Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"People do not seem to realize that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character."

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

"Integrity without knowledge is weak and useless, and knowledge without integrity is dangerous and dreadful."

– Samuel Johnson, The History of Rasselas

"Those that know how to win are much more numerous than those who know how to make proper use of their victories."

– Polybius.

1. Yoon says S. Korea-U.S. alliance elevated to 'nuclear-based' one

2. U.N. report condemns N. Korea's 'extensive, multilayered' system of forced labor

3. The Emerging Nuclear Scenario

4. Geography Is a Dealbreaker for Coalition Building in Asia

5. N. Korean leader's sister warns of 'gruesome' consequences over anti-Pyongyang leaflets

6. FM Cho expresses hope for cooperation between S. Korea's new space agency, NASA

7. North Korean diplomat commended by Kim Jong Un defects to South Korea

8. Washington and Korean Reunification: What Can America Do?

9. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Decreasing number of train riders leads to fall in train services…government focuses on using trains for freight transportation

10. Setting the right level of ambition for Korea- China relations

11. Exclusive: "North Korea has no hope under Kim Jong-un's regime"

1. Yoon says S. Korea-U.S. alliance elevated to 'nuclear-based' one

Excerpt:

"The U.S. will assign a special mission to its nuclear assets for the Korean Peninsula both in wartime and peacetime," Yoon said during a Cabinet meeting. "We have established a posture to respond swiftly and effectively to any kind of North Korean nuclear threat."

(LEAD) Yoon says S. Korea-U.S. alliance elevated to 'nuclear-based' one | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 16, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's remarks in paras 6-10)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said Tuesday that South Korea's alliance with the United States has been elevated to a "nuclear-based" one capable of deterring the North's nuclear threats following their signing of joint nuclear deterrence guidelines.

Last week, Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden adopted the "Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula" on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Washington.

"The U.S. will assign a special mission to its nuclear assets for the Korean Peninsula both in wartime and peacetime," Yoon said during a Cabinet meeting. "We have established a posture to respond swiftly and effectively to any kind of North Korean nuclear threat."

The signing of the guidelines was a culmination of the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group's efforts to ensure the credibility of America's "extended deterrence" commitment to South Korea in an integrated way that includes South Korea's conventional support for U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency.

Extended deterrence refers to a U.S. pledge to mobilize the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear arms, to defend its ally.

During his U.S. trip, Yoon also visited the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, where he stressed the importance of combined defense capabilities between South Korea and the U.S. to counter North Korean threats.

President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during a Cabinet meeting held at the presidential office in Seoul on July 16, 2024. (Yonhap)

Yoon said South Korea's teaming up with NATO's Indo-Pacific partners -- Japan, Australia and New Zealand -- is meaningful as they voiced against North Korea's military cooperation with Russia and paved the way for "institutionalization" of the grouping's further cooperation with NATO.

During the meeting, Yoon also urged relevant ministries to swiftly implement support measures for regions grappling with damage from the recent heavy downpour.

On Monday, the government designated five areas in the central and southern regions as special disaster zones, which make them eligible for financial support for recovery work, relief funds for victims and other benefits.

"Relevant ministries need to swiftly execute support measures for the special disaster zones and mobilize all available personnel and equipment for the recovery efforts," Yoon said.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 16, 2024

2. U.N. report condemns N. Korea's 'extensive, multilayered' system of forced labor

Another reason for a human right upfront approach.

(2nd LD) U.N. report condemns N. Korea's 'extensive, multilayered' system of forced labor | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 16, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with response from the foreign ministry in last 2 paras)

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has maintained an "extensive and multilayered" system of forced labor in a bid to use it as a means of controlling and monitoring its people for the interest of the state, a U.N. report showed Tuesday.

The United Nations Human Rights Office released a new report over North Korea's use of forced labor, which was written based on 183 interviews conducted between 2015 and 2023 with victims and witnesses of such labor exploitation.

"The testimonies in this report give a shocking and distressing insight into the suffering inflicted through forced labor upon people, both in its scale, and in the levels of violence and inhuman treatment," U.N. Human Rights Chief Volker Turk said in a press release.

The report said North Korea's use of forced labor has become "deeply institutionalized" and, in some cases, serious human rights violations have been committed in the process that could amount to the crime against humanity of enslavement.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that "systemic" forced labor is used mainly to generate profit for the state, with most of the money earned by workers going to the government, violating workers' rights.

Notably, the report highlighted "the widespread use of violence and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" by officials to discipline workers who fail to meet work quotas.

The report cited various testimonies from victims of the regime's forced labor system. These include individuals forbidden to leave their worksites and a female worker who was sexually abused by a political guidance officer.

"If we didn't meet the daily quota, we were beaten and our food was cut," according to one victim cited in the report.

Forced labor impacts nearly everyone's lives in North Korea, including military conscripts, requiring 10 years of service or longer, workers in state enterprises and even schoolchildren. It involves construction, farming, logging and mining, which are often hard, arduous and dangerous.

"These people are forced to work in intolerable conditions, often in dangerous sectors with the absence of pay, free choice, ability to leave, protection, medical care, time off, food and shelter," the high commissioner said.

