yong. He was appointed in December last year after former NIS Director Kim Kyou-hyun, who was the first director of the NIS under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, was replaced due to personnel matter-related issues.

The NIS is considering bringing back dozens of managers who were practically removed from the front lines of work as they were instructed to wait to be assigned when former Director Kim was in office. It was reported that the priority criterion for personnel decisions is the professional capabilities of an agent for intelligence work since insufficient capabilities of ‘amateur’ NIS agents were under criticism as the details were revealed regarding the U.S. federal prosecutor’s prosecution of Sue Mi Terry, a Korean-American expert on issues related to North Korea and a former agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. “The NIS has been under criticism for its personnel decisions based on the political environment every time a new administration was introduced,” said a source. “The practice of prioritizing capabilities, not political orientation, will be established.”

According to multiple sources on Friday, Director Cho made some personnel decisions in March after his appointment. However, it was much smaller in size, where mainly level 1 positions were filled. “As Cho had limited understanding of the internal situation at the NIS and its agents in March, the personnel decisions were limited to urgent positions based on senior members’ advice,” said a source.

Personnel appointments at the NIS are typically carried out in June and December. However, they will be carried out in August and September this year since the last decisions were made in March. Some believe that the timing was also decided in consideration of the Sue Mi Terry issue.

한국어

donga.com

11. Letters by Korean independence fighter to go on exhibit

There is a lot to learn from the Korean Independence movement especially when thinking about developing resistance in north Korea.

Letters by Korean independence fighter to go on exhibit

koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · July 26, 2024

By Choi Si-young

Published : July 26, 2024 - 14:29

Letters written by Korean independence activist Na Seok-ju (National Museum of Korea)

Seven letters written by Korean independence fighter Na Seok-ju that shed light on his plans to destroy Japan-run companies in protest of Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule are on display at the National Museum of Korea, from Friday to Oct. 9.

Shown to the public for the first time, the letters, written to fellow activists in 1925, discussed how Na found it more viable to bomb Joseon Siksan Bank and the Oriental Development Company in central Seoul among other Japanese state-run businesses.

On Dec. 28, 1926, Na attempted to carry out his bombing plan, but the bombs failed. A gun battle with Japanese police officers ensued in which Na shot himself. He was taken to a hospital where he died. He was 34.

The letters reveal Na’s deep commitment to the operation. The letters also implored others to join him in the cause and to keep the bombing plan secret. The letters were addressed to three independence activists, including Kim Gu.

Na was posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Honor in 1962.

“The letters detail the plans Na had in mind and demonstrate his conviction,” said Kim Jae-hong, director of the National Museum of Korea.

“We hope to pay tribute to independence fighters and rediscover what Liberation Day means for us Koreans,” Kim added, referring to the upcoming day of remembrance on Aug. 15.

koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · July 26, 2024

12. North Korea to sell gambling rights at vacant 105-floor Ryugyong Hotel in Pyongyang

You have to complete building the hotel first.

North Korea to sell gambling rights at vacant 105-floor Ryugyong Hotel in Pyongyang

The hotel is still under construction after 37 years, but the company that completes it can run its casino.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/ryugyong-hotel-pyongyang-casino-gambling-north-korea-construction-07262024180700.html

By Son Hye Min for RFA Korean

2024.07.26

The top of the 105-storey Ryugyong Hotel, the highest building under construction in North Korea, is seen in Pyongyang, North Korea, Oct. 9, 2015.

 Damir Sagolj/Reuters

A North Korean hotel which has been under construction for 37 years has plans to sell the rights to operate a casino on the premises if the operator promises to complete construction of the building’s interiors, a resident of the capital Pyongyang told Radio Free Asia.

The 105-floor Ryugyong Hotel began construction in 1987 and at 330 meters (1,080 feet), it is the tallest building in North Korea and the most iconic structure in Pyongyang’s skyline.

Though it was supposed to open in 1992, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the steady stream of aid from Moscow, and the North Korean economy entered a period of crisis that culminated in the 1994-1998 famine, so finishing the hotel became less of a priority.

External construction was completed in 2011 and the Ryugyong was supposed to open partially in 2013, but those plans fell through. Though it remains vacant, LEDs have been installed on one side of the building’s facade, converting it into one of the world’s largest displays.

It’s currently used to show propaganda signage, visible from much of the city at nighttime.

