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Apologies for the tardiness. Got a late start today and then had meetings all day.
Quotes of the Day:
"Nobody makes a greater mistake than he who does nothing because he could do only a little."
– Edmund Burke
"Whatever plans we may make, we shall find quite useless when the time for action comes. Revolutions are always full of surprises, and whoever thinks he can play chess with a revolution will soon find how terrible is the grasp of God and how insignificant the human reason before the whirlwind of His breath. That man only is likely to dominate the chances of a Revolution, who makes no plans but preserves his heart pure for the will of God to declare itself. The great rule of life is to have no schemes but one unalterable purpose. If the will is fixed on the purpose it sets itself to accomplish, then circumstances will suggest the right course; but the schemer finds himself always tripped up by the unexpected."
– Sri Aurobindo
"Hardly anyone expected the American uprising (revolution) to succeed. Thousands of colonists emigrated to Canada or hid in the woods, certain that the king's armies would tear the colonial regiments to shreds. Nor did a majority of the people support the struggle for independence, even in theory. Historians estimate that one-third favored independence, one-third favored retaining British ties, and one-third were indifferent."
– James MacGregor Burns
1. Just 105 North Korean escapees arrive in South in first half of 2024: Seoul
2. Childbirths in Korea rise for 2nd month for first time in about 9 years
3. Koreas in 'fierce' cultural battle to win hearts of N. Koreans: minister
4. Strange case of Sue Mi Terry
5. How China can respond to new headache of Russia-North Korea treaty
6. Seoul daily defends publication of op-ed by indicted North Korea expert
7. South Korea’s defense export growth: a success story
8. Security Bite: North Korean hackers impersonate job recruiters to target Mac users with updated BeaverTail malware
9. “I am concerned that North Korea will treat nuclear weapons like sewage balloons.”
10. What Russia's Pact With North Korea Means
11. Trump flaunts friendship with Kim Jong-un, but… North Korea: “A credit is a credit, and a life is a life”
12. Whether Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary
13. Int'l Forum Supporting Korean People's Struggle Held
14. Teaching Juche-oriented War Tactics
15. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Significant decline in sickness and deaths due to government aid and the barley harvest
16. Breathing New Life into US Policy on North Korean Human Rights
1. Just 105 North Korean escapees arrive in South in first half of 2024: Seoul
As an aside we are spending the week with 9 escapees sponsored by the Global Peace Foundation and known as the North Korean Young Leaders Assembly. This growing group of escapees from north Korea are working on ideas for bringing change to north Korea in support of a free and unified Korea. They are learning about the American Experiment and sharing their experiences in north Korea providing us with tremdendouw insights into human rights abuses, information, and communication with the Korean people in the north. They are comparing the US independence movement with the 1919 Korean Independence movement and the Korean Dream They are spending this week in Washington meeting US government as well as elected officials and their staffs, and members of civil society, and then they will travel to Philadelphia to learn about the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and visit the Philip Jeoson memorial, and they then travel to New York for meetings at the UN to include with the US and ROK UN delegations.
Graphic at the link.
Just 105 North Korean escapees arrive in South in first half of 2024: Seoul
Figure is similar to last year and suggests heightened border controls continue to make it difficult to defect
https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/just-105-north-korean-escapees-arrive-in-south-in-first-half-of-2024-seoul/?utm
Ifang Bremer July 24, 2024
North Korean residents in Pyongyang | Image: NK News (2015)
Sixty-two North Korean escapees arrived in South Korea between April and June this year, according to unification ministry data, bringing the total number of arrivals in the first half of 2024 to just 105.
The figure is similar to the 99 escapees that arrived in the South in the first six months of last year, indicating that North Koreans are still struggling to flee after the regime expanded border controls during the pandemic.
Like last year, most of the new arrivals likely did not recently escape North Korea, Unique Kim of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) told NK News.
“Amid the increasing challenges of escaping from North Korea since 2020, this quarter’s figures represent North Korean escapees who had previously left North Korea and resided in a third country, such as China, for significant time before arriving in South Korea,” she said.
The vast majority of the new arrivals in the second quarter were women (60), while just two were men.
“Many [of these women] have experienced human trafficking in transit,” said Kim of NKDB, one of the few organizations allowed to interview defectors shortly after their arrival in South Korea.
She added that this “underscores the need for third countries to adopt protections for this vulnerable group, as well as the need for South Korea to provide greater psychosocial support in resettlement.”
In October last year, China reportedly deported some 600 North Koreans after the DPRK eased COVID-19 border controls.
Since then, there have been more reports of forced repatriations: China sent back at least 260 more North Koreans in late April, according to two South Korean human rights groups.
According to U.N. estimates, China has detained some 2,000 North Koreans in recent years for likely forced repatriation to the DPRK, where they “would be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment and other serious human rights violations … and even execution.”
In an interview with Yonhap News Agency on Tuesday, a former DPRK diplomat in Cuba who defected last year said many North Koreans residing abroad during the pandemic have attempted to escape since Pyongyang began to ease border controls last year.
“As signs of North Korea's border reopening were detected from March and April last year, many thought it was time to decide whether to return (to the North) or flee it," Ril Il-kyu, a former counselor of political affairs at the North Korean Embassy in Havana, reportedly said.
A cumulative total of 34,183 North Korean escapees — 9,552 men and 24,631 women — have now escaped to the South since Seoul began keeping records in 1998.
More than 1,000 North Koreans used to resettle in the South every year before the outbreak of COVID-19.
Edited by Bryan Betts
2. Childbirths in Korea rise for 2nd month for first time in about 9 years
Some slightly good news. Korean young people are finally getting to it.
Childbirths in Korea rise for 2nd month for first time in about 9 years
The Korea Times · July 24, 2024
A nurse takes care of an infant at a hospital in Yeongcheon, North Gyeongsang Province, in this undated file photo provided by Yeongcheon city government. Yonhap
The number of babies born in Korea rose for the second month in a row in May for the first time in about nine years, data showed Wednesday, as the country is struggling to boost its ultra-low birthrate.
A total of 19,547 babies were born in May 2024, up 2.7 percent from a year earlier, according to the data compiled by Statistics Korea.
It was the second consecutive monthly gain as the figure rose for the first time in 19 months in April by increasing 2.8 percent on-year.
It marked the first time since October 2015 that the country reported two months of gains in the number of newborns.
"The number of newly married couples rose over the past couple of years after the COVID-19 pandemic, though it is too early to say that such an uptrend would continue," an agency official said.
The rebound was also partly attributable to a base effect, as the number of newborns fell 12.5 percent on-year to come to 18,528 in May 2023, the lowest level for any May.
During the first five months of 2024, however, the number of newborns lost 2.9 percent from a year earlier.
The number of deaths shed 1.2 percent on-year to 28,546 in May 2024, and the population, accordingly, declined by 8,999.
The number of deaths has outpaced that of newborns since November 2019.
The number of couples getting married surged 21.6 percent on-year to 20,923 in May, and the number of couples getting divorced fell 5.6 percent on-year to 7,923, the data showed.
"We've seen a growing number of people in their early 30s getting married thanks in part to various measures regarding tax, housing and other fields designed to support young couples," the official added.
Korea is experiencing grim demographic changes, as many young people opt to postpone or give up on getting married or having babies in line with changing social norms and lifestyles.
