Quotes of the Day:
“Withholding information is the essence of tyranny. Control of the flow of information is the tool of the dictatorship.”
– Bruce Coville
“Few minds are spacious; few even have an empty place in them or can offer some vacant point. Almost all have narrow capacities and are filled by some knowledge that blocks them up. What a torture to talk to filled heads, that allow nothing from the outside to enter them! A good mind, in order to enjoy itself and allow itself to enjoy others, always keeps itself larger than its own thoughts. And in order to do this, these thoughts must be given a pliant form, must be easily folded and unfolded, so that they are capable, finally, of maintaining a natural flexibility.All those short-sighted minds see clearly within their little ideas and see nothing in those of others; they are like those bad eyes that see from close range what is obscure and cannot perceive what is clear from afar. Night minds, minds of darkness.”
– Joseph Joubert, The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert: A Selection
"Happiness and freedom begin with a clear understanding of one principle: Some things are within our control, and some things are not."
– Epictetus
1. The Ukraine War in 2024: A Pivotal Year for the Transatlantic Alliance and World Order by John Nagl and Alexander Peris
2. A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force by John Nagl and Katie Crombe
3. How Bad Will Political Violence in the U.S. Get?
4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2024
5. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, June 30, 2024
6. Is China at War in the South China Sea?
7. NeXt Secretary of Defense
8. IN THE KILL ZONE: The Life and Times of Willie Merkerson (Part 2)
9. Analysis | What Taiwan is learning from the war in Ukraine
10. Cambodia Denies Hosting Chinese Naval Base, but Two Ships Raise Suspicions
11. For Ukraine and Russia, a Deadly Summer Lies Ahead With Little Hope of Big Gains
12. Analysis: How ready is China’s military? Dramatic downfall of two defense ministers raises questions
13. Commentary: The world came dangerously close to full-scale conflict in the South China Sea
14. Army Futures Command's Gen. Rainey reflects on AI's potential in modern warfare
15. This is how the US-built pier to bring aid to Gaza has worked — or not
16. Forgotten Wars: The Civil War in Myanmar
17. Could AI help US intelligence end decades-long aversion to unclassified data?
18. NATO Should Think Big About the Indo-Pacific
19. Trump the Realist: The Former President Understands the Limits of American Power
20. 'In the spirit of humanitarianism': China, the Philippines jointly rescue stranded Filipino fishermen in South China Sea
21. Immigration Is Behind the Strong U.S. Economy
22. War Books, Special Edition – Seventeen Great War Films: One Army Officer’s List
23. Making Sense of the Populist Present—1
1. The Ukraine War in 2024: A Pivotal Year for the Transatlantic Alliance and World Order by John Nagl and Alexander Peris
The Ukraine War in 2024
A Pivotal Year for the Transatlantic Alliance and World Order
John Nagl and Alexander Peris
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ukraine-war-2024-pivotal-year-transatlantic-alliance-and-world-order
Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine is now in its third year. Ukraine successfully repelled most of Russia’s initial strikes in 2022, and the West rallied to provide enormous support for the battle-hardened Ukrainian people. Yet Ukraine now faces serious challenges on and off the battlefield. Russia is advancing at the same time as international support for Ukraine has been thrown into doubt. The implications stretch far beyond Central and Eastern Europe in what some observers are now calling the opening phases of a renewed Cold War and even a possible World War III.
Russia’s initial battlefield blunders in the face of a nimble and courageous defense saw Ukrainian troops thwart Russia’s thrusts into Kyiv and northern Ukraine. While Russia did gain ground in the south and east, counter offensives saw Russian troops pushed out of the regional capital of Kherson and Ukraine’s “second city,” Kharkiv. Ukraine succeeded in large part thanks to excellent leadership and operational flexibility. President Volodymr Zelensky famously illustrated Ukrainian resolve with the line “I need ammunition, not a ride,” while his generals under military chief Valerii Zaluzhny outwitted the Russians.
International support made the difference in the early stages of the war. Donated weapons such as the Javelin anti-tank missile and the HIMARS rocket system decimated Russian armored formations, command posts, and supply depots. The United States and its Western allies have kept Ukraine in the fight, delivering a wide variety of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other materiel. They have also provided crucial economic aid and formed a mostly united front against Russia, expanding NATO and levying sanctions en masse.
Yet three years on, Russia, supported by what Hal Brands terms a cohort of “Eurasian autocracies,” is achieving increasing success. Thanks to large-scale trade with China, Russia has side-stepped many of the sanctions facing it. The “No Limits” partnership between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping has given Russia access to the components needed to rapidly expand its defense-industrial base. Countries such as North Korea and Iran are increasingly acting in concert with Russia, providing it with arms and ammunition. Pyongyang has sold Moscow millions of artillery rounds while Tehran has provided thousands of suicide drones and the requisite know-how to employ them effectively on the battlefield.
Brands describes the emergence of two, opposing autocratic and liberal-democratic geopolitical blocs as “Cold War II.” Much like Cold War I, this has been accompanied by a rhetorical battle across the developing world. Many African countries have aligned with Russia, booting out American and European troops and importing Russian mercenaries instead. In short, the war in Ukraine has become a global showdown, with implications off and on the battlefield. For Ukraine, Russia’s access to global resources and weaponry means the military environment has become considerably more difficult.
Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed to gain much ground as new equipment fell victim to Russian artillery and drones. Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut, while strategically sound, was costly in casualties. Russia’s casualty rate is leagues worse, but with a considerably smaller population, Ukraine remains at an enduring disadvantage. A shortage of combat troops has caused polarizing internal debates about expanding the draft-eligible population. The hero of the early war, General Zaluzhny, is gone, replaced by President Zelensky amid murky political maneuvering. Russian troops have made steady advances this year. Alarmingly, this includes a return to the Kharkiv region, where indiscriminate Russian bombing has caused many civilian casualties.
Given the circumstances, Ukraine’s current difficulties are unsurprising. Consider Russia’s artillery advantage. Thanks in part to components from China and ammunition from Iran and North Korea, Russia is estimated to possess a 5:1 advantage in shells fired in a war where up to 80% of the casualties have been caused by artillery. Russia’s shell production continues to outstrip that of the EU and the United States combined; the West has struggled to accelerate production of artillery shells and other weapons and ammunition.
Yet perhaps the most significant worry for Ukraine is not on the front lines. Rather, it lies thousands of miles away in Washington DC, where the aid that keeps Ukraine in the fight is coming under increasing threat. One key reason Russia made advances earlier this year is that a vital $60 billion aid package was stuck in Congress, forcing Ukrainian troops to conserve ammunition amid human wave attacks. Large elements of the Republican-majority House tacked to an isolationist course and refused to vote for the bill, which only passed after months of political maneuvering. Donald Trump, the de facto Republican nominee for President, has expressed a desire to end the war quickly and may seek to curtail U.S. aid to Ukraine if elected.
Admittedly, the EU and Ukraine’s European partners are trying to step up. French President Emmanuel Macron has played an important role in rallying support, even coordinating a potential plan to send French advisors to Ukraine. The Czech Republic is leading a European initiative to source hundreds of thousands of artillery shells for Ukraine. The European Union and Ukraine’s other European partners have also provided essential economic aid to Ukraine.
However, Ukraine cannot fight at its current operational tempo without American military aid, even if Europe continues to support its beleaguered neighbor. Europe cannot provide enough support to allow Ukraine to hold off Russia’s numerical and materiel superiority. A cut in aid would lead to the long-term weakening of Ukrainian troops, opening the potential for a devastating Russian breakthrough as artillery and anti-air munitions run low. Alternatively, Ukraine may be forced to the negotiating table, risking leaving nearly a fifth of its territory and millions of its citizens under Russian control. Either outcome puts millions of Ukrainians at risk from an occupying power whose attacks on civilians are a feature, not a bug, of Russia’s strategy. Either outcome would also give Russia time to regroup and rearm, endangering not only millions of Ukrainians but also America’s NATO partners in Eastern Europe.
The next year will be crucial. Ukrainian courage and Western support have thus far kept Russia and its alliance of autocracies at bay. The future of Ukraine, Europe, and the entire transatlantic alliance now lies in the balance.
John Nagl is Professor of Warfighting Studies at the United States Army War College and director of the Ukraine War Integrated Research Project there. A retired Army officer, he served in tank units in both Iraq Wars.
Alexander Peris is a research intern at the U.S. Army War College. He is currently supporting the Ukraine Integrated Research Project, synthesizing the lessons from the war in Ukraine for the U.S. Army. A Pennsylvania native, Alexander studies international relations and modern history at the University of St Andrews in Scotland.
This article reflects their views and not those of the United States Army War College, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense. It draws upon the book A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, edited by John Nagl and Colonel Katie Crombe (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, 2024).
2. A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force by John Nagl and Katie Crombe
Download the 359 page report here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1964&context=monographs
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/968/
Authors
John A. Nagl
Katie Crombe
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Executive Summary (1.4 MB)
Description
John A. Nagl, Project Director
Katie Crombe, Chief of Staff
This book explores the changing character of war through the lens of the Russia-Ukraine War. The authors analyze the conflict’s history, each side’s warfighting functions, the role of multidomain operations, and more. The radical changes in the character of war suggest the United States is at a strategic inflection point. The authors draw lessons from both the Ukrainians and the Russians to suggest improvements for the United States. Advances in drone technology, cyber warfare, and electromagnetic warfare pose new technological vulnerabilities and possibilities. In addition, the war has highlighted the roles of allies in deterrence and training as well as how leadership styles within the military—specifically, in the implementation of mission command—can be a decisive factor. As the Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated, modern conflict touches a plethora of domains; thus, having sufficient personnel who are ready to fill a variety of capacities will be critical in the future. Finally, the war has shown history and justice are critical aspects of going to war and achieving peace, so crafting a narrative and satisfying stakeholders will be necessary for establishing a stable world order. The Russia-Ukraine War foreshadows the challenges the United States will face in future conflict and highlights the keys to adapting to modern warfare.
Researchers: Gabriella N. Boyes, John “Jay” B. Bradley III, Larry D. Caswell Jr., Steven L. Chadwick, Jingyuan Chen, Jason Du, Brian A. Dukes, Volodymyr Grabchak, Matthew S. Holbrook, Clay M. Huffman, Rebecca W. Jensen, Jamon K. Junius, Thomas R. Kunish, Jason R. Lojka, Albert F. Lord Jr., Syeda Myra Naqvi, Dennis M. Sarmiento, Vincent R. Scauzzo, Povilas J. Strazdas, Marlon A. Thomas, Stephen K. Trynosky, Darrick L. Wesson, Sean M. Wiswesser
Interns: Max Blumenfeld, Bridget Butler
ISBN
1-58487-852-5
Publication Date
6-27-2024
Publisher
USAWC Press
City
Carlisle Barracks, PA
Keywords
Russia-Ukraine War, multidomain operations, convergence, combined arms, reconstitution, large-scale combat operations, sustainment, security assistance, personnel depth, mission command, allies, UAS, AI, OSSINT, command post, strategic inflection point
Disciplines
Defense and Security Studies | Eastern European Studies | Military and Veterans Studies | Military, War, and Peace | Peace and Conflict Studies | Public Policy
Recommended Citation
John A. Nagl and Katie Crombe, A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2024),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/968
3. How Bad Will Political Violence in the U.S. Get?
This is the most balanced article I have read in a long time that looks at the potential for political violence from across the spectrum.
Facts and data with some expert analysis.
Here is the thing. Political violence will not get our country back on track. Political violence by either or both extremes will not end in a return to our federal democratic republic. Those who counsel (or incite) the use of political violence are not patriots and they delude themselves and others. True patriots have only one mission, one "prime directive:" to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. If your counsel or action does not contribute to supporting and defending the Constitution you are doing it wrong.
Troubling numbers here.
Excerpt:
These would-be violent extremists represent a microcosm of a U.S. political landscape that is increasingly willing to tolerate violence. A survey conducted last year found that 23 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.” Another more recent poll similarly found that 28 percent of Republicans strongly agree or agree that “Americans may have to resort to violence in order to get the country back on track.” Meanwhile, 12 percent of Democrats agreed with the premise.
How Bad Will Political Violence in the U.S. Get?
Civil war is unlikely, but other alarming scenarios are quite possible.
By Bruce Hoffman, senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council of Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University, and Jacob Ware, a research fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and DeSales University.
Foreign Policy · by Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware
June 28, 2024, 6:00 AM
Election-2024-functional tag-2
It is a measure of the divisiveness and tolerance for violence in the United States that the possibility of civil war looms so large over the 2024 presidential election—no matter which candidate wins. It is even the subject of a hit dystopian thriller. Though an actual civil war resulting from the election’s outcome remains unlikely, a range of sufficiently alarming politically violent scenarios are nevertheless quite possible.
Former President Donald Trump’s conviction on 34 counts of falsifying business records has sharpened frictions, with threats to the judiciary and his opponents immediately intensifying. “Time to start capping some leftys. This cannot be fixed by voting,” was one typical reaction tracked by Reuters on Gateway Pundit, a right-wing news site. Far-right media personality Stew Peters said on his Telegram channel that “our judicial system has been weaponized against the American people. We are left with NO option but to take matters into our own hands.”
Meanwhile, our assessments suggest that elements on the far left in this country are also escalating militant threats. A call to “Fuck the Fourth” recently appeared on an anarchist website, heralding a day of action on July 4 targeting the ports of Seattle, Oakland, Los Angeles, Boston, New York, New Jersey, and Baltimore. Additional summons to “Flood The Gates: Escalate” over the Gaza War both on college campuses and in communities across the nation this summer and fall are circulating on social media. At a pro-Palestine protest at the White House in June, one protester held up a decapitated likeness of President Joe Biden’s head, while crowds chanted “Revolution.”
These would-be violent extremists represent a microcosm of a U.S. political landscape that is increasingly willing to tolerate violence. A survey conducted last year found that 23 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.” Another more recent poll similarly found that 28 percent of Republicans strongly agree or agree that “Americans may have to resort to violence in order to get the country back on track.” Meanwhile, 12 percent of Democrats agreed with the premise.
Among gun owners in the United States, these sentiments are even more prevalent. According to a survey conducted by the University of California, Davis, “About 42% of owners of assault-type rifles said political violence could be justified, rising to 44% of recent gun purchasers, and a staggering 56% of those who always or nearly always carry loaded guns in public
As the United States approaches its November election, the risks of violence will thus rise. This should not be surprising. Historically, violence is actually quite common in the United States, especially during election seasons. During the Reconstruction era, much of white supremacist violence directed against freed Black men and women was intended to intimidate would-be voters, ensuring that segregationist Democrats maintained their grip on power in the Deep South.
More recently, the 2022 midterms saw an assassination attempt target the speaker of the House of Representatives in an attack that seriously wounded her husband. The 2020 election, of course, sparked the Jan. 6, 2021, terrorist attack on the U.S. Capitol. In the 10 days leading up to the 2018 midterms, there were no fewer than four far-right terrorist attacks, most notably the deadliest antisemitic attack in U.S. history at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh. The mail bombs that circulated that same week showed that threats to politicians have in fact been particularly frequent during the Trump era.
Despite that disquieting pattern, 2024 appears to provide even more fertile ground for militant responses to electoral developments. Trump’s court cases, coupled with the insistence from both parties that—in Trump’s words—“If we don’t win this election, I don’t think you’re going to have another election in this country,” have painted the election in existential terms.
As the United Nations Development Program concluded from its research into election violence around the world, “A common cause of election violence is that the stakes of winning and losing valued political posts are in many situations … incredibly high.”
Rendering the threat yet more severe is the range of possible locations and individuals that extremists may target, spanning the duration of election season. But how might violence differ at various stages of the campaign? Before the election, extremists may be more likely to target politicians on the campaign trail, seeking to intimidate them into changing their policies or deter them from running in the first place. Presidential candidate Nikki Haley had, for instance, requested Secret Service protection during her Republican Party primary challenge, while prominent Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher hinted that he was forced into retirement by threats against his family.
Based on experience, the election itself will likely feature armed intimidation at polling places and threats levied against election officials. A database analyzed by scholars Pete Simi, Gina Ligon, Seamus Hughes, and Natalie Standridge found that threats against public officials are likely to hit an all-time high in 2024. The data initially jumped in 2017, the year of Trump’s inauguration.
In the weeks after the forthcoming election, depending on the results, extremists will likely direct their animus toward representatives of the government—especially on one of the many ceremonial dates accompanying the transition of power—such the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, for instance. An exact repeat of that attack is probably less likely; law enforcement agencies will be far better prepared this time, and the groups that led the assault on the Capitol have been effectively dismantled by seditious conspiracy charges targeting their leadership.
Although white supremacist and anti-government extremists will be the likeliest to lash out, in line with trends over the past decade, violence from the far left cannot be discounted. Stabbing attacks have repeatedly targeted right-wing political leaders in Germany, for instance, and the harassment and violence targeting American Jews on U.S. college campuses have highlighted a more militant political left that has historically been quite open to violent action, including in the United States. This violent fringe has frequently deployed armed threats against politicians in particular—never more seriously than the lone gunman who targeted the Republican team practice for the congressional baseball game in 2017, or the far-left extremist from California who brought weapons to the home of Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh to threaten him in 2022.
Salafi jihadi actors are also emboldened by recent successes in Afghanistan, Iran, and Moscow, and they may seek to take advantage of this particularly divided moment in the United States to elbow themselves back into the national consciousness. FBI Director Christopher Wray has suggested that his organization is growing increasingly concerned about the “potential for a coordinated attack here in the homeland, not unlike the ISIS-K attack we saw at the Russian concert hall back in March.” The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has similarly warned that “threat actors” will likely “converge on 2024 election season,” with foreign adversaries using influence operations to further divide the U.S. populace and create new sources of divisiveness and violence.
Is the violence likely to lead to civil war? Trump and many of his allies have repeatedly warned that another election loss—coupled with forthcoming trial verdicts—would trigger one or lead to revolution in the United States. A post on Truth Social shared by Trump, for instance, suggested that 2024 might resemble 1776, “except this time the fight is not against the British, it’s against communist Americans.” The threat doubled down on Trump’s previous warning that his defeat would spark a “bloodbath” in this country.
Punditry, however, is not prophecy. Despite the warnings from scholars, policy wonks, journalists, and others, civil war is in fact unlikely in this country. Geographic distinctions between would-be warring factions today run urban-rural rather than north-south, robbing any potential seditious movement of the geographical safe haven it would need to engage in nationwide conflict. But political rhetoric and the proliferation of threats is almost certain to lead to some level of violence.
Making the threat even more serious is that the Biden administration carries little-to-no legitimacy among most hardcore Trump supporters—who still persist in believing that the 2020 election was stolen. The vice grip that these conspiracy theories hold on many mainstream Republicans means that any response by the Biden administration will be regarded as illegitimate—whether that response is deploying additional law enforcement or even the National Guard to polling places or seeking to educate the public about the veracity and integrity of U.S. elections.
In other words, the United States finds itself in a security dilemma, where any defensive measures designed to safeguard the electoral process will in fact likely be interpreted as an offensive strike—that is, to ensure a repeat electoral fraud. As the aforementioned White House protests have demonstrated, Biden also has little legitimacy in the eyes of the far left, meaning that particular movement would not likely be sated by a Democratic election victory.
Countermeasures will need to focus on education and law enforcement preparation. In particular, the Biden administration should champion education tools that reassure the U.S. public about the resilience of its electoral system from hacking or cheating while also pioneering digital literacy measures that might help protect Americans from disinformation and conspiracy theories shared online, including through artificial intelligence.
In particularly high-risk areas, which might include swing states, the administration should also consider raising the law enforcement presence to deter violent actors from targeting such locations. Successfully stopping violence, however, will require a bipartisan commitment to accept election results and publicly praise the integrity of the election and its many officials—which seems completely unrealistic at this stage.
Americans are therefore left with a political landscape defined by existential rhetoric and violent threats, with very little that the government can do to effectively counter these charges. Accordingly, the threat may be less of another civil war than of the total breakdown of the democratic electoral process that has defined the country since its creation.
Foreign Policy · by Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware
4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that Russia will be able to make creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely will incentivize Putin to protract the war and harden Putin's commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood. The West must hasten to provide Ukraine the support it needs to conduct counteroffensive operations to invalidate Putin's theory of victory and avoid protracting the war more than necessary to secure a peace acceptable to Ukraine and its partners.
- Putin retains his objective of entirely destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity, and all his objectives for territorial conquest in Ukraine are a means to this end.
- The Russian military command appears to be separating some limited elements of airborne (VDV) units and formations into smaller components across different sectors of the front, and the Russian military command may still view VDV units as relatively elite, at least compared with other Russian units and formations.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant (NLMK) in Lipetsk Oblast on June 30.
- Dagestan Republic Head Sergei Melikov publicly sided with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov in a recent debate between Kadyrov and Russian Investigative Commitee Head Alexander Bastrykin about responses to religious extremism in Russia amid growing ethnic and religious tension in Russia.
- Military and civilian flights continue to experience GPS interference over Europe and the Middle East, highlighting the role of long-term GPS jamming in ongoing and future conflicts.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyptsi, Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Avdiivka.
- A Russian milblogger claimed on June 29 that Russian military commanders sent about 50 wounded soldiers of the 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]), who are on leave awaiting medical treatments, to the front against doctors' instructions.
5. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, June 30, 2024
Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, June 30, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-30-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued re-clearing Shujaiya in Gaza City. Hamas combat units began reconstituting there after Israeli forces withdrew in April 2024.
- West Bank: Israeli forces conducted a drone strike killing a senior PIJ official in Tulkarm. The official was responsible for recent militia activity targeting civilian and military targets.
- Northern Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted 10 attacks into northern Israel. One of the attacks involved a one-way attack drone that injured nine Israelis.
6. Is China at War in the South China Sea?
"Maritime insurgency."
Excerpts:
Now, escalation in Southeast Asia was bound to happen sooner or later. You need not subscribe to the notion that China has been pursuing a maritime insurgency to overthrow the regional order to notice that it has been employing insurgent methods at sea. It has. So insights into insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare apply.
The ultimate goal of any insurgency—by definition the weaker combatant—is to stop being an insurgency. This demands a strategy of patience. A Maoist insurgency does strategically defensive things while it remains outclassed by the counterinsurgent. It harries the incumbent power’s army around the margins, enfeebling hostile fighting forces while it musters resources and manpower. If the defensive effort succeeds, the insurgency achieves an interlude of strategic parity with the incumbent. Warmaking starts to take on an offensive tincture. Continued success lets the insurgents stage a transition to a conventional counteroffensive and win a decisive battlefield victory.
The erstwhile weak make themselves the strong—and triumph.
The thuggish conduct of Chinese maritime forces of late could signal that Chinese Communist magnates have decided the time is ripe to seize the offensive. The balance of forces favors them. If so the China Coast Guard and fellow sea services will unleash more and more overbearing tactics. They are already hovering right at the brink between peace and war. They could press their advantage. That being the case, it behooves Southeast Asian states and their extraregional allies and partners to embrace the reality that a martial mentality reigns in China—and to ponder what they are prepared to do should Beijing escalate further. Inaction courts defeat and disaster.
Is China at War in the South China Sea?
Is China at war in the South China Sea? You be the judge. Beyond dispute its conduct is warlike—and that has implications for those resisting its transgressions.
The National Interest · by James Holmes · June 29, 2024
Is China at war in the South China Sea? You be the judge.
