Quotes of the Day:

"Our nation is founded on the ideal of independence, and the quest for freedom and democracy is our eternal endeavor."

– Syngman Rhee

“The difference between force and persuasion is a subtle one not to be drawn by formulas, by force, by science, or textbooks but by men skilled in the art of ruling”

– Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution

"Of our political revolution of '76, we all are justly proud. It has given us a degree of political freedom, far exceeding that of any other nation of the earth. In it the world has found a solution of the long mooted problem, as to the capability of man to govern himself. In it was the germ which has vegetated, and still is to grow and expand into the universal liberty of mankind."

– Abraham Lincoln

1. NORAD intercepts Russian and Chinese bombers operating together near Alaska in first such flight

2. NATO’s Future in Asia

3. Ukraine tells China that Russia not ready for 'good faith' talks

4. Hong Kong a Major Hub for Illicit Transfer to Rogue Nations, Report Finds

5. Swarm Wars: Pentagon holds toughest drone-defense demo to date

6. What did the US military’s Gaza aid pier actually accomplish?

7. Unpacking Harris' record on defense civilians and workforce

8. The Army Is Reducing Job Choice for New Recruits in 2 Critical Fields

9. 3 Army brigades tapped for fall rotations in Europe, South Korea and CENTCOM

10. Anti-base groups plan to protest Osprey flights, alleged sexual assaults on Okinawa

11. Myanmar regional military HQ captured, rebels say, in blow to junta

12. China Casts Itself as Peacemaker in First High-Level Talks With Ukraine Since Russia’s Invasion

13. Reports: Russia Hits NATO Member Romania With Kamikaze Drone​

14. Once Hamas’s Sworn Enemy, a Palestinian Exile Rises as a Potential Postwar Strongman

15. Trump Gunman Researched JFK Assassination Week Before Shooting

16. Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific

17. A Cyber Force Is Not the Only Solution

18. When Nothing Seems to Work: Houthi Edition

19. The Experimentation Experiment: How Small Units Will Drive the Army’s Transformation in Contact

20. The Populist Revolt Against Climate Policy

21. Cambridge 'Psychological Inoculation' Lab Claims Conservatives, Millennials, Gen Z More Susceptible to 'Misinformation'

1. NORAD intercepts Russian and Chinese bombers operating together near Alaska in first such flight

NORAD intercepts Russian and Chinese bombers operating together near Alaska in first such flight | CNN Politics

CNN · by Oren Liebermann, Natasha Bertrand · July 25, 2024

Day breaks at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Point Barrow Long Range Radar Site, north of the northernmost town in the United States in Utqiagvik, Alaska, on February 4, 2023.

US Air Force Tech. Sgt. Curt Beach/Reuters/File

CNN —

The North American Aerospace Defense Command intercepted two Russian and two Chinese bombers flying near Alaska Wednesday in what a US defense official said was the first time the two countries have been intercepted while operating together.

The bombers remained in international airspace in Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and were “not seen as a threat,” according to a statement from NORAD.

The US and Canada, which together comprise NORAD, intercepted the Russian TU-95 Bear and Chinese H-6 bombers. The aircraft did not enter US or Canadian sovereign airspace, NORAD said.

It also marks the first time H-6 bombers, which are a derivative of older Soviet bombers, have entered the Alaska ADIZ, the defense official said.

The intercept was carried out by US F-16 and F-35 fighter jets, as well as Canadian CF-18 fighter jets, according to the defense official. Support aircraft were also part of the intercept, the official said.

On Thursday, China’s Defense Ministry said the Chinese and Russian air forces had organized a “joint strategic aerial patrol in the relevant airspace of the Bering Sea” as part of an existing annual cooperation plan between the two militaries.

Zhang Xiaogang, a spokesperson for the ministry, told a news conference it was the eighth such patrol organized by the two militaries since 2019, which were aimed at “further testing and enhancing the level of cooperation between the two air forces, as well as deepening strategic mutual trust and practical cooperation between the two countries.”

“This action is not aimed at third parties, it is in line with relevant international laws and international practices and has nothing to do with the current international and regional situation,” Zhang said.

Russian flights into Alaska’s ADIZ are not uncommon. In May, Russia flew four aircraft into Alaska’s ADIZ, which NORAD said at the time “occurs regularly.”

Canadian defense minister describes object that was shot down by NORAD

01:40 - Source: CNN

But the presence of Chinese aircraft appears to be a new development. In March, the head of US Northern Command, Gen. Gregory Guillot, said China was pushing farther north into the Arctic and he expected to see aircraft there “as soon as this year potentially.”

“What I have seen is a willingness and a desire by the Chinese to act up there,” Guillot told a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“We have seen them in the maritime. We have seen them under the cloud of a technical or scientific research, but we think it is certainly multi-mission, to include military. And then I expect to see air activity in the Alaska part of the Arctic as soon as this year, potentially.

“It is a very big concern of mine.”

China considers itself a “near-Arctic” state and has worked to expand its presence in the far north, including through its cooperation with Russia.

This story and headline has been updated with additional developments.

CNN · by Oren Liebermann, Natasha Bertrand · July 25, 2024

2. NATO’s Future in Asia

A view from Pakistan.

POLITICS

NATO’s Future in Asia

At least part of it stems from ‘Trump-proofing’ the alliance

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/nato-future-asia?utm

JUL 25, 2024

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

NATO’s 75th-anniversary summit in Washington, celebrated in early July, was unusual not only because of the extraordinary longevity of the alliance but also because of the attention paid to ‘threats’ posed by powers i.e., China, from far outside of its geographical focus in Europe. NATO chiefs indicted China for supporting Russia in Ukraine. But the Ukraine conflict is expected to be only a prelude to the alliance’s adventures outside of Europe. The summit confirmed a deliberate expansion of the alliance into Asia. A quote from the Washington-summit joint declaration says it all:

“The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the continued contributions of our Asia-Pacific partners to Euro-Atlantic security. We are strengthening dialogue to tackle cross-regional challenges … These projects will enhance our ability to work together on shared security interests.”

This is a major upgrade from NATO’s 2019 summit in London, in which the alliance’s officials described China, for the first time, as a “challenge.” In 2021, NATO once again called China a “systematic challenge” that needed to be tackled collectively. In 2024, this ‘collectivity’ has been defined in terms of its growing ties with Asian countries to counter the emerging Russia-China-North Korea nexus, generating concern that this alliance will come to dominate the Asia-Pacific region. Although NATO is not actually looking for members from Asia, it has expressed its willingness to expand military-to-military cooperation with countries such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

China’s view

This expansionist policy comes at a time when NATO is also facing trouble at home. Since February 2022, it has been (indirectly) fighting Russia in Ukraine. Just before the Russia-Ukraine military conflict began, there existed serious doubts about NATO’s viability in Europe. France’s Macron called it “brain dead,” with the then-Trump administration in the US also pushing itself away over the fact that the US contributed more than 60 percent of the alliance’s budget. While the Biden administration was able to underplay the significance of the US’s asymmetrical relationship, this issue is all set to become central should Donald Trump return to the US presidency. Can NATO survive a second Trump presidency, especially with JD Vance, a strong critic of US support for Ukraine and NATO, as his running mate?

There are no easy answers yet, but NATO is already trying to ‘Trump-proof’ itself, including by meeting with officials of the Trump campaign to get a sense of Trump’s foreign policy priorities.

It is my understanding that NATO’s ‘China indictment’ is probably also part of NATO’s unwritten and undeclared ‘Trump-proofing’ efforts. With Trump being a strong critic and opponent of China and as the initiator of the ‘trade war’ on China as well, NATO’s growing focus on China might help, from the alliance’s perspective, to retain (President) Trump’s interest in the alliance. In other words, the Trump administration might be willing to keep the US-NATO ties fully functional i.e., as they are today, if he can be convinced that NATO has a future in the Asia-Pacific region against China.

In fact, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s recent article in Foreign Affairs can be read as an effort to keep NATO strong to face what he described as an “increasingly dangerous world” being fashioned by the Russia-China alliance. Will Trump and Vance listen to him? There are only uncertain answers.

But this is not the only issue worrying NATO. More importantly, will countries in the Asia-Pacific region also endorse its new mission against Russia and China, and jump on the bandwagon of transatlantic security that, instead of finding new members, will make its presence visible and potent through increasing coordination along defense lines? In short, will countries in the Asia-Pacific region be willing to ‘NATOize’ their defense and foreign policies?

For one thing, NATO’s prospects in Asia are seriously undermined by the more than strong possibility of Trump’s victory in November. Will we see the same enthusiasm in the pro-US Asia-Pacific capitals Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra, that we see today if and when NATO skeptics and critics assume power? Before the Washington summit, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s principal deputy national security adviser, Kim Tae-hyo, told reporters that the president will bring to Washington “a strong message regarding the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea and discuss ways to enhance cooperation among NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners”.

Still, there are many states in the region that are far from enthusiastic. The region also includes states like India and Indonesia that still take pride in the Cold War era ‘Non-Alignment Movement’ (NAM). When India’s Modi recently visited Russia, he took all possible steps that could be expected at this stage to further Russia’s agenda of a multipolar world order. Apart from reinforcing the settlement of bilateral trade payments in national currencies, Modi also confirmed his participation in the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia in October.

Indonesia’s Prabowo is also reported to have rejected the “Cold War mentality,” and the Philippines’ Marcos, despite his country’s well-known military ties with the US, thinks that "we are determined as a group in ASEAN and in the Indo-Pacific, those around the Indo-Pacific, despite all of this conflict we are determined to stay away from” the “Cold War type of scenario where you have to choose one side or the other.”

A more accurate description of these countries’ policy seems to be limited to using their defense with the US, rather than NATO, to counterbalance China. There is no desire to de-couple from China given significant and growing trade ties. Yet, because Washington repeatedly frames its policies towards Beijing in terms of permanent de-coupling, it enables China to actually frame the US and the West as the aggressor. Right after the Washington summit, a spokesperson for Beijing’s mission to the European Union said NATO should “stop hyping up the so-called China threat and provoking confrontation and rivalry, and do more to contribute to world peace and stability.”

This counter-narrative seems to have found a significant place in the region. A 2024 Pew survey found that a median of 61 percent across 10 Asia-Pacific countries say China contributes to global peace and stability a great deal or a fair amount. This positive view is also tied to China’s deep economic ties with countries in this part of the world.

Therefore, even if NATO can somehow survive the Trump-Vance duo, it doesn’t have a bright future. Given the depth of China’s economic presence, NATO is handicapped by the conspicuous absence of any comparable Western program of economic connectivity and trade. Still, a Trump presidency would favor ‘economic nationalism’ and protection over multilateralism and open markets with little to no tariffs. China, therefore, is unworried at the moment.

Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor to Asia Sentinel

3. Ukraine tells China that Russia not ready for 'good faith' talks

Ukraine tells China that Russia not ready for 'good faith' talks

24 Jul 2024 04:23PM

(Updated: 24 Jul 2024 08:26PM)

channelnewsasia.com

BEIJING: Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told his Chinese counterpart that his government did not believe Russia was ready for "good faith" negotiations to end the war, his ministry said on Wednesday (Jul 24).

Kuleba's statement to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi came as he visited China for talks starting on Tuesday with Russia's most important ally.

China presents itself as a neutral party in the war, insisting that the only way to end it is by bringing both Ukraine and Russia to the negotiating table.

It says it is not sending lethal assistance to either side, unlike the United States and other Western nations, though it is a key political and economic partner of Russia, with NATO members branding Beijing a "decisive enabler" of the war.

The Ukrainian foreign ministry said Kuleba told Wang that Kyiv was prepared to negotiate with Russian representatives when Moscow is willing to hold talks "in good faith".

"Dmytro Kuleba reiterated Ukraine's consistent position that it is ready to negotiate with the Russian side at a certain stage, when Russia is ready to negotiate in good faith, but stressed that currently there is no such readiness on the Russian side," the ministry said Wednesday.

It cited Kuleba as saying: "I am convinced that a just peace in Ukraine is in China's strategic interests, and China's role as a global force for peace is important".

Kuleba is the first senior Ukrainian official to visit China since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

His trip is scheduled to last until Friday.

China's foreign ministry had said Kuleba and Wang held talks in the city of Guangzhou, with spokeswoman Mao Ning telling journalists they "exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis".

"Although the conditions and timing are not yet mature, we support all efforts that contribute to peace and are willing to continue to play a constructive role for a ceasefire and the resumption of peace talks," she said.

"China has always been firmly committed to promoting a political solution to the crisis," she added.

"POLITICAL SETTLEMENT"

China has sought to paint itself as a mediator in the war, sending envoy Li Hui to Europe on multiple visits, and releasing a paper calling for a "political settlement" to the conflict.

However, Western countries said the plan, if applied, would allow Russia to retain much of the territory it has seized in Ukraine.

Beijing has rebuffed claims it is supporting Russia's war effort, insisting last week that its position was "open and above board" and accusing the West of fuelling the conflict through arms shipments to Kyiv.

China did not attend a peace summit in Switzerland last month in protest against Russia not being invited.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called during that summit for Beijing to engage seriously with developing peace proposals.

"EXTRACT A PRICE"

Kuleba said on arrival in China Tuesday that "we must avoid competition between peace plans" and urged Beijing to "look at relations with our country through the prism of its strategic relations with Europe".

Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told AFP that Kyiv would likely seek this week to "convince China that it should participate in a second peace summit".

"Beijing can try to extract a price, even for sending somebody like special envoy ambassador Li Hui," he said.

China has offered a critical lifeline to Russia's isolated economy since the conflict began.

But that economic partnership has come under scrutiny from the West in recent months, with the United States vowing to go after financial institutions that facilitate Russia's war effort.

The United States and Europe have also accused China of selling components and equipment necessary to keep Russia's military production afloat.

channelnewsasia.com

4. Hong Kong a Major Hub for Illicit Transfer to Rogue Nations, Report Finds

The referenced report can be accessed here: https://www.thecfhk.org/post/beneath-the-harbor

BUSINESS/ECONOMY

Hong Kong a Major Hub for Illicit Transfer to Rogue Nations, Report Finds

Report recommends series of harsh steps against the territory

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/hongkong-hub-illicit-transfer-rogue-nations

JOHN BERTHELSEN

JUL 23, 2024

∙ PAID

Find the needle in the haystack

Since the takeover of Hong Kong by Beijing, the city’s financial and trade strengths have been co-opted to facilitate the transfer of money and restricted technology to Russia, Iran, and North Korea with the tacit agreement of the government, according to an explosive report published by the New York-based Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, which was established after China’s crackdown began in 2021.

The report, titled “Beneath the Harbor: Hong Kong’s Leading Role in Sanctions Evasion,” written by lawyer Samuel Bickett after a six-month investigation, seeks to detail the trade between Hong Kong and the sanctioned countries as well as the city’s role in providing Russia with dual-use technology for its war effort in Ukraine. Bickett, now in Washington, DC, was arrested in 2019 for allegedly interfering with a police officer who was beating a youth who reportedly had jumped a turnstile. Bickett was ultimately sentenced to four months and two weeks in jail. 

The report recommends a series of harsh steps that throw the once-capitalist, pro-western city into enemy territory, including designating it a Primary Money Laundering Concern, that Congress act to increase resources and coordination for sanctions and export control enforcement, that the US, EU, and their allies focus more resources on targeting individuals as well as the associated entities facilitating sanctions evasion, that global financial firms enhance anti-money laundering (AML) procedures to capture data like customs, records, and suspicious vessel activity that the US, EU, and their allies increase enforcement and penalties against manufacturers and distributors of sensitive technologies including imposing strict civil penalties on companies that allow their products to be diverted to sanctioned countries.

“Our investigation shows that in many ways, Hong Kong is the hub and these countries are the spokes,” the report notes. Hong Kong, it says, plays an indispensable role in undermining sanctions and threatening global security and stability. “Simply put, Hong Kong has gone rogue, serving some of the world’s most brutal regimes and damaging international security interests by smuggling military technology, money, and prohibited commodities through the territory to flout sanctions.

Key Findings

Hong Kong exports to Russia initially dropped significantly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, but then almost doubled, with Hong Kong-based companies shipping billions of dollars of goods to Russia for its war effort. In August-December 2023 alone, US$750 million of the total US$2 billion in shipments to Moscow comprised goods on the US and EU list of “Common High Priority Items,” the advanced components most sought by Russia for its war effort.

“Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee’s statement in October 2022 that the territory would not enforce global sanctions on Russia gave a green light to illicit operators to set up shop in the city,” the report says. “Many have done so, from Russian tanker owners to Iranian exporters of drone technology.”

The government’s regulatory environment, “which provides for easy concealment of corporate ownership and rapid creation and dissolution of companies, has facilitated sanctions evasion. The slow and inconsistent enforcement of international sanctions by governments around the world has allowed evaders to adapt and continue their operations with relative impunity.”

Highlights of the findings:

• Hong Kong company Piraclinos Ltd, which claims to be a fertilizer and charcoal seller, has shipped millions of dollars worth of integrated circuits to the sanctioned Russian company VMK. The company’s directors and owners frequently change, often listed under the names of individuals in Cyprus and Central Asia, masking its true beneficial owners.
• After U.S. sanctions targeted Hong Kong company Arttronix International for reshipping drone parts to Iran, owner Li Jianwang swiftly applied to dissolve the company. Once the dissolution was complete, he re-established operations under a new name, ETS International, illustrating the ease with which sanctions evaders can resume business. Neither Li nor ETS has been targeted for sanctions.
• HK Shipping Cooperation Ltd and HK Petroleum Enterprises Cooperation, sought to facilitate significant oil deals with Iranian oil company Sahara Thunder, including arranging vessels for ship-to-ship transfers and the sale of oil originating from Oman. HKSC and HKPEC share the same two shareholders, director, and secretary. Corporate records indicate these companies are part-owned by an EU citizen and resident, Hungarian Anett Szeplaki.
• Hong Kong consignor Align Trading Co. Ltd purportedly shipped nearly US$2 million of integrated circuits produced by French military technology producer Vectrawave to AO Trek, a Russian company previously alleged by Ukraine to be supplying components for missiles and military aircraft.
• Multiple Hong Kong companies have been involved in the illicit activities of the vessel previously known as New Konk involving a group of sanctions evaders that used the vessel under various names for illicit ship-to-ship oil transfers with North Korea, create fraudulent ship identities, and launder proceeds using shell companies. The New Konk and its series of Hong Kong front company owners have appeared repeatedly in the annual reports of the United Nations Security Council’s DPRK Sanctions Committee tracking sanctions evasion. Little media focus has been placed on Hong Kong’s central role in its movements.

