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Quotes of the Day:
"The soldier has to steer between the danger of repeating the errors of the past because he is ignorant and remaining bound by theories deduced from past history although changes in conditions have rendered these theories obsolete."
– Sir Michael Howard
"Preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little--study. However changed and strange the new conditions of war maybe, not only generals, but politicians and ordinary citizens may find there is much to be learned from the past that can be applied to the future."
– Field Marshal Slim, Defeat into Victory
"The oldest, shortest words— "yes" and "no"— are those which require the most thought."
– Pythagoras
1. Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Autocracy's Global Playbook
2. Trump’s Biggest Volatility Risk? Taiwan
3. US-built Gaza aid pier will be dismantled after troubled mission
4. Russia conscripts 150,000 troops as Ukraine says it needs more
5. Opinion | Americans always need an existential threat. This time, it’s each other.
6. How Trump’s Security Failed to Stop an Assassination Attempt
7. Incivility and the Tragedy of the Commons
8. Ukraine defense chief says his nation will find a way no matter who wins US election
9. Italy carrier strike group joins Australia war games, will visit Philippines
10. Opinion | What’s holding up a Gaza cease-fire?
11. The Battle of the Promised Conquest: The Four Pillars of the Houthi Grand Strategy
12. Russia’s ‘New’ Artillery Piece Is A 70-Year-Old Behemoth Firing North Korean Shells
13. U.S. Air Force culture needs a reboot
14. Europe, US worry about Russia’s hybrid warfare attacks
15. America's Adversaries React to the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump
16. Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Integrating Maritime Statecraft and Strategy
17. Nuclear Must Be Part of The Solution
18. The Imperial Presidency Unleashed
1. Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Autocracy's Global Playbook
I just ordered this book (to be released on July 23d).
"Autocracy, Inc." Perhaps we should adopt that term instead of the axis of autocracies/dictators etc.
In strategic competition the dominant threat or problem we face is one of political warfare supported by hybrid military approaches – and these approaches can be described as irregular warfare.
Excerpts:
Applebaum, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for The Atlantic, isn’t breaking new ground in exposing this cooperative network. Hal Brands, Samantha Power, and Maria Stephan have been writing about autocratic forces working in tandem to spread their influence and nourish their survival since about 2021. Rather, the value of Autocracy, Inc. lies in its detailed analysis of modern autocratic cooperation, its juxtaposition of current challenges with historical episodes of repression, and its guidance on how to fight back.
In presenting her case, Applebaum paints an alarming picture of contemporary autocratic power and reach, while, perhaps unknowingly, revealing how the United States’ autocratic adversaries are coalescing around common IW advantages. Viewed through the lens of IW, Applebaum’s analysis makes clear that countering Autocracy, Inc.’s efforts requires both understanding their intricacies and investing in initiatives that undermine their efficacy while still embodying the very democratic values they are employed to dismantle.
Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Autocracy's Global Playbook - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by Ania Zolyniak · July 18, 2024
Anne Applebaum, Autocracy, Inc. The Dictators Who Want to Run the World, (Penguin Random House 2024)
Irregular warfare (IW), often hailed as the oldest form of warfare, remains an enigma within the US defense apparatus and government at large. The Department of Defense (DoD) offers conflicting definitions, while Congress’s attempt at clarification in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 only muddies the waters further. This definitional quagmire, as Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael Nagata astutely observed, has left the United States struggling in its efforts to become “the most effective practitioner [of IW] around the world.”
While the United States grapples with semantics, its adversaries have wholeheartedly embraced IW as their preferred mode of confrontation. Autocratic forces, both in liberal and illiberal polities, are dismantling borders to establish a globalized support network that ensures their survival and enables their coordinated efforts to reshape the post-1989 world order.
Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Autocracy’s Global Playbook – Insider: Short of War
Enter Anne Applebaum’s latest work, Autocracy, Inc. Set for release on July 23rd, this book offers a compelling account of how autocrats are collectively fortifying their domestic and international power. Applebaum, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for The Atlantic, isn’t breaking new ground in exposing this cooperative network. Hal Brands, Samantha Power, and Maria Stephan have been writing about autocratic forces working in tandem to spread their influence and nourish their survival since about 2021. Rather, the value of Autocracy, Inc. lies in its detailed analysis of modern autocratic cooperation, its juxtaposition of current challenges with historical episodes of repression, and its guidance on how to fight back.
In presenting her case, Applebaum paints an alarming picture of contemporary autocratic power and reach, while, perhaps unknowingly, revealing how the United States’ autocratic adversaries are coalescing around common IW advantages. Viewed through the lens of IW, Applebaum’s analysis makes clear that countering Autocracy, Inc.’s efforts requires both understanding their intricacies and investing in initiatives that undermine their efficacy while still embodying the very democratic values they are employed to dismantle.
Misinformation/Disinformation
Disinformation in warfare may be as old as war itself and is even permitted under international humanitarian law. However, Autocracy, Inc.’s tactics, depart from traditional disinformation campaigns in both kind and degree. Rejecting battlefield delimitations, autocrats pursue a “permanent and comprehensive struggle” against their opponents, exploiting globalized information and communication technologies. The Internet has become their potent IW tool, allowing autocratic forces to inject unrealities directly into foreign populations, bolstering their legitimacy while stoking political and social discord.
Having honed their distortion skills by constricting and contorting the information funnel vis-à-vis their populations, autocratic leaders now exploit global information networks. They employ tactics such as “information laundromats”—sites mimicking legitimate news organizations to propagate foreign-produced fake news. Russia, China, and Iran make their falsehoods appear local and credible to foreign audiences. Today, Russia can not only convince its own citizens about American biolabs or that Ukraine was responsible for the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 but also convince citizens—and even some decision-makers—in democratic societies of the same. Americans witnessed this first-hand last year when Republican congress members stalled military aid to Ukraine while reiterating Kremlin-bred falsehoods.
Applebaum also draws out the not-so-coincidental connections between seemingly isolated efforts of autocrats in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and elsewhere to use communication technologies to project their distortions around the world, poisoning the well of potential US partnerships with countries in Africa, Latin America, and beyond. She also warns that less malign forms of Beijing-controlled media are becoming increasingly available across the developing world, projecting softer, more favorable images of China in the hopes of accruing foreign support in a zero-sum game of global influence.
Lawfare
In terms of elusive American concepts, IW stands in good company with lawfare, recognized as first officially entering the American security lexicon in 2001—decades after China integrated it into its military doctrine in the 1960s. Today, the powers-that-be in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and the like have outgrown the limited categories of lawfare described in Orde Kittrie’s leading book on the subject. Autocratic forces are now working in harmony to rejigger the moral and legal underpinnings of the international system; gain influence and legitimacy at the expense of the United States and its allies; and normalize actions that, while currently illegal, are necessary to meet their autocratic objectives.
For example, Chinese talk of win-win cooperation and Russian amplification of a new multipolar world order are packaged to promote an idea of greater fairness and equality than the current US-centric world can offer. The normalization of the abnormal in Syria, where Russian and Syrian forces used UN coordinates to strike hospitals during the Syrian Civil War, further encapsulates how autocrats are seeking to rewire what is considered “acceptable” to serve their needs and interests. These autocratic forces are also pressing forward a narrative of the erosion of universal values, decrying notions of democracy, freedoms, and liberties as decadent or globalist. Take, for example, Putin’s portrayal of Russia’s war against Ukraine as “fighting for the freedom of not only Russia but the whole world” and that the “dictatorship of one hegemon…is decrepit.” It is not difficult to guess what “one hegemon” he is invoking.
Autocrats have also learned to copy and paste the language of repressive legislation from one another to control their populations under the guise of “rule of law.” Uganda, Yemen, Cambodia, and several other countries have passed laws to “catch” activists pressing for reform that are modeled on Russian and Chinese anti-extremism legislation. Many of these laws also target NGOs, charities, and academic programs with possible foreign links or funding. Investigations and prosecutions are lodged against civic organizations and their members using laws criminalizing “foreign agents” and “terrorism.” These laws, while domestically aimed, amplify and legitimize autocratic accusations and narratives that anyone fighting for democratic reform poses a national security threat and is nothing but a US-sponsored foreign spy. Such portrayals cut deeply against American soft power.
Proxies and Security Assistance
During the Cold War, proxy strategies earned a reputation as a means of conducting “war on the cheap” while avoiding direct, kinetic confrontation. Today, autocrats are capitalizing on proxy forces’ value to secure a better return on their IW influence and legitimacy-seeking investments. By financing not only traditional proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis rebels, which are linked to Iran but also modern private security and military forces, like Russia’s Wagner Group (or “Africa Corps”), Autocracy, Inc. seeks to generate new security dilemmas that put pressure on the democratic systems of its foes while helping its autocratic friends retain a firm, repressive grip over their populations. Indeed, these forces have started building their own sub-support network. Last fall, the Wall Street Journal reported, based on U.S. intelligence, that the Wagner Group was planning to send the Pantsir-S1, an anti-aircraft artillery system, to Hezbollah.
China has learned from watching Iran and Russia, slowly growing out its networks of proxies and private military and security companies. This growth, which helps autocrats expand their regional and global influence, has significant consequences in the modern era of great power competition where the struggle for influence is intentionally maintained below the level of armed conflict. China’s entry into the market of private security forces is coupled with its increasing exportation of its domestic security model. The proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology around the world not only raises Beijing’s global profile as a reliable provider of domestic security assistance vis-à-vis the United States but also creates an avenue for the technology’s legitimization and normalization, embedding Autocracy, Inc.’s values and interests in liberal and illiberal societies alike.
In warning that the political elites who depend on Chinese surveillance technology may feel obligated to align themselves politically with China to retain power, Applebaum nevertheless overlooks the complexities of contemporary great power security competition, making her claim seem speculative and attenuated even if there is evidence to support it. As Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac Kardon have explained, while countries have sought to play the United States and China off each other to get the best deal for distinct security objectives, authoritarian leaders accepting U.S. aid may feel compelled to seek more Chinese domestic security assistance not because of some allegiance to China but because of a desire to balance against the view of the United States as “a conduit for promoting human rights and political liberties.”
Understanding the Mission and Fighting Back
After demonstrating how today’s autocrats are uniting to secure their survival and global status, Applebaum offers several recommendations for countering Autocracy, Inc. Among them is a directive to those committed to safeguarding democracy—in their own countries and abroad—to double down on their fidelity to democratic values. This includes promoting the notion of democracy and freedom as a real, viable alternative by using the legal avenues available in democracies to go after autocrats, their schemes, and their resources. It also means undermining autocratic forces in the Information War, including by supporting current programs set up to fight and expose the “epidemic of information laundering.” Such programs include the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), founded in 2023 to “pre-bunk” misinformation campaigns before they launch.
Implementing these strategies requires redirecting resources and channeling a new level of creativity. For example, in order to counter the spread of repressive Chinese security technology and assistance, the United States must find a way to develop security assistance packages that can compete with China’s while remaining committed to democratic values. Therefore, these efforts will need all the help they can get from policymakers and legislators.
Unfortunately, it looks like Washington may be headed in the opposite direction.
Last month, the House of Representatives passed its version of the 2025 NDAA. The 2024 NDAA included provisions for countering disinformation and propaganda campaigns; combating malign foreign influence domestically; protecting against undue influence; promoting public diplomacy through engagements like Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Africa, and Radio Free Americas; and supporting the GEC. The 2025 bill budgets for none of these. While the Senate version officially introduced last week by the chamber’s Armed Services Committee calls for coordinating and amplifying U.S. public messaging efforts with the GEC, a State Department official not authorized to speak publicly expressed to me his concern that, “as things stand, the U.S. government could lose its only congressionally mandated center for countering the threat of Russian and Chinese misinformation overseas.”
The impact of efforts like the GEC is real. My parents distinctly remember the lengths their families in Poland went through to tune into Radio Free Europe and the inspiration it gave everyday people who wanted to bring Poland out from under Soviet communism. They also remember living in constant fear of the Służba Bezpieczeństwa (Ministry of Internal Affairs Security Service) and Milicja Obywatelska (Citizens’ Militia), organizations responsible for the murders of democratic activists like Jerzy Popiełuszko and Grzegorz Przemyk.
Today, rather than funding secret police units, autocrats have learned how to economize on terror tactics by weaponizing information. Applebaum, the wife of Poland’s current foreign minister, discusses how a smear campaign ended in 2019 when a man who had watched state propaganda television from jail murdered a Polish opposition politician. On January 6, 2021, after disinformation about a democratic election and new administration drove a mob to storm the U.S. Capitol, my parents, who never once second-guessed their decision to come to America, questioned whether there was hope for democracy anywhere if it was not possible here—which is exactly what Autocracy, Inc. wants the world to believe.
In her 2021 article that evolved into this book, Applebaum lamented that “the bad guys are winning.” Yet, as she notes in her epilogue, all hope is not lost. Autocracy, Inc. can be stopped, but it requires effort from those living in liberal societies to “make the effort” to preserve their free and open way of life. This means learning to fight—and beat—Autocracy, Inc. and its subsidiaries in the IW arena they have mastered.
Ania Zolyniak is a current JD candidate at Harvard Law School. She graduated with honors from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service in 2021 with a BS in Foreign Service. Prior to law school, Zolyniak worked at the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Academy of Sciences.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
Main Image: President of Russia Vladimir Putin with President of China Xi Jinping during Putin’s state visit to China, May 16, 2024 (Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia Commons)
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2. Trump’s Biggest Volatility Risk? Taiwan
I look forward to reading Elbridge Colby's response to this editorial from the Wall Street Journal.
Trump’s Biggest Volatility Risk? Taiwan
The GOP presidential nominee signals that he might not defend the island.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-taiwan-defense-china-semiconductors-a65db1f3?st=8n7x3heireoabd7&mc_cid=da68e91ee0&mc_eid=70bf478f36
By The Editorial Board
July 17, 2024 5:36 pm ET
A honor guard takes part in a flag lowering ceremony at Chiang Kai Shek Memorial Hall in Taipei, Taiwan PHOTO: LOUISE DELMOTTE/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Democrats are still trying to shuffle President Biden off stage left, but American voters are now choosing between an obviously infirm incumbent or the volatility risks of Donald Trump. As if to remind everyone, Mr. Trump is casually signaling that the U.S. might not defend Taiwan from a Chinese assault.
“I think, Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything,” Mr. Trump told Bloomberg Businessweek. He complained that Taiwan “took our chip business.” Why “are we doing this?” Mr. Trump also offered a geography lesson. “Taiwan is 9,500 miles away” while it’s “68 miles away from China.”
Former National Security Adviser John Bolton recalls similar lines from Mr. Trump in his White House memoir, and you can be sure Beijing read Mr. Bolton’s book. Mr. Trump’s words won’t enhance U.S. deterrence.
