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Quotes of the Day:
“What should young people do with their lives today? Many things, obviously. But the most daring thing is to create stable communities in which the terrible disease of loneliness can be cured.“
– Kurt Vonnegut
"Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass."
– Immanuel Kant, What Is Enlightenment
"Revolutions are usually a matter of people picking up the power of a state in disintegration, a government that has lost the will to enforce its laws."
– Brian Reynolds Myers, interview with Joshua Stanton (August 2017), One Free Korea
1. Russian Saboteurs Behind Arson Attack at German Factory
2. ‘Urgency’ needed on terrorism threats, ex-CIA official says
3. Social media among many barriers to bringing back a draft, report says
4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2024
5. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, June 23, 2024
6. Netanyahu says Israel is winding down its Gaza operations. But he warns a Lebanon war could be next
7. China is watching warily as Putin and Kim forge new ‘alliance’
8. Catherine Herridge: Protecting Sources Is a Hill Worth Dying On
9. The Muslim Soldiers Fighting for Israel
10. Pentagon didn’t adequately track funds sent to Chinese research labs
11. Tight congressional calendar squeezes lawmakers’ defense work
12. Weapons of choice in China’s territorial disputes? Axes, knives, ‘jostling.’
13. How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide in the Battle of the Black Sea
14. How a Texas Factory Will Become a Key Ammo Supplier for the U.S., Ukraine
15. What It Would Take for the U.S. Dollar To Collapse
16. Weakening yuan could be what China needs, but not what it wants
17. Remembering Saipan: The battle that reshaped the Pacific
18. U.S. Army Conducts First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile SINKEX using PrSM
19. Number of Air Force Osprey Pilots and Aircrew Under Review Amid Mechanical Issues, Flight Restriction
20. Israeli Defense Tech is About to Have a Moment
21. Would Russia Aid China in an Invasion of Taiwan?
22. US hasn’t withheld weapons for Israel, but it’s done fast-tracking them — official
23. Inside the Chinese-funded and staffed marijuana farms springing up across the U.S.
24. China’s New Info Warriors: The Information Support Force Emerges
25. Better than the Sum of its Parts: Making NATO Reserves an Alliance Resource
26. Xi Jinping’s Russian Lessons
27. There’s No Dodge Button for Disinformation
1. Russian Saboteurs Behind Arson Attack at German Factory
Excerpts:
In the aftermath of last month’s blaze on the outskirts of the German capital, German investigators said the cause was likely an accident. But Western security officials now say the fire was set by Russian saboteurs trying disrupt shipments of critical arms and ammunition to Ukraine.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the security officials said, dozens of incidents have taken place across Europe, many potentially the work of Russia’s intelligence services aiming to curb arms production, pressure politicians and sow panic.
Targeting civilian infrastructure, such as wind farms and pipelines, also aims at intimidating investors as European economies are struggling, officials say. Data cables and pipelines in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea regions were cut by civilian ships linked to Russia, according to prosecutors, investigators and government officials.
...
“It is part of a hybrid war waged against us by Russia against which we have to defend ourselves and which we must stop,” the Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala said about the case. “Russia is repeatedly trying to sow unrest and undermine our citizens’ trust in the state.”
Suspected attacks that were planned or have taken place in the past two years include sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic; an arson attack in Britain, which triggered the expulsion of the Russian military attaché from the country; and a simultaneous cutting of two data cables that paralyzed part of the German railway system for hours.
Two German-Russian dual nationals were arrested in Germany on suspicion of planning attacks on American military bases and other targets, shortly before caches of explosives were discovered buried along a special overland pipeline that supplies air force bases in Germany.
Russian Saboteurs Behind Arson Attack at German Factory
Attack is a sign of the Kremlin’s more aggressive clandestine operations, security officials say
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian-saboteurs-behind-arson-attackat-german-factory-c13b4ece?mod=
By Bojan Pancevski
Follow
June 23, 2024 1:14 pm ET
Fire engines responded to a fire at a Diehl Metal Applications factory in Germany last month. PHOTO: LISI NIESNER/REUTERS
BERLIN—As fire swept through a sprawling factory owned by a company that manufactures air-defense systems, thick, dark smoke spread through a neighborhood of luxury villas and diplomatic residences. Police warnings blared, ordering people to shelter indoors.
In the aftermath of last month’s blaze on the outskirts of the German capital, German investigators said the cause was likely an accident. But Western security officials now say the fire was set by Russian saboteurs trying disrupt shipments of critical arms and ammunition to Ukraine.
European countries, seeking to avoid escalation, have been cautious about publicly blaming Moscow, but privately security officials say Russia appears to be stepping up attacks on civilian and military sites and people in Europe connected with efforts to help Ukraine fend off invading Russian troops.
The German factory belongs to Diehl Metal Applications, part of the Diehl group, a defense contractor. It produces and processes metal parts for various applications. The factory has since resumed operations.
Firefighters used a remote-controlled extinguishing unit to help fight the Diehl Metal Applications fire last month. PHOTO: LISI NIESNER/REUTERS
The company said Friday that a report by its insurers said a technical problem caused the fire. A company representative said Friday that the technical problem could “in theory” have been caused by sabotage.
German police say they are investigating. A representative for the internal security service said Friday that no possible cause, including sabotage, could be excluded.
The fire at the Diehl factory likely started in an area to which only a few people had access, according to an official familiar with the investigation, and all CCTV footage was lost in the fire. A number of recent incidents that had been considered accidents should be re-evaluated in light of recent events, the official said.
In the case of Diehl, electronic-communications intercepts that provided evidence of Russia’s involvement weren’t admissible in German courts, preventing authorities from clearly attributing the attack and pursuing criminal charges, two German officials said. The intercepts, which were passed on to the German government by an intelligence agency of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, were first reported by the Bild newspaper in Germany.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the security officials said, dozens of incidents have taken place across Europe, many potentially the work of Russia’s intelligence services aiming to curb arms production, pressure politicians and sow panic.
Targeting civilian infrastructure, such as wind farms and pipelines, also aims at intimidating investors as European economies are struggling, officials say. Data cables and pipelines in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea regions were cut by civilian ships linked to Russia, according to prosecutors, investigators and government officials.
A Swedish prosecutor probing the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines linking Russia and Germany said he was closing the investigation because Sweden doesn’t have jurisdiction. PHOTO: HANDOUT/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The arson attack on the factory in Germany is believed to have been the work of experienced professionals, the security officials said. But, they said, Russia often uses civilians, predominantly criminals, recruited on social-media networks and paid in cryptocurrency.
Russian spymasters have turned to Telegram, a popular social-media app, for recruiting. And some people might not even be aware they are working for Russia. Moscow has increasingly sought to attract Russian-speaking Ukrainian migrants in Europe, intelligence and law-enforcement officials say.
“This is like the gig economy for sabotage and terror—perpetrators get recruited like Uber drivers, but the effect is often the same as with using professionals,” a senior Western security official said.
Earlier this month, a man was charged with an attempted act of terrorism on behalf of Russia in the Czech Republic, another NATO ally, for allegedly trying to set public buses on fire.
“It is part of a hybrid war waged against us by Russia against which we have to defend ourselves and which we must stop,” the Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala said about the case. “Russia is repeatedly trying to sow unrest and undermine our citizens’ trust in the state.”
Suspected attacks that were planned or have taken place in the past two years include sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic; an arson attack in Britain, which triggered the expulsion of the Russian military attaché from the country; and a simultaneous cutting of two data cables that paralyzed part of the German railway system for hours.
Two German-Russian dual nationals were arrested in Germany on suspicion of planning attacks on American military bases and other targets, shortly before caches of explosives were discovered buried along a special overland pipeline that supplies air force bases in Germany.
Write to Bojan Pancevski at bojan.pancevski@wsj.com
2. ‘Urgency’ needed on terrorism threats, ex-CIA official says
We must not neglect the terrorism threat.
‘Urgency’ needed on terrorism threats, ex-CIA official says
By ISABELLA RAMÍREZ
06/23/2024 02:52 PM EDT
Politico
“The American public needs to understand what the threat is,” Mike Morell said.
A person puts photos of fallen firefighters on the 9/11 Memorial during a ceremony on the 22nd anniversary of the Sept. 11 terror attacks on Sept. 11, 2023, in New York. | Yuki Iwamura/AP
06/23/2024 02:52 PM EDT
Former CIA deputy director Mike Morell warned Sunday that there is “a lack of sense of urgency” among the Biden administration and Congress to prevent the growing threat of terrorism in the United States.
“There needs to be a sense of urgency about this, and I think the American public needs to understand what the threat is. That’s why we called for a public congressional hearing just on the terrorist threats to the homeland,” Morell told host Margaret Brennan on CBS’ “Face the Nation.” “We need to hear what the administration is doing about this in a broad sense.”
Earlier this month, Morell co-authored a piece titled “The Terrorism Warning Lights Are Blinking Red Again” in Foreign Affairs, comparing present national security concerns to the lead-up to the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. In the article, he pointed to the potential for attacks on U.S. soil motivated by Hamas’ Oct. 7 attacks and Israel’s war in Gaza, as well the vulnerability of the southern border.
As a CIA analyst, Morell delivered the President’s Daily Brief to then-President George W. Bush — including on the morning of 9/11. Offering warnings similar to the ones from then-CIA director George Tenet and Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke about Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in the period before 9/11, Morell wrote in Foreign Affairs that current FBI director Christopher Wray and other senior officials have now been sounding the alarm.
Morell said Sunday that after publishing the article, the response was “almost universal” from current and former intelligence officers and policymakers, which he said signaled to him that there isn’t enough urgency from the Biden administration in addressing these threats.
He agreed that there is an issue of resources, especially as focus has shifted from counterterrorism to China. While Morell said this was “understandable to some degree,” he acknowledged “there’s a cost to the intelligence we’re collecting.
Morell also referenced a Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General report from June 7 that expressed a need for the department to improve its screening of asylum-seekers and noncitizens applying for admission into the U.S. Eight men from Tajikistan who were seen as potential terrorism threats were arrested earlier this month in different American cities; reports indicated that they had crossed through the southern border into the country.
“The vetting system, beyond not having the information, the vetting system does not provide all of the information that the government has,” Morell said. “So it’s lack of information, and it is the system itself.”
“There are all sorts of issues here that need to be resolved,” he added.
Politico
3. Social media among many barriers to bringing back a draft, report says
What kind of military will we have if there is a return to conscription?
Will the current suicide epidemic get worse?
Social media among many barriers to bringing back a draft, report says
militarytimes.com · by Hope Hodge Seck · June 20, 2024
Amid a revived national discussion about a possible return to mandatory military service, a new think tank report illustrates how doing so in today’s America would require the Defense Department to navigate unprecedented social and cultural challenges.
While military conscription — colloquially known as the draft — effectively ended in 1973, all U.S. males aged 18 to 25 are required to register with the U.S. Selective Service in case the draft ever needs to be revived. The House passage of its version of the annual defense policy bill this month included a provision that would make Selective Service enrollment automatic. That, combined with comments by Chris Miller, the former acting defense secretary, about his interest in implementing mandatory service have again spurred curiosity and concern over the possibility of a future draft.
Against that backdrop, the Washington, D.C.-based think tank Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a report this week about what it would take to do just that. The 35-page document, titled “Back to the Drafting Board,” contains 11 recommendations pulled from a tabletop exercise run by the think tank to simulate the mobilization of conscripts in a military crisis. While the U.S. military has run its own mobilization exercises in the wake of the draft — the memorably named exercise Nifty Nugget was run in 1978, followed by Proud Spirit and Proud Saber in 1980 and 1982 — no full test of U.S. mobilization capacity has been executed in the last 50 years, the report states. And the four teams tasked by CNAS with meeting the U.S. Selective Service System planning criteria of being able to produce 100,000 new military inductees within 193 days, found they couldn’t meet those benchmarks. In fact, no team even came close.
The new report emphasizes that a military draft should still be considered a measure of last resort, not a tool for meeting peacetime military needs or a way to encourage national service or close the civil-military divide, which refers to the gap in understanding between the civilian population and the all-volunteer professional military. The tabletop exercise provides such a scenario: it posits that the U.S. is in a hot war with China following either a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or of the U.S. West Coast. These scenarios drive home just how dire national security circumstances would have to be to bring back the draft: one figure highlighted in the report shows casualty rates on the order of hundreds per day at the start of the conflict. While there’s no guarantee that future draft would be instituted under the conditions the exercise CNAS assumed, the think tank sought realism by involving uniformed and civilian Defense Department personnel, legal experts, and Selective Service staff.
One of the four teams, which operated under best-case assumptions about current policy and response to draft notices, had the best outcome: it was able to mobilize 100,000 conscripts in 211 days, and just over 53,000 by the target 193-day mark. Another team, which made realistic assumptions about current conditions, took 402 days to conscript 100,000 troops. The third team, which took on worst-case assumptions for variables, took 1,336 days, or more than three-and-a-half years, to reach 100,000 conscripts. The final team, which assumed that the Selective Service System had been abolished and had to be restarted before conscription could begin, did surprisingly well, taking 223 days to reach the conscription target.
Based on the exercise, it appears that American culture and resistance to the draft in its historical form may present a major obstacle, the report shows. The U.S. public has to believe that the draft is enforceable for mobilization to work, the report’s authors found, and social media messaging could amplify perceptions of inequity or perpetuate disinformation from adversaries.
“The credibility on Day One is really going to matter for proper implementation if we ever have to enact a draft,” Katherine Kuzminski, the report’s primary author, told Military Times. “There’s a lot of ability to sow confusion.”
A viral video of a pop star ripping up a draft notice, or a social media allegation that a local draft board is racist, for example, could quickly turn the tide of public opinion against drafting authorities. She suggested, on the other hand, that enlisting well-known sports figures or celebrities to promote responding to the draft as a civic duty could help the Defense Department and the Selective Service get in front of these obstacles.
Other problems surfaced in the tabletop exercise included the likelihood of legal challenges to the current all-male draft mobilization model, which would likely create “significant delays” in building an emergency force of conscripts. Declining trust in institutions, exercise participants found, would also likely result in historically high rates of deferment, conscientious objector requests, and draft-dodging, raising the possible need for more muscular enforcement mechanisms.
Alongside cultural obstacles are practical ones. The report also found the military services would likely need to relax military entry standards to accommodate a conscripted force of young people who largely don’t meet fitness, education, and mental health standards.
In 1940, Selective Service rejection rates were around 30%, according to the report. Under current models, and assuming only 23% of the draftable population is eligible to serve without a waiver, the military could run out of prospective draftees in just seven rounds, the report found. In addition, the professional all-volunteer force isn’t ready to accept conscripts into the ranks, the report shows. The military, it indicates, would have to plan and prepare to accept draftees in a way that emphasizes their skills and contributions and does not create the perception they’re “cannon fodder,” or simply bodies brought in to inflate the size of the force. Even the Military Entrance Processing Stations, or MEPS, which are now facing delays in recruit in-processing due to health record screening through the new GENESIS platform, would have to get staffed up, potentially with drafted medical professionals, to process a new round of inductees.
The report recommends that the Defense Department create an “executive agent for national mobilization” position to prepare for and address future issues raised in the report. This position was actually required by the fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act but remains unfilled, the report notes. It also calls for the National Security Council to return to full-scale mobilization exercises across the government every two years to highlight preparation needs for a future draft.
For the president, the report recommends considering starting a potential future draft round by calling up older conscripts first — those at the upper end of the 18-25 eligible range. Current plans call for mobilizations of those turning 20 at the time of the draft.
“Operational requirements in a future combat environment may mean that individuals with more experience or technical proficiency are needed,” the report states.
While the prospect of a return to the military draft remains politically unpopular, making it an unlikely scenario in all but the most extreme of circumstances, the ability to call up conscripts quickly and build up military strength and technology can send a deterrent message of its own to the enemy, Kuzminski said.
“The ability to signal that we can be in it for the long haul, and that we have the ability to sustain that, can serve as a deterrent value when it comes to what [China’s] decision calculus is,” Kuzminski said. “They don’t want to start a war that could end up being protracted.”
4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024
Key Takeaways:
- The Islamic State (IS) Northern Caucasus branch Wilayat Kavkaz likely conducted a complex and coordinated attack against churches, synagogues, and law enforcement structures in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of conducting a short-range ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol on June 23. Russian milbloggers widely criticized the Russian MoD and Russia’s occupation authorities in Crimea for failing to prevent the strike and sufficiently protect Russian civilians.
- Ukrainian forces struck a Russian motorized rifle regiment command post in Nekhoteevka, Belgorod Oblast.
- Recent drone footage showing a Russian soldier executing a wounded fellow servicemember exemplifies the brutal culture that is pervasive within the Russian Armed Forces.
- South Korea has adopted a firm approach against Russia in the wake of recently intensified Russo-North Korean cooperation, suggesting that Russian efforts to threaten Seoul into withholding aid from Ukraine have failed.
- The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained two former senior employees of the Wagner Group-affiliated Patriot media holding on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the Wagner mutiny.
- Russian forces recently seized Shumy and advanced near Donetsk City and Robotyne.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on June 22 officially transferring the Cossack Cadet Corps and the Russian Naval Cadet Corps to the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
5. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, June 23, 2024
Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, June 23, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-23-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas appears to be accelerating its reconstitution effort in the Gaza Strip by beginning to regenerate its forces through recruitment. Hamas appears to be successfully reconstituting itself militarily and politically in areas where the IDF is no longer present.
- Yemen: The Houthis claimed on June 22 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting five vessels in and around Haifa Port.
- West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 22.
- Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 22.
- Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted two drone attacks targeting US forces at al Tanf Garrison in eastern Syria on June 22. The reported al Tanf garrison drone attacks do not confirm that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has decided to restart its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria, however.
6. Netanyahu says Israel is winding down its Gaza operations. But he warns a Lebanon war could be next
Excerpts:
“We will have the possibility of transferring some of our forces north, and we will do that,” he told Israel’s Channel 14, a pro-Netanyahu TV channel, in an interview that was frequently interrupted by applause from the studio audience. “First and foremost, for defense,” he added, but also to allow tens of thousands of displaced Israelis to return home.
The Iranian-backed Hezbollah began striking Israel almost immediately after Hamas’ Oct. 7 cross-border attack that triggered the Gaza war. Israel and Hezbollah have been exchanging fire nearly every day since then, but the fighting has escalated in recent weeks, raising fears of a full-blown war.
Netanyahu says Israel is winding down its Gaza operations. But he warns a Lebanon war could be next
AP · June 23, 2024
JERUSALEM (AP) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday that the current phase of fighting against Hamas in Gaza is winding down, setting the stage for Israel to send more troops to its northern border to confront the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.
The comments threatened to further heighten the tensions between Israel and Hezbollah at a time when they appear to be moving closer to war. Netanyahu also signaled that there is no end in sight for the grinding war in Gaza.
The Israeli leader said in a lengthy TV interview that while the army is close to completing its current ground offensive in the southern Gaza city of Rafah, that would not mean the war against Hamas is over. But he said fewer troops would be needed in Gaza, freeing up forces to battle Hezbollah.
“We will have the possibility of transferring some of our forces north, and we will do that,” he told Israel’s Channel 14, a pro-Netanyahu TV channel, in an interview that was frequently interrupted by applause from the studio audience. “First and foremost, for defense,” he added, but also to allow tens of thousands of displaced Israelis to return home.
The Iranian-backed Hezbollah began striking Israel almost immediately after Hamas’ Oct. 7 cross-border attack that triggered the Gaza war. Israel and Hezbollah have been exchanging fire nearly every day since then, but the fighting has escalated in recent weeks, raising fears of a full-blown war.
Hezbollah is much stronger than Hamas, and opening a new front would raise the risk of a larger, region-wide war involving other Iranian proxies and perhaps Iran itself that could cause heavy damage and mass casualties on both sides of the border.
White House envoy Amos Hochstein was in the region last week meeting with officials in Israel and Lebanon in an effort to lower tensions. But the fighting has continued.
Netanyahu said he hoped a diplomatic solution to the crisis could be found but vowed to solve the problem “in a different way” if needed. ″We can fight on several fronts and we are prepared to do that,” he said.
He said any deal would not just be “an agreement on paper.” He said it would require Hezbollah to be far from the border, an enforcement mechanism and the return of Israelis back to their homes. Tens of thousands of people were evacuated shortly after the fighting erupted and have not been able to go home.
Hezbollah has said it will continue battling Israel until a cease-fire is reached in Gaza. The group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, warned Israel last week against launching a war, saying Hezbollah has new weapons and intelligence capabilities that could help it target more critical positions deeper inside Israel.
Hezbollah already has unveiled new weapons during the low-level fighting, including hard-to-defend attack drones that strike with little warning. An Israeli soldier was badly wounded Sunday in a drone strike.
But Israel says it too has shown Hezbollah only a small part of its full capabilities, and that Lebanon will be turned into a second Gaza if there is a war. Israel’s army last week said it had “approved and validated” a new plan for a Lebanon offensive.
In the interview, Netanyahu said that Israel’s offensive in Gaza is winding down. The Israeli army has been operating in the southern border town of Rafah since early May. It says it has inflicted heavy damage on Hamas in Rafah, which it has identified as the last remaining Hamas stronghold after a brutal war stretching nearly nine months. But he said Israel would have to continue “mowing” operations — targeted strikes aimed at preventing Hamas from regrouping.
Israel launched its air and ground invasion of Gaza immediately after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, which killed some 1,200 people and took about 250 others hostage.
The Israeli offensive has killed over 37,000 Palestinians, unleashed a humanitarian crisis and triggered war crimes and genocide cases at the world’s top courts in The Hague.
It also has raised tensions with the United States, with President Joe Biden and Netanyahu clashing publicly over the course of the war. Earlier on Sunday, Netanyahu again repeated his claim that there has been a “dramatic drop” in arms shipments from the U.S., Israel’s closest ally, hindering the war effort.
Biden has delayed delivering certain heavy bombs since May over concerns of heavy civilian casualties, but his administration fought back last week against Netanyahu’s charges that other shipments had also been affected.
Although the U.S. and other mediators are pushing a cease-fire plan, Netanyahu has ruled out an end to the war until Israel frees all hostages held by Hamas and until it destroys Hamas’ military and governing capabilities.
The current phase of the war “is about to end,” Netanyahu said. “That doesn’t mean the war is about to end.”
Netanyahu spoke as his defense minister, Yoav Gallant, was in Washington for talks with American officials about the war and tensions with Lebanon. And next month, Netanyahu has been invited to address Congress for a speech that already is dividing Washington along partisan lines. Some Democrats, angry at Netanyahu’s public fighting with Biden, say they will not attend.
American officials also have been pressing Netanyahu to spell out a clear post-war plan for Gaza. The U.S. has said it will not accept a long-term Israeli occupation of the territory.
Netanyahu spelled out a very different vision. He said the only way to guarantee Israel’s security is for Israel to maintain military control over the territory.
“There is no one else” capable of doing that, he said. But he said he is seeking a way to create a Palestinian “civilian administration” to manage day-to-day affairs in Gaza, hopefully with backing from moderate Arab countries. He ruled out any role for the internationally recognized Palestinian Authority, which was ousted from Gaza by Hamas in a violent 2007 takeover.
Netanyahu said the Israeli army several months ago looked into working with prominent Palestinian families in Gaza, but that Hamas immediately “destroyed them.” He said Israel is now looking at other options.
Netanyahu ruled out one option favored by some of his ultranationalist governing partners — re-settling Israelis in Gaza. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, ending a 38-year presence.
“The issue of settlement is not realistic,” he said. “I’m realistic.”
AP · June 23, 2024
7. China is watching warily as Putin and Kim forge new ‘alliance’
I am not sure China is as worried as we would hope it would be. I think there is some wishful thinking among pundits who see this as an opportunity for US-China cooperation on north Korea. I think hoping for cooperation will not make it so.
China is watching warily as Putin and Kim forge new ‘alliance’ | CNN
CNN · by Nectar Gan · June 23, 2024
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin ride a Mercedes-Benz at a welcoming ceremony in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024.
Gavriil Grigorov/Pool/AFP/Sputnik/Getty Images
Editor’s Note: Sign up for CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter which explores what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world.