Gamblers play a slot machine in Pyongyang, April 12, 2012. (Pedro Ugarte/AFP)

“A plan to install a casino at the Ryugyong Hotel has been reviewed,” a resident of the capital told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “The plan is to try to attract foreign investment.”

The review happened after the country’s leader Kim Jong Un ordered that the government take practical measures to promote tourism, according to the resident. 

“The authority to determine the location of the casino to be installed at the hotel and the right to operate the casino will be granted to a foreign entrepreneur who invests in the cost of internal construction,” he said. 

 “This project was approved by the Central Committee after reviewing and discussing the profitability of the casino installed at the Yanggakdo Hotel, also in Pyongyang.”

The Yanggakdo is North Korea’s first luxury hotel, opened in 1996. It is perhaps most well known as the site of the 2016 Otto Warmbier banner-stealing incident that led to the U.S. citizen’s detention and eventual conviction and 15-year prison term. Warmbier was repatriated in a vegetative state in June 2017 and died shortly afterward.

Authorities hope to capture the success of the foreigners-only casino at the Yanggakdo in the Ryugyong.

Light designer Kim Yong Il smiles during an interview with the Associated Press as his creation, the light show displaying propaganda messages on the facade of the pyramid-shaped Ryugyong Hotel, is seen in the background in Pyongyang, North Korea, Dec. 20, 2018. (Dita Alangkara/AP)

Casinos in North Korea are very profitable for the government, as they siphon away foreign currency from international tourists, a resident from the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely. 

Currently the country has two such casinos, at the Yanggakdo in Pyongyang and the Bipa Hotel in the Rason Special Economic Zone in the northeast near the border with China and Russia.

The 105-storey Ryugyong Hotel, the highest building under construction in North Korea, is seen lit up ahead of 70th anniversary of country's foundation in Pyongyang, September 6, 2018. (Danish Siddiqui/Reuters)

“When the casino is built at the Ryugyong Hotel in Pyongyang and the hotel’s accommodations, restaurants, swimming pool, and billiards room are finally completed … tourism in Pyongyang is expected to be revitalized,” the North Pyongan resident said. “This is why overseas investment is desperately needed.”.

He said trade representatives would advertise the investment opportunity at a Chinese government-sponsored product exhibition event involving North Korea, China, Russia and Mongolia scheduled to start on Saturday in the Chinese city of Dandong, which lies across the Yalu River from North Korea’s Sinuiju.

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.

13. S. Korea's top diplomat calls for sending 'united message' against N.K. nukes at ASEAN-led gathering

S. Korea's top diplomat calls for sending 'united message' against N.K. nukes at ASEAN-led gathering | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 27, 2024

VIENTIANE/SEOUL, July 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top diplomat on Saturday called for sending a "united message" against North Korea's nuclear development program at a foreign ministerial gathering led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul made the call during the ASEAN Plus Three foreign ministers' meeting in Vientiane, noting that North Korea is causing uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula and the region through its provocations and military cooperation with Russia.

"Member states need to send a stern and united message that North Korea's nuclear development will not be tolerated," Cho said during the ASEAN-led meeting that also involves South Korea, Japan and China.

Cho also said the three-way cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing serves to promote cooperation among ASEAN Plus Three members, hailing the three countries' trilateral summit in Seoul in May, which marked the first such meeting in more than four years.

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described ASEAN Plus Three as a channel to lead cooperation in Northeast Asia, noting opportunities for cooperation despite changes to the international situation and challenges to the future of Northeast Asia.

ASEAN Plus Three, which launched in 1997, consists of the 10 ASEAN members, as well as South Korea, Japan and China, and has served as a framework to promote regional cooperation.

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, Laotian Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (from L to R) hold hands for a photo shoot as they attend a foreign ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Plus Three in Vientiane on July 27, 2024. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 27, 2024

14. US-ROK IAMD Tabletop Academy 2024

US-ROK IAMD Tabletop Academy 2024

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/476867/us-rok-iamd-tabletop-academy-2024

Photo By Sgt. 1st Class Victor Aguirre | JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii – The Pacific Integrated Air and Missile... read more

HONOLULU, HAWAII, UNITED STATES

07.23.2024

Courtesy Story

94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command

JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii – The Pacific Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Center hosted the fifth United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) Tabletop Academy (KTTA), marking a significant step in strengthening ROK-U.S. defense cooperation. The event, held from July 8 to 19, brought together key components of the ROK's defense branches, including the ROK Air Force, Air and Missile Defense Command, and the ROK Navy. Several U.S. entities participated, including the Department of Defense, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), NSA Weapons, Space and Cyber Security, U.S. Space Forces – Indo-Pacific, Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-sUAS) Office, and the Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training & Education Center (JBTEC). The academy focused on enhancing ROK-U.S. IAMD expertise through hands-on defense design planning and modeling using the International Simulations (I-SIM) program.