Beyond dispute its conduct is warlike—and that has implications for those resisting its transgressions. On June 19 the BBC chronicled what it termed the latest in a string of encounters between Chinese sea forces, principally the China Coast Guard, and the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy. China Coast Guard cutters intercepted Philippine ships attempting to deliver supplies to Second Thomas Shoal, where soldiers occupy the grounded hulk Sierra Madre to stake Manila’s claim to that contested feature.
The encounter turned ugly. General Romeo Brawner, the Philippine Islands’ seniormost military commander, reported that Chinese vessels rammed their Philippine counterparts, costing one Philippine sailor a thumb. Ramming has been part of the Chinese repertoire for some time. This time, however, Chinese coastguardsmen also brandished bladed weapons such as swords, knives, and spears. According to Brawner, they boarded Philippine ships and made off with weapons and other property. He lambasted the China Coast Guard for “piracy,” adding that “they have no right or legal authority to hijack our operations and destroy Philippine vessels operating within our exclusive economic zone.”
Not quite.
The reality is even worse than General Brawner lets on. Pirates are private seafarers who raid shipping for private gain. The China Coast Guard is a public agency of the People’s Republic of China—in other words, an implement of Chinese statecraft—that’s using methods favored by corsairs since antiquity, against shipping from a neighboring state. Brigandage is Chinese foreign policy in action.
In a sense Beijing has done us all a favor. China-watchers, yours truly among them, have long classed Chinese maritime strategy in the South China Sea as unspooling in a “gray zone” short of open combat. The murk makes it hard for China’s opponents to mount countermeasures: push back too hard against aggression and you look like the aggressor. But the Southeast Asian gray zone is barely gray any more. The situation is resolving into black-and-white clarity owing to domineering Chinese tactics.
Strategic clarity lends itself to solutions.
Still, this doesn’t settle the question whether China is at war. Let’s consult the strategic canon for counsel. In his masterwork On War, Prussian soldier-scribe Carl von Clausewitz defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Carl’s italics). It scarcely passes the giggle test to argue that China is not using force to compel others to do its bidding in Southeast Asia. Ramming and boarding, its tactics of choice, were time-honored tactics in naval warfare for many centuries. In this age of precision-guided ordnance, few naval captains relish ramming an enemy ship. They prefer to stand off and fight at a distance. But ships have rammed each other in extreme circumstances, in wartime, within living memory. This is not a relic of bygone times.
Ramming may have fallen out of vogue, then, but it remains in the panoply of naval force. It is an act of armed force. Ergo, China uses force as an instrument of policy, and it does so as a matter of routine.
For the sake of argument, though, let’s raise the bar for defining war. Small linguistic choices can make a huge difference in how we comprehend the world around us. “Violence” is a more accurate translation of the German word Gewalt than is “force,” the word used in the standard (1976) edition of On War. Let’s make the substitution and set this as our standard for judging Chinese conduct: “an act of violence to compel our enemy to do our will.” Have Chinese sea forces—the China Coast Guard, backed by the maritime militia and People’s Liberation Army Navy—resorted to acts of violence to compel others to accept Beijing’s unlawful claims in the South China Sea?
If so, China is definitely at war by Clausewitzian metrics.
This is trickier. Yes, Chinese coastguardsmen flourished edged weapons at their Philippine counterparts during ramming and boarding operations. But they evidently refrained from striking even as they menaced Filipino sailors. And yet. Clausewitz still might adjudge their tactics at Second Thomas Shoal as acts of war. The key is how you interpret the relationship between “combat” and war. Clausewitz proclaims that combat between fighting forces is the only means for waging war, but at the same time he appends the caveat that combat may be far removed “from the brute discharge of hatred and enmity” of hand-to-hand fighting. It is less impassioned. It is not necessarily wholesale slaughter.
For him, combat—a term we usually equate to fighting—comes in countless shades of gray. Some involve minimal if any violence.
Puzzling, I know. Clausewitz maintains that “all that occurs in war takes place through military forces, but where military forces . . . are used, the idea of combat must necessarily underlie everything.” Ideas matter. Combat happens if the contenders believe fighting might break out, and if they project who would win or lose if it did. “If the idea of combat lies at the foundation of every employment of armed forces,” writes Clausewitz, then combat has occurred—even if no actual fighting takes place. And virtual battle affects what commanders do on real battlegrounds. One force might quit the field rather than face what it reckons to be an unbeatable foe. Or it might relent if a foe can’t be overcome at a cost acceptable to the prevailing government and society.
In fact, war through perceptions of relative power and resolve is what peacetime deterrence and coercion are all about. A rational contestant abstains from actions that an opponent warns would trigger unacceptable risks or costs. Or the opponent issues a fearful threat that coerces the leadership into doing something it prefers not to do. This is China’s game in the South China Sea. It outmatches any single competitor and thus can hope to overawe its neighbors into submission, one by one, without hazarding major battle.
The Clausewitzian conception of war is congenial to Communist China. Clausewitz points out that aggressors love peace! They prefer for their antagonists to submit without a fight. Xi Jinping & Co. are quintessential aggressors. They aspire to win with the minimal violence necessary—none, if possible—holding down the perils, costs, and reversals of fortune endemic to warfare. Nor is this anything new in China’s way of diplomacy and war. Founding Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong paid homage to Clausewitz but with a twist. After ruminating on the relationship between war and politics, Mao vouchsafed that “politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.” In other words, the party means to win. It will do so through hardscrabble peacetime politics if possible, by force of arms if need be.
By any means necessary.
The warlike impulse pervades everything the party does—in peacetime and wartime alike. That’s why Chinese commentators speak of waging “war without gunsmoke,” and other catchy slogans, in maritime Asia. In that sense it is certainly accurate to conclude that China sees itself as at war. And it’s at war on a 24/7/365 basis. Ponder the asymmetries with competitors that ardently desire not to be at war with China. Competitors such as the Philippines or its ally, America.
Now, escalation in Southeast Asia was bound to happen sooner or later. You need not subscribe to the notion that China has been pursuing a maritime insurgency to overthrow the regional order to notice that it has been employing insurgent methods at sea. It has. So insights into insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare apply.
The ultimate goal of any insurgency—by definition the weaker combatant—is to stop being an insurgency. This demands a strategy of patience. A Maoist insurgency does strategically defensive things while it remains outclassed by the counterinsurgent. It harries the incumbent power’s army around the margins, enfeebling hostile fighting forces while it musters resources and manpower. If the defensive effort succeeds, the insurgency achieves an interlude of strategic parity with the incumbent. Warmaking starts to take on an offensive tincture. Continued success lets the insurgents stage a transition to a conventional counteroffensive and win a decisive battlefield victory.
The erstwhile weak make themselves the strong—and triumph.
The thuggish conduct of Chinese maritime forces of late could signal that Chinese Communist magnates have decided the time is ripe to seize the offensive. The balance of forces favors them. If so the China Coast Guard and fellow sea services will unleash more and more overbearing tactics. They are already hovering right at the brink between peace and war. They could press their advantage. That being the case, it behooves Southeast Asian states and their extraregional allies and partners to embrace the reality that a martial mentality reigns in China—and to ponder what they are prepared to do should Beijing escalate further. Inaction courts defeat and disaster.
Apathy kills.
About the Author: Dr. James Holmes
James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.
7. NeXt Secretary of Defense
I see what the headline editor did with that X in the headline.
I would not have guessed the "recommendation" in a million years. Imagine aDOD with all the names listed in this article (and I am sure the author has a spot carved out for himself). Then again considering the recommender perhaps it makes sense from his perspective.
I may be wrong but I do not think a SECDEF has the authority or power to execute any of these recommendations (despite the author saying they do not require legislation).. Two of the three would require major overhauls of laws (DOPMA) and Title 10 and more.
Excerpts:
First, usher in new military leadership across the board
Second, implement a new system of promotion and retention based on competition.
Third, implement a new business model to maximize ROI for a trillion-dollar annual budget.
NeXt Secretary of Defense
By Stuart Scheller
June 29, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/06/29/next_secretary_of_defense_1041262.html
The American military tolerates failure, bleeds talent, and wastes resources at an unsustainable rate. Opinions aside, the military’s resume speaks for itself. True Defense Department visionaries must form a consensus on how to reform the last great American institution.
Engaging this debate was Marine Colonel Gary Anderson in Real Clear Defense’s May ’24 article, “Today’s Generals and Admirals, Children of a Lesser God.” Colonel Anderson correctly identified the systemic problems afflicting military leadership, but his recommendations for reform fell short.
Colonel Anderson, and many other military reformists, believe the path back to victory begins with Congress updating the Goldwater-Nichols legislation governing the current joint model. But this is a fool’s errand. It’s akin to a forward-deployed captain waiting for doctrine to be published before developing a new tactic required by the current battlefield. In both situations, waiting leads to people getting killed. Let Congress rewrite the rules once the new model demonstrates results.
The next President provides the most expedient and effective path to true military reform. Congress will never agree, and military leadership will never aggressively reform a system that validates their titles and positions. Yet, the Commander and Chief has a unique ability to turn the American military from a bad investment into a winner.
The next Secretary of Defense, within the Commander in Chief’s intent, should immediately screen leadership for warfighting lethality, build a promotion system based on competition, and create financial efficiency. This can be accomplished by the following:
First, usher in new military leadership across the board. An entire generation of general officers must be shown the exit. The current system, through good intentions, rewards leadership for various and often counterproductive reasons. Does anyone really believe the current Air Force Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the most capable warfighter in the American military? If so, he’ll have the chance to prove it.
Second, implement a new system of promotion and retention based on competition. Competition drives innovation, creativity, and performance. At a certain point, the only requirement for promotion should be demonstrated performance in “general” (this is literally why that name exists) warfighting lethality. Only the best demonstrated performers should be promoted. In the new model, time in service, DEI, and branch of service become less important.
Place one-star generals with similar forces in the Mojave Desert against each other – the winner gets promoted. Imagine two general officers with a force of 2,500 troops, an equal budget, and complete freedom to solve a military problem in a true head-to-head competition. Specifics of the competition can be refined over time, but the creation of the competition is critical. Defense Department leaders must be able to identify the military’s top performers.
Third, implement a new business model to maximize ROI for a trillion-dollar annual budget.
The next leader of the Defense Department must understand the problems with the current military’s losing culture and possess the professional credibility to influence change. Their expertise in generating battlefield lethality should be unparalleled. And perhaps just as importantly, the next secretary, like any successful CEO, must have executive experience managing organizational performance on a budget.
Based on my reflection, there is only one person possessing this unique set of qualifications: Erik Prince.
Erik Prince, the former Navy Seal, is most well-known as the former owner of the private security company Blackwater. His name generates emotions. Yet he, like many other things I’ve realized over the past few years, is much different than the headlines you read about him.
Bias upfront, I have a personal relationship with Mr. Prince. Unlike thousands of other veterans, I have never worked for Mr. Prince. And despite a few sit-downs, most of our communication is informal. But I found it easy to identify with a man who created an effective wartime service for the government, only to have the government turn on him when it wasn’t convenient.
Anyone who has a conversation with Mr. Prince will be struck by the depth of his knowledge on leadership, military history, and, most importantly, business management. The day following our first sit-down conversation, I found myself doing burpees, buying a book on the Rhodesian War (not taught in military academies), and thinking about how money impacts lethality in warfare.
Who better to implement an effective system in the military than the Navy Seal with a brilliant business mind? After watching Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter, I believe savvy business-minded professionals know how to walk into hostile organizations, lock out former employees, identify obvious shortfalls, and reorganize. The how you “reorganize” is really the point of the debate.
I asked Mr. Prince if he had ambitions to become the next Secretary of Defense, and he stated, “I would never get confirmed by Congress.” He understands that critics will mischaracterize his personal reputation, political views, and business track record. Mr. Prince believes someone like Colonel Doug MacGregor is a better choice. Colonel MacGregor, if you look him up, has a great resume. He is also one of the voices advocating for military reform in the American Conservative. But I believe, if selected, MacGregor ends up like many other safe choices; relegated to foreign policy through the Defense Department lens, and less as a crusading reformer within the Department.
Despite Prince’s (probably correct) prediction about Congressional pushback, he would be the best thing that happened to the American military. A conversation from Prince’s Off Leash podcast illustrates his unique utility:
- Erik Prince: “What does a military do? It recruits, vets, equips, trains, deploys, and supports people to do a difficult mission. We [Blackwater] vertically integrated the steps to do it, did it very efficiently, and measured the cost across each step so that we could be the low-cost provider.”
- Mark Serrano [Co-Host and former Trump advisor]: “So government turns to the private sector solution because they knew it would be done better and more efficiently.”
- Erik Prince: “And more quickly.”
Blackwater was wildly successful because they manufactured combat lethality efficiently and effectively. Mr. Prince, the son of a successful auto manufacturer, inherited his initial wealth from his father. But the importance his father placed on manufacturing, replicated by Erik in his Blackwater model, was perhaps the critical characteristic. Prince’s experience and business insight will be unparalleled for turning the Defense Department’s trillion-dollar annual budget into lethality.
Elon Musk, another brilliant business mind, who on multiple interviews also stresses the critical nature of manufacturing, started Space X by calculating the base cost of a spaceship. What if another savvy business professional calculated the base cost of an Army Brigade or Marine Expeditionary Unit? This base cost could be proven by manufacturing a private Brigade or Expeditionary Unit at a fraction of the current cost. This newly created private force using off-the-shelf technology could be tested in a warfighting competition against current units. The new cost-effective force could be replicated, or simply used as a benchmarking tool to illustrate the current inefficient model. Fear of exposing the wildly inefficient force is the only reason this currently isn’t done.
President Trump, and his pick for the next Secretary of Defense, can reform America’s failing military model. Erik Prince’s business acumen and military experience make him exceptionally qualified for this role. I believe Mr. Prince will lock out the underperformers, deep state sycophants, and politicians in uniform so that talent can rise and lead. I believe he should implement a performance-based system centered on competition to sharpen our force for lethality on a future battlefield. And, in the end, there is no better resume for an American capable of managing financial performance across lethality to drive innovation and not waste.
These changes are all possible without legislation, but they won’t happen without a strong Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense.
Stuart Scheller is a former U.S. Marine Corps infantry officer and author of Crisis of Command: How We Lost Trust and Confidence in America’s Generals and Politicians.
8. IN THE KILL ZONE: The Life and Times of Willie Merkerson (Part 2)
I am looking forward to Part 3.
We should all live by his words in the final paragraph. Those two sentences are going in my quote book and I will use them in the future.
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, Merkerson, in his words, kept his “eyes on the prize,” determined to do the best he could, knowing that as a black man in an overwhelmingly white officer corps, he would be the focus of particular attention. “You’re going to be on display, whether you want to or not, so set a great example,” he said. “Let people know that the best way to figure out what to do with me is to learn who I am, first of all.”
Merkerson paraphrased King in describing his approach: “Don’t judge me by the color of my skin, but the content of my character.”
Drawing inspiration from the church and his mother, Merkerson “stayed clear of people who were talking about conflict [and] hate,” he said. “It just wasn’t something that I grew up doing … It’s easy to hate people. It’s hard to love people sometimes.”
But no matter how hard Merkerson found some people to love, throughout the turmoil of the 1960s, “I never got to the point where I lost faith in my country and my Constitution,” he said. “I just lost faith in some people who I thought were talking out of both sides of their mouths.”
IN THE KILL ZONE: The Life and Times of Willie Merkerson (Part 2)
https://thehighside.substack.com/p/in-the-kill-zone-the-life-and-times-5f2?utm
Part 2: The Gray Unknown
SEAN D. NAYLOR AND JACK MURPHY
JUL 01, 2024
∙ PAID
A C-130 drops part of the main body of paratroopers during the combat jump into Bu Prang on Oct. 5, 1967. (U.S. Army)
Packed with paratroops, the hulking C-130 Hercules turboprop ploughed onward through the clouds blanketing South Vietnam’s central highlands.
It was October 5, 1967 – monsoon season – and thick cloud cover obscured the target up ahead: an abandoned A-camp that, as they worked to counter North Vietnamese and Viet Cong infiltration from Cambodia, Special Forces commanders had decided to reopen. Nestled among grass-covered hills less than five miles from the border, the camp presented challenges to the aircrews and the paratroops: The drop zone was small and surrounded by woodland, while its proximity to the border meant a small mistake could send paratroops into neutral Cambodia.
The 49 troops readying themselves to jump were the pathfinders whose job it would be to secure the drop zone for the main body of paratroops. The pathfinder element was divided between 37 Montagnards and about a dozen Green Berets, led by Maj. Chumley Waldrop, the SF company executive officer. Sitting close to him was the man whose job it was to examine the camp’s small airstrip to see if it could still handle fixed-wing aircraft. That man was Willie Merkerson.
The main body consisted of 50 Green Berets and 275 LLDB and Montagnard troops, according to author Shelby L. Stanton’s book “Green Berets at War.” They were aboard four C-130s about half an hour behind the pathfinders.
Many of the Green Berets were excited for the mission. All Green Berets were airborne qualified, and most yearned to make a combat jump, which would give them the right to adorn the parachutist badge on their uniforms with a small bronze star (or “mustard stain,” as it’s often called). Combat jumps were not unheard ofin Vietnam but were nonetheless quite rare.
“I had been in the airborne for five years and made over eighty jumps with no likelihood that I’d ever get to make a combat jump,” writes Jim Morris, one of the Green Berets on the mission, in his acclaimed memoir, “War Story.” “I wouldn’t have missed that opportunity for ten thousand dollars.”
Merkerson’s enthusiasm was somewhat more restrained. “I was happy that I was selected to go,” he said. “But I wasn’t excited – Oh Lord, let me get that thing, I need that thing, I need the star [on my wings]. Oh no, that wasn’t me.”
The Green Berets had arranged for chilled champagne to be on hand at the drop zone if the mission went well. But that was a big “if.” No one on the planes had any idea whether enemy forces would be lying in wait for them when they landed.
Despite flying only 600 feet above ground level, the pathfinders’ C-130 couldn’t get underneath the clouds. It would have to be what airborne soldiers call a blind drop. “Normally you don’t jump like that,” Merkerson recalled.
Waldrop was undeterred. “You’re going out of this damn plane one way or another,” he said, according to Merkerson.
As the plane reached the drop zone, the lights beside the jump doors on each side of the aircraft turned from red to green. Using both arms, Waldrop, a jumpmaster for the flight, pointed down and to the sides, the signal for the first jumpers to stand in the doorways. Seconds later, one by one, they stepped into the gray unknown.
“Drafted” for officer candidate school
Born in Columbia, South Carolina, in 1939, the eldest of five children to parents who each worked at a local country club, Willie Merkerson Jr. enlisted in the Army Reserve in February 1957, while still in high school, before going on active duty that June at age 17, just weeks after his graduation. In conversation with The High Side, he emphasized that he was not drafted and would have enlisted even if there had been no draft.
“My father died when I was 11 and I was the oldest child,” Merkerson said. He joined the Army in part to earn enough money he could send back to his mother, but also “to get away from Columbia,” he said. Indeed, this was his second attempt to sign up. “I tried to go when I was 16 but I couldn’t – they wouldn’t accept me.”
After three years in a rocket artillery battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg (now Fort Liberty), North Carolina, he re-enlisted and volunteered for Special Forces.
Following a year of arduous training in guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare, then-Cpl. Merkerson received his Green Beret and an assignment to 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. In December 1963, after taking a Vietnamese language course, he deployed to South Vietnam for a six-month voluntary tour. By now a sergeant, he saw “a lot” of combat on that tour as he organized, trained, equipped and led Montagnard tribesmen against the NVA and, especially, the Viet Cong, he said.
Following that tour, Merkerson was reassigned to 7th Special Forces Group at Bragg. There his team’s job was to train others in mountaineering skills and to conduct demonstrations for visiting VIPs. During this assignment, Merkerson was selected for and successfully completed Ranger School, the Army’s notoriously tough tactical leadership course, in 1965.
Merkerson (back row, far left) and other Ranger School trainees at Fort Benning, Georgia, 1965. (Courtesy of the Merkerson family)
In what would become a recurring pattern in his career, Merkerson’s higher-ups in 7th Group noticed his potential and gave his career a boost. One day after formation, the group sergeant major gathered about 20 enlisted soldiers, including Merkerson, and told them that because the Army was short of junior officers and their records qualified them to go to officer candidate school, they were going to “volunteer” for OCS the next day.
Merkerson was shocked. “I had never even heard of anybody being drafted for OCS,” he told The High Side. “What am I going to do? Protest? They’d probably put me in jail.”
Merkerson duly signed up for infantry OCS at Fort Benning (now Fort Moore), Georgia, only to be told a couple of weeks later that Benning had no open slots and he was slated for engineer OCS at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, instead. (The Army did not make Special Forces a branch until 1987.)
“This is the lie they told me: ‘As soon as you graduate from Fort Belvoir, we’re going to make you an infantry officer,’” he recalled. In fact, it took him two years to change branches.
In the meantime, he said, he was plunged into an extremely technical school armed with no more than a high school diploma. “The class I was in, I think they had 88 people,” out of whom “80 were engineers already,” he said. “These guys came from Georgia Tech … MIT, CalTech, Louisiana Institute of Technology, all the technical schools and other [prominent] schools that had an engineering program.” He was one of only three black soldiers in the class.
But Merkerson turned the situation to his advantage. The recent Ranger School graduate helped his classmates with the tactical side of OCS in exchange for their assistance with the academic work.
Meanwhile, Merkerson and his classmates had to deal with a toxic command climate in the school, in which upperclassmen handed out beatings to the more junior candidates, who were being starved by the officer cadre, according to “Don’t Blow Yourself Up,” a memoir by Merkerson’s classmate Homer Hickam. It got so bad that the Army Inspector General’s office intervened roughly midway through Merkerson’s time there, Hickam writes: “Officers were relieved, candidates cited for cruelty were booted out.”
When a High Side reporter remarked that from Hickham’s account it appears that they had to endure a lot of hazing from the upperclassmen, Merkerson’s response was typically understated. “That happened sometimes,” he said.
Hickam was one of the students whom Merkerson helped navigate the tactical parts of the course. Indeed, Hickam credits Merkerson with getting him through OCS. “He picked me up and carried me when I fell during a run, totally exhausted,” he writes. “He pulled me out of the river when I tried to carry too many sandbags and fell off a timber trestle bridge. He was always encouraging me.”
In return for such help, Hickam, a Virginia Tech graduate, and other similarly qualified candidates taught Merkerson the scientific basics he needed to make it through. “We’d have the class curriculum, and the night before they would just force feed me the concepts, principles and fundamentals of the subject coming up that [next] day,” Merkerson said.
The system worked. “I came out number two in the class, and number one in leadership,” Merkerson recalled. “They wanted to keep me there as an instructor.”
But Merkerson was having none of that: “Since I came out as one of the honor graduates, I was allowed by tradition to select my first assignment, and I wanted to go back to Special Forces.”
Merkerson got his wish. His next assignment returned him to Bragg, this time to 3rd Special Forces Group, in November 1966. But it was not the happy landing the former 82nd Airborne paratrooper would have wanted.
Back to Vietnam – by choice
His commander at 3rd Group had been an officer in 1st Group when Merkerson served there as an enlisted soldier. But instead of congratulating him on his new commission, the major chose to insult Merkerson, telling him, “I guess they make anybody an officer these days, don’t they?” (This was not a racist insult – the major was black. Merkerson said he thinks the officer was so hard on him because he wanted to show the white soldiers under his command that he was equally as hard on his black subordinates as he was on them.)