Hong Kong CNN —
As Russian President Vladimir Putin glided through the crowd-lined streets of Pyongyang atop a luxury Mercedes-Benz alongside his North Korean host Kim Jong Un last week, the two autocrats’ most important partner was watching from the sidelines hundreds of miles away in Beijing.
Five years ago, Xi Jinping was offered the same open-top ride with Kim when he became the first Chinese leader to visit Pyongyang in 14 years. At the time, the two leaders vowed to strengthen ties and deepen cooperation, but the language paled in comparison with the “breakthrough” new partnership struck by Kim and Putin.
In a wide-ranging treaty spanning political, trade, investment, and security cooperation, North Korea and Russia pledged to use all available means to provide immediate military assistance in the event the other is attacked.
Putin said Russia and North Korea have ramped up ties to a “new level.” Kim, meanwhile, called the new “alliance” a “watershed moment” in bilateral relations.
The new landmark defense pact agreed by the two nuclear-armed regimes rattled the United States and its Asian allies. Japan voiced “grave concerns” about Putin’s vow not to rule out cooperation with Pyongyang on military technology. South Korea responded by convening an emergency national security meeting and said it would now consider sending arms to Ukraine.
In contrast, the reaction from China, the main political and economic patron for both Russia and North Korea, has been all but muted.
A spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the treaty, calling it a bilateral matter between Russia and North Korea.
Beneath the official reticence, however, China is likely watching warily, analysts say.
China ‘aims to control the situation’
The deepening ties between two wayward autocrats risk creating new uncertainty for Xi, who needs peace and stability in Northeast Asia as he grapples with a raft of domestic challenges, especially the slowing economy.
Beijing is worried that Moscow’s assistance to Pyongyang – especially on military technology – would further enable and embolden the erratic Kim regime, which has drastically accelerated the buildup of nuclear weapons and missile programs, said Liu Dongshu, an assistant professor focusing on Chinese politics at the City University of Hong Kong.
“When it comes to the North Korea issue, China aims to control the situation and prevent escalation, but it also does not want North Korea to completely collapse either” – a scenario that Beijing fears would allow the US to extend its control right to its doorstep, Liu said.
Previously, Russia had been largely aligned with China on the issue, but its desperate need for North Korea to support its grinding war in Ukraine risks undermining the delicate balance.
Kim Jong Un takes Chinese leader Xi Jinping on a ride through the streets of Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 21, 2019.
KCNA/Reuters/File
Russia has received more than 10,000 shipping containers – the equivalent of 260,000 metric tons of munitions or munitions-related material – from North Korea since September, according to a US statement in February. Both Russia and North Korea have rejected the claim.
And while the US has accused China of providing Russia with dual-use goods that bolster the warring nation’s military industrial complex, Beijing has refrained from offering direct military assistance to Putin and has steered clear of supporting Kim’s nuclear and missile programs.
“If Putin provides more support to North Korea on nuclear issues, including some technical assistance, it will become more difficult for China to control the situation on the Korean Peninsula,” Liu said.
The mutual defense pact signed by Kim and Putin harks back to a 1961 treaty between North Korea and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. That deal was replaced with one that offered much weaker security assurances after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
But North Korea’s mutual defense treaty with China, also signed in 1961, remains in place after multiple renewals.
The Sino-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is the only formal military alliance treaty China has signed with another country, though Beijing doesn’t admit it as such and remains deliberately vague about whether China is obliged to automatically come to North Korea’s defense when a war breaks out.
Similarly, it remains unclear what Russia and North Korea are willing – and able – to do for one another under the new defense pact.
The new treaty comes amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, where Kim has ramped up fiery rhetoric and scrapped a longstanding policy of seeking peaceful reunification with South Korea. After the end of the Korean War in 1953, a formal peace treaty was never signed between the two Koreas, leaving them technically in a state of war.
But the political message of the pact is loud and clear. Driven by a shared hostility to the US and its allies, the two autocratic nations are seeking to undermine and create an alternative to the Western-led global order – a goal shared by China.
Speaking after his meeting with Kim, Putin rankled against what he called “the imperialist policy of the United States and its satellites.”
Putin and Xi attend a concert together in Beijing on May 16, 2024.
Alexander Ryumin/Pool/AFP/Getty Images
A month ago, Putin and Xi delivered a similar swipe at the US during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing. In a sweeping joint statement, the two “old friends” took aim at what they described as a global security system defined by US-backed military alliances – and pledged to work together to counter it.
Western observers have warned against a loose but growing coordination of interests among China, Russia, North Korea and Iran – something one senior US military commander recently likened to a new “axis of evil.”
As Moscow and Pyongyang deepen their alliance, Beijing would be cautious to keep a distance, Liu said, adding that “China certainly doesn’t want to be seen as part of a new Axis.”
But despite the absence of Xi, China would have been the elephant in the room throughout Putin and Kim’s meeting.
“Any such meeting will also include discussion of China,” said Edward Howell, a lecturer in politics at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, who focuses on the Korean Peninsula.
“Russia will know full well that China does not want to be left out of any substantial negotiations involving North Korea, not least since China is far more important – compared to Russia – to North Korea.”
Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Washington-based Stimson Center think tank, said China doesn’t feel it can control the pace and extent of the deepening engagement between Russia and North Korea.
“But they do know that China plays an irreplaceable role for both Russia and North Korea,” she said.
China remains the largest trade partner to both Russia and North Korea, providing a crucial lifeline to the heavily sanctioned economies. Beijing also lends significant political support and diplomatic cover to the two international pariahs.
“China doesn’t think that an alliance between Russia and North Korea would be a betrayal,” said Liu with the City University of Hong Kong.
“Neither of the two countries has the capacity to betray China. They still need to rely on China despite their alliance.”
CNN’s Simone McCarthy contributed reporting.
CNN · by Nectar Gan · June 23, 2024
8. Catherine Herridge: Protecting Sources Is a Hill Worth Dying On
It should go without saying that freedom of the press is key to our democratic republic. We need the fourth estate to hold political leaders, officials, and any public figure accountable.
Excerpts:
It is relatively uncommon for a court or the government to try to force a reporter to divulge sources. But it does happen, and when it does, it has a chilling effect on sources, reporters, and journalism itself. Sources wonder if they can trust a journalist who promises confidentiality, while journalists become less willing to offer that promise. It damages the ability of the press to root out wrongdoing.
There is some good news, though. Congress appears poised to make it far more difficult for journalists to be compelled to divulge their sources. In January, in a rare display of bipartisanship, the House unanimously passed the Protect Reporters from Exploitative State Spying Act, or the PRESS Act.
The bill, which is now awaiting action in the Senate, would mandate the disclosure of sources only in a limited number of cases, including imminent violence, such as terrorist threats. It would also bar the government from surveilling journalists via phone or electronic records. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 53 news media organizations call it “. . . a reasonable, common-sense measure to preserve the free flow of information to the public.”
Indeed, a recent letter from a coalition of more than 130 civil liberties and journalism organizations, plus law professors and media lawyers, called the legislation “a rare chance to strengthen freedom of the press.” Led by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Mike Lee (R-UT), the bill is co-sponsored by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Ranking Member Lindsey Graham (R-SC). There is hope Durbin can advance the bill with the support of Graham and others before the end of the year. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is on record saying that he hopes to have the legislation on the president’s desk this year.
Catherine Herridge: Protecting Sources Is a Hill Worth Dying On
I hope I’m the last American journalist who has to spend years in federal court defending confidential sources. That’s why I support the PRESS Act.
By Catherine Herridge
June 23, 2024
https://www.thefp.com/p/catherine-herridge-protecting-sources
If confidential sources are not protected, investigative journalism will die.
I know that sounds overly dramatic, and I know you’ve probably heard it a million times. But it’s true. I’ve been a TV correspondent for three networks—Fox, CBS, and ABC—across four decades. I’ve broken my share of stories about government wrongdoing, and I know for a fact that if I hadn’t been able to offer my sources a credible pledge of confidentiality, they never would have divulged information that was being kept from the public. Like the story I wrote in 2021, to take just one example, about how the Trump administration wrongly denied Purple Hearts to over 40 soldiers because President Trump didn’t want to acknowledge the severity of Iran’s ballistic missile attack on a U.S. base in Iraq.
Any investigative reporter will tell you the same thing: forcing a journalist to disclose confidential sources will have a crippling effect on effective investigative journalism in this country. The First Amendment provides protections for the press because an informed electorate is essential for robust debate and a strong democracy.
But what happens when you find yourself dragged into a lawsuit, ordered to divulge your sources, and held in contempt when you refuse?
That’s the situation I find myself in now. Yet I know just how important it is that I stand by my promise to keep my sources confidential—not just for me but for all journalists.
In brief: in 2017, when I was the chief intelligence correspondent for Fox News, I broadcast three reports about an FBI investigation. Two years later, the subject of that investigation filed a Privacy Act lawsuit against the FBI and several other federal agencies, claiming they had leaked information to me. The plaintiff now wants me to reveal my source(s) as part of her lawsuit against the federal agencies. During a deposition last September, I refused to do so. As a result, in February, the judge overseeing the case held me in civil contempt.
While I have complete respect for the courts and the judicial process, I am now potentially facing crippling fines of $800 a day until I give up my source(s). (For now, the fines have been stayed pending an appeal.)
Around the same time as that contempt ruling in February, I was laid off by CBS News, which I had joined in 2019. (It’s been a rough year.) After locking me out of the building, CBS seized hundreds of pages of my reporting files, including confidential source information. At that time, my primary assignment was the Hunter Biden investigation as well as Special Counsel Robert Hur’s probe of President Biden. A number of my sources told me they feared that by helping me uncover government corruption, they were now going to be exposed.
Thankfully, with support of my union, SAG-AFTRA, the records were returned. But the incident underscored the fragility of confidential sources, and a corporate culture that seemed to diminish journalism by branding the reporting materials as “work product.” (In a statement issued at the time, CBS News said it “acted to secure and protect the material in Ms. Herridge’s office.”)
It is relatively uncommon for a court or the government to try to force a reporter to divulge sources. But it does happen, and when it does, it has a chilling effect on sources, reporters, and journalism itself. Sources wonder if they can trust a journalist who promises confidentiality, while journalists become less willing to offer that promise. It damages the ability of the press to root out wrongdoing.
There is some good news, though. Congress appears poised to make it far more difficult for journalists to be compelled to divulge their sources. In January, in a rare display of bipartisanship, the House unanimously passed the Protect Reporters from Exploitative State Spying Act, or the PRESS Act.
The bill, which is now awaiting action in the Senate, would mandate the disclosure of sources only in a limited number of cases, including imminent violence, such as terrorist threats. It would also bar the government from surveilling journalists via phone or electronic records. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 53 news media organizations call it “. . . a reasonable, common-sense measure to preserve the free flow of information to the public.”
Indeed, a recent letter from a coalition of more than 130 civil liberties and journalism organizations, plus law professors and media lawyers, called the legislation “a rare chance to strengthen freedom of the press.” Led by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Mike Lee (R-UT), the bill is co-sponsored by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Ranking Member Lindsey Graham (R-SC). There is hope Durbin can advance the bill with the support of Graham and others before the end of the year. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is on record saying that he hopes to have the legislation on the president’s desk this year.
In one sense, I’m lucky. Fox News has the resources to support me throughout this fight. I’m grateful for that. But the corporate media companies where I have spent my career are shrinking, while the growth of independent journalism and newsrooms is exploding. Most of these news organizations are small and lack the resources to withstand years of expensive litigation to protect their sources. The PRESS Act, I’m convinced, could be enormously important in preventing these new outlets from being strangled by litigation.
The protection of confidential sources is not about ego, and it doesn’t mean that journalists are somehow above the law. It’s about preserving the tools that shine a light on wrongdoing and hold government officials accountable. No whistleblower, no government insider with firsthand knowledge of corruption and misconduct will come forward without a promise their identity will be protected. In other words, without the promise of confidentiality, a reporter’s investigative toolbox is empty.
The litigation, and especially the contempt ruling, have taken a toll on me and my career. But I’ve come out the other side—bruised, but with a new sense of purpose and clarity. The First Amendment, the protection of confidential sources, and a free press are my guiding principles.
A few months ago, I had the opportunity to testify before Congress on the subject of press freedom and confidential sources, and in support of the PRESS Act. I told the legislators, “One of our children recently asked me if I would go to jail, if we would lose our house, and if we would lose our family savings to protect my reporting sources. I wanted to answer that, in this country, where we say we value democracy and the role of a vibrant and free press, it was impossible. But I couldn’t offer that assurance.”
Our son told me, in a matter-of-fact tone, “to do what it takes,” and he offered reassurance. “I’ve got your back.” I testified that if a teenager can understand the importance of the PRESS Act, surely the Senate can advance the bill and the president can sign it. As we head into the next presidential election, the PRESS Act may be the one issue that can unite both parties.
I hope that I am the last journalist who has to spend two years or more in federal court defending confidential sources against the threat of contempt sanctions. If we want to preserve robust investigative journalism in the United States, I believe the PRESS Act is the hill to die on.
Catherine Herridge is an Emmy Award–winning veteran investigative correspondent who covers national security and intelligence. Follow her on X @C_Herridge.
9. The Muslim Soldiers Fighting for Israel
Excerpts:
“The Bedouin community was traditionally a tribal community that engaged in trade by finding trade routes through the desert,” Iftah Burman, an Israeli geopolitical analyst and founder of the Middle East Learning Academy, told The Dispatch. “Over time, they passed down these techniques from father to son—how to travel in the desert, how to track the animals, how to make use out of vegetation. Those trades made them excellent trackers.” Since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, he added, Bedouins have worked with Israeli forces to “patrol the borders, identify smugglers, and identify terrorists coming in through the borders.”
Many Bedouin soldiers have also fought and at least six have died alongside Jewish soldiers in this war. On October 7, as terrorists attacked the kibbutzim and military bases of the Western Negev, Bedouin troops were among the first on the scene. In one instance, a soldier took off part of his Israeli military uniform and spoke in Arabic to lure the attackers out of hiding before others shot them at close range. They’ve also deployed to the Gaza Strip, where they help locate terrorists, weapons, and tunnels.
At Kerem Shalom—the frequent site of Hamas rocket attacks—the Bedouin Battalion is one of Israel’s first lines of defense. On the day of my visit, an interview was abruptly moved to a shelter amid concerns of oncoming fire. “On October 7, [the soldiers] came here to take their weapons and started fighting right away with no question,” Idat said. “They’ve been here since.”
The Muslim Soldiers Fighting for Israel
The Arabic-speaking Bedouins make up a key unit of the Israeli military fighting against Hamas.
thedispatch.com · by Charlotte Lawson · June 24, 2024
KEREM SHALOM, Israel—Just miles from the point where Israel meets Gaza and Egypt, the Arab descendants of nomadic tribes are defending their country. At the Kerem Shalom military base—the headquarters of the Israeli army’s desert trackers unit, also known as the “Bedouin Battalion”—these soldiers, most of them Muslims, feel a strong sense of national pride and purpose in the wake of Hamas’ October 7 attack.
“I saw a woman shot in the head on October 7. Normally it’s army against army, but here’s a terrorist organization killing an innocent civilian,” said Lt. Col. Nader Idat, the battalion’s Bedouin commander. “I’m a Muslim myself and there’s no religion, including Islam, that says that it’s OK to kill. That’s what differentiates Hamas. Their purpose is to kill.”
And on that day, Hamas’ killing squads didn’t distinguish between combatants and civilians, Israelis and foreigners, Jews and non-Jews. The invaders murdered dozens of Bedouins—fellow Muslims and Arabs—and are believed to have abducted six others into the Gaza Strip, where three remain. Ever since, there has been a surge in voluntary army enlistment from within Israel’s Bedouin community, some 400,000 people—roughly 4 percent of the country’s total population—whose ancestors traversed the desert for trade and livestock rearing.
“The Bedouin community was traditionally a tribal community that engaged in trade by finding trade routes through the desert,” Iftah Burman, an Israeli geopolitical analyst and founder of the Middle East Learning Academy, told The Dispatch. “Over time, they passed down these techniques from father to son—how to travel in the desert, how to track the animals, how to make use out of vegetation. Those trades made them excellent trackers.” Since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, he added, Bedouins have worked with Israeli forces to “patrol the borders, identify smugglers, and identify terrorists coming in through the borders.”
Many Bedouin soldiers have also fought and at least six have died alongside Jewish soldiers in this war. On October 7, as terrorists attacked the kibbutzim and military bases of the Western Negev, Bedouin troops were among the first on the scene. In one instance, a soldier took off part of his Israeli military uniform and spoke in Arabic to lure the attackers out of hiding before others shot them at close range. They’ve also deployed to the Gaza Strip, where they help locate terrorists, weapons, and tunnels.
At Kerem Shalom—the frequent site of Hamas rocket attacks—the Bedouin Battalion is one of Israel’s first lines of defense. On the day of my visit, an interview was abruptly moved to a shelter amid concerns of oncoming fire. “On October 7, [the soldiers] came here to take their weapons and started fighting right away with no question,” Idat said. “They’ve been here since.”
Bedouins currently enlist in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on a voluntary basis, unlike Jewish men and women and Druze men—a non-Muslim, Arabic-speaking minority—for whom military service is compulsory. Prior to Hamas’ attack, voluntary military service among Bedouins was fairly uncommon, even stigmatized, in the often insular communities across Israel.
Now, Bedouin soldiers say they proudly wear their uniforms home. For many, joining the IDF also offers a pathway to integration into broader Israeli society. Bedouin troops can either pursue a military career after their nearly three-year enlistment period or enter the civilian workforce; both endeavors are aided by the Hebrew lessons taught on the military bases.
As one of the most poverty-stricken communities in the country, Israeli Bedouins are increasingly looking to military service to carve out a better life for themselves. But others have turned to crime, particularly the cross-border smuggling of drugs, weapons, and people from the West Bank and Sinai Peninsula. There have also been sporadic instances of Bedouin terrorist attacks, though Hamas’ efforts to recruit Bedouins to its cause have largely failed.
But ongoing land disputes between the Negev Bedouins and the Israeli government risks opening the door to extremism. The Bedouins have many recognized townships, but their claims over larger swaths of land and efforts to build unrecognized villages have put them at odds with Jerusalem, which sometimes orders the demolition of illegal construction. Establishing new neighborhoods requires the approval of Israel’s interior ministry, which has often rejected Bedouins’ right to build on state-owned land.
The unrecognised Bedouin village of Ras Jrabah is seen east of Dimona city in southern Israel, on May 29, 2024. (Photo by AHMAD GHARABLI/AFP via Getty Images)
These communities also lack basic services like water and electricity, and the warning sirens and shelters that offer protection from weapons attacks in other Israeli municipalities. Iran’s attack on Israel in April underscored this unmet need, when shrapnel from an intercepted missile seriously injured a 7-year-old Bedouin girl at her home in the unrecognized Negev village of al-Fur’ah.
Despite what some have described as state neglect, many Bedouins identify proudly with their Israeli identity. That allegiance has only grown in the face of new threats to the country.
“We’re here in Israel, and we know exactly who Hamas is and what we’re up against,” Idat said from Kerem Shalom. Asked whether Bedouins are conflicted about which side to support in the ongoing war, the commander pulled his national identity card from his wallet and held it up: “I’m Israeli. I was born here and I’m going to fight for my country.”
thedispatch.com · by Charlotte Lawson · June 24, 2024
10. Pentagon didn’t adequately track funds sent to Chinese research labs
Pentagon didn’t adequately track funds sent to Chinese research labs
militarytimes.com · by Zamone Perez · June 21, 2024
The Pentagon did not keep adequate track of funds awarded to Chinese research labs or other countries that could have been used to enhance pathogens of pandemic potential, according to a report published Tuesday by a Pentagon watchdog.
The Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General report was required in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act to look at grants, contracts and other forms of collaboration with China and affiliated parties on pathogens of pandemic potential between 2014 and 2023. Investigators did not find any funds were given to organizations for pathogen enhancement, but they ran into difficulty tracking the movement of funds through organizations.
The Pentagon did not track funds “to the level of detail necessary” to allow investigators to completely determine if funds went to Chinese or other foreign laboratories to enhance pathogens, according to the report.
The issue stemmed from the Pentagon not tracking how the institutions that received funds — which frequently contract out work to other institutions — spent the money. The report found that the Pentagon receives a list of intended secondhand recipients of funds during the application process, but organizations can change recipients while in the “performance period” without being required to document those changes.
The Defense Department “did not track funding at the level of detail necessary to enable the [inspector general] to completely and accurately determine if the (Defense Department) provided funding to Chinese research laboratories or other foreign countries for research related to the enhancement of pathogens of pandemic potential,” the report stated. “These limitations hindered our ability to determine the extent of (Defense Department) funds allocated for those research activities.”
The Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General notified Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, and former Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisconsin, in April that the watchdog agency would investigate the diversion of funds from the Pentagon into entities working to enhance pathogens.
In a January letter, Ernst and Gallagher requested a “comprehensive review” of possible experiments being conducted in foreign laboratories with Pentagon funds.
“The DoD OIG report is nothing short of jaw-dropping, with millions of U.S. tax dollars being funneled to China for shady experiments and a complicated web of mysteries that creates more questions than answers,” Ernst told Military Times Friday via email.
Investigators did find seven awards, sub-awards or fee-for-service agreements from the Army for research that involved potential enhancement of pathogens, according to the report. Army officials told investigators that the research did not “necessarily enhance the virus for pathogenic potential.”
Army officials offered investigators a couple examples of what the research they funded produced, such as the modification of a virus to infect a rodent versus a human. Another project looked at combining genetic sequences to produce a protein to develop antibodies in order to study immune responses, according to the report.
“We determined that (defense) officials viewed the enhancement of pathogens of pandemic potential as offensive biological work that does not align with the mission and authorities of the (Defense Department),” the report stated. “Army officials also stated that all pathogen research is for defensive purposes in support of understanding the threat, developing diagnostic systems to identify the threat, and developing medical countermeasures to prepare for, or respond to, the threat.”
Investigators also did not find that any of the $46.7 million awarded to EcoHealth Alliance ― which has come under fire from Republican lawmakers over its ties to the Wuhan Institute of Virology ― was sent to China.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology has been at the center of right-wing conspiracies and accusations of being the originator of the coronavirus pandemic.
Investigators’ findings corroborate an April 2023 Government Accountability Office report, which found that collected data is often incomplete or inaccurate.
About Zamone Perez
Zamone “Z” Perez is a reporter at Military Times. He previously worked at Foreign Policy and Ufahamu Africa. He is a graduate of Northwestern University, where he researched international ethics and atrocity prevention in his thesis. He can be found on Twitter @zamoneperez.
11. Tight congressional calendar squeezes lawmakers’ defense work
Tight congressional calendar squeezes lawmakers’ defense work
militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · June 24, 2024
The Senate has already left Capitol Hill for its Independence Day break, but House lawmakers will be back in Washington, D.C., this week for a blitz of work before the holiday.
Upon their return in mid-July, however, all members of Congress will feel the legislative time crunch as they confront a long list of tasks and a tight summer schedule ahead.
Both chambers are set to reconvene July 8, break one week later for the Republican National Convention, and then work for two more weeks before recessing for the summer. That’s only three weeks of legislative work between July 1 and early September.
Unfinished business includes a full Senate vote on the annual defense authorization bill, a full Senate vote on Veterans Affairs funding for fiscal year 2025 and votes in both chambers on the annual military appropriations measures. The hope is to finish all three by Sept. 30, although that goal may be overly ambitious given the limited schedule ahead.
Congressional staff are expected to negotiate all three measures behind the scenes in the coming months, though final votes may wait until after the November elections.
Wednesday, June 26
House Homeland Security — 10 a.m. — 310 Cannon
Cyber Workforce Gap
Outside experts will testify on the need to recruit more cyber specialists for key security roles.
House Veterans' Affairs — 10:15 a.m. — 360 Cannon
Benefits Claims Systems
Department officials will testify on shortfalls with the Veterans Benefits Claims Management System.