The report stated that forced labor not only provides a source of free labor for the state but also acts as a means for the state to control, monitor and indoctrinate the population.

The agency urged Pyongyang to end these slavery-like practices and ensure effective prevention, including clear definitions in national laws, especially policies that are discriminatory toward women.

The report further recommended the government to replace the system of labor employment based on coercion, including the threat of detention.

To the international community, the agency recommended ensuring strict due diligence in any economic engagement with North Korea and close surveillance of supply chains originating directly and indirectly from the country.

It also called on the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court.

The South Korean government welcomed the report, urging North Korea to implement the recommendations made by the office.

"We hope that this report will raise international awareness of the severe human rights situation in North Korea and strengthen international efforts to improve human rights conditions in North Korea," the foreign ministry said in a press release.

The United Nations Human Rights Office holds a press conference in Seoul on July 16, 2024, to release its latest report on North Korea's "extensive and multilayered" system of forced labor. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 16, 2024

3. The Emerging Nuclear Scenario

Excerpts:

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

...

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

ALLIES & EXTENDED DETERRENCE, STRATEGIC ADVERSARIES

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario

https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-emerging-nuclear-scenario/?mc_cid=4a35aa8661&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Stephen Blank7 days ago1 Comment4 Mins Read

The Russia-North Korea mutual security pact, Moscow’s unceasing nuclear threats, Russia’s global nuclear power sales drive, Iran’s race for nuclear weapons, and China’s “breathtaking” nuclear expansion, are the stuff of daily headlines. They all point to increasing nuclear proliferation, multiplying nuclear threats, and the emergence of an increasingly cohesive bloc of powers fully willing to threaten and possibly employ nuclear weapons.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

4. Geography Is a Dealbreaker for Coalition Building in Asia

Geography matters.

Excerpts:

But this “new convergence” is more of an illusion than reality. As we argued in a longer piece in the Washington Quarterly, the United States still lacks military access to critical parts of Asia, a robust regional security network, and well-armed allies and partners capable of self-defense. Worse, trying harder will not solve these myriad problems because the region’s geography—its vast distances and maritime environment—works against coalition-building. Instead of trying to outmatch or outcompete China, Washington should acknowledge the geographic reality and build a more narrow but sustainable coalition to balance Chinese power and prevent Beijing’s regional hegemony.

...

Ultimately, U.S. policymakers are right: The United States needs allies and partners to counter China. But aiming for an unattainable coalition will leave the United States running excessive risks. U.S. long-term success in Asia will depend, in the end, on Washington’s ability to internalize the region’s geostrategic lessons.

Geography Is a Dealbreaker for Coalition Building in Asia

Kelly A. Grieco, Jennifer Kavanagh

The countries that the United States is trying to rally together are too dispersed to share the same security concerns.

lawfaremedia.org · by Kelly A. Grieco

Editor’s Note: The Biden administration has launched an ambitious effort to work with allies and partners in Asia to counter China. My Georgetown University colleagues Kelly Grieco and Jennifer Kavanagh, who are also senior fellows at the Stimson Center and Defense Priorities, respectively, argue that the United States is trying to do too much and that it will fail as a result. They point to numerous limits and highlight in particular the role of geography in shaping the responses of states in Asia.

Daniel Byman

***

At the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin touted a “new convergence” between the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners that is “defining a new era of security in the Indo-Pacific.” Austin came with a list of accomplishments to back it up, hailing expanded U.S. military access to bases in Australia and the Philippines, a “new era” in U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation, and co-production deals with India.

But this “new convergence” is more of an illusion than reality. As we argued in a longer piece in the Washington Quarterly, the United States still lacks military access to critical parts of Asia, a robust regional security network, and well-armed allies and partners capable of self-defense. Worse, trying harder will not solve these myriad problems because the region’s geography—its vast distances and maritime environment—works against coalition-building. Instead of trying to outmatch or outcompete China, Washington should acknowledge the geographic reality and build a more narrow but sustainable coalition to balance Chinese power and prevent Beijing’s regional hegemony.

The Indo-Pacific Mirage

Despite its boasting, the Biden administration has made only limited progress toward any “convergence” in Asia. First, the United States still lacks the military access it needs to establish a more distributed and survivable force posture against China’s missile threats. New access permissions have done little to remedy this situation, as both the Philippines and Papua New Guinea have said the United States cannot conduct strike operations from their soil in a Taiwan contingency.

Second, most allies and partners—including Taiwan—continue to underinvest in their own defense and spend far too much on big-ticket items like fighter jets and warships, rather than on the anti-ship and anti-air missiles, drones, and sea mines they need to turn themselves into hard-to-conquer porcupines.

Finally, even the administration’s signature project—building a “latticework” of overlapping security partnerships in the region—has met with limited success. Few countries are willing to fully commit to U.S. security networks that they perceive—rightly or wrongly—as requiring them to choose between the United States and China. In December 2023, for example, a few months after entering a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the United States—and raising expectations for closer alignment between Hanoi and Washington on security issues—Vietnam also elevated its relationship with Beijing as part of a carefully balanced refusal to take sides.