Willie Merkerson and others from his Special Forces A-team, A-411, training on mortars at Okinawa, Japan, in 1963 prior to deploying to Vietnam. (Courtesy of the Merkerson family)
The commander followed that by ordering Merkerson to leave immediately for a month-long prisoner-of-war rescue exercise at Fort Polk (now Fort Johnson), Louisiana – meaning his wife Laura Lee would have to move his growing family into their new home at Bragg on her own. When he returned from Polk, the major removed him from his position as an A-team leader and made him the director of personnel for the next higher echelon, a B-team, according to Merkerson.
The short shrift he was getting from his boss, combined with the underwhelming training (“shit like … skiing in the mountains of Montana when the war was going on in Vietnam”) convinced Merkerson that his immediate future lay elsewhere. “I said, ‘Wait a minute, let me go back [to Vietnam] and get in the fight.’”
Together with a few lieutenant buddies “we worked up a scheme to get into Vietnam,” he said. It took a while for the plan to reach fruition, but in May 1967 they volunteered for reassignment to Vietnam. “Because SF was not a branch, we couldn’t get anybody in SF to help us officially,” Merkerson said. In other words, they didn’t have Special Forces jobs waiting for them in Vietnam. However, the 3rd Group command sergeant major, who remembered Merkerson from their time together in Okinawa, gave them a letter of recommendation to give to his counterpart in 5th Group, which was running all Special Forces operations in Vietnam from its headquarters in Nha Trang.
Merkerson traveled to Vietnam with two other lieutenants. Most soldiers who arrived in Vietnam as individuals would be initially sent to the replacement company, from which they’d be assigned to Army units across the country on a first-come, first-served basis. Under that system, Merkerson would have probably ended up in a conventional unit that needed a junior engineer officer. But he was determined to avoid that fate.
Sgt. Willie Merkerson at the time of his first Vietnam tour in 1964. (Courtesy of Willie Merkerson)
“We…snuck away [before reaching] the replacement company, jumped on a helicopter and flew over to Nha Trang and joined 5thGroup,” Merkerson said. The letter of introduction from the 3rdGroup sergeant major had the desired effect, and Willie was assigned to A-223, where he would only spend a few weeks. But that was long enough to write his name into Special Forces history.
The Blue Max
Shortly after the June firefight for which he received the Distinguished Service Cross, Merkerson was summoned to 5th Group headquarters, where his engineering background had garnered attention. At Nha Trang “I was … told that I would be reassigned to Company B to be their on-site engineer,” he said. “They had four engineers in 5th Group, and they wanted at least one in each corps, and I was sent to II Corps, which I was already in.”
(For military purposes, South Vietnam was divided into four tactical zones named after the South Vietnamese army’s four corps. The Special Forces structure in Vietnam was different than it would be today. There were no SF battalions. Fifth Group had one company, or “C-team,” in each corps tactical zone. Each C-team, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, oversaw several “B-teams,” commanded by majors, who in turn oversaw the A-teams, which were commanded by captains.)
South Vietnam, with Bu Prang as the furthest south A-camp on the map and the Ho Chi Minh trail marked in red.
Merkerson’s job with B Company was to survey possible SF base camp sites along South Vietnam’s border with Laos and Cambodia. The sites were in areas from which the teams had the best chance of disrupting NVA and Viet Cong incursions into South Vietnam from the Ho Chi Minh trail that ran through both neighboring countries. The mission of the teams at the A-camps, according to Merkerson, was to monitor “and/or interdict, ambush, raid, mine or do whatever you needed to block the corridors of infiltration.”
“They would put me on an A-team and they would run a mission out to an area of my choosing and then we would determine whether that area could sustain an A-camp,” Merkerson said. “It had to have vegetation, water, proper type of stone to make cement, sand, a good source of water, good habitation for civilians – because you’re going to put a village up there too – food, stuff like that, and [be] free from enemy as much as possible.”
It was his surveying expertise that earned Merkerson his place in the pathfinder detachment on the jump to reclaim the A-camp at Bu Prang in Quang Duc province. Together with the company’s air liaison officer (an Air Force representative), it would be his job to ensure that the small airstrip beside the camp could handle the aircraft that would bring in troops and supplies. He also had to inspect the site of the camp to see what improvements might be necessary to make it defendable.
Willie Merkerson cleaning his weapon during his first Vietnam tour. (Courtesy of the Merkerson family)
The Green Berets had abandoned the camp after the Montagnard rebellion of September 1964, when the resentment felt by the tribesmen from the highlands towards the regular South Vietnamese troops boiled over into violence in numerous locations. At Bu Prang, the Montagnards had killed 15 South Vietnamese troops, before moving out and killing 17 members of the South Vietnamese Popular Force (a sort of National Guard) and two civilians nearby, according to “U.S. Army Special Forces: 1961-1971,” an official history by Col. Francis J. Kelly. Now the camp was to be re-opened in an attempt to combat NVA and Viet Cong infiltration routes.
The mission was the brainchild of one of the most colorful Special Forces officers of the Vietnam era, Lt. Col. Ludwig “the Blue Max” Faistenhammer.
Born in Germany in 1924, Faistenhammer was five years old when his family moved to the United States, where he grew up in Binghamton, New York. He fought for the U.S. Army against the nation of his birth in World War II, including as a tank commander during the Battle of the Bulge.
After serving in the Korean War, Faistenhammer became one of the Army’s first Special Forces officers. By the time Merkerson met him in 1967, he was commanding 5th Special Forces Group’s B Company, based in the central Vietnamese town of Pleiku, about 235 miles northeast of Saigon. From there he ran all Special Forces missions in II Corps and had earned a reputation as a masterful tactician and the sort of leader under whom Green Berets wanted to serve. (Indeed, in Robin Moore’s classic fictionalization of the Special Forces experience in Vietnam, “The Green Berets,” the character of Fritz Scharne is loosely based on Faistenhammer.)
“Willie arrived as a second lieutenant and the first thing I did was ask him what he’d like to do, and he said, ‘Well, I’ll take anything you got,’” Faistenhammer told The High Side in an interview conducted a few days before his 100th birthday.
Another map of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, this one showing more clearly how the trail cut through eastern Cambodia, west of Bu Prang.
Faistenhammer’s decision to open up the camp at Bu Prang was in keeping with an overall effort to ensure that all possible avenues of ingress from the Ho Chi Minh Trail were covered by A-camps. But he had kept the plan to retake Bu Prang via a mass parachute assault close to his chest.
“The Bu Prang plan was between the Vietnamese commander of the [special forces] troops that we had at that time and myself,” he told The High Side. “We didn’t get permission from nobody.” U.S. Special Forces officers often took the view that it was better to beg forgiveness than to ask for permission, but on this occasion Faistenhammer’s failure to give his chain of command a heads up would have consequences.
Whether or not the jump was tactically necessary was open to question. “There was no particular reason to jump in, except we were paratroopers, by God, and every paratrooper wants to get that little bronze star on his wings,” writes Morris, who at the time was the B Company S5 officer, responsible for civil-military operations, including civil affairs and psychological operations. But there were advantages to conducting the airborne operation, according to Faistenhammer. “It would be easier than trying to get in there on foot,” he said.
A-411 in Vietnam in 1964. Sgt. Willie Merkerson is standing in the back row, far left. (Courtesy of the Merkerson family)
The Air Force had nicknamed Faistenhammer “the Blue Max,” which was both the sobriquet of the Prussian “Pour le Merite” medal for extraordinary achievement and the title of a 1966 movie about a German pilot in World War I. The nickname stuck well enough that Faistenhammer adopted it as his call sign for the rest of his career. He and his staff also named the jump into Bu Prang Operation Blue Max.
A ”spectacular” jump
Merkerson was the third man out of the pathfinders’ C-130. “We went out so fast I didn’t get a chance to get nervous,” he told The High Side.
However, as he looked down, he realized he couldn’t see the ground. “We were jumping through the clouds,” he said. “It might as well have been at night.”
In addition to his normal combat gear, Merkerson was jumping with a mine detector, which can’t have helped when, along with every other pathfinder he could see, he landed in a forest, hung up in the upper branches of a tree so high that even when he lowered his reserve chute in order to use it to climb down, it didn’t reach the ground.
Once they had disentangled themselves from the trees, the pathfinders realized they had landed in Cambodia. This might not have been an accident. “That was the best land to land in, and the border was disputed anyway,” Merkerson said. “But we had a good little walk to get to the camp.”
No enemy troops were waiting for them at Bu Prang. The pathfinders quickly established and secured the drop zone for the main force, which was already inbound, while Merkerson and the air liaison officer surveyed the airstrip. A small Montagnard force that had journeyed overland soon arrived.
Helped by the fact that, unlike the pathfinders, they had jumped from beneath the clouds, the paratroops of the main body landed with no injuries, according to Faistenhammer. Also unlike the pathfinders, they found the drop zone with no problems. “We landed in a big open field,” Morris told The High Side. “We could have been at Fort Bragg.”
It was a “spectacular” jump that achieved “complete surprise,” writes Stanton. The planes took no anti-aircraft fire on the way in, and the troops encountered no resistance on the ground, with one notable exception.
“There were enemy on the ground and some of the elements … took fire,” Merkerson said, adding that he did not witness the fighting, but heard his colleagues talking about it afterward. However, according to Faistenhammer, that combat might not have happened in Vietnam.
The proximity to the Cambodian border had caused one of C-130s carrying the main body to drop at least some of its paratroops in the wrong location. A CIDG platoon led by Capt. Andy Irzyk “jumped into Cambodia by mistake,” Faistenhammer said. “Evidently the airplane went further than it should have, and they bounced him out … He landed in Cambodia and had to walk back to Vietnam.”
The C-130s dropping the main body of jumpers at Bu Prang. (U.S. Army)
While patrolling back to Bu Prang, Irzyk and his men got into a firefight, according to Faistenhammer. The unit took no casualties, he said. Asked whether they inflicted any, Faistenhammer replied: “I can’t tell you that. All I know is I was so freaking happy to see him come in, I didn’t ask him about anything.”
The fact that that firefight possibly occurred in Cambodia might explain why books and online references don’t mention it. For example, “Vietnam Combat Operations – 1967,” an unofficial but detailed listing of U.S. missions during that year, states that “there was no enemy resistance.”
Even Morris, whose memoir is nothing if not candid, writes that the operation was “a lot like a training jump, except for the champagne,” which the staff duly broke out once it was clear the mission’s goals had been achieved. (Morris told The High Side that he didn’t recall what type of champagne they celebrated with, “although knowing Ludwig [Faistenhammer], it was probably a good brand … He was a stickler for doing things right.”)
To Merkerson, the jump was a sort of bonus that Faistenhammer gave his headquarters staff. “Most of the guys on the plane that I remember were from the headquarters,” he said. “I think they only left a couple of cooks and bakers back there at the headquarters of B Company. “Once they assembled [on the drop zone] … then they rounded them up and flew them back to Pleiku.”
Meanwhile, Merkerson and the air liaison officer were at the airstrip, waiting for a forward air controller to land his light aircraft before a Hercules came in, each testing the safety and viability of the dirt runway. “Once they gave the ‘okay,’ then we could bring the airstrip back up on line as serviceable and creditable enough to receive U.S. military aircraft. Then our mission was over.”
The camp at Bu Prang was soon operational. “It became a permanent camp,” Faistenhammer said, adding that this underscored how well the airborne operation had gone. “The guys just did a hell of a job,” he said.
There were, however, two aggrieved parties, despite the success of Operation Blue Max. The first was the A-team that was due to take over the camp after the airborne operation. That team – ODA 236 – had not been invited to join the jump, and instead was helicoptered in with two CIDG companies after the paratroops had landed and secured the site. “They were plenty pissed off,” writes Morris.
2nd Lt. Willie Merkerson (far right) with Special Forces team members shortly before insertion into an NVA-controlled area that had recently been treated with Agent Orange. Merkerson’s job was to assess the herbicide’s effectiveness. (Courtesy of the Merkerson family)
The second party upset about the operation was Army Gen. William Westmoreland, the senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam, whose staff had received no prior notice that a Special Forces company was planning a mass combat jump. “I did not go through any channels to make this jump,” Faistenhammer acknowledged. His chain of command was not amused. “He got his ass chewed out for making that jump,” Merkerson said.
“I didn’t think that I had to go through Westmoreland, the jerk who ran everything, who was disappointed because we didn’t ask him for permission to do it,” Faistenhammer said. “I figured I was the commander up there and I did what I wanted.”
Gen. William Westmoreland, head of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, on Sept. 21, 1967, two weeks before the jump into Bu Prang for which he refused to accord “combat jump” status. (U.S. Army)
Westmoreland’s revenge, according to Faistenhammer, was to not grant the operation “combat jump” status. “That’s why Westmoreland would not give us combat credit for it,” Faistenhammer said. “Because we didn’t go through his channels.”
The eager U.S. paratroops were therefore denied their coveted “mustard stains” after all.
“I was of course hugely disappointed,” Morris told The High Side. “If we’d been shot at on the DZ or something like that, I would have been really pissed off, but it wasn’t that hard of a jump. Of course, we didn’t know that going out the door.”
As a consolation prize of sorts, the South Vietnamese military credited the mission as a combat jump. “Most of the guys who went to Vietnam with Special Forces had Vietnamese [jump] wings already,” Merkerson said. “[For] this one, they put a star on it, denoting it was a combat jump.”
Lt. Col. Ludwig Faistenhammer (right) and his Vietnamese special forces counterpart on the drop zone at Bu Prang, Oct. 5, 1967.
Mike Force
Impressed by Merkerson’s performance, Faistenhammer promoted him to 1st lieutenant later that month and, at Merkerson’s request, gave him command of the 186-strong 21st Mobile Strike Force Company (Airborne), better known as the 21st Mike Force, in Pleiku.
The Mike Force units were essentially quick reaction forces apportioned to each region of South Vietnam. They were comprised of a mix of U.S. Special Forces and indigenous – usually Montagnard – troops. Merkerson’s 21st Mike Force included just six Green Berets – half an A-team – to control about 180 Montagnards.
Mike Force units saw a lot of action. Merkerson’s was no exception, conducting a range of reconnaissance patrols and mobile guerrilla operations. During January 1968’s Tet Offensive, when the Viet Cong launched surprise attacks against U.S. and government targets across South Vietnam, his company reinforced Special Forces camps at Dak To and Ben Het near the Laotian border to prevent them being overrun.
Throughout this period, Faistenhammer remained Merkerson’s boss. “Willie did a hell of a job for me,” Faistenhammer said. “He did everything I wanted him to do and he just did a … great, great job.”
Merkerson completed his tour as a Mike Force commander in May 1968 and returned to the United States, where he was assigned to 10th Special Forces Group – newly arrived from Germany at Fort Devens, Massachusetts – as the group’s assistant director of logistics. Handling the demands of moving the entire group (minus 1st Battalion, which stayed in Germany) into its new home led to Merkerson being offered a co-founding role in the post’s sky diving club, despite having no previous military freefall or other sky diving experience.
“These guys weren’t stupid,” he told The High Side. “They wanted to form a skydiving club and … who do you need on your club? Somebody with money, somebody with resources and contacts. So that’s why they made me a member of the team.”
The club eventually developed into a PR and recruiting tool, according to Merkerson. “What we did was to parlay this into a sky diving team that could represent Special Forces throughout New England,” he said. “So, we got parachutes free, we got transportation free.”
“Eyes on the prize”
While Merkerson was going back and forth to Vietnam and building a career in the Army, the United States was undergoing profound upheaval as the civil rights movement led by the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. swept across the country. Merkerson and his wife supported King’s demands for social justice. But as a soldier – and, by the late 1960s, an officer – he was not in a position to join the protests and was reluctant to have Laura Lee take part.
“When I met her, she was working hard at protesting against segregation in the South,” he said. “She was going to university in Columbia, South Carolina and I remember telling her, ‘Babe, I don’t want to have to come and get you out of jail’ … We hadn’t even had a family started, so she agreed to not go out there – to be supportive, but not necessarily to be on the turf and get knocked down and drug off.”
As a result, “we were supportive [of King and the wider racial justice movement] more spiritually than physically,” Merkerson said. “We donated money and stuff like that to the NAACP.” (Indeed, Merkerson said, he still contributes to the NAACP, the nation’s oldest civil rights organization.)
Meanwhile, Merkerson, in his words, kept his “eyes on the prize,” determined to do the best he could, knowing that as a black man in an overwhelmingly white officer corps, he would be the focus of particular attention. “You’re going to be on display, whether you want to or not, so set a great example,” he said. “Let people know that the best way to figure out what to do with me is to learn who I am, first of all.”
Merkerson paraphrased King in describing his approach: “Don’t judge me by the color of my skin, but the content of my character.”
Drawing inspiration from the church and his mother, Merkerson “stayed clear of people who were talking about conflict [and] hate,” he said. “It just wasn’t something that I grew up doing … It’s easy to hate people. It’s hard to love people sometimes.”
But no matter how hard Merkerson found some people to love, throughout the turmoil of the 1960s, “I never got to the point where I lost faith in my country and my Constitution,” he said. “I just lost faith in some people who I thought were talking out of both sides of their mouths.”
To be continued in Part 3: Behind Enemy Lines
9. Analysis | What Taiwan is learning from the war in Ukraine
Excerpts:
Taiwan’s survival — and the ability to thwart or, more accurately, deter a Chinese invasion — has huge international implications. Yui summoned the principles of a rules-based order, of the importance that might should never make right. He also acknowledged the enormous economic stakes: As the world’s leading producer of super-advanced semiconductors, Taiwan is a critical cog in the global economy and at the heart of myriad world-spanning supply chains.
The war in Ukraine was disruptive for food and energy prices in countries far away from Eastern Europe, but that turbulence may pale compared with the chaos unleashed by a Chinese invasion. “A conflict in the Indo-Pacific will be a much uglier scenario,” Yui said.
To that end, he acknowledged that Taiwan and its allies must build up a set of fortifications, defensive capabilities and diplomatic understandings elsewhere that disincentivizes Beijing from making the kind of move the Kremlin did in 2022.
“We have to make sure that whenever Xi Jinping wakes up every day,” Yui concluded, “he looks in the mirror and says, ‘I don’t think today is the day.’”
Analysis | What Taiwan is learning from the war in Ukraine
For the Taiwanese public, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed the dangers at their own doorstep, said Taiwan’s de facto ambassador in Washington.
Columnist
July 1, 2024 at 12:00 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · July 1, 2024
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Some 5,000 miles separate Taipei and Kyiv, but in Washington, the two embattled capitals seem almost geopolitical neighbors. Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbor in 2022 and Ukraine’s subsequent struggle to repel the invaders and reclaim lost territory has resonated in Taiwan, which sits in the looming shadow of China. The increasingly assertive Asian superpower scoffs at the self-ruling island’s sense of sovereignty and can’t countenance the success of Taiwan’s democracy. Chinese President Xi Jinping has yoked his political legitimacy to Taiwan’s eventual “reunification,” describing it as a “historical inevitability.”
The prospect of Xi following in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s footsteps and attempting a land grab across the straits seems more likely than it once did. And Taiwan, with new infusions of U.S. military aid, is preparing more vigorously to head off the threat. For the Taiwanese public, the Russian invasion of Ukraine “has brought some perspective, some reality” to the dangers at their own doorstep, Alexander Tah-ray Yui, Taiwan’s de facto ambassador in Washington, told me.
Last year, Taiwan boosted its defense spending by some 14 percent from the previous budget. It has expanded the training period of the country’s compulsory military service from four months to one year. Like Ukraine, it is trying to develop its asymmetric warfare capabilities in the face of a far larger and more powerful aggressor. And its officials have also noted the sweeping whole-of-society involvement that has accompanied Ukraine’s defense, the “civic resiliency,” as Yui put it, that undergirds the bravery with which Ukraine’s forces defied the odds and staved off Russian conquest in the early months of the war.
“People will only help you if you help yourself,” said Yui, whom I interviewed in the historic Twin Oaks mansion that was once the residence of the Republic of China’s ambassadors in Washington before it was shuttered when the United States opted to formally recognize Beijing’s Communist government in 1979. “So that’s one of the biggest lessons we’ve learned from Ukraine.”
The situation is always tense across the Taiwan Strait, but tensions have spiked in recent weeks. China launched aggressive war games to coincide with the May inauguration of recently-elected Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, a politician who is reviled as a “separatist” in Beijing, where Taiwan is still viewed as a renegade province. A drumbeat of rhetoric hostile to Taiwan followed, with China’s defense minister Dong Jun, speaking at a security forum in Singapore last month, casting Lai and his allies in his ruling Democratic Progressive Party as traitors to the Chinese people.
At that summit, Dong echoed China’s new talking point about Taiwan — that its leadership, along with its supporters in the United States, were pursuing “separation” from China in “incremental” fashion. Taiwan, which has styled itself the Republic of China since the 1949 takeover of the island by Nationalist forces fleeing the victorious Communists, has never formally declared independence from China and the bulk of its population would prefer to maintain the stable, if uneasy, status quo.
The country is not recognized by most of the United Nations’ member states and exists in a kind of diplomatic limbo — denied entrance into major international institutions yet also the source of great affection and concern among U.S. lawmakers and successive U.S. administrations. President Biden alone has authorized some 14 arms sales to Taiwan since taking office in 2021.
In the past three decades, Taiwan has also transformed into a prosperous, vibrant multiparty democracy wholly at odds with the political dispensation in Beijing. Recent polling found that some two-thirds of Taiwan’s population sees itself as primarily Taiwanese in identity, rather than Chinese — a reality that flies in the face of Chinese propaganda about Taiwan and its inhabitants being simply an extension of a greater Chinese nation.
“The more [the People’s Republic of China] tries to squash Taiwan’s internal freedom and our own sovereignty and insist that we are a ‘renegade province’ of theirs, the more actually they’re pushing us away,” Yui told me.
The Taiwanese envoy in Washington pointed to dwindling Taiwanese business investment in China, and a chill in cross-strait economic ties that has set in over the past decade. Yui said it’s better for the two countries to “prosper together,” but China “has to accept who we are, has to accept our existence and treat us accordingly.”
All the noises coming from Xi and the Communist Party elites clustered around him suggest Beijing has no interest in reconciling itself to the DPP in power in Taipei, and sees the growing American investment in Taiwan’s security as a provocative threat. Unlike the divisive debate over funding for Ukraine, there have yet to be partisan disagreements in Congress over support for Taiwan, and Yui expressed gratitude to both Democrats and Republicans for their continued embrace of Taiwan’s cause.
In Washington, some wonks have worried that the United States’ extensive backing of Ukraine’s war effort has hamstrung its ability to bolster Taiwan’s defense. Some lawmakers have argued that the United States should focus principally on warding against Chinese expansionism, even if that means allowing Russia to consolidate its illegal gains in Ukraine.
Yui rejected the necessity of such a trade-off. “The U.S. is the leading power in the world,” he said, adding that it “still has the capability to deal with different scenarios, different theaters and different challenges.”
Taiwan’s survival — and the ability to thwart or, more accurately, deter a Chinese invasion — has huge international implications. Yui summoned the principles of a rules-based order, of the importance that might should never make right. He also acknowledged the enormous economic stakes: As the world’s leading producer of super-advanced semiconductors, Taiwan is a critical cog in the global economy and at the heart of myriad world-spanning supply chains.
The war in Ukraine was disruptive for food and energy prices in countries far away from Eastern Europe, but that turbulence may pale compared with the chaos unleashed by a Chinese invasion. “A conflict in the Indo-Pacific will be a much uglier scenario,” Yui said.