Taiwan is increasing its defense spending and has extended conscription, albeit modestly. Yet Beijing has been mounting the largest military buildup since World War II, which the U.S. hasn’t countered with its own rearmament. Taiwan would struggle to defend itself alone from an amphibious assault or blockade even with heroic military effort.
But since Mr. Trump is wondering why the U.S. would bother with Taiwan, we’ll explain, and the answer isn’t only semiconductors. The fall of Taiwan to the Communist Party would mark the end of America’s Pacific alliance system, which has produced 80 years of mostly peace. Beijing is also provoking a fight in the South China Sea with the Philippines, which the U.S. is bound by treaty to defend.
Mr. Trump has been getting mileage from his claim that he’s the President who prevents wars, but here his bravado is inviting a fight that could cost thousands of American lives. The Taiwan question isn’t about waging endless wars but preventing a catastrophic one.
President Biden has stumbled into saying the U.S. will defend Taiwan, only to walk his remarks back. But he isn’t backing his rhetoric with more military power. Americans deserve a better choice than possible defeat or pre-emptive surrender. Mr. Trump the supposed China hawk would do better to talk about how he plans to deter a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
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In uplifting speeches to the Republican National Convention, Nikki Haley made the case for expanding GOP appeal, while Ron DeSantis detailed what the party stands for—in contrast to Joe Biden's 'Weekend at Bernie's' presidency. Photo: ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/ANGELA WEISS/AFP via Getty Images PHOTO: ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/ANGELA WEISS/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
Appeared in the July 18, 2024, print edition as 'Trump’s Biggest Volatility Risk? Taiwan'.
3. US-built Gaza aid pier will be dismantled after troubled mission
I hope we learned many useful lessons from this.
US-built Gaza aid pier will be dismantled after troubled mission
militarytimes.com · by Lolita C. Baldor and Tara Copp · July 17, 2024
WASHINGTON — The U.S. military-built pier to carry humanitarian aid to Gaza will be dismantled and brought home, ending a mission that has been fraught with repeated weather and security problems that limited how much food and other supplies could get to starving Palestinians.
Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, deputy commander at U.S. Central Command, told reporters in a Pentagon briefing on Wednesday that the pier achieved its intended effect in what he called an “unprecedented operation.”
RELATED
After last-ditch effort, the Gaza pier aid mission is coming to an end
The pier mission resulted in injuries to three U.S. troops earlier this year, and much of the aid has failed to reach Gazans in need.
By Geoff Ziezulewicz and Lolita C. Baldor, The Associated Press
As the U.S. military steps away from the sea route for humanitarian aid, questions swirl about Israel’s new plan to use the port at Ashdod as a substitute. There are few details on how it will work and lingering concerns about whether aid groups will have enough viable land crossings to get assistance into the territory besieged by war between Israel and Hamas. But Cooper said the Ashdod corridor will be more sustainable.
Critics call the pier a $230 million boondoggle that failed to bring in the level of aid needed to stem a looming famine. The U.S. military, however, has maintained that it served as the best hope as aid only trickled in during a critical time of near-famine in Gaza and that it got close to 20 million pounds of desperately needed supplies to the Palestinians.
President Joe Biden, who announced the building of the pier during his State of the Union speech in March, expressed disappointment that it didn’t do as well as hoped.
“I’ve been disappointed that some of the things that I put forward have not succeeded as well — like the port we attached from Cyprus,” Biden, a Democrat, said during a news conference last week. “I was hopeful that would be more successful.”
Planned as a temporary fix to get aid to starving Palestinians, the project was panned from the start by aid groups that condemned it as a waste of time and money. While U.S. defense officials acknowledged that the weather was worse than expected and limited the days the pier could operate, they also expressed frustration with humanitarian groups for being unable and unwilling to distribute the aid that got through the system, only to have it pile up onshore.
A critical element that neither the aid groups nor the U.S. military could control, however, was the Israeli defense forces whose military operation into Gaza put humanitarian workers in persistent danger and in a number of cases cost them their lives.
As a result, the pier operated for fewer than 25 days after its installation May 16, and aid agencies used it only about half that time due to security concerns.
Stuck in the middle were the more than 1,000 U.S. soldiers and sailors who largely lived on boats off the Gaza shore and struggled to keep the pier working but spent many days repairing it or detaching it, moving it and reinstalling it due to the bad weather.
A U.S. Army landing craft broke free from the Gaza pier and beached on the Israeli Coast in May after being swept by wind and current. (Tsafrir Abayov/AP)
The tensions played out until the final moments, as senior Biden administration officials signaled the end of the pier project days ago but U.S. Central Command balked, holding out hope the military could reinstall it one last time to move any final pallets of aid ashore.
Most would agree that use of the maritime route and what is known as the Army’s Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore capability, or JLOTS, fell short of early expectations. Even at the start, officials warned of challenges because the sea is shallow, the weather is unpredictable and it was an active war zone.
The U.S. also had to train Israeli troops and others on how to anchor the pier to the shore because no U.S. troops could step foot on Gaza soil, a condition Biden has had since the beginning of the Hamas-Israel conflict in October.
However, enough aid to feed 450,000 people for a month flowed through the pier, according to the United States Agency for International Development, which coordinated with the United Nations and others to get supplies to people in need. As important, humanitarian leaders say, the pier operation laid the groundwork for a coordination system with the Israeli government and military that they can expand on.
The one place where deconfliction with the Israeli military worked well was at the pier, which came online at a time of some of the greatest despair and food shortages, USAID Administrator Samantha Power said. She said Israel and the military have now agreed to extend that coordination plan to “all of Gaza.”
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said Tuesday that a new Pier 28 will soon be established at Israel’s Ashdod port for delivering aid to the Gaza Strip as a replacement for the U.S. military-built pier. He did not say when it would start operating.
Other aid groups, however, slammed the U.S. military pier as a distraction, saying the U.S. should have instead pressured Israel to open more land crossings and allow the aid to flow more quickly and efficiently through them.
RELATED
Three US troops on Gaza pier mission sustain non-combat injuries
U.S Central Command leaders said two of the injuries were minor, while a third required evacuation to an Israeli hospital.
Everyone has agreed all along that land crossings are the most productive way to get aid into Gaza, but the Israeli military routinely has blocked routes and slowed deliveries due to inspections. Aid groups also were terrorized by attacks, from Hamas, gunmen who stripped convoys of supplies and the Israeli military. More than 278 workers have been killed in the conflict, Power said.
As the Pentagon and the Army take stock of how the pier did, questions will loom about whether officials underestimated the persistent weather challenges and security hurdles that hindered the operation.
The system is run by the Army’s 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) at Joint Base Langley-Eustis in Virginia. And it’s like a huge LEGO system — an array of 40-foot-long pieces of steel that can be locked together to form a pier and causeway.
It’s unclear if U.S. forces were adequately prepared for the unpredictable and turbulent weather in the Gaza region. Nine days after the pier was installed on the Gaza shore, bad weather broke it, forcing troops to dismantle it and take it to the Israeli port at Ashdod for more than two weeks for repairs.
Weather forced troops to detach the pier from the shore two more times and move it to Ashdod. It was detached for the final time on June 28, and poor weather prevented the U.S. from reinstalling it.
Aid groups struggled to distribute the supplies from the pier into Gaza, and their efforts came to an abrupt halt after a June 8 Israeli military raid that rescued four hostages but killed hundreds of Palestinians.
Troops used an area near the pier to land a helicopter and fly out the hostages. To have even a small part of an Israeli military operation so close to the pier creates problems for aid groups who rely on being independent and separate from troops to remain safe.
As a result, the U.N. suspended all World Food Program deliveries while it conducted a review, which has not been released. WFP personnel have not distributed aid from the pier since but hired contractors to move aid that piled up on shore to warehouses so it would not spoil.
4. Russia conscripts 150,000 troops as Ukraine says it needs more
Will we cut away Ukraine?
Excerpt:
This will only deepen fears in Ukraine and Europe that a Trump victory at the presidential election in November will mean that the U.S. aid upon which Ukraine relies might be cut off or reduced.
Russia conscripts 150,000 troops as Ukraine says it needs more
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he wants to host another international peace summit and invited Russia to attend.
NBC News · by Alexander Smith
Russia has finished drafting 150,000 conscripts into its military, its Defense Ministry said Monday, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned he needs more fighter jets and missile defense systems to stop the Kremlin’s renewed battlefront advance.
Zelenskyy, whose forces have scrambled to block the Russian offensive following a six-month delay in American aid, also said he wants to host another international peace summit.
Unlike the June peace summit in the Swiss city of Geneva, this time Zelenskyy invited Russia to attend. “I set a goal that in November we would have a fully ready plan,” he told a news conference in Kyiv. “I think that representatives of Russia should be at the second summit.”
Both countries have come up with different cease-fire plans although Russia’s is little more than a demand for Ukrainian surrender. Both have said each other’s vision is unacceptable.
Meanwhile, the future of Ukrainian military resistance was thrown further into question after former President Donald Trump picked as his running mate Sen. JD Vance, an Ohio Republican staunchly opposed to Washington’s support of Kyiv. Vance has argued that the United States should encourage Ukraine to make a peace deal with Russia, and that Kyiv should be prepared to cede land to its invader.
This will only deepen fears in Ukraine and Europe that a Trump victory at the presidential election in November will mean that the U.S. aid upon which Ukraine relies might be cut off or reduced.
Ukrainian soldiers fire shells toward a Russian position at the front line in the Donetsk region last month. Evgeniy Maloletka / AP
Russia has suffered no such troubles over its military supply lines, ramping up production of key weapons such as cruise missiles despite Western sanctions.
Last week, NATO called on China “to cease all material and political support to Russia’s war effort,” including all “transfer of dual-use materials,” eliciting an angry response from Beijing which rejected the accusation. The U.S. and South Korea say North Korea has already provided Russia with millions of rounds of ammunition and dozens of ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, in Moscow on Monday, the Russian Defense Ministry announced it had completed its spring draft of 150,000 recruits who had been sent into the armed forces. As per Russian law, these conscripts cannot legally be sent into the Ukraine, and should instead be sent to roles inside Russia. But this could free up other troops for front-line service.
Putin signed this decree March 31. All men in Russia over the age of 18 are required to do a year's military service or equivalent training during higher education. From January, the maximum age that men could be drafted was raised from 27 to 30.
This spring conscription follows Putin's order in September calling up 130,000 people for the autumn campaign.
The churn of the Russian war machine has pushed Zelenskyy to continue in his bid to drum up support. Just back from the NATO summit in Washington, he told a news conference in Kyiv that his country needs more F-16 warplanes than the number already pledged, as well as 25 extra Patriot missile defense systems.
The Ukrainian president said his forces had “lost the initiative” against Russia during a six-month delay in which Republicans in Congress held up tens of billions of dollars in aid. That was finally passed in April, and since then Ukraine has been scrambling to halt Russia’s advance.
The U.S. and other NATO allies promised last week to provide Ukraine with dozens of air defense systems, including at least four of the sophisticated and expensive Patriot systems.
F-16 warplanes pledged by Western countries are due to arrive in Ukraine in two waves: the first batch this summer, and the second by the end of the year, Zelenskyy said.
Zelenskyy said he was “not afraid” of the prospect of Trump becoming elected, despite his mixed messages on whether the former Republican president would continue American military support for Kyiv. Those questions will only intensify with Trump’s pick of Vance, who has repeatedly voiced his objection to sending money to the Eastern European nation.
“At this point, we are actively endangering our national security by focusing on Ukraine to the exclusion of other priorities,” Vance posted on X last month. “At the same time that world leaders play armchair general with the Ukraine conflict, their own societies are decaying,” he wrote in another message posted in February.
NBC News · by Alexander Smith
5. Opinion | Americans always need an existential threat. This time, it’s each other.
Some interesting analysis (setting aside the author's partisan views).
Excerpts:
From the founding of the country, grounded not in any shared ethnicity or religion but rather in the novel idea of human liberty and self-rule, we’ve been bound together by the idea that the country isn’t just a place to live. It’s a living force for the advancement of humankind.
This self-image, I grant you, demanded more than a little denial. We wrought genocide across the American continent, fought a war over the enslavement of other human beings, subjugated women and remained, in whole swaths of the country, an apartheid state into the late 20th century. All true. And yet this idea of what Abraham Lincoln called our “political religion” — a nation bound together by its faith in laws and liberties, not just for ourselves but for the world as a whole — endured in the public mind.
It’s fair to say that other countries find this baffling. For most nations, having experienced millennia of empires and invasions, it’s enough to be safe and prosperous and proud of a common heritage. But for us, there has always been a higher purpose, if not a form of political zealotry. Simply by settling towns and raising up cities and sending our kids off to school in the morning, Americans believed we were striking a blow for freedom.
Opinion | Americans always need an existential threat. This time, it’s each other.
The end of the Cold War left a vacuum in our national psyche that we’ve never managed to fill.
The Washington Post · by Matt Bai · July 17, 2024
Here we are again, talking about vitriol and violence and alarming polarization — about the need to “lower the temperature in our politics,” as President Biden put it after a serious attempt on his predecessor’s life.
We don’t need somber pontificators or academic studies to tell us that Americans have been edging closer to some kind of cultural conflagration. The real question is why. And I’ve started to think that the answer might have more to do with the central worldview we share than with the all the ones we don’t.
You’ve heard the explanations for our disintegrating country. Social media amplifies our differences and promotes extremism. Growing inequality and urbanization create rage and resentment. The gradual un-whitening of the society threatens an old social order.
These are persuasive, and yet not entirely satisfactory. We experienced versions of all these things in the 20th century — transformative technologies, massive immigration, stifling plutocracy — and somehow made it through without destroying our political system.
That’s not to say there weren’t moments of heartbreaking violence or frightening chaos; the 1960s are remembered, still, for both. But even then, we never let our tribal instincts overwhelm our shared faith in democratic norms. Court orders were obeyed, however reluctantly; laws were enacted. We did not, in the end, spin apart.
To really understand our current moment, maybe you need to go back to what transpired in the 1990s — and to a gaping vacuum in our national psyche that we’ve never managed to fill.
Americans, for better or worse, have always been defined by existential struggle. From the founding of the country, grounded not in any shared ethnicity or religion but rather in the novel idea of human liberty and self-rule, we’ve been bound together by the idea that the country isn’t just a place to live. It’s a living force for the advancement of humankind.
This self-image, I grant you, demanded more than a little denial. We wrought genocide across the American continent, fought a war over the enslavement of other human beings, subjugated women and remained, in whole swaths of the country, an apartheid state into the late 20th century. All true. And yet this idea of what Abraham Lincoln called our “political religion” — a nation bound together by its faith in laws and liberties, not just for ourselves but for the world as a whole — endured in the public mind.