KTTA 24 was primarily a bilateral hybrid (in-person/virtual) IAMD event. It provided a classified platform for open collaboration, exchange of views, and regional dialogue on IAMD operations between the United States and the ROK. The event aimed to foster theater security cooperation while identifying combined IAMD capabilities and challenges within a multilateral environment, aligned with the U.S. INDOPACOM vision.

A highlight of this year’s KTTA was the integration of trilateral participation from the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. On Aug. 18, 2023, President Biden welcomed ROK President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to a historic trilateral summit at Camp David. During the summit, the three leaders affirmed ongoing progress in regularizing defensive exercises that contribute to strengthening trilateral responses to Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) threats (Fact Sheet: Trilateral Summit, Aug. 18, 2023). In the spirit of this summit, the ROK Air and Missile Defense Command approved the U.S. Planner's invitation for Japan to observe portions of the event and share national IAMD presentations among the ROK, U.S., and Japan. This was the first KTTA enabling the trilateral nations to share their operational IAMD national briefs, strengthening trilateral cooperation in support of a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

"The training was beneficial due to the inclusion of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force," said ROK Air Defense Capt. Choi Jongwon. "It enabled our nations to share ballistic missile knowledge." Additionally, KTTA focused on IAMD observations and lessons learned from theater-wide exercises, making real progress toward ROK joint IAMD academics with both the ROK Navy and Air Force.

This academy reflects the United States' commitment to strengthening the national defenses of the U.S. and its allies while demonstrating the significance of international partnerships in addressing complex security threats. By fostering collaboration and sharing expertise, the U.S. and the ROK work toward enhancing their collective defense capabilities and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

15. Japan and South Korea top diplomats pledge even stronger cooperation

Japan and South Korea top diplomats pledge even stronger cooperation

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/07/27/japan/politics/japan-south-korea-foreign-ministers-asean/?utm

Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and her South Korean counterpart, Cho Tae-yul, shake hands during talks on the sidelines of Association of Southeast Asian Nations meetings in Vientiane, Laos, on Friday. | JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY / VIA JIJI

JIJI

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Jul 27, 2024

VIENTIANE, LAOS – Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and her South Korean counterpart, Cho Tae-yul, have reaffirmed the importance of cooperation in order to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

During their 45-minute talks in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, on Friday, the two agreed to deal with issues related to North Korea through close cooperation between Japan and South Korea, and between the two countries plus the United States.

Kamikawa and Cho also exchanged views on the Japanese government's aim for wartime labor-linked gold mines on Japan's Sado Island to be listed as a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site.

Prior to the meeting, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official suggested that Seoul would accept the UNESCO listing of the gold mines. South Korea has requested that an exhibition and a memorial facility be built to remember that people from the Korean Peninsula were forced to work in the Sado mines during World War II.

With next year to mark the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, Kamikawa and Cho agreed to work together to make bilateral cooperation stronger and broader in a way that benefits the people of both countries.

16. South Korea's Hanwha shows off prototype aircraft engine, says could enter service in 9 years

South Korea's Hanwha shows off prototype aircraft engine, says could enter service in 9 years - Breaking Defense

At the Farnborough Air Show, a company exhibit showed off the proposed engine not just on aerospace systems, but as part of the powerplant for naval vessels.

breakingdefense.com · by Aaron Mehta · July 26, 2024

South Korea’s Hanwha showed off a prototype of a new engine, one it says will eventually power the KF-21 domestic fighter jet. The company says the prototype is a 15,000lb.-thrust-class turbofan engine. (Aaron Mehta/Breaking Defense)

FARNBOROUGH 2024 — South Korean defense firm Hanwha unveiled this week a prototype engine design it says will be ready to power the KF-21 fighter and unmanned systems within the decade.

The engine, a model of which was on display at the Farnborough Airshow, has only recently completed its conceptual design. If the company can get from concept to production, it will have achieved a challenging technical feat: the creation of a dauntingly complex, domestically produced military jet engine.

Hanwha is comparing the engine to the General Electric F414 engine, used on the Boeing-made F/A-18 and the KIA KF-21, Korea’s domestically produced fighter. The goal is for the F414 to be swapped out of the KF-21 and replaced with this domestic engine, which could be ready in nine years, according to company estimates.