Trading on a fading reputation

“Hong Kong continues to trade on the reputation for adherence to international standards that it built up in the final years of British colonial rule, which ended in 1997, and in the first decade of Chinese control,” the report continues.

“Most major international financial institutions have significant operations in the city, and until recently its market for IPOs regularly bested that of New York City and London. But this reputation no longer reflects reality. Following Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, and more forcefully since massive pro-democracy protests in 2019, China has moved to assert near-total political control over Hong Kong, eliminate its democratic institutions, and steadily undermine rule of law. It introduced two national security laws that have seen it imprison political opponents and co-opt the previously independent legal system, while passing several constitutional ‘reforms’ to end free elections and curtail local autonomy.”

John Lee’s October 2022 statement against enforcing sanctions on Russia was offered in response to a mega-yacht docked in the city that belonged to a sanctioned Russian oligarch, the report notes, “a particularly visible symbol of the city’s embrace of sanctions evaders.”

The government has long flouted its legal obligation to enforce the U.N.’s North Korea sanctions against evaders, serving to make it clear that sanctions won’t be enforced.

Easy to open rogue company

It is simple and cheap to open a Hong Kong-based company and firms in the territory can buy goods produced by U.S. companies like Apple and Texas Instruments with little trouble, the report notes. “Once in Hong Kong, goods can be shipped with no questions asked to countries and companies under Western sanctions and trade controls. Hong Kong’s role in helping Russia continue its assault against Ukraine is startling in its growth and extent.”

Although following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hong Kong’s semiconductor exports to Russia initially dropped, likely as officials assessed the situation, eight months later, “the same month that John Lee said that the territory wouldn’t enforce US sanctions, chip shipments had nearly doubled from their prewar levels. A substantial portion—nearly 40 percent of goods shipped from August to December 2023, for example—appear on the Common High Priority Items List and are likely fueling Russia’s production of military goods such as missiles and aircraft. Many of these shipments consist of goods purportedly made by Western companies such as Intel, Analog Devices, Apple, and Texas Instruments.

Iran, North Korea

The report finds that Hong Kong-based companies are also facilitating Iranian and North Korean efforts to trade in military technology as well as oil and other natural resources. “These efforts have enabled these countries to buttress their capabilities, prop up their regimes, and obtain much-needed cash.”

Hong Kong plays a central role in shipping drone and missile components to Iran, which Iran then provides to Russia and destabilizing militias across the Middle East such as the Houthis. Hong Kong has also played a key role in Iran’s use of complex shell company structures to sell its oil illicitly.

“One such network, known as Triliance, has thus far led the US to target 31 different Hong Kong companies over 10 rounds of sanctions.

For North Korea, Hong Kong acts as a hub for illicit shipping operations by which oil and natural resources are traded to and from North Korea in violation of UN sanctions and caps. Often, these transactions are carried out via ship-to-ship transfers at sea using vessels owned by Hong Kong companies. Many of these vessels, like the New Konk, regularly use laundered vessel identities and deactivate their transponders to mask their activities.”

The Hong Kong government’s regulatory environment has facilitated these evasion activities. Its geography is also crucial: it connects mainland China to the busiest shipping lanes in the world. “Its past capitalist, laissez-faire approach to transport and customs reflects its decades as a free port and the absence of taxes on most goods. Huge volumes make it impossible to check everything, even if the government wanted to, which it clearly does not.

Because Hong Kong is a major transport hub, with significant air, shipping, and rail lines that extend to China and from there to Russia, North Korea, and Iran, “it is the ideal hub for evading sanctions and transporting materials to these countries.

While in the US it takes months, if not years, to investigate and sanction a company, in Hong Kong, new companies can be set up in days. “The whack-a-mole strategy of going after individual firms can’t keep up with the ease with the rapid creation and dissolution of companies permitted by Hong Kong regulations.

“Successfully stemming these activities requires a new and forceful approach, the report notes. “Increasing the cost of inaction will get companies to take their compliance obligations seriously.”

5. Swarm Wars: Pentagon holds toughest drone-defense demo to date

Excerpts:

Even without the proverbial “fricking laser beams,” however, the scenario was complex enough that it was much a test of each defense system’s digital brains as of its physical brawn. The ability to process sensor data, combine different data (such as radars and camera) to identify targets, and assign those targets to weapons was as critical as the firepower and accuracy of any individual “effector.”

“It does challenge everything, to include the command and control,” Parent said. “You don’t want to engage [the same] target multiple times. You’ve got so many coming at you, you’ve got to be able to differentiate and go after the most [dangerous] threat first.”

Once the data is crunched, it’ll be up to the services and COCOMs to decide whether or not to buy one (or potentially more) of the candidate defense system. They’ll base those decisions on each system’s performance, its particular strengths and weaknesses, and their own varying operational needs: DoD is under no obligation to buy any of the demonstrated candidates.

Swarm Wars: Pentagon holds toughest drone-defense demo to date - Breaking Defense

Eight counter-UAS systems — wielding a mix of radars, machineguns, missiles, jammers, and more — were tested against swarms of up to 50 drones of different types attacking simultaneously from different directions and speeds.

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · July 24, 2024

The Joint C-sUAS Office’s (JCO) most recent event took place over four weeks in June 2024 at Yuma Proving Ground, and was the most ambitious yet, focusing on demonstrating systems capable of detecting and defeating swarms of sUAS. (U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground via DVIDS)

WASHINGTON — With drone strikes in the news from Kyiv to Tel Aviv, the Pentagon’s all-service drone defense program just held its most ambitious field demonstration yet, with up to 50 unmanned aircraft of different types converging on a single target at a time.

“Demo Five really was our most challenging JCO demonstration to date,” said Col. Michael Parent, chief of acquisitions & resources at the Army-led JCO, the mercifully short acronym for Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System Office.

The JCO demonstrations at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona, first held in April 2021, take prototype systems developed by private firms and test their ability to defend against drones. This year’s especially ambitious event focused on repeated swarm attacks, although the details of the scenario were not shared with vendors beforehand. Attacking waves, coming from different altitudes and angles, also included multiple types of drones — fast jets, slower prop-driven drones, and mini-helicopters — ranging in size from under 20 pounds (Group 1 UAS) to over 1,000 (Group 3).

On the defending side, Parent told reporters Tuesday, the vendors’ prototype defense systems all showed a “greater level of maturity” and offered “much better solutions” to the threat than those at previous demos.

Other than that broad brush, however, JCO officials pointedly declined to discuss how well the candidate counter-drone defenses did.

They’re still crunching data from Demonstration Five, which ran from June 3 to June 28 at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. Once done, the first reports will go not to the press, but to military services, combatant commanders worldwide, and to the eight vendors involved — a much larger variety than last year’s five vendors.

Those eight contenders, whittled down from about 60 initial proposals submitted less than a year ago, were a mix of companies small and large: Clear Align, Trakka, ICR, ELTA, Teledyne FLIR, SAIC, ATSC and Anduril. Elta, the North American spinoff of the Israeli armsmaker, submitted two different systems — one vehicle-mounted, the other man-portable — while the others each contributed one.

Instead of being built around a single weapon, most of these offerings were “layered” defenses that combined multiple sensors to detect the drones, which often are too low, slow, and small for radar, and “effectors” to take them down.

All told, across all nine candidate systems, the demonstration featured at least four types of sensors: radars, cameras both electro-optical and infra-red, and radio-frequency scanners. There were also four types of “effectors”: guided rockets, drone-killing mini-drones, machineguns, and radio-frequency jammers. The last is a so-called “soft kill” approach that scrambles a drone’s GPS signal or its command link to its human pilot rather than physically destroying it.

“No one capability, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, in itself could really just beat this kind of [attack] profile,” Parent said. “What we saw was they really do need a full system of systems approach, a layered approach.”

Interestingly, however, none of the vendors in this demo used “directed energy” weapons, such as lasers or high-powered microwaves. (That said, an HPM weapon was tested in a spinoff event at the same time.)

Even without the proverbial “fricking laser beams,” however, the scenario was complex enough that it was much a test of each defense system’s digital brains as of its physical brawn. The ability to process sensor data, combine different data (such as radars and camera) to identify targets, and assign those targets to weapons was as critical as the firepower and accuracy of any individual “effector.”

“It does challenge everything, to include the command and control,” Parent said. “You don’t want to engage [the same] target multiple times. You’ve got so many coming at you, you’ve got to be able to differentiate and go after the most [dangerous] threat first.”

Once the data is crunched, it’ll be up to the services and COCOMs to decide whether or not to buy one (or potentially more) of the candidate defense system. They’ll base those decisions on each system’s performance, its particular strengths and weaknesses, and their own varying operational needs: DoD is under no obligation to buy any of the demonstrated candidates.

The next JCO demo is expected to happen early in 2025.

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · July 24, 2024

6. What did the US military’s Gaza aid pier actually accomplish?

What did the US military’s Gaza aid pier actually accomplish?

militarytimes.com · by Noah Robertson · July 25, 2024

When President Joe Biden announced the mission to build a humanitarian pier off the coast of Gaza this March, he framed it as a symbol of what the U.S. military can do.

Palestinian civilians were dying five months into the Israel-Hamas war. Most of the territory was struggling to get food or near famine. And Israel wasn’t opening more land routes for assistance to flow in.

So the U.S. would make a route of its own.

“This temporary pier would enable a massive increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance getting into Gaza every day,” Biden said during his State of the Union speech.

Instead, four months later, the pier’s mission is over and its clearest legacy is what wasn’t possible.

Despite the work of 1,000 U.S. soldiers and sailors using the Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS, capability, the pier couldn’t stay afloat for long due to choppy seas. And while it got aid into the Gaza Strip, it couldn’t fix another intractable problem: actually getting it to the Palestinian people — 96% of which face “acute food insecurity,” according to the United Nations World Food Programme.

RELATED

Military’s novel floating pier arrives in Gaza amid security concerns

The Gaza aid pier is made possible by an oft-neglected but vital military capability known as Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS.

The Pentagon estimated the pier would cost $230 million, though the final number isn’t yet certain, and Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command, said it would come in well under budget.

A clearer cost has been to U.S. personnel: One soldier remains in the hospital due to a pier-related mishap in May, and is still recovering stateside.

Citing privacy regulations, DOD officials have declined to explain what injured the soldier and two other service members, who were able to return to duty after the incident.

U.S. officials have defended the mission as the safest and most efficient way to get American assistance into Gaza during the war. And they can cite almost 20 million pounds of aid as evidence.

“The pier has done exactly what we intended it to do,” said Cooper.

Many watching from the sidelines in Washington disagree.

The pier arrived at a moment of acute political pressure on the White House to help the Palestinian people, said Steven Cook, an expert on the Middle East at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Despite that, he said, it’s become an emblem of what the U.S. hasn’t learned in the region.

“This is a constant theme in American foreign policy in the Middle East,” he said. “Despite our best intentions, we didn’t really understand what we were walking into.”

Palestinians storm trucks loaded with humanitarian aid brought in through a U.S.-built pier, in the central Gaza Strip, on May 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Abdel Kareem Hana)

‘I was hopeful that would be more successful’

When announcing that the pier was being dismantled, military officials came with a list of statistics. The JLOTS pier delivered 19.4 million pounds of aid, or enough to feed half a million Palestinians for one month.

By comparison, the U.S. has sent 2.4 million pounds via air drops and 33 million pounds via land crossings since the start of the war in October.

In its 20 days of operating, the admiral said, it carried double or triple the amount of aid the U.S. initially expected. Altogether, it was the most humanitarian support America has ever sent to the Middle East.

“That data stands on its own,” Cooper said.

And yet, those numbers have another side. The aid may have gotten onto Gazan territory, but much of it hasn’t reached people in need. Due to rough weather, the pier was in service only about one-third of the time since it was first anchored in May. At one point, it buckled under rough seas and had to be repaired in the Israeli city of Ashdod.

Meanwhile, crowds ransacked at least one aid-laden truck coming from the pier before it could get to distribution points, The Associated Press reported, and the United Nations halted aid distribution at times due to security concerns.

U.S. troops at work on the Gaza aid pier on June 7. (Staff Sgt. Mikayla Fritz/Army)

“You can have the best fighting force in the world and the best logisticians in the world, but high seas and strong winds still create quite a dilemma,” said Brad Bowman, who researches U.S. defense policy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

After the NATO summit in July, even Biden acknowledged that the pier could have performed better.

“I was hopeful that would be more successful,” he said.

A JLOTS test case

Still, using the pier in a real-world combat zone likely helped prove its use to the Pentagon, argued Keith Robbins, a retired Army officer who oversaw the JLOTS program for U.S. Transportation Command before his retirement in 2007.

JLOTS is, in essence, a set of metal pieces that can be assembled in multiple ways. It’s meant for calmer waters than the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Robbins said, but there were few better options for the mission itself: quickly shuttling tons of aid onshore.

“JLOTS is the perfect capability to handle that, but it has to be put in the right place in order for it to be successful,” he added.

Now that JLOTS has made its debut in a combat zone, Robbins hopes it will convince the Pentagon to continue funding it.

“Ten, 15 years ago, when I was doing it, the higher-ups didn’t really understand what the capability was,” he said. “I would hope that this has been a great illustration of how valuable this capability can be.”

U.S. soldiers assigned to the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) use a modular warping tug’s crane to drop temporary anchors to stabilize the aid pier on the Gaza coast on June 7. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jordan KirkJohnson/Navy)

‘The needs are staggering’

In their briefing last week, CENCTOM deputy commander Cooper and an official from USAID argued the pier hadn’t only finished its mission — it was also no longer necessary.

The maritime supply route was now moving from off the 25-mile Gazan coast to Ashdod, Israel, where aid will enter the strip via trucks.

As the U.S. and humanitarian groups have said for months, there is no substitute for these land crossings.

“The needs are staggering and continue to grow,” said Solani Korde, a USAID official, briefing alongside Cooper.

From the start, U.S. officials stressed that the pier was “temporary.” In other words, the U.S. was not committing to an indefinite mission attached to Gaza, and it wasn’t suggesting this path could replace others.

“A maritime route is not a zero-sum discussion,” said Chris Hyslop, a former U.N. official who now works with Fogbow, a humanitarian advisory group that assisted the pier’s mission.

An aerial photo of the U.S. military-built Gaza aid pier after it was stabbed into the beach on May 16. (DOD)

But even when aid crosses into Gaza it has been extremely hard to deliver. Roads are damaged. Swathes of territory are dangerous. And the actors involved — from Egypt to Israel to Hamas to other groups in Gaza — often don’t have reason to distribute aid quickly, whether due to cronyism, domestic politics or the terrorist group’s total-war strategy, said Cook, the analyst at CFR.

“That is really, chiefly, the obstacle to ensuring that the innocent people of Gaza get the lifesaving food, water, medicine that they need,” National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said in a July briefing. “It’s distribution within as opposed to distribution from without.”

No pier or new land crossing can solve that problem. But while the pier’s mission may be over, some involved don’t think the maritime route should close.

Mick Mulroy, a former Pentagon Middle East official who also works at Fogbow, the aid group, said the pier was a proof of concept, despite its limitations.

“I think it needs to be continued because quite frankly, the mechanism in Cyprus [where aid was sorted] and the aid delivery zone is already established,” he said. “If we don’t put something in its place that will be for naught.”

About Noah Robertson and Geoff Ziezulewicz

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

Geoff is the managing editor of Military Times, but he still loves writing stories. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.

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militarytimes.com · by Noah Robertson · July 25, 2024

7. Unpacking Harris' record on defense civilians and workforce

Unpacking Harris' record on defense civilians and workforce​

The vice president has fought discriminatory pay practices, helped guide how the government uses AI, and championed public-sector unions.

By ERIC KATZ and SEAN MICHAEL NEWHOUSE

JULY 24, 2024 08:00 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

If elected, Vice President Kamala Harris—the likely Democratic presidential nominee after Joe Biden on Sunday ended his reelection bid—would bring to the Oval Office significant experience in federal workforce issues and a history of advocating for employees and their labor groups.

As vice president, Harris led a White House task force that made recommendations for how agencies could reduce barriers for public and private sector workers to organize or join a union. In the year after agencies began implementing these recommendations, the number of federal employees who are dues paying members of a union increased by 20%.

“We are fighting to protect the sacred right to organize. We are protecting the sacred right to organize because we know when unions are strong, America is strong,” Harris said at a Service Employees International Union convention in May.

The task force also encouraged including requirements in federal grants and contracts for using organized labor, especially on projects under the 2021 bipartisan infrastructure law, 2022 Inflation Reduction Act and 2022 CHIPS and Science Act.

Harris played a role in the Biden administration’s development of new regulations that prevent agencies from relying on a job applicant’s salary history to set their pay.

“One factor that contributes to the gender pay gap is the common practice requiring applicants to share their salary history. [For] many women, this practice can mean inequitable pay from a previous job will follow them to their current job, and so on and so on,” Harris said at an Equal Pay Day event in 2022. “So our administration is committed to eliminating discriminatory pay practices that inhibit the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the federal government.”

And she helped in the creation of artificial intelligence policy, including guidance intended to establish safeguards for the federal government’s use of AI while still pushing agencies to utilize the burgeoning technology.

“If the [Veterans Affairs Department] wants to use AI in VA hospitals to help doctors diagnose patients, they would first have to demonstrate that AI does not produce racially biased diagnoses,” Harris said in March as an example of the practices the policy puts in place.

Harris also has led the White House’s response to the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision overturning Roe v. Wade, which — with respect to federal employees — entails the VA providing abortions in certain cases, government workers being allowed to use sick leave to travel for reproductive health care and a Defense Department policy to provide travel allowances for military personnel seeking the procedure.