Though the administration has acknowledged some remaining gaps, officials continue to express confidence that as China’s military assertiveness in the region grows, the U.S.-led coalition will become stronger—with more and better armed members and wider access permissions. But this expectation discounts the geographic reality of the Indo-Pacific.

The Problem of Geography

The region’s sheer size, its expansive oceans and seas, and the unique maritime characteristics of Indo-Pacific states themselves pose intractable barriers to building the region-wide coalition in Asia that Washington expects.

First, the region’s vast distances dampen many regional states’ threat perceptions of China. Many U.S. partners consider hot spots like the Taiwan Strait and the Second Thomas Shoal to be distant concerns. The size of the Indo-Pacific theater—covering 50 percent of Earth’s surface—prevents the emergence of the shared security interests that might serve as the foundation of a regional coalition. Countries like Malaysia and Indonesia have little direct concern about the fate of Taiwan, which is some 1,800 miles away and peripheral to their own security. At the same time, by challenging the U.S. ability to project combat power, the region’s size erodes the perceived benefits of joining U.S-led. coalitions.

Second, the region’s maritime geography offers a powerful defensive barrier—what the political scientist John Mearsheimer terms “the stopping power of water.” This defensive advantage discourages states from making large investments in defense or turning to a balancing coalition for protection. China’s neighbors are wary of its growing power, but few see it as posing an existential threat to their survival. The maritime environment also gives them reason to question the credibility of U.S. commitments, as the air and naval assets that the United States relies on in the region are highly mobile—easy to deploy and easy to withdraw—and raise the perceived risks of lining up behind the United States.

Finally, the unique geographies of Asia’s maritime states tend to focus attention inward and on local security issues and away from more distant regional security threats. Archipelagic states like Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, for example, prioritize protecting their dispersed sovereignty—specifically the internal waters that lie between their many islands. These internal concerns may sometimes overlap with U.S. priorities—as is the case with Japan, as its archipelago extends toward Taiwan—but mostly they reduce regional demand for balancing coalitions. Similarly, coastal states like Vietnam and South Korea tend to focus most heavily on threats to their land borders, content to let the sea’s defensive barrier offer a first line of protection along their coastlines and driving them away from regional coalitions.

Because geography does not change, the coalition Washington wants is unattainable, and no amount of time or effort will alter that reality.

A Power-Balancing Coalition

Going forward, Washington ought to take the region’s geography more seriously. To start, it should right-size U.S. strategic objectives. Washington still clings to the goal of preserving U.S. military primacy in Asia, but its strategy of building a large coalition of allies and partners to help defray some of the costs is unworkable. Worse, it leaves the United States dangerously overstretched. Instead, Washington should focus on drawing together a smaller group of allies and partners that can prevent Chinese hegemony without trying to maintain its own.

To build a balancing coalition, the United States should prioritize the security of the region’s major centers of industrial power, including India, Japan, and South Korea, supporting them in providing for their own self-defense with arms sales, intelligence sharing, and defense industrial base cooperation. At the same time, Washington should deprioritize areas less likely to shift the balance of power—for example, much of continental Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

Second, to reinforce its regional staying power, the United States should invest more heavily in improving its existing defense infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific, including hardening aircraft shelters and submarines pens, moving more resources to pre-positioned equipment stockpiles, and increasing air and missile defense capabilities. These investments would send costly signals that increase the credibility of long-term U.S. commitments to Asia. They would also create the capacity for rapidly surging forces into the region in a conflict and increase the resilience of U.S. posture in Asia without the need for additional forward-deployed U.S. ground forces, which can create their own escalation risks.

Finally, rather than pressing for regional convergence, Washington needs to meet the region—especially Southeast Asia—where it is. The United States should learn to work more effectively within Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) networks and through its many overlapping subgroups as a participant and supporter of these states’ regional security concerns.

Ultimately, U.S. policymakers are right: The United States needs allies and partners to counter China. But aiming for an unattainable coalition will leave the United States running excessive risks. U.S. long-term success in Asia will depend, in the end, on Washington’s ability to internalize the region’s geostrategic lessons.

Kelly A. Grieco

Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and an adjunct professor in the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University.

Jennifer Kavanagh

Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities. She is also an adjunct professor in the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University.

lawfaremedia.org · by Kelly A. Grieco

5. N. Korean leader's sister warns of 'gruesome' consequences over anti-Pyongyang leaflets

The evil sister just cannot help herself. She loves being the bad cop.

(LEAD) N. Korean leader's sister warns of 'gruesome' consequences over anti-Pyongyang leaflets | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 16, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES article based on KCNA's English-language dispatch)

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- The powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un warned Tuesday that South Korea will face "gruesome and dear" consequences if it lets North Korean defectors continue to send anti-Pyongyang leaflets to the North.

Kim Yo-jong, vice department director at the ruling Workers' Party, said North Korea will inevitably change its method of responses if the defectors continue the leaflet campaigns against the North, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"We give the scum a stern warning again. They should be ready for paying a gruesome and dear price," Kim in a statement carried by the KCNA.

Kim said the North has discovered 29 large balloons carrying such leaflets near the inter-Korean border and other areas.