To that end, he acknowledged that Taiwan and its allies must build up a set of fortifications, defensive capabilities and diplomatic understandings elsewhere that disincentivizes Beijing from making the kind of move the Kremlin did in 2022.
“We have to make sure that whenever Xi Jinping wakes up every day,” Yui concluded, “he looks in the mirror and says, ‘I don’t think today is the day.’”
The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · July 1, 2024
10. Cambodia Denies Hosting Chinese Naval Base, but Two Ships Raise Suspicions
Cambodia Denies Hosting Chinese Naval Base, but Two Ships Raise Suspicions
Two Chinese navy corvettes have been docked at Ream Naval Base almost continuously since December
By Austin RamzyFollow
Updated July 1, 2024 12:04 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/cambodia-denies-hosting-chinese-naval-base-but-two-ships-raise-suspicions-b9ce42ce?mod=googlenewsfeed&utm_medium=social
REAM, Cambodia—Residents of this village on the Gulf of Thailand say they have been warned not to talk about the big expansion taking place at the nearby naval base or the two hulking gray Chinese warships docked there, dominating the waterfront. On a wooded hilltop dotted with Buddhist shrines that overlooks the base, security arrived quickly to tell visitors not to take photos.
But the two Chinese navy corvettes, which arrived in December, are hard to miss. Docked at a 1,000-foot pier, they are visible from the village’s main road. Initially, the Cambodian military said the ships were there to help with training.
More than half a year later, they are still there, serving as evidence to many in Washington that China’s military has set up a permanent foothold in a waterway that is set to play a key role in any conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea.
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China is expanding its naval bases on the tropical island of Hainan in the South China Sea. Defense analysts say the upgrades point to Beijing’s preparations for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Photo: The Wall Street Journal
Officials in Washington have been watching the base closely in recent years. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2019 that the Chinese and Cambodian governments had signed a secret agreement allowing Beijing to base its naval vessels there. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh in early June, the first time a Pentagon chief has ever visited the country outside of regional summits, according to the American embassy in Cambodia.
While China’s global military footprint pales in comparison to that of the U.S., the ships at Ream show the growing capabilities and ambitions of Beijing’s armed forces. Cambodia is China’s closest partner in Southeast Asia, with a coveted location near waters claimed by Beijing and a half dozen of its neighbors to the south.
Ream is connected to Cambodia’s capital by a $2 billion Chinese-funded expressway that opened in 2022. The naval base is now dotted with construction cranes, and the view through its southern gate reveals an extensive worksite covered with rubble.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at an arrival ceremony in Phnom Penh. PHOTO: CHAD MCNEELEY/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/PLANET PIX/ZUMA PRESS
“There has been massive construction,” said a fisherman as he and his crew loaded blocks of ice onto their boat, which was tied up on a palm-lined beach near where the ships are moored.
A Ream resident with relatives who work on the base said that Chinese construction workers, who are bused in at night, have been assisting in the redevelopment work. The base is now divided, with an area reserved for the Chinese navy and a separate area for the Cambodian navy, the resident said.
“The Chinese navy doesn’t want Cambodian workers and navy to go close to its part,” the resident said.
Expanding presence, shifting explanation
Cambodia has offered varying explanations for the presence of the Chinese ships. After first saying they were there to help with training, Cambodia later said the Chinese were also helping to prepare for military exercises between the two countries in May. But after those drills wrapped up, satellite images from Maxar Technologies showed the two corvettes were still docked there.
The ships appear to have left the base at times. Satellite imagery showed the pier was empty during brief periods in January and March, according to an April report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington.
Cambodia’s defense ministry, which didn’t reply to comment requests, said in May that the country was in the market to buy type 056 corvettes from China—the model that has docked in Ream and which China has sold to Algeria, Bangladesh and Nigeria.
A Chinese navy ship prepares to dock in a Cambodian port as part of joint military drills. PHOTO: STR/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Asked about the ships and the base expansion, Beijing said it was there at Cambodia’s request. “China supports Cambodia in advancing the Ream Naval Base upgrade and reconstruction project, which is conducive to enhancing Cambodia’s ability to safeguard national independence and sovereignty,” China’s Foreign Ministry said. “It is the result of mutual respect and equal consultation between China and Cambodia.”
When Austin visited Cambodia, he raised the prospect of reviving military ties with Cambodia, according to the Pentagon, which didn’t address whether he posed questions about a Chinese presence at the Ream Naval Base. President Biden expressed concerns about China’s use of the base during a visit to Cambodia for regional summits in 2022.
A Chinese soldier during the Golden Dragon military exercise in Cambodia. PHOTO: HENG SINITH/ASSOCIATED PRESS
China and Cambodia have both vigorously denied the Journal’s 2019 reporting that they had signed a secret deal granting China’s military exclusive use of part of a naval installation. Since then, China’s presence at the Ream Naval Base has only grown more conspicuous.
Two years ago, Cambodia’s then Defense Minister Tea Banh swam in the Gulf of Thailand with China’s ambassador to Phnom Penh ahead of a ribbon-cutting ceremony to inaugurate extensive upgrades to the base. The refurbishment, which China has funded and helped carry out, included plans for the construction of two new piers, a warehouse and maintenance and repair facilities.
Over the past two years, satellite images show the construction of a new wharf, dry dock, administrative buildings and what appear to be living quarters, complete with basketball courts, according to the CSIS report. Two U.S.-funded buildings were demolished at the site despite an American offer to pay for upgrades to one, the Pentagon said in 2021.
More than 2,000 Cambodian and Chinese military personnel participated in the recent large-scale military exercises, known as Golden Dragon. The two weeks of exercises, which included demonstrations of the latest Chinese rifles and drones and counterterrorism and antipiracy drills, ended in late May.
China has funded major infrastructure projects in Cambodia including its largest airport. PHOTO: HENG SINITH/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Keeping the U.S. ‘out of the fight’
The U.S. and Cambodia had a fraught relationship during the Cold War. Large-scale American bombings beginning in the late 1960s to target communist insurgents and their North Vietnamese allies killed tens of thousands of civilians and left a legacy of deadly ordnance and toxic chemicals.
Modest improvements in ties between the U.S. and Cambodia have again deteriorated as the Southeast Asian nation has grown closer to China, the source of major infrastructure investments as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Those projects include Cambodia’s largest airport, which opened last year in the tourist center of Siem Reap, and a proposed canal that would link the Mekong River with the Cambodian coast, reducing dependency on Vietnam for shipping.
Cambodia’s close relationship with China makes it tough for U.S. officials to make headway with the country. “There is nothing much Lloyd Austin could push without unnecessarily ruffling the Cambodians’ feathers,” said Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. The Cambodians “are trying to argue that they are being maligned. They feel they are being victimized by the Sino-U.S. rivalry and they keep insisting that they are independent.”
While Cambodia says China doesn’t have exclusive access to Ream, no other foreign navy has visited since it was upgraded. Japanese navy ships that visited this year berthed at the commercial port in the nearby city of Sihanoukville, said John Bradford, executive director of the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies, a nonprofit in Japan.
A Cambodian official salutes Chinese navy personnel as he visits Chinese warships docked at the Ream Naval Base. PHOTO: CAMBODIA DEFENSE MINISTER TEA SEIHA/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
The Ream pier appears very similar to a facility at a Chinese military base in Djibouti, strategically located on the Horn of Africa, said Thomas Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
The Ream pier has been lengthened and appears to be capable of handling all but the largest ships in China’s fleet, according to analysts, which now includes two operational aircraft carriers. But some cautioned that the depth of the berths and capacity of shoreside facilities are still unclear.
The base gives China a presence closer to the Strait of Malacca, which like the Red Sea is a chokepoint for the transport of goods and energy supplies at sea that could be squeezed in a conflict. It could also play a role in any fight over Taiwan, the self-ruled island that Beijing claims as its territory.
“This new base serves as a platform for potential military action during a Taiwan contingency,” said Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington. “China’s goal is to impede U.S. forces from safely transiting through the Malacca Strait to China’s periphery, in effect keeping them out of the fight.”
Warren P. Strobel in Washington and Sun Narin in Ream, Cambodia, contributed to this article.
Write to Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com
Appeared in the July 1, 2024, print edition as 'Chinese Ships in Cambodia Raise Suspicions'.
11. For Ukraine and Russia, a Deadly Summer Lies Ahead With Little Hope of Big Gains
Attrition or exhaustion?
For Ukraine and Russia, a Deadly Summer Lies Ahead With Little Hope of Big Gains
Thousands likely to die as warring forces seek openings along a largely static front line
https://www.wsj.com/world/for-ukraine-and-russia-a-deadly-summer-lies-ahead-with-little-hope-of-big-gains-164adb67?mod=latest_headlines
By James MarsonFollow
and Daniel MichaelsFollow
Updated July 1, 2024 12:05 am ET
KHARKIV, Ukraine—As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters a third summer, the 700-mile front line is the site of a bloody chess match, with each side moving pieces around in search of an advantage without conceding ground elsewhere.
Ukraine’s army, which recently blunted a dangerous Russian offensive that ran short on troops, is counterattacking in villages on its northeastern border.
Meanwhile, 200 miles to the southeast, Russian forces are squeezing toward a crucial supply road that helps sustain Ukraine’s defense of besieged cities in that area.
The war here is settling in for a brutal season during which thousands will likely die on both sides but neither appears poised to muster a decisive breakthrough.
Ukrainian front line
Russian forces as of Dec. 31
Russian forces as of June 26
BELARUS
RUSSIA
Vovchansk
Kyiv
Kharkiv
Chasiv Yar
UKRAINE
Dnipro
Avdiivka
Mariupol
Kherson
Odesa
Sea of Azov
CRIMEA
Black Sea
100 miles
100 km
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Andrew Barnett
For Ukraine, after last summer’s failed counteroffensive, the task for now is to use fresh Western weapons to hold on to positions.
Russia appears likely to continue its grinding approach, sacrificing large numbers of troops for small gains, said a senior Ukrainian security official.
“They don’t have enough troops” for a major advance in Kharkiv, the official said. “Moving troops there would make other parts of the front weaker.”
Long-range strikes
With the front line largely static, both sides are trying to use deep strikes to gain an advantage ahead of winter. Russia has targeted power stations and other infrastructure using missiles and explosive drones, knocking out half of Ukraine’s power-generation capacity and causing rolling blackouts in many cities. Russia has pummeled Ukrainian defensive positions with glide bombs launched from warplanes, and in June dropped a 3-ton version for the first time.
Ukraine, meanwhile, is using long-range missiles provided by the U.S. and its allies in an effort to cut off Crimea, the southern peninsula that Russia seized in 2014 and remains a weak spot given its geographical isolation from the Russian mainland.
“While Russia still makes some incremental battlefield gains, the sense is that the Ukrainians have been pretty strategic in some of their strikes and movements, and are holding their own,” said a senior U.S. Defense Department official.
Ukrainian forces firing toward Russian troops in the Kharkiv region in mid-June. PHOTO: VIACHESLAV RATYNSKYI/REUTERS
A Ukrainian serviceman preparing a drone in the Kharkiv region. PHOTO: INNA VARENYTSIA/REUTERS
Russia’s thrust across the border into the Kharkiv region, launched at the end of May, appears to have caught Ukrainian forces off guard. Russian troops, advancing in two directions, quickly seized a few villages and the northern part of the city of Vovchansk.
Ukraine rushed in reinforcements and soon halted the Russians’ progress. Russia said it was seeking to create a buffer zone. After the Biden administration allowed Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied weapons to target enemy positions inside Russia that Moscow was using to launch attacks, the buffer zone’s value to Russia declined, said a senior Western intelligence official.
Ukrainian officials and military analysts say Russia also wanted to pull Ukrainian units from elsewhere on its defensive line and to bring Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second city, into range of Russia’s artillery guns. Now, after Ukrainian defenders halted the Russian advances, they are struggling to field enough troops to advance further.
The drones of ‘Yasni Ochi’
A Ukrainian reconnaissance drone streamed footage of a Russian dugout on the edge of the village of Starytsya to the northeast of Kharkiv one recent morning. At a house in a nearby village, a dispatcher concluded after three visits that the Russians had abandoned the position. Ukrainian units in the area are seeking to clear the Russians out, while the invaders are seeking to dig in using excavators.
Drone teams here like one dubbed “Yasni Ochi,” or Clear Eyes, have employed drones—from small explosive craft the size of a dinner plate to larger vehicles that can carry bombs weighing several pounds—to hit Russian positions with precision.
Yasni Ochi had been in the east, but was sent northward to the Kharkiv region recently to reinforce defenses. The team has quickly set up a system to observe and strike Russian infantry and vehicles.
Ukrainian drone teams in the Kharkiv region have targeted Russian positions. PHOTO: VIACHESLAV RATYNSKYI/REUTERS
Ukrainian forces have halted Russian advances in the Kharkiv region. PHOTO: VIACHESLAV RATYNSKYI/REUTERS
In a typical strike in June, a drone team dropped a bomb on a house with a half-dozen Russians inside, causing the ammunition stored there to explode and killing the troops.
“We are holding well,” said Heorhiy Volkov, the unit’s commander. “Our system holds it.”
Some Ukrainian soldiers and opposition politicians had complained that defensive lines in the area were poorly constructed or nonexistent before Russia’s incursion, but the attack appears to have sped up preparations.
Northeast of Kharkiv, close to Russia, a Wall Street Journal team saw soldiers placing antitank mines into shallow holes in fields, part of at least two lines of trenches, dugouts and antitank traps apparently nearing completion.
Reinforced Ukrainian defenses with infantry trenches protected by explosive drone teams, and artillery guns soon to be boosted by additional ammunition approved by the U.S., are sapping Russian strength.
Russian forces inch forward
Russia has been able to replace its losses through recruitment, according to the officials, but the heavy attrition has made any advances plodding and predictable.
Still, Russians are edging forward in the eastern Donetsk region, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has given priority to and claimed as part of his country.
An apartment building in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region that was struck in an aerial attack. PHOTO: ROMAN PILIPEY/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
A trench in the Donetsk region. PHOTO: SERHII KOROVAYNY FOR WSJ
Russian forces in June infiltrated the eastern edge of the city of Chasiv Yar, a high point in the area, after earlier taking it then being flushed out. They are pushing northwest from the city of Avdiivka, Moscow’s only major conquest this year, toward a road that supplies Chasiv Yar.
The gains are devouring resources. Moscow suffered roughly 1,500 casualties on a single day, May 14, which was Russia’s worst day since the start of the war, according to a Western assessment of Ukrainian and other intelligence.
“Russia’s gains have come at a pretty grisly cost,” said the Western intelligence official.
Whether Russia will attempt a large-scale assault during the summer remains a vexing question for Ukrainian strategists and their Western advisers. Kyiv has quite good intelligence about the battlefield situation and can spot Russian forces massing for a potential attack, said the intelligence official.
“Taking strategic intent from that can be quite difficult,” the official said, noting that Russia has launched attacks throughout the war that standard military doctrine wouldn’t foresee.
Ukraine has been able to generate enough forces to replace losses and some reserves, the security official said, but would need several times more to launch any kind of major offensive.
Ukraine targets Crimea
With little prospect of achieving much more than holding the front line in the coming months, Ukraine is targeting Crimea with long-range missiles provided by the U.S.
The U.S. has barred Kyiv from using the longer-range ATACMS, which stands for the Army Tactical Missile System, on Russian territory, but Crimea is recognized by most countries as Ukraine’s, making it fair game.
Ukraine has in recent weeks destroyed launchers and radars of several advanced air-defense systems and two Russian ferries that transport military hardware. The rail-and-road bridge from Russia to Crimea, the main link to the peninsula, hasn’t been used for nearly a year for heavy military equipment since Ukraine severely damaged it with two explosive naval drones, according to Ukrainian officials.
Russian officials said five people on a beach were killed last week by shrapnel from ATACMS. The Kremlin blamed the U.S. and threatened unspecified consequences. Open-source intelligence analysts said debris appeared to be from Russian interceptors and not U.S. weapons.
Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser, said Crimea was “a large military camp and warehouse, with hundreds of direct military targets,” making attacks there legitimate.
Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com
Appeared in the July 1, 2024, print edition as 'A Summer of Slog Is Expected in Ukraine'.
12. Analysis: How ready is China’s military? Dramatic downfall of two defense ministers raises questions
Excerpts:
The announcements by the Politburo said Li and Guo’s actions “betrayed the trust and responsibility” placed in them by the top leadership of the party and the military. Li “betrayed the party’s founding aspirations and party principles,” and Wei was accused of “collapse of faith and loss of loyalty,” according to CCTV.
“Xi must be feeling personally betrayed by this high-level corruption,” wrote Bill Bishop, a China watcher and author of the Sinocism newsletter.
But Xi remains determined to root out corruption and disloyalty. Last month, he convened the military top brass for a political-work conference in Yan’an, a sacred site of Chinese Communist revolution in party history, calling for a deepening of political rectification in the PLA.
“The gun barrel must always be held in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the party,” Xi told the PLA elites. “Strictness is clearly required to…achieve combat effectiveness. There must be no place in the military for corrupt elements to hide.”
Char, the PLA watcher in Singapore, said in the long run, Xi’s cleaning up of the military and its procurement system is a good sign for China’s combat capabilities.
“The problems are being rectified as and when, and there will always be an ongoing review as to how Xi Jinping can actually bring the PLA up to speed to have his dream of modernizing the PLA by 2035 realized.”
Analysis: How ready is China’s military? Dramatic downfall of two defense ministers raises questions | CNN
CNN · by Nectar Gan · July 1, 2024
Military delegates arrive at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to attend the closing session of the National Peoples Congress on March 11, 2024.
Wang Zhao/AFP/Getty Images
Hong Kong CNN —
After months of intense speculation and official reticence, China has finally confirmed its two former defense ministers who vanished from public view last year had been under investigation for corruption.
Their dramatic downfall has exposed deep-rooted alleged deceit in key sectors of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s military modernization drive despite his decade-long war on graft, raising questions about the country’s combat readiness at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Li Shangfu, who was drastically ousted as defense minister in October after only seven months on the job, and Wei Fenghe, who served from 2018 to 2023, were expelled from the ruling Communist Party following the investigations, with both cases handed over to military prosecutors for charges, state media reported Thursday.
The duo are the biggest heads to roll yet in a sweeping purge of China’s defense establishment since last summer, which has felled more than a dozen senior generals and executives from the military-industrial complex.
The turmoil in the upper ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) comes as leader Xi Jinping is seeking to make China’s armed forces stronger, more combat-ready and more aggressive in asserting its disputed territorial claims in the region.
At the height of their careers, former defense ministers Li and Wei often struck a tough tone before the world’s top military officials. At successive regional security forums, the two generals warned the Chinese military would fight “at all costs” if anyone dares to “split” self-governing Taiwan from China. They also fired thinly veiled shots at the United States, vowing to push back against “hegemony” in the disputed South China Sea.
Both promoted under Xi, their removals come despite the Chinese leader’s more than decade long signature anti-graft campaign, underscoring the difficulties in preventing corruption at the highest levels of the military, according to analysts.
While Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has achieved some success, the lack of proper civilian oversight and an independent legal system means the PLA is reliant on its internal investigators for supervision, said James Char, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “That’s difficult, so corruption will definitely continue,” he said.
Former Defense Ministers Li Shangfu and his predecessor Wei Fenghe have both been expelled from the Communist Party over corruption allegations.
AP/Reuters
Corruption in weapons procurement
As part of Xi’s ambition to transform the PLA into a “world class” fighting force, China has poured billions of dollars into buying and upgrading equipment. Xi has also built up the Rocket Force, an elite branch overseeing the country’s fast-expanding arsenal of nuclear and ballistic missiles.
Most of the generals dismissed or disappeared without explanation last year were linked to the Rocket Force or military equipment, including Li and Wei.
Before becoming Defense Minister, Li headed the PLA’s Equipment Development Department for five years. An engineer by training, the 66-year-old spent decades launching rockets and satellites in southwest China before being promoted to the PLA headquarters to deal with military equipment procurement.
Wei, 70, was the inaugural commander of the Rocket Force. In late 2015, it was elevated by Xi into a full service from the PLA’s former missile arm, the Second Artillery Corps, where Wei had worked for decades. Wei’s two successors at the Rocket Force have also been purged.
The allegations against Li laid out in the announcement by the party’s 24-member Politburo clearly point to corruption in the procurement of weapons.
In addition to taking and giving bribes and abuse of power, Li was also accused of “severely polluting the political environment and industry practices of the military equipment sector,” according to state broadcaster CCTV.
Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow at the Pentagon-funded National Defense University, said the carefully worded phrase points to collusion between the state-owned enterprises that manufacture weapons and the PLA procurement system.
“We know there is some collusion, but it’s not clear – and the CCP would not admit it – that critical weapons actually are substandard or not reliable,” Wuthnow said. “If proven, that would be even more serious for Xi since he would have doubts not only about ethics but also about actual military readiness.”
Char, the analyst, said problems in the PLA’s procurement system have existed for many years.
In 2018, a study penned by China’s Naval University of Engineering, the Navy’s equipment procurement center and the audit office of the Central Military Commission had already analyzed the bid rigging practices in the PLA’s equipment procurement and called for improvement of the bidding system, Char noted.
“These problems in procurement and acquisitions raised questions about the quality of the equipment that the PLA had purchased earlier. How well do they actually function on the field? I think that’s quite debatable,” he said.
In a sign that China’s top military leadership could be concerned about the quality of its equipment, Gen. He Weidong, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees the armed forces, vowed in March to crack down on “fake combat capabilities” within the military, Char noted.
“His comment was quickly banned from public view afterwards. I think that says a lot about the actual combat capabilities of (the PLA),” Char said.
Military vehicles carrying DF-5B intercontinental ballistic missiles travel past Tiananmen Square during a military parade marking the 70th founding anniversary of People's Republic of China held in Beijing in 2019.
Jason Lee/Reuters/File
‘Lost confidence’
Li and Wei are the most senior military figures to be felled in six years by Xi’s relentless anti-corruption campaign.
The Chinese leader has made rooting out graft and disloyalty a hallmark of his rule since coming to power in 2012, and he has brought down powerful generals previously deemed untouchable.
Within the first few years of his first term, Xi claimed his two most senior scalps in the military, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, two former vice-chairmen of the CMC. Xu later died of cancer and Guo was sentenced to life in prison for corruption.
In some ways, Wuthnow said, the latest corruption scandal around the two former defense ministers is “even worse for Xi” than the Xu and Guo cases a decade ago.
“Back then we could say Xi was cleaning house,” he said, noting that Xu and Guo had been appointed to the CMC under former leader Jiang Zemin. But both Wei and Li were promoted under Xi.
“Wei and Li’s cases show that Xi’s own vetting processes and vaunted anti-corruption campaign over the last decade haven’t succeeded at preventing graft at the top of the system,” Wuthnow said.
“I think this shows once more that Xi has lost confidence in his own appointees.”
A total of 137 students directional trained for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force participate in a see-off ceremony at Fuyang Institute of Technology and will set off for barracks on December 26, 2021 in Fuyang, Anhui Province of China.
Wang Biao/VCG/Getty Images/File
Related article Xi’s latest purge targets the military. Why did powerful generals fall out of favor?
Wei was promoted to the rank of general just over a week after Xi took the helm of the party. Li was promoted to lieutenant general and then again to general in just three years.
The announcements by the Politburo said Li and Guo’s actions “betrayed the trust and responsibility” placed in them by the top leadership of the party and the military. Li “betrayed the party’s founding aspirations and party principles,” and Wei was accused of “collapse of faith and loss of loyalty,” according to CCTV.