It’s fair to say that other countries find this baffling. For most nations, having experienced millennia of empires and invasions, it’s enough to be safe and prosperous and proud of a common heritage. But for us, there has always been a higher purpose, if not a form of political zealotry. Simply by settling towns and raising up cities and sending our kids off to school in the morning, Americans believed we were striking a blow for freedom.
And in a very real sense, we were. The 20th century was defined by clashes with tyranny that shadowed every aspect of American life — first with fascism and then with communists. If much of the world saw us as the latest in a long line of imperial powers, Americans saw ourselves as a bulwark against the darkest forces of humanity. Our internal differences could be wrenching — the Red Scare and the battle over civil rights come to mind — but what we shared was a common enemy and a constant threat of annihilation.
Then came the end of the Cold War — what the social theorist Francis Fukuyama optimistically called “the end of history.” By this, he meant that absolutism in all its forms — monarchy, fascism, communism — had finally exhausted itself, to be permanently replaced by liberal democracies created in our image. We were supposed to be living through, in effect, the last battle of the broader American revolution.
Fukuyama was wrong, of course; liberty did not enjoy some final triumph over autocracy in the world, or even much of a honeymoon. But he was right in the sense that the civilizational clashes that had long dominated our political discourse suddenly disappeared.
Our first instinct was to fill that vacuum with distractions and triviality. (I wrote an entire book and movie about this moment in our politics, when politicians suddenly became celebrities, in part because now we had the luxury of treating them that way.) By the late ’90s, we were living in a country where the sex life of the president completely eclipsed his foreign policy.
There was a brief moment, after the terrorist attacks of 2001, when our political leaders seemed to cast radical Islam as the new Soviet empire — a global nemesis that might fill the gaping hole in America’s self-image. But it wasn’t long before we realized how remote the threat actually was, and how damaging our response. Conditioned as we were to find meaning in existential conflicts, we whipped out a howitzer to do battle with a wasp.
Our need for some existential contest, however, remained. And we seem to have found it in the collision of cultures in our own cities and towns — an escalating divide between highly urban, educated leftists who denounce white privilege and theocracy and gun culture, on one hand, and rural Trumpists who see themselves as being overrun by modernism and multiculturalism on the other.
The further we get from the Cold War-era consensus, the more inclined we are to see political adversaries as a force hellbent on destroying us. We find our national purpose now in online communities whose common theme is binary conflict; either your side wins, or soon it will cease to exist. (No less influential a culture warrior than Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. said as much in a recent, surreptitiously taped conversation.)
I’m not suggesting that what we need is another world war to unite us; there’s enough romanticizing of the last, extremely bloody century and the costs it extracted. Nor am I saying that all our political fears right now are illusory. Would former president Donald Trump’s election to a second term seriously jeopardize the rule of law that binds us as a society? I think so, yes. Trumpism is a direct consequence of our penchant for political Armageddon.
What I am saying is that our devolution into civil unrest stems from a long-standing lack of leadership. Biden may be the closest thing we have today to an American statesman, but when I hear him urging the country to dial back on the messianic political rhetoric, I hear it as an admission of generational failure.
All of these political leaders shaped by the Cold War consensus had an opportunity, if not an imperative, to redirect our national passion toward some new larger mission — to safeguard the planet from extinction, to dominate the digital economy, to rebuild factory towns decimated by neglect.
They talked about all these things, of course, but mostly in poll-tested clichés. They eschewed complicated truths. They asked for nothing by way of sacrifice. They promised what was popular — endless and reckless tax breaks on the right, ever expanding government on the left — and demonized their opponents for getting in the way.
Biden is right (and so is Trump, to the extent he means it after enduring a near-death experience) that it’s past time to pull back from discourse that seems to be leading us toward a second civil war. But, as I wrote last week in suggesting a new campaign strategy for Biden, it’s also time to retire the generation of leaders who got us here, who let our differences — cultural, religious, racial — fill the absence where common struggle had always bound us before.
America’s aging leaders did not preside over the end of history, after all. They simply failed to figure out where it was supposed to go next.
The Washington Post · by Matt Bai · July 17, 2024
6. How Trump’s Security Failed to Stop an Assassination Attempt
A 6+ minute video that is a useful overview. This captures the sequence of events and describes how things unfolded.
https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000009576871/trump-shooting-assassination-attempt.html
How Trump’s Security Failed to Stop an Assassination Attempt
By Devon Lum, Riley Mellen, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Dmitriy Khavin and Aaron Byrd•July 18, 2024
Videos, audio and photographs of the attempted assassination of former President Donald J. Trump at an election rally shows how a clear threat emerged minutes before the shooting, and how law enforcement failed to protect Mr. Trump.
7. Incivility and the Tragedy of the Commons
Excerpts:
Can we expect current calls for rhetorical civility to endure? Probably not for long.
The history of such appeals isn’t encouraging. We’ve heard civility calls in gushes—after the assassinations of John F. Kennedy in 1963 and of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Others emerged following the attempted assassinations of Ronald Reagan in 1981, Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in 2011 and Rep. Steve Scalise in 2017. And here we are today, hearing civility pleas that are much the same.
Incivility and the Tragedy of the Commons
The economics of collective action explain why rhetoric will turn ugly again.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/incivility-and-the-tragedy-of-the-commons-political-divide-election-1ace37fb?mod=latest_headlines
By Richard B. McKenzie
July 17, 2024 5:07 pm ET
President Biden addresses the nation regarding the attempted assassination of Donald Trump from the Oval Office in Washington, July 14. PHOTO: ERIN SCHAFF/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
In his televised address Sunday from the Oval Office, President Biden discussed Americans’ heated political rhetoric and asked them to “cool it down.” The president and others seem convinced such rhetoric was a major force behind the attempted assassination of Donald Trump. Maybe so, but of all the politicians, pundits and commentators pleading for greater political civility, no one has confessed to having contributed to the “heat.”
Mr. Biden sought to sidestep and diffuse blame, insisting in his address that we—all Americans—must dial back political hostility. The president managed to insert a reference to the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol riot, knowing that the date would offer an implicit reminder of Mr. Trump’s alleged criminal complicity. But Mr. Biden never reminded Americans that he has repeatedly called Mr. Trump a “loser,” a “clown,” an “insurrectionist” and an “existential threat to democracy.”
Can we expect current calls for rhetorical civility to endure? Probably not for long.
The history of such appeals isn’t encouraging. We’ve heard civility calls in gushes—after the assassinations of John F. Kennedy in 1963 and of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Others emerged following the attempted assassinations of Ronald Reagan in 1981, Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in 2011 and Rep. Steve Scalise in 2017. And here we are today, hearing civility pleas that are much the same.
The economics of collective action provide an explanation for the ineffectiveness of such calls. All advocates pushing the “cool it” theme surely recognize that negative political campaigns have proved effective in generating votes, a powerfully tempting election strategy that is unlikely to fade anytime soon.
Attempts to find voluntary solutions to collective problems without the threat of force are almost always powerful on promises but weak on results. In economics, the essence of the problem, long dubbed the “tragedy of the commons,” underlies the purported existential human threat of our time: global warming.
The global atmosphere is a “commons” to which all have free access. Each person’s added atmospheric emissions are inconsequential. But environmentalists claim that individuals’ emissions can sum to a collective threat to humanity’s survival. The resulting “tragedy” is that individual contributions have collectively led to global CO2 emissions of a greater number today than in 2015, when the Paris Agreement on restricted emissions was adopted.
The political airwaves are also a commons—one to which political partisans have free access. Political appeals to common values are seductive. We want to believe that our shared values, such as belief in civil discourse, will rule current politics. But we must recognize that the roots of today’s political discord, as with much of our politics, lie in the economics of collective action, which helps explain why lasting solutions have been elusive. That’s why the honor system has never been sufficient to ensure the payment of taxes; the threat of force is necessary to enforce compliance.
The First Amendment precludes such a solution to the problem of uncivil speech. After a brief pause, expect the political fangs to return. The temptations will be irresistible.
Mr. McKenzie is an economics professor emeritus in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine and author, most recently, of “Rationality Evolved! Why People Have No Choice Over Having Choices.”
8. Ukraine defense chief says his nation will find a way no matter who wins US election
Ukraine defense chief says his nation will find a way no matter who wins US election
AP · by ELLEN KNICKMEYER · July 17, 2024
ASPEN, Colorado (AP) — Ukraine will find a way to deal with whatever comes if former President Donald Trump wins a second term, throwing into doubt vital U.S. support for its defense against Russia’s invading forces, Ukraine’s defense minister said Wednesday.
In carefully framed comments to an audience of U.S. policymakers and journalists, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reflected the diplomatic and military difficulty facing Ukraine as Trump and running mate JD Vance gain momentum in the U.S. presidential race.
Vance, an Ohio senator, has battled in Congress to block U.S. military and financial aid to Ukraine as it fights Russian forces and cross-border attacks, while Trump has said he will bring the war to an immediate end if he wins in November.
Trump, a Republican, has not said how he would do that. Analysts say that could include withdrawal of U.S. aid to Ukraine unless it agrees to a cease-fire on Russian terms, including surrendering Ukrainian territory to Russia.
“We believe in U.S. leadership, and we believe America wants its partners and allies to be strong as well,” Umerov said, speaking remotely to an audience of government officials and others at the annual Aspen Security Forum in Colorado.
“At this stage, we will focus on the battlefield,” Umerov said.
“Whatever the outcome” of the U.S. elections, “we will find solutions,” he said.
Umerov, much like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the NATO summit in Washington last week, stopped short of saying whether Ukraine would attempt to keep fighting or would agree to a cease-fire deal that ceded territory to Russia if the U.S. were to withdraw its support.
While other members of the military alliance of European and North American countries also help provide arms, money and other aid to Ukraine, U.S. support has been the most invaluable since Russia launched its war in early 2022.
For now, Umerov insisted that Ukraine — which has broadened its mobilization efforts to bring in more troops than the 4 million Umerov said were now registered — would keep fighting to regain territory already lost to the Russians.
It was “within our goals” to take back the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, seized by Russians early in their offensive, he said.
The defense minister also pushed back against President Joe Biden on one point, although not by name. While Biden has been the most important single backer of Ukraine’s defense, he has resisted growing pressure to roll back tough restrictions placed on Ukraine’s use of U.S. weapons against military targets in Russia. Biden suggested at the NATO summit that Ukraine might use the weapons to hit Moscow.
Umerov said Ukraine couldn’t stop Russian strikes on its cities and infrastructure unless it could hit the airbases and other military sites in Russia from which the strikes come.
“We want to say it loudly: We are focusing on military targets, so that they are not able to hit the civilians” in Ukraine, he said.
AP · by ELLEN KNICKMEYER · July 17, 2024
9. Italy carrier strike group joins Australia war games, will visit Philippines
Our NATO allies are stepping up in the INDOPACIFIC, though this is not a NATO mission of course.
Excerpt:
Although the deployment is not a NATO initiative, Italy has coordinated with the French Navy and Britain's Royal Navy, which will send ships to the region later in the year, to ensure significant capacity remains in the Mediterranean, he said.
Italy carrier strike group joins Australia war games, will visit Philippines
By Kirsty Needham
July 18, 20245:30 AM EDTUpdated 3 hours ago
https://www.reuters.com/world/italy-carrier-strike-group-joins-australia-war-games-will-visit-philippines-2024-07-18/?utm
The aircraft carrier Cavour is pictured in port at Darwin in northern Australia July 18, 2024. REUTERS/Kirsty Needham Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab
DARWIN, Australia, July 18 (Reuters) - An Italian carrier strike group on its first deployment to the Indo-Pacific region will sail through the South China Sea to the Philippines after participating in war games with U.S. allies in Australia, a senior Italian navy official said on Thursday.
The moves come amid rising tensions between China and some of its neighbours in the contested South China Sea region. About 40% of Europe's foreign trade flows through the South China Sea, where the United States, Japan, Australia and other nations have conducted joint maritime exercises they say uphold freedom of navigation. China claims almost the entire strategic waterway.
The Italian aircraft carrier Cavour is in the northern Australian town of Darwin taking part in Exercise Pitch Black this week, where Italy is contributing nearly two dozen fighter jets to the 20-nation drills with host Australia.
The United States, Britain, Japan, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea are also taking part.
It is the first time an aircraft carrier has joined the exercises, Italian Navy Rear Admiral Giancarlo Ciappina said.
Twenty-three Italian jets, including eight stealthy F-35Bs, are practising dogfights, strikes and other operations alongside its allies over huge swathes of largely unpopulated land in northern Australia.
"Pitch Black gives us a chance to work with the main F-35 communities, shoulder to shoulder," said Captain Dario Castelli, the strike group's carrier air wing commander. "In terms of deploying far from home, it is also an incredible logistics exercise for us."
After the current exercises end on Aug. 2, the 1,200-person strong Italian carrier strike group will travel to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam and Japan, before transiting the South China Sea to the Philippines for the first time, Ciappina said.
'VERY POWERFUL TOOL'
Ciappina said his strike group did not plan to conduct any freedom of navigation operations.
The Cavour will carry out humanitarian work in the Philippines, performing surgery on children in the ship's hospital while at port in Manila, he said.
"An aircraft carrier - just being present somewhere, it has an effect, it can influence. It is a very powerful tool," Ciappina said.
Manila and Beijing have traded barbs repeatedly over jurisdiction as the the Philippines challenges China's permanent presence around strategic features inside Manila's exclusive economic zone.
Ciappina said the Italian Navy's first Indo-Pacific deployment improved its training and provided a better understanding of the region.
Although the deployment is not a NATO initiative, Italy has coordinated with the French Navy and Britain's Royal Navy, which will send ships to the region later in the year, to ensure significant capacity remains in the Mediterranean, he said.
"Everything is connected... that's why we have to also be present in the Pacific now," he said.
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Reporting by Kirsty Needham. Editing by Gerry Doyle and Gareth Jones
10. Opinion | What’s holding up a Gaza cease-fire?
What comes next?
Conclusion:
The horrific Gaza war is entering an endgame. But without better planning for “the next day,” that may not mean an actual end. As hard as the Biden administration has labored on the cease-fire plan, it has more work to do.
Opinion | What’s holding up a Gaza cease-fire?
The remaining differences may seem small, but they involve core issues of future governance in the enclave.
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · July 16, 2024
It’s an iron law of Middle East conflict that the closer you get to a cease-fire, the more last-minute disputes arise. That appears to be happening now with the Biden administration’s push for a truce in Gaza.
Israel on Monday “affirmed its full support for the deal as outlined by President Biden and endorsed by the UN Security Council, G7, and countries around the world,” according to a White House readout of a meeting that included Ron Dermer, who is perhaps the closest adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Hamas, too, is said by U.S. officials to have accepted the plan by agreeing in early July to drop its demand for a guarantee that the initial cease-fire would mean a permanent cessation of hostilities. But agreement on the framework doesn’t mean the bargaining is done — so maybe it’s time for a reality check on what issues remain.