An official from Hanwah told Breaking Defense that the engine has a six-stage compressor, one less than the F414, and sits in the range of 24,000 pounds of thrust. The official also said that while there was no 3D printing used for the engine prototype, but that would be something to consider in the future.

Interestingly, a company exhibit showed off the engine not just on aerospace systems, but as part of the powerplant for naval vessels. The core technology of the engine, according to the official, should be portable into ships in the future, should the technology work out.

The official did not discuss the possibility of exporting the engine in the future, but if the company can make the system work, it will likely have interest abroad — and defense exports have become a major boost for Hanwha in recent years.

According to company literature, Hanwha’s major weapon systems have now been purchased by Poland, Norway, Turkey, Finland, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Malaysia, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia, among others. Perhaps the most notable have been the massive sale of weapons — including K9 howitzers, Chunmoo MRLS and parts of the T/FA-50 trainer — to Poland since 2022, and the decision by Australia to purchase the Redback infantry fighting vehicle in 2023.

breakingdefense.com · by Aaron Mehta · July 26, 2024

17. Moving Past the Kim-Putin Summit: Eyes on the Party Plenary Meeting for Cues

Excerpts:

While the extent of military and technical cooperation has been the main focus of much of the summit analysis, the more tangible benefits may be on the economic side, starting with Russia’s gas and oil supplies and, as stipulated in the treaty, trade and investment opportunities. Though not mentioned during the summit or in the treaty, Putin’s article published in the North Korean Party daily on the day of his scheduled arrival said North Korea and Russia would develop a “trade and mutual settlement system that is not controlled by the West.”

Politically, the two countries have emphasized joining hands on regional and global issues. In that vein, it would be worth noting that the North Korean Foreign Ministry in May mentioned building a “new mechanical structure in the region,” which seemed to echo Putin’s reference in his article to building a “security structure in Eurasia” with North Korea.

Moving Past the Kim-Putin Summit: Eyes on the Party Plenary Meeting for Cues

https://www.38north.org/2024/06/moving-past-the-kim-putin-summit-eyes-on-the-party-plenary-meeting-for-cues/

• BY: RACHEL MINYOUNG LEE
• JUNE 27, 2024

Vladimir Putin’s less-than-24-hour visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) last week spawned a whirlwind of pre-summit media speculation about exactly how far and deep their relationship might stretch, particularly in the military realm. One week after the Kim-Putin summit, we are faced with new questions about the 23-article DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the highlight of the recent Kim-Putin talks that formalizes bilateral cooperation across a full spectrum of issues including political, military, economic, social, cultural, and science and technology.

The treaty itself, and even its scope, including military, should have come as no surprise to North Korea watchers: North Korea in January 2024 said its relations with Russia would be placed “on a new legal basis in…an all-round way.” Yet, the details of the treaty, once revealed, have aroused concern about it apparently giving a legal framework for continued violations of sanctions, as well as what it might mean for Russian participation in a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

However, the latest summit and the treaty are not the end state but merely milestones along a continuum of relations between the two neighbors’ long history. There is still so much we do not know, such as what the treaty means in practice or what deals Pyongyang and Moscow may have struck that were not made public. The real test begins now, as the two countries take steps to implement the treaty.

As stated in my earlier piece, the important question is what Pyongyang ultimately seeks from an improved relationship with Russia. If Kim sees Russia as a viable longer-term economic and political partner, it could have major implications for North Korea’s foreign and economic policy. The best we can do for now is to closely monitor the next moves by Pyongyang and Moscow. North Korea seems to have started already by issuing back-to-back high-level official statements and media commentary on Ukraine, including a “press statement” attributed to Pak Jong Chon—notable for using his Central Military Commission vice chairman title in lieu of the party secretary title he typically employs for public statements. The imminent party plenary meeting will likely be the first best indicator of what all this means.

North Korea’s Messaging: Cementing Longer-term Ties

The new treaty reflects the two countries’ increasingly aligning interests in the international arena and their commitment to long-term cooperation, a big political win for Kim Jong Un, as demonstrated by North Korean media’s positive coverage of the Pyongyang summit. Overshadowed by the glitz and pageantry was what looked to be North Korea taking additional steps to ensure longer-term ties with Russia, further reinforcing its policy of alignment with the country.