"If the ROK scum persist in their crude and dirty play, the mode of counteraction of the DPRK will inevitably be changed," Kim said, hinting that North Korea could take a new tactic to counter the leaflet campaign instead of sending trash-filled balloons.

ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name. DPRK is the acronym of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Since late May, North Korea has sent more than 2,000 trash-filled balloons into the South, in a tit-for-tat move against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent by North Korean defectors in the South.

Kim made a similar warning Sunday claiming that the leaflets from the South were found in more than a dozen places in the border and other regions and were all incinerated.

At that time, the North's state media published rare photos showing leaflets flown in from South Korea being burned, along with a pack of cold medicine.

Materials believed to be anti-Pyongyang leaflets from South Korea are set on fire after being discovered in North Korea, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency on July 14, 2024. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 16, 2024

6. FM Cho expresses hope for cooperation between S. Korea's new space agency, NASA

FM Cho expresses hope for cooperation between S. Korea's new space agency, NASA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 16, 2024

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul met with Pamela Melroy, the deputy chief of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), on Tuesday to discuss space cooperation between the two countries, according to the foreign ministry.

During the meeting in Seoul, Cho expressed hope for active cooperation between the national space agency, the Korea AeroSpace Administration (KASA), and NASA. KASA was launched in Sacheon, approximately 300 kilometers south of Seoul, on May 27.

"Space cooperation between the two countries, based on the S. Korea-U.S. alliance, is a core aspect of our space diplomacy, and cooperation with NASA is particularly important," Cho was quoted by the ministry as saying.

Melroy highlighted that South Korea, which shares the values of transparency and democracy with the United States, is an important space cooperation partner.

The retired astronaut also expressed anticipation for continued cooperation with South Korea, a leading space power in Asia, in areas such as satellite development and space observation.

Both sides also agreed to continue efforts to enhance space cooperation through bilateral consultative bodies based on a bilateral space agreement signed in 2016.

This image, provided by the foreign ministry, shows Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul (R) with Pamela Melroy, the deputy chief of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in Seoul on July 16, 2024. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 16, 2024

7. North Korean diplomat commended by Kim Jong Un defects to South Korea

Excerpt:

“I hope that we, former North Korean diplomats, work together for reunification to make come true North Korean officials’ and residents’ dream for their children to live freely in the Republic of Korea,” said Tae in a statement, calling South Korea by its official name.

North Korean diplomat commended by Kim Jong Un defects to South Korea

Ri Il Kyu is the highest-ranking North Korean diplomat to defect to the South since 2016.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/korean-defector-cuba-07162024041220.html

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.07.16

Taipei, Taiwan

Cuban guards stand ready before a ceremony for Yang Hyong-sop, vice president of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, on Havana’s Revolution Square, Sept. 23, 2005.

Claudia Daut/Reuters

A North Korean diplomat who had been stationed in Cuba defected to South Korea last year, Seoul’s spy agency said Tuesday, joining a small but growing number of defections by the North’s elite in recent years.

Ri Il Kyu, who had served as the counselor of political affairs at the North Korean embassy in Cuba, entered the South in November with his family, said South Korea’s National Intelligence Service without providing further details.

Ri, 52, who joined the North’s foreign ministry in 1999, had been serving as the political counselor at the Cuban embassy since April 2019. His role included preventing the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Cuba, according to Ri’s interview with the South Korean daily Chosun Ilbo.

In February, Seoul and Havana forged formal ties in a move that was widely seen as a setback to Pyongyang, which has long boasted about its brotherly ties with the Caribbean country.

Washington and Korean Reunification: What Can America Do?

Korean reunification offers enormous potential for the Korean people and less direct benefits for many others elsewhere. To reap these advantages, many challenges must be overcome. That can be best achieved if the United States seeks to advance the interests of the Korean people and their neighbors as well as Americans. In this effort, Washington should play the long game, seeking a fundamental transformation of Korean relations and Korea’s role in Northeast Asia and beyond.

The National Interest · by Doug Bandow · July 11, 2024

Many Koreans desired reunification when the United States and the Soviet Union divided the peninsula into separate occupation zones in 1945. Both the Republic of Korea’s Syngman Rhee and North Korea’s Kim Il-sung threatened to use force to restore one Korean nation. Kim acted first and would have succeeded had the United States and its allies not intervened militarily.

After the war-induced hardening of the peninsula’s division, reunification became an aspiration viewed as impractical, if not impossible, by Washington. Although U.S. policymakers had no objection to reunification in principle—indeed, they would have gladly made it an ancillary benefit of defeating the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—they had little interest in pursuing what they believed would be a wasted effort.

Today, reunification looks to many observers like an even greater lost cause. Younger South Koreans have ever less connections to the DPRK and, hence, even less interest in reunification. The North’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un has dropped reunification, peaceful, anyway, as an official state objective, with South Koreans reclassified as “foreigners” rather than benighted co-nationals. As Pyongyang continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and develop ICBMs capable of targeting the U.S. homeland, reunification is on few minds in Washington.

Yet, the ever-compounding short-term crises on the Korean peninsula make long-term planning even more important. It is not enough to dodge day-to-day disasters. American policymakers should consider the end state most beneficial to the Republic of Korea, Northeast Asia, and the United States. Having a final objective in mind would better enable officials to choose short-term policies that are most likely to deliver positive long-term results.