Before the White House

Prior to becoming vice president, Harris was a senator from California for four years, serving on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that oversees federal management. In the Senate, she gained attention for her sharp questioning of witnesses, leading to several high-profile exchanges with Trump administration officials.

During a 2018 hearing with then-Office of Personnel Management Director Jeff Pon, Harris questioned the Trump administration’s proposal to fold OPM into the General Services Administration and the White House’s Executive Office of the President.

“My concern is if OPM is eliminated, who will take on this independent role in the executive branch to ensure that HR decisions will be in compliance with and adhere to merit-based principles as opposed to politics?” she asked.

She also raised concerns about a series of executive orders then-President Trump issued to make it easier to fire federal employees and limit the power of their unions, focusing specifically on the administration’s attempt to limit workers’ ability to engage in representation activities, or "official time," while on the clock.

“Have you ever had the responsibility of actually working with an employee on a grievance?” Harris asked Pon in criticizing a provision that limited how long a federal employee can spend on official time. “Because if you have, you would appreciate that it takes time to establish a relationship of trust to then understand the experience they’ve had and be familiar with the facts in a way that you can sufficiently represent them in their grievance.”

As a senator, she also criticized the Trump administration for loosening hiring standards to support a surge in the number of Border Patrol agents. She called on the former president (and her pending election competitor) to focus resources on management challenges at the Homeland Security Department, including pay and training for current personnel.

During her vice presidency, the Biden administration has backed a bipartisan Senate proposal to boost staffing, enact hiring flexibilities and implement pay reforms at DHS in response to an unprecedented increase in migration at the southwest border.

Harris has faced some criticism for her record as a prosecutor, first as the San Francisco district attorney and then as the California attorney general, though in the Senate she frequently sought to place more stringent oversight on federal law enforcement.

In the wake of the 2020 police murder of George Floyd, Harris was an original cosponsor of the Justice in Policing Act, which would have required federal law enforcement officers to wear body cameras, use de-escalation techniques and employ deadly force only as a last resort.

“We are here today with common-sense solutions, at least at the federal level, to hold police accountable,” Harris said at the time.

Notably, Harris’ guest at Trump’s 2019 State of the Union address was an air traffic controller, who was affected by a government shutdown.

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

8. The Army Is Reducing Job Choice for New Recruits in 2 Critical Fields

The Army Is Reducing Job Choice for New Recruits in 2 Critical Fields

military.com · by Steve Beynon · July 24, 2024

New Army recruits going into two of the service's most critical fields will no longer be able to choose which specific jobs they enlist into, according to an internal service email reviewed by Military.com.

Both the field artillery and air defense fields, which each have several jobs within them that center around different weapons and maintenance, as well as surveillance and communications systems, will no longer allow soldiers to enlist directly into those specific roles.

It's a similar move to what the service did with infantry years ago by not allowing new applicants in some situations to pick between typical ground infantry and mortarmen. It is unclear whether other job fields will be reducing choice for new applicants, and the Army did not respond to a request for comment ahead of publication.

The move comes as both air defense and artillery will likely play a key role in future conflicts, as those two fields have been critical on the battlefield in Ukraine -- where some 12,000 artillery shells are estimated to be fired each day and air defenses have been key to stopping Russian airpower from advancing the front lines.

Air defense has been particularly affected as the Pentagon has spread its units thin in recent years, with the Army amassing troops in Europe and the Pacific while juggling combat missions in the Middle East and Africa. CNN reported that there are more missions than that field has the capabilities for.

The constant string of deployments and training missions has also been linked to suicides in the service, along with other mental health issues. Troops in the artillery field are especially vulnerable to traumatic brain injuries. A report from the Marine Corps found that service members in those roles are about twice as likely to suffer from a TBI or other sensory injuries when they aren't deployed -- meaning standard day-to-day training is inherently dangerous.

The reduction of immediate choice could hamper a key selling point in Army recruiting, which has been that applicants broadly get to pick the roles they will serve in. The reduction in choice for new applicants comes as the service has seen dwindling recruiting numbers in the past decade, mostly fueled by young Americans being unable to meet its academic or body fat standards for enlistment.

Meanwhile, the service has struggled to adapt to modern marketing to reach Gen Z because much of its efforts still center around advertisements built for cable television and sporting events, both of which have increasingly lost relevance with each generation.

The service is projected to meet its lowered recruiting goal this year of bringing in 55,000 active-duty recruits -- a sharp drop from its goal of 65,000 last year, when it came up 10,000 new soldiers short. The little headway the service has made on recruiting has been attributable to the Future Soldier Preparatory Course, a pre-basic training program that helps applicants just outside of the Army standards to come into compliance.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · July 24, 2024

9. 3 Army brigades tapped for fall rotations in Europe, South Korea and CENTCOM

Are rotational brigades really the right way to provide forces to the COCOMs?

Is a Stryker Brigade really the right force for Korea? (replacing the one currently stationed there - how has it performed and how would it perform if the north attacks?)

3 Army brigades tapped for fall rotations in Europe, South Korea and CENTCOM

Stars and Stripes · by Matthew Adams · July 24, 2024

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ByMatthew Adams

Stars and Stripes •

Soldiers carry a tank roadwheel to simulate the necessities of emergency maintenance during training at Drawsko Combat Training Center in Poland on July 2, 2024. (Kimberly Blair/U.S. Army)

WASHINGTON — Three Army brigades will deploy to Europe, South Korea and the Middle East in the fall as part of regular troop rotations, the Army announced.

The 1st Armored Division’s 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team from Fort Bliss, Texas, will deploy to Europe to replace the 4th Infantry Division’s 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team to train alongside NATO forces.

The U.S. launched Operation Atlantic Resolve in 2014 after Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine when it annexed the Crimean Peninsula. The operation — meant to bolster NATO’s eastern flank and dissuade Russian forces from entering the alliance’s territory — grew larger after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The 2nd Infantry Division’s 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., will deploy to South Korea to replace the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. The 3rd Cavalry Regiment from Fort Cavazos, Texas, has been stationed there since February.

The 10th Mountain Division’s 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team based at Fort Drum, N.Y., will deploy to U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations in the Middle East, to replace soldiers from the 44th Infantry Brigade Combat of the New Jersey National Guard. More than 1,800 soldiers deployed earlier this year to support Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led mission to defeat the Islamic State.

Matthew Adams

Matthew Adams

Matthew Adams covers the Defense Department at the Pentagon. His past reporting experience includes covering politics for The Dallas Morning News, Houston Chronicle and The News and Observer. He is based in Washington, D.C.

10. Anti-base groups plan to protest Osprey flights, alleged sexual assaults on Okinawa

​The more things change the more things stay the same.

Anti-base groups plan to protest Osprey flights, alleged sexual assaults on Okinawa

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney and Keishi Koja · July 24, 2024

Members of All Okinawa, a political party that opposes the island's U.S. military presence, protest outside a government office in Naha, Jan. 30, 2023. (All Okinawa)

CAMP FOSTER, Okinawa — Three groups opposed to the U.S. military presence on Okinawa plan a gathering next month to protest Osprey flights over the island and recent sexual assault charges against U.S. service members.

The event, scheduled for 4 p.m. Aug. 10, was co-organized by All Okinawa, a political party that opposes the U.S. military presence, and two civic groups fighting in the courts to eliminate aircraft noise at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and Kadena Air Base.

Organizers hope to attract 1,600 protesters, All Okinawa spokesman Yuji Fukumoto said by phone Tuesday.

The hourlong protest at Union Desukara Dome Ginowan in Ginowan city was originally organized to mark the 20th anniversary of a helicopter crash at the city’s Okinawa International University, Fukumoto said. A CH-53D Sea Stallion from nearby MCAS Futenma crashed on the campus Aug. 13, 2004, resulting in no casualties but damaging the college’s administration building.

More recent events have shifted the event’s focus.

“The main focus of the protest will be the Ospreys and MCAS Futenma,” Fukumoto said. “Additionally, following recent indictments, the protest will also address crimes committed by U.S. service members.”

The U.S. military grounded its fleet of about 400 Ospreys Dec. 6 through March 8 as it investigated the Nov. 29 crash of an Air Force Osprey from Yokota Air Base off the southern coast of Japan that killed eight service members.

Two Osprey squadrons at MCAS Futenma resumed flights on March 14.

Okinawa Gov. Denny Tamaki in March filed protests with Japan’s prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, foreign affairs minister and defense minister against the resumption of tiltrotor flights in Japan, requesting “the relocation of the Ospreys outside the prefecture.”

Japanese media reported Tuesday that Tamaki plans to attend next month’s protest, but he has not confirmed his plans with the event organizers, Fukumoto said.

In June, Japanese media reported that prosecutors in Naha city indicted Senior Airman Brennon R.E. Washington in March on charges of kidnapping and sexual assault of a minor and in June indicted Marine Lance Cpl. Jamel Clayton of attempted sexual assault.

Washington at his first court appearance on July 12 said he is not guilty of kidnapping and sexual assault of a minor.

Tamaki on July 3 visited Cabinet officials in Tokyo to register “strong resentment” over the criminal cases. Members of the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly on July 19 delivered formal protests to the U.S. Embassy and Japanese government.

Following official complaints, the Marine Corps imposed sobriety checks at its base gates in Japan and patrols of off-base hotspots on Okinawa.

U.S. Forces Japan commander Lt. Gen. Ricky Rupp in a statement posted online Monday announced a “new forum of cooperation” with the Japanese and Okinawan governments and community members to address alleged misconduct.

Further changes to the off-duty liberty policy for all service members in Japan are in the works, according to Rupp and an earlier statement from U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel and Lt. Gen. Roger Turner, commander of III Marine Expeditionary Force.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken are scheduled to arrive this weekend in Tokyo for the 2024 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, or “2+2,” meeting.

Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Yoko Kamikawa said Tuesday she plans to bring up those indictments when she and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara meet Sunday with their U.S. counterparts.

“I think that the most important thing is that the measures announced by the U.S. side are steadily implemented, and lead to preventing recurrences,” Kamikawa said at a news conference. “At the bilateral ‘2+2’ meeting that is planned at the end of this month, we will ask the U.S. side to ensure the steady implementation.”

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney and Keishi Koja · July 24, 2024

11. Myanmar regional military HQ captured, rebels say, in blow to junta

What influence will the US have with a new government after the rebels are successful? Are we thinking about the long term potential opportunities? Or will we cede influence to China?

Myanmar regional military HQ captured, rebels say, in blow to junta

By Reuters

July 25, 20246:16 AM EDTUpdated an hour ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-regional-military-hq-captured-rebels-say-blow-junta-2024-07-25/?utm

A rebel soldier of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) holds his rifle as he guards near a military base in Kokang region March 11, 2015. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

July 25 (Reuters) - A rebel army in Myanmar said on Thursday it had seized control of a major regional military headquarters near the border with China, in what could be the biggest recent defeat for a ruling junta that is battling to contain a widening revolt.

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) said it had taken the strategic city of Lashio in northern Shan State, about 120 km (75 miles) from the Chinese border, after 23 days of fighting with government troops.

"Our army has won a decisive victory and is now clearing out the remaining enemy troops. The city is now declared completely liberated," it said in a statement shared by its mouthpiece on social media, urging the public to remain calm and comply with its administration of the city.

Reuters could not independently verify the group's claim and a spokesperson for Myanmar's junta did not respond to calls seeking comment.

The MNDAA is among several ethnic minority rebel groups fighting to repel the military from what they consider their territories, in a loose alliance with an armed resistance movement that has waged a nationwide campaign to undermine the junta's rule.

The conflict has morphed into a civil war that represents one of the biggest challenges to Myanmar's well-equipped military in its combined five decades of rule. More than 2.6 million people are displaced, according to the United Nations.

The military, which seized back power in 2021 after a decade of tentative democracy, has been stretched by fighting on multiple fronts across the country of 53 million people, hampering its ability to govern and manage a crippled economy.

The junta has described its opponents as "terrorists" seeking to destabilise the country.

The MNDAA launched its latest offensive after the recent collapse of a ceasefire brokered by China, which has been concerned about fighting at its border and its impact on trade.

China's foreign ministry on Thursday urged all sides to cease hostilities, enter into dialogue and ensure Chinese businesses and nationals were unharmed.

"We will continue to encourage peace and push for talks," spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular briefing.

Online news outlet Myanmar Now quoted the commander of another armed group fighting alongside the MNDAA as confirming the capture of the regional command headquarters at Lashio.

According to an analysis earlier this year by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, the junta has no effective control of Myanmar, having lost authority over townships covering 86% of the country and two-thirds of the population.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here.

Reporting by Reuters Staff; Additional reporting by Eduardo Baptista and Joe Cash in Beijing; Writing by Martin Petty; Editing by Bernadette Baum

12. China Casts Itself as Peacemaker in First High-Level Talks With Ukraine Since Russia’s Invasion

How is it working out?

China Casts Itself as Peacemaker in First High-Level Talks With Ukraine Since Russia’s Invasion

Beijing has been a key player in helping Russia evade Western sanctions

https://www.wsj.com/world/china-casts-itself-as-peacemaker-in-first-high-level-talks-with-ukraine-since-russias-invasion-1ba6a906?mod=hp_lista_pos1

By Isabel Coles

 and Austin Ramzy

Updated July 24, 2024 11:05 pm ET

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Guangzhou, southern China. PHOTO: LU HANXIN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Ukraine’s top diplomat met with his Chinese counterpart Wednesday for hours of talks in his first such high-level visit to the country since Russia’s full-scale invasion, as Kyiv seeks Beijing’s support to end the war on “just” terms. 

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Beijing’s calls for a diplomatic solution to the war during the meeting in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou with his Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba, who said his country would negotiate when Moscow was ready to engage “in good faith.”

“No such readiness is currently observed on the Russian side,” Kuleba said, according to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. A Kremlin spokesman said in response that Moscow “has always maintained its openness to the negotiation process.”

Efforts to kick-start dialogue between Russia and Ukraine have faltered during a war that has upended European security and triggered commodity price shocks worldwide. Several countries have attempted to broker peace talks, beginning with Turkey in the weeks after Russia’s February 2022 invasion.

While officially professing neutrality in response to the war, China has been a key partner in helping Russia weather Western economic sanctions imposed in response to the invasion. Trade between the two countries has soared, with China buying up Russian oil and gas while providing consumer goods that are increasingly hard for Russia to buy from the West. Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a “no-limits” friendship shortly before the war and see mutual benefit in resisting Western pressure. 

The aftermath of a Russian drone strike in Izmail, Ukraine. PHOTO: STATE EMERGENCY SERVICE OF UKRAI/REUTERS

U.S. and European officials have also accused China of providing Russia with dual-use equipment such as microchips and drone parts to help Moscow rebuild its military. China has denied supplying weapons to Russia and says it strictly controls the trade of dual-use goods.

Beijing has increasingly sought to portray itself as a global peacemaker. This week, it also hosted a meeting of Palestinian rival factions including Hamas and Fatah, which have been estranged for years. Representatives of the 14 groups signed an agreement to work toward unity and establish an interim reconciliation government, but with few details on how that would happen. China has called for a cease-fire in Ukraine and issued a statement with Brazil in May on resolving the war. Russia describes its war on Ukraine as a “special military operation” and China also only refers to it as a “crisis”—a description Wang continued to use Wednesday.

The talks in Guangzhou come on the heels of a public feud between Zelensky and China during a visit last month to Singapore, when he accused Beijing of lobbying countries to boycott a peace conference in Switzerland through which Ukraine sought to build pressure on Russia to end the war on Kyiv’s terms. Xi was invited to the mid-June summit by Zelensky but didn’t attend. Beijing had said that any peace conference should be endorsed by both Ukraine and Russia, which wasn’t invited.

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Chinese leader Xi Jinping spoke on the phone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, signaling China’s desire to become a global power broker. WSJ’s Austin Ramzy explains how Beijing’s peacemaking efforts could challenge the U.S. Photo Composite: Diana Chan

“The best Ukraine can hope for is a patching up of relations with China,” said Lucian Kim, a senior Ukraine analyst at the International Crisis Group. “China has already indicated which side it’s backing.”

Wang didn’t allude to that summit or Zelensky’s criticism on Wednesday, according to a description of the meeting from China’s Foreign Ministry.

“China believes that all conflicts must be resolved by returning to the negotiating table, and that all disputes must be resolved through political means,” Wang said. “Recently, the Russian and Ukrainian sides have, to varying degrees, signaled their willingness to negotiate.”

For Ukraine, the talks come as questions grow about continued U.S. support for Kyiv’s war effort if former President Donald Trump recaptures the White House. Trump didn’t directly answer a question about whether he would pull funding for Ukraine in a Fox News interview that aired Tuesday night. He repeated his claims that Russia wouldn’t have invaded Ukraine if he were still in office and said he told Zelensky in a call last week: “We’ve got to get this war over.” 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at a summit in Singapore last month. PHOTO: NHAC NGUYEN/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

In his public comments following the talks with Kuleba, Wang didn’t criticize the U.S., which China has accused of fueling the war by providing weapons to Ukraine. Instead, he emphasized the six-point peace proposal on Ukraine that China issued with Brazil in May, which called for no escalation of the fighting and for all parties to avoid provocation. China’s Foreign Ministry on Wednesday said the Ukrainians had “carefully studied” the proposal.

A recent poll indicated that support for peace talks among Ukrainians has increased as the war enters its third summer, but a majority of respondents oppose the current cease-fire conditions laid out by Putin. Those entail the complete Ukrainian withdrawal from the four regions that are partially occupied by Russia, including several major cities still under Kyiv’s control.

Putin has also demanded Western sanctions be lifted and that Kyiv agree to a neutral status and abandon plans to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a precondition for talks. 

Zelensky has presented his own list of 10 demands, which the Kremlin isn’t entertaining, including the withdrawal of Russian troops before peace talks begin, the restoration of Ukrainian control over currently occupied territory and the prosecution of alleged Russian war crimes.

Ukraine’s demands gained some traction when initially floated in a peace plan early last year as Kyiv prepared for a major counteroffensive after initially repelling Russia’s invasion. The counteroffensive failed to achieve significant gains, and Russian forces are now snatching territory from overstretched Ukrainian forces in the east of the country. At the same time, international attention has swung toward the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Debris inside a car after shelling in Kharkiv, northeastern Ukraine. PHOTO: SERGEY KOZLOV/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

Ukraine might be seeking to get China on board with a second summit that Kyiv is pushing to hold later this year to advance its vision for peace. Ukraine has said it would like its second summit to be hosted by a Global South country, and that Russia should attend.