House Homeland Security — 2 p.m. — 310 Cannon
Intelligence/Analysis Oversight
Department of Homeland Security officials will testify on operations of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
House Oversight — 2 p.m. — 2154 Rayburn
DOD Background Checks
Military officials will testify on ongoing problems with the department’s background check system.
House Foreign Affairs — 2 p.m. — 2172 Rayburn
Europe Operations
State Department officials will testify on European operations and challenges ahead.
House Veterans' Affairs — 2:15 p.m. — 360 Cannon
VA Health Care Network
Department officials will testify on the structure of VA’s health care network.
Thursday, June 27
House Veterans' Affairs — 10:30 a.m. — 360 Cannon
Reducing Veteran Homelessness
Department officials and outside experts will testify on new approaches to help homeless veterans.
House Foreign Affairs — 1 p.m. — 2200 Rayburn
Indo-Pacific Competition
State Department officials will testify on challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
House Foreign Affairs — 2 p.m. — 2172 Rayburn
Central America
State Department officials will testify on the rise of socialism in Central America.
About Leo Shane III
Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.
12. Weapons of choice in China’s territorial disputes? Axes, knives, ‘jostling.’
I would think the FIlipino sailors would break out the traditional Kris to defend themselves. Filipinos can be pretty handy with a blade.
Weapons of choice in China’s territorial disputes? Axes, knives, ‘jostling.’
Experts say that China’s use of simple weapons rather than firearms has been a tactical choice, but it may not always prevent escalation.
By Anika Arora Seth
June 22, 2024 at 5:00 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Anika Arora Seth · June 22, 2024
When Chinese forces violently intercepted Philippine naval ships Wednesday in a disputed area of the South China Sea, they didn’t use handguns or rifles, let alone the more high-tech weaponry now widely seen in modern conflicts.
Instead, videos shared by the Philippine military showed the Chinese Coast Guard wielding pickaxes and knives as they made their bid to exert control over the area. Experts say that the use of these simple weapons was a tactical choice.
“The underlying logic is something like, ‘Sticks and stones can break my bones, but are less likely to lead to war, probably,’” said Daniel Mattingly, a Yale University political science professor who studies the Chinese military.
China, a sprawling country that shares land borders with 14 countries and has maritime borders with a further six, has volatile territorial disputes with several of its neighbors. But over recent years, its troops have often used simple weapons while battling over these borders, despite the considerable advances in technology used by the Chinese military in the period.
The tactic has been used notably on China’s border with India, according to unverified videos of clashes that have been shared on social media.
In a 2022 clash with the Indian military over a portion of northeastern India that China claims, Chinese and Indian forces appeared to engage in hand-to-hand combat and use stones and makeshift clubs as weapons. In 2017, front-line Chinese and Indian troops did not carry weapons and instead fought by “jostling” — or bumping chests — amid China’s effort to seize land from tiny Bhutan, a close ally of India’s.
China’s use of nonconventional weaponry may be a strategic move to avoid sparking escalation and to stave off international attention, particularly from the United States. But experts warned that while it may have worked this time, it was risky.
“Maybe [China] could point to the idea that these were tools and not weapons in this instance [in the South China Sea],” said Harrison Prétat, deputy director and fellow with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “But we’re getting pretty close to the line.”
In the incident this week in the South China Sea, the Chinese Coast Guard boarded Philippine navy vessels to damage and confiscate equipment, according to Philippine officials, who said China aimed to stop Philippine ships from resupplying the Sierra Madre warship on the Second Thomas Shoal, a reef that has become a focal point of the maritime dispute.
A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington disputed this and asserted that the Philippines had illegally intruded into waters without China’s permission and “violated international law.”
“The Chinese side took necessary measures in accordance with [the] law to safeguard its sovereignty, which was lawful and justified, and done in a professional and restrained manner,” Liu Pengyu wrote in an email to The Washington Post.
U.S. officials have repeatedly said that an armed attack on a Philippine government vessel in the South China Sea would trigger the 1951 mutual treaty that commits the United States and the Philippines to defend each other in the Pacific.
“Not using guns makes it ambiguous whether the United States is obligated to step in and potentially aid the Philippines,” Mattingly said. “If they did use guns, then there is a stronger case that the U.S. should.”
The Philippines said Friday morning that it does not intend to invoke that treaty in response to this week’s altercation, with Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin telling reporters that the government did not consider this week’s confrontation with the Chinese Coast Guard to be an armed attack.
“We saw bolo, axe, nothing beyond that,” Bersamin said, according to the Associated Press.
While the use of sharp objects could limit the risk of escalation, it can still prove dangerous and even lethal. In the South China Sea this week, a Philippine sailor lost a finger. In June 2020, 20 Indian soldiers — and at least four Chinese soldiers — died, according to official accounts from both nations.
China and India have disputed the 2,100-mile Himalayan border for decades. Crude battles date as far back as the 1970s, when the armies confronted each other via fistfights and stone pelting. Under the terms of a 1996 bilateral agreement, border troops are barred from using firearms within two kilometers of the border, called the Line of Actual Control.
Recent Sino-Indian border disputes have centered on the Tawang sector, a sector that lies within the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as around Ladakh — at India’s far northeastern tip — and the Galwan Valley. A clash in 2022 over the Tawang sector took the shape of a gun-free faceoff, leading to hand-to-hand combat and troop injuries. This clash marked the most serious incident between India and China since 2020.
On another Himalayan border, in 2017, Chinese and Indian troops squared off in Bhutan over an area that China claimed belonged to them but that India and Bhutan maintained to be Bhutanese. In that skirmish, too, there were no reports of gun use or weaponry. Instead, the fighting involved “jostling,” in which soldiers from India and soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army bumped chests, without punching or kicking, to push the other side backward but did not open fire.
Sushant Singh, a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in India and a lecturer at Yale, said there was often gunfire on India’s borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh. “The PLA’s culture is very different from what a Western military culture would be, where use of weaponry is far more frequent,” he said.
But September 2020 brought a deviation from this norm, when — amid public pressure following the deaths of Indian soldiers in a clash months before — shots were fired at the border for the first time in decades, with both sides accusing the other of firing warning shots.
“Once either side decides that the norm no longer exists, it doesn’t exist on both sides,” Singh said. “Think of them as very weak guardrails, which can be broken off and then restarted.”
The Washington Post · by Anika Arora Seth · June 22, 2024
13. How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide in the Battle of the Black Sea
A mission type order combined with innovation.
Graphics and photos at the link: https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-innovation-warfare-ukraine-russia-ce35adfa?mod=hp_lead_pos1
Excerpts:
In spring 2022, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was blockading Ukraine’s ports, its main export routes, threatening amphibious landings and soon launching cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tasked his top security and defense commanders with finding a solution.
Ukraine’s military had sunk the Russian fleet’s flagship, the Moskva, on April 14 with antiship missiles not far from Odesa. But Ukraine had no large ships, an outmatched air force and no missiles that could reach deep into the Black Sea or to the fleet’s base in Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.
Lt. Gen. Vasyl Maliuk, deputy head of the SBU, turned to Lukashevych, a career military officer with a background in engineering and experience in clandestine warfare.
At the start of the war, Lukashevych took charge of a special unit in SBU counterintelligence with a simple brief: to find unconventional ways to degrade the Russian military. A keen student of military history, he recalled how Ukrainian Cossacks in the 17th century had used large numbers of small, fast and maneuverable boats to defeat the more powerful navy of the Ottoman Empire.
Applying that lesson to modern times was challenging. The craft would have to travel hundreds of miles undetected, outsmarting Russian radar and signal jamming while carrying hundreds of pounds of explosives.
One technical innovation came to Lukashevych at a military training ground when he saw an aerial drone controlled from the ground with the help of Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet service. Lukashevych tasked the dronemaker with constructing a prototype using Starlink for communications. Three weeks later the general was on the shore controlling a boat 10 miles away.
The craft was 16 feet long, able to carry 220 pounds of explosives and sat low in the water to avoid detection by radar.
“We made a drone that hides in the waves,” said Lukashevych.
How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide in the Battle of the Black Sea
Unmanned vessels developed in the fight against Russia are part of a revolution in modern warfare
https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-innovation-warfare-ukraine-russia-ce35adfa?mod=hp_lead_pos1
By James MarsonFollow
/ Photographs by Emanuele Satolli for WSJ
Updated June 24, 2024 12:02 am ET
KYIV, Ukraine—The Russian naval corvette had just left the safety of Sevastopol Bay one morning last fall when an explosion ripped a hole in its hull.
As tugs pulled the ship back to port on Sept. 14, Russian state news agencies claimed it had fought off the latest attack by Ukrainian naval drones—small, explosive craft that had for months been ramming Russian naval ships in the Black Sea. This time, Ukrainian officials added a twist, saying their forces had used an “experimental weapon” as well as drones.
In an interview, the architect of Ukraine’s groundbreaking naval drone program said that the attack marked a first in warfare: The Russian ship had been disabled by a mine laid by a Ukrainian unmanned craft that had hauled it some 250 miles before returning to port.
“Before, naval drones were used mostly for surveillance or logistics,” said Brig. Gen. Ivan Lukashevych of the Security Service of Ukraine, the country’s main security and intelligence agency. “We are doing many things that no one in the world has done.”
Ukraine has sunk or damaged around two dozen Russian ships of all sizes using explosive drones or mines delivered by low-slung craft about the size of a small fishing boat. Sea drones caused severe damage to a bridge from Russia to occupied Crimea that Russia used to supply its forces in Ukraine. Ukraine has also targeted Russian ships and port facilities with missiles provided by the West.
As a result, Russia has dispersed the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet far from Sevastopol. Ukraine has been able to restart exports worth billions from its main port of Odesa. Missiles launched from Russian ships take longer to reach Ukraine, giving air-defense crews critical extra time to intercept them. Russia has relocated reconnaissance planes, jet fighters, helicopters, aerial drones and electronic-jamming systems from the front lines to counter Ukraine’s sea drones, easing the pressure on Ukraine’s embattled ground forces.
Smoke rises from a shipyard hit by Ukrainian missile attack in Sevastopol, Crimea, last September. PHOTO: REUTERS TV/REUTERS
The drones are revolutionizing warfare on the seas much as uncrewed aerial craft have in the skies. They are relatively cheap and hard to detect and defend against. Their use shows how smaller, poorer nations can level the naval playing field against larger, more-powerful navies.
The U.S., which for years has focused on defending against drones or using them for surveillance, is taking note. The Pentagon in August announced an initiative to deploy hundreds of small, cheap air and sea drones to counter China’s growing military mass.
Lukashevych, in his first interview with a Western publication, laid out details of Ukrainian operations and plans to develop the boats. The security service, known as the SBU, has spearheaded efforts in partnership with the Ukrainian Navy. More recently, the country’s military intelligence agency has also entered the fray.
Lacking the resources to build up its own conventional navy, Ukraine is seeking to create squads of 10 to 20 drones with separate functions that, when combined, replicate the capabilities of a single warship, Lukashevych said.
Ukraine’s military recently revealed it had mounted a multiple rocket launcher on a naval drone and used it to attack a target on land.
“We do have a fleet, but it’s divided into smaller elements,” said Lukashevych, better known by his call sign, Hunter.
Brig. Gen. Ivan Lukashevych heads an unconventional-warfare unit of Ukraine’s SBU security service.
A Lesson From Cossacks
Ukraine’s use of sea drones accords with its broader approach to war against a much larger and wealthier enemy. From the start of Russia’s invasion in 2022, Ukraine has relied on quick thinking, nimbleness and a technological edge to sap the strength of its powerful but plodding adversary.
Russia has adapted to counter some of the Ukrainian innovations and advanced weapons provided by the West, spurring further efforts by Ukraine and its partners to upgrade them. Russia is using a variety of measures against naval drones, from surveillance aircraft to detect them to electronic-warfare systems to cut communications.
In spring 2022, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was blockading Ukraine’s ports, its main export routes, threatening amphibious landings and soon launching cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tasked his top security and defense commanders with finding a solution.
Ukraine’s military had sunk the Russian fleet’s flagship, the Moskva, on April 14 with antiship missiles not far from Odesa. But Ukraine had no large ships, an outmatched air force and no missiles that could reach deep into the Black Sea or to the fleet’s base in Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.
Lt. Gen. Vasyl Maliuk, deputy head of the SBU, turned to Lukashevych, a career military officer with a background in engineering and experience in clandestine warfare.
At the start of the war, Lukashevych took charge of a special unit in SBU counterintelligence with a simple brief: to find unconventional ways to degrade the Russian military. A keen student of military history, he recalled how Ukrainian Cossacks in the 17th century had used large numbers of small, fast and maneuverable boats to defeat the more powerful navy of the Ottoman Empire.
Applying that lesson to modern times was challenging. The craft would have to travel hundreds of miles undetected, outsmarting Russian radar and signal jamming while carrying hundreds of pounds of explosives.
One technical innovation came to Lukashevych at a military training ground when he saw an aerial drone controlled from the ground with the help of Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet service. Lukashevych tasked the dronemaker with constructing a prototype using Starlink for communications. Three weeks later the general was on the shore controlling a boat 10 miles away.
The craft was 16 feet long, able to carry 220 pounds of explosives and sat low in the water to avoid detection by radar.
“We made a drone that hides in the waves,” said Lukashevych.
A Ukrainian serviceman operates a Magura naval drone.
On Sept. 17, 2022, they were ready to attack the Russian naval base in Sevastopol. The Ukrainians launched 12 sea drones at night, but as the first reconnaissance drone approached Sevastopol, the signal cut out. The Ukrainians, who had thought that Starlink was working there, were shocked. A Ukrainian official tried to persuade Elon Musk to get SpaceX, his rocket and satellite company, to turn Starlink on, but to no avail. Musk later wrote on social media that he declined to activate Starlink because, if he had, “then SpaceX would be explicitly complicit in a major act of war and conflict escalation.”
The reconnaissance drone ran out of gas and ran aground in a bay near Sevastopol. Russian authorities blew it up.
‘Fighting With Metal’
A month later, Lukashevych’s team tried again after switching satellite-internet providers.
They launched 12 sea drones toward Sevastopol on Oct. 29. Of the seven that made it, three attacked the Admiral Makarov, a frigate, just outside Sevastopol Bay. One of them smashed into its right side, knocking out two engines and the antenna, cutting the ship’s communications.
The other four drones slipped into the bay. Then came a surprise: The Russians, perhaps forewarned or wary after discovering the beached drone a month earlier, had set up barriers and a huge net.
One drone tried to sneak around through shallow water, where it encountered the minesweeper Ivan Golubets. The ship turned on a powerful searchlight and began firing from a machine gun. The drone smashed into its stern.
The Russians turned on electronic jammers, knocking out GPS signals used to guide the craft. So the commander of Ukraine’s navy, a native of Sevastopol, took charge, directing the drones using images from their cameras.
One of the craft was detonated near the Admiral Essen, a frigate, damaging its propellers. Another smashed into a refueling station.
At the same time, the damaged Admiral Makarov was limping back to port with a sea drone in pursuit. Russian coastal artillery batteries opened fire on the frigate, apparently assuming it was an enemy ship. The boat eventually managed to signal it was friendly.
The Russians sent a speedboat to try to intercept the drone. As the drone veered toward the Russian craft, Lukashevych saw through the onboard camera that several Russian sailors were jumping into the water. “It shows their sailors are frightened of going on the water because they are fighting with metal, not with sailors,” said Lukashevych.
The attack was a success. With a handful of small sea drones, Ukraine had caused panic, damaged three ships and port facilities, and showed it could hit boats anywhere in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.
A Bigger Boat
President Zelensky set a new target: the Crimean Bridge, the main link from Russia to Crimea and a key logistical artery for Russia’s military.
At first, Lukashevych had little to go on beyond photos of the bridge, with road and railway spans stretching 12 miles across the Kerch Strait opened with fanfare by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2018.
Then Maliuk, who had led the SBU since summer 2022, handed him a secret booklet: the bridge’s design documentation. Further information on the bridge was obtained from open sources, such as videos posted online by someone on a yacht sailing underneath.
The details allowed Lukashevych to calculate that around 1,750 pounds of TNT equivalent would be needed to blow up a support pillar. The boat would need enough fuel to travel some 500 miles, about 300 gallons.
He was going to need a bigger boat.
This SeaBaby naval drone on display at the SBU museum, traveled more than 3,000 miles to deliver mines.
Lukashevych pulled together a team of military and civilians, including engineers, naval officers and communications experts. They made a prototype and loaded it with more than 3,000 pounds of sandbags. They tested new materials to make it less visible to radar. And they gave it a name: SeaBaby.
By mid-2023, they were ready to go. On July 16, five sea drones were dispatched into the Black Sea, controlled from a command bunker some 500 miles away in Kyiv. They had to circumvent a large number of helicopters, warplanes and boats to avoid detection, adding 45 miles to the journey.
As the first two drones sliced along the southern coast of Crimea, the operators spotted the Admiral Essen, the Russian frigate damaged during the Sevastopol raid. They wanted to attack the ship, but Maliuk told them to focus on their original task.
They approached the bridge, carefully dodging commercial ships. A video from the Kyiv bunker later broadcast on Ukrainian television shows a tense scene with Maliuk and Lukashevych crouched near the drone operators. The first boat speeds toward the pillar of the railway bridge, but the delay in response time between the video, the controller and the steering mechanism complicates quick maneuvers, and the drone misses. After a quick U-turn, the boat slams into a pillar of the road bridge. The second drone arrows toward the railway bridge.
Lukashevych badgers the operator: “To the left, to the left. Go, go.”
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The Kerch Bridge, which connects Russia to the occupied Crimean Peninsula, was disabled in a strike by Ukrainian naval drones last year. Photo: Reuters
“Hunter, take it easy, he gets it,” Maliuk cautions.
A black-and-white video from the bridge shows the moment the drone strikes, causing a large explosion and a cloud of dust.
“Got it!” Lukashevych yells, as the room erupts in cheers. Maliuk pumps his fist.
Russian officials played down the extent of the damage, but Ukrainian intelligence said it was even worse than an earlier strike by a truck bomb. Maliuk and Lukashevych said that, even after repairs, Russia no longer sends heavy military equipment, such as tanks and ammunition, over the bridge.
The Mine Operation
Lukashevych was already planning another operation. The Russians had built larger barriers at the entrance to the port in Sevastopol, all but ruling out sea-drone strikes there. So he came up with an alternative: laying sea mines.
Lukashevych’s team built a special SeaBaby that could lay mines that Ukraine had received from a Western partner. The so-called bottom mines are made of plastic and weigh about 400 pounds and are hard to find as they nestle into the mud under shallow water. They use acoustic and electromagnetic sensors to detect the presence of a ship, triggering a detonation.
For a month and a half, the team tracked the routes taken by naval ships and civilian traffic, before sending a SeaBaby to lay two mines. On Sept. 14, the Samum, a guided-missile corvette, triggered one of the mines, which ripped a hole in its stern. The boat is still under repair in dry dock.
The SeaBaby went back and forth in the following weeks, covering more than 3,000 miles as it laid about 15 more mines. During one of the trips, detected by three Raptor-class patrol boats, it fired back with a grenade launcher, scattering the enemy craft.
On Oct. 11, an explosion tore into the side of the Pavel Derzhavin, a large patrol boat, as it was entering Sevastopol Bay. It limped into port for checks.
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet
In operation
Damaged*
Destroyed
CRUISERS
Slava class
GUIDED-MISSILE FRIGATES
Grigorovich class
Struck by missile
Sea drone
CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINES
Kilo II class
FRIGATES
Krivak I/Krivak II class
TANK-LANDING SHIPS
Gren class
Alligator class
Ropucha class
Unknown
CORVETTES
Bykov class
Sviyazhsk class
Tarantul class
Uragan class
Bora class
Sea mine
TUGS
Various classes†
LANDING CRAFT
Serna class
PATROL CRAFT
Raptor class
Ondatra class
BK 16 class
Bomb
Aerial drone
*Some damaged vessels have since been repaired.
†For drawing purposes the Goliat-class tug has been used to represent all tugs in the Russian fleet.
Note: Drawings are approximate. As of June 6
Sources: Janes (Black Sea Fleet, strikes); Ukrainian military (two Grigorovich frigates struck by sea drone, one Bykov-class corvette and one tug both struck by sea mine, one tug struck by sea drone); staff reports
Andrew Barnett/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The Pavel Derzhavin was dispatched to another port for repairs on Oct. 13, but hit a mine as it left Sevastopol Bay. A large tugboat dispatched to rescue the ship, but also struck a mine and had to be towed back to port itself.
Days later, an explosion hit a modern anti-mine ship, one of only two in Russian service.
Meanwhile, another Ukrainian player was getting into the game. Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, known as HUR, had started working with the manufacturer who built the first drones with the SBU. They had worked together to develop their drone, now called Magura, to focus on open-sea operations where speed and maneuverability are critical.
A HUR operator demonstrated the drone’s agility on a lake one recent day, sending it carving through the water at high speed.
The console used to operate a Magura naval drone.
The Magura naval drone had its first successful operation in November when it sank two Russian landing craft in a port in western Crimea.
It caught other ships out at sea, including a corvette, a large landing ship and a fast patrol boat launched in 2021. HUR had damaged that boat, the Sergei Kotov, in two earlier attacks.
On March 5, HUR operators closed in on the ship again with several drones. The Sergei Kotov tried to evade them by weaving between civilian ships, “but it didn’t help,” said the HUR operator, who was piloting one of the drones.
HUR released video footage from the drones of at least one huge explosion. The agency said the ship sank.
Serhii Bosak and Nikita Nikolaienko contributed to this article.
A Magura naval drone carves tight arcs at a site used for testing.
Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com
14. How a Texas Factory Will Become a Key Ammo Supplier for the U.S., Ukraine
The operative word is "will." The question is why wasn't our defense industrial base ready? What if the US needed this ammunition for sustained direct US military operations?
How a Texas Factory Will Become a Key Ammo Supplier for the U.S., Ukraine
A General Dynamics facility slated to make artillery shells is part of the Pentagon’s push to produce more weapons domestically
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/dallas-texas-ammo-ukraine-3ce81762?mod=latest_headlines
By Doug Cameron
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June 23, 2024 9:00 pm ET
MESQUITE, Texas—Walking past new hydraulic presses and orange robots handling semi-finished artillery shells, U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth had a question for a manufacturing company executive.
“Do the Russians have this technology?” Wormuth asked Ibrahim Kulekci, chief executive of the Turkish firm that designed and installed key machinery in the plant.
Kulekci said they wouldn’t get it from his firm. “Keep it that way,” Wormuth responded.
The conflict in Ukraine has left the U.S. military and allies wanting for shells and other firepower, triggering a push to quickly boost production. Long reliant on World War II-era plants, the Pentagon is spending $6 billion to revamp them with modern equipment and expand output at new facilities that can churn out a variety of munitions, from shells to mortars.
Armed with a slice of a $1 billion contract, defense contractor General Dynamics GD -0.46%decrease; red down pointing triangle is leaning on complex machines to make ammunition faster and more efficiently.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. each month produced around 14,000 of the commonly used 155mm shells, which are about 2 feet long and weigh around 100 pounds. Ukraine has been firing thousands of shells a day from U.S.-made M777 howitzers, weapons designed to hit targets as far as 20 miles away.
Ukrainian servicemen preparing to fire an M777 howitzer toward Russian positions on the front in Donetsk, Ukraine. PHOTO: FRANCISCO SECO/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Pentagon is seeking to boost U.S. output of 155mm shells from around 30,000 a month currently to 100,000 by the end of 2025. The Texas plant will take the nation more than halfway to that target, with the first of three production lines set to start this fall.
The shell factory is among U.S. efforts to bring home the production of materials deemed critical to national security, such as explosives, rare-earth minerals and semiconductors. Lockheed Martin LMT 0.27%increase; green up pointing triangle is doubling output of its Javelin and Himars rockets at facilities in Camden, Ark. A subsidiary of L3Harris Technologies LHX 0.63%increase; green up pointing triangle is expanding a nearby solid rocket motor plant.
The push to quickly expand domestic manufacturing will rely heavily on foreign countries. Machine tools and other critical gear needed to run domestic factories come from plants in countries such as Japan, Germany and Turkey. Defense supply chains that took decades to develop outside the U.S. could take as long to replicate domestically, industry executives said.