Pressure for peace is growing on both sides. Some Hamas commanders have urged their leader Yehiya Sinwar to close the deal, Israeli officials tell me. And for weeks, Israeli defense leaders have been pushing Netanyahu to embrace the pact. But the two leaders may hope to gain more leverage from continued fighting.
The remaining disputes may seem trivial, but some go to the core issue of future governance in Gaza, which remains the fuzziest part of the U.S. mediators’ plan. In dozens of conversations with U.S., Israeli and Arab officials about “the day after,” I still haven’t heard a detailed explanation of who will enforce security in Gaza when the fighting stops.
For starters, there’s the question of whether the Palestinian Authority will play a role. The PA would like to oversee the Gaza side of the southern border, with its own flag flying. Israel has balked at that, but there’s tentative agreement on a compromise that would include Palestinian representation in an obscure group known as “EUBAM,” which stands for European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah.
EUBAM was created in 2005 to help the PA monitor the Egypt-Gaza border. It operated just two years — until Hamas kidnapped Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier, in June 2006. But EUBAM still has a small staff in Rafah, and it provides a useful shell for a new border-control unit, U.S. and Israeli officials say.
Then there’s the question of Israel’s military presence along the border, in what’s known as the Philadelphi Corridor. The Biden administration’s plan, as codified by the U.N. Security Council, calls for Israel to withdraw its troops from “the populated areas in Gaza,” which Palestinians say includes the strip south of Rafah. But Israel is resisting full withdrawal there, so negotiators are seeking a compromise that delays full evacuation to a later date.
Another clause of the cease-fire framework promises “the return of Palestinian civilians to their homes and neighborhoods in all areas of Gaza,” including in the north. This migration seemed set a week ago, but officials say that Israel now wants to check Palestinians moving north to make sure that Hamas fighters aren’t rebuilding their forces and restocking weapons. Remote technical-surveillance systems may provide a fix here, but, as of Monday, negotiators were still said to be wrangling.
Israelis and Arabs want the U.S. military to have “boots on the ground” during the transition. But putting U.S. troops in Gaza is a nonstarter. A compromise plan is a command-and-control and logistics hub across the border in Egypt. At the same time, Lt. Gen. Michael Fenzel will coordinate training of Palestinian security forces from his headquarters in Jerusalem. His title is “U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority,” which may promise more than the United States can deliver.
What authority will oversee the postwar transition? Here, again, the details are vague. U.S. and Israeli officials envision a Security Council mandate, or perhaps joint sponsorship by the United States and the European Union. A senior Israeli official suggested supervisory roles for Nikolay Mladenov, the United Nations’ former special coordinator for the Middle East, and Tony Blair, former British prime minister, though both men are controversial because of business dealings in the region.
And finally, on the gut issue of security, just who will maintain order in Gaza during the initial six weeks of the cease-fire and then in the indefinite “Phase 2” of the agreement that follows? Hamas is bidding for a role by punishing thieves who have been stealing humanitarian supplies. U.S. and Israeli officials propose a loose alliance of Gaza Palestinians, foreign advisers and paid mercenaries from one of the big U.S. security contractors.
It’s a shaky structure at best. U.S. and Israeli defense officials think the best solution would eventually be a Palestinian Authority security force, trained by Fenzel’s mission and perhaps headed by Majed Faraj, director of the PA’s intelligence service. But one Israeli told me that a covert Hamas presence is almost inevitable — a prospect that frightens leaders of neighboring Arab countries.
Let’s assume that a cease-fire is actually announced in Gaza over the next several weeks, as framed by the Biden administration and endorsed by the United Nations. What comes next? The White House should move urgently with Israel and other key allies to fill in the blank spaces in the transition plan.
The horrific Gaza war is entering an endgame. But without better planning for “the next day,” that may not mean an actual end. As hard as the Biden administration has labored on the cease-fire plan, it has more work to do.
correction
Due to an editing error, in an earlier version of this column, a portion of a sentence about Hamas commanders urging Yehiya Sinwar to close a cease-fire deal with Israel was removed. This version has been updated.
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · July 16, 2024
11. The Battle of the Promised Conquest: The Four Pillars of the Houthi Grand Strategy
The Battle of the Promised Conquest: The Four Pillars of the Houthi Grand Strategy
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-battle-of-the-promised-conquest-the-four-pillars-of-the-houthi-grand-strategy?utm
The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, has emerged as a significant player in the complex political landscape of Yemen. Beyond the borders of Yemen, the movement has articulated a grand strategic vision encapsulated in what they term the "Battle of Promised Conquest." This vision signifies the Houthi's ambition to expand their influence and control beyond Yemen, potentially reshaping regional dynamics in the process.
The Battle of Promised Conquest reflects the Houthi's aspiration to establish themselves as a formidable force in the broader Middle East region. It suggests a desire to challenge existing power structures and assert their ideological and political agenda on a larger scale. By framing their objectives in such grandiose terms, the Houthi movement seeks to project strength and determination, both internally and externally. This article will explore the four pillars of the Houthi’s Grand Strategy.
Pillar I: Appearance of the Mahdi in Yemen
The concept of the Mahdi, a messianic figure in Islamic eschatology, holds significant importance within the strategic narrative of the Houthi movement in Yemen. The Houthis have strategically intertwined their vision with religious prophecy, particularly emphasizing the belief in the appearance of the Mahdi. By positioning Yemen as the birthplace of the Mahdi, the Houthis seek to leverage this religious narrative to galvanize support and legitimize their rule.
The belief in the Mahdi's imminent appearance is deeply ingrained in Islamic tradition, with followers anticipating a savior who will bring justice and righteousness to the world. The Houthis' portrayal of Yemen as the birthplace of the Mahdi serves to elevate the significance of their movement, framing their struggle as a divinely ordained mission with profound religious implications.
This strategic narrative not only resonates with the religious sentiments of their supporters but also helps the Houthis consolidate their power and authority by presenting themselves as the chosen instruments of the Mahdi's arrival. By aligning their political objectives with religious prophecy, the Houthis aim to strengthen their legitimacy and inspire fervent loyalty among their followers.
The narrative of the Mahdi's appearance in Yemen adds a layer of spiritual significance to the Houthi movement, shaping their identity and objectives in a way that transcends conventional political discourse. This religious framing underscores the complex interplay between faith, ideology, and power dynamics within the context of the conflict in Yemen.
Pilar II: Capture of Mecca
The conquest of Islam’s holiest city is a symbolic and strategic goal for the Houthi movement in Yemen. Gaining control over Mecca holds profound religious significance, as it would bestow upon the Houthis immense religious authority and prestige. Moreover, capturing Mecca would not only symbolize a significant military victory but also serve as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Saudi regime, which currently administers the holy sites in the city.
The aspiration to take Mecca underscores the Houthi's broader ambition to reshape the power dynamics within the Islamic world. By targeting Mecca, the Houthis aim to assert their authority and influence on a global scale, positioning themselves as key players in the Muslim world. The capture of Mecca would not only have immediate implications for the control of the holy sites but also carry far-reaching consequences for the geopolitical landscape of the region.
The Houthis' pursuit of Mecca as a strategic objective reflects their willingness to challenge established power structures and assert their vision for a reconfigured Islamic order. This ambition to control Mecca highlights the complex interplay between religious symbolism, political power, and regional dynamics in the context of the conflict in Yemen.
Pillar III: Destruction of Israel
The Houthis have maintained a strong stance against Israel, echoing prevalent anti-Israel sentiments in the region. Their unwavering opposition to Israel aligns them with broader anti-Israel movements in the Middle East. Strategically, the objective of destroying Israel serves to portray the Houthis as champions of resistance against perceived Western and Zionist influences in the region.
By positioning themselves as staunch opponents of Israel, the Houthis aim to bolster their image as a vanguard of resistance and anti-imperialism. This stance not only resonates with like-minded groups and states in the region but also helps the Houthis garner support from those who share similar anti-Israel sentiments.
The rhetoric of destroying Israel is not merely a symbolic gesture for the Houthis but a strategic move to solidify their position within the broader geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. By framing their opposition to Israel in such strong terms, the Houthis seek to differentiate themselves and carve out a distinct identity as a force standing against perceived external threats to the region.
The Houthis' anti-Israel stance underscores their commitment to challenging established power dynamics and asserting their influence in the region. This strategic objective reflects the complex interplay between ideological motivations, regional alliances, and geopolitical considerations within the context of the broader Middle East conflict.
Pillar 4: Rise of the Global Caliphate
The Houthis' ultimate goal of establishing a global caliphate signifies their ambition to expand their influence far beyond the borders of Yemen. This objective is deeply rooted in a vision of a unified Islamic governance system that transcends national boundaries, aiming to challenge and reshape the existing international order.
The concept of a global caliphate represents the Houthis' aspiration to create a unified Islamic state under a single leadership, governed by Islamic principles and values. By pursuing this goal, the Houthis seek to extend their ideological and political influence on a global scale, positioning themselves as leaders of a transnational Islamic movement.
The vision of a global caliphate reflects the Houthis' desire to challenge the prevailing international order, which is often characterized by nation-states and geopolitical alliances. By advocating for a unified Islamic governance system that transcends national borders, the Houthis aim to assert their vision of a new world order based on Islamic principles and unity. This goal highlights the complex interplay between religious ideology, political aspirations, and regional power dynamics within the context of the Houthi movement's vision for the future.
Conclusion
The Houthi movement's grand strategic vision encapsulated in the "Battle of Promised Conquest" reflects their ambitious aspirations to extend their influence beyond Yemen and reshape regional dynamics. By intertwining their objectives with religious prophecy, such as the appearance of the Mahdi in Yemen, the Houthis seek to galvanize support and legitimize their rule.
Their strategic pursuit of capturing Mecca and opposing Israel further underscores their desire to challenge existing power structures and assert their influence on a global scale. Additionally, the ultimate goal of establishing a global caliphate signifies the Houthis' vision of a unified Islamic governance system that transcends national borders, aiming to challenge the prevailing international order.
These four pillars of the Houthi's grand strategy highlight the complex interplay between religious ideology, political aspirations, and regional power dynamics, shaping their identity and objectives in a way that goes beyond conventional political discourse. The Houthi movement's strategic narrative reflects a multifaceted approach that seeks to redefine the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and beyond.
#HouthiGrandStrategy #BattleOfPromisedConquest #Strategycentral
12. Russia’s ‘New’ Artillery Piece Is A 70-Year-Old Behemoth Firing North Korean Shells
Russia’s ‘New’ Artillery Piece Is A 70-Year-Old Behemoth Firing North Korean Shells
To make good losses in Ukraine, the Kremlin is pulling hundreds of old M-46 howitzers out of long-term storage.
Forbes · by David Axe · July 17, 2024
David Axe
Forbes Staff
David Axe writes about ships, planes, tanks, drones and missiles.
Following
Jul 17, 2024,11:18am EDT
A Soviet M-46 in 1964.
Thomas Taylor Hammond photo
Russian ground forces went to war in Ukraine in February 2022 with around 5,000 artillery pieces and rocket launchers. Twenty-eight months later, they’ve lost no fewer than 1,400 of the guns and launchers to Ukrainian action.
But combat losses aren’t the only drag on Russia’s artillery corps. More than two years of hard fighting have worn out the barrels on many howitzers—and also depleted Russia’s pre-war ammunition stocks.
Increasingly desperate for heavy firepower and struggling to manufacture new artillery and shells, the Kremlin has opened up storage yards from the early Cold War and guns that were obsolete decades ago. And to arm them, the Russia has turned to a new ally: North Korea.
The 1950s-vintage M-46 howitzer is indicative of this new dynamic. The 8.5-ton, eight-person gun fires a 130-millimeter shell as far as 17 miles at a rate of five shells a minute. It’s a powerful weapon—but heavy, hard to transport and manpower-intensive. Which is why, in the 1970s, the Soviet army replaced the M-46s with more efficient 152-millimeter howitzers.
Steep losses of those newer guns—and the depletion of Russia’s pre-war stocks of artillery barrels and shells—drove the Kremlin back in time. A year or so into the wider war in Ukraine, the M-46s’ drawbacks were no longer disqualifying. At that point, the alternative to old artillery was no artillery.
As of 2022 there were 665 M-46s in reserve in Russia, according to @highmarsed, an analyst who scrutinizes satellite imagery of Russian storage yards. By February 2024, around 65 had been removed. And now the pace of the reactivation is increasing.
A video that appeared on social media early this month depicts M-46s on a train apparently bound for the front line. “They have probably taken about half of the stored 130-millimter M-46[s] from storage,” @highmarsed concluded last week.
That’s 330 or so powerful—but old and heavy—replacement howitzers for the firepower-starved Russian force in Ukraine. Russian factories no longer produce 130-millimeter rounds, but North Korean factories do—so it should come as no surprise that videos have appeared online depicting Russian M-46s firing North Korean shells.
The howitzer ammo is the fruit of Moscow’s closer military ties to Pyongyang—ties that have alarmed Kyiv and Seoul and prompted the latter to boost its financial support for the former.
With its powerful shell and decent range, the M-46 is particularly useful as a “counterbattery” weapon—that is, a howitzer for destroying other howitzers. That the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s conclusion when it scrutinized North and South Korean artillery holdings in 2009. The CIA called the M-46 the “most effective counterbattery weapon in Korea.”
But the Russians may struggle to transport and support the big guns along the 700-mile front line in Ukraine. The Russian military has lost so many vehicles in Ukraine—not just tanks and armored personnel carriers but also trucks and artillery tractors—that it’s begun equipping front-line regiments and brigades with civilian-style all-terrain vehicles and dirt bikes.
It should go without saying that a 1.5-ton ATV can’t tow an 8.5-ton M-46.
The other problem for the Russian gunners who are about to receive 70-year-old M-46s is that they’re going to depend on foreign largess for their ammunition. North Korea and Iran are the only major manufacturers of 130-millimeter shells.
To keep its new old howitzers in action, Moscow will have to maintain good relations with Pyongyang and Tehran.
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Sources:
1. @highmarsed: https://x.com/HighMarsed/status/1753578879367713117; https://x.com/HighMarsed/status/1811887643363291142
2. Oryx: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
3. Central Intelligence Agency: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84S00553R000100070002-0.pdf
13. U.S. Air Force culture needs a reboot
Quite a critique.
Excerpts:
Air Force leaders know they face new threats, as recent reorganization efforts and doctrinal changes like Agile Combat Employment demonstrate. However, emphasis on pulsed operations and standoff weapons and tactics suggest that leaders believe the threat can only be managed, not defeated.
