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Quotes of the Day:
“The historian's rightful task is to distil experience as a medicinal warning for the future generations, not to distil a drug.”
– B.H. Liddell Hart
"When you teach a man to hate and fear his brother, when you teach that he is a lesser man because of his color or his beliefs or the policies he pursues, when you teach that those who differ from you threaten your freedom or your job or your family, then you also learn to confront others not as fellow citizens but as enemies... "
– Robert Kennedy
“Each of us was put here in this time and this place to decide the future of humankind. Did you think you were put here for something less.”
– Chief Arvol Looking Horse
1. What the Putin-Pyongyang Axis Means
2. Putin and Kim Bring Back Cold War-Era Military Alliance to Tense Region
3. Putin Came to Asia to Disrupt, and He Succeeded
4. “The deepening of North Korea-Russia closeness complicates U.S. calculations… “We are not yet at the military response stage.”
5. Takeaways from the Putin-Kim Summit (Stimson Center)
6. S. Korea, U.S., Japan agree on close cooperation through 'timely' dialogue after Kim-Putin summit: Seoul minister
7. Deepening N.K.-Russia ties may drive S. Korea in direction of nuclear option: ex-Trump official
8. USS Theodore Roosevelt arrives in Busan in show of force
9. U.S. Navy secretary hails Hanwha's acquisition of U.S. shipbuilder as 'game-changing' milestone
10. [WHY] Why are both Koreas fixated on cross-border propaganda?
11. North Korea’s Flawed but Winning Strategy in Ukraine
12. Russia and North Korea’s military deal formalizes a bustling arms trade
13. DPRK Workers Meet to Pledge Revenge on U.S. Imperialists
14. Regarding Self-reliance As Treasured Sword of Prosperity
15. N. Korean soldiers cross border for 3rd time in June: JCS
16. Putin and Kim are creating a crisis—Can the US and China rein them in?
17. The Putin-Kim summit produced an unusual — and speedy — flurry of glimpses into North Korea
1. What the Putin-Pyongyang Axis Means
At least people are not including north Korea in the axis. Most of the pundits and mainstream press have only focused on China, Russia, and Iran. But it is north Korea that has long been inextricably linked to all three (and other malign actors). But of all our, it is the least understood.
But I suspect this will soon pass and the focus on north Korea will fade and will be relegated to the backwater by national security and foreign policy specialists, pundits, the press, and policy makers (except for those who focus on the Korea question).
What the Putin-Pyongyang Axis Means
Adversaries are working together. The U.S. will have to adjust to this new world disorder.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-putin-pyongyang-axis-means-a95799c9
By The Editorial Board
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June 19, 2024 5:38 pm ET
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang on Wednesday. PHOTO: KREMLIN POOL/ZUMA PRESS
For the benefit of the liberal internationalists in the White House who still live in the 1990s, take a look at Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea this week. This is another illustration of the axis of authoritarians working together around the world against America and its allies.
Not very long ago North Korea was isolated, subject to United Nations sanctions and a global effort to enforce them. Donald Trump thought he could cajole the North into giving up his nuclear weapons in return for investment and commercial ties. Our sources say he has mused about trying again in a second term.
But today that’s even more of a fantasy. The U.N. sanctions are still in place but are evaded with ease with the help of Russia and China. Mr. Putin’s visit symbolizes this shift that has been going on for some time and has accelerated with the Ukraine war.
Mr. Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signed a new agreement this week to come to each other’s aid if one faces “aggression.” Both define aggression to include a war they start, like Russia’s in Ukraine.
The details of their cooperation aren’t public. But the U.S. has accused North Korea of “unlawfully” sending ballistic missiles and 11,000 containers of munitions for Russia to use against Ukraine. In return, Russia is propping up the North with money and other aid, as well as technology for advanced weaponry. Especially dangerous is Russian help for the North’s long-range-missile and satellite-launch programs. These could put U.S. space assets and the homeland at risk.
The “international community,” to use a favorite Barack Obama phrase, is as effective at stopping this as the League of Nations. The U.S. response is to issue statements of denunciation that include words like “unlawfully,” as if either the North or Russia care. Russia used its veto at the Security Council in March to disband a U.N. panel that monitored North Korea’s compliance with sanctions. The realistic conclusion is that Russia and China want North Korea as a nuclear-armed state to threaten South Korea, Japan and the U.S.
The dictators don’t agree on everything, and a skillful U.S. diplomacy would look for opportunities to exploit differences. But the first necessity is to shed illusions that this axis is going away. Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, Havana, Caracas and others share a common interest in creating mayhem that stretches U.S. and Western defenses.
Another illusion to drop is that these nations will give up their malign ambitions if the U.S. accommodates them and retreats to the Americas. This is the fantasy of some in the Trump wing of the GOP. The emergence of this hostile axis is a direct response to the perception of U.S. weakness and retreat. More weakness will court more aggression.
The U.S. and its allies will have to rearm, and far more urgently than President Biden and Mr. Trump seem willing to do. The West will also have to stop thinking that global institutions like the U.N. are serving U.S. interests. The U.N. is now useful mainly to Russia and China as veto blockades against the U.S., and to Iran and Hamas as a forum for hostility to Israel.
The International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice are now as intent on prosecuting leaders of free countries as they are marauding dictators. The G-20 forum, meanwhile, is increasingly being used by left-wing governments to weaken U.S. economic interests.
***
The “collective security” of the West will have to come from alliances like NATO, the AUKUS accord and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. will have to use its economic clout, open trade, and soft power to court the global South against the money and debt traps offered by China in particular.
Perhaps most important, the U.S. will have to stop solely playing defense and start looking to exploit vulnerabilities within the new axis. This means supporting sources of opposition within these countries, and pushing against their weakest links. This is what the Reagan Doctrine did against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe.
The Biden Administration has behaved as if the world still wants to play by post-Cold War rules. The result is growing disorder and the menacing ambitions of anti-American states. If Mr. Trump has a better response than saying there were no wars when he was President, the American people would love to hear it.
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Review and Outlook: Mississippi Sen. Roger Wicker, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, is pushing much higher defense spending to meet the growing threats from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Image: Mc2 Evan Mueller/US Navy/Zuma Press
Appeared in the June 20, 2024, print edition as 'What the Putin-Pyongyang Axis Means'.
2. Putin and Kim Bring Back Cold War-Era Military Alliance to Tense Region
Concern yes. Fear no.
This transactional pseudo alliance is a result of weakness, fear, and envy.
Russia and north Korea are weak and desperate and need each other's support because of their myriad failures, internally and externally.
Russia and north Korea fear the alliances of like minded democracies because those alliances are strong and resilient.
Russia and north Korea envy the alliances of like minded democracies but they will never be able to achieve anything close to the strength and resilience of them.
But the alignment of malign actors in the axis of aggressors and dictators is concerning because they must create friction, chaos, and conflict within the international community to advance their interests. They need to create the perception of external threats (especially Kim) to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the people as they prioritize the security of the regime leadership over the welfare of the people. And unfortunately this can lead to miscalculation if we do not deeply understand the nature, objectives, and strategies of these regimes.
What is to be done? Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake (Bonaparte) - we should be observing for the mistakes of Russia and north Korea.
And in terms of north Korea it is time for an aggressive new strategy at this inflection point - a human rights upfront approach, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea to solve the Korea question (the unnatural division of the korean peninsula per paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice. And there needs to be a realization that the only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
Putin and Kim Bring Back Cold War-Era Military Alliance to Tense Region
Pact between Russia and North Korea arouses concern in Washington, Seoul, Tokyo
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/putin-and-kim-bring-back-cold-war-era-military-alliance-to-tense-region-eab19938?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
By Dasl Yoon
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and Timothy W. Martin
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June 21, 2024 11:44 am ET
SEOUL—The revival of a Cold War-era military pact between Russia and North Korea has unnerved the U.S. and its main Asian partners, stirring uncertainty and concern that the agreement could undermine regional security.
The accord signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Wednesday includes a clause under which if one country is attacked, the other would provide “military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay.”
The pact, similar to one signed between Russia and North Korea before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, gave Pyongyang security assurances that Moscow would support it in the case of conflict.
But with tensions high across Northeast Asia, Putin used his first trip to Pyongyang in nearly a quarter-century to restore what has been a historic military relationship with North Korea.
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North Korea’s Kim Jong Un said he and Russian President Vladimir Putin share an “unbreakable relationship of comrades-in-arms.” WSJ’s Ann Simmons explains what they hope to gain from each other. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/Sputnik/Kremlin/Shutterstock
While the pact’s open-ended language left unclear how strong the commitment is, it drew a swift rebuke from Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. A security pact signed in August at Camp David by President Biden and the heads of South Korea and Japan reaffirmed bilateral commitments to swiftly consult each other in response to regional threats. The agreement was aimed at strengthening trilateral cooperation amid growing threats from North Korea and China.
South Korea’s national security adviser described the treaty as troubling and said Seoul would reconsider its prohibition against providing weapons directly to Ukraine. Until now, South Korea had a longstanding policy of not supplying weapons to countries actively engaged in conflict, despite calls from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for Seoul to do more to help Kyiv.
South Korea summoned Russia’s ambassador in Seoul on Friday to protest the new treaty. Seoul plans to sanction Russian ships and organizations involved in weapons transfers to North Korea.
Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa said the type of military aid Russia is talking about providing North Korea may develop into a violation of United Nations sanctions. North Korea’s language referring to an alliance suggested that its military ties with Russia would be extremely close, she said, speaking at a news conference Friday.
The Russia-North Korea agreement “potentially poses great harm to the regional security environment surrounding Japan, and our government is gravely concerned,” Kamikawa said.
The Pyongyang-Moscow accord raises the possibility of an increased flow of weapons between the two countries and a wider proliferation of weapons. Pyongyang’s weapons have already been used by Russian soldiers in fighting with Ukraine.
Ukrainian soldiers prepare to head to the front against Russia in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. PHOTO: ROMAN PILIPEY/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The broad nature of support suggested under the agreement sends a clear signal to the West that North Korea and Russia are banding together, said Paul Poast, a professor of international relations at the University of Chicago.
“It’s all up to interpretation, negotiation and bargaining regardless of what’s on paper,” said Poast, who researches military alliances.
China hasn’t commented on the Russia-North Korea pact. It has largely kept quiet on the growing cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, characterizing it as a matter between the two countries—and showing a lack of interest in trilateral efforts.
There are a number of mutual defense pacts around the world, the best known of which is NATO’s Article 5 agreement stipulating that if an ally is the victim of an armed attack, every member of the alliance will come to its assistance. While Article 5 is considered one of the world’s strongest defense commitments, such articles are rarely invoked, signaling that military support isn’t automatic, Poast said.
Instead, it is likely that more weapons transfers will occur as a result of the pact, rather than North Korea or Russia intervening militarily in a conflict, as interpretations of alliance obligations will always vary, said Tongfi Kim, a research professor in Asian geopolitics at the Brussels School of Governance.
“Great powers like the U.S. worry about hurting their reputation by abandoning an ally, but neither Russia nor North Korea have such a reputation to protect,” Kim said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un took the wheel alongside Russia’s Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang on Wednesday. PHOTO: KREMLIN/ZUMA PRESS
The North Korea-Russia defense treaty revives a 1961 pledge, which was renounced after the fall of the Soviet Union and Russia’s establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea. The treaty was succeeded by weaker security assurances in 2000.
By reviving terms of the 1961 agreement, Kim received the strongest form of military, economic and diplomatic support from Putin that is possible now, especially the suggestion of being drawn to the defense of North Korea, said Lee Yong-joon, a former South Korean nuclear envoy.
“The language used in the treaty is purposefully broad, allowing any form of military assistance that Russia and North Korea agree on,” said Lee, who was South Korea’s deputy representative during six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program that included Russia, the U.S. and others.
Kim Jong Un said the treaty was defensive in nature, while Putin said South Korea had “nothing to worry about” unless Seoul plans an attack on Pyongyang. Yet their growing military cooperation has drawn the condemnation of the U.S. and its allies.
South Korea, through an indirect arrangement, has provided artillery shells for Ukraine’s war efforts with Russia. There are various options apart from lethal weapons that South Korea could consider, a presidential official told reporters on Thursday.
South Korea’s Foreign Trade Act stipulates that weapons exports can only be used for “peaceful purposes.”
Such export permission is reviewed by South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration, the country’s arms-procurement agency, and a presidential decree to overturn the policy barring exports to Ukraine wouldn’t need parliamentary approval, said Bang Jong-kwan, a former South Korean Army major general.
“If South Korea sees Russia’s expansion as a bigger threat to international peace, aiding Ukraine and stopping Putin’s ambitions becomes a matter of preventing further global conflicts,” Bang said.
Putin, who traveled to Vietnam after his trip to North Korea, said Seoul would be making a “big mistake” if it supplies arms to Kyiv, and threatened to make decisions that are “unlikely to please the current leadership.”
Ann M. Simmons and Peter Landers contributed to this article.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the June 22, 2024, print edition as 'Military Pact’s Revival Raises U.S. Concerns'.
3. Putin Came to Asia to Disrupt, and He Succeeded
He only disrupts if we allow him to. Our alliances are stronger and we should not fall for his malign activities in the region or anywhere in the world.
Putin Came to Asia to Disrupt, and He Succeeded
His embrace of North Korea and deal making with Vietnam injected more potential threats into a region already strained by Taiwan tensions and South China Sea clashes.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/22/world/asia/putin-korea-china-disruption.html
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Hanoi, Vietnam, on Thursday.Credit...Pool photo by Manan Vatsyayana
By Damien Cave
Reporting from Sydney, Australia
June 22, 2024
Updated 4:17 a.m. ET
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Four days in Asia. That’s all President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia needed to anger Washington, undermine Beijing and rattle a collection of Indo-Pacific nations already scrambling to cope with a jumbled world order.
After stops in Pyongyang and Hanoi this week that were draped in Communist red, Mr. Putin left behind a redrawn map of risk in Asia. North Korea sat at the center: a rogue nuclear state that regularly threatens its neighbors, suddenly empowered by Russian promises of sophisticated military aid and a mutual defense pact.
Mr. Putin also signed at least a dozen deals with Vietnam — a country of growing importance for both China and the United States as they vie for influence — where he insisted that “reliable security architecture” could not be built with “closed military-political blocs.”
The trip was both defiant and disruptive. It showed that the jockeying for power sometimes framed as a new Cold War between the United States and China is less binary than it might seem, and many countries in the region seemed to emerge from the week with a deeper sense of unease.
Mr. Putin’s presence and his threats, bold one minute, vague the next, have added even more complexity to their already difficult calculations around security and Great Power competition.
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Reading news about Mr. Putin’s visit in Pyongyang on Thursday.Credit...Jon Chol Jin/Associated Press
Over the past few years, the Indo-Pacific has been knocked around by a geopolitical shoving match between the United States and China, primarily over China’s claims on Taiwan, and increasingly over heightened Chinese militarization in the South China Sea.
In May, China launched two days of intense navy and air force drills around Taiwan in what it called a form of “strong punishment.” The exercises came after Taiwan’s new president pledged to defend the sovereignty of the self-governing island that Beijing sees as lost territory.
Just this week, another flashpoint — the South China Sea — edged closer to conflict. After months of bitter standoffs in the middle of a turquoise choke point for global trade, a Philippine Navy sailor was injured Monday after ships from China and the Philippines collided near a disputed archipelago. Widening the potential ramifications, the Philippines is an ally the United States is treaty-bound to help in case of war.
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A photo released by the Philippine military showing Chinese coast guard personnel clashing with Philippine Navy boats in the South China Sea on Monday.Credit...Armed Forces of the Philippines
Many countries in the region were already beefing up their militaries to deal with China’s pressure and the uncertainty over how far the rivalry between the United States and China might go.
Add to those concerns a wave of jitters in the region over the U.S. presidential election, not to mention a new report this month showing that China is in the midst of a “significant” expansion of its nuclear capabilities, and headaches have become common in the region’s foreign policy circles.
Now Mr. Putin has induced a few more. With his embrace of North Korea, including his open threat to better arm Kim Jong-un’s military, he has effectively added another potential crisis to Asia’s list of concerns, reigniting old hostilities on the Korean Peninsula..
Officials in South Korea and Japan — North Korea’s avowed enemies — were especially alarmed. Both countries had already been talking about toughening their defenses and growing closer to the United States and each other, particularly since Mr. Kim’s rhetoric has become markedly more hostile toward them in recent months.
Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, described Mr. Putin’s burst of activity in Asia as “your worst fears come true.”
“What Russia just did is they told us they are going to be the principal organizers of rogue states that develop nuclear weapons, violate nonproliferation treaties, and allow countries under U.N. sanctions to get outside those sanctions,” he said.
Peter Tesch, Australia’s ambassador in Moscow from 2016 to 2019, stressed that Mr. Putin favors keeping the world chaotic because he believes Russia benefits from keeping other countries off-kilter. Disinformation and partnerships with other provocateurs have become Putin doctrine.
“He’s quite happy for Russia to be the smelliest, farting uncle at the barbecue,” Mr. Tesch said. “The signal is, ‘Yes I am a disrupter. I can act in ways that increase the complexity of what you’re trying to manage.’”
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Mr. Putin and Mr. Kim riding in a limousine in Pyongyang on Wednesday, in a photo released by Russian state media.Credit...Gavriil Grigorov/Sputnik Kremlin, via Associated Press
China, North Korea’s largest trading partner and arguably its biggest influence, must also contend with the fallout. That could include pressure to clarify what its “no limits” friendship with Russia means for China’s stated goal of stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Some analysts suggest Mr. Putin had all of this in mind. He may have tightened the bond with Mr. Kim, who greeted him with hugs at the airport, to both scare the United States and signal frustration to China’s leader, Xi Jinping, for not doing more to help Russia win in Ukraine.
“If Putin cannot get everything he wants from Beijing, he will look to get it elsewhere, and there aren’t a lot of supermarkets that cover his wish list — arms, labor and a willingness to pick a fight with Washington,” said Samuel Greene, a professor of Russian politics at King’s College London. “Iran is one. North Korea is another.”
“The point is that, while Putin recognizes his dependency on China, he can’t afford to let Beijing dictate the course of the war effort — because as goes the war, so goes Putin.”