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The 155mm shell is the most requested artillery munition of the war in Ukraine. WSJ’s Alistair MacDonald explains why it is so popular and whether the U.S. and other global arms suppliers can cope with the demand. Photo: Viacheslav Ratynskyi/Reuters
Pumping out shells
The facility here is far removed from decades-old shell plants in the U.S. that feature cacophonous clanking from aging machines or fiery blast furnaces.
The new plant is quiet and compact, sitting next to a Frito-Lay distribution facility in a modern industrial park east of Dallas. General Dynamics targeted the Mesquite area as it operates a munitions plant about a dozen miles north in Garland, providing a trained workforce and access to nearby suppliers.
“You have all the elements here necessary to get the job done,” said Phebe Novakovic, chief executive of General Dynamics.
Inside the plant, 30-foot-tall, green-painted presses fashion steel bars into the shape of shell casings. A small furnace heats the partly finished shells to 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit, allowing them to be shaped more precisely. They are then transferred to cooling tunnels and checked for quality.
Most of the process is automated. Roughly 27 machine operators are required, with the bulk of the planned workforce of 400 focused on maintaining the computer-controlled equipment.
A robot arm places a billet in a hot ironing press, where the part will be pressed again to reduce the wall thickness and be elongated.
DESIREE RIOS FOR WSJ
General Dynamics selected Repkon, whose headquarters are in Turkey, to supply the presses because no U.S.-based vendor could meet the deadline of having the plant up and running in two years.
Turkey has emerged as a big defense-equipment producer, including drones widely used in Ukraine. Its close ties with U.S. defense companies were interrupted in 2019 when Turkey bought a Russian-made missile defense system, triggering its ejection from the F-35 fighter jet program. Diplomatic relations have since improved.
“Without the support from Turkey, this facility would be empty,” Wormuth said after a plant tour with Novakovic.
The robots are made in Germany by Kuka. The firm was bought in 2016 by Midea, a Chinese appliance maker. The equipment isn’t subject to any of the sanctions imposed on some Chinese machinery and raw materials, an Army spokesperson said.
“U.S. companies could have duplicated a lot of the machinery, but not quickly enough,” said John Kelly, CEO of the U.S. arm of Hanwha Defense 012450 0.00%increase; green up pointing triangle. The South Korean company has worked with General Dynamics, though it wasn’t involved in the Mesquite project.
155mm shells at the General Dynamics plant.
The Texas plant is one link of the shell supply chain. The steel shell casings produced here are trucked to an Army plant in Iowa. There, the casings are packed with explosives made at facilities in Pennsylvania and Tennessee. When completed, the 155mm shells are shipped to Army warehouses or directly to Ukraine.
Building an ecosystem
For years when the Pentagon needed to cut its budget, orders for munitions were among the first items on the chopping block.
A different approach is under way, as the Pentagon seeks for the U.S. to be self-sufficient in producing key ammunition like artillery shells. In January it outlined a long-range strategy to prop up the defense industrial ecosystem.
The Defense Department said it is committed to maintaining output at elevated levels for several years, and the new plant machinery allows a variety of shells and mortars to be produced on the same line. Boosting domestic stockpiles is critical to prepare for future conflicts, officials have said.
Shells coming off the new production lines cost the Army the same as existing ones from older facilities. They also have improved accuracy and a lower failure rate, Army acquisition chief Doug Bush said.
The Ukraine conflict has charged growth at General Dynamics’s combat systems division, which also makes equipment such as Abrams tanks and Stryker armored vehicles. Demand for war-fighting gear pushed sales in the combat division up 20% in the first quarter after rising 13% last year.
“We’re in an ugly period right now, and that is driving the need for our allies and the United States to arm in the face of threat,” said Novakovic at a General Dynamics’s investor conference in February.
Write to Doug Cameron at Doug.Cameron@wsj.com
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Appeared in the June 24, 2024, print edition as 'Texas Ammo Factory to Supply U.S., Ukraine'.
15. What It Would Take for the U.S. Dollar To Collapse
As many know, I have been raising concerns about the dollar as the reserve currency and that our debt is an existential threat to the US. Someone has taken me to task saying that I am ill-informed and overly sensationalizing (in a polite and professional way) and recommended I do more study of the issue.
I found this article to be useful in explaining the strength of the dollar as the reserve currency (but not the only one). This article could be an "indications and warnings" list to observe for potential collapse but the conclusion/bottomline is all important.
Excerpts:
Since the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, many of the world's central banks have relied on the U.S. dollar to back up the value of their currencies. Through its reserve currency status, the dollar receives extra legitimacy in the eyes of domestic users, currency traders, and participants in international transactions.
The U.S. dollar is not the only reserve currency in the world, though it is the most prevalent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved four other reserve currencies: the euro, the British pound sterling, the Japanese yen, and the Chinese yuan.
...
The Bottom Line
The commercial viability of the U.S. dollar is unchallenged. The dollar is used globally as a currency in worldwide transactions, most oil trades are done in U.S. dollars, and the country itself is the largest economy in the world and a politically and economically stable nation.
Some countries aim to de-dollarize or reduce their dependency on the U.S. dollar, but it is still essential for global business and is a widely held reserve currency. There is no reason to expect the U.S. dollar to collapse in the near future.5
15
Such a change would require the entire world to change its adherence to an international monetary system that has the greenback at its center. As yet, no replacement is anywhere on the horizon.
What It Would Take for the U.S. Dollar To Collapse
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex-currencies/091416/what-would-it-take-us-dollar-collapse.asp
By SEAN ROSS Updated June 17, 2024
Reviewed by THOMAS J. CATALANO
Fact checked by SUZANNE KVILHAUG
AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / Contributor / Getty Images
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Imagine waking up to a world where the U.S. dollar (USD), the bedrock of global finance, has collapsed. This scenario may seem far-fetched, but it's a narrative often found on dubious platforms pushing gold, crypto, and extremist political views, and it occasionally creeps into mainstream discourse. The greenback has always had its external foes during the long period of its dominance—from the communist bloc and anti-colonialists to contemporary adversaries like China, Russia, and other emerging powers. Meanwhile, critics argue that mounting inflation, the rising U.S. federal deficit, and government entitlements could bring down the USD's dominance from within.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Currencies collapse when there is a sustained loss of faith in their stability or usefulness as a store of value or medium of exchange, often because of economic mismanagement, political instability, or a significant shift in global market conditions.
- The value of a currency is determined by the demand for it, which is very high for the U.S. dollar, given the U.S.'s position as the world's largest economy and perceived political stability.
- The U.S. dollar's prevalence as the world's primary reserve currency, making up 58% of worldwide currency reserves, further contributes to its high demand and stability.
- Despite occasional challenges and concerns, the likelihood of the U.S. dollar collapsing is considered to be extremely low, given its strong global position and the underlying strength of the U.S. economy.
Given the ever-present economic and political uncertainty of geopolitics, pundits have predicted the dollar's collapse ever since the greenback gained worldwide supremacy. They've been wrong each time—though a prognosticator needs to be right just once to gain fame in financial circles. Nevertheless, we shouldn't be too sanguine: history shows that even the sturdiest of human edifices crumble, becoming ruins future generations barely notice as they trammel them underfoot.
To be clear, there are no such signs on the horizon. While about a fifth of the foreign currency reserves of the world's central banks have moved away over the last quarter century, from 71% to 58%, that's still a dominant position of strength for the greenback worldwide, let alone as a worthwhile currency within the U.S. In this article, we'll explore the calamitous coincidence of events needed to dethrone the dollar, examining historical precedents, contemporary vulnerabilities, and potential scenarios.
Why Currencies Collapse
A currency collapse is a severe and sudden decline in the value of a nation's currency, leading to economic instability, financial distress, and often political turmoil. This phenomenon includes skyrocketing inflation, vastly increased prices for imports, and a mass movement of investors out of the currency, if not the home country itself. In simple terms, a currency collapse means that the money people use every day loses its value rapidly, making it difficult to buy goods and services, repay debts, and maintain economic stability.
Argentina, Hungary, Chile, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Germany have all experienced horrific currency crises since 1900. The root of any collapse stems from a lack of faith in the stability or usefulness of money to serve as an effective store of value or medium of exchange. As soon as users stop believing that a currency is useful, that currency is in trouble.
History is full of such currency collapses. Paraphrasing Ernest Hemingway's line in "A Sun Also Rises" about bankruptcy, such catastrophes happen "gradually, then suddenly." Events slowly build, but the collapse itself will be swift as everyone races for the exits.
What Is a Currency Crisis?
To start off, we can borrow from a now-classic paper by Graciela Kaminsky in the wake of the major currency crises in Mexico and across Asia in the 1990s, which provides the often-used categories for how economists have defined what a currency collapse is.1
2
Here are the types of crises (the examples are our own):
1. Crises with current account problems: These crises are marked by a loss of competitiveness, often because of real exchange rate appreciations. This can happen because of various factors, including overvaluation of the currency, rising production costs, or trade policies that disadvantage domestic producers. When a country’s goods and services become too expensive for foreign buyers, the demand for its currency falls, leading to devaluation and potential collapse.
Example: Argentina's currency crisis in 2001 was partly because of a significant loss of competitiveness. The fixed exchange rate regime led to an overvalued peso, resulting in a severe current account deficit and, ultimately, a currency collapse.
2. Crises of financial excesses: These arise from booms in financial markets, characterized by a previous and unsustainable growth in domestic credit.
Example: In 2008, Iceland experienced a financial crisis characterized by a rapid expansion in credit and financial markets. The country's banks accumulated significant foreign debt, and when the global financial crisis hit, these financial excesses led to a collapse of the Icelandic krona.
3. Crises of sovereign debt problems: These are linked to "unsustainable" foreign debt levels.
Example: In the early 2010s, Greece's debt crisis was driven by catastrophic levels of foreign debt. The country's inability to service its debt led to severe austerity measures and a dramatic devaluation of its economic stability within the eurozone.
Most global oil transactions are conducted in petrodollars, meaning sales and revenues of oil transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars.
4. Crises with fiscal deficits: These result from expansionary fiscal policies. When investors perceive that a government is unable to manage its economy effectively, they may withdraw their investments, leading to a currency collapse.
Example: Brazil faced a currency crisis in 1999, exacerbated by large fiscal deficits. The government's expansionary fiscal policies led to a loss of confidence, resulting in a sharp devaluation of the Brazilian real.3
5. Sudden-stop crises: These occur because of sudden reversals in capital flows, typically triggered by sharp increases in global interest rates. These crises, then, are externally driven. Countries heavily reliant on commodity exports, like oil or metals, can see their currencies plummet if global prices for these commodities fall sharply.
Example: In 1994, Mexico sustained a sudden stop in capital inflows triggered by a sharp rise in U.S. interest rates. This external shock caused a massive outflow of capital, leading to a severe devaluation of the peso.
6. Self-fulfilling crises: These occur without any apparent domestic or external vulnerabilities.
Example: In 1997, the Thai government took the baht off its peg to the dollar, given currency trading pressure that had suddenly appeared in the previous months. This marked the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis an example of a self-fulfilling crisis. Initially, there were no clear signs of vulnerability, but speculative attacks on the baht led to a loss of confidence and a dramatic devaluation.
How a U.S. Dollar Currency Collapse Could Happen
Now that we know how a currency could go under, let's imagine a scenario not too far from those depicted in the jump cuts at the beginning of post-apocalyptic movies. The dollar collapsing would require the convergence of improbable events that would tear much of society apart. The scenario is heuristic, not predictive.
- Trigger event: A combination of escalating geopolitical tensions and a major cyberattack on U.S. financial institutions severely disrupts global markets.
- Loss of confidence: Investors panic, rapidly selling off U.S. Treasurys and other dollar-denominated assets, triggering a steep decline in the dollar's value.
- Inflationary spiral: The weakened dollar makes imports more expensive, fueling already high inflation rates. The U.S. Federal Reserve raises interest rates aggressively to combat inflation, but this has little effect, even as domestic businesses can't find the dollars to pay for materials and keep workers on. Economic activity now collapses.
- Debt crisis: The combination of higher interest rates and a sliding economy makes it difficult for the U.S. government to service its massive debt. Concerns about a potential default rise, further eroding confidence in the dollar.
-
Economic Crisis: The U.S. economy plunges into a deep recession, marked by high unemployment, business failures, and a collapse in consumer spending. Anyone who can move their money abroad is doing so.
- Loss of reserve status: Foreign governments take the cue, and central banks, alarmed by the dollar's instability and the U.S.'s economic woes, begin a race to get themselves out of USD before everyone else does. This breakdown in demand for the USD is self-fulfilling: no one wants to be the last ones holding increasingly worthless greenbacks.
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Search for alternatives: Countries and investors shift into alternative currencies, such as the euro, Chinese yuan, or a basket of currencies, for international trade and investment. The world economy is reeling, too, as currencies pegged to the dollar are in free fall, and the declining dollar is wiping out much of the value in central banks worldwide.
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Social unrest: Economic hardship and growing inequality fuel widespread social unrest, further destabilizing the country and undermining any calming messages representatives put out to quell the damage.
- Dollar collapse: The dollar loses its status as a viable currency and gets no takers for international transactions. The U.S. faces a prolonged period of economic and political tumult.
Strengths of the U.S. Dollar
Since the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, many of the world's central banks have relied on the U.S. dollar to back up the value of their currencies. Through its reserve currency status, the dollar receives extra legitimacy in the eyes of domestic users, currency traders, and participants in international transactions.4
The U.S. dollar is not the only reserve currency in the world, though it is the most prevalent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved four other reserve currencies: the euro, the British pound sterling, the Japanese yen, and the Chinese yuan.5
Below is a table of advantages the USD has as a globally dominant currency.
StrengthDescriptionGlobal Reserve CurrencyThe USD is the primary reserve currency, held by central banks and financial institutions for international transactions and as a safeguard against economic instability.Economic Stability and SizeThe U.S. has the largest and most diversified economy, with strong legal and political frameworks that instill confidence in the USD, making it a safe haven during global uncertainty.Deep and Liquid Financial MarketsThe U.S. has highly developed and liquid financial markets, including the largest stock and bond markets, making the USD attractive for reliable investment prospects.Trade and InvestmentThe USD is the preferred currency for global trade and investment, with many commodities priced in dollars and substantial foreign direct investment flowing into the U.S.Technology and Financial IndustriesThe U.S. often leads in technology and finance, keeping the USD relevant and competitive in the global economy.Military and Political InfluenceThe U.S. has substantial military and political clout, which helps keep the USD in use by allies and those in line with U.S. policies.Trust and ConfidenceThe USD benefits from high trust and confidence due to credible U.S. monetary policy managed by the Federal Reserve.Network EffectsThe widespread use of the USD creates a self-reinforcing cycle of increased liquidity and utility, making it more attractive for future transactions and holdings. Even adversaries would face substantial problems should the USD face a crisis.
Weaknesses of the U.S. Dollar
The fundamental weakness of the U.S. dollar is that it is only valuable through government fiat. This weakness is shared by every other major national currency in the world and is perceived as normal in the modern age. However, as recently as the 1970s, it was considered a somewhat radical proposition. Without the discipline imposed by a commodity-based currency standard (such as gold), the worry is that governments might print too much money for political purposes.
In fact, one reason the IMF was formed was to monitor the Federal Reserve and its commitment to Bretton Woods. Today, the IMF uses the other reserves as a discipline on Fed activity. If foreign governments or investors switch away from the U.S. dollar en masse, the flood of short positions could significantly hurt anyone with assets denominated in dollars.4
6
If the Federal Reserve creates money and the U.S. government assumes and monetizes debt faster than the U.S. economy grows, the future value of the currency could fall in absolute terms. Fortunately for the U.S., virtually every alternative currency is backed by similar economic policies. Even if the dollar faltered in absolute terms, it would still be strong relative to all other currencies.
Potential Threats to the Dollar's Status
U.S. Fiscal and Monetary Policy
America's fiscal and monetary policy can make the long-term purchasing power of the U.S. dollar uncertain. Large budget deficits of just over 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) and trade deficits of about 3% of GDP, funded by foreign investors through dollar-denominated securities, often raise concerns, especially with those critical of expansionary fiscal policy.7
Against gold, for example, the dollar's purchasing power has fallen by 99% since 1972. If these imbalances grow and erode faith in the dollar's future value, its status could be jeopardized.8
The Federal Reserve's unprecedented monetary expansion in response to recent economic crises, such as the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, has led to concerns about inflation and the dollar's stability. The Fed's balance sheet has ballooned because of massive asset purchases (quantitative easing) and low interest rates, which some argue could debase the currency over time.9
If the U.S. continues to run large deficits and the Fed maintains an accommodative monetary stance for an extended period, it could lead to a loss of confidence in the dollar. Investors might fear that the U.S. will resort to inflation to erode the real value of its debts or that the dollar will depreciate significantly against other currencies.
Rising Strength of Foreign Currencies
While the dollar remains dominant, other national currencies are vying for a greater role in global trade and reserves. Despite challenges within the eurozone, the euro is the second most widely held reserve currency. The Chinese renminbi, bolstered by China's economic might, is gradually gaining wider use, though it remains less than 3% of worldwide central bank foreign reserve currencies. Some central banks are also increasing holdings of the Japanese yen, British pound, and Swiss franc to diversify reserves. However, as you can see below, there has been no significant rise among any other leading currency in the past decade.
In addition, some countries are exploring bilateral trade in local currencies to bypass the dollar. China has currency swap lines with several nations to facilitate renminbi trade. The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and others) are discussing a shared currency. Rising powers may also forge new monetary alliances.
Moreover, countries facing U.S. sanctions, like Russia and Iran, are working to circumvent the dollar's dominance. In response to sanctions, Russia has significantly reduced its dollar holdings and increased its gold reserves. It has also promoted using the ruble and other currencies for international transactions, particularly in the energy sector.
Efforts by Russia, Iran, and other nations to de-dollarize their economies and build alternative financial networks could, if successful, chip away at the dollar's global dominance over time. They underscore how U.S. foreign policy, while powerful, can also give incentives to targeted countries to seek workarounds that could gradually erode the dollar's universal standing.10
Trade Wars and Geopolitical Tensions
Escalating trade wars and geopolitical tensions, particularly between the U.S. and China, could also threaten the dollar. If conflicts intensify and lead to a decoupling of the world's two largest economies, efforts to reduce reliance on the dollar might be accelerated.
As America's largest creditor and trading partner, China has significant leverage. In a worst-case scenario, China could dump its trillion-plus dollar holdings of U.S. Treasurys, sending shock waves through global markets. However, this would destroy the value of China's own reserves and export-driven economy, making it a risky move to say the least.11
More realistically, trade wars could spur China and other nations to hasten the development of alternative trade and financial channels that bypass the dollar. For example, China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System aims to internationalize the renminbi and cut its dependence on dollar transactions.12
If trade friction splinters the global economy into rival blocs and alternative spheres of influence, it could fragment the monetary order and erode the dollar's universality. Much depends on how the U.S. engages in economic and political diplomacy in a multipolar world. Finding a modus vivendi with rising powers while reassuring allies will be vital to maintaining global trust in the dollar amid geopolitical flux.
Fallout from the Global "Weaponization" of the Dollar
The dollar has become, in the words of some, America's "weapon of choice" to further political objectives and preserve its global position.13
The U.S. has historically used dollar dominance to apply its policies and laws extraterritorially, undermine transactions contrary to U.S. interests (even if legal in other countries), exclude parties from dollar-based payment systems, and freeze or seize foreign dollar assets.14
This runs the risk of making foreign institutions more reluctant to transact in dollars or hold dollar assets. Some countries are already reducing U.S. Treasury holdings, favoring alternative assets and trade arrangements.11
A shift away from dollars could undermine the U.S. ability to fund deficits, leading to higher interest rates and a devaluation of the dollar.
Can the U.S. Dollar Collapse?
There are conceivable scenarios that might cause a sudden crisis for the dollar. The most realistic is the dual threat of high inflation and high debt, a scenario in which rising consumer prices force the Fed to sharply raise interest rates.
Much of the national debt is made up of relatively short-term instruments, so a spike in rates would act like an adjustable-rate mortgage after the teaser period ends. If the U.S. government struggled to afford its interest payments, foreign creditors could dump the dollar and trigger a collapse.
If the U.S. entered a steep recession or depression without dragging the rest of the world with it, users might leave the dollar. Another option would involve some major power, such as China, reinstating a commodity-based standard and monopolizing the reserve currency space. However, even in these worst-case scenarios, it is not clear that the dollar necessarily would collapse.
The collapse of the dollar remains highly unlikely. Of the preconditions necessary to force a collapse, only the prospect of higher inflation appears reasonable. Foreign exporters such as China and Japan do not want a dollar collapse because the U.S. is too important a customer.
And even if the U.S. had to renegotiate or default on some debt obligations, there is little evidence that the world would let the dollar collapse and risk possible contagion.
What Would Happen If the U.S. Dollar Collapses?
If the U.S. dollar collapses:
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The cost of imports will become more expensive.
- The government wouldn't be able to borrow at current rates, resulting in a deficit that would need to be paid by increasing taxes or printing money.
- Inflation will spike because of the higher cost of imports and the printing of money, resulting in an overall accelerating collapse of the economy.
What Would Happen to My 401(k) If the Dollar Collapses?
If the dollar collapses, your 401(k) would lose significant value. Exponential inflation would result if the dollar collapsed, decreasing the real value of the dollar compared with other global currencies, which, in effect, would reduce the value of your 401(k).
What Can Be Done Before the Dollar Collapses?
Though the U.S. dollar collapsing is unlikely, ways to hedge against it include purchasing the currencies of other nations, investing in mutual funds and exchange-traded funds based in other countries, and purchasing the shares of domestic stocks that have large international operations.
Can Cryptocurrencies Replace the Dollar?
Some have speculated that the rise of cryptocurrencies like bitcoin could impact the dollar's status. While their role is limited, crypto may eventually gain traction as alternative stores of value or payment methods.
However, despite their growth, cryptocurrencies remain highly volatile and lack the scalability, stability, and widespread acceptance needed to replace a significant fiat currency like the dollar. Their decentralized nature also poses challenges for large-scale monetary policy and financial regulation.
The Bottom Line
The commercial viability of the U.S. dollar is unchallenged. The dollar is used globally as a currency in worldwide transactions, most oil trades are done in U.S. dollars, and the country itself is the largest economy in the world and a politically and economically stable nation.
Some countries aim to de-dollarize or reduce their dependency on the U.S. dollar, but it is still essential for global business and is a widely held reserve currency. There is no reason to expect the U.S. dollar to collapse in the near future.5
15
Such a change would require the entire world to change its adherence to an international monetary system that has the greenback at its center. As yet, no replacement is anywhere on the horizon.
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16. Weakening yuan could be what China needs, but not what it wants
Charts at the link.
Weakening yuan could be what China needs, but not what it wants
China's yuan hits 7-month low in 'complex environment'
ECHO WONG and WATARU SUZUKI, Nikkei staff writers
JUNE 24, 2024 06:00 JST
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Market-Spotlight/Weakening-yuan-could-be-what-China-needs-but-not-what-it-wants?utm
HONG KONG/SHANGHAI -- China's policy makers are facing a tough call on where they want the yuan to stand as the tightly-controlled currency hits a seven-month low against the U.S. dollar, approaching its weakest level since 2008.
A weaker yuan could help boost exports and bring inflation to the economy but risks undermining President Xi Jinping's ambitions to make it a global currency.
On June 21, the People's Bank of China set the daily fixing -- a benchmark where the currency is allowed to trade -- at 7.1196 against the dollar, the weakest since Nov. 23. Pan Gongsheng, the governor of PBOC, told a major financial forum in Shanghai on Wednesday that the yuan exchange rate has "maintained relative stability in a complex environment." The central bank will "maintain exchange rate flexibility" using the fixing.
But foreign investors are overwhelmingly predicting a softer yuan by the year-end, as expectations for a U.S. Federal Reserve interest rate cut scale back. Earlier this month, the Fed kept interest rates at the highest level in more than two decades and officials projected only one rate cut this year.