This attitude feeds a passive, participatory culture, especially at tactical levels. Hopefully, the nation will never have to fight another great power war. But it needs a healthy USAF ready for any contingency. This starts with reinvigorating an “over not through” culture that pushes airmen to identify and solve complex operational problems, and reaffirms they hold an essential key to victory.
U.S. Air Force culture needs a reboot
Too many of today’s operators think of themselves as passive helpers, not innovative war-winners.
By PAULA THORNHILL and LT. COL. SHANE PRAISWATER
JULY 16, 2024
defenseone.com · by Paula Thornhill
“Over not through” is the strongest, most unifying culture in the U.S Air Force’s history. It’s a mindset that inspires airmen to attack the toughest operational problems with grit and innovation. And it’s a mindset that urgently needs renewing.
This culture arose during World War I, when airplanes turned the battlefield into a three-dimensional space; new operational problems required new, somewhat risky solutions. It reached its apogee during World War II, when Army Air Forces commanders tackled an array of unprecedented challenges by harnessing technology, geography, and the talents of their airmen, even at high risk. By the time the war ended, AAF personnel knew they belonged to a service that could prevail against any adversary under any circumstances, and the newly independent Air Force built itself around this culture.
But recent decades have brought a shift, fostered by the long, land-focused operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of defining themselves as innovative, confident war-winners, service leaders adopted the more passive frame of “critical enablers.” And as the Air Force and U.S. military refocus on great power conflict, three symptoms suggest that the service’s culture is growing more passive yet.
Passivity in a military is dangerous; it can give way to apathy and even defeatism. As Marc Bloch—historian, combat veteran, and resistance fighter—wrote of France’s “strange defeat” in 1940, “Our soldiers were defeated and, to some extent, let themselves be too easily defeated, principally because their minds functioned far too sluggishly.”
Three symptoms
The Air Force’s growing mindset might be called a “participatory culture”—one that relies on others to identify, offer, and pursue solutions to vexing operational problems. This approach encourages airmen to await direction from outside the Air Force, and discourages the taking of reasonable risk. More specifically, in a peer-on-peer fight, operators understand their role to be predominantly one of participation. Due to improving adversary defenses, operators expect to employ weapons, but not in pursuit of air superiority.
The first symptom reflects many conversations the authors had with Combat Air Force operators over the last year. Most seem to have little faith in the USAF’s ability to prevail in a major conflict and have adopted a passive mindset to fulfilling their responsibilities. They believe that general officers have assumed some fights are unwinnable via traditional theories of victory, so the best the USAF can do is participate in operations, rather than train to defeat an adversary. Years of emphasis on pacing threats may have disillusioned operators accustomed to enabling joint forces, not leading them.
The second symptom is the USAF’s focus on standoff weapons. These lower the risk of attack, but also feed a participatory mindset. Leaders come to rely on them, then to conclude that “stand-in” attacks are too dangerous, then to conclude that the force cannot “stand-in” and prevail as it has historically done. To be sure, standoff weapons and associated tactics are vital—but to give up on stand-in attacks, as many operators believe their leaders have done, stifles tactical creativity and cedes the initiative to the adversary.
Finally, a robust organizational culture requires a shared history. However, conversations at the unit level and in professional military classrooms highlight a profound lack of knowledge, much less critical understanding, of Air Force history. Names such as Schweinfurt, Rolling Thunder, or even Desert Storm no longer evoke a shared memory and common narrative, and, more importantly, no longer spark debate. To most operators, their service’s cultural narrative starts with the “critical enablers” of the post-9/11 era.
If, as these conversations suggest, the Air Force is moving toward a participatory culture, there are at least three implications. First, it reinforces the USAF’s enabling role rather than revitalizing an innovative, empowered mindset—and just when the demands of operating in the Pacific mean all services should prepare to lead at varying levels of risk.
Second, it suggests an Air Force shift from risk management to risk aversion. Senior airmen have historically managed risk effectively. At times, such as during the Schweinfurt missions, leaders made wrong calls. But, even then, they tried to balance risk and effectiveness. A more risk-averse culture leads commanders to pursue dubious theories of victory.
Finally, it suggests that the service may be tipping from an enabling culture to a passive one. In the latter, airmen wait to be told what to do rather than seeking to lead and win. Culturally, as Bloch highlighted, this is a dangerous place for any military organization.
Reinvigorating a culture
Bloch reminds us that even the best leaders must constantly nurture their organization’s culture in peace and war. Air Force leaders can take three steps. First, open a frank dialogue between general officers and the company and field-grade officers they lead. This communication is always tricky in a hierarchy, but the disconnect between what generals say and what those in lower ranks think seems even greater than usual.
Second, leaders should challenge operators to think of improved adversary defenses as challenges to overcome rather than avoid. For example, drawing on the recent use of 4th-generation fighters to fend off Iranian standoff attacks, the Combat Air Forces could embrace creating overlapping anti-access area denial zones around critical bases in Europe and the Pacific. These efforts could help evolve from pulsed operations into methodical integrated air defense takedowns or, at the least, interdiction efforts that adversaries fear.
Finally, airmen should learn about their service’s rich history in nuance and complexity. This includes understanding different theories of victory, and how airmen pursued effective tactics even in dire circumstances. Without this historical foundation, there is little hope for a shared, dynamic organizational culture.
Air Force leaders know they face new threats, as recent reorganization efforts and doctrinal changes like Agile Combat Employment demonstrate. However, emphasis on pulsed operations and standoff weapons and tactics suggest that leaders believe the threat can only be managed, not defeated.
This attitude feeds a passive, participatory culture, especially at tactical levels. Hopefully, the nation will never have to fight another great power war. But it needs a healthy USAF ready for any contingency. This starts with reinvigorating an “over not through” culture that pushes airmen to identify and solve complex operational problems, and reaffirms they hold an essential key to victory.
Paula Thornhill is a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general and a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
Lt. Col. Shane Praiswater, USAF, PhD, is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University Strategic Thinkers Program and is the director of operations, 31st Test and Evaluation Squadron, B-21 Initial Cadre, at Edwards AFB, California.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Defense Department, or the U.S. government.
defenseone.com · by Paula Thornhill
14. Europe, US worry about Russia’s hybrid warfare attacks
Excerpt:
But increased collaboration between military, intelligence and civilian agencies remains weak. Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum on Wednesday, INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock described growing collaboration among non-state criminal organizations as a rising challenge and one for which governments were still not well-prepared to deal with due to challenges in collaboration. “We are still operating based on national jurisdiction, and more than ever, the threats for our communities are coming from outside of all jurisdictions. We know that there is a fragmented legal framework and in many of our member countries there is not the kind of law at all to deal with cyber criminality.”
As Russia’s history of supporting organized crime across Europe shows, organized criminal groups can provide a very convenient extension of state-run hybrid warfare operations.
While experts across NATO elsewhere call improving intelligence sharing within government entities and with allies critical to detecting and deterring hybrid-warfare attacks, the United States may be soon be moving in a different direction. A Politico report from earlier this month found that U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump is considering curbing critical intelligence sharing with allies, which could hobble efforts to detect and deter hybrid warfare attacks.
Europe, US worry about Russia’s hybrid warfare attacks
The key to curbing shadow wars is better intelligence sharing, which is itself under threat.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
ASPEN, Colorado—Even as NATO pledged more support for Ukraine in its hot war against Russia last week, news broke of the Kremlin’s latest plot elsewhere in Europe—and alliance members wondered whether a key tool for detecting and thwarting such attacks would disappear under a Trump presidency.
Over the last several months, European and U.S. intelligence officials have highlighted efforts by the Russian government to sow mayhem across Europe. These include attempts to recruit ethnic Russians in Estonia to attack the property of government officials; disinformation campaigns to influence French elections and turn Moldovan citizens against their leaders; possibly arson and attempted attacks in Lithuania, England, and Poland; and a plot to assassinate the German head of arms manufacturer Rheinmetall, a key supplier of 155mm artillery rounds and other military equipment to Ukraine.
“These are part of a pattern, part of an ongoing Russian campaign. And the purpose of this campaign is, of course, to intimidate NATO allies from supporting Ukraine,” Jens Stoltenberg, the outgoing NATO Secretary General, said last Thursday. He added: “And what we have seen over the last month is that NATO allies have not been intimidated. NATO allies are actually stepping up their support, delivering more aid to Ukraine.”
The alliance has been watching out for such a pattern. Its 2022 Strategic Concept cites hybrid warfare by both Russia and China as a key concern and calls on members to “invest in our ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against the coercive use of political, economic, energy, information and other hybrid tactics by states and nonstate actors.”
Now, alliance members are trying to do just that.
“We've been working to turn it into real plans, real programs that demonstrate that NATO is capable and effective in dealing with exactly these kinds of challenges that's going to be carried forward at this summit,” U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said last Wednesday
Blinken called the hybrid attacks a rising concern.
“Every ally is acutely focused on this fact that we've seen attacks in recent months, arson attacks, sabotage attacks, attempted assassinations, misinformation, disinformation, cyber threats. This is not these are not one-offs. This is part of a deliberate strategy by Russia, to try to undermine our security and undermine the cohesion of the Alliance. It's not going to work because we see it and we're acting on it,” he said.
Allies are working to forge “multilateral security alliances, [prepare] domestic resistance units, and [create] new cyber and intelligence capabilities within their national security bureaucracies,” three authors wrote in the spring 2022 issue of the Texas National Security Review.
Still, many hurdles make it difficult to detect and deter hybrid attacks—not least that such preparation can require blending of military and other state functions in a way that many democratic governments resist.
“This leaves states largely defenseless against Kremlin hybrid tactics that target civilian (non-military) institutions with the aim of disrupting social cohesion,” the authors wrote.
That idea was reinforced by Scott Jasper, a lecturer at the Naval Graduate school.
“Collaboration among federal, international, and private sector partners is required to disrupt this threat,” Jasper wrote in an email. “For instance, last week the U.S. Justice Department announced the search of nearly a thousand social media accounts used by Russian state-sponsored actors to create an AI-enhanced bot farm that spread disinformation in the United States and overseas.”
He pointed out that the FBI, along with the U.S. Cyber National Mission Force, Canada, and the Netherlands, had released a joint cybersecurity advisory on an AI-enabled bot maker called Meliorator that created authentic-looking social-media accounts to push disinformation.
“The tech company X Corp. (formerly Twitter) voluntarily suspended the bot accounts,” he wrote.
But increased collaboration between military, intelligence and civilian agencies remains weak. Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum on Wednesday, INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock described growing collaboration among non-state criminal organizations as a rising challenge and one for which governments were still not well-prepared to deal with due to challenges in collaboration. “We are still operating based on national jurisdiction, and more than ever, the threats for our communities are coming from outside of all jurisdictions. We know that there is a fragmented legal framework and in many of our member countries there is not the kind of law at all to deal with cyber criminality.”
As Russia’s history of supporting organized crime across Europe shows, organized criminal groups can provide a very convenient extension of state-run hybrid warfare operations.
While experts across NATO elsewhere call improving intelligence sharing within government entities and with allies critical to detecting and deterring hybrid-warfare attacks, the United States may be soon be moving in a different direction. A Politico report from earlier this month found that U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump is considering curbing critical intelligence sharing with allies, which could hobble efforts to detect and deter hybrid warfare attacks.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
15. America's Adversaries React to the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump
America's Adversaries React to the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · July 17, 2024
This is a special edition of our members-only newsletter, The Adversarial, where we provide expert analysis on America’s greatest challengers: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and jihadists. To receive The Adversarial directly in your inbox, and to gain access to all of our members-only newsletters and podcasts, sign up for a War on the Rocks Platinum membership today.
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Iran
Reactions to the attempted assassination of Donald Trump were mixed in Iran’s media and political arena. Perhaps the most sensationalist reaction among Iran’s major news sites was by Tasnim, a site closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which called the incident “Blood and Pig” in a bold headline, which was also accompanied by a photo of Trump with blood on his face. Underpinning Tasnim’s reaction, as well as that of much of Iranian media, were two lingering associations from Trump’s time in office: his administration’s “maximum” pressure campaign on Iran, and its assassination of Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani. The bitterness of the latter has especially colored coverage of the affair, with most articles remarking, sometimes ironically, that the man who ordered Soleimani’s death almost suffered a similar fate. Yet, Iran’s media has been mostly measured, hesitant to editorialize too strongly. Many stories have reflected on what the incident might mean for America’s election, its politics, or its future. A story in the hard-liner site Mehr compared the attempt on Trump’s life with similar failed killings of other political leaders through history, and emphasized how those incidents emboldened their political careers. Adolph Hitler’s ability to turn the failure of Operation Valkyrie into something that strengthened both his power and the trajectory of Nazism was offered as a preview of what might be to come of Trump and his brand of populism in the United States. There was also some predictable indulgence of conspiracy theory, with some articles questioning why America’s vaunted Secret Service had apparently failed to stop the shooter despite some advanced warning from witnesses in the crowd. The logic here is that because the failed attempt has stirred sympathy for Trump and energized his followers, then it must have been staged.
President Trump Signs an EO Sanctioning Iran. Image by the Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons.
Russia
In the immediate aftermath of the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, Russian analysts argued that the event is likely to become the key event of the electoral campaign, eclipsing Joe Biden’s debate performance and the pending court cases against Trump. One expert suggested that as a result of the shooting, many Americans will come to see Trump as a martyr and potential victim of the U.S. political system, increasing the likelihood of his victory in November. Some analysts went further, directly blaming the attack on the Biden administration’s rhetoric that “Trump was the number one threat to U.S. security and might destroy American democracy should he come to power,” which could not but radicalize some of Trump’s opponents. The most conspiratorially minded analysts suggested that it was possible that U.S. security services were involved in the shooting.
At the same time, official reaction from the Russian government was relatively limited and restrained. Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov noted that while Vladimir Putin condemned the attack, he had not spoken directly to Trump and had no plans to do so. He also highlighted the highly polarized political atmosphere in the United States for creating a climate that led to the shooting, while rejecting any possibility that the attack was organized by the Biden administration.
Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump from 2019. Image via Wikimedia Commons.
China
After the shocking assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump at a political rally in Butler County, Pennsylvania, on July 13, the Chinese government reported that President Xi Jinping conveyed his sympathy directly to Trump. Official Chinese media has not devoted too much coverage to the incident in their reporting. The key message from the few official commentaries have emphasized the polarization, radicalization, and violence in U.S. domestic politics, which, in Beijing’s view, demonstrate the superiority of China’s political system
On Chinese social media, the discussions are much more diverse. Conspiracy theories have been quite popular, with the Chinese netizens debating whether the assassination attempt was staged by the Republican or the Democratic Party. More people are focused on the sympathy that Trump has gained from the incident, drawing the conclusion that now the result of the election is more or less decided. Interestingly, a growing number of professional policy analysts are also favoring this view. As Trump’s reelection would be the single most important geopolitical event for China externally, Beijing’s concerns and preparation for the further deterioration of bilateral relations have only accelerated.