However, there may be little progress until the outcome of the November election in the U.S., Kim said. “There’s understanding in Moscow and in Kyiv that nothing substantial is going to change until there’s clarity [on the U.S. election]. It’s the key event for what happens next.”  

Write to Isabel Coles at isabel.coles@wsj.com and Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com

13. Reports: Russia Hits NATO Member Romania With Kamikaze Drone​\

I have not seen any reporting from the mainstream media on this event.

Do we have our heads buried in the sand for fear of an Article 5 trigger?

Reports: Russia Hits NATO Member Romania With Kamikaze Drone​\

Although Kremlin strike planners probably didn’t intend to hit a NATO member, Romania’s military launched F-16s fighters and said it would investigate.

by Stefan Korshak | July 24, 2024, 2:06 pm

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · July 24, 2024

Although Kremlin strike planners probably didn’t intend to hit a NATO member, Romania’s military launched F-16s fighters and said it would investigate.

by Stefan Korshak | July 24, 2024, 2:06 pm

Ukrainian investigator from the Prosecutor General’s office views fuel trucks burnt and destroyed during a Russian kamikaze drone attack on the Danube port city Izmail on Wednesday. According to local news reports and social media, at least one Russian weapon flew into NATO airspace and blew up near the Romanian village of Plauru. Prosecutor General office official photo.

A Russian kamikaze drone on Wednesday flew into NATO air space and detonated near a Romanian village, Ukrainian news reports said, but official Bucharest said the fact of the strike wasn’t confirmed and that they would check.

The Iran-manufactured Shahed robot plane reportedly struck and blew up in the vicinity of the Danube River shoreside hamlet of Plaura, in southeastern Romania.

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Ukrainian social media video recorded in the river port city of Izmail, opposite Plaura, showed an orange flash lighting up the night horizon and a booming blast on the Romanian side of the river. Flames and smoke reaching hundreds of meters into the sky were visible following the explosion. A Russian kamikaze drone strike against Izmail had been in progress at the time.

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A Wednesday Ukrainian Air Force statement said Russian operators based in Crimea launched the Kremlin’s latest drone raid shortly after midnight.

Kyiv Post combined a screen grab of a social media recording of fire and explosions on the Romanian side of the Danube River in the early hours of July 24th, and a stock photograph of Iran-designed Shahed drones of the type used in the strike hitting NATO territory. Russian planners likely intended to hit the town of Izmail on the Ukrainian side of the river.

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Zelensky Discusses Peace, Prisoners With Senior Vatican Official

President Zelensky praised the Vatican’s efforts in seeking peace and releasing prisoners of war in talks with a senior official, a contrast from previous tensions between Kyiv and the Holy See.

Civilian air defense networks closely tracking the incoming strike reported almost all the explosives-toting UAVs appeared to be flying in two waves east of and parallel to the Danube River.

Anti-aircraft gunners, missile operators and tactical jamming teams in engagements across the country knocked down 17 Shahed kamikaze drones, six reconnaissance drones and two loitering strike drones, the official Kyiv statement said. “Most” of the kills were, per that report, in the airspace above the southwestern Odesa region, where the Danube separates Ukraine and Romania.

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Ukrainian civil defense networks reported impacts after 2 a.m. local time in the vicinity of Izmail. Local social media variously reported between six to ten ground explosions. Odesa region air defense authorities called an all-clear by 3:45 a.m.

The Ukrainian government-funded Ukrinform news agency, citing air defense and civilian officials, said that in Izmail, port infrastructure was damaged and that at least one Russian kamikaze drone hit an upper floor of a five-story residential building.

A statement by the Izmail District State Administration reported destroyed or broken windows, a smashed stairwell and substantial damage to the front facade of an apartment building. There was no fire but three residents were injured and hospitalized, that report said.

A press statement by Romania’s Defense Ministry said two Romanian F-16 fighter jets took off at 2:19 a.m. (approximately an hour after the Russian drones launched from Crimea), in response to the incoming raid towards Izmail. The aircraft returned to Borcea Air Base at 4:20 a.m. The statement mentioned no engagements by the F-16s.

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Images published by the Izmail regional government showing the aftermath of a Russian Shahed drone hit on a five-story apartment building in the city. The left-hand image shows fire and smoke in the seconds following the early Wednesday morning attack. The right-hand image shows damage to an apartment stairwell. Ukrainian media widely confirmed the images and the fact the attack. These images were published by the military news correspondent Andriy Tsaplienko.

An investigation team would deploy to the field to check the possibility a Russian strike drone hitting Romanian territory, the official statement said.

“The Ministry of National Defense has ordered measures to conduct investigations in the field, in the vicinity of Plauru, to search for possible objects that may have fallen on national territory,” the statement said in part.

During the Russian attack, ten locals called in reports to Romania’s emergency phone service 112 that they heard an explosion near their home, the Romanian Digi 24 news platform reported.

Romanian authorities last confirmed a Russian weapon struck Romanian territory in early September 2023. At the time, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis criticized the strike as a “violation of our sovereign air space” and said he had discussed the attack with Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general.

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Russia, since early 2023, has, as a declared war aim, tried to stop all Ukrainian sea exports, particularly the major profit-earner, grain.

A Kremlin attempt to use its Black Sea Fleet to blockade Ukraine’s ports during the first year of the war failed after multiple Ukrainian anti-ship missiles – to date – sank and sent to the bottom about one of every three Russian warships operating in the Black Sea, and forced the survivors to retreat to mainland Russia.

Map graphic published by the Ukrainian military information platform WarLive showing the proximity of the Ukrainian city of Izmail, on the north bank of the Danube River, and the Romanian village Plauru (indicated by red arrow) on the opposite southern bank. Multiple reports confirmed a Russian kamikaze drone struck Izmail between 2-4 a.m. on Wednesday.

The Kremlin has continued its attempts to interfere with Ukrainian grain shipments by launching long-range weapons at Ukrainian shoreside freight handling facilities.

On Monday, the most recent attack appearing to target Ukrainian port infrastructure before the Wednesday drone raid, a Russian missile landed near the Black Sea port city of Odesa and damaged an office building, shoreside warehouses, and civilian vehicles.

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Russian strike planners launch drone attacks on targets inside Ukraine almost nightly, most often using slow-flying propeller-driven drones imported from Iran. The Kremlin has said it only hits military targets or critical infrastructure in Ukraine. Kyiv officials have said the Russian bombardment mostly strikes Ukrainian homes and businesses and accused strike planners of complicity in war crimes.

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 in an attempt to return its southern neighbor to Moscow’s control, by invoking regime change and ending Western-style democratic government. At the time, the Kremlin said closer NATO relations with Ukraine was a direct threat to Russian national security.

Since then, NATO states have slowly strengthened their support to Ukrainian resistance to Russian attacks and bombardments, but with few exceptions, NATO members have said the Atlantic Alliance has no intention to intervene in Ukraine directly, because of the need to avoid confronting Russia.

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Stefan Korshak

Stefan Korshak is the Kyiv Post Senior Defense Correspondent. He is from Houston Texas and is a Yalie. He has worked in journalism in the former Soviet space for more than twenty years, and from 2015-2019 he led patrols in the Mariupol sector for the OSCE monitoring mission in Donbass. He has filed field reports from five wars and enjoys reporting on nature, wildlife and the outdoors. You can read his blog about the Russo-Ukraine war on Facebook, or on Substack at https://stefankorshak.substack.com, or on Medium at https://medium.com/@Stefan.Korshak

14. Once Hamas’s Sworn Enemy, a Palestinian Exile Rises as a Potential Postwar Strongman

Once Hamas’s Sworn Enemy, a Palestinian Exile Rises as a Potential Postwar Strongman

Some U.S., Israeli and Arab officials see Palestinian Mohammed Dahlan as a viable leader of an interim security force

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/once-hamass-sworn-enemy-mohammed-dahlan-rises-as-a-postwar-strongman-f64676b1?mod=hp_lead_pos10

By Summer SaidFollow

, Fatima AbdulKarim and Stephen KalinFollow

Updated July 25, 2024 12:05 am ET

The question of who will govern Gaza has plagued efforts to end Israel’s nine-month war to destroy Hamas. Some U.S., Israeli and Arab officials are pushing to empower a former Palestinian security chief who himself once tried to crush the militant group, was later exiled from the West Bank and now lives in luxury in Abu Dhabi.

Some negotiators are increasingly drawn to Mohammed Dahlan as a temporary solution to a dilemma facing postwar Gaza: Putting someone in charge of security in the strip that Israel, Hamas and foreign powers such as the U.S. and Arab Gulf states all find palatable. The discussions are picking up speed as cease-fire mediators try to revive stalled talks. Negotiators were planning to convene in Doha, Qatar, this week but are now likely to meet next week.

Dahlan is a rare Palestinian leader who is independent of both Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, and the Palestinian Authority that runs parts of the West Bank, making him someone the Israeli government could potentially work with, said Israeli political analysts. And in Washington, where the George W. Bush administration saw him at the time as a future Palestinian president, some officials have privately touted him as a key player since Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, sparking the war.

Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip. Dahlan was born and raised in the city and still has family living in Gaza. PHOTO: MOHAMMED SABER/EPA-EFE/SHUTTERSTOCK

Dahlan, a wealthy businessman who grew up poor in Gaza, has been on the sidelines of Palestinian politics for over a decade and said recently that he doesn’t want to lead Gaza himself. But he has a political party that is active there and links to groups on the ground which could help make up a security force to bridge from the end of fighting to whatever comes next.

Since the war began, he has ferried between the United Arab Emirates—a wealthy Gulf state that could help fund Gaza’s reconstruction and provide troops for an international stabilization force—and Egypt, whose border with Gaza and Israel makes it integral to the territory’s future. Dahlan has advised both countries’ leaders and benefited from their patronage.

In Cairo, he has convened Gaza businessmen and the heads of rich families, who fled the conflict, to find ways to get desperately needed supplies into the territory. Companies and families in southeast Gaza that have historically been aligned with Dahlan have provided security to some commercial shipments.

In recent conversations with Hamas and Fatah, Dahlan has presented himself as someone who could eventually oversee aid distribution in a new Palestinian administration of Gaza, Arab and Hamas officials said.

Mohammed Dahlan, in 2011, is a rare Palestinian leader who is independent of both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. PHOTO: MAJDI MOHAMMED/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, in 2006, flashing the V sign as Mohammed Dahlan, a Fatah official at the time, looks on. PHOTO: KEVIN FRAYER/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Dahlan has the charisma, street cred and connections across the political spectrum to be successful, said Aaron David Miller, a veteran U.S. peace negotiator in the Middle East. “He’s incredibly effective and could deliver under circumstances that would allow him to deliver,” he said, including a supportive Israeli government and backing from the U.S. and key Arab states.

Importantly, Hamas has softened its opposition to Dahlan, indicating to mediators in recent weeks that it could accept him as part of an interim solution to help end the war. Dahlan led Palestinian Authority security forces in a bloody U.S.-backed conflict with Hamas, after the U.S.-designated terrorist group won elections in 2006 to rule the Gaza Strip. 

Senior Hamas official Bassem Naim said the group is giving priority to an overall vision for postwar Gaza that is “based on national interest and national consensus” over opposition or support for specific individuals. 

“It is unacceptable for any party to be imposed from above,” he told the Journal.

Dahlan has said he now speaks to Hamas regularly and believes the group can’t be eradicated. Israel previously approached Dahlan to help put anti-Hamas Palestinians in charge of Gaza aid, the Journal has reported, a plan that Hamas moved quickly to stamp out. 

According to an option currently under consideration, Dahlan would oversee a Palestinian security force of 2,500 men working in coordination with an international force, as Israeli troops pull out, Arab officials said. The Palestinian forces would be vetted by the U.S., Israel and Egypt and wouldn’t have clear loyalties to the Palestinian Authority, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu doesn’t want to control Gaza, the officials said. 

If successful, the force could expand to help with the reconstruction of Gaza, with training from the U.S. and Arab states, the officials added. Private Western security firms could also play a role, the officials said. 

A truck carrying aid entering Gaza in March. PHOTO: BASSAM MASOUD/REUTERS

The Philadelphi Corridor, a long sandy road that runs the length of the border fence with Egypt. PHOTO: MAHMUD HAMS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Other figures are also being considered to run the Gaza security force, including Majid Faraj, director of the Palestinian Authority’s intelligence service in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Ehud Yaari, an Israeli analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Dahlan has had preliminary talks with Israeli security officials about a possible role in Gaza but Israeli acceptance isn’t assured. 

“Dahlan can play a role, but he cannot be the solution. He can share the load,” said Yaari. 

The Israeli prime minister’s office declined to comment on Dahlan.  

From his villa in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the U.A.E., Dahlan, 62, has laid out an expansive vision for the impoverished and now largely destroyed Palestinian territory where he was born and raised in Khan Younis. He still has family living in Gaza.

His ideas largely echo those of the Arab states involved in either the cease-fire talks, such as Egypt, or in discussions about funding the reconstruction of Gaza, such as the U.A.E. They include a transitional government to administer security and basic services until more permanent arrangements could be made, potentially through parliamentary elections. 

Majid Faraj, director of the Palestinian Authority’s intelligence service in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, is under consideration to run the Gaza security force. PHOTO: ATEF SAFADI/EPA-EFE/SHUTTERSTOCK

Dahlan, who was arrested repeatedly by the Israelis for his involvement in the Fatah youth movement and learned to speak Hebrew in prison, was a close adviser to late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. He later had a falling-out with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and moved to the U.A.E. before he was convicted in the West Bank of corruption charges, which he denied.

“He’s always remained on the scene and yet not on the scene, as he hasn’t been to Palestine since 2011,” said Diana Buttu, a former Palestinian peace negotiator who worked with Dahlan. “He may have left Gaza but Gaza never really left him.”

Dahlan remains a rival of Abbas. Dimitri Diliani, a spokesman for Dahlan’s Democratic Reform Current, said the faction wants to relegate Abbas’s presidency to a ceremonial role. There must be room for Palestinian factions beyond Hamas and Abbas’s Fatah to have a say in Gaza’s future, Diliani said. 

A future role securing aid would build on Dahlan’s work in recent months to get desperately needed goods into the embattled enclave, where a breakdown in civil order has impeded international aid delivery.

Dahlan associates could end up helping run the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt along with international partners, Egyptian officials said. The Hamas-run government operated the crossing until May, when the Israeli military seized the Gaza side of the 9-mile border area. Israel wants to maintain permanent security oversight there to prevent weapons smuggling, but Egypt says that would violate its 1979 peace treaty with Israel. 

An empowered Dahlan would risk sidelining the Palestinian Authority, which sees him as a fugitive. It would also present a wrinkle for the Biden administration, which has said that a revitalized Palestinian Authority should eventually take power. Further, Israeli officials oppose a Palestinian state, which the U.S. and Arab states that could fund reconstruction say is essential for regional security.

Among Palestinians, views of Dahlan are mixed. In a leadership election, he would receive around 8%, almost entirely from Gaza, according to a June poll by the West Bank-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. That puts him about even with Hamas military leader Yahya Sinwar but far behind Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh and longtime Fatah official Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five life sentences in an Israeli jail on charges of murder and membership in a terrorist organization.

Fatma Waheed, who lives in the central Gaza city of Deir al-Balah, described Dahlan as self-serving but would accept his return if it was the only way for Gaza to be rebuilt and its borders reopened.

“I really want Hamas to leave us alone,” said Waheed, 37. “If Dahlan is the one to replace them, then he is welcome.”

Abeer Ayyoub and Dov Lieber contributed to this article.

Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com

Displaced Palestinians receiving food in Zawaida in the Gaza Strip, in June. PHOTO: OMAR ASHTAWY/APA/ZUMA PRESS

15. Trump Gunman Researched JFK Assassination Week Before Shooting

​Will there be a "Warren Commision" to determine the motivation and all the "facts" behind this?

Trump Gunman Researched JFK Assassination Week Before Shooting

FBI Director Christopher Wray says gunman was interested ‘in public figures more broadly’​

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-rally-gunman-jfk-assassination-07b0d254?mod=hp_listc_pos1

By Sadie Gurman

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Updated July 24, 2024 2:16 pm ET

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FBI Director Christopher Wray told a House committee that Donald Trump’s shooter searched online for information about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in the days before the rally. Photo: Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—The gunman who tried to kill former President Donald Trump searched Google a week before the shooting for “How far away was Oswald from Kennedy,” referring to the 1963 presidential assassination, the clearest indication yet that the 20-year-old had been plotting a similar attack.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Christopher Wray disclosed the gunman’s search at a congressional hearing Wednesday where he provided new glimpses into what led up to the July 13 shooting at a Trump campaign rally in western Pennsylvania. 

“That’s a search that obviously is significant in terms of his state of mind,” Wray said during a congressional hearing. The gunman, Thomas Matthew Crooks, researched the Kennedy assassination on July 6, a search of his laptop revealed—around the time he registered to attend the rally.

“He was interested in public figures more broadly, and, I think this is important, starting somewhere around July 6 or so, he became very focused on former President Trump and this rally,” the FBI director said.

Former President Donald Trump was helped offstage by Secret Service agents after the assassination attempt on July 13. PHOTO: EVAN VUCCI/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Multiple investigations are under way into how Crooks was able to open fire from the roof of a building roughly 400 feet away from where Trump spoke, killing one spectator, critically injuring two others and leaving the former president with a graze wound to the ear. A Secret Service sniper team shot back, killing him.

Crooks fired at least eight shots from an AR-15 rifle with a collapsible stock, Wray said, a feature that may explain why no witnesses reported seeing him carrying the weapon before the attack. He had purchased a ladder the same day as the shooting, but authorities haven’t found it, Wray said. They believe instead that he used mechanical equipment on the ground and piping on the side of the building to get on the roof.