Reunification is one such objective. Other important designs, such as denuclearization, also look like paths to nowhere. However, these issues disproportionately affect either Seoul or Pyongyang. Despite the obvious political headwinds against reunification, it benefits both the South and North (though not necessarily their governments).

The greatest challenge to reunification in Washington is indifference rather than opposition. The DC policy community does not currently take the idea seriously. That will remain a significant challenge in today’s environment, with an overload of vital public policy concerns. Backers must persuade policymakers that reunification is possible, if not probable, and that it would promote regional peace and prosperity while reducing the security challenges facing Washington.

Support for reunification among the Korean neighbors would also advance the process. It is vital to convince other nations, most notably Japan, Russia, and China, that reunification would not undermine their interests. For them, a united Korea, depending on its orientation, could be a competitor, an adversary, or even an enemy. Such fears must be rebutted before it will be possible to persuade skeptical governments of the advantages of Korean reunification.

This process may not be easy. Beijing’s attitude is critical. Allied advocates of a Seoul-led reunification may underestimate the possibility of China seeking to retain the DPRK as a buffer state. Given Russia’s recent dramatic shift toward the North, Moscow might also seek to preserve North Korea in some form. Moreover, Japan might harbor concerns over relations with a more populous and powerful united Korea, especially if reunification occurred amid a nationalist surge in popular opinion. Defusing opposition may be more important than gaining support. Reunification should be presented as a collective positive, not as a weapon for use in other geopolitical disputes.

Rising tensions on the Korean peninsula offer a powerful reminder of the need to improve U.S. relations with both China and Russia. Doing so obviously will not be easy, but both governments today are unwilling to cooperate with the United States and its allies over other issues, ranging across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Improving the prospects for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia is an essential reason to pursue this path.

Unfortunately, both Koreas have been drawn into the Ukrainian conflict. Perhaps a regional initiative could be launched seeking to pull both out of the conflict, an effort that might help encourage broader negotiations to moderate their conflict and move toward reunification.

Indeed, this challenge illustrates Washington’s limitations. Thus, the United States should encourage other nations to make the case for international support for reunification. For instance, Mongolia has long had good relations with both Koreas. Southeast Asian nations also could play a special role. After all, Singapore and Vietnam both hosted Kim-Trump summits, suggesting that they were trusted by Washington and Pyongyang alike. There may be other potential international salesmen. Moreover, NGOs of various sorts and interested peoples, wherever located, also could argue on behalf of the Korean people in both the North and South.

Ultimately, of course, the Korean people must decide on Korean reunification. If they decide otherwise, their choice should be respected. However, the greatest challenge today is that the people of North Korea are not able to freely decide their future any more than they do in the present, which adds to the reasons that reform in the North is essential. Moving Pyongyang in a more liberal, humane, and democratic direction remains the most significant challenge for any Korean policy.

About the Author: Doug Bandow

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea. This article is drawn from his remarks to the Mongolia Forum on Northeast Asian Peaceful Development and Korean Unification, which was held in early July in Ulaanbaatar.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Doug Bandow · July 11, 2024

9. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Decreasing number of train riders leads to fall in train services…government focuses on using trains for freight transportation

＜Inside N. Korea＞Decreasing number of train riders leads to fall in train services…government focuses on using trains for freight transportation

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) A woman carrying goods for business heading towards a train. This isn’t the case anymore as authorities have recently cracked down on private business and distribution. Taken in October 2013 in a northern border city. Photo by ASIAPRESS

The number of passenger trains entering the Yanggang Province area has significantly decreased recently. The number of train riders, which had sharply declined due to North Korea’s zero-COVID policy, has not increased even after the relaxation of pandemic-era controls. Meanwhile, there are efforts to revive the national distribution network, primarily using freight trains, such as organizing dedicated trains to supply domestic products to state-owned stores. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Passenger train services reduced due to decrease in travelers

In June, a reporting partner in Hyesan, Yanggang Province, told ASIAPRESS that the number of passenger train services has been declining significantly as of late. Hyesan, a border city in the north, is connected by an inland line that passes through North Pyongan Province and Jagang Province to the west, and the East Coast line railway that passes through North and South Hamgyong provinces to the southeast.

According to North Korea's train schedule, Train No. 1 (Pyongyang-Hyesan, East Coast line) and Train No. 3 (Pyongyang-Hyesan, Northern Inland line), which depart from Pyongyang for Hyesan, are supposed to operate once a day each. However, delays and cancellations are common due to electricity issues and deteriorating railway conditions.

The reporting partner said that passenger trains, which usually operated every other day, have been reduced to about once a week, stating:

"It seems to be because there are fewer people traveling by train due to controls on private business and movement, and also because it's the farming mobilization' period (May-June)."

◆ Freight cars increase due to government logistics plans

According to what the reporting partner learned from railway officials, while passenger train operations have decreased, freight car operations have been maintained or even increased. This appears to be due to changes in the state transportation plans.