The PBOC also kept its benchmark rate steady this month, but some economists expect the central bank to loosen monetary policy as it battles a property market downturn. Offshore demand for Hong Kong dollars from Chinese companies for dividend payouts to prop up much-beaten-up share prices are also putting pressure on the yuan.
The onshore yuan on June 21 fell to 7.2613 against the dollar, edging closer to the upper limit of the plus or minus 2% that it is allowed to fluctuate against the daily fixing. That's the lowest level since November. If the yuan falls past the 7.3498 recorded on Sept. 8, 2023, it will be a new low since 2008. The offshore yuan, which trades more freely, hit a fresh year-to-date low of 7.2926 against the dollar.
While Asian currencies are suffering with the strong dollar, one thing is unique to the Chinese currency. The upcoming U.S. election escalates geopolitical uncertainty around holding yuan assets. In particular, investors are nervous about potential additional tariffs being put on Chinese goods if former U.S. president Donald Trump gets reelected.
"We remain bearish on the Chinese yuan," said Kiyong Seong, lead Asia Macro Strategist at French bank Societe Generale, which predicts the yuan will fall to 7.4 against the dollar in the third quarter. A fall to that level would bring the currency to its weakest level since December 2007. The call reflects concerns about geopolitical headwinds brought by the U.S. election, Seong said. The PBOC is likely to continue with the current "surgical management" of the currency for the rest of the year, however, he added.
Cheuk Wan Fan, Asia CIO for HSBC private bank, and Leonard Kwan, a portfolio manager at U.S. asset manager T Rowe Price, also predict a weaker yuan this year, when asked about their views recently by Nikkei Asia.
A weak yuan would help stimulate exports and help generate inflation pressure for China in the form of higher import costs. Those two forces are actually what the economy needs, said Michelle Lam, Greater China Economist at SocGen. China's consumer price index in May rose 0.3% year on year, unchanged from April, indicating persistent deflationary pressures.
"But I don't think that's what the policymakers want," Lam said, citing Chinese President Xi Jinping's agenda for a stronger yuan to push for internationalization of the Chinese currency. "Whether it works in the long term, it's debatable. But I don't think they also want a weakening currency."
China's exports and imports grew in the most recent two months. The country's trade surplus stood at $82.62 billion in May, up from April.
A weaker yuan may further escalate trade tensions with the U.S. and Europe. The European Union recently announced additional import tariffs of up to 38% on EV imports from China, prompting Beijing to launch an anti-dumping investigation into imports of EU pork.
Ken Cheung, director of FX Strategy at Mizuho Securities in Hong Kong, said China may be "more tempted to consider allowing further [yuan] depreciation to counter impact from the potential tariff hikes," even though he believes any policy-driven depreciation will likely be gradual.
The episode of the weak yuan in 2015 has induced capital outflow pressure, SocGen's Lam said. "And I think that is really what policymakers want to avoid right now."
Any drastic depreciation of yuan could risk exacerbating the capital outflows. Back in 2015, when China's central bank devalued the yuan, it sent shocks to the global currency market, driving down the South Korean won and the Australia and Singapore dollars.
Today, China's rich are also looking to diversify their assets overseas under the push of low-yielding yuan-deposit rates, a disappointing stock market performance, and wealth destruction in a property market which has yet to respond to the latest policy push. Hong Kong dollar bank deposits and insurance savings products have been popular choices for mainlanders.
China's central bank is managing the currency via more routes instead of relying on using the foreign exchange reserve, a series of methods are being deployed in a more strategic way in order to avoid a big depreciation that could shock the market. But these measures are also making it harder for investors to gauge potential impacts.
Onshore banks were selling spot dollars for yuan and swapping into one-year forwards in September when the Chinese currency underwent big depreciation pressure, Nomura analysts led by Craig Chan wrote in a note on May 28. Now, the concern is if banks will roll these swap positions, especially at a time when they may need to borrow dollars, which actually creates demand for the greenback. "September may mark the beginning of pressure on major banks," the analysts said.
Some are taking a more defensive view. Becky Liu, head of China macro strategy at Standard Chartered Bank, predicts the yuan to trade at 7 to 7.1 against the dollar approaching the year-end, citing a "smaller" short position of yuan compared to the second half of 2023.
"I am not aware of who's really having a gigantic position [shorting the yuan]. So everyone has a little bit of a position to express their view," Liu said. China's incentive and ability to defend the currency remain "very strong," she said. But she also cautions that potential tariff policies brought by U.S. election could put headwinds on the currency.
"There is an orderly weakening in the currency," said Owen Murfin, institutional portfolio manager at U.S. asset manager MFS. "I think it's justified by fundamentals, it helps exporters. So I don't think authorities will be too concerned about an orderly devaluation of the [yuan], which is another reason why we are pretty defensive on the [yuan] right now."
17. Remembering Saipan: The battle that reshaped the Pacific
Remembering Saipan: The battle that reshaped the Pacific
militarytimes.com · by Cleo Paskal · June 20, 2024
Nine days after D-Day, on June 15, 1944, the Battle of Saipan erupted on the other side of the world. It was to be as pivotal for the Pacific Theater as D-Day was for the war in Europe.
Eighty years later, commemorations were held June 15, 2024, on Saipan to remember the battle and to honor those who sacrificed so much.
Operation Forager
The Battle of Saipan was part of the U.S. military’s Operation Forager, which also included taking Tinian and liberating Guam. Capturing Saipan and the neighboring islands meant Tokyo would be within range of the United States’ B-29 Superfortress bombers.
As explained by Don Farrell, author of “Seabees and Superforts at War,” it was “a critical turning point” in the Pacific War.
“The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-British Chiefs of Staff recognized it would be a costly, bloody battle,” Farrell wrote. “But they also realized that if Saipan, Tinian and Guam were captured, then the fleet could turn due north toward Japan. They concluded that the capture of the Marianas would provide a faster route to Japan.”
Japan had designated the islands as part of its “absolute national defense sphere” and knew what losing them would mean. Japan had control over Tinian and Saipan since 1914 and had invaded Guam just after it attacked Pearl Harbor. Imperial Japanese forces had years to fortify the islands. By the time the Americans arrived off the coast of Saipan, there were more than 30,000 Imperial Japanese troops dug in.
U.S. Marines take cover behind a flame-throwing Sherman tank, nicknamed "King Kong," during the Battle of Saipan. (Cpl. Angus Robertson/Marine Corps/FPG/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
The battle itself was a brutal, intense and a compressed microcosm of the war in the Pacific, described by Naval History and Heritage Command as “the most daring — and disturbing — operation in the U.S. war against Japan to date.”
It was disturbing, in part, because of the large civilian population. Around 20,000 Japanese, Okinawans and Koreans, plus 4,000 Chamorros, were on Saipan when the 71,000 U.S. troops landed, most from the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions and the 27th Infantry Division.
For Japanese forces, this was a desperate last stand. When it was clear Japan was losing, commanding Japanese General Yoshitsugu Saitō committed suicide. In the early morning hours of July 7, an estimated 4,000 Japanese charged American positions in one of the largest “banzai” charges of the war. Hundreds, and possibly more, Japanese civilians threw themselves off “suicide” and “banzai” cliffs.
Meanwhile, American forces — which included Navajo Code Talkers and local Scouts, the latter of whom were eventually made full Marines — were caught between the brutal desperation of Japanese forces, attempts to save civilians and sheer survival.
By the time the battle officially ended on July 9, America had endured more than 16,500 casualties, including close to 3,500 killed. On the Japanese side, 921 were taken prisoner. The rest died in battle or by suicide.
The capture of Saipan led to the capture of Tinian, which allowed for the establishment of the Tinian airfields. These became some of the busiest airfields in the world as waves of B-29s took off to hit Japan. This was also where the Enola Gay and Bockscar took to the sky on their way toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, leading to the end of the war in the Pacific.
After the war, Saipan, Tinian and the rest of what is now the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas voted to enter into a “Covenant” with the United States and formally joined the U.S., granting American citizenship to their residents. Today, the people of the Marianas serve in the U.S. military at high rates.
The commemoration
The 80th anniversary commemoration ceremony began at Green Beach, where some of the 8,000 Marines who came ashore in the first 20 minutes of the massive amphibious operation landed. They were represented by the sons of three 4th Marine Division veterans.
They laid a wreath at the veterans memorial, then moved the commemorations to American Memorial Park, where a parade — including representatives from the 4th Marine Division — and speeches followed. The Japanese consul spoke sincerely about the bond now shared between Japan and the U.S.
Another speaker, Saipan mayor Hon. Ramon “RB” Jose Blas Camacho, was instrumental in ensuring the event happened as scheduled despite Saipan’s present economic difficulties.
In an interview, he explained that he wanted to make sure the younger generation remembered the courage and sacrifice that occurred there 80 years ago.
“Just imagine when they landed … the worry, the fear,” he said.
He also wanted to put a spotlight on Saipan.
“Every year they talk about Normandy, but what happened here was really important.”
It was. It changed the Pacific — and resulted in a new piece of America being created. That transformation was embodied by attendee Cdr. Christine Igisomar. The Marianas native is the highest-ranking Chamorro woman in U.S. Coast Guard history. After the ceremony, she was on her way to her new post as Coast Guard liaison to the Philippines Coast Guard.
The Commonwealth of Northern Marianas is where America touches Asia and, while the theme of the commemoration was “80 Years of Peace in the Pacific,” the region is once again on the front lines.
The airfields at Tinian are being rehabilitated in a $409 million Air Force project. At the same time, this is the only U.S. territory where Chinese nationals can arrive without a visa. Regional tensions are building.
Still, in true commemoration of the warriors who died in Saipan, the message from the Marines is clear. In his speech, 4th Marine Division Commanding General Brig. Gen. John K. Jarrard had a message for any current enemies listening: “Be afraid.”
Cleo Paskal is Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
18. U.S. Army Conducts First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile SINKEX using PrSM
Photos and graphic at the link: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/06/u-s-army-conducts-first-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-sinkex-using-prsm/?mc_cid=85d93bc7e2&mc_eid=70bf478f36
U.S. Army Conducts First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile SINKEX using PrSM - Naval News
navalnews.com · by Naval News Staff · June 23, 2024
Support was provided from high-altitude balloons and 'Vanilla' UAS providing communications relay over 27 hours even through severe weather.
U.S. Army press release
FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII – 3d Multi-Domain Task Force (3MDTF) continued to demonstrate its ability to operate in the INDOPACOM theater through its participation, experimentation, and innovation in Valiant Shield 24. 3MDTF deployed teams of soldiers across the Pacific while executing distributed command and control and employing emerging concepts and capabilities partnered with Department of Defense agencies and commercial industry.
Teams operating out of Japan, Guam, and Palau integrated extended range sensing, long range communication, effects, and fires to contribute to accomplishing training objectives.
In Guam, 3MDTF soldiers, partnering with the Research and Experimentation branch of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OUSD) and Aerostar Industries, launched high altitude balloons (HABs) from Won Pat International Airport. Once launched, the HABs rapidly ascended above 50,000 feet and began operating around the Marianas Islands. Equipped with electromagnetic sensing and mesh communications equipment, the HABs helped inform future maritime domain awareness innovation and experimentation.
While HABs floated at high altitude, Platform Aerospace, partnering with OUSD (R&E) and 3MDTF, launched the Vanilla Ultra-Long Endurance Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Vanilla holds the world record for continuous, un-refueled flight of a combustion engine aircraft (>8 days). Vanilla can be configured for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Persistent Communications.
For Valiant Shield 24, Vanilla performed as a communication relay, operating effectively during a 27-hour flight. Vanilla’s launch and flight, including multiple hours of flight during a violent storm, validated operational use of an Ultra-Long Endurance UAS capable of multi-day, multi-mission configurations.
Vanilla is an OUSD Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) Program; Valiant Shield 24 was Vanilla’s graduation event and formal Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 8 assessment.
The U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center and Ground Vehicle Systems Center’s combined Autonomous Multi-domain Launcher team conducted a successful live fire of a Reduced Range Practice Rocket fired from the AML at Yuma Proving Ground in April. (Photo Credit: Army photo)
In Palau, hundreds of miles away, soldiers from 3MDTF and 1-181 Artillery Regiment of the Tennessee National Guard participated in the VS24 Combined Joint Live Fire SINKEX on June 16, 2024, utilizing the U.S. Army Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher (AML) and two Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM). During the SINKEX, the AML was able to engage a moving maritime target in conjunction with other Joint assets. The VS24 SINKEX is the first employment of both the AML and the PrSM outside of the U.S and is a significant milestone in the Army’s development of long-range fires capabilities.
The prototype launcher will be capable of convoy operations, autonomous way point navigation, tele-operation, and remote launcher turret and fire control operation.
PrSM is the Army’s next-generation Long Range Precision Fires weapon and is capable of neutralizing targets at standoffs greater than 400 kilometers.
To bring together the soldiers and capabilities spread thousands of miles throughout the Pacific, the3MDTF All-Domain Operations Center (ADOC) on Oahu, and a Battalion command in Japan were established. These operations centers provided the hub for synchronized planning and execution during the exercise.
VS24 provides 3MDTF an invaluable ability to train alongside partners and allies. Col. Michael Rose, the 3MDTF Commander commented, “Valiant Shield enabled us to integrate with the Combined Joint Force and operate distributed while forward in theater. We were able to build new relationships and continue to deepen existing ties. Valiant Shield and like exercises in the region enables us to test our systems and processes as well as integrate new capabilities alongside our partners and allies, contributing to the continuous transformation of our multi-domain capability and increasing our warfighting readiness.”
VS24 is a multinational, biennial field training exercise focused on integrating interoperability training in a multi-domain environment. This training builds real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces through detecting, locating, tracking, and engaging units at sea, in the air, in space, on land, and in cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. VS24 is the 10th iteration of the Valiant Shield exercise which first began in 2006.
-End-
Screen capture from a Lockheed Martin video showing the main components of the PrSM.
Naval News comments:
The decommissioned hulk of the Austin-class amphibious transport dock ex-USS Cleveland (LPD-7) was the target ship for this SINKEX.
The Lockheed Martin PrSM has an objective range of 60 to 650 kilometers (37 to 403 miles). It is a surface-to-surface, all-weather, precision-strike guided missile, fired from both the M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). As the replacement for the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), PrSM doubles ATACMS’ current rate-of-fire with two missiles per launch pod. It is designed to attack threat air defense systems, missile launchers, command and control (C2) nodes, troop assembly/staging areas and high-payoff targets throughout the battlefield at ranges of more than 500 kilometers.
A multi-mode seeker is used for engaging moving land and maritime targets. Future Increments of PrSM will include:
- Multi-domain operations capability to engage moving land and maritime targets;
- Enhanced lethality payloads capable of autonomously and collaboratively detecting, targeting, and striking high payoff targets that are moving, have moved, poorly located, or dispersed;
- Extended range capability enabled through air-breathing ramjet propulsion.
navalnews.com · by Naval News Staff · June 23, 2024
19. Number of Air Force Osprey Pilots and Aircrew Under Review Amid Mechanical Issues, Flight Restriction
Some real challenges for long term personnel management.
Number of Air Force Osprey Pilots and Aircrew Under Review Amid Mechanical Issues, Flight Restriction
military.com · by Thomas Novelly · June 21, 2024
Air Force Special Operations Command may shift the number of its CV-22 Osprey pilots and aircrew as it reevaluates how the controversial tilt-rotor aircraft is used -- and as officials probe the cause of recent deadly crashes.
The review of the size of the Osprey force is part of a larger analysis of the aircraft operations being conducted by Air Force Special Operations Command, or AFSOC, Lt. Col. Rebecca Heyse, a command spokesperson, told Military.com. It's possible that those service members could be trained for other aircraft.
The crash of an AFSOC Osprey off the coast of Japan in November that killed eight airmen signaled the most recent mishap for the aircraft and triggered a monthslong grounding of Ospreys flown by the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. An investigation is underway to find the root cause of the mechanical issues that are believed to be causing Osprey mishaps, and the aircraft remains restricted to flying within 30 minutes of a safe landing space.
"AFSOC is currently evaluating all aspects of our CV-22 operations to ensure that we are properly organized, trained and equipped to conduct safe and effective missions," Heyse said. "As part of this evaluation, we are considering various courses of action, including an analysis of the size of our CV-22 aircrew force."
Heyse added that the command has "a long history of cross-flowing aviators into other AFSOC airframes" and said that "no final decisions have been made at this time." The revelation that the size of the Air Force's Osprey community could be in flux comes as officials continue the investigation into the deadly CV-22 crash off the coast of Japan.
The Air Force's decision to look at the size of the Air Force CV-22 pilot and aircrew force also comes after Vice Adm. Carl Chebi, head of Naval Air Systems Command, said during a congressional hearing last week that all of the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy Ospreys will not have the 30-minute flight restriction lifted "before mid-2025."
"The primary goal of this evaluation is to ensure that our aircrews get the necessary experience and flight hours to operate the available aircraft safely and effectively, as well as have development opportunities throughout their careers," Heyse added.
Spokespeople for the Marine Corps and Navy did not respond prior to publication on whether those services are undergoing similar evaluations.
The Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy grounded their Osprey variants for roughly four months after the deadly crash off the coast of Japan.
Marine and Navy aviators had their variants up in the sky within a month of the grounding being lifted in March, whereas the Air Force only recently stated that "several" of its aircraft were flying at Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico "conducting aircrew currency flights."
Military.com reported last month that the Joint Program Office guidance regarding the Osprey limits them to flights within 30 minutes of a suitable landing zone.
Officials with that office also told Military.com this week that they've recently developed "a leading theory" into a long-standing clutch issue responsible for a deadly 2022 crash in California that lead to the deaths of five Marines.
The cause of the November crash in Japan hasn't been publicly released, but officials said at the time it was due to a mechanical failure -- one that had never been seen before, according to officials.
– Konstantin Toropin and Drew F. Lawrence contributed reporting.
military.com · by Thomas Novelly · June 21, 2024
20. Israeli Defense Tech is About to Have a Moment
Excerpts:
All these challenges demand a collaborative and decisive response if we are to emerge victorious. And it is “we,” not “they,” as this is a global conflict. Israel must continue to adapt and quickly. Integrating their air and space domains is essential for maintaining its regional military superiority. Israel’s reliance on US-supplied aircraft further highlights the need for such integration. Long-endurance logistics and maintenance will pose challenges in Lebanon, straining Israel’s resources in a protracted conflict.
I’m a proud American who served my country in a civilian capacity in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of my brothers served in the Marine Corps—one did multiple tours in Iraq and one served in Afghanistan. I share in the collective horror of GWOT veterans who watch our streets being filled with the demonic rage we sacrificed so much to keep on the other side of the world. But here they are. And the time for hiding and cowering is behind us. Now is the time to invest in Israeli defense tech, to partner with and benefit from their combat-tested solutions against our common enemy. Make no mistake—those of us in the West are in deep trouble. This is an all-hands-on-deck scenario. As warfare evolves, we must ensure we are adapting to these changes for our own national security and in partnership with our allies for their own. Investing in the best and most innovative defense technology created by the Startup Nation in a time of expanding global war is not just a wise strategic move, but a moral imperative.
Israeli Defense Tech is About to Have a Moment
By Simone Ledeen
June 22, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/06/22/france_is_wrong_to_ban_israeli_defense_firms_1039769.html?mc_cid=85d93bc7e2&mc_eid=70bf478f36
The announcement from France that Eurosatory 2024 in Paris, one of the world's largest defense and security exhibitions was banning Israeli companies and Israeli nationals from participating has sent shock waves through the defense industry. The Macron government claimed its policy of Judenrein was in response to Israel's ongoing military operations in Gaza. In marked contrast, Hamas’s sponsor and global terrorism proliferator Iran faces no such ban. Indeed, no other country in the world was banned from Eurosatory but Israel.
The ban affected over 70 Israeli defense firms, including major companies which were scheduled to showcase their latest technologies and weaponry at the event, as well as innovative startups with recently battle tested solutions needed to advance the cause of western civilization on battlefields across the globe. If these firms are not permitted to sell their products legitimately to friendly partner nations, the less scrupulous among them will turn elsewhere. While a French judge struck down the ban at the last minute, it was already too late for most on the Israeli side to recoup. This is a morally abhorrent moment we must take time to properly understand. This current path leads inexorably to the collapse of western civilization in favor of the Islamists and Marxists who have joined forces against us. The age of short wars is likely over, and we must prepare for protracted conflicts.
John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, recently noted on X that the lessons learned by Israel in Gaza—from dealing with information warfare in the age of social media to facing an enemy in an urban defense prepared over 15 years—are invaluable and will be studied by militaries (including our own here in the US) for many years. Indeed, our learning from these experiences, including in combating lawfare, human shields, and underground warfare, will significantly enhance the US military’s readiness for future challenges and will save American lives.
Israel’s discovery of Hamas’s extensive tunnel networks in Gaza have revealed a new dimension of warfare. Neither we nor the Israelis understood their sheer scale and scope until the IDF began its military operations there in response to the terrorist attacks of October 7th. These tunnels, used for attacks, smuggling, and evasion, pose a psychological and tactical challenge. The IDF is now developing specific tactics and technology for underground combat, recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach to counter these threats.
Hamas’s underground city beneath Gaza, with its complex network of tunnels, living quarters, and workshops, represents a significant military challenge. Traditional bombardment methods are ineffective against deep tunnels, and alternative strategies such as tunnel flooding face technical limitations. The psychological impact of underground warfare is equally profound. The constant threat of enemy fighters emerging from tunnels creates an environment of perpetual fear and anxiety. This is already evident in areas like Judea, Samaria, and the borderlands of Israel, where residents have reported hearing underground noises at night, fearing the enemy is digging beneath them.
We also see Russian forces using tunnels in Ukraine, further illustrating the tactical advantages of underground warfare. These tunnels and trenches have neutralized the effectiveness of Western weapons and allowed Russian forces to effectively conduct offensive operations and counterattacks. It is no exaggeration to say that a modern army’s ability to conduct underground operations may well be a crucial factor in future conflicts.
It is now clear that over the years Hamas significantly transformed itself through its close collaboration with the Iranian axis. This axis, which is responsible for the deaths of many Americans over decades of the Global War on Terror, has grown much more confident through the Biden sanctions waivers and the Iranian regime’s growing partnership with Russia. This evolving alliance is reshaping the geopolitical landscape. Not since the Cold War's end a generation ago have military power and defense capabilities been so vital.
At the same time, and because of these ongoing and expanding conflicts, there is a global munitions shortage. This shortage affects a wide range of munitions, particularly artillery shells, precision-guided munitions, and anti-tank missiles. Here is the stark reality staring us in the face: when it comes to military power, there is no capability without capacity. No country can expect to prevail in war without a robust defense industrial and manufacturing base that can produce weapons and munitions at speed and scale. For instance, we are not producing nearly enough 155mm artillery shells. Scaling up production can take several years, in some cases due to dependencies on specialized materials. The need for skilled labor is also a significant issue. As new production lines for advanced military equipment take years to set up, the shortage keeps getting worse.
All these challenges demand a collaborative and decisive response if we are to emerge victorious. And it is “we,” not “they,” as this is a global conflict. Israel must continue to adapt and quickly. Integrating their air and space domains is essential for maintaining its regional military superiority. Israel’s reliance on US-supplied aircraft further highlights the need for such integration. Long-endurance logistics and maintenance will pose challenges in Lebanon, straining Israel’s resources in a protracted conflict.
I’m a proud American who served my country in a civilian capacity in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of my brothers served in the Marine Corps—one did multiple tours in Iraq and one served in Afghanistan. I share in the collective horror of GWOT veterans who watch our streets being filled with the demonic rage we sacrificed so much to keep on the other side of the world. But here they are. And the time for hiding and cowering is behind us. Now is the time to invest in Israeli defense tech, to partner with and benefit from their combat-tested solutions against our common enemy. Make no mistake—those of us in the West are in deep trouble. This is an all-hands-on-deck scenario. As warfare evolves, we must ensure we are adapting to these changes for our own national security and in partnership with our allies for their own. Investing in the best and most innovative defense technology created by the Startup Nation in a time of expanding global war is not just a wise strategic move, but a moral imperative.