Donald Trump and Xi Jinping meet in 2018. Image via Wikimedia Commons.
North Korea
North Korean state media has remained conspicuously quiet about the assassination attempt on U.S. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, carrying no government statements and posting zero articles in state media on the topic. Considering how carefully curated and controlled Pyongyang’s public messaging is, this absence of coverage is significant. As context, it’s worth noting that North Korea had also been rather quiet about the upcoming U.S. election even before the assassination attempt. North Korea also kept mum after Trump lost the 2020 election to Joe Biden (and refused to concede). Many analysts believe that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un prefers dealing with Trump than with Biden. The two leaders engaged in an unprecedented series of summits and corresponded favorably. Although they were unable to come to terms on a deal to improve relations, Pyongyang likely still believes it can get better terms from a future Trump administration. Indeed, the Trump camp has hinted that it might be open to arms control. Kim could seek a deal with Trump wherein the United States would reduce troops in Korea, suspend military drills, or otherwise downgrade the alliance relationship in exchange for Pyongyang halting development or testing of its weapons. The Kim regime has spurned the Biden White House’s many attempts at dialogue and could manufacture a crisis on the eve of the November presidential election to help promote Trump’s odds of winning. Historically, North Korea tends to engage in provocations around U.S. (and South Korean) elections. In May of this year, U.S. intelligence stated that North Korea may carry out “its most provocative military actions in a decade,” likely with the support of Russia. Although it remains unknown if Kim has sent any personal message to Trump since the attempted shooting, there is a precedent for Kim Jong Un wishing Donald Trump well. Kim sent a message of sympathy to Trump after he contracted coronavirus in October 2020. South Korean analysts are concerned that a second Trump administration could reduce U.S. troops, suspend exercises, or even water down the American commitment to defend Korea. Seeking to allay these concerns, the Trump campaign reassured Korea that “the Korea-U.S. alliance would not be weakened but rather even strengthened.” North Korea’s restraint thus far should be an indicator that its leadership is carefully weighing its options and could still carry out a provocation in the runup to the election. Even if said crisis would prove unnecessary to help Trump beat Biden at the polls, it would give his administration an easy win and give North Korea free leverage to trade away at the beginning of an engagement cycle.
Kim and Trump shaking hands at the red carpet during the DPRK–USA Singapore Summit. Image via Wikimedia Commons.
Jihadists
In the aftermath of the assassination attempt against former U.S. President Donald Trump, one would think the issue might be of interest to the global jihadi movement. However, in the intervening days, there has not been anything officially released by either al-Qaeda and its branches or the Islamic State. Usually these groups are quite chatty about various issues, so it is interesting that there has not been any comment yet since the United States remains one of its top adversaries. While neither group has commented on the assassination attempt thus far, supporters of the both groups noted what occurred on social media platforms like Telegram. They essentially were reposting the various videos and pictures that came out in the aftermath of the assassination attempt and noting the schadenfreude they had about the United States. It is plausible that the Islamic State could devote an editorial to the assassination attempt in its weekly newsletter al-Naba — it arrives every Thursday night, so we will have to wait and see. However, it is more likely they will devote the editorial this week to its most recent attack in Oman and to highlight its continuing war against Shia. It is likely that this event hasn’t registered for the groups as important enough to comment on because both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State view all Americans as crusaders and infidels. Thus, the internal politics of the United States, the current political campaign, and divisions within society do not really matter for groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, since everyone is viewed in a negative light and as legitimate targets of their terror campaigns. Thus, the assassination attempt against Trump for jihadis is just another news event alongside all of the other news events that happened that day and doesn’t change their calculus or views of the United States.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · July 17, 2024
16. Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Integrating Maritime Statecraft and Strategy
Conclusion:
Today, American naval forces are responsible for not only operations and success in war, but also advancing American interests during peacetime. With the mission of the U.S. Navy including both economic prosperity and peacetime interests, the U.S. government must find a way to develop collaboration between the interests represented in the new mission, bringing together those that contribute to both security and prosperity. Using the insights of the past to help us ask the right questions about the development of naval policy and maritime strategy for the present, Mahan offers us an old idea to think about in a new context.
Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Integrating Maritime Statecraft and Strategy - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by BJ Armstrong · July 18, 2024
In the past several months, the U.S. Navy has continued to protect global shipping in combat in the Red Sea, the Port of Baltimore struggled through the Francis Scott Key Bridge disaster, and the Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia conducted attacks on Philippine ships. With these events and more, concerns about shipping rates and routes and responses to global maritime insecurity have led commentators and strategists to turn their attention toward the U.S. role in the maritime world. These reflections have not all been positive. We are assured that “America is a maritime mess” and that the “list of America’s maritime vulnerabilities is long.” Our collective sea-blindness is being peeled away. Challenges on the world’s oceans are being covered by major news outlets. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has called for a “New Maritime Statecraft,” and the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference in the spring of 2024 touted “Integrated Maritime Power.”
In May 2024, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders offered a report that identified issues with both naval and civil elements of U.S. maritime strategy and provided a vision for future maritime spending. This report explains key reasons why a new focus on maritime strategy and policy are important and makes significant suggestions the executive branch should pursue moving forward. All of these engagements with the maritime world, from political leaders, industry, and national security thinkers offer important reflections on “why” the United States should be taking maritime strategy more seriously. But, as Philip Zelikow reminds us, just as important for achieving strategy and policy aims is the “how.” Lists of places where the U.S. might invest and areas for potential focus are an excellent starting point. But in the American system, where naval and maritime ideas and actions require coordination and political collaboration, it is time to consider how maritime strategy and statecraft are executed.
More than a century ago, the world experienced another era of rising great powers and tension on the world’s oceans. In the early years of the 20th century, the American strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan examined the role of navies in international affairs. Even today, his insights have much to offer and have a remarkable applicability to the present. It is in that spirit that today’s leaders might consider one of his ideas for the creation of national policy: a coordinated approach to maritime statecraft and strategy that integrates executive and legislative efforts in the form of a committee of American maritime power. Such a body could help the United States create the necessary framework for a unified maritime strategy, combining economic, diplomatic, and military interests.
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Mahan’s World
In the first decade of the 20th century, rising powers across the globe were dramatically changing the realities of the world order. In the Pacific, the Japanese had defeated Imperial Russia and created an alliance with Britain that raised their stature and helped them develop their naval power. In the Atlantic, the rise of Imperial Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II drove the British and French into an alliance and shook the imperial holdings of European powers. Lodged between the Atlantic and Pacific worlds, the United States was growing its navy at a rapid rate and was on the cusp of opening the Panama Canal, which would change the flow of trade and have global economic and political impact. This was the world in which Alfred Thayer Mahan was thinking and writing about strategy, naval policy, and international affairs.
Mahan, who had graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1859 and served nearly 40 years in uniform including through the Civil War, became a leading voice in American discussions of international affairs. His book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783, published in 1890 while he was still on active duty, was only the beginning of a career as a strategist, historian, and educator. He published over a dozen books and hundreds of articles before his death in 1914. The New York World newspaper described him as “intellectually, influentially, a man without peer in the United States,” and a leading voice in national strategy. In 1911, he published an article with the North American Review reflecting on global naval affairs and international relations in his contemporary world entitled “Navies as International Factors.”
The essay, rather than an operational study of navies, is a reflection on how governments create naval and maritime policy and develop national strategy. It is about coordination, integration, and implementation of maritime statecraft. Mahan examined a number of examples but primarily focused on the rise of Imperial Germany as a system based in authoritarianism and the British model as a system involving representative democracy. After examining each, and how the two had been competing with one another across the first decade of the 20th century, he turned to how the U.S. government was organized and ways that it might better approach the creation of naval policy and national strategy. As Nicholas Lambert has shown, Mahan was more than just a naval officer who wrote about battles; he was also one of the early scholars of what today we call international relations and globalized economics. His essay is one of the works that has driven the noted military historian Jon Sumida to conclude that he was the inventor of the concept of grand strategy in the American context.
Executive and Legislative Naval Power
Mahan’s comparison of the German and British models for the development of seapower fundamentally comes down to a question of executive versus legislative political power, and how each is involved in different systems of government. According to his analysis, the German model was an executive-heavy model. While the German state did have a legislature, it largely followed the wishes of the kaiser. Having a system where the executive predominated allowed for efficiency and for planning that could be executed over years or decades. Mahan pointed out that this, from the standpoint of the rapid and consistent development of seapower, was a most effective system.
In contrast, Mahan’s examination of the British model concluded that in the parliamentary system, legislative power predominated as the members of the government were all members of the majority party but also members of the legislature. This created a risk to the creation of a consistent naval policy and national strategy since there is an “unsteadiness of naval policy dependent upon party government.” By his analysis, in democratic systems like the British one and the American one, the executive tends to be responsible for “estimates” and budgets, but legislatures often do not trust them or will “tend to naturally contest” them. Having outlined the risks of legislative power, Mahan makes his commitment to democracy clear and tells readers that even with the challenges of the system, “it is in accord with the genius of their institutions” and of democratic values in the United States and the United Kingdom.
According to Mahan, the United States was in a peculiar situation that differed from both the German and the British models. The American system had a strong and independent executive, like the Germans. But it also had a strong legislature that, through the two-party system, protects its own prerogatives like the British. In some ways, this combines the best of both systems, particularly effective in protecting the “foundation of their edifice of liberty.” However, it also introduces the possibility of conflict between the branches of government and the unsteadiness of strategy and policy that might result. Mahan insisted that good strategy-making requires “a process of reasoning,” but the overt politicization that can result from party politics or the interaction between the executive and legislative can result in simple ideas, such as simple ship-counting or sloganeering, driving policy. This replaces formulation based on strategic principles with a strategy constructed on simplicity and politics.
Strategic Collaboration: The Best of Both Worlds
Approaching the challenge of developing and wielding seapower in the 21st century requires policymakers and strategists to look both backward to the precedents of the past and forward to the possibilities of the future. Mahan was doing exactly this when he wrote in 1911, a kind of applied history of an earlier era. After explaining his analysis of the German and the British paths toward building their navies and developing seapower, he turned to how the Americans might approach the process of strategy and policymaking based on their own unique political system and process. In doing so, he developed an organizational scheme that offers interesting possibilities for today’s American seapower challenge.
Mahan was looking for a way to organizationally bring the executive and legislative power bases into a formal conversation with one another. He believed this would engender collaboration instead of the tendency to “naturally contest” one another. Recognizing that the Americans could not, and should not, adopt the more authoritarian model of Germany, he turned to the structures used in the British system. At the dawn of the 20th century, the U.K. government had created the Committee of Imperial Defense in order to develop a collaborative process across the government. The committee was chaired by the prime minister and included the foreign secretary, first lord of the admiralty, secretary of state for war, chancellor of the exchequer, and uniformed heads of the army and navy. But it was also “elastic” and could include other members of the government that the prime minister felt were appropriate for the deliberations. This largely ad hoc committee brought the stakeholders together, and was supported by a secretariat to staff the process.
Mahan suggested that an American committee to oversee strategy and naval policy could begin with a similar baseline. The secretary of the Navy would be joined by the secretary of state and the secretary of war, the uniformed heads of the Navy and the Army, and the secretary of the treasury. But Mahan pointed out that in the American system of government, the legislative branch needed to be included. He suggested adding the chairs of the naval affairs committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the chairs of the foreign affairs committees from each chamber. With a small staff to manage their meetings and administer the products and communications, the stakeholders could all be brought together to make collaborative policy and strategy.
While a council on national defense was formed in 1916, and had pieces of what Mahan and others suggested, it focused on the coordination of industry for the war effort and involved less work on national strategy. In some ways, what Mahan suggested in 1911 has a lot of similarities to the way that we think about the National Security Council today. With “the principals committee” gathering all of the executive branch leadership to make strategic decisions, it might be suggested that his vision has largely been achieved. And in our 21st-century government, the executive departments represented by Mahan’s suggestion are far larger, and the secretaries and principals have much more to oversee and administer in their current establishments.
Yet, returning to the purpose of Mahan’s essay: Considering the role of navies as international factors and the creation of naval policy and strategy, today we might reimagine his suggestion in a purely maritime sense. To determine the “how” of the recent congressional guidance and the secretary of the Navy’s speeches, a committee made up of representatives to collaborate and coordinate American maritime strategy and naval policy could be useful. This might help in overcoming the tendency to “naturally contest” one another, which remains not only between the executive and legislative branches but also between the executive departments themselves.
Whether the members of this committee of American maritime power were principals or deputies, or other leaders specifically appointed by departments or stakeholders, the point would be collaboration rather than seniority and posturing. Bringing leaders from the Department of the Navy, both civilian and uniformed Navy and Marine Corps, together with the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration, the State Department, and the Commerce Department, as well as the House and Senate Seapower Committees and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, would include relevant participants. This representation would allow for a body to develop maritime strategy and naval policy that would forward the economic, diplomatic, and military goals of the United States. Taking a suggestion from the century-old British model, the committee membership could also be elastic depending on issues discussed. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development could be at the table for discussions of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief policy, or the Department of Labor might be at the table in conversations about rebuilding the maritime industrial base. As Mahan wrote in another essay on the “Considerations Governing the Dispositions of Navies,” in the planning for and exercise of seapower, “the political, commercial, and military needs are so intertwined that their mutual interaction constitutes one problem.”
American Maritime Strategy at the Water’s Edge
It may be that a committee aiming to bring together competing executive departments and the legislative branch would be too difficult. Between departments competing for budget, partisan divisions, and the in-built tensions between Congress and the executive it funds and oversees, there are surely many challenges.
The inability to simply appoint members to the naval review commission created in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act suggests we should be wary. In that case, while Congress created the committee in the National Defense Authorization Act, members of Congress never appointed enough members to the committee for it to begin work. However, as Mahan wrote, “The question for the United States, as regards to the size of its navy, is not so much what it desires to accomplish as what it is willing, or unwilling, to concede.”
This question would be best addressed with an integrated and whole-of-government approach that a committee of American maritime power could provide. Efforts like the bipartisan “Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy” and Secretary Del Toro’s maritime statecraft initiative are positive steps. But U.S. maritime policy needs something more than the legislative branch and the executive branch each making demands of the other, no matter how intelligent those suggestions might be. At the very least, an effort to bring together leaders from the multiple sources of American maritime power would offer an opportunity to raise the key questions of the new era of great power competition and clarify what it might be that we are conceding with our policy decisions.
Today, American naval forces are responsible for not only operations and success in war, but also advancing American interests during peacetime. With the mission of the U.S. Navy including both economic prosperity and peacetime interests, the U.S. government must find a way to develop collaboration between the interests represented in the new mission, bringing together those that contribute to both security and prosperity. Using the insights of the past to help us ask the right questions about the development of naval policy and maritime strategy for the present, Mahan offers us an old idea to think about in a new context.