The total fertility rate, which means the average number of expected births from a woman in her lifetime, hit a record yearly low of 0.72 in 2023, which came far below the 2.1 births per woman needed to maintain a stable population without immigration.
Many have also pointed to high home prices and a tough job market as major reasons.
In the first quarter of 2024, the fertility rate came to 0.76, falling 0.06 on-year.
Korea is expected to be a highly aged country by 2072 as the median age will increase from 44.9 in 2022 to 63.4 in 2072, and the population will tumble to around 36.22 million in 2072 from last year's 51 million. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · July 24, 2024
3. Koreas in 'fierce' cultural battle to win hearts of N. Koreans: minister
We were able to enjoy hearing from Minister Kim for the past two days. He is demonstrating important leadership on human rights and unification.
Koreas in 'fierce' cultural battle to win hearts of N. Koreans: minister
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 24, 2024
Seoul to thoroughly document Russia's oversight of NK's illicit actions, says unification minister
By Ji Da-gyum
Published : July 24, 2024 - 14:57
South Korea's Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho delivers his keynote speech at the 2024 International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights, Tuesday in Washington, DC. The conference is co-hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, the National Endowment for Democracy, and Human Asia. (Screen capture from the CSIS YouTube channel)
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho on Tuesday emphasized that South Korea's cultural wave is fiercely battling the cultural indoctrination of the Kim Jong-un regime to win the hearts and minds of North Koreans.
"With the influx of external culture and information such as South Korean soap operas and K-pop, many North Koreans are consuming Juche culture by day, South Korean culture by night," Kim said in his keynote speech at the 2024 International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights held in Washington.
Kim underscored in English that the pattern of cultural consumption signifies a "fierce competition between the regime's Juche culture and the people's South Korean Hallyu (Korean wave) culture over the consciousness and minds of North Koreans."
Juche, which translates to "self-reliance" via political, economic and military independence at the levels of the individual and nation state, is the state ideology of North Korea.
"The fact that more than half of the total 196 defectors last year are from the 2030 young generation (of those in their twenties and thirties) and high-ranking officials attests to the influence of South Korean culture, which is causing cracks in the rigid wall of Juche culture," Kim told participants during the first such event held overseas.
Kim explained that North Korea's "totalitarian dictatorship" places a high importance on stringent information control to exert comprehensive dominance over the minds and bodies of its citizens.
However, the Unification Ministry’s recent report indicates that these draconian measures did not stop North Korean people from accessing outside information.
The "Report on North Korean Economy and Society," based on a survey of 6,351 defectors, revealed a sharp rise in foreign video viewership: from 49.2 percent of those defecting before 2011 to 82.4 percent for those defecting after 2012.
"Considering these internal changes within North Korean society, the importance of cultural approaches is increasing alongside political and military approaches to strongly deter North Korea's military threats, making it a time to start discussions on this issue," Kim said.
Kim also noted that North Korea's continuous enactment of laws to ramp up indoctrination and ban external culture "reflects the North Korean authorities' sense of crisis regarding the rejection of Juche culture."
North Korea promulgated the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture in 2020, the Youth Education Guarantee Law in 2021 and the Law on Protecting Pyongyang Cultural Language in 2023.
Kim also issued a strong message to the Russian government, condemning the detrimental effects of the "Treaty on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" signed between the leaders of North Korea and Russia in mid-June.
"Despite being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Russian government is leading efforts to undermine UN sanctions against North Korea to import its weapons," Kim said.
Kim underscored that any cooperation aiding North Korea's military development, or maintaining and expanding the dispatch of North Korean overseas workers, constitutes a blatant breach of UN Security Council resolutions.
Kim also cautioned that the Unification Ministry's Center for North Korean Human Rights Records will meticulously document Russia's complicity in, or passive acceptance of, North Korea's illicit activities and human rights abuses.
"The exploitative labor conditions and intensity of North Korean workers dispatched overseas, along with the exploitation by North Korean authorities and the neglect by host countries like Russia, will be thoroughly documented and preserved as cases of human rights violations," he said.
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 24, 2024
4. Strange case of Sue Mi Terry
The question everyone is asking:
A lingering question is why the FBI would spend so much time and money on such an extensive operation against Terry, especially since her activities — like facilitating access to U.S. officials and promoting Seoul’s message through media contacts — don’t seem to justify such a large-scale surveillance effort.
Strange case of Sue Mi Terry
The Korea Times · July 24, 2024
Sue Mi Terry / Yonhap
NIS should do more to regain trust of US
By John Burton
The indictment of Sue Mi Terry last week has sent shockwaves through Washington’s Korea-watching community. As a respected North Korea expert and former CIA analyst, her alleged role as an unregistered agent for South Korea’s spy agency has triggered the biggest scandal in this field in years.
This case offers a glimpse into the tangled relationships within Washington’s foreign policy establishment, while also raising concerns about South Korea’s efforts to influence U.S. politics and the possibility of U.S. spying on the Korean Embassy.
Terry is a beneficiary of the revolving door that shuffles former government officials into jobs at leading U.S. think tanks. Her career began as a North Korea analyst at the CIA before moving to the National Security Council at the White House during the George W. Bush administration and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the early years of the Obama administration.
Leaving government service in 2010, she held an academic post at Columbia University as well as working for a consultancy firm before joining the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2017 and the Wilson Center in 2022. This year, she moved to the Council on Foreign Relations, where her husband, Max Boot, a conservative foreign policy commentator and a Washington Post columnist, is a senior fellow.
Her role at leading think tanks made her a go-to commentator for the U.S. media on Korean issues and she was a regular talking head on U.S. news programs. Her background meant she was a reliable promoter of the hawkish views of America’s national security establishment. It was during this period that Terry allegedly became involved in Seoul’s influence operations in Washington. She has denied accusations that she acted improperly.
The alleged recruitment of Terry by Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) would have been regarded as quite a catch because of her prominent media role and her access to officials setting U.S. policy on the two Koreas.
Given the importance of the security alliance with the U.S., Seoul has always been concerned about political developments in Washington that could impact this relationship. South Korea is one of the top lobbyists in Washington. It views U.S. think tanks as a source of both information and as a way to influence decision makers.
These influence operations are supposed to be regulated by the Foreign Agent Regulatory Act (FARA), established in 1938 to combat Nazi propaganda, which identifies those working on behalf of foreign governments. Terry is accused of violating FARA by not disclosing her alleged links with the NIS.
Seoul has resorted to illegal operations at times. The most famous incident is the Koreagate scandal in 1976, when it was disclosed that the South Korean CIA, as it was known at the time, had conducted a secret influence campaign using bribery to persuade members of the U.S. Congress to block President Jimmy Carter from withdrawing U.S. troops. In 1996, Robert Kim, a U.S. naval intelligence analyst, was arrested and convicted for handing over classified documents to Seoul.
Given this history, it would not be surprising that U.S. security agencies, especially the FBI’s counter-espionage unit, would have kept tabs on NIS agents working out of the South Korean Embassy. This surveillance could have led to exposing Terry’s alleged association with Seoul’s spy agency. The U.S. government indictment against Terry suggests that she may have been tracked by U.S. agents for as long as 15 years.