To some degree, Mr. Putin’s trip to Asia was also a potent reminder of Russia’s historic military ties: North Korea, India, and Vietnam are just a few of the countries that have been heavily dependent on Russian hardware for decades, creating links in training and maintenance that keep Moscow deeply embedded in the region.
But even before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, those ties were fraying: Russia’s arms sales to Southeast Asia dropped to $89 million in 2021, down from $1.2 billion in 2014, according to independent studies. A clean break or even significant diversification is what Mr. Putin has sought to delay.
And if Mr. Putin’s gestures toward North Korea do end up fueling an arms race in Asia, Moscow also stands to gain: Weapons from Russia do not just intensify the risk of chaos when shared with a country like North Korea. They also bring in revenue, much needed for a Russian economy that has been squeezed by sanctions, war, inflation and 16 percent interest rates.
Mr. Putin’s visit to Hanoi focused on deals. The full scope of what was agreed is not clear, but analysts predicted that some would probably emerge later as defense-related, with financing devised to skirt international sanctions — possibly with payment in the form of oil and gas rights in the South China Sea.
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Outside the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum during Mr. Putin’s visit in Hanoi on Thursday.Credit...Pool photo by Athit Perawongmetha
“Vietnam hasn’t made a major upgrade to its land forces in years, but supposedly that’s coming,” said Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at Rand. “You may see Vietnam purchase new Russian tanks.”
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Nguyen The Phuong, who studies Vietnam’s military affairs at the University of New South Wales in Australia, said Vietnam also needs new fighter jets and bigger warships in line with what Beijing uses to mark territory that Hanoi also claims in the South China Sea.
He added that the high-stakes security dynamics in Asia have put countries like Vietnam in a bind. “Western weapons are expensive and politically sensitive,” he said.
But would Vietnam use new Russian vessels to stand up to China over oil deposits explored with Moscow’s help and claimed by both Beijing and Hanoi?
For many countries, the Putin tour has raised another round of such aggravating questions. Beijing has clearly sided with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. In May, Mr. Putin visited Beijing, and while his trip to North Korea may bother Mr. Xi, analysts do not expect a major rupture in the relationship.
Angering one leader may risk punishment from another, or both.
“I think there’s some concern about Russia-China ties strengthening,” Mr. Grossman said, “and the potential for both countries to gang up on the smaller and medium-sized ones.”
At a defense conference in Singapore this month, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said that was already happening. He accused China and Russia of colluding to undermine a peace summit in Switzerland led by Ukraine last week. Only a handful of Asian countries attended.
Motoko Rich contributed reporting from Tokyo.
Damien Cave is an international correspondent for The Times, covering the Indo-Pacific region. He is based in Sydney, Australia. More about Damien Cave
4. “The deepening of North Korea-Russia closeness complicates U.S. calculations… “We are not yet at the military response stage.”
This is a Google translation of a VOA report.
Excerpts:
Former US Forces Korea Commander John Tillally also emphasized that the only response the US can take now is to maintain the unity of the US-ROK alliance.
In an email sent to VOA on the 21st, former Commander Tillally said that the most reasonable measure to respond to the close relationship between North Korea and Russia is for the ROK-US combined forces to maintain a strong deterrence posture while continuing to conduct high-intensity tactical training.
Patrick Cronin, the Hudson Institute's Asia-Pacific Security Chair, told VOA on the 21st that there is a need to devise a strategy to neutralize Chairman Kim Jong-un's potential increase in provocations in the wake of the North Korea-Russia treaty.
He said that for this purpose, it is necessary to integrate defense systems and build multi-layered defense.
He also said there is room for the United States to cooperate with China on this issue.
[Recording: Cronin Chair] “it is in China's interest not to see Russia destabilize Northeast Asia. And the problem with Putin's strategy to pin down the Americans in Asia is exactly what China does not want. China has been trying to push us back away from the Eurasian landmass in the Far East, and the idea that Putin wants to pin us down to focus on China is antithetical to Beijing's interest. So, there's a common interest here. Second interest is, of course, the specific transfer of technologies that could be offensive, that could be therefore destabilizing on the Peninsula, are going to be watched as closely in Beijing as they are in Seoul or in Washington.”
Cronin said that China does not want Russia to destabilize Northeast Asia, and in particular, “Putin’s strategy of tying the United States to Asia is the exact opposite of what China wants.”
Chair Cronin continued, “Russia’s transfer of offensive military technology could destabilize the Korean Peninsula, so it will be watched closely by China as well as by South Korea and the United States.” In that respect, the United States and Korea can find common ground with China. I said there is.
“The deepening of North Korea-Russia closeness complicates U.S. calculations… “We are not yet at the military response stage.”
2024.6.22
Experts have predicted that with President Putin's first visit to North Korea in 24 years, the close relationship between North Korea and Russia will deepen, making the United States' calculations more complicated. However, he advised that there is no need to overreact because the military situation has not fundamentally changed yet. Reporter Kim Young-kyo reports.
Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Photo = Paul Morigi/Brookings Institution/Flickr.
Michael O'Hanlon, a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution, said in a phone call with VOA on the 21st that it is true that the 'Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' between North Korea and Russia is a significant geopolitical change.
This is because Russia not only does not support the international community's sanctions against North Korea, but is also actively supporting North Korea's various weapons activities and ambitions.
[Recording: Senior Researcher O'Hanlon] “This is a big change that now Russia is not only unwilling to support sanctions against North Korea, but actively aiding North Korea in its various weapons endeavors and ambitions. Second, it certainly does complicated strategic planning for the United States, because we do have to worry about multiple things happening in multiple places at the same time, and that's not really been true for the most part, for the last 20 years.”
Senior researcher O’Hanlon pointed out that this close relationship between North Korea and Russia “definitely complicates America’s strategic plan.”
“We now find ourselves in a situation where we have to worry about multiple things happening in multiple places at the same time,” he said, adding, “This has rarely happened in the last 20 years.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un, who are visiting North Korea on the 19th, are shaking hands after signing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement.
Earlier, on the 19th, North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the ‘Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ in Pyongyang.
This treaty states, “If either side is put in a state of war due to an armed invasion by an individual state or several states, the other side shall immediately retain its reserves in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the laws of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. “We will provide military and other assistance by whatever means we can.”
In a joint press statement after the summit, President Putin said, "Russia does not rule out advancing military-technical cooperation with North Korea," and added, "We will cooperate in the military field within the new agreement."
Some interpret this as North Korea and Russia restoring their military alliance.
In this regard, senior researcher O'Hanlon said that it is not currently necessary for the U.S. military to further increase the level of military activities on the Korean Peninsula.
[Recording: Senior Researcher O’Hanlon] “I don’t think that’s a necessary response. I think you have to understand where this is coming from. This is not any interest by Russia in trying to get involved in a war against South Korea. I think Russia is simply trying to calculate what the United States is now attempting in Ukraine, and trying to complicate American views by reminding the United States that Russia can do things in response. ”
O'Hanlon said it was not in Russia's interest to get involved in a war with Korea.
“Russia is trying to complicate the U.S. position by reminding the U.S. of what it can do in response to what the U.S. is currently trying to do in Ukraine,” he explained.
In particular, he said that Russia has not yet made any substantive changes in its support for North Korea other than new commitments, and that “the military situation has not fundamentally changed.”
So there is no need for the United States to overreact, O'Hanlon said.
U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller warned on the 20th that Russian arms support to North Korea “could potentially destabilize the Korean Peninsula.”
He continued, “Therefore, we will continue to cooperate with our regional allies South Korea and Japan to respond to the threat from North Korea.”
Robert Gallucci, former special envoy to North Korea at the State Department
Former State Department special envoy for North Korea Robert Gallucci said in a phone call with VOA on the 21st, “There is no need for the United States to escalate tensions at this point.”
He said that the reason U.S. government officials are emphasizing the importance of the alliance in relation to the new North Korea-Russia agreement is because there are no other practical measures that can be taken.
[Recording: Former Special Envoy Gallucci] “I don’t see any need for the United States to up the ante here. I think making the right statements, which I think, we've done, secretary of state, particularly... I am not impressed by this as a change in circumstances to which the United States of America needs to start… ”
Former special envoy Gallucci said that although North Korea and Russia signed a treaty to further strengthen military cooperation, the geopolitical environment has not changed to a level that requires the United States to immediately respond militarily.
However, he added that the situation may change if there are actual signs that Russia will transfer advanced military technology to North Korea.
Former Special Envoy Gallucci believed that the United States might take more active action to physically block technology transfer.
[Recording: Former Special Envoy Gallucci] “There are physical ways to block transfers. If the United States uses force to stop a transit of an aircraft or a ship from somewhere in Russia to somewhere in North Korea, you might ask, on what basis in international law does the United States do that? Does the sanctions regime of the United Nations justify a state acting with military force against a transfer like that? “I would be trying to make sure that anything the United States did was explainable, justifiable in terms of international law and practice.”
Former special envoy Gallucci said, however, that before the United States uses force to prevent the transfer of Russian technology via aircraft or ships, it must properly understand whether it can be justified under international law and the UN sanctions regime.
John Tillerly, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea. (file photo)
Former US Forces Korea Commander John Tillally also emphasized that the only response the US can take now is to maintain the unity of the US-ROK alliance.