Simone Ledeen is a Venture Partner at Texas Venture Partners and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East.
21. Would Russia Aid China in an Invasion of Taiwan?
Excerpt:
The capacity in which Russia may offer China assistance during an invasion of Taiwan can be debated. Several factors would come into play, including the length of the conflict and those involved, specifically the degree to which the US would respond. Would the invasion take less than an hour, as one expert claims? Or would the conflict become drawn out and turn into a hot war with the US? Regardless of the exact scenario that could play out, Russia would most likely aid China in some capacity. Whether its military support during the invasion, economic assistance and support following an invasion, or political and diplomatic support, China’s role in the Sino-Russian partnership and demonstrated support for Russia during the war in Ukraine places it in a position to solicit some form of assistance from Moscow during an invasion of Taiwan. While this reasoning could stand on its own, it is supported by U.S. officials’ testimony that the U.S. Department of Defense is reconsidering its planning and preparedness to account for cooperation between Russia and China during a conflict.
Would Russia Aid China in an Invasion of Taiwan?
By Audrey Oien
June 24, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/06/24/would_russia_aid_china_in_an_invasion_of_taiwan_1039899.html?mc_cid=85d93bc7e2&mc_eid=70bf478f36
A Chinese J-11 military fighter jet flies above the Taiwan Strait near Pingtan, the closest land of mainland China to the island of Taiwan, in Pingtan in southeastern China's Fujian Province. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan, File)
If China were to invade Taiwan, it is likely that Russia would provide Beijing with military, economic, or political assistance. While some experts have argued Ukraine and Taiwan are not the same situation, there are nonetheless lessons that can be drawn from Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as insight from U.S. officials that can be drawn upon to come to this conclusion.
Over the last several years, Russia and China have grown closer in many ways, including through increased military cooperation. Of the numerous joint exercises that have been held, ones that stand out are joint naval drills and air force patrols over the East China Sea. The naval drills began in 2022 and are the closest that joint drills have been held to the Taiwan Strait. Joint exercises are not a smoking gun, but concern from American officials may be a reliable indicator that this is worth paying attention to.
In early May, two American intelligence officials testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that increased Sino-Russian military cooperation has prompted new planning in the Department of Defense. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated that China and Russia are exercising together in relation to Taiwan for the first time, and that “China definitely wants Russia to be working with them.” She then said, “we see no reason why they wouldn’t” work together. Answering a follow-up question from Senator Mike Rounds, Haines confirmed that in the event of a conflict with Russia or China, a second front opening with the other is possible, with the likelihood depending on the scenario. U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse testified that Russian and Chinese military forces “would certainly be cooperative,” if not interoperable.
But on what grounds would Russia assist China? Why would it be willing to aid Beijing in an invasion that would likely be met with a response from the United States and its allies? The most simple answer is because China did it for Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin is now indebted to Chinese President Xi Jinping, whether he realizes it or not. And no, the debt is not payable by monetary means. Putin will be able to pay his debts to Xi for his assistance in a war that has turned Chinese public opinion toward Ukraine, led to sanctions, and affected Xi’s image by providing assistance if, or when, China invades Taiwan.
To get a better idea of what this assistance could look like, one can take a look at how China has aided Russia’s war in Ukraine. According to U.S. officials, China has helped supply Russia with dual-use material like optics, microelectronics, and drone engines to boost Moscow’s arms production, as well as provided Moscow with cruise missiles and machine tools for ballistic missiles. U.S. intelligence claims that Russian and Chinese groups have worked together to jointly produce drones inside Russia. It was also reported that a Chinese government agency established to promote trade with Russia has been attempting to source drone detectors and jammers, likely to supply Moscow with. U.S. officials further claimed that China helped Russia improve satellite and other space-based capabilities, as well as provided satellite imagery. Additionally, it was reported that China supplied Russia with 90% of the chips it imported in 2023 which were used to make missiles, tanks, and aircraft. The British Defense Minister has also accused China of providing or preparing to provide Russia with lethal aid.
Beyond providing this military equipment, China has continued support for Russia in its wartime by working together to avoid taxes and evade Western sanctions on goods like copper. And, China has increased imports of Russian gas and oil since the war began, as imports from the US, UK, and EU have dropped due to sanctions. Politically, Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused China of using its influence and diplomats to help Russia disrupt the 15-16 June peace summit on Ukraine in Switzerland by encouraging other countries not to attend.
Russian support during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could follow in a similar vein. Or, Xi may be able to pressure Putin into providing something more than what Beijing has done for Moscow. Analysts have maintained that Beijing holds the upper hand in the Sino-Russian partnership. While the relationship has been described as having no limits, it is not a relationship between two equals. Russia’s economic dependence on China puts Putin in a vulnerable position, with little room to say “no.”
The capacity in which Russia may offer China assistance during an invasion of Taiwan can be debated. Several factors would come into play, including the length of the conflict and those involved, specifically the degree to which the US would respond. Would the invasion take less than an hour, as one expert claims? Or would the conflict become drawn out and turn into a hot war with the US? Regardless of the exact scenario that could play out, Russia would most likely aid China in some capacity. Whether its military support during the invasion, economic assistance and support following an invasion, or political and diplomatic support, China’s role in the Sino-Russian partnership and demonstrated support for Russia during the war in Ukraine places it in a position to solicit some form of assistance from Moscow during an invasion of Taiwan. While this reasoning could stand on its own, it is supported by U.S. officials’ testimony that the U.S. Department of Defense is reconsidering its planning and preparedness to account for cooperation between Russia and China during a conflict.
Audrey Oien is a Research Analyst at RANE, primarily focusing on the Asia-Pacific.
22. US hasn’t withheld weapons for Israel, but it’s done fast-tracking them — official
This could cause some domestic political/election problems in the US as many across the political spectrum will find fault with this for different reasons.
US hasn’t withheld weapons for Israel, but it’s done fast-tracking them — official
Emergency protocol used to cut through bureaucratic procedures in early months of war no longer in place, as intensity of IDF fighting drops and US fears of regional war rise
https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-hasnt-withheld-weapons-for-israel-but-its-done-fast-tracking-them-official/
By JACOB MAGID
FOLLOW
23 June 2024, 9:55 pm
Illustrative: Israeli soldiers fire mortar shells towards targets in the Gaza Strip near the border with the Gaza Strip on February 8, 2024. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
The Biden administration in recent months removed emergency procedures that were in place to fast-track weapons to Israel toward the beginning of the war, an American official familiar with the matter told The Times of Israel on Sunday.
The revelation helps explain the claim Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu began making last week that the United States has been withholding weapons shipments to Israel. The US has denied the assertion, explaining that it has only withheld one shipment of heavy bombs it was concerned Israel would use in the densely populated southern Gaza city of Rafah.
All other shipments have continued at a normal pace, the White House explained.
The US official told The Times of Israel on condition of anonymity that a “normal pace” does not mean the fast-tracked rate that the US allowed during the early months of the war. In recent months, the US resumed its normal procedures for weapons transfers, including various Congressional authorizations.
The US official added that the move has coincided with a significant slowdown in the IDF’s operations in Gaza along with concern in Washington about a potential Israeli preemptive offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon that could lead to a regional war.
Channel 12 reported Sunday that during the first part of the war, some 240 weapons shipments were delivered to Israel. That number has dropped to roughly 120 shipments in recent months, the network said, without citing any sources or providing specific dates for the two timeframes.
File: US President Joe Biden is greeted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (right) after arriving at Ben Gurion International Airport, on October 18, 2023, in Tel Aviv. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci)
A second official — an Israeli one — insisted that the return to the pre-war pace of US weapons shipments has not impacted the IDF’s operational capacity in Gaza or Lebanon.
Accordingly, Netanyahu’s decision to publicly attack the US has perplexed and frustrated the Biden administration, the US official said.
The US official speculated that Netanyahu either feels he might benefit politically at home by provoking a spat with Washington or that he is concerned Defense Minister Yoav Gallant will manage to convince the US to resume faster-paced weapons transfers during his meetings at the White House this week and that the premier will not be credited for resolving the issue.
“For many weeks we appealed to our American friends to speed up the shipments. We did it time and time again. We did this at the senior echelons, and at all levels, and I want to emphasize — we did it in private chambers. We got all kinds of explanations, but we didn’t get one thing: The basic situation didn’t change,” Netanyahu claimed during a Sunday cabinet meeting.
“Certain items trickled in, but the bulk of armaments were left behind,” he added.
Responding to the premier’s latest claim, the White House sufficed with saying that it looks forward to hosting Gallant later this week.
“We have made our position clear on this repeatedly, and we aren’t going to keep responding to the Prime Minister’s political statements. We look forward to constructive consultations with Defense Minister Gallant in Washington this week,” said a White House official.
Netanyahu has yet to specify which weapons shipments the US has allegedly withheld.
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant makes a statement before flying to Washington, June 23, 2024 (Defense Ministry)
The White House expressed deep frustration with Netanyahu’s criticism last week.
“It was perplexing to say the least, certainly disappointing, especially given that no other country is doing more to help Israel defend itself against the threat by Hamas,” White House spokesman John Kirby told reporters last week.
“The idea that we had somehow stopped helping Israel with their self-defense needs is absolutely not accurate,” he said, describing the claim as “vexing and disappointing to us as much as it was incorrect.”
Gallant is slated to meet with top US officials this week. He landed in Washington earlier Sunday.
23. Inside the Chinese-funded and staffed marijuana farms springing up across the U.S.
Unrestricted warfare?
Potential for subversion from within?
Excerpts:
An NPR investigation into a cluster of farms, which the industry calls cannabis “grow” operations, in New Mexico found businesses that employ and are managed and funded largely by Chinese people. They’re seeking opportunities in a flourishing U.S. cannabis market after the coronavirus pandemic led to a global economic crisis. But some of the businesses have run afoul of the law, even as states such as New Mexico have legalized marijuana.
...
Investigations by nonprofit news outlet ProPublica have found links between Chinese diplomats, Chinese Communist Party-affiliated organizations, local Chinese criminal syndicates and some marijuana operations in the United States.
In the operations reported on in this story, NPR found no signs of Chinese state or Asian organized crime involvement. The businesses did attract small-scale, individual investors from China who were eager to invest abroad.
Inside the Chinese-funded and staffed marijuana farms springing up across the U.S.
NPR · by Emily Feng · June 24, 2024
List Feng for NPR
Last summer, New Mexico state special agents inspecting a farm found thousands more cannabis plants than state laws allow. Then on subsequent visits, they made another unexpected discovery: dozens of underfed, shell-shocked Chinese workers.
The workers said they had been trafficked to the farm in Torrance County, N.M., were prevented from leaving and never got paid.
“They looked weathered,” says Lynn Sanchez, director of a New Mexico social services nonprofit who was called in after the raid. “They were very scared, very freaked out.”
They are part of a new pipeline of migrants leaving China and making unauthorized border crossings into the United States via Mexico, and many are taking jobs at hundreds of cannabis farms springing up across the U.S.
An NPR investigation into a cluster of farms, which the industry calls cannabis “grow” operations, in New Mexico found businesses that employ and are managed and funded largely by Chinese people. They’re seeking opportunities in a flourishing U.S. cannabis market after the coronavirus pandemic led to a global economic crisis. But some of the businesses have run afoul of the law, even as states such as New Mexico have legalized marijuana.
Getting out of China
One of the workers encountered at the farm in Torrance County is 41-year-old L., who came from China's central Hubei province a year ago. He asked NPR to use only his first initial because he is anxious about legal prosecution in the U.S. and China.
L. told NPR he struggled to find work in China during the pandemic lockdown. He was forced to move out of his home after a state developer demolished his house to make way for a new project, but his new apartment was never built and he lost his deposit. When L. went to the developer's office to protest, he got into a physical fight with employees of the company and was jailed.
That was when a disillusioned L. saw videos on Douyin, a sister app of TikTok in China, about people purportedly earning good money in the United States.
"There was one influencer who kept messaging me his pay stubs in California showing how he was making 4-, sometimes $5,000 a month and telling me how easy it was," L. says. He got in contact with an agent who promised to help him get to the U.S.
Watching Douyin videos, L. learned how to zouxian, or "walk the line," to the U.S.-Mexico border. First, he flew to Turkey, then Ecuador. He then took a grueling, monthlong trip from South America to Mexico that included buses, boats and a long walk through the hazardous Darién Gap jungle.
"The journey was full of countless trials and tribulations," says L. He was robbed twice in Latin America and feared he might die from exposure but crossed into the U.S. in May 2023.
On a path also regularly used by Caribbean and South American migrants, now large numbers of Chinese migrants are taking this land route. U.S. border authorities say they encountered 37,000 Chinese people who crossed irregularly into the U.S. southern border last year — more than the past 10 years combined.
Border officials apprehended L. but released him in July, pending review of his asylum claim. He rented a room in Southern California's Monterey Park, which is home to a large Chinese immigrant community. There, fellow Chinese immigrants introduced him to labor agencies that promised to place workers without documentation for a $100 fee.
One agency’s Chinese-language social media ad for "cutting grass" in a greenhouse caught L.'s eye. It offered to pay $4,000 a month in cash for what seemed like easy work, he says. Borrowing a cellphone, he dialed the number listed.
A supply chain for labor
From California, L. and a handful of other recent Chinese migrants were driven to a New Mexico grow operation called Bliss Farm.
They were shocked by what they saw — a hodgepodge of about 200 greenhouses — but because their phones and passports had been taken by their managers, they felt obligated to stay, workers say.
"The farm said it would cover food and shelter, so you could save all your wages," a Bliss Farm worker, from China's northern province of Shenyang, told NPR. "But the farm was just a big dirt field." He also requested anonymity because he is applying for asylum in the U.S. and fears being sent back to China.
He says he regularly worked 15-hour shifts, alongside the greenhouse's manager, a man from China's Shandong province, and the manager’s relatives.
At the end of their shift, the managers left, and the workers slept in wooden sheds with dirt floors, three workers NPR interviewed say. None of them were paid before the operation was shuttered.
New Mexico authorities say a tip about worker conditions and zoning violations led them to visit the farm last year.
"Just a very disastrous grow. There was trash, water, fertilizers, nutrients, pesticides leaking into the ground," says Todd Stevens, director of the state's Cannabis Control Division. "As soon as the officer stepped in, I think red flags started going off everywhere.”
Authorities raided Bliss Farm in August 2023.
Sanchez, director of the New Mexico social services nonprofit The Life Link, describes the condition of laborers she encountered there.
"They had burns, visible burns on their hands and arms. ... The chemicals, they told me it was from the chemicals," Sanchez says. "They looked very malnourished."
L. and two other workers NPR interviewed were among those found at the farm. They've applied for asylum in the U.S. and their cases are pending.
State authorities revoked Bliss Farm’s license and fined it $1 million for exceeding state grow limits.
Immigrants from Ecuador warm themselves after crossing the U.S.-Mexico border on March 6, in Campo, Calif. Migrants from Ecuador, China, Georgia and other nations waited for U.S. Border Patrol agents to collect them to process asylum claims. John Moore/Getty Images
"Trying to get in on the money train"
Weed has become big business in the U.S., where about half of states have legalized it for adult recreational use and about two-thirds have legalized medical use. Despite federal law still prohibiting marijuana, states swapped out local penalties for new rules to regulate sales, create tax revenue and stimulate economic growth.
New Mexico is one of them. In 2021, it legalized the recreational use of marijuana, after it was already long legal for medical use, and permitted growers to raise a limited number of the plants. That set off a scramble to purchase residential land for cannabis grows.
"So many people were interested in trying to get in on the money train, so to speak, right from the start," says Don Goen, a planning and zoning director in New Mexico's Torrance County who has investigated waste and water usage complaints related to marijuana growing. "Some really knew what they were doing and others, it was more of a dream than it was a reality."
Investigations by nonprofit news outlet ProPublica have found links between Chinese diplomats, Chinese Communist Party-affiliated organizations, local Chinese criminal syndicates and some marijuana operations in the United States.
In the operations reported on in this story, NPR found no signs of Chinese state or Asian organized crime involvement. The businesses did attract small-scale, individual investors from China who were eager to invest abroad.
Ella Hao, an accountant from China's northern Shandong province, says she moved with her husband to Los Angeles in 2020 during the start of the pandemic, in part to secure new passports for their two U.S.-born children.
In September 2020, following the recommendation of two other Chinese-speaking immigrants, Hao and her husband decided to invest about $30,000 in a New Mexico marijuana farm near the town of Shiprock, according to handwritten receipts seen by NPR. "We invested on the strength of the recommendation from someone we thought was a close friend," Hao says.
Shiprock is on the Navajo reservation in New Mexico. And the farm had been started by Dineh Benally, a former Navajo Nation farm board president, who is currently dealing with numerous legal challenges over cultivating hemp on Native land.
In 2022, Hao and her husband paid another $300,000 to buy a plot of land in neighboring Oklahoma in a joint purchase with another recent emigrant from China. She convinced them that setting up greenhouses to grow marijuana there would be even more lucrative than in New Mexico.
Despite successfully applying for a grow license under her friend's name, the Oklahoma grow never started operations, papers show.
"Our land prices are really cheap. There really was no enforcement going on until we started looking at this," says Donnie Anderson, director of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics. "So I think it was just really a perfect storm."
Trouble at other grow operations
Just a few miles from Bliss Farm, authorities zeroed in on another, unrelated marijuana grow in Shiprock, N.M. — started by Navajo Nation entrepreneur Benally.
In September 2023, 15 Chinese workers brought a lawsuit alleging that Benally and his associates made the laborers work 14-hour shifts with no pay at the Shiprock operation, that managers physically abused the laborers to get them to work harder and that guards prevented the workers from leaving.
After Benally obtained a license to start a new operation in Torrance County, County Commissioner Samuel Schropp visited the Shiprock site.
"I saw a shed with bunks built floor-to-ceiling like a submarine, stacked 18 inches apart, and a number of RVs with no hookups, [no] water or sewer hooked up to them, and electric cords laying in the mud in the water," Schropp says.
Some of the workers came from Chinese-speaking immigrant communities in New York. They were people who had worked in restaurants, nail salons, massage parlors and other industries hit hard during COVID, says Aaron Halegua, a lawyer representing the 15 workers.
New Mexico authorities revoked the farm's license and fined it $1 million for exceeding state growing limits and other violations.
NPR's efforts to reach Benally were unsuccessful. This past April, Benally tried to dismiss the workers’ lawsuit against him, arguing that federal law had no jurisdiction over his case. Reporting by the nonprofit investigative outlet Searchlight New Mexico published in April suggested he was still growing marijuana.
Benally had partnered with a number of Chinese businesspeople to get the Shiprock operation started, according to a work agreement seen by NPR.
In early 2022, one of the partners, real estate agent Irving Rea Lin, was arrested in California during a months-long crackdown on illegal grows. And one of the operation's backers, a solar panel entrepreneur named Xiaofeng Peng or Denton Peng, is a fugitive who is wanted in China on fraud charges. He did not respond to NPR's request for comment.
Another associate named Bryan Peng (not related to Xiaofeng Peng) started a grow in Oklahoma, which used some of the same Chinese workers from their Shiprock farm. In 2022, that grow was raided as well and shut down.
That November, an investor named Chen Wu killed four workers on the farm demanding a $300,000 investment back. Wu is serving a life sentence in prison.
The investor Hao says she lost a lot of money in the businesses she invested in. Her $30,000 was not returned when the Shiprock farm closed, she says. And the Oklahoma operation where she sank $300,000 — her family's life savings — disappeared after Hao discovered her name had been omitted from all the land deeds and the business license.
"Because we do not speak English, we could not read any of the documents and licenses or dispute the facts in any legal case. We do not know where to turn," Hao says.
Too ashamed to return to China, Hao says she has been raising her two young children in California by finding short-term jobs.
Her most reliable gig has been pruning marijuana plants at a licensed California grow operation.
NPR's Emily Feng reported from Taipei, Taiwan. KUNM's Alice Fordham contributed reporting from Torrance County, N.M. NPR's Greta Pittenger contributed research from Seattle.
NPR · by Emily Feng · June 24, 2024
24. China’s New Info Warriors: The Information Support Force Emerges
Excerpts:
The final and most important variable is whether the People’s Liberation Army can keep pace with U.S. technical advances. For one, the reforms are a reminder that the quest for joint all-domain command and control is not occurring in a vacuum. Adversaries are designing and upgrading their own approaches. The side that is best able to leverage artificial intelligence and other new technologies could gain a decisive advantage — and have more confidence in using force in the first place. The U.S. side might have had a head start, but whether it can retain a lead cannot be taken for granted, and should therefore remain a priority for the Department of Defense as well as U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific (who are working to fashion a more capable combined joint command and control system).
There are also questions about whether the United States can sharpen deterrence. Holding at risk Chinese information systems could present Beijing with severe operational dilemmas and promote deterrence – this is central to how the U.S. military is thinking about implementing its own version of “systems destruction warfare.” The Department of Defense is making new investments in electronic warfare. Budgets for cyber operations are also increasing, supporting new arrangements such as U.S. Cyber Command’s China Outcomes Group. Nevertheless, stronger deterrence will mean, first, understanding the mechanics of China’s new system, which requires a deeper analysis into the communications links holding the system together. It will also mean further investments in the tools needed to target those systems, including the ability to rapidly reconstitute cyber and electronic warfare capabilities in a degraded environment. Finally, U.S. doctrine needs to adapt to a changing adversary structure, including by identifying the key vulnerabilities in the new system, and developing a campaign to reveal select U.S. capabilities that may be able to disrupt China’s ability to maintain resilient military information systems in wartime. Such moves will be needed to undermine any confidence that may have accrued to Xi and his senior general from the latest reorganization.
China’s New Info Warriors: The Information Support Force Emerges - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Joel Wuthnow · June 24, 2024
Xi Jinping has tried to remake the People’s Liberation Army, but he’s recently been forced to undo part of his own creation. In April, China’s military underwent its largest reorganization this decade when the Strategic Support Force was eliminated, and a new Information Support Force inaugurated. Xi has hailed the new force as a “strategic force and a key support for coordinating the construction and application of network information systems.” He added that it would help “smooth information links,” “strengthen information protection,” and “efficiently implement information support,” all of which would be crucial for the military to carry out multi-domain joint operations.
The latest reorganization hints at a combination of frustration and ambition for China’s leaders. The establishment of the Strategic Support Force was a key part of Xi’s 2015-6 military reforms and could have been part of his legacy as the leader of the largest peacetime transformation in the Chinese military’s history. Yet its elimination after only eight and a half years signaled that Xi was willing to trade that achievement for a new arrangement that would better prepare the Chinese military for regional conflicts, especially the high-intensity joint operations necessary to intimidate and, if needed, conquer Taiwan. Indeed, Chinese sources describe the reforms as helping to keep the People’s Liberation Army on track for its 2027 modernization goal, which focuses on preparations for a cross-strait conflict.
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While the need for reform suggests a perceived problem, the concern is that structural changes could increase Xi’s confidence in his military’s prospects over the long term. The new force will be tasked with protecting China’s military information systems from cyber and electronic warfare attack and upgrading command-and-control systems to better leverage artificial intelligence, thereby improving the speed and accuracy of Chinese decision-making. Confidence that China’s military is now better organized, resourced, and led to pursue those improvements could complicate deterrence by weakening U.S. advantages in joint all-domain command and control and reducing U.S. abilities to hold at risk key Chinese systems. In response, new investments in U.S. capabilities and doctrine will be needed to ensure that Chinese leaders remain wary about their preparedness in 2027 and beyond.
Information Support
Chinese military doctrine has long contended that the outcome of high-intensity wars will be determined by a contest between opposing systems, sometimes called “systems confrontation” or “systems destruction” warfare. Prevailing in this contest requires the victor not only to be able to destroy their opponent’s critical systems, such as logistics, communications, command and control nodes, and aircraft carriers, but also to protect one’s own systems. Doctrinal writings since the early 2000s have therefore discussed the need to build a capable “information support system” that will enable a joint force to communicate effectively in wartime by maintaining battle networks, transmitting and processing data, and protecting critical information systems from adversary cyber and electronic warfare attacks.