Terry admitted to FBI investigators that she had resigned from the CIA in 2008 to avoid being fired over the agency’s concerns about her contacts with NIS agents, although this did not prevent her from landing a job at the White House. The indictment is supported by recent surveillance photographs showing Terry shopping for luxury goods with NIS agents, who bought these items for her.
A lingering question is why the FBI would spend so much time and money on such an extensive operation against Terry, especially since her activities — like facilitating access to U.S. officials and promoting Seoul’s message through media contacts — don’t seem to justify such a large-scale surveillance effort.
One answer may be that the FBI believes that Seoul’s influence operations may reach further into the U.S. government. The indictment alleges that Terry talked with an NIS source about “her close relationship with a senior State Department official with responsibilities covering Korean affairs who had previously served in senior roles at the CIA and at the National Intelligence Council.” This description seems to fit Jung Pak, the top U.S. official for North Korea policy, who suddenly resigned two weeks ago after only a year in the position.
Terry's indictment comes at an awkward time for the Seoul government when it is scrambling to obtain as much information as possible about South Korea policy under a possible second Trump administration. Many in Washington will now be reluctant to share their views with South Korean officials.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant. He is a guest editorial writer of The Korea Times.
The Korea Times · July 24, 2024
5. How China can respond to new headache of Russia-North Korea treaty
Excerpts:
Russia’s increasing military cooperation with North Korea complicates China’s efforts to maintain a stable relationship with Russia and a united front on key global issues. China must navigate this delicate situation by leveraging diplomatic channels to dissuade Russia from destabilising actions and using economic incentives to influence Russia’s actions. Russia’s economy is heavily reliant on trade with China, providing Beijing with leverage.
Another strategic move China should consider is strengthening relations with South Korea, a democratic ally of the West with its own security concerns regarding North Korea. Establishing a closer relationship with South Korea via economic partnerships and joint initiatives to foster mutual trust and cooperation could provide China with valuable leverage in regional diplomacy.
In conclusion, the Russia-North Korea treaty poses significant challenges to China’s national security and regional stability. Beijing’s strategic response should involve diplomatic negotiations, strengthening ties with South Korea and firm measures to protect its interests and uphold international law. By navigating these complex dynamics, China can safeguard its interests and maintain its influence in East Asia.
How China can respond to new headache of Russia-North Korea treaty
- Beijing needs a firm response, deft diplomacy and better ties with South Korea to safeguard its interests and influence in East Asia
Listen to this article
Cao Xin
+ FOLLOWPublished: 5:30am, 24 Jul 2024
https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3271411/how-china-can-respond-new-headache-russia-north-korea-treaty
South China Morning Post · July 24, 2024
However, the treaty invoking Article 51 is critical. The article mandates reporting self-defence measures to the UN Security Council, which retains the authority to maintain or restore international peace and security.
This provision imposes two conditions: immediate reporting of self-defence actions to the Security Council and ensuring such actions do not impede the council’s authority to maintain peace. For North Korea, which is already under UN sanctions for nuclear weapons development, this means any self-defence involving nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles could be deemed illegal.
Therefore, Article 4 of the North Korea-Russia treaty significantly limits both countries’ wartime conduct, particularly North Korea’s. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely included this clause to maintain flexibility in dealing with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s regime.
03:05
Putin, Kim sign ‘strongest ever’ defence treaty amid growing tensions with the West
The primary goal of the treaty seems to be showing solidarity against the West, allowing both sides operational room in the geopolitical landscape without forming an official defence pact. This is evident as previous treaties between North Korea and the Soviet Union or China and North Korea do not have similar conditions in them.
Despite the restrictive nature of the treaty, potential Russian military aid to North Korea poses significant threats to Chinese national security. China has traditionally used economic leverage to moderate North Korean and Russian behaviour, with varying success. The new treaty jeopardises this balance in several ways.
First, Russian assistance in military technology directly threatens regional stability and China’s security interests. The treaty mentions cooperation in various scientific and technological fields, many of which could have military applications. This would increase risks to China’s national defence and border security.
The treaty could also lead to the perception that North Korea prioritises its relationship with Russia over ties with China. Reduced Chinese influence over a neighbouring country with nuclear capabilities and minimal internal restrictions could worsen China’s security. South Korea’s proximity to China adds complexity as strengthened North Korea-Russia ties could destabilise the Korean peninsula.
The Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge across the Tunmen River carries rail traffic across the Russia-North Korea border. Photo: Handout
To safeguard its interests, China must distance itself from the North Korea-Russia alliance and negotiate with Russia to prevent the transfer of nuclear missile and advanced military technology to North Korea. This will protect China’s security and uphold UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has emphasised the importance of adhering to these sanctions, stating that any country with a bilateral relationship with North Korea must comply with them.
China should also clarify Russia and North Korea’s commitment to implementing elements of May’s Sino-Russian joint statement, which includes granting Chinese fishing vessels access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River. This access is vital for China’s fishing industry and maritime security. Ensuring it would symbolise a broader commitment to cooperation and respect for international agreements.
Careful diplomacy is required to secure this access. China must emphasise the economic and mutual benefits of honouring the Sino-Russian joint statement, including the provisions on fishing access. Framing the issue within the context of broader bilateral cooperation will strengthen China’s negotiating position.
Maintaining access to the Sea of Japan would serve as a stabilising factor in the region, demonstrating China’s ability to uphold international agreements and work collaboratively with its neighbours. This can help mitigate tensions and foster a more cooperative regional environment.
03:07
Xi welcomes ‘old friend’ Putin to Beijing, affirms strength of China-Russia bond
Xi welcomes ‘old friend’ Putin to Beijing, affirms strength of China-Russia bond
China’s relationship with Russia is multifaceted, characterised by both cooperation and competition. While both share an interest in counterbalancing Western influence, their strategic objectives do not always align. The Russia-North Korea treaty exemplifies this tension.
Russia’s increasing military cooperation with North Korea complicates China’s efforts to maintain a stable relationship with Russia and a united front on key global issues. China must navigate this delicate situation by leveraging diplomatic channels to dissuade Russia from destabilising actions and using economic incentives to influence Russia’s actions. Russia’s economy is heavily reliant on trade with China, providing Beijing with leverage.
Another strategic move China should consider is strengthening relations with South Korea, a democratic ally of the West with its own security concerns regarding North Korea. Establishing a closer relationship with South Korea via economic partnerships and joint initiatives to foster mutual trust and cooperation could provide China with valuable leverage in regional diplomacy.
In conclusion, the Russia-North Korea treaty poses significant challenges to China’s national security and regional stability. Beijing’s strategic response should involve diplomatic negotiations, strengthening ties with South Korea and firm measures to protect its interests and uphold international law. By navigating these complex dynamics, China can safeguard its interests and maintain its influence in East Asia.