Become a Member
BJ Armstrong is the author of several books on naval history and strategy including Naval Presence and the Interwar U.S. Navy and Marine Corps: Forward Deployment, Crisis Response, and the Tyranny of History, and 21st-Century Mahan, Revised and Expanded: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era. He holds a PhD from King’s College, London. Opinions expressed in his article are offered in his personal and academic capacity and do not reflect the positions or policies of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other agency.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by BJ Armstrong · July 18, 2024
17. Nuclear Must Be Part of The Solution
Excerpts:
There is no simple and direct correlation between the three parts that of the NPT bargain—nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Yet like a tripod, all three legs are needed to provide stability—a balance that has worked very well for more than half a century. This accomplishment should not be taken for granted, especially amid today’s divisive political atmosphere.
We face a convergence of challenges: climate change, energy, water and food insecurity, and the need to provide health care for all. Floods, fires, and droughts portend a disastrous future. But we have the means to avoid the worst and to adapt to new realities—with nuclear technology as a vital part of the solution. Global leaders must embrace and scale up this tool in ways commensurate with the challenges we face.
Nuclear Must Be Part of The Solution
Reinforcing the Bargain That Strengthens Security While Expanding Peaceful Use
July 18, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Rafael Mariano Grossi · July 18, 2024
A little more than 70 years ago, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower gave his famous Atoms for Peace speech before the United Nations General Assembly. He urged the international community to use nuclear fission to improve the planet rather than to fuel more destructive wars. The United States, he pledged, would “find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”
At the time, there was cause for both hope and concern. When Eisenhower took to the podium on December 8, 1953, experts already understood the enormous potential of atomic science, including its ability to generate large amounts of energy and fight diseases like cancer. But alongside this optimism was the horror caused by the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and the specter of a nuclear arms race—principally between the Soviet Union and the United States—spurring the development of ever more destructive thermonuclear weapons.
In subsequent decades, the system built on the foundations of Eisenhower’s vision helped drastically limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, reduced the growth of nuclear arsenals, and supported increasing global access to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, from energy production to medicine. Today, however, that system is being tested. North Korea continues its illegal nuclear weapons program, and Iran has enriched a significant amount of uranium to military grade, for which there is no logical peaceful use. Meanwhile, arms control and disarmament treaties, including the New START accord—the last remaining nuclear weapons treaty between the United States and Russia—have either collapsed or come under significant strain. There have even been open discussions about whether nuclear weapons will be used in a war in Europe, and idle threats made about their use in the Middle East, challenging the almost-40-year-old principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Amid all this, one could be forgiven for wondering how far we have in fact come on our journey, as Eisenhower put it, “out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light”.
Yet even as the nonproliferation and disarmament sides of the “Atoms for Peace” equation are under threat, the third part of the bargain—the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology for the betterment of all—holds more promise to heal the world than it has at any time since the Austrian-Swedish physicist Lise Meitner and her colleagues discovered nuclear fission in 1938. It is increasingly clear that nuclear energy must be a central part of getting the world to net-zero carbon emissions. In Europe and the United States, it provides more low-carbon electricity than any other source. In China, more nuclear power plants are being built than in most of the rest of the world combined, while fast-growing economies such as India are also looking to expand their nuclear power capacity. Across Africa and other developing regions, nuclear medicine promises to help address the cancer crisis killing millions of people who lack access to lifesaving tools like radiotherapy. And nuclear techniques are playing key roles in adapting crops and agricultural practices to the new and harsher conditions brought about by climate change.
To fulfill Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace vision, we must accelerate the pace at which the life-affirming uses of nuclear science and technology become accessible to those who need them most. Some people fear that widening the use of nuclear technology around the world increases the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The counterargument is that remedying the ongoing inequality of access will strengthen the regime that prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons while widening support for a system that relies on buy-in from all countries—both nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states, countries that want to use nuclear energy and those that don’t.
Meitner and other scientists unlocked the awesome power of the first Greek god of the elements. In itself, that power is neither good nor bad. As the venerable late Professor David J. Rose of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology put it, “The evil lies not inherently in the phenomenon of nuclear fission or of any of the chemical elements, all of them parts of creation, but in the nature of man himself, who being given free will, can choose to build toward heaven or toward hell.” For decades after the United States and Soviet Union abandoned their Cold War brinkmanship, we largely built toward heaven. Amid today’s challenges and opportunities, it is crucial that we redouble our resolve—both expanding access to the beneficial uses of nuclear science for all and stemming proliferation as we continue working toward a world free of nuclear weapons.
THE GRAND BARGAIN
Despite the brewing competition between Moscow and Washington, Eisenhower’s 1953 speech had a strong positive effect. His call for the creation of an agency to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation became a reality three years later when 81 nations unanimously approved the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also set in motion intensive negotiations between the world’s two superpowers, as well as other nations, culminating in 1970 with the adoption of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The crucial equipoise of the NPT is based on a tripartite bargain. States without nuclear weapons promise not to develop or acquire them and to submit to IAEA inspections to verify their adherence; nuclear weapons states promise in good faith to eliminate their arsenals; and those with the means to harness the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology pledge to make them available to those that don’t.
The significance of this arrangement—some call it a “grand bargain”—is difficult to overstate. The treaty is nearly universal and has been extended indefinitely. Although India, Israel and Pakistan have not joined the treaty and North Korea announced in 2003 that it would no longer be bound by it, fewer than ten countries have nuclear weapons, compared with the dozens once feared. The nuclear arsenals of the big nuclear weapons states have shrunk considerably over the decades, and nuclear science and technology have saved millions of lives and livelihoods.
This order has had its limitations, and it is still an imperfect work in progress. But it has proved adaptable. The NPT established a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA. But the strict parameters curtailing what the agency’s inspectors could do allowed Iraq to pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons program in the 1990s without much fear of discovery. The Additional Protocol has since addressed this weakness and is now in force in 142 states, although some others have yet to adopt it.
Meanwhile, the original Small Quantities Protocol, introduced in 1974, minimized the burden of implementing safeguards in countries with little to no nuclear material. It did not allow the agency’s inspections to verify whether a country’s volume of nuclear material was indeed minimal enough for it to qualify for the protocol, however. This weakness was addressed when the protocol was updated in 2005. So far, 81 states have an operative SQP based on the revised text, leaving 18 still to make the shift.
Having the strongest and most adaptable safeguards system possible is essential, as is support—political and financial—for the IAEA’s inspections. The increase in the overall amount of nuclear material worldwide is a reflection of its greater use for peaceful purposes, such as medicine, agriculture, construction, and science. But that increase also means that there is a lot more to inspect. In the past decade, the number of nuclear facilities and locations to inspect has risen by eight percent, and the amount of nuclear material needing to be safeguarded has grown by more than a fifth. Today, the agency’s inspections are responsible for verifying the peaceful use of enough material to in theory produce more than 230,000 nuclear warheads.
Meanwhile, challenges to international peace and security underscore the importance of an impartial and strong monitoring body. North Korea’s illegal nuclear weapons program continues to advance outside the nonproliferation treaty. In Iran, the IAEA has found traces of undeclared manmade uranium, and Tehran has not been forthcoming in answering many of the agency’s questions. As a result, the agency cannot assure that all the activities in Iran’s growing nuclear program are entirely peaceful. After the United States’ withdrawal in 2018 from the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran abandoned all restraints embedded in that agreement. That means there is no longer a far-reaching, long-term system of enhanced monitoring and verification to reduce the risk of proliferation around Iran’s civil nuclear program. As things stand, Iran is the only nonnuclear weapons state producing uranium at 60 percent enrichment.
Yet the actions of states allowed to have nuclear weapons under the NPT are putting undeniable stress on the order, too. Several of the world’s existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons are growing, raising questions, especially among nonnuclear weapons states, about the commitment of nuclear weapons states to hold up their end of the bargain.
The NPT is essential to international security. Countries regularly weigh the costs and benefits of nuclear proliferation, and if new nuclear states were to emerge or existing ones were to create even more fearsome arsenals, more countries might feel inclined to start their own weapons programs. A mass expansion is not imminent; the treaty remains remarkably resilient. But it is notable that at the past two NPT review conferences, where leaders of the states party to the treaty gather to take stock of its effectiveness, they were unable to agree on a joint document, mainly because of political differences not always directly related to the NPT.
As diplomats meet this month in Geneva to lay the groundwork for the review conference in 2026, the international community has a choice. It can either reinforce—through action and word—the legal framework, including the inspections process, it so painstakingly built. Or it can do nothing, allowing apathy and current political divisions to chip away at it.
ATOMS AND PEACE
The implementation of the NPT not only curbs the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also facilitates the exchange of equipment, training, and scientific information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA has a mandate to expand access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. (Most of the 178 nations that have joined the agency did so to gain precisely these benefits.) The uses of nuclear technology and science are so varied that they directly support more than half of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (and indirectly support all of them). This makes the IAEA a crucial force for sustainable economic and social development, the improvement of health systems, the mitigation of climate change and pollution, and the strengthening of energy, food and water security.
Consider the advances this system has already produced. The agency has transferred nuclear science and technology to help eradicate rinderpest, a viral disease that has killed cattle across the world; to help create over 3,400 new varieties of 210 plant species; and to map microplastics in the ocean, from Antarctica to the tropics. By widening developing countries’ access to equipment and training, the agency has helped build cancer care centers in partnership with the World Health Organization, created a network of laboratories to detect and respond better to zoonotic diseases such as COVID-19 with the Food and Agriculture Organization, and developed the nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidance on which the world depends.
Today, nuclear science can play a significant role in the fight against climate change. To help reach the goal of keeping global warming under two degrees Celsius, most analysts, including those at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the IAEA, agree that the world will need to more than double current nuclear power capacity. Some traditional climate activists reject this premise on the grounds that nuclear power produces too much radioactive waste, presents too much of a risk of accidents, or has upfront costs that are too high. But these concerns are misplaced. No energy source is without risk. Yet nuclear power has caused fewer deaths—relative to its output—than any other source except solar energy. What is more, there simply is no substitute for what nuclear fission has proved it can accomplish at scale. Solar and wind power have made important inroads and will play a considerable role in decarbonizing energy systems, but grids that use these intermittent forms of energy still require a consistent stream of baseload power so that electricity can flow even when it is dark or the air is still.
Nuclear power does not have the problem of intermittency. That is part of the reason why it is already the source of a quarter of low-carbon power across the world. A nuclear plant built today can help displace coal and gas and will produce vast amounts of low-carbon energy for the best part of a century at a low operating cost without emitting a single particle of greenhouse gas. Nuclear power plants do not need constant refueling and can store years of supplies on site, meaning they also provide a degree of energy security and independence.
It is true that nuclear facilities produce radioactive waste. Today’s nuclear energy sector has carefully stored its byproducts and sought to minimize any impact such waste could have tens of thousands of years from now. Finland, France, and Sweden, for instance, are on their way to securely disposing of their nuclear waste deep underground.
Thankfully, policymakers, ordinary citizens, and even many influential environmental activists are beginning to understand that nuclear power is essential to decarbonization, helps stimulate economic growth, and provides improved energy security. The most recent UN climate change summit, COP28, was a pivotal moment: the world finally agreed that nuclear must be part of the transition to net-zero emissions. After decades of allowing ideology to strong-arm science, the countries that produce nuclear energy as well as those that don’t agreed to include the need to invest in nuclear power alongside other low-carbon energy sources in the global “stocktake” of progress toward meeting the goals of the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change. In addition, more than 20 countries agreed to work toward tripling nuclear power capacity.
Around the world, countries are recommitting to nuclear energy or embarking on developing it. In Europe, much has been made of Germany’s decision to close its last three nuclear power plants last year. But Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Romania, and the United Kingdom are significantly increasing their nuclear capacity. Other countries, such as Poland, are preparing to introduce it for the first time. Canada, China, India, the United States, and even Japan, the site of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, are refocusing on nuclear energy. Countries are restarting dormant nuclear power stations, extending the operating lives of existing plants while building new ones, and creating investment conditions for advances in technology, including in small modular reactors. Even the oil-rich United Arab Emirates has connected its first nuclear power reactors to the grid. Turkey and Egypt will soon join the list of nuclear energy-producing nations. Many of these projects are cross-border efforts, with China, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States competing to sell their technology abroad. Some 60 reactors are under construction in 15 countries, and nearly double that number are being planned.
NOT ENOUGH
These efforts, however, are not enough. Although countries such as France and Sweden have shown how to decarbonize an electricity grid using both nuclear and hydropower, the world is only adding a quarter of the peak annual nuclear capacity that it did after the oil shocks of the 1970s. That growth is less than half the annual average that analysts say is needed to reach current climate goals. Agreeing that the world needs more nuclear power does not automatically make it happen. In its latest World Energy Investment Report, the International Energy Agency noted that of the $3 trillion to be invested in energy this year, $2 trillion is destined for clean sources overall but only $80 billion of that for nuclear power, a bit more than half of what is needed to triple capacity. Investment in unabated fossil fuel supplies—coal, oil, gas—make up the remaining $1 trillion.
Meanwhile, carbon emissions continue to reach all-time highs. Coal, the largest source of manmade carbon dioxide emissions, remains the biggest energy source for electricity generation as well as for steel and cement production. Most of the green investment is happening in advanced economies and in China, and there are big shortfalls in developing countries. To fix these trends, the world will need much larger investments in nuclear energy.
In market-driven economies, governments need to set the conditions that facilitate public and private investment in nuclear energy. Meanwhile, international financial institutions and development banks must make sure that no one is left behind. For this, they need to align their policies with science and the global imperative by removing the barriers to their vital involvement in financing nuclear power construction.
Getting to net-zero emissions will also require investment in advanced nuclear technologies—for example, reactors that can recycle spent nuclear fuel, leaving less waste, and in small modular reactors. SMRs, which are made up of prefabricated units, produce about a third of the energy of traditional nuclear power plants. By 2050, they could make up about 10 percent of the world’s nuclear power capacity, distributing electricity in developing countries and providing more affordable options for smaller grids, such as those operated by industries in remote locations. Governments of many developing countries are already working with the IAEA on strategies for meeting the energy needs and climate goals of their growing populations and economies. But the small reactors will not reach these markets on the required timeline without determined cross-border cooperation on regulatory approaches and greater standardization of design, efforts that the agency is currently .
Mastering nuclear fusion is an even bigger technical challenge. While nuclear fission produces energy by splitting the atom, nuclear fusion does so by combing two light atomic nuclei to form a single heavier one—in essence, recreating the conditions inside the sun in a . This enormous experiment has been keeping scientists and engineers busy for decades.