Searches of his cellphone and other electronics and interviews with hundreds of people paint only a murky portrait of a loner with few regular face-to-face contacts, the director said. He revealed that Crooks bought the rifle from his father, who kept 14 legally purchased firearms in the home they shared about an hour south of the rally site in Butler, Pa.

“It’s fair to say that we do not yet have a clear picture of his motive,” Wray said. “So far, we have not found any evidence of any accomplices or co-conspirators, foreign or domestic.”

Wray testified before the House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday, a day after Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle resigned in the wake of the agency’s most stunning failure since President Ronald Reagan was shot in 1981.

Crooks had been identified as suspicious more than an hour before the shooting, milling about with a range finder—which resembles binoculars that hunters use to measure distance to a target—and backpack. But officers ultimately lost sight of him, and the Secret Service allowed Trump to take the stage, even after agents had received several notifications of a person acting suspiciously.

Crooks started planning the attack well before the rally, Wray’s testimony made clear, including by visiting the site a week earlier and on the morning of the shooting. At about 4 p.m. that day, less than two hours before Trump was set to speak, Crooks was able to fly a drone over the vicinity for 11 minutes, Wray said, confirming a Wall Street Journal report about the drone last week. Crooks was likely livestreaming or viewing footage from the device as it was flying about 200 feet away from the stage. The FBI reconstructed the drone’s flight path, but didn’t recover any video or pictures from the device.

“We’re still trying to figure out exactly what he saw,” Wray said.

Investigators found the drone in his car, along with two “relatively crude” homemade bombs that appeared to be designed to be set off by remote control. Investigators found a transmitter on the gunman’s body but, “at the moment it looks to us like, because of the on-off position on the receivers, that if he had tried to detonate those devices from the roof it would not have worked.”

16. Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific

There are many who seem to disagree with the first phrase of this conclusion. But we are not effectively campaigning against the PRC's political warfare (unrestricted warfare and three warfares). And the PRC's strategy is of course not limited to the Pacific.  

Conclusion

Since the PLA is not ready for a direct confrontation, China will continue to bide its time and leverage gray zone activities to achieve its interests while preparing the PLA to be able to counterbalance any potential near-peer adversary. To this end, we should expect to see increased use of irregular warfare, coercion, and pressure in the maritime domain from the China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, especially given the elevation of Admiral Dong Jun to the position of defense minister. With these developments, the PLA will step closer to towards its goal of being able to execute unified multi-domain operations. The United States and its partners must also prepare for the future challenges to come.

Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by tobias.switzer · July 25, 2024

By Brandon Tran

“During the progress of hostilities, guerillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army… There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.”

–On Guerilla Warfare, by Mao Zedong

The expulsion of former Chinese defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on June 27, 2024, is the latest development in a months-long series of personnel purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As President Xi Jinping continuously reforms the PLA to make it a “world-class military” capable of achieving the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) national security objectives, these purges illustrate an underlying tension that stems from competing priorities. Because the PLA is the armed wing of the CCP, Xi Jinping must make tradeoffs in balancing regime loyalty and military competence when selecting PLA officers for senior positions. As a result of this and similar compromises, the PLA remains unprepared for direct confrontation with near-peer adversaries. To address this gap, China will continue leveraging irregular warfare activities to incrementally accomplish its strategic objectives while buying time to achieve the level of conventional force development it desires. This article will evaluate how China’s use of irregular warfare sets the stage for its conventional force development, given the context of the competing requirements for senior PLA officer promotion, the PLA’s guiding principles, and the role of the new defense minister, Dong Jun.

Loyalty and Experience within the CMC

By necessity, Xi Jinping’s selection of senior officials balances political loyalty with operational and command experience. While he favors aggressive and competent commanders capable of realizing his ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, these leaders must remain politically loyal to Xi’s rule. His selections for the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2022 attest to this. In order of rank, they are Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu (who has since been removed), Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. Xi’s appointment of senior leaders to the CMC indicates an attempt to balance loyalty and experience because many of his selections break precedent. Examples include Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, both promoted despite Zhang being past retirement age and Liu being the youngest in his rank group. These exceptions to policy were made because both Zhang and Liu have combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese border wars, a rare and valuable quality given that the PLA is largely untested and inexperienced in combat. In other unconventional moves, He Weidong was permitted to skip key career milestones before assuming his position on the CMC. At the same time, Miao Hua transitioned from a long Army career to become the Navy’s political commissar. Indeed, selection to senior leadership positions has also been based on personal connections and previous experience with Xi. He Weidong and Miao Hua worked with Xi back when he was a provincial official in Fujian, and both Zhangs hail from the same region as Xi, claiming membership in his infamous Shaanxi Gang.

Chinese Strategic Concepts

To put Xi’s priorities and the PLA’s irregular military operations into context, it is vital to understand the guiding principles that inform the PLA’s military philosophy. Since its founding, the PRC has adhered to a warfighting philosophy of Active Defense. Under this principle, conflict is believed to exist on a spectrum ranging from peace to kinetic war. As a result, the PLA assumes a proactive force posture, constantly assessing potential threats and carrying out activities below the threshold of kinetic war that could create a better geopolitical position for the PRC. Through Active Defense, the PLA would theoretically be able to accomplish its objectives while controlling escalation on the conflict continuum.

In tandem with Active Defense is the concept of People’s War, incorporating lessons from the past century and a half and forming the backbone of the PLA’s tactics and strategies. From its inception by Mao during the Chinese Civil War to the present day, the idea of People’s War has gone through several revisions, but the crux remains the same. Warfighting proficiency must be pursued through all possible means at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The United States understands this in the modern context as being able to field a proficient joint force capable of combined arms and multi-domain operations.

However, due to having to include party loyalty as a prerequisite for promotion, the PLA suffers from an acute “Big Army Mentality” that prevents the realization of an effective joint force. Consider the service component composition of the 2022 CMC. Four of these officials are PLA Army officers, a Navy officer, and a Rocket Force officer, with no Air Force representation in the CMC. Because of the pervasive attitude in the PLA that favors the dominance of land forces, the PLA has struggled to integrate its different services, preventing it from executing seamless multi-domain operations in both war and peacetime. Wargames conducted by Chinese military leaders have shown that the PLA is not yet ready to face near-peer adversaries in conventional warfare. PLA publications and training orders frequently acknowledge these shortcomings, using phrases like the “Five Incapables,” “Two Incompatibles,” and “Three Whethers” to describe issues of inflexibility, poor training performance, and a general lack of readiness.

As a result of these weaknesses, and despite the PLA’s many modernization initiatives in recent years, the PLA still favors asymmetrical approaches and remains hesitant to embrace large-scale combat operations fully. This is best explained by the Chinese military concept of shi (勢), rendered in English as a “strategic configuration of power.” Under this framework, one’s military assets are arrayed to create an advantageous situation and physical power is applied at that particular moment to achieve victory. Returning to Active Defense and People’s War, shi (勢), when applied, would craft an unassailable position for the PLA and enable it to maximize its resources if conflict escalates to kinetic war. The PLA employs irregular tactics to create favorable geopolitical and battlefield conditions to achieve this objective, maximizing China’s strengths and neutralizing enemy advantages before conflict begins.

Irregular Warfare Activities

As military reforms continue, China will likely employ unconventional methods to achieve immediate security objectives. Recognizing its forces are not yet war-ready, China keeps tensions below the threshold for war through gray zone activities. The PLA uses warfighting, military deterrence, and military operations other than war to build capabilities and gather information, aiming to discourage adversaries or decisively defeat them if conflict arises. These activities are expected to intensify once military reforms and modernization are complete.

This strategy is already on display in the South China Sea. There, China optimizes anti-access and area-denial capabilities to prevent any significant and sustained challenge to Beijing’s territorial claims, all while remaining under the threshold for kinetic conflict. Components of this strategy consist of technological development, legal warfare, and expansion of China’s presence through manufactured islands.

Technological development in key areas of the maritime domain is intended to negate the West’s advantages of firepower and experience to ensure Beijing’s dominance over other Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea. Legal warfare limits the range of potential responses to China’s actions by its adversaries yet still achieves PRC interests. Expanding China’s presence in the adjacent seas through conventional troop deployment and unconventional state entities ensures the persistence of Chinese influence. It enables China to continue its regional operations without escalating to war. All these activities require significant planning and expertise to function as intended and synchronize with other PLA activities, thus necessitating leadership with joint experience and knowledge.

The PRC bolsters its sea claims through conventional and unconventional means. Troop deployments and exercises, as well as the construction of artificial islands and commercial sea vessels, ensure a continuous Chinese presence that is hard for other maritime states to displace. These artificial islands provide strategic bases for sustainment and defense, which are crucial for sectoral control in naval warfare. Coupled with advances in military technology, this enables China to project its reach beyond the First Island Chain, effectively limiting the entry of other navies into the area.

The China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Maritime Militia are key in these irregular activities. Their vast number of assets and plausible deniability, under the guise of internal security, offer significant advantages. CCG and Maritime Militia vessels often target other ships with non-lethal means, preventing competing states from establishing a sustained maritime presence in the South China Sea while minimizing the risk of military escalation. The PRC frequently obstructs and evades attempts to enforce international law about maritime practices. This enables China to act with impunity in the South China Sea and provides the PRC the time and space to consolidate its claims within the Nine Dash Line. Again, these gray zone activities require considerable expertise and experience to avoid escalating tensions beyond China’s readiness.

The New Defense Minister

Further evidence that the PLA will continue to execute gray zone activities can be found in the appointment of the new Minister of Defense. On December 29, 2023, China announced the appointment of the PLA Navy (PLAN) commander Dong Jun as its new defense minister. Dong Jun previously served as the deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, responsible for Taiwan Strait maritime issues and disputed islands in the East China Sea. After that, Dong was deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command, which oversees operations in the contested South China Sea. His operational experience in these strategically vital theater commands handling China’s most salient national security interests already makes him a desired candidate for promotion by conventional force standards alone. Dong Jun also has extensive experience conducting gray zone activities because such operations are largely carried out by the PLA Navy and conducted in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands’ areas of responsibility.

Also of note is the fact that Dong Jun is not sanctioned by the United States, unlike his predecessor, which suggests that he will be able to serve China effectively in military diplomacy. Dong’s recent engagements with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin illustrate the role he is stepping into. These are the first of such meetings in over two years and reflect attempts to ease tensions between the two countries. Thus, Dong Jun’s promotion facilitates diplomatic engagement and enables China the time and space to develop conventional military capabilities and bring China’s military power to the immediate forefront. Military diplomacy reduces threat perceptions, preventing escalation along the continuum of conflict and enabling China to continue its activities in repositioning and improving the PLA.

Conclusion

Since the PLA is not ready for a direct confrontation, China will continue to bide its time and leverage gray zone activities to achieve its interests while preparing the PLA to be able to counterbalance any potential near-peer adversary. To this end, we should expect to see increased use of irregular warfare, coercion, and pressure in the maritime domain from the China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, especially given the elevation of Admiral Dong Jun to the position of defense minister. With these developments, the PLA will step closer to towards its goal of being able to execute unified multi-domain operations. The United States and its partners must also prepare for the future challenges to come.

Brandon Tran is a cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is majoring in International Affairs and Chinese.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Chinese Minister of Defense Adm. Dong Jun in Singapore, May 31, 2024. Photo by Chad J. McNeeley, DOD.

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17. A Cyber Force Is Not the Only Solution

I love references to cyber and "rucking." But I am old school and still think everyone should be able to hump a ruck at least when necessary! But I guess it does not really contribute to the making of a good cyber officer in modern times.

Conclusion

As we rucked long before the sun rose, and later laid in the woods waiting for our trainers to stumble into our ambush, my lieutenant friends and I used to joke that those field exercises would make us better cyber officers. Even in 2018, when I commissioned into the Army’s Cyber Corps, the patent absurdity of those situations made us laugh. These are the memories I think of when I read calls to create a Cyber Force. The U.S. military has struggled to train and retain talented cyber personnel for years and it’s no mystery why. A Cyber Force is certainly the best long-term solution to the myriad challenges facing the military’s cyber personnel, but it would not solve them soon. In the short term, the Army could make several changes to improve its ability to train, employ, and retain talented cyber personnel now while also preparing for the eventual creation of the Cyber Force. Specialization would ease the pain of rotating between unrelated missions. Job-specific training would prepare graduates of the Cyber School to execute cyber operations. Redesigned career maps and a revamped Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay program would improve retention.

Implementing these changes will be hard, but they are not impossible. Lawmakers have demonstrated a willingness to force change within the military when necessary. Such external pressure could be the catalyst necessary for specialization within the offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare fields, at which point the Army’s bureaucracy would be forced to develop job-specific training and to redesign career maps to account for that specialization. Congress could also force a redesign of the Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay program to effectively incentivize and retain highly skilled cyber personnel in the military. Whether the Cyber Force activates in one year or 10, these changes will markedly improve the nation’s efficacy in the cyber domain today.

The new cyber lieutenants my unit receives today have gone through much of the same training I did six years ago. The specifics have changed, but they still go to the field, they still ruck, and they still get told that these things will make them better cyber officers. Survivorship bias is strong. A Cyber Force is the best chance to address the many challenges inhibiting the military’s cyber forces, cultural challenges chief among them — but in the meantime, the Army has other options. A Cyber Force is not the only solution.

A Cyber Force Is Not the Only Solution - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Zachary Szewczyk · July 25, 2024

Recent calls to create a Cyber Force are only the latest response to the U.S. military’s years-long struggle to train and retain talented cyber personnel. In 2019, for example, an instructor at the Cyber Center of Excellence noted the difficulty of rotating soldiers through assignments executing offensive or defensive cyber operations given the need for specialization within those fields. In 2021, then-Maj. Gen. Paul Stanton, commanding general of the Cyber Center of Excellence, observed that graduates of the Cyber School weren’t ready to execute those missions due to a lack of job-specific training. A 2022 article for the Modern War Institute highlighted a number of issues: the Army’s culture of generalization, a lack of opportunities to build mastery, and insufficient compensation.

A future Cyber Force is the best long-term solution to addressing these problems. But it would not solve them soon. In the meantime, a few changes could help the Army significantly improve its efficacy in the cyber domain. Specialization would ease the pain of rotating between unrelated missions. Job-specific training would prepare soldiers to execute cyber operations. Redesigned career maps and a revamped Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay program would improve retention. In the short term, the Army should implement these changes to improve its ability to generate, employ, and retain talented cyber personnel today, and to position the Army well for the creation of a Cyber Force soon.

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Encourage Specialization

A good first step to improving the Army’s ability to generate, employ, and retain cyber personnel would be to formalize the de facto specialization between offensive cyber operations, defensive cyber operations, and electronic warfare. Under the current system, a 17A cyber operations officer might spend their lieutenant years supervising offensive cyber operations, plan and execute defensive cyber operations as a captain, and then find themselves integrating electronic warfare into tactical missions as a major. A 17B electronic warfare officer might work through this same series of disjointed assignments except in reverse. Although their enlisted counterparts — 17C cyber operations specialists and 17E electronic warfare specialists — are less likely to move between these specialties, I have seen it happen to them, too.

While this does build “well-rounded” soldiers, the dubious assumption that generality is superior to mastery only hurts the force. Erica Lonergan and Mark Montgomery made this clear in United States Cyber Force: A Defense Imperative: “Potential cyber leaders cannot look to their superiors for mentorship or wisdom gained from experience within the domain. Facing disincentives to the further development of their skills, talented cyber officers choose other paths or exit the military altogether, depriving the next generation of cyber-experienced leadership.” The problem is even worse when that captain might have come from the infantry, or that major from another maneuver branch. What practical guidance will those officers give their soldiers? What experience will ground their advice to their commanders? In many cases, little and none — certainly not due to a lack of intelligence or desire, but simply due to a lack of relevant experience.

The flawed idea that offensive and defensive cyber operations are two sides of the same coin, and that electronic warfare is “close enough” that soldiers ought to be able to move between all three, has unfortunately persisted for years. The Army’s recent push to merge the cyber and electronic warfare specialties — which Congress thankfully blocked — is a symptom of its continued insistence on generality over specialization. Everything from foundational institutional education to job-specific training, weapons systems, concepts of employment, and staff processes differ across offensive cyber operations, defensive cyber operations, and electronic warfare, though. The Army should recognize this by expanding its current military occupational specialty codes beyond 17A and 17B.

Within distinct offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare specialties, sub-specialization could then be encouraged based on existing work roles. Under expanded specialty codes on the defensive side, for example, a 17I incident handler could oversee defensive operations, and 17H host analysts and 17N network analysts could make up the mission elements. A 17P data scientist and 17U data engineer could complement them. A formal designation in each of these roles, rather than the extant non-binding system based on informal work role designations, would give these personnel longevity within their field. This stability is necessary to achieve mastery without being cycled through other, unrelated jobs. A similar approach could be taken within the nuanced offensive cyber and electronic warfare specialties, too. This is not a new idea, but rather the predictable evolution of a maturing field: “Twenty years ago, all you needed was somebody who was a computer expert. Ten years ago, all you needed was somebody who was a computer security expect. Five years ago, you did have to specialize in a various domain of security, but then you could still keep it to a few broad divisions. … Today, you have to really dig down deep to get to the various specializations.”

Real separation between the functions would also allow the Army to more effectively allocate its forces to the appropriate echelons. Cyber officers, for example, could be assigned away from tactical units where they lack the authorities, equipment, training, and mission to function in favor of billets at the strategic level where they do. Electronic warfare officers, on the other hand, could eschew strategic-level assignments where they lack the equipment and opportunity to conduct any sort of electronic warfare in favor of tactical units where they would make a difference on the battlefield. In abstracting away the nuances of work roles and mission sets under “cyber,” we have introduced inconsistency in some units who see their cyber personnel filling an offensive role, others that envision employing them in a defensive capacity, and still others who see them in an intelligence role supporting targeting. Formal specialization could serve as a guardrail against the improper employment of cyber personnel for aspirational mission sets in units that ought to use them in other ways and give the cyber branch a formal mechanism to keep highly trained, narrowly specialized individuals from atrophying outside of the roles for which the Army invested heavily to train them.