Cao Xin is senior researcher of The Charhar Institute. Cao Zhong also contributed to this article
South China Morning Post · July 24, 2024
6. Seoul daily defends publication of op-ed by indicted North Korea expert
Seoul daily defends publication of op-ed by indicted North Korea expert
Hankook Ilbo denies it received money to run article by Sue Mi Terry, after US alleges she wrote op-ed for ROK gov’t
https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/seoul-daily-defends-publication-of-op-ed-by-indicted-north-korea-expert/?utm
Joe Smith | Joon Ha Park July 23, 2024
Sue Mi Terry speaking at a conference | Image: New America via Flickr (April 9, 2018) (CC BY 2.0)
A South Korean newspaper has defended its decision to publish an op-ed by the recently indicted North Korea expert Sue Mi Terry, after U.S. prosecutors alleged that the former CIA analyst and White House official wrote the article at the behest of Seoul’s foreign ministry.
In a notice uploaded on Sunday, the Hankook Ilbo acknowledged that it received a request from South Korea’s foreign ministry last year to consider publishing an op-ed by Terry about President Yoon Suk-yeol’s visit to the U.S.
But the ROK daily insisted that it made the decision to run the article based on its own merits and relevance to Yoon’s trip, not because of the South Korean government’s request.
The Hankook Ilbo published the op-ed on April 27, 2023 under the title “ROK-U.S. Summit, A More Solid Road Ahead for 70 Years of Alliance.” An English-language version of the article was also uploaded to the website of the Wilson Center, where Terry worked at the time.
In a 31-page indictment filed last week, U.S. federal prosecutors alleged that Terry worked for South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) and foreign ministry for over a decade in exchange for luxury goods, expensive dinners and other perks.
The indictment states that a South Korean official asked Terry in early April 2023 to write an article for an ROK newspaper about Yoon’s planned visit to the U.S. later that month, offering $500 for her to write an op-ed about how his summit with President Joe Biden was “good for Korea and the alliance.”
The indictment noted that Terry subsequently published both a short article in a South Korean newspaper and a longer online article highlighting the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance on April 27, 2023.
“Our goal is to offer a wide range of professional viewpoints without undue bias, regardless of ideological leanings,” the Hankook Ilbo wrote in its notice on Sunday, stating that it did not receive money from the South Korean government to publish the article.
Seoul’s’s foreign ministry told NK News that it is “not appropriate” for it to comment on foreign judicial proceedings but said “requesting expert contributions is a common part of public diplomacy activities.”
“However, the $500 payment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested by the media in relation to this case is not true,” the ministry’s foreign press team said, appearing to reference the allegations in the U.S. indictment.
The U.S. accusations that Terry worked for South Korean intelligence has forced a number of media outlets and think tanks to reevaluate contributions that they’ve published by the U.S. expert over the years, in some cases even removing her work from their websites.
The federal indictment alleged that Terry also wrote an op-ed for The Washington Post about the Yoon administration’s efforts to improve ties with Japan, and the newspaper has since added an editor’s note at at the top of the op-ed outlining the allegations and stating that information about her writing the piece at Seoul’s request “would have been pertinent for The Post’s publication decision.”
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where Terry served as a senior fellow at the time of her indictment, also added editor’s notes to her pieces, noting that she was placed on unpaid administrative leave once CFR learned of the indictment.
Foreign Affairs, a magazine published by CFR, did the same, stating that the publication “requires all contributors to disclose any affiliation or activity that could present a genuine or perceived conflict of interest or call into question the integrity of their work.”
Notably, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) removed posts on its website that Terry contributed to, including a Jan. 2024 discussion with other scholars titled “North Korea in 2024: What to Expect?”
“CSIS cannot verify the independence of the scholarship of this material containing the views of Ms. Terry and has therefore archived this content pending the resolution of the charges,” the website states.
Meanwhile, the Brookings Institution added an editor’s note atop Terry’s profile page that links to articles and events that she contributed to in the past, outlining the accusations against her and stating that she “has not been a Brookings employee or affiliate.”
Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU), told NK News that it is common for governments to engage scholars in diplomatic or political matters.
“The crucial issue is whether scholars are asked to set aside their personal opinions and write according to government demands, or if the government simply utilizes the scholar’s existing viewpoints,” he said.
The expert argued that it is natural for scholars to write about significant diplomatic events or anniversaries, though he said government requests for specific arguments or positions could be problematic.
“This practice is more about providing a platform for certain viewpoints rather than coercing or forcing a particular stance,” he said.
Sue Mi Terry faces up to five years in prison if convicted of failing to register as a foreign agent. She has denied the allegations against her.
Edited by Bryan Betts
7. South Korea’s defense export growth: a success story
A partner in the arsenal of democracy.
South Korea’s defense export growth: a success story - Asia Times
Asian nation has the advantage of being able to offer battle-tested military products
asiatimes.com · by Tatiana Kanunnikova · July 21, 2024
World famous for its cutting-edge electronics and automobiles, South Korea looks set to conquer new heights. According to the 2024 Military Strength Ranking, the country is now the fifth-ranked military power in the world, yielding only to the USA, Russia, China, and India.
Recently, this Asian country has emerged as one of the fastest-growing military exporters, steadily earning recognition on the international stage. Over the last decade, South Korea’s defense exports have surged by 12%, making it the world’s 10th major supplier with a 2% share of global arms exports.
In 2021, South Korea’s military exports exceeded imports for the first time in history, although the nation still remains among the largest recipients of weapons – primarily from the US. This year, South Korea aims to secure $20 billion worth of defense exports, a sizeable growth compared with $14 billion of arms export contracts in 2023.
In the meantime, Seoul is not going to stop there, as the government has previously announced an ambitious plan to gain a 5% share of global arms exports by 2027. Reaching this goal would make South Korea the fourth-biggest defense exporter in the world.
To this end, the government pledged to strengthen support for the arms industry, placing a special emphasis on game-changing technologies such as AI and quantum physics. As part of this policy, the Defense Innovation 4.0 initiative was launched, with some progress already being made in the first half of the year.
This includes putting the nation’s second reconnaissance satellite into orbit, something that will allow Seoul to better monitor North Korea’s hostile actions. Also, the Defense AI Center was set up in Daejeon, with a function to oversee artificial intelligence development in the sector.
Four reasons for success
Making a breakthrough is not easy, and South Korea’s success story in the export market of weapons systems resulted from a whole range of factors. Uk Yang, a research fellow at the Seoul-based Asan Institute, has outlined four of them.
According to him, the first one is world-class performance.
“The advanced technologies of Korea’s civilian industry are now being applied to the development of weapons systems, enabling the development of world-class weapons systems,” Yang told this author.
Secondly, this Asian nation has the advantage of being able to offer battle-tested military products.
“South Korea’s weapons systems are developed to counter the North Korean threat and continue to be upgraded even after they enter the frontline,” he noted. “They have also been used in actual engagements with North Korea and have achieved outstanding results.”
The third strength lies in affordability.
“South Korea operates 500,000 troops against the North Korean threat, so the South Korean military has achieved economies of scale,” the expert said. “This allows it to mass-produce advanced weapons, which can be purchased at relatively affordable prices.”
And, finally, a rapid production schedule has also contributed to the success.
“In order to meet the steady demand of the South Korean military,” Yang said, “the South Korean defense industry maintains large-scale production facilities, which allows for faster delivery compared to companies in the United States and Europe.”
What South Korea has to offer
The country’s defense industry manufactures a wide range of products, including land, naval, air and space systems. This includes, among other things, light weapons, ammunition, tanks, surface combatant vessels, submarines, combat aircraft, multi-purpose satellites, space launchers and ballistic missiles.