In an email sent to VOA on the 21st, former Commander Tillally said that the most reasonable measure to respond to the close relationship between North Korea and Russia is for the ROK-US combined forces to maintain a strong deterrence posture while continuing to conduct high-intensity tactical training.
Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute.
Patrick Cronin, the Hudson Institute's Asia-Pacific Security Chair, told VOA on the 21st that there is a need to devise a strategy to neutralize Chairman Kim Jong-un's potential increase in provocations in the wake of the North Korea-Russia treaty.
He said that for this purpose, it is necessary to integrate defense systems and build multi-layered defense.
He also said there is room for the United States to cooperate with China on this issue.
[Recording: Cronin Chair] “it is in China's interest not to see Russia destabilize Northeast Asia. And the problem with Putin's strategy to pin down the Americans in Asia is exactly what China does not want. China has been trying to push us back away from the Eurasian landmass in the Far East, and the idea that Putin wants to pin us down to focus on China is antithetical to Beijing's interest. So, there's a common interest here. Second interest is, of course, the specific transfer of technologies that could be offensive, that could be therefore destabilizing on the Peninsula, are going to be watched as closely in Beijing as they are in Seoul or in Washington.”
Cronin said that China does not want Russia to destabilize Northeast Asia, and in particular, “Putin’s strategy of tying the United States to Asia is the exact opposite of what China wants.”
Chair Cronin continued, “Russia’s transfer of offensive military technology could destabilize the Korean Peninsula, so it will be watched closely by China as well as by South Korea and the United States.” In that respect, the United States and Korea can find common ground with China. I said there is.
This is Kim Young-kyo from VOA News.
5. Takeaways from the Putin-Kim Summit (Stimson Center)
Takeaways from the Putin-Kim Summit
Stimson experts weigh in on the recent Putin-Kim summit and the implications of this partnership for both regional and global security
By Jenny Town • Yun Sun • Rachel Minyoung Lee • Yuki Tatsumi
Asia & Indo-Pacific
Russia and North Korea Upgrade Relations
By Jenny Town
Director, Korea Program and 38 North
On June 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were all smiles during Putin’s whirlwind state visit to Pyongyang. Amid fanfare and pageantry (as well as some lavish gift giving including a joy ride in a second luxury car gifted to Kim), the two leaders signed a Treaty upgrading their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” – the highest level of bilateral relations for Russia.
Among the 23 articles of the treaty was a clause that brought back language from the 1961 Treaty between the Soviet Union and DPRK, pledging mutual immediate “military and other assistance by all means at its disposal” in case of armed aggression on either of the parties. This biggest divergence from the past formulation was a new reference to the UN Charter’s Article 51, which invokes the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs,” a rather ironic clause given Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine in violation of the UN Charter itself. It does beg the question of what either believes constitutes an armed attack or armed aggression and what all “military assistance” entails.
While the international community contemplates the scope and meaning of this mutual defense clause, the treaty serves to create the basis of long-term cooperation across military, economic, socio-cultural, and political aspects of the relationship, including in a number of sanctioned areas such as military and technology cooperation. A strong theme throughout the treaty focused on the collective efforts to resist coercive measures and promote a multipolar world order.
The collective aim of the treaty may have been to send a strong signal of defiance to the international community and discourage countries like the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) from getting further involved in the war in Ukraine, but it was likely a miscalculation. With all illusions about either Russia’s or North Korea’s willingness to uphold international law, South Korean officials have already announced a willingness to reconsider the country’s policy against sending lethal military assistance directly to Ukraine. Russia-South Korea relations were already strained from Seoul’s signing onto sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine, this upgrade in relations with Pyongyang may cause South Korea to reevaluate its relations with Russia altogether. At the very least, formalizing the trends in Russia-North Korea relations seen in recent years will only add to the momentum and will for the US and South Korea to bolster their bilateral ties and trilateral security cooperation with Japan, and for Seoul to continue building ties to NATO and European states, as Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security become more intimately intertwined.
China’s Reaction to Putin’s North Korea Visit
By Yun Sun
Director, China Program
On the official level, China’s reaction to Putin’s North Korea visit has been so reserved that it borders aloof. During the China-ROK 2+2 meeting that took place around the same time as Putin’s visit, China maintained the position that Russia and DPRK have normal needs to conduct exchanges, cooperation, and develop their relations as friendly neighbors; and their senior visits are a bilateral arrangement between two sovereign states. The implied message is that this is a bilateral matter between Russia and DPRK and China does not have a position or a role in it.
Based on available information, Putin’s visit to DPRK does not have a direct impact on China yet. After all, Putin visited China one month before he visited Pyongyang, which more than anything else demonstrated Russia’s prioritization of China over any other country in its current diplomatic playbook. Regardless of the economic or political consensus reached during Putin’s trip to North Korea, neither Russia nor DPRK could replace China in the critical role it plays in both economies. That’s reassuring for China.
The potential troubling aspects for China are also obvious. China has had a monopoly of influence over both, and if had the option, China would have preferred to maintain it. The warming ties between Russia and DPRK do not necessarily equate to their desire to alienate or antagonize China, but they could embolden Moscow and Pyongyang, who otherwise would need to be more prudent.
But it’s not all bad news for China. Russia-DPRK ties bolster the anti-U.S. coalition and further distract the U.S. from the strategic competition with China on top of the Ukraine War and the Middle East Crisis. Last but not least, China does not need to appear to be the sole patron and supporter of both pariahs or be the only one to carry the water for them diplomatically.
What China has been very careful and clear about is to frame the relationships among the three countries as three bilateral relations rather than one trilateral relation. China wishes to keep its options open rather than being bogged down by Russia and DPRK in a bipolar arrangement in Northeast Asia and the broader regional, or even global power equilibrium. That would eliminate China’s chance to maintain a good relationship with the West, especially with Europe, Japan, and ROK. China has been working hard to influence the external alignment choices of these U.S. allies and trying to pull them into the Chinese orbit. A trilateral coalition with Russia and DPRK will bury that prospect.
From the trip, the most tangible outcome that potentially antagonizes China is the ostensible “mutual defense” agreement Russia and DPRK signed. Given that China has maintained a mutual defense treaty with DPRK since 1961, the Russia-DPRK pact could potentially drag China into conflict against its preference. The language of the “mutual assistance” clause carries a lot of ambiguity, and China has always maximized its own flexibility in interpreting the language of its own treaty with North Korea. Therefore, the Russia-DPRK pact does not have China cornered, but the discomfort for China would be understandable and obvious.
Cooperation and Conflict for Russia and North Korea
By Rachel Minyoung Lee
Senior Fellow, Korea Program and 38 North
As expected, Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin signed a legally binding “treaty” on expanding bilateral cooperation across the gamut of areas during Putin’s June 19 visit to Pyongyang. This treaty was a culmination of the highly unusual scope and pace of exchange between North Korea and Russia since Kim’s summit with Putin in September 2023.
Putin’s visit to North Korea was a huge win for Kim in a number of ways: 1) North Korea is only the fourth country Putin visited after his reelection in March 2024; 2) the new treaty formally puts the bilateral relationship on a strategic, long-term footing; and 3) the visit underscored Kim as an equal to the president of a major power, working shoulder-to-shoulder to defy global norms led by the West, such as sanctions. That cannot be bad for propaganda at home and abroad.
Article 4 of the new treaty, which stipulates “military and other assistance” in case of “armed aggression,” closely resembles Article 1 of the 1961 treaty between North Korea and the Soviet Union. The practical implications of this clause are questionable, as Article 1 of the 1961 treaty was not once invoked between 1961 and 1996 when the treaty ceased to be in effect. However, the very fact that the 1961 DPRK-USSR treaty was revived is symbolic enough: the document puts in writing the possibility of Russia’s military involvement in the Korean Peninsula, which itself gives North Korea an extra cover against what it views as external threats, such as South Korea and the US.
There are some clauses throughout the treaty that could have a more immediate and substantial impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula and the region. For example, Article 10 stipulates advancing cooperation and exchange “in the fields of science and technology, including space, biology, peaceful atomic energy.” Cooperation in “space” and “peaceful atomic energy” could open the way for Russia’s cooperation with North Korea on satellites, missiles, and nuclear weapons, respectively. Putin said he did “not exclude developing military-technical cooperation” with North Korea. Article 8 refers to “mechanisms for taking joint measures with the aim of strengthening the defense capabilities for preventing war and ensuring regional and global peace and security.” This sounds like it could be an institutionalized military arrangement, possibly regular North Korea-Russia joint military drills.
The treaty also includes provisions (Articles 10 and 11) on exploring investment and economic cooperation opportunities. This is concerning not only for their potential violations of UN Security Council sanctions but also for their implications for North Korea’s longer-term economic policy. The more successful North Korea’s economy can be despite sanctions still in place, the less of an incentive Pyongyang has to try to improve relations with the United States.
Kim has declared that the treaty placed the bilateral relationship in a “stage of relations of alliance,” a term that Putin avoided using, at least in public. This raises questions about whether the countries are completely on the same page with regard to the longer-term prospects of their relations. This treaty is a milestone in North Korea-Russia bilateral relations, but its feasibility and sustainability will depend on the follow-on measures that both countries take in the months and years to come.