Specialization is the snowball that would start the avalanche and motivate other changes necessary to improve the Army’s ability to operate in the cyber domain. With specialization comes job-specific training, distinct career maps, and tailored retention strategies. Fortunately, there has been some progress on this front. In April of 2024, Army Human Resources Command published Military Personnel message 24-134: Implementation of Personnel Development Skills Identifiers (PDSI) for personnel certified in Cyber Work roles. Personnel Development Skills Identifier codes provide a formal mechanism with which to categorize personnel with cyber work roles. Unfortunately, these codes do not carry the same weight as unique military occupational specialty codes. They can be ignored, and do not necessitate unique job-specific training, distinct career maps, and tailored retention strategies. The Army’s Cyber Certification Program, another similar initiative, goes further but still falls short — support for it is mixed, and its future is uncertain. The actual implementation of this critical step, then, is unlikely to happen without external intervention. Lawmakers recently forced the Navy to create cyber-specific designations — a similar intervention would likely be necessary to address this problem in the Army.

Develop Job-Specific Training

Because of the Army’s lack of specialization within the cyber branch, its personnel currently endure long generalist training pipelines that do little to prepare them for the operational force. Stanton highlighted this issue in 2021: “When you graduate from the schoolhouse, in my personal opinion, you should be ready to execute your job.” That was not the case when I graduated in 2018, nor when he said that in 2021, and it is not the case today either. Particularly on the defensive side, the Army expects its soldiers to gain the knowledge and experience necessary to function at a high level elsewhere, outside of its institutions and often in their own time.

Due to insufficient initial entry training, operational units pick up where institutions have failed them by resourcing job-specific training themselves. This job-specific training could entail weeks of additional military-run courses, days of online classes, and difficult certifications from private sector organizations totaling months of additional learning after graduation, unique to each job, just to get to work. A soldier preparing for offensive cyber operations, for example, must go through lengthy courses primarily sponsored by government agencies before they can do their job — conversely, a soldier preparing for defensive cyber operations must take almost exclusively trainings from the private sector before doing theirs. Thanks to the Army’s continued insistence on a generalist educational model, the operational force bears the brunt of this burden. A normal three-year tour therefore typically entails much less than three years’ worth of work as a result. Formalizing distinct offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare specialties would simultaneously enable Training and Doctrine Command to develop and sponsor useful training narrowly scoped to soldiers’ actual duties, offload that training requirement from operational units, and lead to greater consistency across the force.

Recognition of distinct offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare specialties could also open the door to institutionalizing industry training and certifications much like the Signal Corps has. The Signal Corps expects its personnel to earn industry certifications as they progress in their career. Fantastic initiatives like the Pacific Signal University provide access to basic courses like CompTIA’s Security+, for example, as well as advanced training like the Cisco Certified Network Associate in a splendid example of the Army Learning Concept in practice. Today, though, the opportunities available to cyber soldiers in traditional Army units versus those available to soldiers in units specifically focused on cyber operations are vastly different.

As a young lieutenant, for example, my first unit — a cyber unit — invested tens of thousands of dollars into sending me to trainings from vendors across the private sector. In fact, in the five years since I left the Cyber School, the Army has spent over $100,000 on training and certifications for me alone. Almost none of those opportunities exist in traditional Army units that do not recognize the need for expensive, highly specialized training in lieu of canned Army courses. Unfortunately, this approach will only perpetuate the status quo of descending tiers of competency as soldiers stray further from cyber units out into the traditional Army — something that ought to engender concern, not pride. Specialization within the cyber branch could fix this by enabling the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command to adequately address the unique training needs of distinct offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare specialties.

Redesign Career Maps for Specialization

A novel approach to personnel management, with distinct offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare specialties and further sub-specialization within each of those fields, would also require redesigned career roadmaps. DA PAM 600-3: Officer Talent Management and DA PAM 600-25: U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide provide career guidance to officers and non-commissioned officers, respectively. As a cyber operations officer, for example, I should have spent my lieutenant years as a platoon leader and company executive officer before becoming a company commander as a captain. In effect, these guides provide a roadmap to success in this organization. Not one technical work role has ever appeared in these career roadmaps. The unique needs of the Army’s cyber and electronic warfare operators are not recognized by the Army.

Fortunately for the soldiers’ career prospects, although unfortunately for the branch’s efficacy in cyber operations, the difficulty of developing deep technical expertise has negligible impact on promotion. Neither the officer nor the non-commissioned officer career map lists a single offensive cyber, defensive cyber, or electronic warfare work role — not even the work roles most in demand. Technical jobs are not required and are therefore seldom encouraged. The Army’s one-size-fits-all command versus leadership model has not served it well as of late, though, especially in the cyber branch where many desire alternative career paths. Indeed, survey data about the Army’s retention issues suggest that redesigning career maps would not only enable specialization, but also improve retention as well.

Fortunately, some of the work for specialized career maps has already been done. The operational force has invested heavily in analyst-specific training. The Cyber Protection Brigade, for example, has created host analyst and network analyst training. My own unit built a similar curriculum. The Air Force is in the process of creating a comprehensive data science course. These programs could help inform career roadmaps redesigned for specialization. Army Cyber Command could also bring back its recently discontinued job qualification records, which both define the knowledge, skills, and abilities that cyber and electronic warfare personnel must satisfy to become qualified in technical work roles and also outline five-year career paths within each. Together, these training plans and career paths could serve as the basis for redesigned career maps for specialization based on the existing cyber and electronic warfare work roles.

Revamp the Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay Program

Under a future system with distinct offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare specialties, further sub-specialization within each of those fields, job-specific training, and career maps that encourage rather than hinder specialization, the last and final change the Army should make would be to revamp the Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay program.

This program is a well-meaning but inherently broken initiative. Each year, the Army identifies gaps in technical work roles, then incentivizes soldiers to obtain those skills through small, monthly bonus payments. By design, this addresses cyber skills gaps only after they have manifested. By monetarily incentivizing personnel to develop in-demand skill sets and then removing that monetary incentive once a sufficient population has attained them, the program also implicitly incentivizes the atrophy of those skills in favor of ever-changing operational needs.

The Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay program is also too little, too late. While monthly bonuses range from $200 to $1,500 based on job and experience level, few ever make it to the upper end of that spectrum. Most receive just a few hundred dollars per month. It’s no wonder they leave: I watched a junior soldier, an E4 specialist making less than $50,000 per year in Augusta, Georgia, leave the Army for a job using the same exact software for over $150,000 per year fully remote. I have friends in other units who have watched their personnel, also junior soldiers paid similarly, get replaced by contractors making over $200,000 per year. RAND wrote an entire study on this in 2017, almost a decade ago. I have heard many senior leaders appeal to duty and patriotism in response, but these arguments fall flat when these soldiers can do the same job, supporting the same mission, with more personal freedom and higher quality of life outside the Army than within it. The Army is unlikely to ever match private sector pay, but it could at least get close enough that the difference does not drive its most competent soldiers from its ranks.

The Army has several far better models upon which to base such an incentive program. The Medical Corps, for example, must compete with extremely lucrative opportunities in the private sector and manages to do so in part due to its far more robust incentive pay and retention bonus program. The Critical Skills Retention Bonus could target highly trained cyber personnel with critical skills, to retain them. The Army could use annual bonuses to at least bring military compensation into the same ballpark as comparable civilian opportunities. As Mark Gorak of the Office of the Chief Information Officer recently explained, “Pay for performance. Pay for what your actual expertise is. That’s the system we have to get.” To retain highly trained cyber and electronic warfare personnel, significantly more resources should go to a program like this, not fewer. Distinct specialties with unique, tailored training pipelines and concrete career roadmaps would provide the rigor necessary to support this level of investment.

Conclusion

As we rucked long before the sun rose, and later laid in the woods waiting for our trainers to stumble into our ambush, my lieutenant friends and I used to joke that those field exercises would make us better cyber officers. Even in 2018, when I commissioned into the Army’s Cyber Corps, the patent absurdity of those situations made us laugh. These are the memories I think of when I read calls to create a Cyber Force. The U.S. military has struggled to train and retain talented cyber personnel for years and it’s no mystery why. A Cyber Force is certainly the best long-term solution to the myriad challenges facing the military’s cyber personnel, but it would not solve them soon. In the short term, the Army could make several changes to improve its ability to train, employ, and retain talented cyber personnel now while also preparing for the eventual creation of the Cyber Force. Specialization would ease the pain of rotating between unrelated missions. Job-specific training would prepare graduates of the Cyber School to execute cyber operations. Redesigned career maps and a revamped Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay program would improve retention.

Implementing these changes will be hard, but they are not impossible. Lawmakers have demonstrated a willingness to force change within the military when necessary. Such external pressure could be the catalyst necessary for specialization within the offensive cyber, defensive cyber, and electronic warfare fields, at which point the Army’s bureaucracy would be forced to develop job-specific training and to redesign career maps to account for that specialization. Congress could also force a redesign of the Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay program to effectively incentivize and retain highly skilled cyber personnel in the military. Whether the Cyber Force activates in one year or 10, these changes will markedly improve the nation’s efficacy in the cyber domain today.

The new cyber lieutenants my unit receives today have gone through much of the same training I did six years ago. The specifics have changed, but they still go to the field, they still ruck, and they still get told that these things will make them better cyber officers. Survivorship bias is strong. A Cyber Force is the best chance to address the many challenges inhibiting the military’s cyber forces, cultural challenges chief among them — but in the meantime, the Army has other options. A Cyber Force is not the only solution.

Become a Member

Capt. Zachary Szewczyk commissioned into the Cyber Corps in 2018 after graduating from Youngstown State University with an undergraduate degree in computer science and information systems. He has supported or led defensive cyberspace operations from the tactical to the strategic level, including several high‐level incident responses. He currently serves in the 3rd Multi‐Domain Task Force.

The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

Thanks to N.A.P for providing feedback during the writing of this article. Their input was considered, but this article is not necessarily an accurate reflection of their opinions.

Image: Maj. Zachary Leuthardt

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Zachary Szewczyk · July 25, 2024

18. When Nothing Seems to Work: Houthi Edition

Excerpts:

So, what should the United States do? In lieu of escalating militarily, the administration’s first instinct may be to double down on sanctions. But sanctions nearly always strengthen autocratic actors while punishing ordinary people. So that is not a great idea, especially when Yemen is already suffering from humanitarian disaster. Step number one, therefore, should be to keep pushing for a ceasefire in Gaza. At this stage, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu are not quite prepared to get to yes, but Secretary of State Tony Blinken says the parties are within the 10-yard line. If that is the case, Houthi intentions will at least be clarified. The second, working with the United Nations, would be to establish a contact group consisting of Houthi representatives, Saudis, Emiratis, the Palestinian Authority, China, Russia, the European Union, and other participants in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Allison Minor, the former deputy envoy for Yemen, makes a powerful case for this sort of diplomatic approach based on her impression of dynamics at the U.N. Security Council. Its job will be keeping the Houthi leadership focused on resolving the conflict from which they clearly benefit. Although the Houthis thus far have waved off Saudi inducements, the larger contact group might be able to sweeten the pot. Separately, Washington should engage Beijing and Moscow directly or through intermediaries to press them to persuade Iran and the Houthi leadership to lower the temperature, define more specifically their requirement for a ceasefire in the Red Sea, and establish rules of the road for the future. And, in combination with these steps, the United States will need to continue to urge Israel to keep its nerve, focus on defensive measures, and, of course, agree to a ceasefire in Gaza. None of these steps will yield miracles given the unpromising conditions, but they are better than the alternative.

Returning to the subject of U.S. interests, the facts suggest that these would be best preserved by maintaining the current U.S. posture, which enjoys multilateral support and avoids an escalatory spiral that forecloses an exit strategy even as it strengthens a determined adversary.

When Nothing Seems to Work: Houthi Edition - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Steven Simon · July 25, 2024

What is a country to do when military action and diplomacy are both presently hopeless? That is the situation the United States finds itself in today: Military escalation will not compel the Houthis to halt their anti-shipping campaign or attacks on Israel. Nor will diplomacy — at least not yet.

Intensifying the use of force will strengthen the Houthis’ regional legitimacy and their control over Yemen. At the same time, it will draw the United States further into a conflict it cannot win, thus making it harder to cut losses when the time comes. It will also incentivize Israel to deepen its own involvement, creating a negative feedback loop in which the United States gets even more bogged down. These risks far exceed the importance of the Red Sea to U.S. interests.

The Houthi challenge will eventually dwindle. The Gaza war will die down, enabling the Houthis to declare victory. In the meantime, Washington should set the stage for a diplomatic process that locks in a Houthi ceasefire and reduces the likelihood of a repeat performance. This will require Iranian and Russian cooperation or at least acquiescence. Their support for the Houthis, and whatever leverage it buys them, is collateral to their primary interests. They might be responsive to direct approaches by Washington (as the United States has already done vis-à-vis Iran), and Masoud Pezeshkian’s accession to the presidency in Iran might provide another opportunity. But the key intermediary, if there is one, would be China. Given the hazards that the Red Sea crisis poses, this issue should be a priority in U.S. talks with China. The bilateral agenda is, of course, already overloaded, and neither country might be able address this issue. And China’s interests will be divided, impeding its ability to make any hard decisions about this situation. For Washington, though, the stakes are high — avoiding the trap in which Yemen turns into the motel where you can check in, but you can’t check out.

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U.S. interests in the Red Sea are straightforward: ensuring the security of this particular shipping route, which has an important place in global commerce. As a practical matter, this means suppressing the Houthi threat to vessels transiting the Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Thus far, the U.S. approach to these objectives has been primarily defensive, gearing cost to scale of interest.

Pressure, however, is mounting in Washington to shift to the offensive against the Houthis. Patience is wearing thin with an approach that is not producing the expected results. But compellence is the hardest trick to pull off in international relations, especially when it’s more costly for the actor attempting to compel the party than it is for the targeted party. One can understand policymakers’ frustrations. When the United States is so strong — America has a $27 trillion economy, an $850 billion defense budget, and a population of 330 million, and it occupies a good chunk of an entire continent with vast resources — while its adversary is so weak – a gross domestic product of $22 billion, where a large part of the population faces starvation — this irritation can turn into something worse. This sort of cumulative frustration transformed the U.S. policy of “keeping Saddam Hussein in the box” into regime change and all that ensued. But, of course, this exasperation tends to ignore the fact that these raw correlations don’t account for the Houthis’ political will, control of territory, and manifest destiny (see under “Taliban”).

Then there are the perennial preoccupations. The first is the conviction that failure to take the offensive signals weakness and invites further aggression. Concern over credibility is the twin sister to this. Having declared a U.S. interest and committed forces, we need to show results. If we don’t, adversaries will laugh off future commitments of military power. At the strategic level, global deterrence requires a response to Russian and Iranian reliance on horizontal escalation. If these competitors get a free pass, they’ll escalate elsewhere as well. And then there are practical naval issues. Given the U.S. Navy’s worldwide responsibilities, keeping a carrier strike group pinned down in the Red Sea is imprudent and punishes crews and equipment. The fact that the Houthis have refused to negotiate in what the United States considers good faith fuels the momentum for escalation. The United States and United Nations have tried diplomacy, and it hasn’t worked. Time for the gloves to come off, right?

The standard menu of escalatory options would include attacks against Yemen’s limited infrastructure along the lines of Israel’s bombing of the port at Hodeida, factories and warehouses linked to Houthi missile, rocket, and drone stocks, military bases, and senior Houthi officials. No one is talking about boots on the ground. But there is no doubt about the U.S. ability to hurt the Houthis.

So why not pull the trigger? Let us count the reasons. At the tactical level, the Houthis enjoy substantial territorial depth, which, combined with the range of their munitions, greatly complicates effective targeting of mobile launchers. The needles are in a vast haystack. The distributed production and storage of platforms and warheads also make targeting a difficult proposition. An economist would say that the United States would face a classic stock/flow problem: Given the size of existing stockpiles, interfering with marginal increases in the stockpiles will yield meager results. And these stockpiles are probably quite large, although no one knows just how large. And despite the large number of Houthi strikes since 2023, expenditure rates have been relatively modest. Moreover, there is the ample historical evidence for the ineffectiveness of airstrikes in the absence of synchronized ground maneuver. Did I mention that there would be no boots on the ground?

These are just the operational challenges. It gets worse. Strikes against Houthi territory would strengthen the regime’s grip and thereby increase its incentive to carry out attacks against shipping, Operation Prosperity Guardian fleet assets, and Israel. As a response to Russian and Iranian horizontal escalation — that is, where Russia and Iran turn up the heat on Washington outside of the main theaters in which they are confronting each other — U.S. attacks would be ineffective because the Houthis are mere cannon fodder, and the U.S. escalation will only draw it into a hopeless war. This, dear reader, is precisely why Russia and Iran rely on horizontal escalation. On balance, therefore, an offensive strategy would just recalibrate the current equilibrium to a higher level of violence and deeper U.S. commitment, while rewarding the Houthi regime and further incentivizing it to escalate the fight.

But surely there are costs to maintaining the current posture? Not necessarily. In terms of direct cost to the U.S. economy, despite Houthi provocations, U.S. gross domestic product is on the upswing, inflation is slowing, credit markets are booming, and the stock market is bullish. The cost of fleet operations is substantial, about $1 billion, but derisory compared to the administration’s overall 2025 defense budget request.

As for opportunity cost, the virtue of a navy is that it is supremely mobile. If, say, tensions over Taiwan suddenly spiked or Russia attacked cargo ships carrying military aid for Ukraine, the strike group could be out of the Red Sea through the Bab al-Mandeb toward the Pacific, or through the Suez Canal toward the Atlantic, very quickly.

It is true that the “cost/exchange ratio” — the difference between the cost of the missiles the Navy uses to down Houthi weapons and the cost of those weapons — is unfavorable to the United States, but the Defense Department is working to fix this imbalance.

Current policy enables the United States to claim credibly that it is carrying out its responsibility to secure maritime trade routes and deny the Houthis the military edge in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb. These factors alone meet U.S. strategic objectives in the Red Sea. But the U.S. posture to this point has a number of additional virtues. It demonstrates the considerable defensive capacity of U.S. fleet assets to potential adversaries, while avoiding the trap of escalation — the costs of which would outweigh the interest at stake. America’s mainly defensive stance also assists in Israel’s defense. And it has done these things without further fueling Houthi justifications for waging war and further oppressing Yemenis under Houthi control. This in turn has maintained space for negotiation should the present logjam loosen up. The current approach also works as a hedging gambit because it allows the United States to focus on more urgent challenges at the same time.