In the 2010s, Chinese sources often discussed these requirements under the label of strengthening “network information systems.” The 2015 Science of Military Strategy, a key textbook for Chinese officers, called for the military to “continuously improve joint combat capabilities based on network information systems,” and to “give full play to the role of information technology.” A 2017 revision of this volume went a step further, describing “joint operations based on network information systems” as nothing less than the “basic form of combat.” This view was endorsed at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, which instructed the military to “increase joint combat capabilities based on network information systems,” a goal repeated at the 20th Party Congress five years later.
Over this period, the military experimented with how best to institutionalize the doctrinal emphasis on information support. Prior to the Xi era, responsibilities for information systems, communications, and command-and-control networks were held by the former General Staff Department’s Informatization Department. After the 2015–2016 reforms, this function moved to the new Joint Staff Department with the title Information Support Base. In another reorganization carried out in 2017–2019, this organization was transferred into the Strategic Support Force as the Information Communications Base — this outfit, according to J. Michael Dahm, controlled various information communications brigades within the five theater commands.
In another innovation, in 2017 a new “information operations group” was revealed at the military’s 90th anniversary parade. Led by a major general, the Strategic Support Force-affiliated group included an “information support team,” as well as electronic reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and uncrewed aerial systems formations. A Chinese analyst boasted that because of improving “combat information groups and electronic warfare capabilities, I think that in future local wars under high-tech conditions, we should win.” Nevertheless, references to this “group” receded, overtaken in the 2020s by a new “information technology force,” whose recruitment ads targeting students at elite universities disclosed that it was “mainly responsible for network information support and information security protection tasks.”
Impetus for Reform
Several factors might have contributed to the decision to establish a new Information Support Force. First, Chinese analysts paid close attention to upgrades in U.S. information support systems over the previous decade. Analysts were especially interested in the 2012 announcement that the Defense Information Systems Agency was pursuing a Joint Information Environment program to converge “communications, computing, and enterprise services into a single joint platform that can be leveraged for all Department missions.” They also observed the unveiling of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept in the late 2010s, under which the agency would provide decision-makers with “correct data to help them make informed decisions in real time,” and other innovations such as the use of drones to provide secure battlefield communications.
Second, Russia’s poor performance in the Ukraine conflict demonstrated the risks of failing to provide effective battlefield information support. One Chinese defense industry analysis explained that Russia was historically weak in this domain, dating back to World War II when Soviet tanks lacked communications gear and were easily isolated and destroyed by German anti-tank batteries. This weakness persisted in Ukraine, where the author notes that the Russian military did not destroy Ukraine’s civil communications infrastructure because it needed to rely on those systems to coordinate its own forces. This created serious vulnerabilities because Ukrainian defenders could monitor communications, including between senior Russian generals operating near the front lines, resulting in the loss of several of those commanders.
Third, in the context of U.S. improvements and Russian failures, Chinese analysts observed limitations in their own systems. A 2018 PLA Daily article alluded to “conceptual, organizational, and technical obstacles” hindering the operations of China’s network information systems. The military would need to focus more on “unifying data standards, key links, operating rules, and basic information.” As Samuel Bresnick writes in a new report, other Chinese sources noted difficulties in maintaining secure networks and maintaining “communications in future high-intensity conflicts.” A senior colonel commenting on the rationale for the 2024 reform noted the persistence of problems such as “incompatible software and hardware” between different services and poor information sharing between units. In his view, the new force would “build a solid line of defense in this area and ensure information superiority.”
Fourth was stronger direction for the People’s Liberation Army to prepare for high-end warfighting missions. Specifically, Xi reportedly instructed the military to be capable of defeating Taiwan by 2027 as part of an updated development strategy announced in 2020. Presumably, the need for Xi to announce this goal was based on the observation that its preparations were lagging. Reformers would have scrutinized areas where institutional and technical improvements were needed, including in the information support arena — whose functioning would be key to “information dominance” in any fight with Taiwan and the United States. Chinese commentary hailed the new force as an “important increment in increasing the military’s combat effectiveness” that would “definitely help” achieve the 2027 milestone “on schedule.”
System Improvements
As an institutional innovation, the Information Support Force could improve the leadership’s confidence in pursuing “systems destruction warfare” by further integrating joint combat capabilities “based on network information systems.” This is not a new goal, but the new arrangement could have advantages over its predecessors. No longer buried inside the general departments or the Strategic Support Force, the Information Support Force — along with other existing support forces, including the Cyberspace Force, which is responsible for offensive cyber and electronic warfare, the Space Force, and the Joint Logistic Support Force — is under direct Central Military Commission supervision and can receive guidance from Xi and his top brass. This helps resolve a self-described problem of excessive bureaucracy that prevented forces from “adapting to a readily changing environment.”
Changes in the new force’s status also gives it bureaucratic advantages. Unlike its predecessor, which was likely a grade lower, the force is a theater deputy leader-grade organization, like the other support forces. This means it is relatively senior in the military’s organizational hierarchy and, combined with its direct access to the Central Military Commission, means that it is in a better position to advocate for the resources it needs to complete its mission. Yet it is not too bureaucratically senior — it still ranks one level below the theater commands. As a result, it will be hard for the force to develop into a cloistered (and potentially corrupt) power center oblivious to higher-level directives, such as from the Joint Staff Department and theaters, who will need to coordinate its development and operations.
The new force’s mission to integrate joint combat capabilities will fall to its new leadership. The inaugural commander, Lt. Gen. Bi Yi, is a career ground force officer who spent most of his career in the Northern Theater Command. His qualifications stem mainly from his previous position as a deputy director of the Central Military Commission’s Training and Management Department, which is responsible for setting joint training requirements — putting him in an ideal position to understand the role information systems should play in joint exercises — as well as from his prior role as a Strategic Support Force deputy commander. The new political commissar, Gen. Li Wei, previously served in the Nanjing Military Region (responsible for Taiwan) and has the status of a theater command-grade officer, which gives him an advantage in lobbying on behalf of the force.
An Uncertain Future
The creation of the Information Support Force suggests that the Chinese military continues to study and update its organizations when it needs to. Xi appears not to be content with how the former Strategic Support Force was functioning and accepted military advice that eliminated an entire bureaucracy virtually overnight and created a new one, albeit not out of whole cloth. This decision paints a picture of frustration, on one hand, but also adaptability on the other. Part of Xi’s initial military reforms failed to achieve their goal, but new ideas — probably inspired by a combination of what the United States had been doing right, what Russia did wrong, and the specific needs of the Chinese military — were able to gain Xi’s support. Institutional adaptation, with a practical end in sight, was a higher priority to him than cementing one of his seminal 2015 and 2016 achievements.
If it succeeds at its missions, the force will position the Chinese military to compete more effectively in “systems destruction warfare.” Different services and branches will be able to coordinate more smoothly, adversaries will have fewer options to infiltrate and attack critical network information systems, and technical upgrades will allow commanders to leverage the power of artificial intelligence to make sense of and act upon massive amounts of data in a compressed timeframe. If it works, senior commanders and even Xi himself, sitting directly above this force, will have greater confidence in the military’s ability to succeed in a fast-moving contingency against a well-prepared adversary, thus avoiding the fate of their Russian brethren. The result could be a stronger conviction that China’s military forces have met the 2027 deadline to be better capable of war across the Taiwan Strait.
However, the force’s effectiveness will depend on several key uncertainties. First is its ability to deepen interoperability across the services, which has eluded previous reforms. Second is how well it can support end users. To prove its value, the force will need to work closely with supported commands, just as the Defense Information Systems Agency offers enterprise-level support to geographic and functional combatant commands through its field offices. Yet it remains unclear how the force will coordinate with the Central Military Commission, services, and theaters. It is also unclear whether and how well it will support global operations, which may include managing satellite communications and Beidou navigational satellites. Third is whether, amid competition from private companies, the force can recruit the civilian talent it needs to perform tasks such as software engineering, integrating artificial intelligence, and developing new communications and encryptions modes.
The final and most important variable is whether the People’s Liberation Army can keep pace with U.S. technical advances. For one, the reforms are a reminder that the quest for joint all-domain command and control is not occurring in a vacuum. Adversaries are designing and upgrading their own approaches. The side that is best able to leverage artificial intelligence and other new technologies could gain a decisive advantage — and have more confidence in using force in the first place. The U.S. side might have had a head start, but whether it can retain a lead cannot be taken for granted, and should therefore remain a priority for the Department of Defense as well as U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific (who are working to fashion a more capable combined joint command and control system).
There are also questions about whether the United States can sharpen deterrence. Holding at risk Chinese information systems could present Beijing with severe operational dilemmas and promote deterrence – this is central to how the U.S. military is thinking about implementing its own version of “systems destruction warfare.” The Department of Defense is making new investments in electronic warfare. Budgets for cyber operations are also increasing, supporting new arrangements such as U.S. Cyber Command’s China Outcomes Group. Nevertheless, stronger deterrence will mean, first, understanding the mechanics of China’s new system, which requires a deeper analysis into the communications links holding the system together. It will also mean further investments in the tools needed to target those systems, including the ability to rapidly reconstitute cyber and electronic warfare capabilities in a degraded environment. Finally, U.S. doctrine needs to adapt to a changing adversary structure, including by identifying the key vulnerabilities in the new system, and developing a campaign to reveal select U.S. capabilities that may be able to disrupt China’s ability to maintain resilient military information systems in wartime. Such moves will be needed to undermine any confidence that may have accrued to Xi and his senior general from the latest reorganization.
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Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the U.S. National Defense University. He is on X at @jwuthnow. This essay represents only his views and not those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
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warontherocks.com · by Joel Wuthnow · June 24, 2024
25. Better than the Sum of its Parts: Making NATO Reserves an Alliance Resource
Excerpts:
As with any initiative of this scale, the first hurdle is bureaucratic inertia. The most basic options to encourage international training still touch on multiple laws and policies regulating assignment, pay, and legal status of service members. Even if states accepted reserve sharing as a goal, one can imagine the difficulty of resolving such issues through dozens of bilateral memoranda. NATO, however, could overcome such challenges by setting up a fund for countries to pay into or draw from, depending on whether they were net providers or consumers of combined reserve training. Alternatively, the European Union would surely invite an opportunity to reinforce NATO’s European pillar, and increase NATO-EU ties by funding some of this effort or helping set up some of the legal framework to recognize the status of reserves at least across the European Union.
Multiple sources suggest that European countries are interested in rebuilding reserve components, offering a foundation on which to pursue integration between reserve forces that can counter the inertia. Whether this integration is limited to exchange programs within NATO or geared toward creating a brand-new Reserve Corps, the time is right and the reasons for doing so are many. At a high point in transatlantic and European unity, NATO should answer the difficult question of what it actually wants from its reserves.
Better than the Sum of its Parts: Making NATO Reserves an Alliance Resource - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Stephen Dalzell, Paul Cormarie · June 24, 2024
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In response to mounting security challenges, NATO countries are trying to recruit and retain more service members, both active and reserve. At the same time, NATO is attempting to make its formations increasingly interoperable and multinational. There is one initiative that can help address both goals: integrating reserve capabilities. In doing so, NATO can both grow its forces and teach those forces how best to fight as a multinational force.
NATO has not been ignoring the potential of reserves. Many countries, especially those with conscription, have large national reserves. Finland, for instance, has only 24,000 active personnel but can reach 280,000 soldiers during wartime thanks to its active reserves. Our interview sources and reporting on individual exercises and components suggest reserves already constitute 30–40 percent of the personnel involved in some NATO exercises and make a significant contribution to multinational operations. As with most military activities, they are doing this through ad hoc task forces, fundamental skills, and can-do spirit, not a deliberate program of training.
A broader vision could also have a quantitative impact on the reserve contribution. Fourteen million Europeans (3.1 percent of the total EU population) live in a European country other than that of their citizenship, with an even higher percentage among the military-age cohorts. A collaborative program could turn this loss of potential manpower to a gain, by creating a framework to integrate former service members living in other NATO countries, either as individuals or as part of organized multinational reserve units.
Such integration could take several forms. The easiest would be to expand existing policies that allow reservists to conduct training away from their assigned units or training facilities. This could be expanded into institutional frameworks that improve collaboration and interoperability among NATO members’ reserve components. A more ambitious project would be to take this framework even further and apply the Eurocorps model to a new NATO Reserve Corps structure.
Today, most military reserve policies are of national concern; it is unusual for reservists of different national forces to meet and train together. Often, reserve components across different NATO forces are characterized by quite different career paths, training, and structure. But across these forces, a constant is that reservists help build a bridge between the civilian world and the military. When defense is left to career-oriented volunteers, instead of relying on compulsory military service, positive attitudes of civilians toward the military is critical to recruiting and retaining the necessary troops. With the deteriorating security environment, some European NATO members are bringing back the important operational role reserves play in integrated deterrence, while also seeing Ukraine as an example of the continued relevance of strategic reserves.
NATO could prevent forces from being overstretched in the critical early days of a security crisis or war by having more trained individuals on reserve status, available during contingencies. As far back as 1989, RAND research argued for increasing the number of national reserve units to offset shortages in NATO’s active forces, noting that the supply of European eighteen-year-old males was already declining. Additionally, in light of the current lack of training and readiness reported by many European countries’ reserve forces, restructuring and reorganizing reserves would offer the opportunity to conduct larger and more frequent exercises.
A more transnational reserve force would also generally improve NATO’s fighting force. Individuals would gain experience working as part of another country’s military and the sponsoring units would gain in-house liaisons and subject-matter expertise on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of an allied force.
The most basic option would build on the United States’ bilateral agreements with several allies, which allow reservists and National Guardsmen living overseas to train with local units. Within Europe, it should be relatively simple to borrow this model and expand training with units from other NATO countries. The unit hosting the reservist would simply validate the individual’s participation; the losing component would compensate the individual as it would for normal training.
A more ambitious effort would be to identify up to three countries to host a multinational reserve augmentation unit (MRAU). Individuals already under contract with a NATO member’s reserve component, but living within a reasonable distance of the MRAU, could volunteer to be assigned to it. The MRAU, commanded and logistically supported by the host country, would conduct periodic training and other activities needed to keep the assigned personnel ready for mobilization by their home countries. Additionally, the MRAU would be available to the host nation’s military units and other NATO commands to provide voluntary individual augmentation for unit training or exercises. Both the individual reservists and their home countries would clearly benefit from this situation. Because such a program would also aim to bring in expats who otherwise would remain outsides the reserves, even if they are not actively supporting operations they would be adding depth to the country’s strategic reserve.
Initially, the MRAU’s host country might expend more than it gains from this relationship. But there would be training value to having foreign reservists provide a combined dimension to wargames and exercises, and community benefits from giving resident aliens this opportunity to participate in organized local activities. If the initial MRAUs meet expectations, others could follow, at which point the initial host countries could find themselves benefiting when their own reservists become members of MRAUs elsewhere in NATO. Additionally, given the fiscal constraints most NATO militaries face, uniting some reserve components can be a cost-effective way to build strategic personnel depth quite quickly.
Among the many advantages of this program would be that the MRAUs would not be tied to a particular rank, grade, or specialty structure; they could simply accept any reservist wishing to affiliate with them. Because they would not be operational forces, they wouldn’t affect NATO’s planned structure, or take away from any other unit’s missions.
A third approach would be to create multinational operational reserve units. Because human resource management in combined forces is generally left to each troop-contributing country, either new systems capable of efficiently managing reservists from multiple countries and services will need to be created, or workarounds designed to achieve similar results. Beyond the technical challenges, reserves across NATO tend to be very different in legal status, nature of service, rank structure, and training, all of which would have to be accounted for if these reserve units are to have operational value. The fact that NATO has been working on similar issues for decades suggests the systems being used for its multinational brigades and corps may be adaptable to these new units as well. Because of these obstacles, NATO might look to the example of the Eurocorps, which began as a Franco-German unit, starting small and growing over time. This minilateral option helped the Eurocorps be a plug-and-play unit, sometimes incorporating itself into NATO’s forces.
As with any initiative of this scale, the first hurdle is bureaucratic inertia. The most basic options to encourage international training still touch on multiple laws and policies regulating assignment, pay, and legal status of service members. Even if states accepted reserve sharing as a goal, one can imagine the difficulty of resolving such issues through dozens of bilateral memoranda. NATO, however, could overcome such challenges by setting up a fund for countries to pay into or draw from, depending on whether they were net providers or consumers of combined reserve training. Alternatively, the European Union would surely invite an opportunity to reinforce NATO’s European pillar, and increase NATO-EU ties by funding some of this effort or helping set up some of the legal framework to recognize the status of reserves at least across the European Union.
Multiple sources suggest that European countries are interested in rebuilding reserve components, offering a foundation on which to pursue integration between reserve forces that can counter the inertia. Whether this integration is limited to exchange programs within NATO or geared toward creating a brand-new Reserve Corps, the time is right and the reasons for doing so are many. At a high point in transatlantic and European unity, NATO should answer the difficult question of what it actually wants from its reserves.
Stephen Dalzell is a senior defense policy researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporatioin.
Paul Cormarie is a policy analyst at RAND.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: NATO
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Stephen Dalzell, Paul Cormarie · June 24, 2024
26. Xi Jinping’s Russian Lessons
As I have mentioned recently a journalist from Singapore who did a 3 part documentary on the PLA told me that the main lesson China has learned from Putin's war is do not be the one to fire the first shot. It wants to maintain the moral high ground by firing the second shot.
Excerpts:
As the son of a man so involved in his country’s relationship with Moscow, Xi Jinping knows his history. The past has shown the dangers of both incautious embrace and full-blown enmity. Now, Xi wants to have his cake and eat it, too—move close enough to Russia to create problems for the West, but not so close that China has to decouple entirely. It is not an easy cake to bake, and it may become harder. Washington is trying to make it as difficult as possible by painting Russia and China with the same brush, portraying China (correctly) as facilitating Russia’s war in Ukraine. The conflict has created real economic and reputational costs for Beijing, even as it shies away from some of Moscow’s requests.
Problems exist in any relationship, especially between great powers. What is different from the Cold War is that thorny ideological and personal issues no longer make such challenges so hard to manage. Absent high-impact but low-probability events—such as the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the collapse of the Russian state, or a war over Taiwan—China will probably maneuver within the broad parameters it has already set out for the relationship. Sometimes Beijing will suggest a close relationship with Moscow, and sometimes it will imply a more distant one, modulating its message as the situation demands. The United States, for its part, may be able to shape some of China’s calculus and limit what kinds of help Russia receives. For the foreseeable future, however, Xi’s model for Chinese-Russian relations will likely prove sturdier than the past because, perhaps counterintuitively, it avoids the danger of intimacy.
Xi Jinping’s Russian Lessons
What the Chinese Leader’s Father Taught Him About Dealing With Moscow
June 24, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Joseph Torigian · June 24, 2024
On February 4, 2022, just before invading Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Beijing, where he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a document that hailed a “no limits” partnership. In the two-plus years since, China has refused to condemn the invasion and helped Russia acquire materiel, from machine tools to engines to drones, crucial for the war effort. The flourishing partnership between Xi and Putin has raised serious questions in Western capitals. Is the alliance that linked Moscow and Beijing in the early Cold War back? The Russians and Chinese have repeatedly dismissed such talk, but they have also asserted that their current partnership is more resilient than the days when they led the communist world together.
Xi would know. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a high-level Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official whose own career was a microcosm of relations between Beijing and Moscow during the twentieth century, from the early days of the revolution in the 1920s and 1930s to the on-and-off help during the 1940s and the wholesale copying of the Soviet model in the 1950s, and from the open split of the 1960s and 1970s to the rapprochement in the late 1980s. The elder Xi’s dealings with Moscow showed the dangers of intimacy and enmity, how growing too close created unmanageable tensions that produced a costly feud. Understanding that history, the younger Xi by all appearances believes that the current relationship between Moscow and Beijing is indeed stronger than it was in the 1950s, and that he can avoid the strains that led to the earlier split.
During the Cold War, communist ideology ultimately pushed the two countries apart, while now they are united by a more general set of conservative, anti-Western, and statist attitudes. In the old days, poor relations between individual leaders damaged the relationship, while today, Xi and Putin have made their personal connection a feature of the strategic partnership. Then, the exigencies of the Cold War alliance, which required each side to sacrifice its own interests for the other’s, contained the seeds of its own demise, whereas the current axis of convenience allows more flexibility. China and Russia will never again march in lockstep like they did in the first years after the Chinese Revolution, but they won’t walk away from each other any time soon.
DANGEROUS LIAISONS
Xi Jinping was born in 1953, at the height of China’s feverish copying of the Soviet Union. The most popular slogan in China that year: “The Soviet Union of today is the China of tomorrow.” Xi Zhongxun had just moved to Beijing from China’s northwest, where he had spent most of the first four decades of his life fighting in a revolution inspired by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Like so many of his generation, Xi was devoted to the cause despite numerous setbacks and personal sacrifices—a devotion that survived his persecution and incarceration by fellow members of the CCP in 1935 for not adhering closely enough to communist orthodoxy.
The Bolshevik victory influenced early Chinese radicals, and Moscow led and bankrolled the CCP in its early years. But the growing independence of the Chinese Communists went hand in hand with the rise of Mao Zedong—and tied Xi Zhongxun’s fate to Mao’s. In Mao’s narrative, Soviet-trained radicals had almost buried the revolution in China because they had failed to understand the country’s special conditions. These dogmatists, Mao claimed, had persecuted Xi in 1935 just like they had mistreated Mao himself earlier that decade, when Mao was sidelined by Soviet-aligned leaders in the CCP.
Xi and Putin have made their personal connection a feature of the strategic partnership.
Nonetheless, Mao was not advocating a break from Moscow. Xi Zhongxun met very few foreigners for most of his early life, but that changed in the late 1940s, as the Communists swept across China during the country’s civil war. He started having sustained interactions with Soviets as the head of the enormous Northwest Bureau, the party organization that oversaw the Xinjiang region. The Soviet Union helped the CCP project military power there, and, in December 1949, after the Communists had won the war and consolidated control over mainland China, Xi successfully proposed to the party’s leaders that Xinjiang and the Soviet Union cooperate to develop resources in the province. A year later, Xi became head of the Northwest Chinese-Soviet Friendship Association.
Right around the time of Xi Jinping’s birth, the CCP undertook its first great purge—an incident closely linked to both the Soviet Union and the Xi family. Gao Gang, a high-level official who was seen as a potential successor to Mao, went too far in his criticisms of other leaders during private conversations. Mao turned on his protégé, and Gao eventually committed suicide. Gao had close ties to Moscow, and although they were not the reason for his purge at the time, Mao came to worry about such connections and concluded that they amounted to treachery. The danger of close relations with a foreign power, even an ally, could not have been lost on Xi Zhongxun, who had served alongside Gao in the northwest and had been persecuted along with him in 1935. Xi nearly fell along with him.
Although Xi Zhongxun’s career was hurt by Gao’s misfortune, he was later put in charge of managing the tens of thousands of Soviet experts sent to help China rebuild after years of war. That was no easy task. As Xi recounted in a 1956 speech, these experts had a hard time acclimating to China, and some of them had “died, been poisoned, been injured, gotten sick, and robbed”—even suicide was a problem. When Mao decided that same year that the Chinese political structure was too “Soviet” and concentrated too much authority in Beijing, Xi was also tasked by the leadership to devise a government-restructuring plan.
SPLITTING UP
In August and September 1959, Xi, then a powerful vice premier, led a delegation to the Soviet Union. The timing was inopportune. In June, the Soviets had reneged on a promise to support China’s nuclear weapons program. Xi was supposed to visit the Soviet Union earlier in the summer of that year, but a CCP plenum in Lushan—where Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai was purged—shattered those plans. Peng had written a letter to Mao criticizing the Great Leap Forward, and Mao not only interpreted Peng’s act as a personal affront but also suspected, incorrectly,that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had put him up to it. Peng and Xi were linked by career ties forged on the battlefield for northwest China. The CCP’s second great purge, just like the first, was both proximate to the Xi family and tied to Mao’s suspicions of Soviet intentions. And once again, Xi only narrowly survived.