"Currently, private distribution is not allowed, so goods are not coming in properly. Therefore, they have arranged to operate covered freight cars specializing in transporting manufactured goods 2-4 times or more per month, allowing goods produced in North Hamgyong Province to be transported to Pyongsong and Sinuiju, and goods from those areas to be brought into Kim Chaek, Kilju, and Yanggang Province."

This means that the North Korean authorities have been relying heavily on railway transportation as they have recently strengthened state control over distribution and promoted the revitalization of the state-owned distribution network.

The reporting partner also said that the government is attempting to make stations distribution hubs in each region.

"They have built new supply centers or storage warehouses at every station so that incoming goods can be quickly delivered to state-owned stores."

◆Hand carts are still key to logistics in North Korea

(FILE PHOTO) A woman pulling a hand cart full of large sacks. Taken in October 2013 in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. Photo by ASIAPRESS

Nevertheless, state-planned transportation through railways seems to have limitations from a practical perspective.

"Because cars can't transport properly due to fuel costs, they ordered transportation by train from February this year, but trains are not operating properly due to frequent power outages. Even when goods are transported, there are no proper means of transportation to each store, so they are resorting to using personal hand carts to carry them."

The Handcart Porter Is Now an Indispensable Business

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

asiapress.org

10. Setting the right level of ambition for Korea- China relations

Excerpts:

Yoon issued the Indo-Pacific Strategy in December 2022 and declared that Korea’s foreign, security and economic policies will have to be based on further strengthening the rules-based international order. At the same time, he declared his firm commitment to further developing relations with China. His declaration was followed by Korea’s efforts to deepen dialogue with China at various levels of government.

China’s response so far has been lukewarm at best. In Korea’s view, China kept on ignoring diplomatic démarches from Korea while responding far more attentively to the approaches by other U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, Korea has often been offended with instances of “wolf warrior” diplomacy.

Such asymmetry in how Korea and China address each other must be recognized and removed. On that basis, the two countries could move ahead, make progress through the channels of dialogue established in the Yoon-Li meeting on May 26 and meet the expectations raised through the meeting.

Setting the right level of ambition for Korea- China relations

The Korea Times · July 16, 2024

By Ahn Ho-young

Ahn Ho-young

A trilateral summit between Korea, Japan and China was held in Seoul on May 26 and 27 after a hiatus of four and a half years. Given the many challenges still facing the relations among and between the three countries, the summit meeting made notable progress in improving them. Besides, the bilateral meeting between Korea and China, held on the sidelines of the summit, attracted extraordinarily high attention in Seoul.

After the deployment of THAAD missile defense batteries in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang Province, in 2017, relations between Korea and China entered a tough patch. Concern over these relations have grown only deeper since then.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Seoul for the first time in nine years for a Chinese premier and had a meeting with President Yoon Suk Yeol, making agreements on widening economic exchanges and having further security dialogue between the two countries. Many Koreans seem to be relieved of their concerns about the tough patch and expect to see tangible progress in Korea’s relations with China. However, premature expectations can lead to deeper frustration and tension between the two countries. This is a time to set the right level of ambition for Korea-China relations.

First of all, the agreements made in Yoon-Li meeting were on the process, not on the substance. It will take much time and effort to make substantive progress through the process.

With respect to the free trade agreement (FTA) between Korea and China, it was agreed to begin negotiations in order to further open the service markets in culture, tourism and legal services. The Korean service sectors that suffered acute market access difficulties due to the “punish Korea order” imposed after the deployment of THAAD missiles were cultural services and tourism. Thus, the new round of negotiations on services raises expectations for improved market access for those sectors. What we must remember, though, is that China’s official position has been that there does not exist any “punish Korea order.” The FTA negotiations cannot undo the non-existing order.

Similar concerns are in order about the agreement on fuller utilization of the bilateral channels to address supply chain issues and launch a new dialogue to address export control. On supply chain issues, Korea and China seem to talk past each other. For Korea, supply chain issues are mainly about the stable supply of critical minerals and other materials. For China, supply chain issues are centered on semiconductor-related products, equipment and technology, which are closely affected by the overall U.S.-China relations and the U.S. export control regime. Soon after the Yoon-Li meeting, the supply of diesel exhaust fluid issue flared up once again due to China’s move to limit its exports.

Yoon and Li also agreed on May 26 to begin a 2+2 dialogue on foreign and security issues, where vice foreign ministers and director generals of national defense of each country would participate. Its first round of discussions was held in Seoul on June 18, immediately before Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea. South Korea is highly concerned about the deepening relations between North Korea and Russia, given its dire implications for North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the war in Ukraine. Putin’s visit to North Korea was thus a subject of paramount apprehension for Korea at the 2+2 meeting. For China, Putin’s visit, according to the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, was nothing more than a routine visit between countries wishing for exchanges and cooperation.

In order to reset their relations, the leaders of the two countries have to start by acknowledging the significant gap in perceptions and policies between them and show a firm commitment to removing it. For now, there seems to be a huge asymmetry in the way the leaders of the two countries are addressing these issues.

Yoon issued the Indo-Pacific Strategy in December 2022 and declared that Korea’s foreign, security and economic policies will have to be based on further strengthening the rules-based international order. At the same time, he declared his firm commitment to further developing relations with China. His declaration was followed by Korea’s efforts to deepen dialogue with China at various levels of government.