In short, the American approach avoids starting a fight that it cannot finish given the natural advantages enjoyed by the Houthis, their relative imperviousness to air assault, and their tight control of their political destiny.

For this approach to stick, it will be essential that the United States convince Israel to maintain a defensive posture in the face of further Houthi provocations and not carry out renewed retaliatory attacks. The U.S. priority should be reassuring the Israeli government that the United States will continue to integrate its own regional air defenses with Israel’s to deny the Houthis the prospect of any further successful attacks against Israeli territory. Washington is probably doing exactly this right now.

Commitments carelessly acquired can be extremely difficult to abandon. There was a time when this was not necessarily the case. In 1982, the Reagan administration committed U.S. forces to the stability of Lebanon. Upon maneuvering itself onto one side in a civil war it had intended to defuse, U.S. forces and diplomats came under fierce attack. After hundreds of Americans perished and the U.S. attempt to bring its tormentors to heel through enormous firepower failed, President Ronald Reagan simply walked away. No U.S. administration in this day and age could afford to abandon the sort of solemn yet frivolous commitment Reagan made in Lebanon. That U.S. forces were in Afghanistan for 20 years, 19 years after they accomplished their mission, is the contemporary counterexample — hence this warning to policymakers tempted to make just such a commitment when the countervailing winds blow so strongly.

So, what should the United States do? In lieu of escalating militarily, the administration’s first instinct may be to double down on sanctions. But sanctions nearly always strengthen autocratic actors while punishing ordinary people. So that is not a great idea, especially when Yemen is already suffering from humanitarian disaster. Step number one, therefore, should be to keep pushing for a ceasefire in Gaza. At this stage, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu are not quite prepared to get to yes, but Secretary of State Tony Blinken says the parties are within the 10-yard line. If that is the case, Houthi intentions will at least be clarified. The second, working with the United Nations, would be to establish a contact group consisting of Houthi representatives, Saudis, Emiratis, the Palestinian Authority, China, Russia, the European Union, and other participants in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Allison Minor, the former deputy envoy for Yemen, makes a powerful case for this sort of diplomatic approach based on her impression of dynamics at the U.N. Security Council. Its job will be keeping the Houthi leadership focused on resolving the conflict from which they clearly benefit. Although the Houthis thus far have waved off Saudi inducements, the larger contact group might be able to sweeten the pot. Separately, Washington should engage Beijing and Moscow directly or through intermediaries to press them to persuade Iran and the Houthi leadership to lower the temperature, define more specifically their requirement for a ceasefire in the Red Sea, and establish rules of the road for the future. And, in combination with these steps, the United States will need to continue to urge Israel to keep its nerve, focus on defensive measures, and, of course, agree to a ceasefire in Gaza. None of these steps will yield miracles given the unpromising conditions, but they are better than the alternative.

Returning to the subject of U.S. interests, the facts suggest that these would be best preserved by maintaining the current U.S. posture, which enjoys multilateral support and avoids an escalatory spiral that forecloses an exit strategy even as it strengthens a determined adversary.

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Steven Simon is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and author, most recently, of Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East (Penguin Random House, 2023).

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Steven Simon · July 25, 2024

19. The Experimentation Experiment: How Small Units Will Drive the Army’s Transformation in Contact

Excerpts:

Based on the army’s timeline for budgeting, the inputs for the Army of 2030 may already be in place. Concept-driven transformation is a necessary stage in the Army’s evolution, yet the aspirational future-gazing must not blind us to the threat in the current operational environment. Similarly, the Army should tread lightly when reintroducing old concepts; new approaches will be needed for the future fight, and these must be driven by new insights developed through experimentation. Experiments in the continental United States, such as Project Convergence, are a necessary step to drive transformation across the Army, but this must be paired with experimentation forward. Indeed, recent iterations of Project Convergence have extended into priority theaters. This is because technology and equipment may be disruptive, but not decisive. Technology designed to solve problems but untested by soldiers in the environment may actually punish untrained units and unskilled commanders. To keep pace with the number one threat in the national defense strategy, people and organizations must be the drivers of change and allow other elements across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum to evolve simultaneously. Realizing this, the Army is already developing new prototype formations.

Shortly after General Shinseki described his vision of transformation toward the Army of 2030, 9/11 served as a catalyst for change. Part of the plan involved a new vehicle, which would become the Stryker, and the first Stryker brigade was in Iraq by 2003. Absent a catalyst of this level, service-wide transformation at a pace necessary to respond to today’s near-peer threats demands agile and adaptable formations with a bias toward action ahead of the receipt of new technologies. The Army cannot afford to wait.

The Experimentation Experiment: How Small Units Will Drive the Army’s Transformation in Contact - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ben Blane, Dale Hunter · July 25, 2024

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In 1999, after introducing a bold vision to transform the Army by 2030, General Eric Shinseki spent his first year as chief of staff of the Army communicating the urgency behind his transformation vision. “If you dislike change,” he stressed, “you’re going to dislike irrelevance even more.” Yet, as General Shinseki has described, this vision didn’t gain much traction initially and was met with resistance across the Army. The Army of 1999, which he argued was in dire need of change to maintain its relevance to the joint force, had just achieved overwhelming success in Operation Desert Storm earlier in the decade. So why the need to change?

Simply put, any potential adversary that paid attention to Desert Storm would certainly take heed to never engage in that type of fight against the US Army in future conflict. The Army that fought in Desert Storm was organized, trained, and equipped during the Cold War era to counter an invading Soviet force in Europe. It was not a force designed to respond to the wide variety of small-scale contingencies and nontraditional threats emerging in 1999.

Likewise today, adversaries have evolved to avoid conditions that favor a US Army that fought in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past two decades or one that is simply reintroducing Cold War doctrine as a solution to the challenges of large-scale combat operations. And the pacing threat is evolving faster than ever. Once again, the Army faces a choice between change and irrelevance. Maintaining relevance will require continuous transformation in contact. And given that the senior US military commander of the most strategically consequential theater has stated that the United States’ pacing threat, China’s People’s Liberation Army, would be ready to invade Taiwan over the next 18–24 months, it must occur now. How can the Army expect to appropriately transform in such a short period of time?

The Army as a Startup

In a 2021 interview, General Mike Murray, serving at the time as the commander of Army Futures Command, credited Eric Ries’s 2011 book The Lean Startup for the direction the Army was taking in transformation toward the force of 2030. In this book, Ries defines a startup as an “institution designed to create a new product or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty.” In a competitive and uncertain environment, successful startups must demonstrate value and interact with potential customers, often through iterative experimentation, to determine what works and what does not. Ring doorbell, which transformed from a homemade solution to a personal problem of its inventor into the industry leader in camera doorbells, or how Airbnb was incubated from two air mattresses and grew into a worldwide phenomenon, the success of these programs was driven by an organization’s experience with the user, not necessarily the technology itself.

Not dissimilar from these examples, following its activation in 2017, Army Futures Command introduced a strategy of prototyping and customer-centered design through its initial eight cross-functional teams representing priority focus areas for modernization and acquisition of new technology. Recognizing the need for an organization to drive this change, in that same year, Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley provided the initial vision for a new prototype formation along with additional guidance to begin supporting operations and exercises in the Indo-Pacific later that summer.

Operating as a startup within the Army, the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) would treat new tools, new tactics, and new approaches the way innovative companies treat their products—as minimum viable products—and operationalizing the Army’s emerging multidomain operations concept in the priority theater. Indeed, the MDTF was itself the Army’s minimum viable product, destined to rapidly evolve as needs became apparent. Smaller than a brigade combat team, setbacks and failures for the MDTF would help the larger Army to make cost-saving decisions while refining concepts across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy) and simultaneously set conditions to support the joint force in a potential future conflict in the Indo-Pacific. With three MDTFs now active and two more on the way, each is designed to innovate and encouraged to take risks within a structured campaign of learning forward in priority theaters.

Mess Around and Find Out

At the small-unit level, organizations stay lean by being adaptive and agile. Unbound by DOTMLPF-P constraints, they are not limited by a structured approach to learning but, rather, value iterative experimentation that is agnostic toward experimentation objectives. In other words, because these units may actually have to fight with the equipment they are given, they value product performance over sales pitch. Regular deployment of MDTF formations into priority theaters provides an optimal learning environment and makes them the choice units for transforming in contact. This is best highlighted by recent and ongoing experimentation by Indo-Pacific MDTFs with subordinate prototype formations with new disruptive technologies in long-range fires, deep sensing, and joint all-domain command-and-control capabilities.

The Army’s first long-range hypersonic battery organized and began training even before it received any equipment. Despite initial skepticism from other services about the program and setbacks in live-fire tests, the decision to deliberately build concurrency into the activation program paid dividends. By moving forward with operational unit training and certifying while simultaneously working to prototype equipment, Army senior leaders were able to announce that the organization was “ready to go” upon fielding of the missiles. More recently, the unit’s integration into joint exercises has ensured that combatant commanders understand how to use the capability and, more importantly, that they can see that the system fills the capability gap it was intended to address. With recent successes in flight tests, the Army is far closer to bringing a new operational deep-strike capability to the joint force than it would have been if it had waited on the complete DOTMLPF-P solution ahead of delivery.

The extended-range sensing and effects company introduces deep-sensing capabilities and has been testing these capabilities forward since 2022. As the Army increases the ranges of its fires along with the addition of nonkinetic effects, it also runs the risk of being able to shoot farther than it can see. With changes in technology, we can expect that the future operational environment will be saturated with sensors across the subsurface, ground, aerial, and space layers. Using iterative experimentation with high-altitude and long-endurance capabilities across multiple theaters, the unit aims to meet commanders’ requirements for deeper and more persistent sensing, supporting decision-making and delivering effects. This company’s experimentation informs requirements for the entire Army as it aims to support the joint force’s theater-wide situational awareness and understanding.

The headquarters battery for the Army’s first indirect fires protection battalion will be one of the first to employ the Army’s new integrated battle command system (IBCS). While this emerging formation has an important responsibility to protect fixed and semifixed sites from rockets, artillery, mortars, cruise missiles, and even drone threats, IBCS possesses a scalable architecture to bring multiple sensors and weapon systems into a single unified network. A higher level of integration and interoperability across sensors and shooters from this battery’s engagement operations center would enable faster decision-making against a diverse set of targets across domains. Blurring the line between artillery and air defense artillery, this unit’s experimentation outcomes could fundamentally change the way we organize and employ fires capabilities distributed across a theater of operation.

Together, these organizations are both validating and invalidating concepts in theater, driving all other aspects of DOTMLPF-P development, and creating an operational capability at a pace relevant to the threat. Optimizing the potential value of these units to the joint force can only be achieved through unit-level experimentation, underneath a combatant commander and forward in the theater of operation alongside other partners with similar interests.

But Will it Scale?

Scalability is one thing that senior leaders must keep in mind with experimentation at the small-unit level. MDTFs are not a panacea for deterrence, nor can they be penny packets of soldiers spread across a theater. The Army continues to focus on divisions as the unit of action in a conflict scenario against a near-peer adversary, with a consequent need for the corps to synchronize multidomain effects at scale. Thus, it is important to determine how these units will integrate during different phases of the fight and how command and control might need to be enhanced to enable this integration.

While most of the efforts in the continental United States to develop new command-and-control capabilities are focused at the tactical level, MDTF experimentation with its distributed units in theater necessarily drives operational- and theater-level network requirements. Even with a lean approach, it is important to understand how new and emerging formations will fight alongside legacy ones. MDTFs, along with other land forces, set conditions for the return of air and maritime power, which, in turn, sets conditions for the arrival of larger land formations. Units within the MDTF work with and rely upon forward Army elements in the contact layer to solve tough problems, such as force projection and sustainment, ahead of the arrival of additional land forces. Experimentation conducted within these theater rehearsals both informs and sets conditions for the divisions and corps that will leverage the same interior lines built by forward elements. Additionally, this multidomain experimentation has helped to further refine concepts for new theater-level formations and cross-functional teams supporting transformation across multiple echelons and time horizons.

Ready or Not

Based on the army’s timeline for budgeting, the inputs for the Army of 2030 may already be in place. Concept-driven transformation is a necessary stage in the Army’s evolution, yet the aspirational future-gazing must not blind us to the threat in the current operational environment. Similarly, the Army should tread lightly when reintroducing old concepts; new approaches will be needed for the future fight, and these must be driven by new insights developed through experimentation. Experiments in the continental United States, such as Project Convergence, are a necessary step to drive transformation across the Army, but this must be paired with experimentation forward. Indeed, recent iterations of Project Convergence have extended into priority theaters. This is because technology and equipment may be disruptive, but not decisive. Technology designed to solve problems but untested by soldiers in the environment may actually punish untrained units and unskilled commanders. To keep pace with the number one threat in the national defense strategy, people and organizations must be the drivers of change and allow other elements across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum to evolve simultaneously. Realizing this, the Army is already developing new prototype formations.

Shortly after General Shinseki described his vision of transformation toward the Army of 2030, 9/11 served as a catalyst for change. Part of the plan involved a new vehicle, which would become the Stryker, and the first Stryker brigade was in Iraq by 2003. Absent a catalyst of this level, service-wide transformation at a pace necessary to respond to today’s near-peer threats demands agile and adaptable formations with a bias toward action ahead of the receipt of new technologies. The Army cannot afford to wait.

Lieutenant Colonel Ben Blane is a field artillery officer and commands the Army’s first long-range fires battalion as part of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Columbia University and John Jay College.

Chief Warrant Officer Four Dale Hunter is an intelligence officer and formerly served as the senior intelligence warrant officer advisor in the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force. He currently serves as a readiness officer in the Department of the Army G-2. He holds an undergraduate degree from Excelsior College in Korean.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image: Bravo Battery, 5-3 FA (Long-Range Fires Battalion) deploys a long-range hypersonic launcher at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in support of a joint exercise, Resolute Hunter. (Credit: First Lieutenant David Kim, US Army)

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ben Blane, Dale Hunter · July 25, 2024

20.  The Populist Revolt Against Climate Policy

Excerpts:

The problem of short-termism should be mitigated by setting short-term intermediate targets. Hitting those targets will make progress more evident. Many climate activists invoke the prospect of calamitous conditions in 2050, but that is too distant a prospect for many people to take seriously. Even 2030 is too far away to induce today’s governments to adopt bold but politically costly climate policies. It is politically expedient to set climate goals beyond the natural duration of a legislature, so as not to be held accountable if the goal is missed. But the milestones embedded in climate policies should if possible be timed to coincide with each electoral cycle. This is certainly easier in the United States, where the presidential and congressional mandates have a fixed duration, than it would be in parliamentary systems that are predominant in Europe, where parliaments can bring down governments at any time. But even in these countries, intermediate goals should have shorter time horizons to build momentum—and even optimism—when these targets are met and people see that tangible progress is underway. In this way, governments can tackle the problem of hyperbolic discounting at the heart of populist opposition to climate policy.

They should also empower communities to have greater leeway in adopting measures, such as public-private partnerships, that develop solutions to address local challenges and opportunities, thus moving away from a politics of necessity toward one of volition. Top-down, technocratic approaches can easily trigger a populist backlash. Citizens need to feel heard and engaged in the decision-making process. A bottom-up approach that increases their political participation can make democratic systems more nimble and effective at dealing with climate change.

Of course, all these measures may not be enough. Many skeptics will be convinced by climate policies only if they offer material and financial benefits. That requires making climate-friendly technologies in energy, transportation, industry, and agriculture cheaper than their carbon-intensive alternatives. In turn, the sensible path here is to not let national security concerns get in the way of a green transition that would work for all people. Some technologies do have serious national security implications, but many associated with the green transition do not. Take, for example, solar panels. China already subsidizes their production. Western governments should take advantage of that fact to speed their installation and adoption. Similarly, tariffs on steel and aluminum make domestic production of wind turbines more costly. At a minimum, special exemptions from these tariffs should be granted for renewables production. In addition, the mix of green subsidies should be shifted toward more spending on R&D to accelerate the pace at which the price of decarbonizing falls. Over time, access to cheap green technologies will likely activate a virtuous process of domestic innovation in areas where the country has a true comparative advantage. In sum, more open trade in the short run and more innovation in the long run are needed to reduce the costs of the green transition.

Governments need to keep doing what science tells them to do. But they need to better activate the majority of people who believe in the urgency of reining in climate change. And they need policies that reduce the costs of the climate transition, so that even climate skeptics can be persuaded of the merits of going green.

The Populist Revolt Against Climate Policy

How the Culture War Subsumed Efforts to Curb Global Warming

By Edoardo Campanella and Robert Z. Lawrence

July 25, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Anglo Nostalgia: The Politics of Emotion in a Fractured West · July 25, 2024

Few analysts studying the West’s political landscape saw a populist earthquake coming a decade ago. But then, with the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom in 2016 and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States later that year, the earthquake hit. Observers were quick to see the rise of a new “silent majority” in the West, one bent on repudiating an out-of-touch elite that was either oblivious to the suffering their policies had caused or entirely indifferent to it. The effects of globalization, deindustrialization, and the financial crisis fueled the discontent at the heart of the populist wave. But other forces drove upheaval in particular countries, including concerns relating to immigrants, tax increases, budget cuts, regulatory excesses, and the general view that government programs unfairly favored the ruling class.

Now, a new populist front is opening in Western politics. Anti-establishment leaders are singling out for scorn efforts to avert global warming. Attempts to curb climate change make an almost perfect target for populist rhetoric and conspiracy theories because policies to forcibly reduce carbon emissions rely on expert knowledge, raise costs for ordinary people, require multilateral cooperation, and rest on the hard-to-prove counterfactual that such policies would stave off disasters that would otherwise happen.