Since 1956, Sino-Soviet tensions had been growing gradually behind the scenes, but they broke out publicly during Xi’s trip. On August 25, the same day the Soviet embassy in Beijing invited Xi on his visit, Chinese soldiers killed one Indian soldier and wounded another on the Chinese-Indian border. Although the Chinese concluded that the deaths were accidental, the Soviets were incensed, as they believed that the violence would push the Indians away from the communist bloc and frustrate Khrushchev’s attempts to achieve détente with the West during an upcoming trip to Washington.
Arriving in Moscow two days after the violence on the border, Xi did his best to affirm the alliance. In a private meeting with a Soviet vice premier, he tried to put a positive spin on Mao’s Great Leap Forward, then one year in. He visited the Exhibition of Achievements of National Economy, a showcase for Soviet technological triumphs, and placed a wreath at the mausoleum of the Soviet Union’s first two leaders, Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. After spending a few days in Soviet Ukraine and Czechoslovakia, Xi returned to Moscow, where his delegation toured Lenin’s old office and apartment in the Grand Kremlin Palace. He apparently told his son about the moment: in 2010, when Xi Jinping visited Moscow as vice president, he asked Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to take him to the same room. According to a well-connected Russia expert, Xi lingered there, telling Medvedev that this was the cradle of Bolshevism. His father, Xi claimed, had said that Russia and China should always be friends.
Putin and Xi attending an official welcoming ceremony in Beijing, May 2024
Sergei Bobylev / Reuters
Yet in 1959, Xi Zhongxun was in the middle of a crisis in the relationship. On September 9, back in Beijing, Soviet diplomats informed the Chinese about plans to publish a statement in TASS, the state-owned news agency, that took a neutral position on the Chinese-Indian border skirmish. The Chinese were furious and asked the Soviets to change or delay the bulletin. The Soviets not only refused their request but published the statement that evening. Xi left for Beijing the very next day—even though he was supposed to continue leading the delegation until September 18. When Mao and Khrushchev met the following month, Mao complained about the incident, saying, “The TASS announcement made all imperialists happy.”
The dispute was merely the first public crack in the alliance. In the summer of 1960, Khrushchev removed all Soviet experts from China, and Xi was placed in charge of managing their departure. The lesson his son drew from the episode was that the Chinese needed to rely on themselves. At a November 2022 meeting in Bali, according to a former senior U.S. diplomat, Xi Jinping told U.S. President Joe Biden that American technological restrictions would fail, pointing out that the Soviets’ cessation of technological cooperation had not prevented China from developing its own nuclear weapons.
HOT AND COLD
In 1962, Xi Zhongxun’s luck ran out, and he was expelled from power in the CCP’s third great purge. Just like Gao and Peng, he was accused of spying for the Soviet Union, although that was not the primary reason for his punishment. Mao had decided that China, like the Soviet Union before it, was losing its fixation on class struggle, and Xi was caught up in destruction that Mao wrought in reaction. In 1965, while Mao was planning a costly reorganization of Chinese society to fight a possible war against the Soviet Union or the United States, Xi was exiled from Beijing to a mining machinery factory hundreds of miles away in the city of Luoyang. Ironically, that factory had been completed with the help of Soviet experts and had even been described in a local newspaper as a “crystallization” of the “glorious Sino-Soviet friendship.”
All told, Xi Zhongxun spent 16 years in the political wilderness. He had to wait until 1978, two years after Mao’s death, to be rehabilitated. As party boss of the province of Guangdong, Xi warned Americans that they needed to be strong to ward off Soviet aggression. On a trip to the United States in 1980, he impressed his U.S. counterparts with his anti-Soviet views and even made a trip to the headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command, or NORAD, in Colorado, where he took copious notes. As the Politburo member charged with managing relations with foreign parties that were revolutionary, leftist, or communist in nature, Xi helped lead Beijing’s competition for influence with Moscow throughout the world. He also managed Tibetan affairs, and in the first half of the 1980s, he worried about Soviet influence over the Dalai Lama. But by 1986, as ties thawed, Xi was praising the reforms of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and expressing hope for improved relations.
What did Xi Jinping make of this history? In 2013, on his first overseas trip after becoming top leader, he went to Russia, where he spoke warmly to a group of Sinologists about his father’s 1959 visit. The pictures from that journey had been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, he said, but his mother kept the gifts from it. Xi explained that although many observers believed that his generation was oriented toward the West, he was raised reading two literatures, Chinese and Russian. After Xi was exiled to the countryside as a “sent-down youth” during the Cultural Revolution, he spent his days reading Russian revolutionary novels, with a favorite being What Is to Be Done? by Nikolay Chernyshevsky. Xi later claimed to like the character Rakhmetov, the revolutionary fanatic who slept on nails to forge his will. Claiming inspiration, Xi said he wandered through rainstorms and blizzards during his time in the countryside.
But in his 2013 talk with the Russian Sinologists, he did not mention the dismal state of Sino-Soviet relations at the time of his Russian reading. In 1969, the year he was sent to the countryside, China and the Soviet Union were fighting an undeclared border war, and there were even fears of a Soviet nuclear attack. Nor did he tell them about his first job after graduating university, working as a secretary to Geng Biao, secretary-general of the Central Military Commission. Geng viewed Moscow warily. In 1980, at a meeting in Beijing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told Geng that, when it came to the two sides’ views on the Soviet Union, “it seems to me, our respective staffs must have written our talking papers together.”
THE IDEOLOGICAL IRRITANT
Given the state of relations among Russia, China, and the United States today, it is hard to imagine that Xi Jinping spent part of his teenage years digging an air-raid shelter in preparation for a possible Soviet attack—or, for that matter, that his father had been invited to see NORAD. The fluidity of the Washington-Beijing-Moscow triangle over the last 75 years has led some to hope that Xi might somehow be convinced to rein in his support for Russia. But those wishing for a redux of the Sino-Soviet split are likely to be disappointed.
For one thing, the irritant of ideology is now mostly absent from the relationship. It is true that a common communist ideology served as an extraordinary glue for China and Russia in the years immediately after 1949. But as time went on, ideology actually made it harder for the two countries to manage their differences. Mao had a habit of interpreting tactical differences as deeper ideological disputes. The Soviets, Mao increasingly came to believe, did not support China’s combative position toward the West because they had gone “revisionist.” And among communists, charges of theoretical heresy were explosive. When Mao and Khrushchev fought over the TASS announcement in October 1959, it was Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi’s claim that the Soviets were “time-servers” that especially enraged Khrushchev, as it questioned his communist credentials by painting him as a traitor to the revolutionary enterprise. There is a lot of truth, then, to the historian Lorenz Luthi’s claim that “without the vital role of ideology, neither would the alliance have been established nor would it have collapsed.”
Chinese and Russian elites consider democracy promotion an existential threat.
Moreover, once ideological differences entered the equation, it became hard to talk about anything else, in part because debates over ideology could imply calls for regime change. In 1971, after a relatively productive conversation with two Soviet diplomats, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai exploded when one of them raised the issue of a People’s Daily article that they believed called for the Soviet people to start a revolution. Zhou noted that the Soviet Union was hosting Wang Ming, an early CCP leader who had clashed with Mao and been effectively exiled. “You think that we fear him,” Zhou said. “He is worse than shit!” When one Soviet diplomat asked a Chinese participant to stop yelling, saying “a shout is not an argument,” the Chinese diplomat fired back: “If not for shouting, you will not listen.”
Today’s Russia, however, is distant from the ideals of communism, to put it mildly. Although Putin once called the collapse of the Soviet Union a “geopolitical catastrophe,” he has often revealed rather negative views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In his speech on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he blamed Lenin for creating modern Ukraine and spoke of Stalin’s “dictatorship” and “totalitarian regime.” Xi Jinping, on the other hand, continues to take communism’s legacy seriously. According to an Australian diplomat, Russian diplomats found it odd when, on one occasion, Xi quoted to them the Russian revolutionary novel How the Steel Was Tempered. Although not a dogmatist, Xi cares deeply about ideology and has even blamed the collapse of the Soviet Union in part on Moscow’s failure to ensure that people took Marxism-Leninism seriously.
Despite these important differences, Chinese and Russian elites do share a conservative, statist worldview. They both see attacks on their history as Western plots to delegitimize their regimes and consider democracy promotion an existential threat. They both appreciate traditional values as a bulwark against instability and think the West is tearing itself apart with cultural debates. They both have concluded that authoritarian regimes are better at dealing with modern challenges. They both want their countries to regain a lost status and lost territory. Putin and Xi even spin the same legitimation narrative, claiming their predecessors allowed an intolerable (and Western-influenced) degradation of authority that only their strongman rule could arrest.
MAN TO MAN
Another factor binding Moscow and Beijing today are the warm relations between Putin and Xi. Chinese and Russian media tout a strong personal relationship between the two leaders, although it is hard to say how genuine the supposed friendship is. Putin was trained as a KGB agent, an experience that taught him how to manage people, and Xi would have learned similar tricks from his father, a master of the party’s “united front” efforts to win over skeptics. Putin and Xi are very different people. Putin once broke his arm fighting toughs on the Leningrad subway. Xi has consistently demonstrated extraordinary self-control, as evidenced by his ability to rise to power without anyone knowing what he really thought. Putin enjoys high living, while Xi’s personal style seems to border on ascetic. But at the very least, a functional relationship between Russian and Chinese leaders is something of a historical anomaly.
For Mao, Stalin’s ideological credentials and contributions to Soviet history made him a titan of the communist world. Yet Stalin’s cautious attitude toward the Chinese Revolution in the second half of the 1940s rankled him. So did Stalin’s high-handedness during the negotiations for the alliance treaty between the two countries in 1949 and 1950. After Stalin’s death, Mao felt his own stature far outweighed Khrushchev’s, and the chairman famously treated his Soviet counterpart with disdain.
Mao was impressed by the toughness his protégé Deng Xiaoping displayed during interminable debates over ideology in Moscow in the 1960s, when Deng was Beijing’s most prominent attack dog on the world stage. After Mao’s death, Deng noted that countries close to the Soviet Union had dysfunctional economies, while U.S. allies thrived. By the time Deng became China’s paramount leader, many of his associates hoped for a better relationship with Moscow, but Deng ignored those voices. He and Gorbachev met only once—during the Tiananmen Square protests—and Deng concluded that the Soviet leader was “an idiot.” After the Soviet Union collapsed and Boris Yeltsin became president of Russia, the Chinese were at first skeptical of him, given his role in helping bring about the demise of communism, but relations among top leaders gradually improved. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, had studied in the Soviet Union and could sing old Sino-Soviet friendship songs.
Warm interpersonal relations are not the main reason Russia and China are so close today, but the past certainly shows how much individual leaders can matter when they have disdain for their counterparts and the countries they lead. And despite their differences, it is not hard to guess why Putin and Xi might get along on a personal level. They are almost the same age, and they are both sons of men who sacrificed for their countries. And, perhaps most important, they both had formative experiences about the dangers of political instability. During the Cultural Revolution, Xi and his family were kidnapped and beaten by Mao’s Red Guards, while in 1989, Putin, then a KGB officer stationed in Dresden, watched as East Germany collapsed around him while he could not get guidance from Moscow. The two have much to talk about when they make blini and dumplings together for the television cameras.
TEAMING UP
Greater flexibility in the partnership between Beijing and Moscow today also makes it hardier than it was in the past. Since 1949, the central strategic challenge has been how the two powers, which together make up Eurasia’s authoritarian heartland, can cooperate effectively against the threat of the U.S.-led democratic periphery. Despite the extraordinary strength of Washington’s position in their neighborhoods, Beijing and Moscow have struggled to get this coordination right. Time and time again, they have proved unwilling to sacrifice their interests for each other, driven in part by a suspicion that the other is selling them out and seeking improved relations with the West.
Before the Sino-Soviet split, the alliance between Moscow and Beijing created real problems for the United States and real benefits for the two powers. A calm border between the two countries allowed them to focus on confronting the West and to share military technology. In 1958, when China attacked Taiwan in an attempt to take control of the island, Khrushchev came to Beijing’s aid by publicly warning that he would intervene to protect China if the United States entered the conflict—even though he resented that Beijing had failed to tell him about its plans ahead of time.
Xi attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Moscow July 2017
Sergei Ilnitsky / Reuters
Yet the heartland’s relationship with the periphery has always been a mix of coexistence and competition, and Moscow and Beijing have rarely given equal weight to those dueling objectives. During the 1950s and 1960s, China was essentially shut out of the international system while the Soviet Union was largely a status quo power. Mao’s cavalier language threatening nuclear war, along with his use of force on the Chinese-Indian border and against the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait, raised fears in the Kremlin that China would drag the Soviet Union into war. Moscow supported the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, declined to help China during various crises, and hoped for détente with the West—moves that led leaders in Beijing to conclude that Moscow cared more about the West than it did about the communist bloc.
Now, China and Russia have switched positions. Beijing hopes to benefit economically and technologically from continued ties with the United States and Europe, while Moscow sees itself in a purely competitive relationship. The Russians undoubtedly wish that Beijing would provide lethal aid in Ukraine and agree to the Power of Siberia 2, a proposed pipeline that would send natural gas to northeastern China. Unlike during the heyday of the Sino-Soviet alliance, however, Beijing is not technically beholden to sacrifice its economic or reputational interests for Moscow because the two are not formal allies. The Russians have less reason to feel betrayed—and the Chinese have less reason to fear entrapment.
HISTORY LESSONS
As the son of a man so involved in his country’s relationship with Moscow, Xi Jinping knows his history. The past has shown the dangers of both incautious embrace and full-blown enmity. Now, Xi wants to have his cake and eat it, too—move close enough to Russia to create problems for the West, but not so close that China has to decouple entirely. It is not an easy cake to bake, and it may become harder. Washington is trying to make it as difficult as possible by painting Russia and China with the same brush, portraying China (correctly) as facilitating Russia’s war in Ukraine. The conflict has created real economic and reputational costs for Beijing, even as it shies away from some of Moscow’s requests.
Problems exist in any relationship, especially between great powers. What is different from the Cold War is that thorny ideological and personal issues no longer make such challenges so hard to manage. Absent high-impact but low-probability events—such as the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the collapse of the Russian state, or a war over Taiwan—China will probably maneuver within the broad parameters it has already set out for the relationship. Sometimes Beijing will suggest a close relationship with Moscow, and sometimes it will imply a more distant one, modulating its message as the situation demands. The United States, for its part, may be able to shape some of China’s calculus and limit what kinds of help Russia receives. For the foreseeable future, however, Xi’s model for Chinese-Russian relations will likely prove sturdier than the past because, perhaps counterintuitively, it avoids the danger of intimacy.
- Joseph Torigian is a Research Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover History Lab and a Professor at the School of International Service at American University.
Foreign Affairs · by Joseph Torigian · June 24, 2024
27. There’s No Dodge Button for Disinformation
Excerpt:
Even in an ideal environment, there would be modest expectations for such a small program, but those may be impossible to meet. Disinformation is ultimately a political challenge, not a technical one, and the politics of disinformation in the United States have already tied the GEC’s hands. It’s just not clear how this political problem can be solved with a video game.
There’s No Dodge Button for Disinformation
The United States is trying to use video games to counter propaganda.
By Joshua Foust, an incoming assistant professor of public relations at the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/18/video-games-online-disinformation-united-states-state-department/?utm
Foreign Policy · by Joshua Foust
June 18, 2024, 5:24 PM
Can a video game teach you to resist disinformation?
The U.S. government certainly thinks so: In May, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), the government agency tasked with countering foreign disinformation, released a request for proposal offering $1 million for “an evergreen game in a sandbox platform, with an existing fan base, in which participants play a game that builds cognitive resilience to authoritarianism and promotes democratic norms and values.” The call for a sandbox platform refers to open, multiplayer game spaces such as Minecraft, Roblox, or Fortnite, which allow players to build forts, explore virtual worlds, experience short stories, and share experiences. This request is asking for proposals to use creative mode in Fortnite (or a similar platform) to design a custom game experience—only instead of being fun, it is meant to train people to resist Russian disinformation.
It’s an intriguing way to combat an existential challenge for democracy. Can play undermine lies more effectively than speech does? There is a lot about this idea that is compelling, but there are just as many reasons to be skeptical.
The GEC’s idea certainly has some validity. It wants to leverage the emerging field of prebunking—the art of making people aware of disinformation before they encounter it—to help build media literacy skills and contribute to online safety. This is a process that researchers call “inoculation,” which treats disinformation like a virus: You need to train your psychological immune system, so to speak, to learn how to identify and reject bad information. Researchers have suggested different methods for this, ranging from a very literal metaphor of exposing people to “weakened” forms of common disinformation up to complex media literacy training intended to prepare people to identify disinformation on their own.
Using games as part of the battle over information isn’t new. The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism has an entire project devoted to understanding the role of video games in what the U.N. calls “countering violent extremism.” Late last year, the Swedish Psychological Defense Agency—which, like the GEC, is empowered to combat foreign disinformation—sponsored research into foreign political interference that uses video games. And the European Journalism Observatory has highlighted video games, specifically, as a vector for disinformation during Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
So, the GEC is addressing a serious problem with global implications. And the sandbox anti-disinformation proposal is not the only video game program that the agency is funding. As Aftermath reports, it is also offering $250,000 for a program at the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine that will use the process of building an esports team and hosting an esports tournament to provide “counter disinformation/conflict resolution training to confront foreign propaganda and disinformation in competitive online gaming spaces.” While these sums may seem high, a typical “indie” game (one that is not developed by a major studio) can cost a million dollars or more, and so-called AAA games (such as Grand Theft Auto, Fallout, or Call of Duty) can cost hundreds of millions of dollars to develop.
One challenge that inoculation programs face is establishing success conditions. After all, how do you know when someone is successfully protected against disinformation? There is no good answer for this yet—we can design experiments and surveys to measure how messages are being accepted or rejected by a population, but—like other preventative measures—success is negative. You know the program worked if you don’t see people repeating disinformation, rather than knowing it worked because some tangible finish line has been crossed. It is a problem requiring constant vigilance. In that sense, the GEC’s call for an evergreen (permanent) game to counter disinformation is aligned with broad aspects of disinformation research.
But is a game the best way to do this? For decades, games studies have adopted an argument put forth by Dutch cultural historian Johan Huizinga in the 1930s: Games and play are essential to civilization, because they (however unintentionally) teach children how to socialize and move within rules-based systems in a mirror of society.
Building on those ideas, media theorist Ian Bogost coined the term “procedural rhetoric” in the 2000s to argue that video games instruct players to view the world through a certain set of rules and to discard others—even when trying to “break” a game system, he argued, players are still learning how rules and games work. If one accepts this line of argument, then it would naturally follow that an effort to design a game to inoculate against disinformation has the potential to be highly effective.
There are some problems with this approach. The research into so-called serious games, which are games intended to do something other than entertain, suggests that they are the most effective when they are also fun to play. This is a bit of a contradiction, since a serious game is not made with entertainment as its primary purpose, and that is reflected in the GEC’s call. There is no mention of the evergreen game being fun for its players. The agency, understandably, is focused on the outcomes of the game, not the game itself. But making serious games fun is a hard challenge that researchers are still working on, and without it, the effectiveness of any serious game will be limited.
The fun challenge has plagued efforts to use video games to do achieve goals in foreign policy, statecraft, and human rights since the start of the 21st century. Games such as the International Committee of the Red Cross’s LifeRun (2020) or 11 Bit Studio’s This War of Mine (2011) try to cultivate in players a concern for civilians in warfare. The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah released Special Force (2003) so players can battle against Israeli soldiers in South Lebanon, and Fursan Al-Aqsa (2022), places players in the shoes of a Palestinian student who seeks revenge on the Israeli soldiers who tortured him in prison. Fursan is available on Steam, an online video game marketplace used by players around the world that (relevant for the GEC grants) also restricts sales in Russia and Belarus due to sanctions stemming from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Militaries have used games for propaganda, too, from America’s Army (2002) to China’s Glorious Mission (2011). Some of these games went nowhere. (Hezbollah, for instance, did not make a fun game.) But others, such as America’s Army, endured for decades because they were fun—and that game became fun by abandoning some of its more serious pretensions as new editions were published.
While it is clear that the GEC is drawing on a large number of precedents, ideas, and projects, is there evidence that any of it works? After studying the Red Cross’s LifeRun game, which seems to be a close analog to the GEC’s call for proposals, scholar Jolene Fisher concluded that there are structural limits to what these games can be expected to do, given their small distribution and limited scale. In a recent report, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observed that initiatives to support local journalism and media literacy education were far more effective at undermining disinformation than statecraft or counter-messaging, but the former are also much more difficult to fund, implement, and scale.
Bogost, the media scholar, reflected in 2018 on his experience trying to make “persuasive games” and concluded the concept was more promise than delivery. “It was emotion and novelty that drove much of the interest in this work,” he wrote, not concrete or supportable projects. It could be that games are just an accessible channel to do this work compared to more effective methods.
There are broader issues with the GEC’s plans, too. I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on the U.S. Army Esports (USAE) team, an effort launched in 2018 in an attempt to use esports to bolster years of flagging recruitment. The U.S. Defense Department certainly seems to be convinced that the team has been effective in growing its recruiting pipeline and boosting morale, however controversial it may be. But it also does not release data to support its claims of effectiveness, and in 2023, the Army announced a major overhaul of the recruiting process due to multiple consecutive years of missing enlistment goals. If the USAE is effective at growing recruitment, that growth was hard to see. (The service claims that it is on track to meet a much lower recruiting goal in 2024).
I wasn’t alone in observing the limited effects that games on influencing thinking. A couple of years ago, games scholar Philip Hammond observed that decades of U.S. military influence on video games has coincided with declining recruiting and less public trust. If games can persuade people, it’s hard to see how.
This does not mean that such programs are a failure, nor does it mean that the GEC’s program is futile. Rather, it indicates that, as Bogost cautioned, we should be clear about the gap between promise and delivery, and mindful of where that gap emerges.
The GEC’s success in persuading social media companies to moderate away Islamist extremist content on their platforms (the most effective way to counter disinformation, according to researchers) suggests that it sometimes can do this work effectively. After all, while the growing presence of extremists in video games is a real concern, it is the community and discourse around games where that extremism tends to emerge, not within the storylines and play of the games themselves.
Games scholar Sky LaRell Anderson calls these conversations “extraludic narratives,” and in studying them found that they form an important basis for building communities around sharing gameplay experiences. Such a dynamic leaves open the potential for the GEC’s sponsored esports team in Ukraine to influence some of those narratives about Russia, or even to cultivate a community of resistance against Russian narratives in Ukraine’s Esports spaces. But researchers find this dynamic hard for outsiders to understand in real time, much less to intentionally shape beforehand. Governments just aren’t cool, and the USAE’s own engagement scandals point to the many scenarios where government sponsorship might be a poison pill.
The GEC has experienced this with its other efforts to counter disinformation. Its successful campaign to contain Islamist disinformation online, when applied to countering Russian disinformation, resulted in the center being subjected to unfair, partisan attacks by far-right politicians in the United States. Republicans in the House of Representatives tried last year to block the center’s budgetary reauthorization, falsely claiming that it targeted conservatives for censorship. Embattled Rep. Darrell Issa disputed the need for a counter-disinformation agency and claimed that the GEC had no successes to justify its budget despite the agency’s successful work countering disinformation.
The dishonest nature of these attacks points to a difficult political environment emerging for the agency. It could be the case that sponsoring games and gaming events is all that the agency has left if platform governance has become closed off by toxic right-wing politics. The GEC is a meaningful organization that treats the threat of disinformation with the appropriate seriousness.
But if politics prevent the agency from responding effectively to disinformation in the venues where it can be the most effective, it is hard to blame it for trying something else. Still, we should be cautious and keep our expectations in check: As unfair as the right-wing attacks on the agency are, and as hard as it works to address disinformation globally, those same attacks will also be carried over to the teams and games the agency sponsors.
Even in an ideal environment, there would be modest expectations for such a small program, but those may be impossible to meet. Disinformation is ultimately a political challenge, not a technical one, and the politics of disinformation in the United States have already tied the GEC’s hands. It’s just not clear how this political problem can be solved with a video game.
Foreign Policy · by Joshua Foust
28.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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