Russia-North Korea Alignment Renews Tokyo’s Geopolitical Concerns
By Yuki Tatsumi
Director, Japan Program
The “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation” signed between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un on June 19 attracted the world’s attention to the revitalization of the relationship that Moscow and Pyongyang enjoyed, particularly in the years following Kim Il-Sung’s visit to Moscow in 1984. One of the key features of this agreement is a ”win-win” bargain between Russia and North Korea—Russia gains access to North Korea’s Soviet-era-made weapons while North Korea gains access to Russia’s missile and nuclear technologies.
From Japan’s perspective, this new honeymoon period between Russia and North Korea—particularly with their newly announced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty including languages about mutual defense obligations that are akin to any military alliance—renews Tokyo’s concerns about the further worsening security environment that it finds itself in.
Already driven by “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan” posed by China as articulated in its 2022 National Security Strategy, the revitalization of the Russia-North Korea partnership demonstrated by Putin’s Pyongyang visit further aggravates Tokyo’s sense of urgency of taking measures to safeguard its national security.
Of particular concern for Tokyo is the type of technology that might be transferred from Russia to North Korea. Should Pyongyang be able to leverage the technology transfer from Russia to finally gain the capability to build nuclear bombs that can be used operationally, this will drastically change Tokyo’s threat perception because it will elevate the sense of priority in its ongoing effort to acquire counterstrike capabilities.
This likely further motivates Tokyo to continue to double down on moving forward with the initiatives that Prime Minister Kishida and US President Biden announced during Kishida’s visit to Washington DC in April, particularly those aimed at further realigning the bilateral defense relationship. Furthermore, it will incentivize Tokyo to continue to explore ways to revitalize its defense relationship with the Republic of Korea, as announced by the two countries’ defense ministers on June 1, as well as continue to invest in trilateral cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and ROK.
More broadly, the Russia-Pyongyang partnership reconfirmed the argument that Japan, spearheaded by Prime Minister Kishida, has been making about the connectivity between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters. Kishida, scheduled to attend the upcoming NATO summit in Washington DC next month, should use the occasion to put the recent Russia-North Korea summit in the context of this intra-region connectivity, reinforcing his message of why NATO allies need to sustain its strategic attention to Indo-Pacific, and vice versa.
What Putin’s Visit to Pyongyang Says About the Kremlin’s Unfolding Foreign Policy
By Vladimir Ivanov
Adjunct Senior Fellow
Most international commentators of Vladimir Putin’s visit focus on the immediate implications of the emerging Russia – DPRK alliance: military-technical cooperation in the framework of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and North Korea’s strategic missile buildup, prospects for Russia’s space technologies, food, and fuel supplies to Pyongyang, possible North Korea’s support to Russia with its labor and potentially combat force, and general political messages both leaders are sending to their global and regional foes – to US, the West in general, including its allies in Asia, ROK, and Japan in the first place.
Signing the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with a mutual security assistance clause provides a solid long-term framework for the Russia-DPRK relationship. It gives Moscow, Pyongyang, and Beijing (having a similar agreement with DPRK) a stronger, however flexible, deterrence capability. At the same time, the treaty highlights a belated response to the US-led consolidation of alliances in the Indo-Pacific: QUAD, AUKUS, and JAROKUS, as well as growing NATO’s interest in the region (See the latest statements by NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg).
Crystallizing its security alliances in the Middle East and East Asia ostensibly indicates Russia’s escalatory strategy in these regions helping to distract Western resources from supporting Ukraine. It naturally leads to increasing tensions and risks of military escalation in North East Asia inspiring China and DPRK in their anti-American posturing, particularly over Taiwan and South Korea, provoking respective retaliatory policies by ROK, Japan, and other US allies in the region.
But does it mean that Russia’s intentions go as far as instigating hostilities in the proximity of its Far Eastern borders with a risk of nuclear confrontation and the actual start of WWIII?
In a broader geopolitical context, the Kremlin’s major underlying priority is securing and extending where possible its traditional spheres of influence, and grabbing as many power resources (starting with natural, infrastructural, cognitive, and diplomatic) in the emerging new world order, primarily in Eurasia, the “heartland”, but also relying on the Soviet Union global legacies (in Asia, Africa, Latin America). Having failed to engage Ukraine in the Eurasian Economic Union by 2014 and blitzkrieg it militarily in 2022, Vladimir Putin seems to be ready to accept the “realities on the ground” in Europe, turning the bulk of his efforts to Global South and Global East (a new notion becoming popular in the Kremlin’s foreign policy lexicon – See Putin’s meeting with the senior staff of the Russian MFA, June 14, 2024). North Korea is one of the natural targets in this strategy, a hot potato to pick sharing it with China before the US managed to spread its might in East Asia with an eventual Korean unification under the ROK leadership. Securing a buffer zone with the West in the East along the 38 North DMZ, the Kremlin might feel more confident in negotiating a ceasefire in Ukraine to freeze the conflict around the actual line of demarcation.
Economic agreements with DPRK, congruent with those signed with China during the Putin-Xi summit in May 2024 (e.g. resumption of trilateral cooperation in the Tumen River estuary), are outspoken: Russia perceives North Korea as another alternative source for its economic development in these difficult transitory times (the loss of European markets), and a platform to jointly circumvent Western unilateral sanctions (where North Korea has a particularly vast experience).
Escalation strategy contradicts these goals. Neither Russia, nor China are interested in being directly involved in a major military, even more so nuclear, conflict in East Asia, and they will have to coordinate their policies to contain Kim’s missile saber rattling. In the longer term, maneuvering through the transitory framework of a “Cold War II” may open new opportunities for a trilateral US-Russia-China consultation on security risk management in the region, as well as developing grounds for broader post-conflict cross-border cooperation in East Asia, to include North Korea. That is unless an inadvertent spark provokes a big fire
6. S. Korea, U.S., Japan agree on close cooperation through 'timely' dialogue after Kim-Putin summit: Seoul minister
Putin and Kim's unintended consequence? – stronger trilateral cooperation of JAROKUS.
S. Korea, U.S., Japan agree on close cooperation through 'timely' dialogue after Kim-Putin summit: Seoul minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 22, 2024
By Song Sang-ho and Lee Ji-heon
WASHINGTON/NEW YORK, June 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan have agreed on close security cooperation through "timely" consultation, after Russia and North Korea signed a new security treaty during a summit in Pyongyang this week, Seoul's top diplomat said Friday.
Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul made the remarks, commenting on his back-to-back phone calls with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa.
On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty that included an article calling for one side to provide miliary assistance to the other "without delay" in case of an armed invasion.
"In response to North Korea's threats, we agreed to strengthen the robust South Korea-U.S. alliance and security cooperation among the South, the U.S. and Japan, while closely working together to lead stern responses of the international community," Cho said in a meeting with reporters.
"I think that it is meaningful that we sent a strong message under close cooperation through timely consultation with the friendly countries of the U.S. and Japan," he added.
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul speaks during a meeting with reporters in New York on June 21, 2024. (Yonhap)
Cho was in New York to attend an official U.N. Security Council (UNSC) meeting on cybersecurity that took place on Thursday. Cho presided over the council meeting as South Korea holds this month's rotating UNSC presidency.
"As we have undertaken the UNSC presidency at this challenging juncture, we will make efforts to ensure that this role as the UNSC president will serve as an opportunity to expand the horizons of our diplomacy and enhance our standing as a global pivotal state," he said.
The government of President Yoon Suk Yeol has been pursuing the role as a "global pivotal state" to contribute more to tackling global issues in line with its growing national stature.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 22, 2024
7. Deepening N.K.-Russia ties may drive S. Korea in direction of nuclear option: ex-Trump official
Note that Ms. Hooker also spent 2 and a half years as the Korea director on the Obama NSC. I do not think she is as partisan as the headline implies. I think she is a professional versus a political operative.
Deepening N.K.-Russia ties may drive S. Korea in direction of nuclear option: ex-Trump official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 22, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, June 21 (Yonhap) -- A deepening military relationship between North Korea and Russia could be a factor pushing South Korea to consider seeking its own nuclear program, a former U.S. official said Friday, amid growing concerns about the security implications of this week's summit between the two countries.
Allison Hooker, former senior director for Asia at the National Security Council, made the remarks after Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held a summit in Pyongyang on Wednesday, in a show of their burgeoning military cooperation.
Putin and Kim signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty that included an article calling for one side to provide military assistance to the other "without delay" in case of an armed invasion.
"I think we cannot rule out the fact that South Korea continues to move, maybe more rapidly, towards its own nuclear program. And we have to figure out how we feel about that in the U.S. and the alliance context as well," she said during a webinar hosted by the Asia Society Policy Institute.
"But I think this definitely, the deepening relationship with Russia kind of pushes them in that direction," she added.
This file photo shows Allison Hooker, former senior director for Asia at the White House National Security Council. (Yonhap)
Hooker also said that the growing partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow elevates the importance of the alliance between Seoul and Washington, and heightens concerns about what would happen to the alliance after the U.S. presidential election in November.
"It just increases uncertainty," she said. "We are already living in a very uncertain, intense world, but I think this just adds to it."
Daniel Russel, a former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, cast the latest developments in relations between the North and Russia as a "serious setback" for Chinese interests.