“Xi must be feeling personally betrayed by this high-level corruption,” wrote Bill Bishop, a China watcher and author of the Sinocism newsletter.
But Xi remains determined to root out corruption and disloyalty. Last month, he convened the military top brass for a political-work conference in Yan’an, a sacred site of Chinese Communist revolution in party history, calling for a deepening of political rectification in the PLA.
“The gun barrel must always be held in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the party,” Xi told the PLA elites. “Strictness is clearly required to…achieve combat effectiveness. There must be no place in the military for corrupt elements to hide.”
Char, the PLA watcher in Singapore, said in the long run, Xi’s cleaning up of the military and its procurement system is a good sign for China’s combat capabilities.
“The problems are being rectified as and when, and there will always be an ongoing review as to how Xi Jinping can actually bring the PLA up to speed to have his dream of modernizing the PLA by 2035 realized.”
CNN · by Nectar Gan · July 1, 2024
13. Commentary: The world came dangerously close to full-scale conflict in the South China Sea
Excerpts:
The risk of a premeditated armed conflict in the South China Sea, over Second Thomas Shoal in particular, remains low. The bigger worry is either country sleepwalking into a fight.
China could be risking a high-stakes gambit by pushing the envelope of coercion, raising the chances of a miscalculation when emotions run high.
Will attempts to de-escalate, if such eventuality ever transpires, be effective in avoiding conflict? It would behove Beijing to take a bold step back and avoid crossing the firebreak.
Commentary: The world came dangerously close to full-scale conflict in the South China Sea
Koh Swee Lean Collin
01 Jul 2024 06:00AM
(Updated: 01 Jul 2024 09:20AM)
channelnewsasia.com
SINGAPORE: On Jun 17, the world came dangerously close to an outright armed conflict in the South China Sea.
The clash between China and the Philippines in the disputed Second Thomas Shoal was the most serious ever documented. Things could have easily escalated beyond a Filipino sailor’s severed thumb - but for a measure of restraint and a whole lot of luck.
One might have seen this coming after more than a year of high tensions between the two countries.
Besides the usual disruptions of Philippine rotation and resupply missions to the garrison stationed on the beached Sierra Madre warship, there were signs of the noose tightening. In the fortnight leading up to the latest fracas, China accused Filipino troops of pointing firearms at the coast guard and destroying Chinese fishing nets in the shoal’s vicinity.
In video footage of the Jun 17 episode released by the Philippine military, the Chinese coast guard can be seen right alongside the Sierra Madre - just short of boarding the outpost. In a fait accompli, they might have pushed the Filipinos off the rusting hulk to resolve the stalemate once and for all, potentially igniting a wider conflict that could involve the United States.
That did not happen. Instead, the Chinese coast guard resorted to the unprecedented means of wielding knives, an axe and other weapons, adding to the usual ramming of boats. They managed to board and seize rubber dinghies, confiscate firearms, and severely damage navigational systems.
That this incident did not erupt into a full-scale armed conflict is down to two elements: Restraint and luck.
A MEASURE OF RESTRAINT
Restraint has been the constant refrain in the South China Sea. The Chinese have argued that their coast guards had exercised restraint and acted “professionally and reasonably” in this latest skirmish.
Yet, the boarding and seizure of Philippine Navy boats, which per international law qualify for sovereign immunity status, could have been construed as an act of war. Had the Sierra Madre - still a commissioned navy vessel despite being grounded and disused since 1999 - been boarded in the heated frenzy, the situation could have easily escalated out of control and potentially triggered the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States.
In the end, it was self-restraint by the Filipinos that prevented escalation.
Some of the Philippine Navy personnel involved in the mission are highly-trained elite forces from the Naval Special Operations Command. This incident might have ended in an uglier manner if they had vigorously fought back against the comparatively less well-trained Chinese coast guards.
Wary of being baited into firing the first shot that could invite retaliation in the name of self-defence, the garrison on the Sierra Madre most likely did not fire warning shots, per standard rules of engagement, which allowed the Chinese to push this close to the outpost. The troops standing on deck issued verbal warning and tossed water overboard at the Chinese coast guards right below, as seen in the video footage.
DEPENDING ON LUCK TO PREVAIL?
And there was just sheer luck that the confrontation resulted in just one severe casualty, even if it was the most serious to date. But can one continue to count on luck even if one or both parties exercise some level of restraint?
The Mutual Defense Treaty was not invoked in large part because Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr set the bar pretty high at the Shangri-La Dialogue a month ago. He said getting to the point “where any of our participants, civilian or otherwise have been killed” was "almost certainly going to be a red line".
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr delivers a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, 2024. (Photo: Reuters/Edgar Su)
Based on past run-ins with the Chinese, Manila had assiduously avoided the invocation of the treaty. According to American military-legal terms, the Chinese acts would have amounted to non-kinetic means of the use of illegal force even though the clause “armed attack” within the treaty was not clearly defined.
This time, Manila still sought to de-escalate tensions, most plausibly because the severity of the Jun 17 incident could have brought the countries - and even potentially the Americans - to the precipice of outright armed conflict.
On Jun 23, Mr Marcos said that the Philippines is “not in the business to instigate wars” in a speech to troops of the unit overseeing the South China Sea.
PROBING THE “RED LINE” IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
All these could be music to China’s ears. Beijing has managed to further probe the American-Filipino “red line”.
The Jun 17 incident yielded some vital data points: Manila’s reticence to escalate tensions and Washington’s apparent ambivalence about committing more robust forms of support to the Philippines even without invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty.
China also demonstrated the lengths it could go to disrupt the Filipinos’ moves and its escalation dominance. The yawning capability asymmetry between the two countries was on clear display: The largest Chinese coast guard vessel, displacing over 10,000 tonnes, was deployed at close proximity to the Sierra Madre outpost barely a week after the fracas.
All in all, it would convince Beijing that it remains feasible to play the long game - to slowly but surely outlast the Filipinos, given the deteriorating conditions of the Sierra Madre, and compel them into accepting Chinese terms eventually.
The risk of a premeditated armed conflict in the South China Sea, over Second Thomas Shoal in particular, remains low. The bigger worry is either country sleepwalking into a fight.
China could be risking a high-stakes gambit by pushing the envelope of coercion, raising the chances of a miscalculation when emotions run high.
Will attempts to de-escalate, if such eventuality ever transpires, be effective in avoiding conflict? It would behove Beijing to take a bold step back and avoid crossing the firebreak.
Collin Koh is senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He primarily researches maritime security and naval affairs in Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea disputes.
channelnewsasia.com
14. Army Futures Command's Gen. Rainey reflects on AI's potential in modern warfare
Excerpts:
Recognizing the complex possibilities that accompany these and other challenges, however, the Futures commander still said he has hope that America’s values and principles will help it prevail.
“Certainly, it’s the most disruptive and dangerous time in my lifetime — at least since World War II, for sure. But I am an optimist. I think that this country is still a diverse country. I believe it’s the freest place in the world. I believe that the overwhelming majority of the people — our teammates, our citizens — believe that and are willing to sacrifice for that. So we need it. We need industry to stay with us,” Rainey told the audience. “So I would just probably end there — just asking everybody to stick with the department.”
Army Futures Command's Gen. Rainey reflects on AI's potential in modern warfare
“I don't personally think we have a technology problem — I think we have a tech adoption problem,” Gen. Rainey said.
BY
BRANDI VINCENT
JUNE 28, 2024
defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · June 28, 2024
The Defense Department must streamline data, requirements, procurement and more to prepare for rapidly developing, next-generation artificial intelligence and large language models that will likely transform global warfare and how the U.S. military fights in the years to come, according to the top general leading Army Futures Command.
“To say the period that we’re living in right now is disruptive would be like an epic understatement. Different people use different analogies, but I think what we’re witnessing right now is as significant as the nuclear arms race. Potentially, even the Industrial Revolution — that’s how big this period of time is, and that potential. We don’t use the words ‘revolutionary change’ very often in the military. But I think it clearly falls into that category,” Gen. James Rainey, Army Futures’ commanding general, said Tuesday at Scale AI’s government summit.
In a discussion moderated by the startup’s founder Alexandr Wang, Rainey reflected on ways the military is adapting to the quickly evolving advantages and limitations posed by AI in modern warfare.
“I don’t personally think we have a technology problem — I think we have a tech adoption problem,” he said.
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Futures Command is the Army’s key innovation-pushing and modernization-enabling arm. Rainey took the helm in 2022.
“I am not a data scientist or expert by any means. I am not an acquisition professional. I’m an infantry officer with a lot of experience deploying and running big formations,” he told Wang during the event.
Pointing to his unique “warfighter lens,” Rainey noted that it is critical to recognize that, for the DOD, AI is not simply about intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, logistics, or targeting.
“The real potential for military application of artificial intelligence is to empower our commanders — the men and women who lead our formations. And how do we bring the power of AI to bear to let them do three things: make more decisions, make better decisions and make faster decisions?” Rainey said.
“Nobody’s going to win the war between two nuclear-equipped superpowers, right? So I think the real potential is to confront China with that capability, and through that lens,” the general said.
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Rainey’s tenure as commander comes at a time when AI and machine learning present seemingly unprecedented potential to enable and empower military chiefs and the teams and operations they lead.
“The amount of things that are knowable that our commanders do not know is staggering. And I think we could rapidly [apply AI for that] right now — because you don’t have to be as perfect about that as you do to drop a bomb into a room. You almost have a level of certainty to comply with the law of armed conflict,” the general noted.
Rainey described how he’s gone “back and forth to Iraq and Afghanistan” about seven different times in his military career so far, which isn’t uncommon for other military insiders around his age. Doing so has exposed him to those scenarios where he experienced such a knowledge gap, one faced by the U.S. military’s “men and women going places all over the world right now.”
“The amount of things that they don’t know that are absolutely knowable about the human beings that live there about the terrain. You know, Russia decided to invade Ukraine based on an assumption that the ground would be frozen, because it was always frozen that time of year — but it didn’t freeze. Absolutely unknowable piece of information. So I think we can use large language models, AI and machine learning to rapidly capture that,” Rainey told Wang.
But as generative AI and other connected, advanced capabilities come into fruition and pose new opportunities for the U.S. military, they’re also ushering in much more unpredictability and uncertainty through risk — particularly associated with how adversaries might apply them.
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“That’s one of the challenges for us, because I spent most of my career trying to hide from the enemy — like, striving to not be observed and use terrain and hide, like in silence so that the enemy doesn’t know where I’m attacking from there. But it’s just different with software,” Rainey said.
China, he added, is now coupling “ubiquitous sensing, plus precision-guided munitions, with huge stockpile magazine depth.” That means U.S. personnel will now have to essentially assume enemies will be able to see them and therefore have to contest their ability to understand what they observe.
Other impending obstacles AI presents for Futures Command, the Army, and the larger DOD enterprise involve data, which underpins the technology.
“Right now, if one of you came up to me and said, ‘Hey, we have a large language model where we’ll scan an area and find all the Russian tanks,’ — we could not do anything with that because of the state of our data in the Army and in the department is just ridiculous. I mean, it’s all over the place,” the general explained.
In that sense, his command is looking to partner with more companies that can help get to a state where all of its data is usable and accessible so that it can pave the way for next-gen algorithmic warfare.
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Among other topics during their onstage chat, both he and Wang agreed that the department must also confront challenges related to requirements and procurement frameworks to become a software-enabled organization.
“We’ve got the world’s best acquisition folks, but they’ve got to get faster. They need fiscal agility, we need some help from Congress. … But we can’t we can’t buy radios or buy server stacks. We have to add funding lines that are for command and control and set what the appropriate oversight would be able to rapidly move money from one system to another,” Rainey said.
Recognizing the complex possibilities that accompany these and other challenges, however, the Futures commander still said he has hope that America’s values and principles will help it prevail.
“Certainly, it’s the most disruptive and dangerous time in my lifetime — at least since World War II, for sure. But I am an optimist. I think that this country is still a diverse country. I believe it’s the freest place in the world. I believe that the overwhelming majority of the people — our teammates, our citizens — believe that and are willing to sacrifice for that. So we need it. We need industry to stay with us,” Rainey told the audience. “So I would just probably end there — just asking everybody to stick with the department.”
Written by Brandi Vincent
Brandi Vincent is DefenseScoop's Pentagon correspondent. She reports on emerging and disruptive technologies, and associated policies, impacting the Defense Department and its personnel. Prior to joining Scoop News Group, Brandi produced a long-form documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. She was named a 2021 Paul Miller Washington Fellow by the National Press Foundation and was awarded SIIA’s 2020 Jesse H. Neal Award for Best News Coverage. Brandi grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland.
defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · June 28, 2024
15. This is how the US-built pier to bring aid to Gaza has worked — or not
This is how the US-built pier to bring aid to Gaza has worked — or not
BY LOLITA C. BALDOR AND TARA COPP
Updated 3:53 PM EDT, June 28, 2024
AP · by TARA COPP · June 28, 2024
WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. military-built pier has been pulled again from the Gaza shore due to rough seas, and its future role in the distribution of aid to Palestinians is uncertain.
Humanitarian aid groups stopped distributing supplies that arrived by sea on June 9 due to security concerns and have not started again. U.S. officials say the pier may not be reinstalled unless aid agencies reach an agreement to begin distributing the aid again. Meanwhile, food and other provisions shipped from Cyprus are piling up on shore, and soon the the secure area on the beach in Gaza will reach capacity.
It’s been a long and difficult road for the pier, which has been battered by weather and troubled by security problems. Here’s a look at how it started and where it is now.
March: announcement and prep
MARCH 7: President Joe Biden announces his plan for the U.S. military to build a pier during his State of the Union address.
“Tonight, I’m directing the U.S. military to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the coast of Gaza that can receive large shipments carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters,” he said.
But even in those first few moments, he noted the pier would increase the amount of humanitarian aid getting into Gaza but that Israel “must do its part” and let more aid in.
MARCH 8: Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, Pentagon spokesman, tells reporters it will take “up to 60 days” to deploy the forces and build the project.
MARCH 12: Four U.S. Army boats loaded with tons of equipment and steel pier segments leave Joint Base Langley-Eustis in Virginia and head to the Atlantic Ocean for what is expected to be a monthlong voyage to Gaza.
The brigade’s commander, Army Col. Sam Miller, warns that the transit and construction will be heavily dependent on the weather and any high seas they encounter.
LATE MARCH: U.S. Army vessels hit high seas and rough weather as they cross the Atlantic, slowing their pace.
April: construction and hope
APRIL 1: Seven World Central Kitchen aid workers are killed in an Israeli airstrike as they travel in clearly marked vehicles on a delivery mission authorized by Israel.
The strike fuels ongoing worries about security for relief workers and prompts aid agencies to pause delivery of humanitarian assistance in Gaza.
APRIL 19: U.S. officials confirm that the U.N. World Food Program has agreed to help deliver aid brought to Gaza via the maritime route once construction is done.
APRIL 25: Major construction of the port facility on the shore near Gaza City begins to take shape. The onshore site is where aid from the causeway will be delivered and given to aid agencies.
APRIL 30: Satellite photos show the U.S. Navy ship USNS Roy P. Benavidez and Army vessels working on assembling the pier and causeway about 11 kilometers (6.8 miles) from the port on shore.
May: The pier opens ... then closes
MAY 9: The U.S. vessel Sagamore is the first ship loaded with aid to leave Cyprus and head toward Gaza and ultimately the pier. An elaborate security and inspection station has been built in Cyprus to screen the aid coming from a number of countries.
MAY 16: Well past the 60-day target time, the construction and assembly of the pier off the Gaza coast and the causeway attached to the shoreline are finished after more than a week of weather and other delays.
MAY 17: The first trucks carrying aid for the Gaza Strip roll down the newly built pier and into the secure area on shore, where they will be unloaded and the cargo distributed to aid agencies for delivery by truck into Gaza.
May 18: Crowds of desperate Palestinians overrun a convoy of aid trucks coming from the pier, stripping the cargo from 11 of the 16 vehicles before they reach a U.N. warehouse for distribution.
May 19-20: The first food from the pier — a limited number of high-nutrition biscuits — reaches people in need in central Gaza, according to the World Food Program.
Aid organizations suspend deliveries from the pier for two days while the U.S. works with Israel to open alternate land routes from the pier and improve security.
MAY 24: So far, a bit more than 1,000 metric tons of aid has been delivered to Gaza via the U.S.-built pier, and USAID later says all of it has been distributed within Gaza.
MAY 25: High winds and heavy seas damage the pier and cause four U.S. Army vessels operating there to become beached, injuring three service members, including one who is in critical condition.
Two vessels went aground in Gaza near the base of the pier and two went aground near Ashkelon in Israel.
MAY 28: Large portions of the causeway were pulled from the beach and moved to an Israeli port for repairs. The base of the causeway remains at the Gaza shore.
June: big crises for the pier
JUNE 7: The damaged causeway was rebuilt and reconnected to the beach in Gaza.
JUNE 8: The U.S. military announced that deliveries resumed off the repaired and reinstalled dock.
The same day, Israel rescued four hostages taken by Hamas during the Oct. 7 attacks in an operation that killed 270 Palestinians.
JUNE 9: World Food Program chief Cindy McCain announced a “pause” in cooperation with the U.S. pier during a TV interview, citing the previous day’s “incident” and the rocketing of two WFP warehouses that injured a staffer.
JUNE 10: WFP said the U.N. would conduct a security review to assess the safety of its staff in handling aid deliveries from the pier. In the meantime, the U.S. military said it would stockpile aid shipments on a secure beach in Gaza.
Ryder, the Pentagon spokesman, said no aspect of the pier or its equipment had been used in Israel’s rescue operation. The Pentagon says an area south of the pier was used for the return of the freed hostages back to Israel.
JUNE 14: The pier was detached from the beach in Gaza to prevent damage during rough seas and allow the military to reattach it more quickly later, U.S. officials said.
JUNE 19: The pier was re-anchored in Gaza and more than 656 metric tons, or 1.4 million pounds, of aid was delivered in the hours after it resumed operations, Ryder said.
Aid agencies, however, did not restart their distribution of the aid, so workers have been storing it in the secure area.
JUNE 28: The pier is removed due to weather, and the U.S. is considering not putting it back unless aid begins heading again to Palestinians in need, several U.S. officials said.
AP · by TARA COPP · June 28, 2024
16. Forgotten Wars: The Civil War in Myanmar
Forgotten Wars: The Civil War in Myanmar
By Matteo Balzarini Zane
June 29, 2024
https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2024/06/29/forgotten_wars_the_civil_war_in_myanmar_1041270.html?utm
After the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) overthrew the government of Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup on February 1, 2021, the country was plunged into chaos and violence. Peaceful protests against the government were violently suppressed, resulting in thousands of arrests and hundreds of civilian deaths. Minority militias have been fighting for partial or full independence from the central government for decades, increasing the resistance of the army and making internal conflicts more comfortable.
The United Nations and various human rights organizations have repeatedly reported human rights violations by the military, including executions, torture, and indiscriminate attacks on the population. The Security Council passed several resolutions condemning this, but direct sanctions were hampered by the joint veto power of Russia and China. The two superpowers have strategic and economic interests in the region and are therefore reluctant to support policies that could jeopardize their relations with Myanmar and the Tatmadaw (which supplies arms to Moscow).
Rebel groups under the protection of the Federal Government and the People's Defense Forces have stepped up resistance in recent months, but they are seeking greater control, with the military still controlling major cities and key construction sites. The harsh countryside and mountains have deep ethnic groups.
Myanmar's geostrategic position with China and India has long placed it in the middle of the interests of regional and world powers. Its rich natural resources, including oil products, mineral deposits, and forests rich in valuable trees, make it a popular destination for many players around the world.
China sees Myanmar as an important gateway connecting its territory to the Indian Ocean route via the Belt and Road. In this context, Beijing has made significant investments in the development of infrastructure in the country, such as the Kyaukpyu port and the network of oil and water pipelines that cross Myanmar from north to west and connect the Bay of Bengal to China's Yunnan Province. That's why Myanmar's security is so important to China, which has given the government a vague nod that both gauges political support and ensures the country's stability.
Myanmar's security is very important to China because Myanmar is rich in jade, copper, gold, and other precious minerals, which are very important to China. The Chinese market is one of the main exporters of raw materials and one of Myanmar's most important economic resources. This economic cooperation enabled Beijing to gain government approval, equal political support (including using a veto in the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on the Tatmadaw), as well as actions to be taken in an effort to stabilize the country. It undermines the junta's decision.
At the same time, India sees Myanmar as a friend who can strengthen its relations in Southeast Asia as part of its "Act East" policy. New Delhi is ready to counter Chinese influence in the region and provide military support to the Tatmadaw and humanitarian assistance to the people. It also maintains good relations with the political government and minority activists operating in the eastern part of the country.
India is particularly concerned about the security of its northeastern border, which has been destabilized by various ethnic insurgencies and internal rebellions. In this regard, support for ethnic minorities in Myanmar could help create an Indian territory that is immune from arms, drug trafficking, and influence.
New Delhi is also investing in infrastructure in Myanmar to improve relations and promote trade between the two countries. These projects include the tripartite highway connecting India, Myanmar, and Thailand, and the Sittwe port, which is part of the Kaladan Corridor plan that will provide India with direct access to the Bay of Bengal.
Domestic ethnic conflicts constitute a significant part of Myanmar's civil war. The country consists of more than 135 recognized ethnic groups, each with its own geography, culture, and politics. Among them, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and Arakan Army are the main armed forces. The group, which controls mostly semi-controlled territory, saw in the crisis following the attack an opportunity to continue its historic fight against the government in Naypyitaw. All alliances are weak, and now only the importance of the "enemy" can stabilize them. Decades of military conflict and failed attempts to establish national unity have increased tensions between the Tatmadaw and nationalist forces. All parties to the conflict are trying to maintain their positions ahead of the peace process, which makes the peace process very difficult.
In this case, the real victims of the conflict are citizens. Thousands of people were forced to flee their homes, leading to a humanitarian crisis. Refugees living on the borders of Thailand, India, and China often live in overcrowded and harsh conditions.
A solution to the current compromise seems unlikely. Internal differences, foreign interests, and bad military practices make the path to peace very difficult. However, the international community cannot ignore the crisis in Myanmar. Encouraging and uniting for the protection of human rights, providing humanitarian aid, and encouraging dialogue with all parties are important steps that will bring the country closer to a solution.
Matteo Balzarini Zane, bachelor degree in Political Science, International Relations and Human Rights at the University of Padua (Italy). His X account is @m_balzarinizane.
17. Could AI help US intelligence end decades-long aversion to unclassified data?
Could AI help US intelligence end decades-long aversion to unclassified data? - Breaking Defense
In this op-ed, Joshua Haecker explains how AI and LLMs can help the Intelligence Community use unclassified information, an often untapped source.
By JOSHUA HAECKER
on June 28, 2024 at 2:02 PM
breakingdefense.com · by Joshua Haecker · June 28, 2024
Pentagon Lock Security Defense Concept Illustration (Getty images)
The rapid development of generative AI and large language models (LLMs) has created an opportunity for the US intelligence community to break with its long-standing reluctance to use unclassified information — a reluctance that has until this point largely closed an entire avenue of intelligence and information-gathering and made the US and its allies much more vulnerable to strategic or tactical surprise.
But while adoption of AI models and LLMs by national security agencies could be technologically transformative, it must be done in the right way, without transferring longstanding biases treasuring classified information over unclassified information, or the opportunity to substantially improve America’s intelligence capability will be missed.