Pessimists quip that fusion will forever be the abundant clean energy source of the future. Others say it will come, but too late. Both arguments are false. We may not yet have the full picture, but for the first time, all the pieces of the puzzle are there: the physics, the policy drivers, and the investment. And the world will not end in 2030, 2050, or 2070 just because those are the deadlines of many countries for meeting their current climate goals. We must continue to back fusion so it will be able in the not-so-distant future to produce nearly unlimited quantities of power with almost no harmful waste at all. The establishment of a worldwide fusion platform by the IAEA—working with the G-7 and other bodies, including the 35-nation fusion experiment known as ITER—is moving us closer to fusion electricity than ever before.
But the world cannot afford to think only in the long term. Climate change is already here, evident in dry fields in Africa, in floods in Central Asia, and in record heat levels across the world. Nuclear technologies and techniques can help societies adapt to climate disruptions. Isotope hydrology uses radioisotopes as tracers to analyze water flows, making it possible to better manage precious groundwater sources, for example. Physical radiation can speed up the natural process of genetic variation, creating crops better able to withstand drought and disease and thereby boost food security while reducing the use of harmful fertilizers and pesticides.
THE TRIPOD
There is no simple and direct correlation between the three parts that of the NPT bargain—nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Yet like a tripod, all three legs are needed to provide stability—a balance that has worked very well for more than half a century. This accomplishment should not be taken for granted, especially amid today’s divisive political atmosphere.
We face a convergence of challenges: climate change, energy, water and food insecurity, and the need to provide health care for all. Floods, fires, and droughts portend a disastrous future. But we have the means to avoid the worst and to adapt to new realities—with nuclear technology as a vital part of the solution. Global leaders must embrace and scale up this tool in ways commensurate with the challenges we face.
- RAFAEL MARIANO GROSSI is Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Foreign Affairs · by Rafael Mariano Grossi · July 18, 2024
18. The Imperial Presidency Unleashed
Excerpts:
Right now, analysts are thinking mostly about how the Supreme Court’s ruling will shape Trump’s future decisions if he wins in 2024. But the decision will apply to all future presidents and therefore have a lasting effect on how other countries think about Washington. Allies and adversaries must now assume that all presidents have the potential to act untrammeled because they are completely unaccountable.
Consider, for example, the now-dismissed Trump classified documents case. It matters to allies and partners how presidents treat classified communications and information: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, for example, was unhappy that Trump made the record of their 2019 phone conversation public two months later. U.S. partners were thus already uncomfortable that presidents could declassify documents at will while in office. But now, U.S. presidents may have the power to take classified documents with them when they leave, possibly for nefarious purposes. This possibility could prompt allies to withhold intelligence.
Presumably, not every president will abuse the immunity protections the Supreme Court justices provided in their decision. After the ruling, Biden declared that he knows and “will respect the limits of presidential power.” He well might. But other countries trust or fear democracies precisely because the rule of law keeps policy within certain bounds, regardless of who holds executive power. Relying on the forbearance of one individual leader is no way to run a credible, sound foreign policy—or a democratic government.
The Imperial Presidency Unleashed
How the Supreme Court Eliminated the Last Remaining Checks on Executive Power
July 18, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by The Insiders’ Game: How Elites Make War and Peace · July 18, 2024
This week in Milwaukee, Republicans have gathered to formally nominate Donald Trump for president—as they have twice before. But this time, they meet under vastly different circumstances. Most obviously, they are nominating the former president just five days after a man tried to assassinate him during a campaign rally. But they are also nominating Trump in the wake of two extraordinary legal developments. The more recent of the two is the dismissal of the classified documents case in Florida. The other, more enduring one is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. United States—which grants presidents sweeping immunity from criminal prosecution after leaving office.
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts declared that presidents—and former President Trump in particular—have absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for their exercise of “core” executive powers. The court also granted ex-presidents presumptive immunity for actions at the “outer perimeter” of their responsibilities. They are not immune for their “unofficial” acts, but the opinion’s distinction between what is official and unofficial is so blurry that it may be meaningless. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in a bracing dissent, Trump v. United States makes the president “a king above the law.”
For Trump, the ruling brings immediate legal benefits—including further delaying proceedings related to the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. It also helps explain why the classified documents case was dismissed. In a solo concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the U.S. Attorney General’s appointment of Jack Smith as special counsel to prosecute the cases against Trump was unconstitutional, which is the reasoning Judge Aileen Cannon cited when throwing out the government’s indictment.
The long-term consequences of the immunity decision are even more alarming. The former president has repeatedly evoked the prospect of prosecuting his political opponents. If Trump returns to the presidency in January, he could certainly now order the Department of Justice to pursue his enemies, free from fear that he will be charged and tried for those actions after leaving office.
In the realm of national security and foreign policy, this ruling may seem less significant. As we wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2020, and as two of us (Goldgeier and Saunders) wrote in 2018, the president’s power over national security has been relentlessly increasing for decades. But the decision pushes that dynamic into overdrive. It injects confusion and uncertainty about when and how the few remaining constraints on the president could even operate. Trump, for example, has floated the idea of using military tribunals to take revenge on his enemies, such as Liz Cheney, the Republican former House member from Wyoming. Can he do so, citing his authority as commander in chief? The Court didn’t say, but its majority opinion did not rule out that prospect.
Now that the U.S. judicial system will struggle to hold presidents accountable for violating the law, it falls to Congress and the electorate to keep the executive in check. But Congress has become increasingly less engaged in overseeing the president’s conduct, particularly when it comes to foreign policy. This ruling will only make it easier for the White House to ignore congressional requests to testify or provide evidence. And the public rarely focuses on international affairs, a fact that a Supreme Court decision is unlikely to shift.
Allies and adversaries alike should now assume that U.S. presidents will never be held officially accountable for their actions, even through political processes such as congressional hearings or impeachments. The majority opinion has simply made the costs of enforcing these constraints too high—and the costs for presidents who circumvent them too insignificant.
THIN LINES
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court divided presidential behavior into three different categories, each subject to a different standard of scrutiny. The first are so-called “core” official acts, or actions the president takes that are part of his central constitutional powers. These actions, according to the Court, are now entirely and indisputably immune from prosecution—no exceptions.
Such core powers include the ability to grant pardons or veto legislation. But the majority went a step farther, declaring that core powers extend to any domains over which a president has “conclusive and preclusive” authority. The Court singled out the president’s authority to oversee investigations by the Department of Justice as one such area, despite the fact that Congress has long exercised the authority to regulate the department. This means, in theory, that the president could order the department to launch specious prosecutions of his political opponents without ever facing judicial consequences. This segment of the majority opinion was a step too far even for Justice Amy Coney Barrett, a Trump-appointed conservative. In her separate partial concurrence, she argued that the majority had drawn the perimeter of what counts as “conclusive and preclusive” far too broadly.
The Court called the next category of presidential behavior the “outer perimeter” of his official, constitutional responsibilities. This includes giving speeches and conferring with the vice president. According to the court, these actions are presumed immune from prosecution. To secure a conviction, the government would have to show that the criminal prosecution of such acts would pose “no danger” of infringing on executive branch authority—an exceedingly difficult task. The Trump opinion likely puts challenges to all official acts out of reach.
The final category of acts are those deemed “non-official.” Here, presidents do not enjoy immunity. For example, suppose a president running for re-election ordered campaign staff to organize fraudulent slates of electors and send their votes to Congress for counting, after losing the Electoral College. In theory, the incumbent president would be vulnerable to criminal prosecution because the act is that of a candidate and not a president. But the line between official and nonofficial acts can be blurry. A president running for reelection might claim that a campaign decision was actually a governmental one. And the Supreme Court made it especially challenging to make that determination by blocking prosecutors from probing the president’s motives. Nor can prosecutors use evidence from official, immunized acts when prosecuting the executive for private ones. The president, for instance, might veto a bill after accepting a bribe—something that sure sounds like a nonofficial, criminal act. But prosecutors would not be able to introduce evidence at trial that the bribe was tied to vetoing the bill, because vetoes are a core presidential power.
The upshot of the court’s decision, then, is to make prosecuting a former president for any act carried out while in office practically impossible. Determined prosecutors could try. But the path to success is now so long and so winding that it is all-but blocked.
ALL THAT POWER
Understandably, most of the analysis of Trump v. United States has been on its domestic implications. But the potential foreign policy ramifications are also significant. After all, most foreign policy decisions are official acts: part of the president’s core constitutional powers. The president may therefore be able to do whatever he wants internationally, even if it is blatantly illegal, without being prosecuted. He could, for example, use the military to take personal revenge, line his pockets, or commit war crimes. Just as a president might accept a bribe in exchange for vetoing a bill, he could also demand one for deciding where U.S. troops should be based overseas, invoking his authority as commander-in-chief.
In the logic of the Supreme Court’s conservative majority, foreclosing most post-presidential prosecution does not make the president less accountable but simply returns that power to Congress, which can now again play its rightful constitutional role as a check on the executive’s power. The majority seems to envision a world where through lawmaking, hearings, and impeachment, the House of Representatives and the Senate can rein in and, if necessary, penalize the president for his misbehavior.
Strictly speaking, the Court is correct: Congress can hold the president responsible for foreign policy errors and wrongdoing. Although the president is the commander in chief, the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war. The president oversees the entire executive branch of government, but it is Congress, through its power over the purse, that funds the state—including the military and the executive branch’s foreign policy apparatus. And Congress can impeach and convict the president, removing him from office, for what the Constitution calls “high crimes and misdemeanors.”
But Congress has rarely checked the president’s international actions. Instead, over the last 60 years, the legislative branch has given—and presidents have grabbed—more and more authority over national security, creating what the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., called an “imperial presidency.” Congress has granted the president the power to take the country to war in places such as Vietnam and Iraq with little oversight. When it takes the rare step of trying to restrict the president’s authority through efforts such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (passed after the Vietnam War), it has failed. Despite sincere, bipartisan attempts, Congress could not even muster the political effort to repeal or revise its 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force—which greenlighted the war in Afghanistan and the global campaign against al Qaeda—even though four presidential administrations have used it to pursue operations that bear hardly any relationship to those initial missions.
NO CHECKS, NO BALANCES
The Supreme Court may hope that its decision will inspire the House and the Senate to be more aggressive in clawing back power. But this is extremely unlikely to happen. A general decline in legislative expertise and capacity has made it hard for Congress to scrutinize bad or dangerous policy, much less police the line between legal and illegal actions. What is more, polarization has diminished the incentives for members of the president’s political party to constrain the White House even when they know their leader is in the wrong. The opposition might want to do so, but polarization makes any attempt to stand up to the president seem reflexively partisan. That may not deter the opposition party from challenging the executive’s international decisions, but it would need to control both chambers of Congress to have any real bite. And the president could veto its bills unless they were passed by an overwhelming majority (which would require bipartisan support).
Even if partisanship were not a concern, lawmakers have little electoral incentive to rein in the president when it comes to foreign affairs. Giving the president a free hand internationally is generally popular, so legislators rarely want to bear the political costs of standing in the executive’s way. Take the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. Despite a longstanding bipartisan view that the act is outdated and should be repealed, lawmakers face high hurdles to doing so. Few in Congress want to remove a power from the president only to be blamed later if the White House needs to act quickly (for example, if terrorists were to attack the United States again). Replacing the law would get around that problem, but then members would need to hash out the details of a new measure—always a difficult lift. Little wonder, then, that few members of Congress want to expend political capital on this issue.
Legislating, of course, is not the only way to hold presidents accountable for foreign policy misdeeds. Representatives can hold hearings to investigate such failures. Sustained congressional hearings can highlight issues for the public, as seen during the Vietnam War and more recently with the House’s January 6 investigation. But today’s hearings typically do little to pressure the president to change course: intense partisanship within and beyond Capitol Hill means that lawmakers and their voters interpret hearings through a partisan team lens, limiting their broader reach and effect.
The decision will have a lasting effect on how other countries think about Washington.
For gross foreign policy misconduct, legislators could try impeaching the president. But the impeachment process also rarely leads to accountability or policy shifts. In 2019, the Democratic-controlled House impeached Trump for abuse of power after he sought to condition military aid for Ukraine on Kyiv’s willingness to investigate his likely opponent in the 2020 presidential election, Joe Biden. But the impeachment did not change Trump’s behavior, and the Republican-led Senate later acquitted him at trial. Only one Republican, Mitt Romney of Utah, voted to convict him, and only on one of two counts.
Far from returning power to Congress, the Supreme Court ruling will likely have a chilling effect on Congress’s already weak drive to wield constraints. The ruling applies to prosecuting presidents after they leave office. But it still confers legitimacy on presidential claims of absolute authority and immunity for their official acts. That will inevitably lower the costs for presidents to successfully press such claims—and so members of Congress will have to think even harder about whether they can shoulder the increased political burden of trying to rein in the president.
Perhaps voters, rather than Congress, can be counted on to penalize presidents for their foreign policy failures or misdeeds. After all, opposition to the Iraq war helped facilitate Barack Obama’s victory in 2008. But voters typically do not pay much attention to the day-to-day management of foreign policy or make decisions around it. Even when those gears start to turn, they are very slow. Public protests did little to stop the Iraq war, and President George W. Bush won reelection in 2004 even though the situation in Iraq had deteriorated catastrophically. It was not until the Democratic Party made Iraq a prominent issue in the 2006 midterms that voters delivered a clear electoral message.
TRUST ISSUES
Right now, analysts are thinking mostly about how the Supreme Court’s ruling will shape Trump’s future decisions if he wins in 2024. But the decision will apply to all future presidents and therefore have a lasting effect on how other countries think about Washington. Allies and adversaries must now assume that all presidents have the potential to act untrammeled because they are completely unaccountable.
Consider, for example, the now-dismissed Trump classified documents case. It matters to allies and partners how presidents treat classified communications and information: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, for example, was unhappy that Trump made the record of their 2019 phone conversation public two months later. U.S. partners were thus already uncomfortable that presidents could declassify documents at will while in office. But now, U.S. presidents may have the power to take classified documents with them when they leave, possibly for nefarious purposes. This possibility could prompt allies to withhold intelligence.
Presumably, not every president will abuse the immunity protections the Supreme Court justices provided in their decision. After the ruling, Biden declared that he knows and “will respect the limits of presidential power.” He well might. But other countries trust or fear democracies precisely because the rule of law keeps policy within certain bounds, regardless of who holds executive power. Relying on the forbearance of one individual leader is no way to run a credible, sound foreign policy—or a democratic government.
- SARAH BINDER is Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
- JAMES GOLDGEIER is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Professor of International Relations at American University.
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ELIZABETH N. SAUNDERS is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and the author of The Insiders’ Game: How Elites Make War and Peace.
Foreign Affairs · by The Insiders’ Game: How Elites Make War and Peace · July 18, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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