Skeptics of climate policies object to the costs of the transition away from fossil fuels, which in relative terms will weigh more on poorer people and on places where fossil fuels play a significant role in the local economy, and to the often-exaggerated claims made by the promoters of the green revolution about the tremendous potential of future “green jobs.” But, as is often the case with populists, critics also frequently cite misinformation and wild conspiracy theories. Before entering the White House in 2017, for example, Trump tweeted that climate change was a hoax “created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” Spain’s far-right Vox party has labeled the UN climate agenda as “cultural Marxism.” Germany’s far-right Alternative für Deutschland has regularly accused mainstream parties of “climate dictatorship.” Few populist leaders better epitomize the turn against climate policy than Nigel Farage, the British agitator who led the campaign to leave the European Union. In 2022, he lambasted the Conservative government’s net-zero plans. “During the past decade, the people forced the political class to allow us a Brexit vote,” he said. “The same needs to happen again in relation to Net Zero.” In elections this July, he won a parliamentary seat for the far-right Reform UK party after he spent much of his campaign railing against climate policies.

This second anti-elite revolt is already in the making. In the June 2024 European Parliament election, even if the center largely held, far-right parties that are skeptical of the battle against climate change gained seats and influence, while green parties lost votes and seats. Europe’s signature Green Deal, which aims to make the EU climate neutral by 2050, is likely to be scaled back. In the United States, a Trump win in the 2024 presidential election could further undermine efforts to fight climate change. And political disruptions will likely intensify as the deadlines to meet net-zero targets loom ever closer—plans call for the world to move away from coal by 2030, from oil by 2045, and from gas by 2050.

Rational arguments are unlikely to either persuade those convinced of the perfidy of the green transition or allay the grievances that fuel the populist ferment in the West. Only economic incentives will convince doubters of the merits of climate policies. If green technologies are cheaper than brown ones, then people will adopt them. The costs of the green transition need to be reduced through more open trade in the short run and more innovation in the long run. But economic incentives alone will not be enough. Mainstream leaders need also to better mobilize their citizens through more engaging political strategies, more emotional narratives, and more bottom-up and participatory policy approaches. Governments can win backing for climate policies when those measures promise to make a tangible difference to people in the present, not simply save the planet in the future.

A PROBLEM OF HORIZONS

The rise of climate populism poses a historic test for Western liberal democracies, as short electoral cycles make it hard for politicians to sell long-term agendas. That is why former U.S. Vice President Al Gore deemed global warming in 2009 the “greatest failure of democratic governance in history” and the British scientist James Lovelock once stated that to tackle climate change “it may be necessary to put democracy on hold for a while.”

To try to convince voters of the urgency of the issue, policymakers in Western countries have framed the crisis as an imminent emergency that requires policies that should not be litigated through the normal processes of democracy. Those seeking to combat climate change often pitch this struggle as a sober obligation, an imposition that all societies must bear because science tells them to do so. Populist leaders, by contrast, succeed by espousing the politics of volition over that of necessity. Anti-establishment parties gain popularity precisely because they promise agency to their voters, often questioning the accuracy of the empirical evidence marshaled by experts and policymakers and characterizing efforts to combat climate change as an elitist project to deprive people of both power and money.

A new populist front is opening in Western politics.

With climate-related shocks rising across the world, how do populists manage to downplay the urgency of combating global warming? They do so by leveraging the propensity of humans to prioritize immediate rewards and satisfaction over future benefits. In behavioral economics, this psychological bias is known as hyperbolic discounting. That people do not worry about the future as much as their present shapes how they respond to the prospect of a warming world. To win votes, opportunistic politicians can pander to this impulse by dismissing calls for immediate climate action and decrying the costs of such policies. This is how economic populism works: through the adoption of shortsighted policies that turn out to be highly damaging in the medium and long term.

However,climate populism is not a homogeneous phenomenon across the political spectrum in terms of intensity and claims. Left-wing populists, such as the Five Stars movement in Italy, Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France, and Bernie Sanders in the United States, support climate action because they see such measures as necessary to rein in greedy corporations that use fossil fuels and pollute the environment to the detriment of ordinary people. By contrast, right-wing populists see climate policies as driven by transnational political elites who want to impose taxes and regulations no matter the burdens they place on working-class people. Left-wing populism is traditionally more cosmopolitan, while right-wing populism is frequently nationalist. Conservative voters often oppose climate policies because they see them as forms of market regulation and state activism that limit the freedom of citizens and firms. Lobbyists from carbon-intensive industries often have a hand in fomenting conservative arguments against the green transition. And climate denialism on the far right is also associated with religious beliefs: some Christian conservatives reject climate science for the same reason they oppose evolutionary theory or COVID-19 vaccination.

These views have all coalesced into polarized political positions: according to a 2024 Pew survey in the United States, 59 percent of Democrats believe dealing with climate change should be a top priority, whereas only 12 percent of Republicans do. In Europe, where unlike in the United States climate populism is chiefly the preserve of nontraditional parties, only two of the nearly 20 right-wing populist parties—Hungary’s far-right Fidesz and Latvia’s National Alliance—explicitly support the scientific consensus on the climate crisis. Some parties, including the far-right Alternative for Germany and the Dutch Party for Freedom, reject altogether the idea that humans are responsible for global warming.

LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION

To be sure, the green transition has stirred real concerns about how it may place unfair costs on poor and middle-class families. The disquiet with new regulations that drove the “yellow vest” protests among rural populations in France in 2018 flared again in 2023 in farmer protests in most major European capitals. Demonstrators decried the taxes that raise the costs of fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides. The protests forced several governments to delay the implementation of measures that are part of the green transition. In June 2023, protests in Bavaria forced the German government to water down its phaseout of gas heating systems. Similar protests have erupted in Belgium, Italy, and Spain and are still going on across Europe in different forms. Going forward, a major source of discontent in the European Union will be the application of its carbon pricing system to transportation and heating, which will invariably raise energy prices for millions of households.

In the United States, climate policies, such as they exist, have a smaller effect on prices because they emphasize subsidies and incentives over taxes. The Inflation Reduction Act, for instance, uses subsidies to encourage the development of renewable energy, not punitive taxes. But the IRA has irked many on the right because it increases government spending by close to $400 billion, according to official estimates (or, according to some analysts, by over $1 trillion). As climate policies raise U.S. debt levels, the fights over how such measures should be financed will become increasingly bitter. The IRA also promotes unions and seeks to support disadvantaged communities whose populations often consist heavily of people from racial and ethnic minorities. Such favoritism has also incurred the opprobrium of the right. The climate battle between Democrats and Republicans is also taking place at the local level. Republican-controlled legislatures in Montana, Idaho, North Dakota, and South Dakota have blocked cities from banning natural gas hookups in new buildings. In Texas, a new law will effectively prevent cities from enshrining climate policies in their charters. Should Trump return to the White House in 2025, he has promised to expand oil drilling “on day one,” eliminate the IRA, and withdraw again from the Paris climate agreement.

People protest against energy price hikes in Madrid, Spain, March 2022

Susana Vera / Reuters

U.S. President Joe Biden has insisted on several occasions that climate policy is directly related to sound economic policy. “When I hear ‘climate,’” he said in 2021, “I think ‘jobs’—good-paying union jobs.” The Biden administration claims that the IRA could create around 1.7 million jobs. But U.S. climate policies also threaten the jobs of at least 730,00 workers who work in fossil-fuels extraction, refining, and power generation, and they also affect many others who work in industries, such as chemicals and cement, that have high carbon dioxide emissions. Many of these workers lack the skills for the jobs associated with the green transition. They also may not be able to move to where those jobs will be created. The bitter auto strikes in 2023 in the United States were motivated partly by fears that the transition to electric vehicles would produce major job losses and force workers to relocate.

The green transition also threatens to exacerbate the urban-rural divide. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has found that green jobs tend to be concentrated in already prosperous cities or urban regions, such as Helsinki, London, Paris, Stockholm, and Vilnius. Remote rural regions have a much smaller share of these jobs. Rural areas in the United States and parts of Europe also tend to host renewable facilities that require space, such as solar panels and windmills, and deal with how such facilities disrupt the landscape of the countryside and reduce property values—factors that often offset the economic benefits of hosting these facilities, at least in the minds of local people. In response, 24 percent of U.S. counties have started restricting the use of land for renewable energy facilities. All the main right-wing populist leaders, from Trump to Farage to Marine Le Pen in France, have their electoral strongholds in rural areas. With the battle lines drawn, it is not hard to see in the future a concerted transnational campaign by populist parties to snub scientific elites and boycott global climate cooperation.

TELLING THE RIGHT STORY

Widening polarization in Western countries makes it all the harder to convince opponents to change their positions. But most of the public now believes in the necessity of climate change policies. According to a recent global survey conducted by the UN Development Program, 80 percent of respondents want their countries to strengthen commitments to address climate change. And according to the 2024 Pew poll, even 54 percent of Republicans in the United States say they support their country participating in international efforts to help reduce the effects of global climate change. Leaders who want to grapple with climate change head-on must find ways of better mobilizing popular support for such policies. Rather than framing the green transition as a technical problem with technocratic solutions, those promoting climate policies need to spin more compelling narratives, emphasizing how global warming threatens peoples’ traditional ways of life, their health, and the places where they live.

As explained so powerfully by the Nobel Prize–winning economist Robert Shiller, stories help propel economic events. The Biden administration has not convincingly told the story of its climate agenda. Most Americans are unaware that the IRA is designed to combat global warming, as its major climate measures are hidden behind the bill’s efforts to tamp down inflation. That was a mistake. Voters, even the most informed and politically aware, often think and act with their hearts. Proponents of climate policy should not leave playing on people’s emotions to the populist right. Instead, they should tell compelling and energizing stories about the consequences of climate inaction. Green transition advocates should highlight the health and quality-of-life benefits that would come from successful climate adaptation. They should emphasize that the most radical solutions for the green transition will not come from government intervention but from entrepreneurial genius in its purest form. And they should remind people that they have a responsibility to meet the needs of their children and grandchildren, offering voters in the present the prospect of a rosier future if only they recognize the urgency of combating climate change—even in those cases where policies might lead to increases in the cost of living.

The Biden administration has not convincingly told the story of its climate agenda.

The problem of short-termism should be mitigated by setting short-term intermediate targets. Hitting those targets will make progress more evident. Many climate activists invoke the prospect of calamitous conditions in 2050, but that is too distant a prospect for many people to take seriously. Even 2030 is too far away to induce today’s governments to adopt bold but politically costly climate policies. It is politically expedient to set climate goals beyond the natural duration of a legislature, so as not to be held accountable if the goal is missed. But the milestones embedded in climate policies should if possible be timed to coincide with each electoral cycle. This is certainly easier in the United States, where the presidential and congressional mandates have a fixed duration, than it would be in parliamentary systems that are predominant in Europe, where parliaments can bring down governments at any time. But even in these countries, intermediate goals should have shorter time horizons to build momentum—and even optimism—when these targets are met and people see that tangible progress is underway. In this way, governments can tackle the problem of hyperbolic discounting at the heart of populist opposition to climate policy.

They should also empower communities to have greater leeway in adopting measures, such as public-private partnerships, that develop solutions to address local challenges and opportunities, thus moving away from a politics of necessity toward one of volition. Top-down, technocratic approaches can easily trigger a populist backlash. Citizens need to feel heard and engaged in the decision-making process. A bottom-up approach that increases their political participation can make democratic systems more nimble and effective at dealing with climate change.

Of course, all these measures may not be enough. Many skeptics will be convinced by climate policies only if they offer material and financial benefits. That requires making climate-friendly technologies in energy, transportation, industry, and agriculture cheaper than their carbon-intensive alternatives. In turn, the sensible path here is to not let national security concerns get in the way of a green transition that would work for all people. Some technologies do have serious national security implications, but many associated with the green transition do not. Take, for example, solar panels. China already subsidizes their production. Western governments should take advantage of that fact to speed their installation and adoption. Similarly, tariffs on steel and aluminum make domestic production of wind turbines more costly. At a minimum, special exemptions from these tariffs should be granted for renewables production. In addition, the mix of green subsidies should be shifted toward more spending on R&D to accelerate the pace at which the price of decarbonizing falls. Over time, access to cheap green technologies will likely activate a virtuous process of domestic innovation in areas where the country has a true comparative advantage. In sum, more open trade in the short run and more innovation in the long run are needed to reduce the costs of the green transition.

Governments need to keep doing what science tells them to do. But they need to better activate the majority of people who believe in the urgency of reining in climate change. And they need policies that reduce the costs of the climate transition, so that even climate skeptics can be persuaded of the merits of going green.

• EDOARDO CAMPANELLA is a Research Fellow at the Mossavar Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School and a co-author of Anglo Nostalgia: The Politics of Emotion in a Fractured West.
• ROBERT LAWRENCE is Albert L. Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment at the Harvard Kennedy School and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Foreign Affairs · by Anglo Nostalgia: The Politics of Emotion in a Fractured West · July 25, 2024

21. Cambridge 'Psychological Inoculation' Lab Claims Conservatives, Millennials, Gen Z More Susceptible to 'Misinformation'

This will make some peoples' heads explode.

Cambridge 'Psychological Inoculation' Lab Claims Conservatives, Millennials, Gen Z More Susceptible to 'Misinformation' - Foundation for Freedom Online

foundationforfreedomonline.com · by Oscar Buynevich · July 19, 2024

The Cambridge Social-Decision Making Lab (CSDMLab) has a Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST) that purports to test people’s susceptibility to so-called “misinformation.” Researchers at the lab have used the results of the test to portray younger people (millennials and Gen Z) and conservatives, who tend to rely less on mainstream media sources for news, as particularly susceptible to misinformation.

The test uses a survey with headlines and asks participants to choose if they are real or fake:

The MIST takes only 2 minutes to complete, but participants are given no context other than a headline to ascertain what is supposed to be “fake” or “real.”

Cambridge indicated that “real” headlines in the survey were taken from sources such as Pew Research Center and Reuters. The “fake” headlines were developed by researchers using ChatGPT. The researchers at first said that they used the AI tool to create fake headlines that looked and felt real in an “unbiased way.”

From the University of Cambridge:

“To create false but confusingly credible headlines – similar to misinformation encountered ‘in the wild’ – in an unbiased way, researchers used artificial intelligence: ChatGPT version 2.”

While this makes it seem like their choice of headlines was free of human bias, they admit that their original, much larger set of ChatGPT-produced headlines were narrowed down by “an international committee of misinformation experts.”

“For the MIST, an international committee of misinformation experts whittled down the true and false headline selections. Variations of the survey were then tested extensively in experiments involving thousands of UK and US participants.”

“Experts” dedicated to the work of countering so-called “mis- or disinformation” often belong to the highly partisan censorship industry – their work has been documented to target populist viewpoints in particular, and speech that espouses skepticism in government.

After their study of MIST participants, Cambridge reported that “Democrats performed better than Republicans on the MIST, with 33% of Democrats achieving high scores, compared to just 14% of Republicans.” Cambridge also reported that a MIST survey showed those who consumed “legacy media” such as “Associated Press, or NPR.”

The Social Decision-Making Lab has in the past been highly preoccupied with targeting conservatives and conservative viewpoints:

• Targeting U.S. conservatives: Meta-analysis reveals that accuracy nudges have little to no effect for US conservatives.
• Targeting “climate change skeptics: ”Climate of conspiracy: Meta-analysis of the consequences of belief in conspiracy theories about climate change; Responding To Climate Change Denial.
• Targeting “vaccine skeptics:”Prebunking messaging to inoculate against COVID-19 vaccine misinformation: An effective strategy for public health.
• Targeting “election deniers:”Democratic Norms, Social Projection, and False Consensus in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election.

The study also finds that younger people and people who spend a lot of time online are more likely to fall for “misinformation” – both factors that tend to correlate with shunning the mainstream legacy media.

From the University of Cambridge:

When it came to age, only 11% of 18-29 year olds got a high score (over 16 headlines correct), while 36% got a low score (10 headlines or under correct). By contrast, 36% of those 65 or older got a high score, while just 9% of older adults got a low score.

CSDM Lab’s Partnershps

Under leadership of Sander van der Linden, the Social Decision-Making Lab has been at the forefront of research into psychological inoculation, or “prebunking.”

Van der Linden describes the technique as follows:

“Prebunking, trying to preemptively protect people before [the] damage occurs, is much more effective than debunking. So what the media described as a psychological vaccine against fake news is really based on the psychological theory of inoculation. So just as injecting yourself with a weakened dose of a virus triggers the production of antibodies to help protect you from future infection you can do the same with information by preemptively injecting people with a severely weakened dose of fake news.”

Cambridge has worked with not only the U.K. government, but also for the now-notorious censorship agencies of the U.S. government – the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency (CISA), and the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC).

The GEC worked closely with the CSDMLab, paying $275,000 in U.S. taxpayer dollars to create a counter-disinformation video game called Cat Park. FFO published an analysis of a leaked State Department memo in November 2022 that detailed plans to roll out the video game in schools globally to “inoculate” young people against populist news content especially “ahead of national elections.”

Cat Park served as the predecessor to Harmony Square, another video game which the CSDMLab created with GEC and CISA in 2020. CSDMLab personalities, including director Sander van der Linden, wrote in Harvard’s misinformation journal that the Harmony Square game would serve as a “psychological vaccine” against “political misinformation especially during elections.”

They additionally touted how their game expanded upon CISA’s counter-disinformation frameworks. At this time, CISA was involved in organizing a public-private election censorship machine that throttled Trump-supportive speech and individuals online.

The Social Decision-Making Lab’s biggest private sector partner is Google Jigsaw, a unit of the tech giant dedicated to “counter extremism” and psychological inoculation work.

FFO director Mike Benz documented Jigsaw’s ties to government influence operations and their counter-misinformation work in November 2023. Numerous researchers involved in the creation of MIST and the MIST study are involved with Jigsaw.

While speaking about the MIST study, CSDMLab’s Rakoen Maertens pointed the finger at social media usage for making young people more susceptible to misinformation. He called for new “media literacy” initiatives to be developed when discussing the findings.

Maertens’ own CV reveals that he received two separate grants from Jigsaw for counter-misinformation work.

The CV also reveals a grant from WhatsApp, Meta’s instant messaging platform and a major area of focus for the censorship industry, which has developed methods to monitor and censor seemingly private WhatsApp discussions.

Oscar Buynevich

foundationforfreedomonline.com · by Oscar Buynevich · July 19, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com