Government agencies have long monitored news reports and what is said online, starting with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, but they have largely overlooked — or at best, siloed off — the huge store of publicly available information from other reputable sources. There is now a rich stream of such data. For instance, just days before Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel last October, there was an upsurge in visits to the Arabic-language web content about many of the locations subsequently targeted by Hamas. A properly trained AI model could have detected these and provided critical early warning.
The Intelligence Community has traditionally regarded anything that is secret as inherently better than anything that is not secret, the idea being “if only I know this, then it’s much more valuable than something everybody else knows.” At the height of the Cold War, that would have been true because most good intelligence was secretive; the internet or forums where data was publicly available did not yet exist. Yet the mindset around the perceived superiority of classified information has persisted even as good-quality online information has mushroomed. It is a cultural problem that many within the Intelligence Community believe should be addressed.
To its credit, the Intelligence Community has long recognized it has a challenge here. For over a decade, the prominence of open-source missions and agencies has risen significantly in Congressional language, in agency reviews, and in Presidential Executive Orders. This year’s Intelligence Community strategy [PDF] uses the strongest language yet to address this problem. Yet, despite lots of writing, several new agencies or offices created, and multiple Executive Branch-backed initiates, they’ve still failed to break through long-held institutional biases.
Success or failure to use AI to its fullest in the IC will hinge on how analysts and officers go about training generative AI and LLM models to synthesize and analyze the vast amount of publicly available data that could enhance the classified sources they already employ. Critically, during this process, they will need to be careful not to transfer their inherent reservations about unclassified information to the models. Without such caution, the risk of human bias literally becoming machine bias is incredibly high and will limit the potential benefits of widening the scope of data sources.
One way such biases could be introduced into training AI models or LLMs is when the trainer grades how well the model answers the questions it is asked. If the answer cites unclassified information, when the trainer believes there is a better classified source it could have used, they may mark it down. If this pattern is repeated time and time again during training, then the model will have effectively been taught that it should disregard unclassified data. Therefore, when training generative AI models and LLMs, intelligence agencies would need to be expansive with both the set of data they train the models on and the set of graders they use to assess the quality of the content that’s being sourced.
The other principal concern for the introduction of bias is the propensity for the Intelligence Community to do things differently on high-side (or classified) computer networks as opposed to low-side (or unclassified) networks. The community is no doubt already at work experimenting with LLMs and Generative AI on both networks — however, because of security concerns, these are likely segregated efforts. The true transformational opportunity here is to let a model work across both networks, even if its results must only be displayed on the classified platform. If the models and resulting outputs are kept separated, the institutional bias will just be further perpetuated.
This is a pivotal moment. There’s now an opportunity to tackle a pre-existing and counterproductive prejudice within the Intelligence Community that everyone there recognizes. Yet, if they are not careful, intelligence analysts tasked with training models could end up setting the bias problem in “technological stone” and make it even more intractable.
In other words, there is a risk that analysts may spend the next few decades teaching models to make the same mistakes that they made in the past in excluding unclassified data from their assessments. However, with training where the only bias is towards the best quality data, generative AI models and LLMs could transform intelligence-gathering for the US and its allies.
Joshua Haecker is Head of Product at FiscalNote Global Intelligence. He is a former Intelligence Specialist in the US Army.
18. NATO Should Think Big About the Indo-Pacific
Conclusion:
When they meet in Washington, NATO leaders should remember that America’s focus on Asia and the strengthening Sino-Russian partnership underscore the growing interdependence between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. The Ukraine war is a formidable example in this regard. This does not mean European and Indo-Pacific countries should extend mutual defense commitments to each other. But it means the time has come for them to think big about their partnership and move beyond the declaratory and transnational level onto a more concrete one stressing inter-state deterrence. To do that, they should begin to lay the foundations of a cross-theater deterrence ecosystem of concepts, doctrines, capabilities, technologies, industries, and standards geared for protracted warfare against revisionist great powers.
NATO Should Think Big About the Indo-Pacific - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Luis Simón · July 1, 2024
When NATO leaders gather in Washington on 10-11 July, the war in Ukraine will likely dominate conversations. But the war can no longer be seen exclusively as a Euro-Atlantic affair – if it ever really was. North and South Korea have, directly and indirectly, given Russia and Ukraine more munitions than any other country except the United States. China has helped Russia cushion Western economic and political pressure from day one, and continues to enable Moscow’s defense-industrial and battlefield effort through the transfer of dual-use goods. So does Iran, particularly through drone exports. Conversely, countries like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea continue to stand behind Ukraine.
What happens in Ukraine also has broader geo-strategic ramifications. The Sino-Russian relationship may continue to be characterized by a good dose of friction and mistrust. But a key takeaway from the war is that what unites these two powers is greater than what divides them. Their shared interest in rolling back U.S. power appears to be animating a broader Sino-Russian geopolitical alignment, especially around the critical regions of Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. For China, the war in Ukraine offers an opportunity. A United States that diverts scarcer national security resources to a never-ending protracted battle in Europe cannot fully focus on the Indo-Pacific. Relatedly, Russia’s down payment to North Korea and Iran comes by way of support of their missile and nuclear programs, which may fuel regional instability in the Middle East and the Korean peninsula and help further disperse U.S. attention far and wide. All in all, through a set of interlocking strategic partnerships with Russia, North Korea, and Iran, China may well seek to “gain advantages and avoid disadvantages in chaos.”
References to a Beijing-Moscow-Tehran-Pyongyang axis might indeed be premature. Russia will surely try to mitigate its dependence on China, not least by strengthening its own ties with North Korea or trying to preserve a functional relationship with India. North Korea and Iran will also strive to maneuver between China and Russia to maximize their own leverage. But for all those frictions, the war in Ukraine appears to be catalyzing the consolidation of two sets of adversarial alignments, however imperfect or relatively incohesive these might remain. The first is structured around China and Russia but also includes North Korea and Iran. The second comprises the United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies, and while it might be less advanced, it actually boasts far greater potential.
The United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies must match up. And the forthcoming meeting in Washington between NATO and its Indo-Pacific four (IP4) partners, Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand, offers an excellent opportunity to do just that. The fact that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances are structured around a clear anchor – U.S. military power – makes them more cohesive and gives them a strategic edge as compared to the sort of interlocking partnerships that bind China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. To capitalize on such advantage, however, NATO and its IP4 partners must think big, move past declaratory statements about tackling transnational challenges, and articulate their partnership around the need to deter great power revisionism. Even if they are to remain operationally focused on their respective regions, NATO and its IP4 partners should think about how to develop a cross-theater deterrence ecosystem of shared concepts, doctrines, capabilities, technologies, and standards that gives them the scale required to outmatch their competitors, especially in a context of attrition and protraction.
The Long and Winding Road to the NATO-IP4 Partnership
The United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies seem to be well aware of the need to situate the war in Ukraine in the context of broader geo-strategic dynamics. A look at NATO’s post-February 2022 narrative reveals that the alliance is as clear-headed about the fact that its center of gravity lies in Europe as it is about the fact that the Indo-Pacific has become the epicenter of global power competition politically, militarily, economically, and technologically. Indeed, at their meetings in Madrid (2022) and Vilnius, allied leaders recognized that the fate of the Euro-Atlantic is increasingly tied to broader geostrategic dynamics. This is significant. Since NATO’s birth in 1949 – and long before that, arguably – the Euro-Atlantic has been the epicenter of global power dynamics. That is no longer the case. And this new normal compels the alliance – especially Europeans – to reflect more systematically about the links between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
To be sure, NATO’s efforts to develop a more global or Indo-Pacific sensitivity are riddled with strategic and political obstacles. For one thing, most European allies believe that the Euro-Atlantic should be NATO’s main – and even only – business, and that preserving security therein is challenging enough as it is. For another, most of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners do not want the alliance in or near their region. They would rather have NATO – and Europeans in particular – focus on securing Europe so that the United States has as much spare bandwidth as possible to focus on Asia. Just as importantly, not even the United States itself appears to be particularly interested in a NATO role in the Indo-Pacific. European diplomatic solidarity regarding territorial disputes in Asia is no doubt welcome, and so is greater transatlantic technological coordination vis-à-vis China. But from a strictly military viewpoint, Europeans should focus on bolstering their conventional defenses.
The current push for cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners is therefore about generating greater diplomatic solidarity with each other’s problems and fostering global and cross-theater situational awareness. It is about NATO with rather than in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, the NATO in the Indo-Pacific scare narrative appears to come primarily from China, who is appropriating and amplifying Russian references to NATO’s expansionist gene being a source of instability in Europe, and projecting that logic to the Indo-Pacific and global levels. Europeans, Americans, and Indo-Pacific countries themselves seem to have no appetite for NATO in the Indo-Pacific.
And yet, a sort of guilt complex around the “no NATO in the Indo-Pacific” narrative might be slowing down the alliance’s agenda of cooperation with the Indo-Pacific. This agenda still bears a strong transnational, 1990s flavor. It is by and large framed around the need to address global challenges like terrorism, proliferation, or the climate-security nexus, and centers on the need to strengthen cooperation in areas like cyber or disinformation. This is understandable, as it provides a sound diplomatic umbrella under which deeper cooperation can occur. But it is also insufficient. After all, transnational challenges have become a second-order priority for both NATO and its Indo-Pacific countries. In fact, they all – especially NATO, Japan, Australia, and, increasingly, the Republic of Korea – have almost identical strategic and political priorities: the strengthening of deterrence against revisionist great powers in their immediate vicinity. Their focus may be on different regions or threats. And they may not be interested in directly engaging in each other’s region. But the fact that they require similar operational concepts, capabilities, and technologies provides a formidable foundation for serious cooperation.
Think Big: Towards a Cross-Theater Deterrence Ecosystem for Europe and the Indo-Pacific
As NATO leaders look toward their forthcoming summit in Washington, and beyond, they should think harder about how to link their Indo-Pacific partnership agenda with the Alliance’s core business: strengthening deterrence in the face of great power revisionism.
NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners have to focus on different competitors and areas of responsibility, and that encourages them to develop bottom-up operational concepts and strategies tailored around their specific needs. The Indo-Pacific is a predominantly maritime environment requiring Air-Sea operational solutions, and Europe is a predominantly continental environment, which requires prioritizing Air-Land-centric concepts. That said, the operational challenges and objectives NATO and Indo-Pacific countries confront are remarkably similar.
Both sets of alliances face the challenge of standing up to revisionist great powers that, by expanding their nuclear arsenal and fielding Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities to obtain local escalation dominance, seek to undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, all the while they engage in corrosive below-the-threshold probing. The fact that China and Russia are engaging in military-technological cooperation and mirroring each other’s strategies further underscores the similar nature of the threat faced by European and Indo-Pacific allies. Critically, both sets of alliances seek to offset their respective threat predicaments through operational concepts and strategies that contribute to deterrence by denial and pave the way to preserve access, movement, and punishment options for their ultimate security guarantor, i.e. the United States. This opens up significant opportunities for cross-regional collaboration conceptually and doctrinally, and thus when it comes to training, exercises, and military education. Overall, a similar threat predicament incentivizes allies in both regions to develop a new operating system or “software”, and arguably incentivizes a collaborative quest for new ways of war drawing on shared concepts and strategies
The fact that European and Indo-Pacific allies are looking at similar strategic and operational solutions, or ways of war, also underscores the potential for synergies in terms of “hardware.” Indeed, both sets of alliances are eyeing similar capabilities and technologies, namely multi-layered air and missile defense, theater-range conventional strike (land-, sea- and air-launched), suppression of enemy air defenses, stealth air-combat, SSNs or electronic warfare. All these capabilities are critical to the implementation of deterrence by denial, and to enabling access and punishment options for the United States in maturing A2AD environments. Moreover, European and Indo-Pacific countries are often developing many of these capabilities and technologies in collaboration with the United States, and are plugged into America’s architecture of strategic enablers and technological innovation. The more compatible their ammunitions, platforms, doctrines, technical standards, and defense-industrial bases are, the easier it will be to generate the scale required to outmatch their competitors and prevail, especially in a context of attrition and protraction. Additionally, this compatibility will facilitate mutual assistance in the event of an attack, even if they choose not to operate within each other’s regions
The main competitive advantage that the U.S.-led alliance ecosystem bears in relation to the China-Russia partnership is that it is asymmetric. As research has shown asymmetric alliances tend to last longer and be more cohesive than symmetric ones, partly because the allies or partners aren’t constantly looking over each other’s shoulder. European and Indo-Pacific allies will of course constantly seek to reduce their dependence on the United States, either because they value their autonomy and status or to mitigate risks associated with abandonment and/or entanglement. However, they are all aware that there is no security outside the alliance with the United States. The same principle does not apply to the China-Russia partnership. In practical terms, this means that the United States and its allies can go further in terms of functional division of labor operationally, but also when it comes to capability development, defense-industrial, or technological collaboration. More broadly, it means America’s European and Indo-Pacific allies are all in the same boat. They may have different short-term priorities, but such differences are tactical in nature. Strategically, they each have a stake in a prudently disciplined and efficient management of U.S. power. As such, a U.S. focus on Asia and outcompeting China is in their collective interest, because that is where the main threat to America’s power base comes from.
When they meet in Washington, NATO leaders should remember that America’s focus on Asia and the strengthening Sino-Russian partnership underscore the growing interdependence between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. The Ukraine war is a formidable example in this regard. This does not mean European and Indo-Pacific countries should extend mutual defense commitments to each other. But it means the time has come for them to think big about their partnership and move beyond the declaratory and transnational level onto a more concrete one stressing inter-state deterrence. To do that, they should begin to lay the foundations of a cross-theater deterrence ecosystem of concepts, doctrines, capabilities, technologies, industries, and standards geared for protracted warfare against revisionist great powers.
Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Centre for Security Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. He is also a senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Luis Simón · July 1, 2024
19. Trump the Realist: The Former President Understands the Limits of American Power
Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam" should take the lead in containing China.
South Korea should take the lead in containing north Korea.
Excerpts:
But Washington can constrain China without launching a full-blown trade war, and so it should avoid issuing new tariffs, except in direct response to Chinese trade restrictions against American goods. U.S. officials should also avoid belligerent military initiatives that would risk an actual war between the two states. And in the event the countries do find themselves at risk of a hot conflict, the United States should push a coalition of Indo-Pacific countries, including Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam—whose aggregate power roughly matches that of China—to take the lead in containing Beijing.
With other U.S. adversaries, Washington should be even less involved. Russia may be militarily dangerous, but the country is not an existential threat to the United States—a fact that its middling performance in Ukraine has made clear. It therefore makes no sense for Washington to continue writing blank checks to Kyiv, especially when Ukraine’s European neighbors are so rich. The United States should apply significant pressure to these countries to start paying for Ukraine’s defense, especially given that they are the states actually threatened by Moscow. Washington should, similarly, pressure South Korea to assume leadership in containing its poor, northern neighbor. The United States should even push its Arab partners and Israel to work together to hold Iran in check, so that Washington can withdraw most of its own forces from the Middle East.
The reality is that, after almost 80 years of U.S. leadership, the world has entered a transition phase from hegemonic order to a restored balance of power. Like all prior balance-of-power systems, this one will feature global dissent, disharmony, and great-power competition. Today, such dissent most obviously comes from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Yet disruption of global stability during this transition phase comes not only from rising challengers but also from the hegemon itself. To forestall decline, the dominant power undermines its own system, which it begins to see as a drain. It grows increasingly unwilling to accept subsidizing the security of allies and the well-being of the world in general. It increasingly views trade policy not in terms of price optimization, efficiency, and corporate profits but in terms of whether it makes the country weaker or stronger, whether it helps the working class find and maintain good-paying jobs, whether it builds or destroys communities, and whether it causes trade surpluses or deficits. A hegemon in decline no longer believes that trade is free.
The United States has become exactly this type of weary titan, less able to honor external commitments and less interested in doing so, too. This explains the rise of Trump and his appeal to his followers, who disdain what they see as a corrupt governing class that puts the world’s well-being above their own country’s interests. It explains why his rise coincides with the rise of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Both men, though they have entirely different personalities, pledged to make their countries great again by upending the liberal world order. This should alert analysts to the fact that neither is responsible for the system’s demise. Instead, there are greater structural factors at work. Trump may still shock many in Washington, and he no doubt has a divisive personality. But his foreign policies are the predictable product of deeply impersonal forces.
Trump the Realist
The Former President Understands the Limits of American Power
July 1, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Andrew Byers and Randall L. Schweller · July 1, 2024
The structure of unipolarity that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union bestowed the United States with enormous, unchecked power. The United States became the first country in history with no peer or near-peer competitors. It became the only one with influence in every region of the world and the only one to unquestionably dominate its own neighborhood. By 1992, the United States may have been the most powerful country in every major global theater.
For American officials, the natural temptation was to use this moment to expand the United States’ global influence. Drunk with power, Washington doggedly enlarged NATO into eastern Europe, paying little heed to Russian concerns about Western encroachment. It broadened its embrace of economic openness, supporting the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995, despite the potential threat its compulsory dispute settlement posed to national sovereignty. It also backed China’s membership in the organization in 2001. In the eyes of U.S. policymakers, this expansionist campaign was not just good for their country but also good for the world. Washington, like all hegemons, convinced itself that the world order it was creating was universally preferred to all others. It began to pursue what the international relations scholar Arnold Wolfers called “milieu goals,” or goals designed to make the world better conform to one country’s values.
In the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, it was possible to defend this line of thought. When power is highly concentrated in the hands of one hegemonic state, the dominant entity’s fortunes and misfortunes are, in fact, often shared by everyone else. The hegemon’s well-being necessarily carries some measure of well-being for other members of the international system, since its collapse would entail the collapse of the system as a whole. That is why, in its 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush administration could honestly argue that the world’s major powers were converging on “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” These states were, the document continued, “on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.”
But as the hegemon’s dominance begins to fade, so, too, does this natural harmony of interests. Rising powers become increasingly unhappy with their global standing, with the international order’s rules and norms, and with the interests and values the order promotes. Community interests cease to overshadow individual ones. And as revisionist states grow in power, they develop the capacity to realize their aims. In the 2002 report, for example, the Bush administration depicted China as a team player, one that was “discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth.” But by 2017, the U.S. National Security Strategy declared that China’s “integration into the post-war international order” was a failure, labeling China a “revisionist” power that wants to “shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.”
Rising challengers are not the only revisionists: as the hegemon declines, it also becomes frustrated with the existing order. Many of the deals it made at the peak of its power no longer make sense. For example, U.S. policymakers from across the ideological and partisan spectrum have become frustrated with the transatlantic partnership. In the original bargain struck after World War II, Washington provided security to its European allies and vital economic assistance to their struggling postwar economies. In exchange, they mostly supported Washington during the Cold War with Moscow and enabled the United States to project power over the European continent. But once the Soviet Union dissolved and Europe became rich, it no longer made any sense for the United States to shoulder more than 70 percent of NATO’s defense expenditure. The alliance ceased to have a clear raison d’être.
It is, therefore, not surprising that many Americans are turning away from presidential candidates who embrace a muscular, expansive foreign policy. They see the compelling structural reasons to demand a shift. And so many of them have embraced a candidate who has called for global restraint, retrenchment, and narrow self-interest: Donald Trump.
During his first term as president, Trump proved that he was truly unique among modern U.S. leaders. Unlike any president before him in the post–1945 era, he was skeptical of treaties and alliances, preferring competition to cooperation. He defined the national interest to exclude things such as the spread of liberal values and military or humanitarian interventions. He did not view the United States as a divine intervenor for the mistreated abroad. Instead, he shifted Washington’s focus to great-power competition and to regaining the United States’ global power advantages. He was, in other words, a true realist: someone who avoids idealistic and ideological views of global affairs in favor of power politics.
In Trump’s first term, these realist impulses were muted and sometimes stopped by hawkish national security staffers who did not share his vision. But having learned that personnel is policy, Trump will not make this mistake again. His next administration will, instead, result in perhaps the most restrained U.S. foreign policy in modern history.
REALITY CHECK
The Republican Party is having an intense debate about international relations. The party’s traditional establishment is made up of neoconservatives and primacists who want the United States to exercise its power around the world and use its military capabilities to achieve many ends. For example, they support massive, continued U.S. aid to Ukraine as a means of sticking it to Russia, and have wholeheartedly embraced the Biden administration’s framing of military support for Ukraine as a contest between democracy and autocracy. Trump and his allies, on the other hand, do not support more aid to Ukraine. They do not see geopolitics as a grand ideological contest. And unlike neoconservatives, they have a pronounced preference for U.S. allies paying for their own security. In February, for example, Trump declared that he would let Russia have its way with any European country that does not spend at least two percent of its GDP on its own defense. “If we don’t pay and we’re attacked by Russia, will you protect us?” Trump recounted a NATO country’s leader asking him. “No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay. You gotta pay your bills.”
The traditional Republican establishment still retains substantial power. The party’s Senate leadership, for instance, is dominated by neoconservatives. Slowly but surely, however, the Trumpist camp is winning. It is doing so, most obviously, in primaries, where Trump and Trump-endorsed candidates continue to prevail. But polling suggests that Trumpist realism is also winning the hearts and minds of conservative voters. In a recent poll by the Chicago Council on World Affairs, 53 percent of Republicans answered “stay out” to the question “Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?” A similar number—55 percent—said the costs outweigh the benefits of maintaining the United States’ role in the world.
To most foreign policy elites, who view U.S. power as a normative good, this trend appears dreadful. But the former president’s “America first” agenda is an intellectually defensible, fundamentally realist program that seeks to ascertain and act on the United States’ national interests rather than the interests of others. It is born of an inescapable premise: the United States no longer has the power it once did and is spreading itself too thin. It needs to sort its essential national interests from desirable ones. It must devolve more responsibility to its wealthy allies. It must stop trying to be everywhere and do everything.
In his first term, Trump’s realist instincts were frequently thwarted by his senior national security advisers. But the former president’s inclination for restraint nonetheless shaped his policies. Trump avoided new military entanglements, began extricating the United States from its 20-year occupation of Afghanistan, and engaged adversarial states such as China, North Korea, and Russia in ways that lessened the possibility of conflict. He shifted the burden of paying for mutual defense to allies and away from American taxpayers. He talked tough as a means of pressuring other leaders and appeasing his domestic base. But he never acted like a neoconservative primacist. Even when it came to Iran, the country toward which he was most belligerent, Trump always pulled back from the brink of using significant military force.
BREAKING FREE
In his second term, Trump’s realist instincts would find fuller expression. Trump will not completely turn Washington’s back to the world (contrary to the claims of his opponents). But he will likely withdraw from at least some current U.S. commitments in the greater Middle East. He will surely demand that wealthy allies in Asia and Europe pay for more of their security. And he will likely focus most of his attention on Beijing, concentrating on ways to outcompete China while avoiding military conflict and a new cold war.
Trump and his allies have also talked about the need to become less dependent on foreign sources of energy; they predict greater self-sufficiency would lead to U.S. job growth and decreased energy costs for American consumers. As president, Trump would likely follow through on this rhetoric by eliminating many current regulations in the energy sector, thereby making it easier for domestic oil and gas producers to drill. Critically, such a policy would make the Persian Gulf much less important to Washington. Over the last 50 years, every U.S. presidential administration has been forced by circumstances to spend a disproportionate amount of time, attention, and resources on the Middle East—in no small part to ensure the flow of oil. A United States that no longer needs to do so would be freed from having to care very much about Iranian-Saudi squabbles and would no longer need to maintain a significant number of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf region. As the Biden administration’s experiences have shown, U.S. troops spread out across dozens of bases in Iraq and Syria are at risk of being attacked by Iran and its proxies.