First, North Korean media cited Kim Jong Un’s interpretation that the treaty put bilateral relations “on a new higher stage called the relations of alliance” and have since described Pyongyang-Moscow relations as a “strategic partnership and alliance relations.” The Kim leader’s utterance of “alliance,” a term North Korea rarely uses even in connection to China, seems to have been meant to underscore the long-term, strategic nature of the relationship that Kim deemed was not sufficiently expressed by “strategic partnership.” By now, the North Korean domestic public should be well versed in Kim’s foreign policy direction. Kim’s remarks denoting major policy shifts with the United States and South Korea, as well as the highly unusual frequency of exchange with Russia since Kim’s last summit with Putin, have all been covered in both North Korea’s internally and externally focused outlets. Yet, state media’s coverage of Kim’s “alliance” reference for both domestic and external audiences still seems like a significant gesture, as a domestic announcement leaves the regime with little policy flexibility.[1]

Second, North Korean media’s readout of the Kim-Putin summit reaffirmed that Pyongyang-Moscow relations had “anti-imperialist independence as their ideological basis.” This appears to be aimed at solidifying the foundation of the relationship by giving it an ideological underpinning, similar to China-DPRK relations, which Pyongyang habitually says are rooted in “anti-imperialist independence” and socialism. North Korea has characterized anti-imperialism as a common cause between itself and Russia since former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang in July 2023. In September of that year, after the Putin-Kim Summit in the Russian Far East, the party used the formulation “independence against imperialism as an ideological basis” for the first time in reference to North Korea-Russia relations. The motto of “anti-imperialist independence” in North Korea-Russia relations seems to have added significance when viewed in the context of Kim Jong Un’s instructions during a parliamentary session earlier this year. He proclaimed that “anti-imperialist independence” was North Korea’s “immutable and consistent first national policy” and called for “launch[ing] a courageous anti-imperialist joint action and joint struggle on an international scale.”

Looking Ahead to the Party Plenary Meeting

We may start to see implications of the Kim-Putin summit as early as this week, when a Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (CC) plenary meeting is set to convene to review the work of each sector in the first half of the year. Party plenary meetings discuss and decide on key domestic and foreign policy issues. North Korea has held a plenary meeting every June since 2021 to review the first half of the year, and the June plenary meetings have always addressed foreign policy and military issues.

In the wake of Kim’s 2023 summit with Putin, the WPK CC Political Bureau (Politburo) held a meeting to receive a summit readout and discuss the next steps. If that precedent is followed, the plenary will likely be used to review the recent Kim-Putin summit and follow-on measures. It is possible that North Korea may reach a significant policy decision as a follow-up to the summit and the treaty, although on what aspect of various lines of effort put forward is hard to say.

As a point of reference, during a late May 2024 Politburo meeting, the party leadership received a Korean People’s Army General Staff briefing on the “recent military situation” and put forward “immediate tasks for military activities.” The Politburo rarely discusses military issues, and when it does, its meetings have resulted in a major action or change in policy. For example, a Politburo meeting in January 2022 signaled that North Korea would be lifting its moratorium on longer-range missile and nuclear testing. Pyongyang resumed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing two months later. It is possible that the “immediate tasks for military activities” led to North Korea’s trash-filled balloon operations from late May to early June and meant nothing more, but even so, it shows a trend. It should be noted that North Korea suspended those operations in the lead-up to and during the summit, and resumed them following Putin’s departure from Pyongyang.

Potential Next Steps for Pyongyang

While the extent of military and technical cooperation has been the main focus of much of the summit analysis, the more tangible benefits may be on the economic side, starting with Russia’s gas and oil supplies and, as stipulated in the treaty, trade and investment opportunities. Though not mentioned during the summit or in the treaty, Putin’s article published in the North Korean Party daily on the day of his scheduled arrival said North Korea and Russia would develop a “trade and mutual settlement system that is not controlled by the West.”

Politically, the two countries have emphasized joining hands on regional and global issues. In that vein, it would be worth noting that the North Korean Foreign Ministry in May mentioned building a “new mechanical structure in the region,” which seemed to echo Putin’s reference in his article to building a “security structure in Eurasia” with North Korea.

1. [1]
2. For more information on the distinction between North Korea’s domestic and external audiences, see Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Understanding North Korea’s Public Messaging: An Introduction,” National Committee on North Korea, May 6, 2022, https://www.ncnk.org/news/rachel-minyoung-lee-understanding-north-koreas-public-messaging-understanding-north-korea-paper.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com