"It gives Kim much more room to maneuver, makes it easier for him to disregard Chinese interests," he said. "A North Korea that has more impunity, that has more running room just isn't going to be responsive to Beijing's preferences."
Since last year, the Putin-Kim partnership has seen a significant rise. Washington has revealed that the North has supplied Russia with munitions and other weapons for use in Ukraine, while in return, Pyongyang has been seeking assistance to help advance its weapons programs.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 22, 2024
8. USS Theodore Roosevelt arrives in Busan in show of force
5 acres of US territory arrives in Pusan.
(LEAD) USS Theodore Roosevelt arrives in Busan in show of force | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · June 22, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES story with more details in paras 5-6; CHANGES dateline)
By Lee Minji
SEOUL/BUSAN, June 22 (Yonhap) -- The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) arrived at a naval port in the southeastern city of Busan on Saturday, the Navy said, in a show of force against evolving North Korean threats emboldened by the North's deepening military cooperation with Russia.
The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the Carrier Strike Group 9 entered the naval base in Busan, 320 kilometers southeast of Seoul, early Saturday, joined by the Aegis-equipped destroyer USS Halsey and the USS Daniel Inouye, according to the Navy.
It marked the first arrival of a U.S. aircraft carrier in South Korea in seven months since the USS Carl Vinson's visit in November. It also marked the first port call in Busan by the USS Theodore Roosevelt, which took part in a trilateral naval exercise among South Korea, the United States and Japan in April.
Saturday's arrival came as the three countries are expected to hold their first-ever trilateral multidomain exercise, dubbed the Freedom Edge, later this month amid joint efforts to bolster security cooperation against North Korean threats.
Speaking at a public event, Rear Adm. Christopher Alexander, commander of Carrier Strike Group Nine, highlighted that the Freedom Edge drill is aimed at enhancing tactical capabilities, improving interoperability and being capable of responding to contingencies in the area.
He pointed out that the exercise is not intended to send a message with relation to the growing security risks amid the recent development in relations between Russia and North Korea, saying it is part of the regular and routine drills.
The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt arrives at a naval base in the southeastern port city of Busan on June 22, 2024, in this photo provided by the Navy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The three sides agreed to launch the exercise during their three-way talks held on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference earlier this month. It takes its name from key bilateral exercises the U.S. holds with the Asian neighbors -- Freedom Shield with South Korea and Keen Edge with Japan.
Under the agreement, the exercise will take place across various domains, including air, maritime, underwater and cyber.
It also comes as relations between North Korea and Russia are feared to further strengthen after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a pact pledging mutual defense in the event of war during a summit in Pyongyang on Wednesday.
The Navy said the latest visit was conducted to carry out the "ironclad" U.S. extended deterrence commitment and display the robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture and will for stern response against evolving North Korean threats.
The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt arrives at a naval base in the southeastern port city of Busan on June 22, 2024, in this photo provided by the Navy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · June 22, 2024
9. U.S. Navy secretary hails Hanwha's acquisition of U.S. shipbuilder as 'game-changing' milestone
We can use South Korean help with our shipbuilding.
I asked Perplexity (AI) this question:
What US laws and regulations prohibit South Korea from building warships for the US Navy in South Korea?
Based on the search results provided, there are a few key laws and regulations that currently prohibit or restrict South Korea from directly building warships for the U.S. Navy in South Korea:
- The Jones Act: This 1920 law requires that vessels carrying goods between U.S. ports be built, owned, crewed and registered in the United States. While not directly about warships, it reflects a broader policy of protecting U.S. shipbuilding.
- Buy American Act and similar regulations: U.S. defense procurement laws generally require military equipment to be manufactured domestically, with some exceptions.
- Export control regulations: While not prohibiting foreign shipbuilding directly, U.S. export control laws restrict the transfer of sensitive military technologies, which could complicate overseas warship construction.
- U.S. Navy policies: The Navy has traditionally relied on U.S. shipyards for warship construction, both for security reasons and to maintain domestic shipbuilding capabilities.
However, the search results also indicate that the U.S. is exploring ways to potentially collaborate more closely with South Korean shipbuilders:
- U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro recently toured South Korean shipyards and encouraged Korean companies to establish subsidiaries and invest in U.S. shipbuilding facilities.
- The U.S. and South Korea are discussing joint ship maintenance and repair opportunities, which could include maintaining and overhauling U.S. warships.
- Some experts argue that partnering with allies like South Korea on shipbuilding could help address U.S. naval shipbuilding capacity shortfalls.
While current laws and policies generally prohibit direct construction of U.S. warships in South Korea, there seems to be growing interest in finding ways to leverage South Korean shipbuilding expertise to support U.S. naval needs, potentially through investments in U.S. facilities or maintenance partnerships
U.S. Navy secretary hails Hanwha's acquisition of U.S. shipbuilder as 'game-changing' milestone | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 22, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, June 21 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has welcomed South Korean conglomerate Hanwha Group's acquisition of a U.S. shipbuilder as a "game-changing" milestone, as he stressed the need to strengthen America's shipbuilding capabilities amid its intensifying competition with China.
Hanwha Group said that it has invested US$100 million in Philly Shipyard Inc. to acquire a 100 percent stake in the U.S. shipbuilder, marking the first entry of a South Korean company into the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
"Hanwha's acquisition of Philly Shipyard is a game-changing milestone in our new Maritime Statecraft. This will bring good paying union jobs to Philadelphia, a city with a 250-year relationship with the U.S. Navy," he said in a statement posted on the Navy's website on Thursday.
"Knowing how they will change the competitive U.S. shipbuilding landscape. I could not be more excited to welcome Hanwha as the first Korean shipbuilder to come to American shores—and I am certain they will not be the last," he added.
During a speech at Harvard University in September, Toro unveiled the pursuit of a new maritime statecraft, which he said encompasses not only naval diplomacy, but a national, whole-of-government effort to build comprehensive U.S. and allied maritime power, according to his office.
Founded in 1997, Philly Shipyard is a subsidiary of Aker ASA, a Norwegian industrial investment company. It constructs not only large commercial vessels, including tankers and container ships, but also training vessels for the U.S. Maritime Administration.
Hanwha Group said it plans to utilize Philly Shipyard's largest dry dock for shipbuilding, maintenance, repair and operations, tapping into the U.S. naval market, which is in need of additional shipbuilding facilities due to a production shortage for the Navy's fleet.
This photo provided by Hanwha Group shows a panoramic view of Philly Shipyard Inc. in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 22, 2024
10. [WHY] Why are both Koreas fixated on cross-border propaganda?
Information by the South (and the ROK/US alliance) and civil society groups should not be tit for tat. Information needs to go into north Korea because it is the right thing to do to help the Korean people in the north.
Let's in mind these important statements from a previous report.:
Former South Korean President Park Geun-hye said in 2016 the loudspeaker broadcasts were "the most effective form of psychological warfare" and they had encouraged North Koreans to risk their lives and defect to freedom in the South.
Defectors who fled the North have backed up the statement.
South Korea's military has called the broadcasts "Voice of Freedom," with four major themes: the superiority of liberal democracy, the history of South Korea's economic success, the justification for reunification and the reality of North Korean society.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/psychological-warfare-k-pop-south-korea-blast-loudspeakers-north-korea-2024-06-09/
Saturday
June 22, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 22 Jun. 2024, 06:00
[WHY] Why are both Koreas fixated on cross-border propaganda?
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-06-22/national/northKorea/WHY-Why-are-both-Koreas-fixated-on-crossborder-propaganda/2072725?detailWord=
Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff announced on June 9 that the South Korean military would hold an exercise to recommence loudspeaker operations along the inter-Korean border. In this undated photo provided by the military, South Korean Army soldiers inspect mobile loudspeakers as part of a similar drill held in the past. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]
Late in the evening on May 28, mobile phones across South Korea blared warnings that the country’s military had detected unidentified airborne objects from the North crossing the inter-Korean border.
While the alert recalled the North’s first failed attempt to launch a military spy satellite last year, the objects that flew across the border this time turned out to be balloons — specifically, balloons carrying packages filled with excrement, cigarette butts, waste paper and other general rubbish.
Before the week was done, the North had flown almost a thousand trash-laden balloons into the South as part of what Pyongyang’s state-controlled media described as a “tit-for-tat” action against anti-regime leaflets flown into its territory by defector groups living in the South.
In a statement released by state media on May 29, Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of regime leader Kim Jong-un, called the balloons “sincere presents” for the “goblins of liberal democracy who cry out for guarantees of freedom of expression” in apparent reference to the South Korean government’s stance that it cannot legally block activists from sending leaflets critical of the regime across the border.
Although the North suggested it might halt the trash balloon launches if the South stopped activists from sending leaflets in the future, Pyongyang’s actions led Seoul to suspend its participation in a 2018 inter-Korean accord designed to reduce military tensions and resume measures that had been banned under the agreement, including loudspeaker broadcasts across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that divides the peninsula.
But what is it about South Korean leaflets that anger the North so much, and why have both Seoul and Pyongyang put so much effort into cross-border propaganda?