The former president, of course, would maintain his belligerent rhetoric toward Washington’s adversaries, criticizing their depredations and acts of aggression. Such talk can be useful in reminding the rest of the world that the United States does not share many values with countries such as China, Iran, Russia, or even some U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia—and that even a more transactional, realist United States would not stoop to the level of those countries. But Trump should not talk the United States into a new cold war with China or a hot war with regional competitors such as Iran. The Trump administration must hold other states accountable and extract the very best deals it can for the United States. But military conflict or prolonged periods of hostility are in no one’s best interest.
Trump, thankfully, has an impressive track record at avoiding the use of U.S. military force. This is not because he is more of a humanitarian than his predecessors but because he views world politics more in geoeconomic terms than geostrategic ones, and so he tries to conduct conflict via economic rather than military means. “I want to invade, if I have to, economically,” Trump said in 2019, when talking about Iran and its nuclear program. “We have tremendous power economically. If I can solve things economically, that’s the way I want it.”
This sentiment is deeply held by the former president. As far back as 2015, when all of Washington was under the influence of unfettered free-trade shibboleths, Trump warned about the dangers of economic dependencies, built up over decades of liberalization, that could be exploited for geopolitical leverage. (The United States relies, for example, on foreign countries for energy, medical equipment, semiconductors, and critical minerals.) He also emphasized the enormous power wielded by the United States in the forms of tariffs, sanctions, access to the dollar, and control over global economic networks. Once in office, he wielded American economic power, typically seen as a way to entice others to join the multilateral free-trading system, as a stick to punish those who suckered Washington during the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. “We are righting the wrongs of the past and delivering a future of economic justice and security for American workers, farmers, and families,” Trump declared at the signing of the interim trade deal with China. “It should have happened 25 years ago.”
THE WEARY TITAN
As a conservative realist, Trump should be clearheaded about what really matters to Washington and avoid steps that might provoke military confrontation. Whenever possible, he should delegate responsibility for global problems to U.S. allies, leaving the United States to focus only on what is truly necessary for the American national interest.
Trump can start by focusing on China. Securing a relationship with Beijing that ensures American prosperity and does not increase the likelihood of war may be the supreme challenge facing the United States. Beijing and Washington are contesting global economic and political leadership, and there are multiple flash points between them. But none of these should lead to conflict. The primary point of military contention—the fate of Taiwan—does not require U.S. military intervention. The United States ought to arm the island so it can deter and hopefully defeat a Chinese invasion. But Taiwan is not a U.S. ally, and so Washington should not risk war with China to outright defend it.
In other areas, Trump can constrain China by relying, as he usually does, on trade restrictions. The Trump administration’s innovative use of export controls on cutting-edge technology has become the new tool of choice for twenty-first-century power politics. Unlike traditional balancing, which amasses power through arms and allies to offset a target’s military power, Trump’s strategy seeks to prevent, not counter, the further rise of a peer competitor. In the coming years, both the United States and Europe will want to ensure their firms avoid sharing certain technologies with Beijing and rely on non-Chinese suppliers for critical sectors, such as telecommunications and infrastructure.
Trump has an impressive track record at avoiding the use of U.S. military force.
But Washington can constrain China without launching a full-blown trade war, and so it should avoid issuing new tariffs, except in direct response to Chinese trade restrictions against American goods. U.S. officials should also avoid belligerent military initiatives that would risk an actual war between the two states. And in the event the countries do find themselves at risk of a hot conflict, the United States should push a coalition of Indo-Pacific countries, including Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam—whose aggregate power roughly matches that of China—to take the lead in containing Beijing.
With other U.S. adversaries, Washington should be even less involved. Russia may be militarily dangerous, but the country is not an existential threat to the United States—a fact that its middling performance in Ukraine has made clear. It therefore makes no sense for Washington to continue writing blank checks to Kyiv, especially when Ukraine’s European neighbors are so rich. The United States should apply significant pressure to these countries to start paying for Ukraine’s defense, especially given that they are the states actually threatened by Moscow. Washington should, similarly, pressure South Korea to assume leadership in containing its poor, northern neighbor. The United States should even push its Arab partners and Israel to work together to hold Iran in check, so that Washington can withdraw most of its own forces from the Middle East.
The reality is that, after almost 80 years of U.S. leadership, the world has entered a transition phase from hegemonic order to a restored balance of power. Like all prior balance-of-power systems, this one will feature global dissent, disharmony, and great-power competition. Today, such dissent most obviously comes from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Yet disruption of global stability during this transition phase comes not only from rising challengers but also from the hegemon itself. To forestall decline, the dominant power undermines its own system, which it begins to see as a drain. It grows increasingly unwilling to accept subsidizing the security of allies and the well-being of the world in general. It increasingly views trade policy not in terms of price optimization, efficiency, and corporate profits but in terms of whether it makes the country weaker or stronger, whether it helps the working class find and maintain good-paying jobs, whether it builds or destroys communities, and whether it causes trade surpluses or deficits. A hegemon in decline no longer believes that trade is free.
The United States has become exactly this type of weary titan, less able to honor external commitments and less interested in doing so, too. This explains the rise of Trump and his appeal to his followers, who disdain what they see as a corrupt governing class that puts the world’s well-being above their own country’s interests. It explains why his rise coincides with the rise of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Both men, though they have entirely different personalities, pledged to make their countries great again by upending the liberal world order. This should alert analysts to the fact that neither is responsible for the system’s demise. Instead, there are greater structural factors at work. Trump may still shock many in Washington, and he no doubt has a divisive personality. But his foreign policies are the predictable product of deeply impersonal forces.
- ANDREW BYERS is a Nonresident Fellow at Texas A&M University’s Albritton Center for Grand Strategy.
- RANDALL L. SCHWELLER is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program for the Study of Realist Foreign Policy at Ohio State University.
Foreign Affairs · by Andrew Byers and Randall L. Schweller · July 1, 2024
20. 'In the spirit of humanitarianism': China, the Philippines jointly rescue stranded Filipino fishermen in South China Sea
'In the spirit of humanitarianism': China, the Philippines jointly rescue stranded Filipino fishermen in South China Sea
The Philippine Coast Guard said one of its ships encountered “shadowing and initial blocking” by Chinese vessels while en route to rescue the crew of a stricken Filipino fishing boat. The Chinese ships ceased these actions and offered to help after being informed about the “humanitarian mission”, it added.
01 Jul 2024 05:32PM
(Updated: 01 Jul 2024 06:29PM)
channelnewsasia.com
SINGAPORE: China assisted the Philippines in the crew rescue of a stricken Philippine fishing boat near a disputed shoal in the South China Sea on Saturday (Jun 29), although it faced accusations of initially blocking the efforts.
The weekend incident marks a rare instance of cooperation between the two countries in the South China Sea, where a violent confrontation erupted recently amid heightened tensions.
The vessel had experienced an engine explosion in the waters off Scarborough Shoal, injuring two of the eight fishermen on board, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) stated in a Facebook post on Sunday (Jun 30). It referred to the shoal as Bajo de Masinloc, as it is known in the Philippines.
According to the PCG, a Philippine vessel patrolling the area, the BRP Sindangan, was immediately instructed to provide medical assistance.
"During the operation, our vessel received radio challenges, as well as encountered shadowing and initial blocking by China Coast Guard (CCG) and People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy ships,” said PCG spokesperson CG Rear Admiral Armando Balilo.
The Chinese vessels stopped shadowing the BRP Sindangan when they were informed about the humanitarian mission, the spokesperson said. He added that the CCG also launched two inflatable boats and offered to help the eight fishermen on the stricken fishing boat.
PCG nurses assessed that two crew members had suffered second-degree burns and provided them with first aid. All eight were also given food and drinking water, added the PCG in its Facebook post.
“In times of emergencies, the safety of life should always be our priority. The Philippine Coast Guard and the China Coast Guard communicated in a diplomatic manner and set aside issues on sovereignty, in the spirit of humanitarianism,” said the spokesman.
“We will not elevate tension, but we will remain firm on our mission to ensure the safety of lives at sea,” he added.
The fishing boat had experienced an engine explosion in the waters off Scarborough Shoal, injuring two of the eight fishermen on board. (Photo: Facebook/Philippine Coast Guard)
The incident was also covered by Chinese media, although their reports did not mention any blocking or shadowing by Chinese coast guard or military vessels.
The state-run Global Times reported that a CCG vessel on patrol “launched a rescue operation and helped rescue a Philippine fishing boat in distress”. It added that this took place in the waters “near China’s Huangyan Dao”, referring to how China describes Scarborough Shoal.
The Chinese vessel released small boats during the operation, according to the Global Times. Life jackets and lifebuoys were also provided to the “distressed Filipino fishermen”, reported Chinese news outlet China Daily.
The China Coast Guard communicated with its Philippine counterparts during the rescue operation and the Philippine side “expressed gratitude for the humanitarian rescue” by the Chinese authorities, reported the Chinese news outlets.
COOPERATION AMID CONFRONTATIONS
The incident on Saturday was a rare occasion of cooperation between the Philippines and China as tensions mount in the South China Sea, with a major incident erupting just two weeks ago.
Video footage released by the Philippine military showed Chinese coast guard sailors brandishing knives, an axe, and other weapons on Jun 17 in a clash with Philippine naval vessels near the disputed Second Thomas Shoal.
A Filipino sailor lost a thumb in the clash, which broke out when Philippine forces were attempting to resupply marines stationed on a derelict warship that was deliberately grounded atop the shoal in 1999 to assert Manila’s territorial claims, AFP reported.
Philippine military chief General Romeo Brawner said the "outnumbered" Filipino crew had been unarmed and had fought with their "bare hands".
China has blamed Manila for the confrontation. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said the Philippines had "escalated tensions" and accused them of ramming Chinese boats.
Beijing has insisted that its coast guard behaved in a "professional and restrained" way during the confrontation and claimed "no direct measures" were taken against Filipino personnel.
Source: CNA/Agencies/lk(ws)
21. Immigration Is Behind the Strong U.S. Economy
And we 'd be really strong with legal well controlled immigration (meaning effective processes).
Immigration Is Behind the Strong U.S. Economy
We’d be a poorer, weaker country without it. Too bad Biden couldn’t make that point at the debate.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/immigration-is-behind-the-strong-u-s-economy-growth-election-2024-debate-042a8bd8?mod=latest_headlines
By Jason Furman
June 30, 2024 3:04 pm ET
President Joe Biden talks with the U.S. Border Patrol and local officials, at the southern border, Feb. 29. PHOTO: EVAN VUCCI/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The most economically important part of the presidential debate was a leitmotif—and at times, a heavy motif—throughout the evening: immigration. While Donald Trump made many false remarks throughout the debate, he spoke a grain of truth when he said of his opponent that “the only jobs he created are for illegal immigrants and bounce-back jobs that bounced back from the Covid.” The employment level for native-born workers is indeed below its pre-pandemic level, while foreign-born workers have accounted for all employment gains. But contrary to Mr. Trump’s contention, that’s a strong argument for, rather than against, immigration.
The U.S. population is aging, and millions of baby boomers retire each year. We can expect that absent immigration, we would have a decreasing working-age population and shrinking employment for decades to come—especially considering the low fertility rate. This is already happening in Japan and will soon happen in many European countries.
Meantime, millions of jobs have been added for foreign-born workers since 2019. The majority of these immigrants were in the U.S. prior to Covid, but another roughly 10 million have arrived since then, according to the Congressional Budget Office. These newly arrived immigrants are the main reason the U.S. economy has defied pessimistic forecasts, with 200,000 jobs added a month, real growth in gross domestic product at 3% in the past year, and an inflation rate that has fallen dramatically in the past few years. The biggest factor behind this strong economic performance is immigration.
But aren’t immigrants taking jobs from native-born workers? The answer is no, as a simple statistic—the employment rate for native-born workers 25 to 54—demonstrates. These workers are in what economists call their “prime age.” Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that in 2019, before the pandemic, the employment rate for prime-age workers was 82%. Today, that rate is even higher, at 83%. Focusing on this age group is an effective way to control for demographic shifts. Even if the employment rate goes up for every age group, it can still go down overall if the share of older workers, whose employment rates are lower, grows. And that’s what is happening with the native population.
Immigrants aren’t merely workers competing for a fixed number of jobs. They’re also consumers who generate demand and the need for more jobs. Historically, when the U.S. economy faces structural changes as a result of variations in the labor supply—whether through a surge in immigrants, women entering the workforce or other demographic changes—supply and demand increase roughly in tandem, raising or lowering the economy’s potential growth rate without triggering changes to the unemployment rate or inflation.
Moreover, immigrants help the economy in a few other ways. First, immigrants are more likely to be of working age than their U.S.-born counterparts, so they can help support American retirees through their labor and taxes. Second, immigrants bring innovation that helps the economy grow. Finally, research shows that native-born workers may even become more productive and innovative when they work with immigrants—something I experience every day at Harvard.
In the debate, Mr. Biden never defended immigration for enabling him to preside over strong economic and job growth. That’s unsurprising given the mixed feelings Americans have about immigration. But the reality is that we’d be a poorer and weaker country without it—doomed to having a shrinking number of workers paying higher taxes to support a growing number of retirees.
Mr. Furman, a professor of the practice of economic policy at Harvard, was chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, 2013-17.
22. War Books, Special Edition – Seventeen Great War Films: One Army Officer’s List
War Books, Special Edition – Seventeen Great War Films: One Army Officer’s List - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brendan Gallagher · June 28, 2024
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Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We ask an expert on a particular subject to recommend five books on that topic and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.
For this edition, we’re turning to the archives and one of the most widely read War Books entries of all time—a special edition from 2019 that reminds us that professional development isn’t solely about the books we read. Lieutenant Colonel Brendan Gallagher offers a list of films and describes how each enhances our understanding of war.
What are the hallmarks of a great war film? Realism? Unforgettable combat sequences? Memorable dialogue? Powerful performances? Timeless themes? Lasting impact?
Early in my military career I had a supervisor who often used quotes from war movies in everyday conversation and grew frustrated when doing so garnered blank looks. Hence he lent my peers and me stacks of movies (yep, on VHS tape) to help increase our movie IQ. This initial military education spanned genres and included films such as Hamburger Hill, The Green Berets, Force 10 from Navarone, Private Benjamin, Stripes, and others.
I soon learned that certain war films have become ingrained in military culture, and a well-timed movie quote or reference can sometimes communicate a great deal. Years later, I was fortunate to run a war movie series at graduate school, which helped spark discussion on various topics spanning the tactical and strategic levels of war—again, reinforcing the relevance of such films.
Acknowledging the many possible criteria of a “great” film, I’m going to go out on a limb and propose seventeen great war films. To be sure, these choices are highly subjective. They largely reflect my personal preferences, and many will undoubtedly disagree with my picks or will argue I overlooked other deserving films (spoiler alert: I did not include documentaries on this list). But in my opinion the following films successfully encompass diverse aspects of war, they all stand up to multiple viewings, and they all meet my personal threshold of being “great.”
Without further ado, here is my list:
Leadership and the Challenges of Command
Twelve O’Clock High (1949)
What is the “maximum effort” that any unit can put forth in combat? Twelve O’Clock High explores how a US bomber group tries to cope with an incredibly difficult mission during World War II. Gregory Peck gives a terrific central performance as the commander who employs unconventional techniques to try to achieve success—and who must ultimately try to hang on to his own mental health.
The Caine Mutiny (1954)
This one would be worth it simply for Humphrey Bogart’s unforgettable performance as Capt. Queeg. But the film is also much more than that. Based on the brilliant 1951 novel by the recently deceased Herman Wouk, this is a masterful study on military leadership. Multiple viewings might very well prompt you to draw different conclusions as to who was truly “right” or “wrong” among the crew of the USS Caine.
The Bridge on the River Kwai (1957)
Boosted by a standout performance by Alec Guinness, this film delves into the knotty choices confronted by British POWs held in a Japanese camp during World War II. What do concepts such as “discipline” and “honor” mean when you are being held prisoner and forced to help the enemy? Could the best of intentions lead you astray in such a situation?
Patton (1970)
George C. Scott is remarkable in the title role. His opening speech is, of course, brilliant and iconic, but I’d argue what really makes the film unforgettable is the ongoing back and forth between Patton and his opposite, Gen. Omar Bradley, played by Karl Malden. The tension between their opposing styles of leadership helps define the film.
Breaker Morant (1980)
This military courtroom drama set during the Boer War explores how standard rules of engagement might or might not apply in a messy guerrilla war. Expertly acted with sharp dialogue, the film has many key themes and complexities that still resonate decades later in our thorny post-9/11 conflicts.
Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World (2003)
Based on the book series by Patrick O’Brian, Master and Commander makes you feel you are truly there, experiencing life in the early 1800s aboard the HMS Surprise as it plays cat and mouse with the French privateer Acheron. Russell Crowe turns in an outstanding performance as Capt. Jack Aubrey, and Paul Bettany is excellent as the doctor who doesn’t always see eye to eye with the captain. This is a truly phenomenal and enthralling film. Special mention goes to the excellent battle scenes, the top-notch musical score, and the entire Galapagos sequence.
War at the Tactical Level and Small-Unit Combat
Saving Private Ryan (1998)
Although we can quibble about its minor shortcomings, ultimately Saving Private Ryan is about as close to a “perfect” war film as you could imagine. From its breathtaking portrayal of the Omaha beach landing, to the timeless “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” decisions that combat leaders must inevitably make, this is an astonishing cinematic achievement. With the recent seventy-fifth anniversary of D-Day, Saving Private Ryan is a tribute to the brave warriors who helped liberate Europe and dismantle fascism, and a brilliant examination of the complex nature of war itself.
Black Hawk Down (2001)
A brutally realistic and visceral depiction of modern war, Black Hawk Down was released shortly after the 9/11 attacks—yet it depicted the character of post-9/11 combat better than practically every subsequent film. In the years since, countless other movies, TV series, and video games have tried (unsuccessfully) to recapture the essence of this modern classic. Also, like other ensemble war films, this one is replete with actors who would go on to become even bigger stars. Mandatory viewing for every Army Ranger.
We Were Soldiers (2002)
When the trailers for We Were Soldiers first came out, it seemed to resemble a somewhat by-the-numbers war film. Yet it tackles the 1965 Battle of Ia Drang so well, and with such intensity, it becomes easy to overlook the slight lack of originality. The film depicts one US battalion’s efforts to survive against a far larger North Vietnamese force. It also portrays the nascent air-mobile tactics employed and illustrated the heartbreaking toll of war on the home front before other films like American Sniper came around. A must-see for anyone who ever served in the 1st Cavalry Division.
War at the Strategic Level
Dr. Strangelove (1964)
A black comedy about nuclear apocalypse, Dr. Strangelove is the first of two films directed by Stanley Kubrick on this list, and it truly has it all. Brilliant survey on civil-military relations? Check. Stinging commentary on nuclear deterrence? Check. Riding the bomb to the point of impact while waving a cowboy hat? Check. And remember, you can’t fight in the war room.
Thirteen Days (2000)
OK so maybe Thirteen Days isn’t exactly a “war” film per se. It also takes some historical liberties by boosting the prominence of Kenneth O’Donnell (played by Kevin Costner) to help the narrative flow. But Thirteen Days gets many other details correct, and it provides a riveting portrayal of the Kennedy administration’s successful effort to confront the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis while averting a potential nuclear holocaust.
Path to War (2002)
A captivating HBO film that explores the Johnson administration’s descent into Vietnam. Michael Gambon’s portrayal of a tormented LBJ is spot-on, and Alec Baldwin turns in an against-type performance as Robert McNamara that is also quite memorable.
The Horror of War
Apocalypse Now (1979)
In the same decade that he directed The Godfather (parts I and II), Francis Ford Coppola also delivered this bold, trance-like take on the Vietnam War. No one who watches this film can forget Robert Duvall as Lt. Col. Kilgore (“I love the smell of napalm in the morning”), nor Brando’s portrayal of the unhinged Col. Kurtz. The atmosphere and imagery of Apocalypse Now are especially haunting, as Martin Sheen guides us on a dark journey through the horrors of war.
Full Metal Jacket (1987)
Throughout his career, director Stanley Kubrick took cinematic risks while tackling diverse and controversial subject matter. In this film he follows the protagonist “Joker” from his deeply unsettling training regimen at Parris Island to the depths of Vietnam. Without question, it is extremely dark and disturbing stuff. But once seen, it is difficult to ever forget, particularly Gunnery Sgt. Hartman’s troubling interactions with Pvt. Gomer Pyle (“a jelly doughnut?”).
Surviving War
Dead Presidents (1995)
What happens when surviving as a veteran back home is even tougher than surviving the war itself? This hard-hitting film by the Hughes brothers follows a young African American (played by Larenz Tate) who serves as a Marine in Vietnam and then returns home to the Bronx to find his life in pieces, with seemingly no good options but turning to armed robbery.
Rescue Dawn (2006)
Christian Bale plays Dieter Dengler in this emotional true story of a German-born US Navy pilot who is captured during the Vietnam War and subjected to torture and starvation after he refuses to sign a statement condemning America. It is moving and impactful tale of survival that stays with you long after watching it.
Dunkirk (2017)
Christopher Nolan is one of the most talented directors working today, and in Dunkirk he delivers gripping action across the air, land, and sea. In the film, characters struggle to stay alive against the Nazi war machine, which is on the verge of achieving a stunning military success by pushing Allied forces in France back into the sea. And in a Nolan-esque twist, the film’s multiple narrative arcs play out across differing time horizons, eventually intersecting near the film’s end.
Honorable Mention
A Bridge Too Far (1977)
Gallipoli (1981)
Das Boot (1981)
Platoon (1986)
Deliberately Left off This List
Pearl Harbor (2001)
The Hurt Locker (2008)
Brendan Gallagher is a US Army lieutenant colonel in the infantry with multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds a PhD from Princeton and is the author of the book The Day After: Why America Wins the War but Loses the Peace (Cornell University Press).
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Thomas Dwyer
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brendan Gallagher · June 28, 2024
23. Making Sense of the Populist Present—1
A long read, but this excerpt caught my eye. A fascinating perspective on our two political parties.
Excerpts:
I’ll just drop my last point like a hockey puck for you to whack at. The biggest asymmetry between left and right stems from the fact that the left, broadly understood, is uncomfortable being in power. Culturally and psychologically, it wants to be the rebellious and transgressive, insurgency moving the wheel of progress towards some utopian goal. This is why so many universities struggle with tension of their basic mission and their heartfelt desire to “speak truth to power” and other inanities. Historically, the right has wanted to be in power in order to defend the status quo, but it was kicked out by the Gramscian Long Marchers. For a couple generations, the intellectual right saw itself as something akin to a government-in-exile. “If we can just get back in charge of the universities, the government, etc,” the thinking was, “we can right the ship, and get back to the core missions of the institutions we were purged from.”
That thinking still exists on the right. But it has to contend with the fact that many conservatives spent so long in the wilderness they now conceive of themselves as radicals with no stake in the institutions of the mainstream culture. They have become like the leftwing radicals of the 1960s, at war with the American project itself. Only a handful would put it remotely like that. Many aren’t smart enough to even realize their own role in the drama. The Candace Owens, Alex Jones, Benny Johnson crowd measure their success in dollars and clicks and little else. But a few post-liberals and post-constitution types are admirably honest about this stuff. I don’t think the word “paleocon” fully captures their worldview or their origin stories. But since you introduced it, I think we can use it serviceably. In this sense, your thesis “Right-wing populists are paleocons, paleocons are the Old (pre-fusionist) Right, and Trump is a vehicle for paleocon/Old Right revenge” has merit.