Remarkably, the bulk of this equipment is made by six domestic producers, through joint ventures between private companies and government agencies. Apart from being a source of initial demand for defense industry products, the government also provides financial services for South Korean arms exporters to promote international sales. And recent projects have proven that the country is becoming a serious player in the global defense market.
In April, a delegation of Polish defense officials visited Seoul to ink a $1.6 billion contract for the purchase of multi-barreled missile launchers. Two years earlier, South Korea and Poland signed a framework agreement, under which a major arms export deal worth $12.4 billion was concluded. That included exports of missile launchers, tanks, light combat aircraft and self-propelled howitzers.
In the Middle East, Seoul is strengthening ties with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Specifically, the Saudi Arabia trip of South Korea’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik earlier this year resulted in a $3.2 billion deal. The two nations agreed on Riyadh’s purchasing the Cheongung II – a surface-to-air missile system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and aircraft at a 40-kilometer altitude.
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Closer to home, South Korea’s chief of the state arms procurement agency, Seok Jong-gun, met with his Malaysian counterparts in May to discuss ways to deepen arms industry cooperation. Last year, Malaysia had already chosen Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) to supply 18 FA-50 Block 20 fighters for $920 million. Now, the partners are set to negotiate another batch to be supplied no later than in 2027.
It is worth noting that, compared with the Block 10 variant, which is owned by the South Korean Air Force itself, the Block 20 is a more advanced one. The aircraft is equipped with a modern radar system and can be used to conduct beyond-visual-range air-to-air missions.
Why defense exports matter to South Korea
Foreign commerce is a major source of the country’s outstanding economic growth, accounting for a high percentage of GDP. As an export-oriented nation, South Korea benefits from foreign trade diversification, and the international sales of domestically produced weapons systems are a shining example of that. Not only have its defense exports seen growth in sales figures, but the customer base and product range have been expanding, too.
Not least important is a matter of national security. Through lucrative deals and overseas orders, arms exports contribute to the development of the domestic defense industry, increasing the country’s military capacity. This is particularly relevant in the case of South Korea, a country that has to deal with an ongoing threat and unpredictability emanating from its northern neighbor.
asiatimes.com · by Tatiana Kanunnikova · July 21, 2024
8. Security Bite: North Korean hackers impersonate job recruiters to target Mac users with updated BeaverTail malware
The all purpose sword continues to cause problems.
Security Bite: North Korean hackers impersonate job recruiters to target Mac users with updated BeaverTail malware - 9to5Mac
9to5Mac · by Arin Waichulis · July 23, 2024
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Security researchers have identified an attempt by state-sponsored hackers from North Korea (DPRK) to target Mac users with infostealer malware through a trojanized meeting app.
Once infected, the malware would establish a connection between the Mac and the attacker’s command and control (C2) server to exfiltrate sensitive data like iCloud Keychain credentials. It was also found to quietly install the remote desktop application AnyDesk and keylogging software in the background to take over machines and collect keystrokes.
The malware, a new variant of a known strain dubbed “BeaverTail,” was first reported by MalwareHunterTeam via a post on X. While BeaverTail was an existing JavaScript info stealer discovered in 2023, it now appears to have been reworked to target Mac users with a malicious disk image titled “MicroTalk.dmg.”
Security researcher and author Patrick Wardle analyzed the malware in a fairly comprehensive and hilariously titled blog post on Objective-See. Wardle found that hackers were most likely posing as job recruiters, tricking victims into downloading what appeared to be the legitimate video conferencing platform MiroTalk, hints the “MicroTalk.dmg” disk image file name, but was actually a clone containing hidden malware.
About Security Bite: Security Bite is a weekly security-focused column on 9to5Mac. Every week,Arin Waichulis delivers insights on data privacy, uncovers vulnerabilities, and sheds light on emerging threats within Apple’s vast ecosystem of over 2 billion active devices.
This wouldn’t be the first report of North Korean hackers posed as job recruiters to target victims. Palo Alto Network’s infamous Unit42 research group recently reported on a similar story titled: “Hacking Employers and Seeking Employment: Two Job-Related Campaigns Bear Hallmarks of North Korean Threat Actors.”
According to Wardle’s analysis, the malicous MicroTalk clone containing the malware is unsigned or hasn’t been registered with Apple by an identified developer, so macOS Gatekeeper will prevent the application from executing. However, users can circumvent the block by right-clicking and hitting “Open” from the shortcut menu.
Malicious disk image containing the MicroTalk clone. Image via Objective-See
Gatekeeper is a regular headache for cybercriminals targeting Mac users. In fact, it’s become such an effective nuisance that in some cases, they instruct the user to open the malicious application the “Correct” way (aka right-clicking and hitting “Open”) instead of double-clicking.
Unsigned macOS Gatekeeper notification. Image via Objective-See
Once infected, the malware communicates with C2 servers to download and extract data, including iCould KeyChain credentials and browser extension IDs of popular cryptocurrency wallets, which can be used to steal private keys and mnemonic phrases. What’s most elusive, however, is when the malware was discovered last week, it could pass through antivirus scanners, like VirusTotal, completely undetected. Cybercriminals will upload their executables on platforms like VirusTotal to ensure the malicious aspects are hidden well enough to remain undetected from popular scanners. The downside is the “good guys” can see them too.
“Specifically from the symbol’s output, we see methods names (fileUpload, pDownFinished, run) that reveal likely exfiltration and download & execute capabilities,” according to Ojective-See’s blog post.
“And from embedded strings we see both the address of the likely command & control server, 95.164.17.24:1224 and also hints as to the type of information the malware collect for exfiltration. Specifically browser extension IDs of popular crypto-currency wallets, paths to user browsers’ data, and the macOS keychain. Other strings are related to the download and execution of additional payloads which appear to malicious python scripts.”
At the end of the day, I wouldn’t be surprised if this is the work of BlueNoroff, a subgroup of the nation-state’s well-known cybercrime enterprise, Lazarus Group. There have been several distinctive cases of BlueNoroff often reaching out to potential victims under the disguise of an investor or company head hunter. If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.
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9. “I am concerned that North Korea will treat nuclear weapons like sewage balloons.”
I spent a week in Mongolia with the Ambassador. An interesting gentleman with important experience in north Korea. Needless to say I disagreed with part of his views on Korean unification. He is absolutely right that there will be no peaceful unification as long as the Kim family regime is in power. But peaceful unification is possible after there is regime transformation generated by Koreans in the north. This is why there needs to be peaceful unification planning. And if unification happens through war or regime collapse all the planning for peaceful unification will have application in those scenarios as well. He like, most people (especially those infected with the disease of "US unification dismissiveness") are stuck on the fact that nothing is possible as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. He, like other people, needs just a little bit of imagination.
He has/had no clue about the extent of our planning for regime collapse.
This is a Google translation.
“I am concerned that North Korea will treat nuclear weapons like sewage balloons.”
https://weekly.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=36036
[Interview] John Everard, Former British Ambassador to North Korea
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Former British Ambassador to North Korea John Everard being interviewed. Photo: Newsis
“Get your rotten tomatoes ready. I’m going to tell you something that will upset many of you here. Unification is possible. But is ‘peaceful unification’ possible?”