The war before the war
While the contents of the balloons launched by North Korea and the BTS songs that began playing on South Korean loudspeakers along the border last week might come across as childish forms of retaliation, these actions constitute the latest battle in an inter-Korean propaganda war that precedes the 1950-53 Korean War itself.
“North Korean propaganda really took off in earnest around the time the South Korean government was established in 1948, reflecting the North Korean regime’s confidence that it could take over the South by turning people against the government in Seoul,” says Lee Ho-ryung, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
The North’s early emphasis on using propaganda against the South stemmed from the belief of North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il Sung that psychological warfare constituted “the most potent strategic means” for both touting the superiority of the newly communized North and neutralizing the nascent republic in the South even before launching his invasion across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, according to Col. Lee Yoon-gyu, a senior research director at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs and author of “Psychological Warfare During the Korean War.”
“By making nine overtures for reunification to the South, including a plan to establish a unified government with an inter-Korean parliament just five days before his planned invasion, Kim deceived the South Korean government and the people into letting down their guard against an attack,” Lee said.
Just as the North Korean troops began their invasion of the South, Kim’s regime falsely claimed over radio waves and print media that it was mounting a counterattack in response to a South Korean assault on its territory, underlining the importance that the North Korean leader assigned to laying psychological and political justification for the war, according to Lee.
Calling for surrender from the air
During the first 13 months of hostilities that began in June 1950, the war in Korea was fluid and marked by drastic changes in territory that saw Seoul change hands four times.
But after South Korean and UN forces reclaimed the capital in July 1951, fighting along the rugged front turned into a stalemate characterized by battles of attrition over relatively minor territorial gains and losses.
With fighting bogged down in trenches and valleys across the peninsula, airborne propaganda leaflets showered over the front lines by both sides focused on convincing enemy soldiers to surrender, according to Jacco Zwetloot, the host of the NK News podcast.
“Propaganda in this period encouraged soldiers on the other side to stop fighting and allow themselves to be taken prisoner,” Zwetloot explained. “For example, North Korean and Chinese flyers told South Korean soldiers to use communist leaflets as ‘safe passes’ that would allow them to safely surrender and receive blankets and warm meals once they crossed the frontlines.”
A North Korean soldier stands guard on the balcony of a watch post along the inter-Korean border across from Paju, Gyeonggi, on June 9. [YONHAP]
Zwetloot also observed that North Korean and Chinese flyers tailored their messaging to soldiers from South Korea and the United States by emphasizing social divisions in both countries with the intent of leading them to question the value of fighting.
“Flyers by the communists targeted working-class South Korean soldiers by suggesting rich capitalists in the South were only getting richer through the war and also sleeping with their girlfriends, while leaflets aimed at black U.S. soldiers reminded them of racial discrimination at home and in their army.”
While South Korean and UNC propaganda also promised better treatment for their North Korean and Chinese audiences, their flyers also made use of testimonials from communist soldiers who had defected to the South.
“A lot of these leaflets took the form of letters by defectors that were addressed to their former comrades and detailed how much better conditions were on the southern side. These flyers often included photos of the writer dressed in a new smart uniform, or being welcomed with a hot meal by his South Korean captors,” Zwetloot said.
But propaganda by both the communists and the UNC was not only aimed at soldiers.
“A lot of material from both sides tried to convince turn civilians against their military,” Zwetloot said, noting that the UNC also tried to discourage North Korean civilian participation in the communist war effort “by warning them that they could be bombed if they helped rebuild a bridge, for instance.”
Changing times, changing messages
Although active hostilities ended with the armistice of July 1953, the end of fighting merely marked a new phase in the inter-Korean propaganda war as the two Koreas began to play up their relative strengths while denigrating the other’s shortcomings from the 1960s to 1980s.
For example, the UNC — which carried out cross-border leafletting through Operation Jinli (“Truth”) until the mid-to-late 1960s — produced flyers that emphasized South Korea’s economic development, which were then released via planes flying close to the border where the wind might carry them into the North.
“Propaganda from the South Korean side tended to emphasize how much life had improved since the war and boasted about the South’s newfound industrial prowess,” Zwetloot said, pointing to leaflets that highlighted the South’s then-burgeoning shipbuilding and coal industries, then later South Korean fashion and freewheeling consumer culture.
But South Korean leaflets also tried to stoke discontent among North Koreans against their communist regime, such as by pointing out “how many meetings Workers’ Party cadres hold while actual workers toil in the fields,” according to Zwetloot.
By contrast, North Korean propaganda during this period tended to focus less on economic issues and more on denigrating the South for the presence of U.S. troops and its authoritarian government.
Lee Ho-ryung observed that the North’s propaganda push through the 1960s and 70s showed the regime “believed even after the war it could overthrow the government in Seoul by fomenting a communist revolution.”
But the North’s intensifying efforts to foster pro-communist agitation in the South by trying to convert key figures to communism caused Seoul to expand its own anti-Pyongyang messaging, according to Lee.
Under President Park Chung Hee, loudspeakers were installed along the southern side of the DMZ in 1963, facing off North Korean broadcasts that praised the regime’s own communist system and denounced the South as a “depraved capitalist” country.
The North also played up its political independence in its propaganda materials, which depicted the South “as a U.S. colony and its soldiers as the lackeys of Americans,” according to Lee Yoon-gyu.
To this end, North Korean propaganda took quite a bit of creative license with stories of abuses committed in the South, where a military dictatorsip held power until 1987.
“North Korean leaflets fixated especially on what U.S. soldiers were doing with, or to, South Korean women,” Zwetloot said, adding that flyers from the 1970s and 80s also “often told exaggerated or entirely fabricated stories about deeds committed by the South Korean or U.S. military, such as a South Korean drill sergeant who somehow killed 20 conscripts during training.”
Fabrications aside, both Zwetloot and Lee noted that North Korean propagandists also drew their material from real events in the South, such as President Chun Doo Hwan’s violent suppression of the pro-democracy uprising in Gwangju in May 1980, to try and turn South Koreans against their government.
“Chun was an especially easy figure to caricature, not only politically but also physically, because of his baldness. After the Gwangju uprising, the North Koreans had a field day printing leaflets about Chun collaborating with the U.S. government to keep South Koreans oppressed,” Zwetloot said.
Statistics on North Korean loudspeaker broadcasts compiled by the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1980 and 2000 show that Pyongyang dedicated almost twice as much airtime in the 1980s to criticizing Seoul’s politicians and government than it did to praising its own leaders and system after the Gwangju uprising, suggesting the North sought to capitalize on pro-democracy unrest in the South, according to Lee.
Touchy neighbors to this day
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw dramatic reversals of fortunes for both Koreas. The South, which had surpassed the North economically in the 1970s, also became a democracy in 1987, while the North went into freefall after aid from the Soviet Union ceased with its dissolution in 1991.
With the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and a large-scale famine underway, the North could no longer realistically extol the advantages of its communist system and thus began to push a different message toward South Korea.
“Instead of promoting its own ideology in its propaganda, the North made appeals to South Korean pride and hopes for inter-Korean reconciliation, such as calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, criticizing the alliance between Seoul and Washington, and arguing that both Koreas should work to achieve unification without external interference,” said Lee.
Such propaganda found fertile soil in the South, where students disaffected by the previous military dictatorships in Seoul were “lured by the North’s use of race-based nationalism,” according to Zwetloot.
While most experts agree that such North Korean messaging no longer holds the same sway over South Korean youth as it did in the 1990s — mainly because conditions in the North have become apparent to most South Koreans over time — they also agree that the inter-Korean propaganda war is likely to remain part of the reality of the divided peninsula for the time being.
“As we saw with the trash-laden balloons and the threats issued by Pyongyang afterward, the North still views propaganda as one way of fostering conflict and divisions within South Korean society,” said Lee Ho-ryung, adding that Pyongyang “continues to issue criticism and threats against Seoul’s conservative government with the aim of encouraging protests and unrest.”
South Korean soldiers dismantle loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border following talks between Seoul and Pyongyang in 2004. [YONHAP]
Lee Yoon-gyu also noted that the North’s longtime emphasis on reconciliation, which was only recently renounced by current leader Kim Jong-un, “exploited South Koreans’ desire to avoid war and their hope for reunification.”
As for South Korean propaganda, all experts agreed that the North Korean regime especially despises any information inflows it can’t control, including K-pop music that was incorporated into the news and informational broadcasts from South Korean loudspeakers beginning in 2000.
Zwetloot noted that such broadcasts are “singled out by Pyongyang as a danger to the morale of troops along the border, leading the North Korean military to bolster its troops’ psychological training against the information they hear.”
According to Lee Ho-ryung, the ban on loudspeaker broadcasts was incorporated into the 2018 inter-Korean military accord “due to the North’s demands and the regime’s view of broadcasts, as well as anti-regime leaflets, as threats to its own stability.”
While Lee Yoon-gyu argued that South Korean broadcasts and leaflets all serve to provide North Koreans with mostly inaccessible information and criticism of their regime, Zwetloot noted that less than 40,000 North Koreans have defected to the South since 1953, with most coming from deprived areas close to China, and not from regions near the DMZ, where Seoul’s propaganda is more likely to be heard or picked up.
“Sometimes, one has to ask whether the juice is worth the squeeze,” Zwetloot said regarding the South’s propaganda efforts, while noting that even the few defections from areas close to the DMZ “are a win from the perspective of South Korean intelligence.”