EYES ON THE RIGHT
Making Sense of the Populist Present—1
A wide-ranging conversation with The Dispatch's Jonah Goldberg about where we are, how we got here, and where we might be going
https://damonlinker.substack.com/p/making-sense-of-the-populist-present1?utm
DAMON LINKER
JUL 01, 2024
∙ PAID
Republican presidential candidate, former U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally at the Liacouras Center on June 22, 2024 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)
As I say at the top of my first volley below, I’ve been reading, learning from, and productively disagreeing with Jonah Goldberg for more than two decades now. He’s one of the country’s leading center-right intellectuals, just as The Dispatch (the online publication he co-founded with Stephen F. Hayes and Toby Stock in 2019) is a must-read source for news and ideas from an anti-Trump conservative standpoint. I hope you’ll join me in subscribing to The Dispatch—and that you enjoy my conversation with Jonah, which I’ve broken into two parts to run this holiday week. Part 2 will be posted on Friday morning. In the meantime, best wishes for a happy and healthy Independence Day holiday. (Also: There is no audio version of this or Part 2. As I explained when I ran my conversation with Alexandre Lefebvre, the dialogue is simply too long, and I don’t think it would be a good idea for me to read both my own and my interlocutor’s words.)
Notes from the Middleground is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
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DL: Thanks so much for agreeing to do this, Jonah. I’ve enjoyed your writing for such a long time — all the way back to the years I worked at First Things (2001-2005), when you were writing every day for NRO. I’ve been especially impressed with your unwillingness to compromise with the Trumpification of the Republican Party, even when it adversely affected your career. On that note, The Dispatch is great, very much including your regular column, the old “G-File,” now reborn as a newsletter. I never miss it.
One thing I’m eager to discuss with you, in light of how the presidential race is unfolding, is the old question that animates so much of what I write at Notes from the Middleground — namely, Why is [hands gesticulating wildly] all of this happening? By which I mean: Why has the GOP become a party of the populist right led by Donald Trump, with the Reaganite/fusionist conservatism you prefer in eclipse (supported by something around 20 percent of the party, if we use Nikki Haley’s vote margin in the 2024 primaries as a rough measure)? Here are some options you’ll hear from pundits of various stripes:
- The Republican Party has been racist since the Southern Strategy, the country as a whole is still very racist, and Trump is the result.
- Reaganite conservatism was discredited by the Iraq War, and Trump is the result.
- Rush Limbaugh and Fox News (and now myriad imitators who are even more rabidly right-wing) have turned Republican voters into reactionary morons who live in an alternative reality of lies and care only about driving liberals crazy, and Trump is the result.
- Right-wing populists are paleocons, paleocons are the Old (pre-fusionist) Right, and Trump is a vehicle for paleocon/Old Right revenge.
- Americans love gangsters, con men, and crooks who thumb their noses at “the system,” and Trump (with the help of criminal prosecutors) has turned himself into a vehicle for this very American love of outlaws. (You might call this one the dark side of American libertarianism.)
- Democrats have moved further and further left on social and cultural issues—including immigration, crime, race, and sex/gender—and Trump is the result.
- What I just said about Democrats is true of center-left parties in many places, and this has super-charged the populist right in countries across the democratic world, making Trump just the local example of a much broader trend.
And I haven’t even mentioned social media!
So what do you think? Which of these are your favorite explanations? Or would you like to offer others?
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JG: Damon, thanks very much for all the kind words and the opportunity. I do miss the old days. Even past disagreements seem quaint now, given how much has changed. I’ll skip the mutual admiration society bullet points and get straight at it.
The way you put the question to me makes me feel a bit like Rodney Dangerfield taking his economics oral exam in Back to School.
“I have only one question for Mr. Mellon, in 27 parts…”
But that’s okay, because I think my succinct answer to nearly all of this is, “Yeah.”
This isn’t a dodge, nor is it self-contradictory. I think the Trumpification of the GOP is what social scientists call an “overdetermined” phenomenon. When I make this point, I often illustrate it by first answering another question. I used to get asked all the time, “Why are Jews liberal?” There are at least dozen answers to that question – and they’re all true, to some extent. Jews are liberal because they are disproportionately urban and educated. They’re also liberal because as a matter of survival, Jews historically looked to central governments – the king, the czar, the sultan – to protect them from more local threats. The Jews who immigrated to the US in large numbers came from Europe at a time when the prevailing ideas about politics were decidedly to the left. In the 1930s, Jews were more welcome in FDR’s Democratic Party, and the partisan allegiance of your parents, like religion, is highly determinative. Harry Truman recognized Israel. The Holocaust and the Civil Rights movement both played independent and combined roles in Jewish culture and its relationship to politics and the state. Many Jews are very secular and feel put off by overt talk of a “Christian nation” and that sort of thing. Also, because of their secularism, some Jews came to see political or charitable engagement with society as a substitute expression of Jewishness.
I could go on. But the point of bringing this up is to say that some of these explanations are very powerful for some American Jews, now or in the past, and less so for others. But it’s nearly impossible to tease out any one of these threads and say, “See? This is why they’re liberal.”
In other words, I can agree with all of your proposed explanations to one extent or another for some conservatives or some Republicans. But I don’t think any one of them alone explains what’s happened, or why. I promise to drop the analogy to the Jews in a second. But it’s worth noting that at some point the diverse forms of causation become irrelevant to the emergent culture as a whole. Jews growing up in many Jewish communities today are liberal because that’s the way mainstream Jewish culture is. Big chunks of the American right today are MAGA because the culture has become MAGAfied. Some are faking it, most aren’t. The causation stuff is really interesting about specific personalities, but I think hard to tease out for large groups.
I’m happy to return to that, but let me do some quick clean-up work before readers think I am endorsing all of your suggested explanations, equally (and I realize they are only suggestions). I think your first bullet point is probably the weakest, with the least explanatory power: “The Republican Party has been racist since the Southern Strategy, the country as a whole is still very racist, and Trump is the result.”
Eh. I’m not saying there’s nothing to this, but I think there’s very little – on both ends of the claim. At the front end, I think the racism of the Southern Strategy is often very overstated. We don’t need to get into the weeds on that – unless you want to – but I don’t think Goldwater’s opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act (mistaken as it was) was particularly driven by racial animus, nor do I think Nixon’s politics are all that helpfully illuminated by the prism of racism. I’m not in the business of defending Nixon on much, but I’ve never found the “it was always about racism” schtick to be very persuasive when you look at the details. I certainly think the collaboration of the Republican Party and Black Democrats 40-50 years ago to create more gerrymandered black districts was cynical and problematic. But I don’t think it was motivated by racism more than more mercenary political impulses.
As for the other end of the claim—that America is very racist today and that’s why we have Trump—I’m even less persuaded. Oh, I think Trump is racist in a New York City, Archie Bunker, sort of way – at least when it comes to black people. That’s not a defense, I’m just saying the guy isn’t a Klansman type. He's an old dude who thinks in outdated stereotypes (recall his comment that didn't want blacks counting his money, but Jews). He’s much more open to the charge of bigotry when it comes to Muslims and immigrants. That’s not a defense either. I just point it out to note that trying to draw a straight line from George Wallace to Donald Trump, dragging a half century of GOP politics along for the ride, is kind of silly. It’s one of those self-serving stories liberals like to tell themselves in order to say “we’ve always been good and right and they’ve always been bad and wrong.”
Last point on this, contrary to the apocalyptic, Manichean, rhetoric about race from the left over the last decade, America is not a very racist country, and it has been getting, albeit with ups-and-downs, steadily less racist for our entire lives (this is not to say there isn’t any real and gross racism out there. To paraphrase Adam Smith, there's a great deal of ruin, and racism, in a nation). And to the extent one could point to recent anecdotes or trends to the contrary, I would argue that much of the gross racist nonsense on the right has two main drivers. The first is cultural and turbocharged by social media and Trump’s success: Idiots, grifters, and demagogues want attention and, in particular, want to be attacked by the left and the establishment for saying controversial or ugly things. The “influencer” right is full of this garbage. But I don’t think it reflects where the broader culture is that much.
The second, related, explanation is a thermostatic response to ill-advised, ugly, or radical projects and arguments on the left. That excuses none of it. But it’s worth saying nonetheless.
I guess that tips you off that I think there’s a lot of merit to the claim that, as you put it, “Democrats have moved further and further left on social and cultural issues—including immigration, crime, race, and sex/gender—and Trump is the result.” Again, I don’t think this explains everything, not even close. But the behavior of the left elicited a response from the right. I am happy to concede that the way Rush Limbaugh. Fox, et. al. covered the left and the Democrats made the right’s response worse than it should have been in some respects. But the left is hardly blameless in the craptacular state of American politics.
And that gets me to the explanation is most sorely missing from your menu. I am the first to admit the right has many problems (which is why I am so unpopular these days on the right). And I’m also quite game to point out the left has many problems. But what I think is missing from a lot of these kinds of debates is that we overlook the fact that both right and left suffer from many of the same problems.
They look different because they manifest themselves differently on the left and the right. The left controls most of the commanding heights of the culture – the Democratic Party, the mainstream media, Hollywood, publishing, academia, museums, libraries, the arts, big swaths of corporate America etc. The right has the GOP, Fox and….what? A few Christian denominations, NASCAR, a few Silicon Valley bros, and a timeshare with the country music industry. It controls very few institutions that have the cultural power and dominance claimed by “mainstream” institutions. So the way our common problems are expressed will necessarily vary in profound ways but they are nonetheless common problems. A few of them off the top of my head: identitarianism, illiberalism, popular-frontism, ingratitude, “performativeness,” populism, and romantic individualism.
I was told there would be no Hegel in this colloquy, but I should say that a lot of our problems are dialectical. The left abuses its political or cultural power and the right overreacts in response. The left sees these overreactions and feels ever more vindicated in its philosophical and ideological priors. The right sees the doubling-down and triples down on its priors. Normal people are sidelined in these debates, forced to choose between the lesser of two evils. Each time one team wins political power it overreaches, guided by the false assumption that its agenda has a sweeping mandate. Voters are turned off, and the other side comes to power, again assuming it has a mandate to overreach. And so the pendulum goes back and forth.
I’ll just drop my last point like a hockey puck for you to whack at. The biggest asymmetry between left and right stems from the fact that the left, broadly understood, is uncomfortable being in power. Culturally and psychologically, it wants to be the rebellious and transgressive, insurgency moving the wheel of progress towards some utopian goal. This is why so many universities struggle with tension of their basic mission and their heartfelt desire to “speak truth to power” and other inanities. Historically, the right has wanted to be in power in order to defend the status quo, but it was kicked out by the Gramscian Long Marchers. For a couple generations, the intellectual right saw itself as something akin to a government-in-exile. “If we can just get back in charge of the universities, the government, etc,” the thinking was, “we can right the ship, and get back to the core missions of the institutions we were purged from.”
That thinking still exists on the right. But it has to contend with the fact that many conservatives spent so long in the wilderness they now conceive of themselves as radicals with no stake in the institutions of the mainstream culture. They have become like the leftwing radicals of the 1960s, at war with the American project itself. Only a handful would put it remotely like that. Many aren’t smart enough to even realize their own role in the drama. The Candace Owens, Alex Jones, Benny Johnson crowd measure their success in dollars and clicks and little else. But a few post-liberals and post-constitution types are admirably honest about this stuff. I don’t think the word “paleocon” fully captures their worldview or their origin stories. But since you introduced it, I think we can use it serviceably. In this sense, your thesis “Right-wing populists are paleocons, paleocons are the Old (pre-fusionist) Right, and Trump is a vehicle for paleocon/Old Right revenge” has merit.
Trump is a hammer, good for driving some points – immigration being the most obvious – like a nail. But hammers are also good for smashing, and smashing is the modus vivendi of radicalism. The smartest so-called “paleocons” are fairly honest about this. Trump is a tool for smashing the established order to rubble, and it is upon the rubble they want to build their new Kingdom. Trump himself is happily oblivious to this. He’s not primarily motivated by racism, xenophobia, patriotism, nostalgia or any higher concepts—even if they describe aspects of his political character. He has a thumbless grasp on any such concepts. He’s motivated by narcissism, and our culture and media landscape have become deeply conducive to narcissism, thanks to technological, economic, and cultural forces, but also thanks to the mistakes of both sides.
DL: What a fabulous response, Jonah—including a GenX pop-culture reference right at the top! Couldn’t be better!
Let me begin by noting points of agreement (there are a lot): Of course you’re right about the Trump Question being overdetermined. I share your openness to crediting multiple paths of causality, and also agree with what sounds like your ranking of the various options in terms of relative extent of influence. I’m not one to push the “Republicans have always been racists” line. I merely included it because I hear it a lot. That includes an overemphasis on the decisive importance of the Southern Strategy. Though I would want to push back a bit on some of your inclination to dismiss this line of explanation: I do think George Wallace is very much a Trump precursor, if we focus on his 1968 presidential campaign, in which the revanchist pro-segregation line broadened out into a much more sweeping attack on the Washington establishment, cultural grievances, dirty hippies, how the Vietnam War was being waged, etc. Trump rallies definitely echo Wallace rallies in their vulgarity, atmosphere of menace, humor, and threatened violence. And Wallace ended up doing surprisingly well outside of the South, including in the upper Midwest (2016’s Trump country, which now seems to have migrated to the southwest and southeast).
Here’s how I’d put what happened in those years: The Nixon people (especially Kevin Phillips) were right that there was a path to a strong electoral majority through the GOP appealing to Democrats who disliked what was happening to the party (and the country) in the 1960s. Race was the biggest factor, but urban riots, crime, and the antiwar movement were adjacent but distinct and very important trends. I don’t begrudge the GOP for making an appeal to voters who were unhappy about all of this. That’s what democracy is about: winning votes from the greatest number of people. But of course the Wallace run complicated matters, by giving these voters an alternative protest candidate to vote for besides Nixon. By 1972, they moved over to the incumbent president. Ronald Reagan would repeat this in 1980 and really consolidate it in 1984.
But what did he consolidate? I’d say some significant portion of those voters were more paleocon (to continue using this shorthand) in outlook and instinct. First Nixon’s law and order message and then Reagan’s toughness and patriotism appealed to these voters, and they stuck around for a long time in the Republican electoral coalition—but as junior partners, expected to vote for the Republican presidential nominee every four years, and increasingly for Republicans down ticket as well, but without really shaping the policy agenda for the party. These folks (and, as time went on, their kids) were willing to support foreign policy internationalism as long as it was to oppose Soviet communism, or later to defend the country against Islamic terrorism under Bush 43. But they had no interest in something called the “liberal international order” or spreading democracy far and wide. I’m not sure they were ever thrilled about liberal immigration or free trade either. But they played along, because they liked Reagan’s tax cuts, skepticism about the federal government, and rhetorical support for moral traditionalism.
I’d say what we saw with Pat Buchanan’s 1992 challenge to George H.W. Bush’s re-election, the Perot boom that same year, the GOP takeover over Congress in 1994, the loathing of Bill Clinton (which culminated in the Starr Report and impeachment), Tea Party movement circa 2010, the “clown car” primaries of 2012, etc.—all of these were waves of discontent emanating from these junior partners in the coalition. But they had nowhere else to go—until Trump did such an effective, instinctual, charismatic job of articulating the faction’s discontents that they flocked to and latched onto him. The end result was something like a Nietzschean transvaluation of values, where those on the bottom depose and replace those on the top, but those on the top don’t go anywhere. They mostly just assimilate to the new moral order of things. You didn't, Jonah, and several other prominent conservative intellectuals have refused—some by going into the wilderness, others by becoming Democrats (our friends at The Bulwark). But most Republican voters have just accepted it, however much they personally dislike Trump.
The Democrat in me is inclined to say this is because Trump has been smart enough to appoint lots of conservative judges, champion social conservatism (within limits when it comes to restricting abortion), and promise lots of tax cuts. Most of the Republican electorate will tolerate a lot of garbage as long as they get some mixture of these. (The Oren Cass option of going consistently right and left populist at once sounds good in theory, but it would blow up the Republican electoral coalition pretty severely, and much more so than Trump has.)
In your next round, I’ll be quite interested in what you make of all of this, especially my “junior partner” theory of the GOP’s evolution. But I’d also like to point toward an even broader perspective: Right-wing populism is surging around the world—over the past decade in Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, and many other places. That makes Trump the American expression of a much bigger trend—and therefore places a kind of bracket around everything we’ve each said up to now, because all of those explanations for Trump are American-centered. But in place after place, parties of the center are in a state of relative electoral decline, while parties of the populist right are rising up to replace them and challenge other parties, making these new (or newly) populist parties the new normal in democracies around the world.
First off, I’m interested in how you understand this worldwide development. What causes could be at work in so many different places with so many different histories, economies, cultures, etc.? But second, and more importantly, how bad is this for the future viability of liberal democratic government? I go back and forth about this myself, sometimes thinking it’s terrible, because it means that growing numbers of voters are open to, essentially, empowering people and parties who want to rule semi-permanently, which requires doing damage to the many institutions and norms that prevent that from happening. (Of all the populist figures in the world, Trump has gone farthest down this road, which certainly adds an ominous dimension to talk of American exceptionalism.) Lots of people on the center left take this position, both in the U.S. and in Europe. I mean, the entire electoral strategy behind French President Emmanuel Macron’s hastily called snap elections for the National Assembly seems to be an effort to portray a vote for the right-populist National Rally party as a vote against French self-government itself. We see something similar in Germany, with the “normal” parties refusing to form governing coalitions with the far-right AfD, even as it wins larger and larger shares of the vote.
I’m not sure how that can work over the long term, unless these right-populist parties decline in popularity rather than continue to surge. That’s what leads me, more often than not, to embrace the other position—that is, accepting the new normal as legitimate but also worth trying to defeat electorally, in part by selective appropriation of the right-populist critique of the centrist establishment. I think it would be great for the Democrats to go back to their pre-2012 skepticism about immigration, for example, and their pre-1992 embrace of free-trade deals. not to mention distancing themselves from transgender ideology. Not so much because I’ve been convinced by the populist critique of each, but because parties need to be responsive to public opinion in order to win. It’s necessary to follow the votes, just as the GOP did in the late 1960s, in trying to exploit discontent with what was happening during the Johnson administration. I suppose that brings this round of the conversation full circle.
JG: Thanks Damon, once again, I’m coming at you hot with violent agreement on much of this. But let’s start with the fairly modest disagreement. I definitely believe that George Wallace was in many ways a precursor of Trumpism.
Before I get to that, I need to establish something else first.
I’ve argued for a long time that a key part of Trump’s success stems from his ability—with an enormous assist from Fox News in the Obama years—to merge urban populism with rural and southern populism. Donald Trump was a darling of what I call bridge-and-tunnel populism in New York. Rightwing populism is often infused with a kind of nostalgia-infused sense of grievance, which is why so many rightwing demagogues talk in the language of restoring better times, and reclaiming a lost sense of status, “making America great again,” etc. A similar ethos suffused New York City in the seventies and eighties. The shocking decline of the city—driven by any number of factors, but most certainly liberal policies high among them—drove massive white flight and deindustrialization of the city. Vast numbers of New Yorkers moved to the suburbs in Long Island, New Jersey, or in enclaves in the outer boroughs.
(An interesting exercise is to look at the movies set in the Big Apple in the early sixties compared to those in the early 70s and you can see the suddenness of the decline. From Breakfast at Tiffanys, That Touch of Mink, and Barefoot in the Parkto Death Wish, Taxi Driver, Dog Day Afternoon, and Serpico in about a decade.).
Pining for the lost New York (pining I share to some extent), became a major undercurrent in New York culture. That undercurrent became a tide for Rudy Giuliani to ride to City Hall. His very successful stewardship of New York’s comeback, including the enemies he made, was the central narrative of rightwing New York City politics, but also a huge backdrop for the Murdoch empire, both at the New York Post and then Fox News. It’s no coincidence that many of Fox’s early star personalities were Long Island and New Jersey boys with family roots in the Lost New York. Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity grew up on Long Island. Giuliani’s tough guy act—and his success at it—tickled the erogenous zones of Fox HQ denizens in all sorts of ways. It also was the political and psychological backdrop for a lot of Fox’s framing, including Fox’s own self-conception as an insurgent media company in the capital of the liberal media, taking on all those horrible elites.
Anyway, Trump comes out of that milieu. He was a garish intruder from Queens. He was a fixture—sometimes vaguely heroic, sometimes clownishly comedic—of the working classes, the folks who read the New York Post on the subway into Manhattan. Understandably, he was a liberal Democrat in those days, not as a political calculation but because why wouldn’t he be? So were most of the construction workers, doormen, cops, and firemen. But in the New York of the 1970s and 1980s—where I grew up—culturally rightwing Democrats were a thing. They were the guys who supported the hero cops over the no-good-thugs, as the Post might put it. Trump may have been a draft-evader, but he was an avatar of the Hard Hat Riot types. He took out that ad calling for the death penalty for the Central Park Five. And, he moved his schtick from the Howard Stern show to Fox and Friends in the Obama years. I’ve always said Fox was more populist than conservative—Bill O’Reilly demonstrated that early on, and Glenn Beck, and “radicalized” Tucker Carlson did too. Part of the genius of Ailes and Murdoch was to culturally fuse urban populism and “flyover” country populism. All of those country music concerts in Fox plaza punctuated by segments on the war on cops and whatnot amounted to a new kind of populist fusionism that the left couldn’t really comprehend and the traditional intellectual right hitched itself to for fun and profit.
But back to your point, yes, George Wallace represented a breakaway segment of the FDR coalition and, yes, Republicans picked up some of them. But I remain more skeptical of the strong version of the thesis you present, never mind the Rick Pearlstein stuff. You say race was the biggest factor. Maybe for some, but I think the damn hippies, crime, inflation, riots, and the hangover from the Great Society generally were more important. Some of those issues certainly had racial components, but outside of Jesse Helms types, I think the racial appeals were far more muted or non-existent than you seem to.
A lot of liberals think race is the most important issue, morally or politically. That’s fine. But they often project that belief negatively on their political opponents, assuming they have to hold the opposite position on racial matters: “We’re enlightened, hence we hate racism, therefore people who don’t subscribe to our view are unenlightened and are racist.” Sometimes that’s true, but far more often it’s not. The utter confusion of MSNBC types to explain the existence of Obama-Trump voters is a source of constant amusement to me. Apathy on racial issues or simply having other priorities is often perceived as intentional racism. This is the sum total of Ibram X. Kendi’s anti-racism schtick. But this mode of thinking is also a hallmark of polarized politics generally, across the ideological spectrum, on issues from climate change to immigration. We live in the age of the excluded middle fallacy.
That’s a long detour, but I think a lot of Blue City types think that American political currents they don’t like happen out there. In 1976, in the Democratic primaries, Scoop Jackson won Massachusetts, but George Wallace came in a close second, largely because he carried the liberal bastion of Boston, thanks to the issue of busing. In 2016, the two most populist candidates were Bernie Sanders, an avowed socialist, secular Jew, from Vermont and a New York real estate “billionaire.” Normally, populist movements point their pitchforks at such people, not for them.
That gets me to your actual question….
The conversation continues in the post scheduled to be published on the morning of Friday, July 5.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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