These are the words of former British Ambassador to North Korea John Everard, who began his keynote speech at the Mongolia Forum held at a hotel in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia on July 9. He pointed out that “peaceful unification can only be achieved when the North Korean regime decides that it is in their interest,” and that “if North Korea does not change its regime, unification may only strengthen China’s position.”
Why did he make the bitter remark, “Now is the worst time to think about the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula” at a forum discussing the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula? After the forum, I met former Ambassador Everard. He stayed in Pyongyang as the British Ambassador from February 2006 to July 2008, and experienced North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the October 4th Inter-Korean Summit in 2007, and the shooting of a tourist at Mt. Kumgang in 2008.
- What are the differences between the time you were ambassador to North Korea and the current North Korea? “At that time, Pyongyang was less developed and quieter than it is now. There were fewer restaurants and coffee shops, and not many cars passing by. However, I could feel that there was great optimism among the Pyongyang residents at that time. On the other hand, the current North Korean residents are quite worried about their future.”
- Recently, North Korea has been sending waste balloons to South Korea and continuing provocations. “The waste balloons show the vulnerability of the North Korean regime. North Korea responded to South Korea’s distribution of anti-North Korea leaflets with waste balloons. It is quite predictable how South Korea will react to this. The waste balloons only revealed the childishness of the North Korean leadership. I am worried that North Korea will treat nuclear weapons in this way. If we make a hasty judgment about using nuclear weapons without thinking it through, it could be disastrous.”
- North Korea is defining South Korea as a “hostile belligerent” and is working to erase the concepts of unification and nationhood. “North Korea is concerned that the regime could be shaken by South Korean culture. The Kim Jong-un regime knows that many North Korean youth watch South Korean dramas and other broadcasts, and wants to stop this. It is trying to maintain its regime for a long time by severing relations with South Korea. Shouldn’t there be a justifiable reason to provoke South Korea? That’s why it has defined South Korea as an enemy. North Korea is shrinking its own world by withdrawing embassies from Africa and Europe.”
- North Korea signed a 'comprehensive strategic partnership treaty' with Russia. The international community is paying attention, as some are evaluating it as a de facto military alliance. "This treaty signing can be seen as a huge success for Kim Jong-un. However, it is quite a contrast that he has achieved great diplomatic success while facing serious domestic problems. It should be noted that the Russian parliament has not yet ratified the treaty. Russia knows that if it crosses the red line set by President Yoon Seok-yeol, South Korea can send its military to Ukraine. How much of a threat will the treaty actually be?"
- At this forum, I asked a skeptical question about whether ‘peaceful unification’ is possible. “Even if an agreement on unification is reached in Korea, peaceful unification is extremely difficult. How can we persuade the North Korean regime to commit political suicide? As long as the Kim Jong-un regime maintains power and maintains the current course, peaceful unification is impossible. We can think of a scenario of unification through chaos in North Korea, but if chaos actually occurs in North Korea, China could send troops under the pretext of stabilizing North Korea. We need to consider the possibility of China intervening in North Korea.”
10. What Russia's Pact With North Korea Means
Excerpts:
So this pact, by the wording, again, as I said, the language is very similar to the 1961 pact, and it states that if one or the other is attacked, the other will come to their aid with everything at their disposal.
So the language of that is really interesting. I don’t think it’s going to change very much in the short or even medium term.
But it really depends on how those words are interpreted.
So what potentially could happen, and I’m not saying it will, but let’s say Ukraine launches a counteroffensive into Crimea, which Russia claims is its own.
Does that count as an attack on Russian territory?
And would that require North Korean intervention?
Possibly.
Similarly, and this is something that European countries have been trying to avoid, is if there’s a strike on Russian territory using Western hardware, does that count?
What Russia's Pact With North Korea Means
247wallst.com · by Austin Smith · July 23, 2024
Investing
Austin Smith
Published: July 23, 2024 7:54 am
A Friendship That’s Putting The World On Edge
Military and defense expert Michael Muir examines the implications of the recent North Korea-Russia security pact. He explores the historical context of their relationship and the potential consequences of their alliance, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
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Transcript:
Let’s stick with sanctioned countries here real quick and talk about North Korea, South Korea.
I’m curious. So North Korea just had a pact with Russia and you alluded to earlier that there’s been allegations that North Korea shipped arms to Russia.
What does this North Korea-Russia pact look like?
What does it mean?
Sure. It’s actually very, very similar to a security pact the Soviet Union and North Korea had.
That was signed in 1961, and the language is remarkably similar in this pact.
Again, there’s a pretty long history between North Korea and Russia.
It goes back to the tail end of World War II, the Korean War.
We don’t need to really get into the specifics, but North Korea’s foreign policy for a long time was to play off Russia and China as two communist states against one another.
Then when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia sort of distanced itself from North Korea.
Yeltsin didn’t really have too much interest in maintaining ties with Pyongyang and preferring South Korea.
But then when Putin came into power, then that began to change, and again, when you are without a lot of friends on the world stage, you’ll take what you can get.
But yeah, what North Korea has to offer Russia is artillery shells, and a lot of them.
Its arms industry is quite closely aligned to the Soviet Union, so it’s quite well—it was quite close to the Soviet Union, so the munitions that North Korea are building are, you know, compatible with Russian artillery.
So this pact, by the wording, again, as I said, the language is very similar to the 1961 pact, and it states that if one or the other is attacked, the other will come to their aid with everything at their disposal.
So the language of that is really interesting. I don’t think it’s going to change very much in the short or even medium term.
But it really depends on how those words are interpreted.
So what potentially could happen, and I’m not saying it will, but let’s say Ukraine launches a counteroffensive into Crimea, which Russia claims is its own.
Does that count as an attack on Russian territory?
And would that require North Korean intervention?
Possibly.
Similarly, and this is something that European countries have been trying to avoid, is if there’s a strike on Russian territory using Western hardware, does that count?
Possibly.
11. Trump flaunts friendship with Kim Jong-un, but… North Korea: “A credit is a credit, and a life is a life”
This is a google translation.
Trump flaunts friendship with Kim Jong-un, but… North Korea: “A credit is a credit, and a life is a life”
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Then-US President Donald Trump and North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un shaking hands at Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. Photo: Newsis
When former US President Donald Trump, the Republican candidate for the US presidential election in November, showed off his close relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, North Korea responded by saying that he was "inflating his expectations about the prospects for North Korea-US relations."
North Korea's state-run media outlet, Korean Central News Agency, drew a line on the 23rd, saying, "North Korea-US relations depend on the actions of the US." It refuted this by saying that personal relations and diplomacy are different. Korean Central News Agency said, "No matter what administration is inaugurated in the US, the chaotic political atmosphere of the two parties' back-and-forth will not go away, and therefore we do not care about it."
He also emphasized that "although Trump is trying to develop a personal relationship with North Korea, North Korea still views the U.S. policy as hostile," and that "Trump has not actually brought about positive changes in relations with North Korea."
He continued, "It is true that when Trump was president, he emphasized the personal friendships between leaders and tried to reflect them in relations between countries," but drew a clear line, saying, "A credit is a credit and a life is a life, and a country's foreign policy and personal feelings must be clearly separated."
Earlier, on the 18th (local time), former President Trump showed off his personal friendship with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un in his acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination. Trump said, “When I return to the White House, I will get along well with Kim Jong-un,” and “I think he will want me to come back and miss me.”