China’s response so far has been lukewarm at best. In Korea’s view, China kept on ignoring diplomatic démarches from Korea while responding far more attentively to the approaches by other U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, Korea has often been offended with instances of “wolf warrior” diplomacy.

Such asymmetry in how Korea and China address each other must be recognized and removed. On that basis, the two countries could move ahead, make progress through the channels of dialogue established in the Yoon-Li meeting on May 26 and meet the expectations raised through the meeting.

Ahn Ho-young is chair professor at Kyungnam University. He served as the South Korean ambassador to the United States.

The Korea Times · July 16, 2024

11.Exclusive: "North Korea has no hope under Kim Jong-un's regime"

A very interesting interview with the latest defector.

But I found this comment odd.

Have you met Kim Jong-un?

“I’ve had tea with him. In person, Kim Jong-un is just an ordinary human. Up close, you can’t help but think his blood pressure must be extremely high; his face is always red like he’s been drinking, even redder than on screen. He looks almost like a Native American.”

Exclusive: "North Korea has no hope under Kim Jong-un's regime"

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/07/16/TFSCLREBFZF4XAIADGMOBUACWY/

Defector Ri Il-gyu, a former North Korean diplomat, reveals reality of Kim Jong-un's hopeless regime

By Kim Jin-myung,

Kim Seo-young,

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2024.07.16. 15:17

Updated 2024.07.16. 16:51

Ri Il-gyu, a defected former counselor who worked at the North Korean Embassy in Cuba, speaks during an interview with the Chosun Ilbo in Seoul on July 14, 2024. He said that he participated in the interview to "inform more people about the realities of the hopeless Kim Jong-un regime." /Kim Ji-ho

Ri Il-gyu, a 52-year-old former counselor responsible for political affairs at the North Korean Embassy in Cuba, appeared calm and gentle in an interview with the Chosun Ilbo at a hotel in Seoul on July 14. If not for his Pyongyang accent, it would be hard to believe he had defected just eight months ago. However, he was resolute when criticizing Kim Jong-un’s “anti-reunification two-state policy” as “an act that obliterates the soul of the nation.”

◇ Bribery demands and refusal of medical treatment led to decision

What made you think about defecting?

“The direct cause was the unfair evaluation of my efforts, leading to frustration and anger. The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs is full of people from powerful families. My background is classified as ‘clerical,’ which is less favorable compared to ‘worker’ or ‘soldier.’ I started at the lowest rank and worked diligently. However, in August 2019, when I went to Pyongyang to open a North Korean restaurant in Cuba, the deputy director of the Foreign Ministry’s representative office demanded a significant bribe. Lacking funds, I deferred the bribe, saying “let’s discuss it later,” which led to resentment and attempts to recall me. After that, they continuously gave me harsh evaluations of my work.”

Is that when you decided to defect?

“While suffering from nerve damage due to a cervical spine injury last year, I requested permission from the Ministry to go to Mexico for treatment, as Cuba lacks medical equipment due to sanctions. Less than 24 hours later, my request was denied. I was enraged and became convinced that my decision to leave North Korea was correct. The passing of my parents and parents-in-law, who proudly displayed ‘Kim Jong-un commendations’ in their living rooms, also contributed to my decision.”

How did you plan your defection?

“I seriously considered defection from mid-July 2023 and executed it in early November. I lost 7 kg over those three months. I truly experienced the saying, ‘food feels like sand in your mouth.’ Six hours before my defection, I informed my wife and child without mentioning ‘South Korea,’ instead suggesting we live abroad.”

North Korea keeps passports at embassies. How did you board the plane?

“Explaining the details would allow North Korean authorities to preemptively block such methods, potentially harming those who wish to defect after me. The one hour I waited at the airport gate felt like years. For the first time, I prayed earnestly for God to protect my family, understanding why people believe in religion.”

Former North Korean counselor and defector, Ri Il-gyu /Kim Ji-ho

◇ Kim Jong-un shocked by Park Geun-hye’s election

Have you met Kim Jong-un?

“I’ve had tea with him. In person, Kim Jong-un is just an ordinary human. Up close, you can’t help but think his blood pressure must be extremely high; his face is always red like he’s been drinking, even redder than on screen. He looks almost like a Native American.”

He revealed his daughter Kim Ju-ae in November 2022.

“Kim Jong-un had been seen with Ju-ae long before her media debut. They lived in an apartment in Pyongyang’s Second Academy of Natural Sciences, where over 80% of residents work on nuclear and missile development. According to them, since she was a toddler, whenever Kim Jong-un was in a good mood, he would bring her out, saying, ‘I will show you my princess.’ Initially, it was intriguing when she was first revealed, but as she appeared in official state events like military parades, it became increasingly uncomfortable. After enduring all sorts of humiliation under these people, the thought of my children bowing to that little girl was unbearable. Many North Koreans probably felt the same.”

Do you see her as a successor?

“Personally, I find it unlikely. Absolute authority and worship require an aura of mystery. With her being so exposed, how can there be any mystery or reverence?”

Could a female leader emerge in North Korea?