Former President Trump met with Chairman Kim Jong-un three times, starting with the first-ever US-North Korea summit held in Singapore in June 2018 while he was still president.
However, the second US-North Korea summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam in February 2019 ended without a deal, and the third US-North Korea summit held in Panmunjom in June of the same year also ended without any significant results.
12. Whether Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary
The Propaganda and Agitation Department always has it backward. It is up to Kim Jong Un whether the confrontation will stop. The US and ROK/US alliance are simply implementing prudent defensive measures in the face of north Korean aggressiveness.
Whether Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1721687985-638655645/whether-second-hand-of-dprk-u-s-confrontation-stops-or-not-depends-on-u-s-act-kcna-commentary/
Date: 23/07/2024 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source
Pyongyang, July 23 (KCNA) -- The U.S. is running high fever in its move to expand the overall structure of confrontation against the DPRK.
According to the data released on July 21, more than ten FA-18 Super Hornets belonging to an attack squadron of the U.S. marines, named Fighting Bengals, were recently deployed in the Suwon Air Force Base in Kyonggi Province of the ROK.
The U.S. Defense Department said that it is aimed at providing the experience in operation in the Indo-Pacific region, adding that these fighters are training to increase their preparedness and the power of fatal blow with its ally.
And as if threatening someone, it opened to the public the several FA-18 Super Hornets taking off.
It is said that these fighters will stay in the ROK in and after August for different joint exercises.
It is known to the world that FA-18 Super Hornet is the one for special warfare which has its mission to hit the major bases and the "war command" of the other party with JDAM and other precision guided bombs in the way of "high-density strike".
The ROK military side, encouraged by the bluffing of its master, said that "as the powerful air forces of the U.S. marines are permanently deployed in fact, the effect of increasing the deterrence against the north is also expected".
This being a hard reality, a few days ago, the U.S. made a spokesperson for the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador to the ROK and others let loose a spate of rhetoric about dialogue, saying that the U.S. policy toward the DPRK including dialogue remains unchanged and the door of negotiations with the DPRK is still opened.
The confrontation maniacs, suffering from the endemic like the "hostility toward the DPRK", are talking about honeyed dialogue. This is prompted by the ulterior intention to easily realize their ambition for stifling the DPRK by leading it to mental and psychological slackness.
Dialogue with sinister attempt and such dialogue as an extension of confrontation are needless to be held from the outset.
Through the decades-long relations with the U.S., the DPRK has keenly and fully felt what the dialogue brought to it and what it lost.
Watching the whole course of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, the fair international community has already come to a conclusion that the U.S. is a perfidious country which does not fulfill its promises, saying this or that.
The DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework was adopted as a result of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue during the Clinton administration, but the U.S. had put the brake on its implementation under this or that pretext and completely scrapped it while entering the Bush administration. This is a typical example.
It admits of no argument about the reliability as regards the political climate of the U.S. which "cooks" at random the inter-state agreement solemnly declared before the world in conformity with the "taste" and "feeling" of the political faction in power whenever the government is replaced and throws away it like "waste".
All facts go to prove that the U.S. is a "backward country and rogue state in politics" which makes no scruple of turning over the inter-state treaty and agreement in a moment.
Amid the full-dress presidential election race in the U.S., Trump, who has been officially confirmed as a candidate for the Republican Party, said in his speech of acceptance for candidate that "I got along with them and it is nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons and otherwise", thus buoying a lingering desire for the prospects of the DPRK-U.S. relations. Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this.
It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of states in the relations between states, but he did not bring about any substantial positive change.
He that puts on a public gown must put off a private person. The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished.
For nearly 80 years since the founding of the DPRK, the U.S. has pursued the most vicious and persistent hostile policy toward it.
The DPRK has bolstered up its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S.
Due to the serious strategic mistakes of the successive administrations, the era has come when the U.S. should really worry about its security.
No matter what rhetoric like dialogue and negotiations it may let loose while frequently staging frantic war rehearsals for aggression foreseeing the nuclear operation by dispatching nuclear strategic assets regardless of the time and reinforcing the ultra-modern weapons and equipment, can we believe it?
The U.S. had better make a proper choice in the matter of how to deal with the DPRK in the future, while sincerely agonizing the gains and losses in the DPRK-U.S. confrontation.
Whether the second hand of the DPRK-U.S. confrontation stops or not entirely depends on the U.S. act. -0-
www.kcna.kp (Juche113.7.23.)
13. Int'l Forum Supporting Korean People's Struggle Held
I wonder why no US Korea watchers were invited to speak at this forum? (note sarcasm with this KCNA report)
Int'l Forum Supporting Korean People's Struggle Held
Date: 23/07/2024 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1721725551-689943694/intl-forum-supporting-korean-peoples-struggle-held/
Pyongyang, July 23 (KCNA) -- An international forum supporting the just struggle of the Korean people for sovereignty and peace took place in Cairo of Egypt from June 25 to 29 on the occasion of the June 25-July 27 month of anti-U.S. joint struggle.
On display at an internet website opened for the successful forum were a photo of the statues of President Kim Il Sung and Chairman Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill and a photo of the respected General Secretary Kim Jong Un .
Also carried on it were a book showing the history of Kim Jong Un 's devoted and revolutionary activities for the people's wellbeing and congratulatory letters and written speeches sent to the forum.
And posted were data on the historical facts disclosing the true colors of the U.S. imperialists as provokers of the Korean War and their brutal atrocities, and photos and video showing their shameful defeat.
Attending the forum were personages of the Arab, African and Asia-Pacific regional committees for friendship and solidarity with the Korean people, the European Regional Committee for Friendship with the Korean People, the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Committee for Solidarity with the DPRK, international democratic organizations and political parties of different countries, members of the Regional Office of the Arab-Korean Cooperation Council and organizations for friendship and solidarity with the Korean people in different countries and Juche idea followers.
The chairman of the Arab Regional Committee for Friendship and Solidarity with the Korean People addressed the forum.
Then followed speeches.
A statement of the Socialist Workers' Party of Egypt and a joint statement of the British Association for the Study of Songun Policy, the British Group for the Study of the Juche Idea and the British Branch of the Korean Friendship Association noted that the U.S. has persistently pursued a hostile policy toward the DPRK as the latter stands against the imperialists' moves for "globalization" under the uplifted banner of independence.
The statements stressed that the Korean people led by H.E. Kim Jong Un would surely win in the confrontation with the U.S., the enemy of mankind, as proven by the great Korean people's history of struggle, and that the world people would support the Korean people and get united around the DPRK.
A letter to Kim Jong Un was adopted at the forum.
Also, an appeal to the world progressives was made public. -0-
www.kcna.kp (Juche113.7.23.)
14. Teaching Juche-oriented War Tactics
You really have to appreciate the regime's propaganda and ideological focus.
And the political is more important than any other training.
Excerpts:
Noting that it was an important duty of soldiers to conduct military and political training well, he said: First of all, you should well receive political training. Through political lessons the People’s Army units should thoroughly instil the Party’s lines and policies into the soldiers so that they could act as intended by the Party.
Giving as gift a submachine gun, on which the slogan “Annihilate the US imperialist aggressors!” is etched, to every of the DPRK heroes and exemplary combatants, he said that the rifles were permeated with the precious blood and sweat shed by the revolutionary forerunners and other Korean people and called on them to destroy the US imperialist aggressors to the last by means of those arms.
Teaching Juche-oriented War Tactics
Date: 24/07/2024 | Source: Naenara (En) | Read original version at source
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1721819205-616693361/teaching-juche-oriented-war-tactics/
During the Fatherland Liberation War (June 25, 1950—July 27, 1953) President Kim Il Sung made sure that the military and political training was intensified among service personnel and dogmatic tendencies were overcome in the military field.
In June Juche 40 (1951) he summoned the DPRK heroes and exemplary combatants from the front to the Supreme Headquarters to have a talk with them.
Noting that it was an important duty of soldiers to conduct military and political training well, he said: First of all, you should well receive political training. Through political lessons the People’s Army units should thoroughly instil the Party’s lines and policies into the soldiers so that they could act as intended by the Party.
Giving as gift a submachine gun, on which the slogan “Annihilate the US imperialist aggressors!” is etched, to every of the DPRK heroes and exemplary combatants, he said that the rifles were permeated with the precious blood and sweat shed by the revolutionary forerunners and other Korean people and called on them to destroy the US imperialist aggressors to the last by means of those arms.
One January day, while having a talk with commanders and political officers of the Korean People’s Army, he pointed to the need to overcome the dogmatic tendencies in the military field. As Westerners use knives and forks to have meals, we couldn’t follow suit, he said, adding we had better dine using a spoon and chopsticks following our traditional table manners and we should also deal with foreign war tactics in this way.
True to his instructions, while displaying matchless bravery and mass heroism in every battle, the KPA service personnel made the best use of mortars and howitzers to suit the topographical conditions of their mountainous country and took advantage of its mountainous landform, thus making tangible contributions to winning the war.
Yang Ryon Hui
15. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Significant decline in sickness and deaths due to government aid and the barley harvest
Rarely do we see any even slightly good news. But this article stil describes terrible conditions that result from regime policies and methods of governing/ruling.
＜Inside N. Korea＞Significant decline in sickness and deaths due to government aid and the barley harvest
asiapress.org
A guard post built by urban residents to prevent crop thieves and surveil the border. It appears to be a farmhouse of the “Worker-Peasant Red Guards,” a paramilitary force. Photographed from the Chinese side in late September 2023 in Sackju County, North Pyongan Province (ASIAPRESS)
North Korea experienced a severe humanitarian crisis from early spring to September last year, with many deaths due to starvation and disease, particularly among urban residents in provincial areas. However, this year, the situation is said to be improving as the government’s relief measures for vulnerable groups are taking effect. (ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Ji-won)
◆ Criticism of top North Hamgyong Province party official for causing famine
Since the spring of 2023, information on the spread of hunger has been continuously reported by reporting partners living in the northern regions of North Pyongan Province, Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province. As the Kim Jong-un regime tightened regulations on private economic activities such as business, urban residents in particular lost significant cash income, worsening their living conditions. Many lives were lost among vulnerable groups, including the elderly, households with sick members, and single-parent families.
In some provincial cities, the situation deteriorated to the point of famine. In late June last year, the Kim Jong-un regime strongly criticized a Workers' Party official in North Hamgyong Province for causing a serious crisis. A reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province who is a party member explained the situation as follows:
"When I attended a meeting for party members, I heard that the top officials of the North Hamgyong Province chapter of the Workers' Party were ordered to submit self-criticism reports. At the meeting they were also severely criticized for “not fulfilling their roles as provincial and city party officials, being too preoccupied with maintaining their positions, not properly dealing with the chaos in people's lives, and just sitting idly by without taking any action, which has led to various social problems.”
The northern region had a good potato harvest, so the crisis in various areas temporarily eased from September, when the harvest began.
Regarding the humanitarian crisis in 2023, ASIAPRESS has not received any reliable information about the situation in Pyongyang or the breadbasket region of the two Hwanghae provinces.
◆ Authorities survey starving families and distribute corn
A reporting partner in Ryanggang Province recalls the situation in early spring: "With the fear of starvation from last year still fresh in their minds, many people were worried about how they would survive from around March to the fall of this year. When the elderly gathered daily at a district office in downtown Hyesan to demand food, a riot broke out at the end of March and the police were called in to disperse them. After that, the people’s committee (local government), under party orders, conducted a thorough survey of "food-short households."
※ "Food-short households" refers to families who have run out of both food and money.
In Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province, where ASIAPRESS conducted its investigation, the authorities checked the living conditions of all households through the inminban system. Workplace managers visited homes where people couldn't come to work because of malnutrition. Households without food were given free maize, albeit in small quantities of a few kilograms each.
"Since everyone was struggling, there were many complaints that it was unfair to distribute corn only to 'food-insecure households,' but the number of people dying of starvation dropped significantly," said the Ryanggang Province reporting partner.
※ Inminban: The lowest administrative unit in North Korea. Each unit consists of about 20-30 households.
◆ Farmers also catch a break due to good barley harvest - "No starvation deaths this year"
The period between the consumption of the entire harvest distribution of the previous fall and the corn harvest in September is called the "barley hump." Even in rural areas where food is produced, there are peasants who can't go to work in the collective farms because of malnutrition every year during the "barley hump" period.
The state also took measures for rural areas before the start of the agricultural season. Another reporting partner surveyed Farm A in North Hamgyong Province in April. Six months later, after the fall harvest, Chinese white rice was lent to "households without food supplies" on the condition that they repay it with 30% interest.
In addition, when Farm A was surveyed in early July, "the harvest of barley, which is a double crop, was good, so it was distributed free of charge to households without food. There are no starving people on Farm A this year," the reporting partner said.
While many people are still struggling with economic hardship, the number of people dying from hunger and disease in mid-July, at least in the northern regions, was significantly lower than last year.
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)
asiapress.org
16. Breathing New Life into US Policy on North Korean Human Rights
We will be at the Hudson Institute this Friday with our friends from north Korea. Please join us.
RSVP at the link. https://www.eventbrite.com/e/breathing-new-life-into-us-policy-on-north-korean-human-rights-tickets-952638747137
Friday, July 26
Breathing New Life into US Policy on North Korean Human Rights
https://www.eventbrite.com/e/breathing-new-life-into-us-policy-on-north-korean-human-rights-tickets-952638747137
The North Korean people continue to endure immense suffering at the hands of the Kim regime...
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Date and time
Friday, July 26 · 11am - 12pm EDT
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Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004
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About this event
Event lasts 1 hourThe North Korean people continue to endure immense suffering at the hands of the Kim regime. Post-COVID-19 indicators suggest that conditions inside the country are worsening. Heightened state-imposed isolation has cut off the North Korean people from critical lifelines like the use of informal markets for livelihood and sustenance, as well as from outside information. Even fewer North Koreans are making it to freedom beyond the country’s borders than before the pandemic.
But the lucky few who escape are forging new lives for themselves and identifying new lines of effort to bring freedom and human rights to the North Koreans who were left behind. Join Hudson for a conversation with the new generation of North Korean refugees on the future of American and South Korean policy to address the North Korean human rights challenge.
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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