“When President Park Geun-hye was elected in South Korea in 2012, Kim Jong-un was quite shocked. He told Kim Phyong-hae, the ruling Workers’ Party’s department head and secretary, that we should also elevate women to show the international community that we are a normal country.”

◇ Han Song-ryol, U.S. affairs official, was publicly purged in front of senior officials

The 10th Bureau of the WPK Central Committee (formerly the United Front Department), rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led North Korea-U.S. talks.

“Kim Jong-il frequently called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at night, with documents being reported without any time restrictions. However, since Kim Jong-un came to power, these calls have significantly decreased. There was even an order prohibiting document reports after 11 PM. Consequently, the authority and influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been completely diminished.”

Why is that?

“Early in Kim Jong-un’s rule, he didn’t fully grasp the importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for regime maintenance. In 2016, there was a series of defections by diplomats, including Thae Yong-ho, the former deputy ambassador to the UK. In 2017, Kim Jong-un made a direct call to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but both the then-Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho and First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan missed the call. As a result, Kim Jong-un lost trust in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and delegated the North Korea-U.S. talks to the 10th Bureau of the WPK Central Committee.”

Around that time, the then-Vice Foreign Minister who was in charge of U.S. affairs, and Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho fell from power. What happened to them?

“Han Song-ryol was publicly executed on charges of being a U.S. spy. On Feb. 12, 2019, senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, above the rank of deputy director, were gathered near Pyongyang Sunan Airport at the Kang Kon Military Academy to witness the execution. I could not attend as I was being assigned to Cuba at the time. Those who witnessed the execution reported being unable to eat for several days afterward. In December 2019, Ri Yong-ho was accused of corruption, leading to his entire family being sent to a political prison camp. An embezzlement case involving a secretary at the embassy in China revealed Ri Yong-ho’s involvement during the investigation of higher-ranking officials who had accepted bribes. Kim Jong-un, furious over the matter, stated, ‘No wonder he couldn’t do his job properly if he was engaged in such activities behind my back.’ He then criticized Ri Yong-ho for half a day during the third day of the Central Committee plenary meeting from December 28 to 31, 2019. Attendees remarked that they believed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be entirely dismantled.”

Ri Il-gyu (left), then Deputy Director for Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East at the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attends a banquet celebrating the 57th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Jesús Aise Sotolongo (right), the Cuban ambassador to North Korea, at the Koryo Hotel by the Taedong River in Pyongyang on Aug. 29, 2017, in this file photo provided by Ri.

Choe Son-hui’s position as Foreign Minister appears well-established.

“There are rumors in South Korea that Choe Son-hui’s position as Foreign Minister is secure because she is the stepdaughter of former Prime Minister Choe Yong-rim, but that is not true. She climbed the ranks while working as an English interpreter for former First Vice Minister Kim Kye-gwan, who mentored her. She is articulate and, despite being a woman, is known for her authority. In North Korea, authority signifies having Kim Jong-un’s trust. At a banquet in February 2018, Kim Jong-un saw Choe Son-hui and said, ‘The Vice Minister in charge of U.S. affairs is doing a good job.’ When informed that she was a director, not a vice minister, Kim Jong-un asked, ‘Where is Kim Phyong-hae? I told you to promote capable women, so why is she still in this position?’ The next day, Choe Son-hui was appointed Vice Minister in charge of U.S. affairs.”

◇ Kim Jong-un has eradicated even the smallest hope for reunification

Do North Korean residents desire reunification?

“North Korean residents long for reunification even more than South Korean citizens. The reason is simple: they live in poverty. Both officials and ordinary citizens believe that reunification is the only way to secure a better future for their children. This sentiment is widely shared. They think that if South Korean conglomerates were to invest and create jobs, their living conditions would improve significantly.”

Why has Kim Jong-un embraced an anti-reunification stance?

“I believe the primary reason is to suppress the North Korean people’s desire for reunification. Despite strict control and punishment, the popularity of South Korean pop culture has not diminished. Previous generations at least kept reunification as a top national priority, developing policies and engaging in inter-Korean dialogues to maintain hope among the people. Kim Jong-un has cruelly extinguished even that hope.”

☞ Who is Ri Il-gyu?

Ri Il-gyu, formerly a Counselor at the North Korean Embassy in Cuba, was born in Pyongyang in 1972. He spent his adolescent years in Algeria and Cuba, accompanying his father, who was employed by a trade company under the 10th Bureau of the WPK Central Committee (then the United Front Department). He pursued French studies at Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute, encompassing both middle and high school, and later studied Spanish at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999. His service in Cuba spanned from September 2011 to January 2016 and again from April 2019 to November 2023, amounting to approximately nine years.

In July 2013, while serving as the Third Secretary (officially First Secretary) at the North Korean Embassy in Cuba, he successfully negotiated with Panama for the release of the North Korean ship Chong Chon Gang, which had been detained for carrying surface-to-air missiles and fighter jet parts. In recognition of his efforts, he received a commendation from Kim Jong-un. From 2016 to 2019, Ri served as the Deputy Director for Latin American Affairs at the Ministry’s headquarters in Pyongyang before returning to Cuba as a Counselor. During his second assignment in Cuba, his primary responsibility was to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Cuba.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website