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
11. North Korea’s Flawed but Winning Strategy in Ukraine
Images at the link: https://www.38north.org/2024/06/north-koreas-flawed-but-winning-strategy-in-ukraine/
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A backdrop for all of this is that Russia is increasing its capacity to produce its own munitions. While in 2023 and even early 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sources indicated that Russia could not cover its daily 10,000-12,000 shells consumption that sometimes reaches 40,000-80,000 shells, since March-April 2024, more intelligence agencies began to ring alarms that Russia is now on track to outpace its three million shells per year target and cover its own deficit by the end of 2024.
Because both Russia and North Korea deny the arms transfers and because of the general opacity of Russia’s military strategy, it remains unclear exactly how the munitions are being used. It is possible that North Korea’s artillery shipments are crucial for filling urgent Russian deficits, and it is also possible that they are merely adding additional capacity to help overwhelm Ukrainian positions with constant barrages. In either case, Russia would no longer rely on North Korea’s help quite so much if it revved up its industrial capacity. This would likely dramatically reduce or even end the quid pro quo exchange that sees Russia provide North Korea with hard currency, oil, food, weapons, and technology.
For now, Kim and Putin remain united in a marriage of convenience because of their anti-West dispositions and need to set up systems of exchange and support outside the US-dominated global financial system and rules-based order. Therefore, even if the relationship cools, a breakup is unlikely. Until then, as long as Russia’s industrial capacity is unable to match its military’s demand for deadly munitions, the primary beneficiary will remain Kim Jong Un.
North Korea’s Flawed but Winning Strategy in Ukraine
https://www.38north.org/2024/06/north-koreas-flawed-but-winning-strategy-in-ukraine/
Much attention has focused on how North Korea’s illicit arms shipments have boosted Russia’s ability to prosecute its invasion of Ukraine and prolong Russian war efforts. In May, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently said the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) assistance helped Russia “get back on its feet” and “turn the tide” of the war. But the other side of this relationship also deserves scrutiny.
The North Korean regime has extracted major benefits from its warming ties with Russia despite significant flaws in its arms shipments. Based on insights from Ukrainian and Russian channels of Telegram, a social networking service, there are obvious flaws in the supplied armaments that could affect military, economic and geopolitical dynamics moving forward.
Overall, however, ongoing Pyongyang-Moscow engagement is much more significant than a simple arms deal. It has given the Kim Jong Un a crucial lifeline amid the country’s relative isolation and supercharged their collective aggressive, revisionist agendas.
The War in Ukraine and How is North Korea Winning
North Korea’s wins from Russia’s war can be broken down into three major categories: military, economic, and geopolitical.
Military Factors
First, North Korea is supplying poor-quality artillery shells, which are in high demand but cannot currently be fully replaced by Russia’s vast yet outdated and corrupt defense industry. It is indeed a calculated move on North Korea’s side. While sending cheaply produced/outdated munitions, North Korea may be receiving far more advanced military assistance in return. According to the White House, this could include: fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies. Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) intelligence believes Russia helped North Korea launch a reconnaissance satellite last November and the failed launch from this May. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un, while visiting Russia in 2023, was given a tour of Russian nuclear-capable strategic bombers, hypersonic missiles and warships. Worryingly, Russian military and technological assistance can also help North Korea improve capabilities related to missile targeting, reentry, and maneuverability that are needed to evade and overwhelm the US-ROK ballistic missile defense, thereby undermining deterrence.
North Korea also now has a rare opportunity to test its ballistic missiles in battlefield conditions, providing valuable and actionable data. According to South Korean intelligence, North Korea dispatched military advisors to Russia in 2023 to help with the “use of the munitions,” but these same advisors can also collect information for North Korea’s benefit.
Ukrainian officials believe North Korea has fired 50 North Korean missiles at Ukraine this year. They have investigated 21 of these and generally state, “About half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air; in such cases, the debris was not recovered.” A United Nations Panel of Experts report concurred, pointing to Russia’s use of Hwasong-11B missiles in its January 2024 attack on the city of Kharkiv. In a different assessment by Ukrainian officials, only two out of 24 missiles reached military targets.
This poor performance is nonetheless a valuable learning opportunity for Pyongyang’s missile makers. Missile development is iterative, so this field testing will provide North Korea an opportunity to improve the reliability and lethality of its arsenal.
Economic Factors
Owing to large Russian demand, North Korea’s military-industrial complex received a boost in orders. According to South Korea’s defense ministry, North Korean factories producing artillery shells for Russia are “operating at full capacity,” while factories producing for the Korean Peoples’ Army are operating at merely 30 percent because of a shortage of materials and power outages.
North Korea’s economy is famously opaque, so we are left to speculate on the macro consequences of this activity. Some analysts believe that an increase in weapons production could have positive spillover effects for the ailing North Korean economy, limping from years of isolation, pandemic disruptions, and poor policy choices. But others view the military-industrial complex in North Korea as relatively sectioned off and believe the vast majority of the benefit will be absorbed by the Kim regime and its top-tier military patronage networks.
It remains unknown whether Russia is paying cash for the weapons or following the Cold War bartering model. It has been speculated that the value of the arms exports could exceed $1 billion, a massive step up from North Korea’s paltry $160 million in total exports in 2022. According to the South Korean Minister of Defense, “food accounts for the largest proportion [of shipments from Russia by volume], which is believed to have stabilized food prices in North Korea.”
Geopolitical Factors
Despite these massive military and economic benefits, North Korea’s most significant gain is something more intangible: geopolitical breathing room. In the wake of a failed 2019 US-DPRK summit in Hanoi, compounded by a severe pandemic border closure in early 2020, North Korea was as isolated as ever. Pyongyang’s multi-decade-long gambit to gain recognition as a nuclear power and normalize relations with the United States on those terms has hit a wall. Pyongyang’s leaders have always been wary of over-relying on China, their lone security ally (until the Treaty signed with Russia on June 19) and source of 97 percent of their external trade. But new options have emerged after Russia’s war against Ukraine and increasing strategic competition between the US and China have scrambled the global chess board and solidified opposing blocs.
North Korea is no longer so isolated; it has found company in a cast of revisionist powers with anti-West agendas, including Russia, China and Iran. Over and above ideological comradery and an anti-West posture, Russia’s support for North Korea stems from its dependence on North Korea’s military-industrial complex. Russia vetoed the March 2024 mandate extension for a UN Security Council body set up to oversee the implementation of sanctions on North Korea, thereby obscuring Russia’s own transgressions and opening up scores of new proliferation opportunities for the Kim regime.
As the centerpiece of this new relationship, Kim Jong Un was able to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to sign a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that includes a pledge to “immediately provide military assistance” in case either country is attacked. North Korea already has a similar agreement in place with China, but Beijing has hinted that there are limits to this. The solidification of Pyongyang’s alliance with Moscow. Therefore. not only helps it to evade sanctions, beef up its military and earn currency, but also empowers the Kim regime by freeing it from over-reliance on Beijing. Kim is no doubt taking a page from his grandfather’s playbook here: during the Cold War, Kim Il Sung took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to score mutual defense treaties with both countries.
As a consequence of the trickle-down effects from the arms sales to Russia, Kim Jong Un is militarily, economically and politically better positioned today than he was before the Russian invasion. This is an impressive feat, considering that the quality of the armaments leaves something to be desired.
Evidence From the Ground
When discussing arms trade between North Korea and Russia, the most commonly addressed theme is that of numbers. In February, the US State Department said North Korea had shipped 10,000 containers, while South Korea said 6,700 containers. The proportion of different armaments (which is unknown) affects the bottom-line estimate. For instance, South Korea reported that 6,700 containers could fit either “3 million rounds of 152 mm artillery shells or more than 500,000 rounds of 122 mm multiple rocket launchers.”
However, what is less discussed is the quality of the artillery shells. Artillery is especially important to sustain Russia’s style of fighting in Ukraine, as it inflicts up to 80 percent of the casualties in the conflict. Russia relies on artillery bombardments in Ukraine, just like it did in the Chechen Wars and the war in Syria, to compensate for shortcomings like poor performance in combined arms and joint maneuvers. Although the infusion of fresh arty is a welcome relief for Russia, the poor-performing North Korean arms can’t help but have an impact on Russia’s ability to gain and hold territory.
Novel primary sources derived from the Ukrainian military-related Telegram (a messaging and social media service) channels shed more light on this issue. Ukrainian Telegram channel administrators have accessed and collected pictures and discussions from Russian Telegram channels in order to provide contextual clues and visual evidence of North Korean shipments. While the authors are unable to independently verify the authenticity of the photos, the low quality of the ammunition evident in the photographs is consistent with other evidence about the performance of North Korea’s arms.
When North Korea struck South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 with multiple rocket launchers, “fewer than half of them hit the island; of those, about 25% failed to detonate,” according to the South Korean military. In December 2023, the Ukrainian army reported on Facebook that North Korean artillery shells were often defective. The post said, “Due to the unsatisfactory state of such ammunition, there are only cases of their breaking directly into the barrels of the occupiers’ cannons and mortars, resulting in the loss of weapons and personnel of the invaders.” Observing the dispersed pattern of Russian blast craters, a South Korean defense analyst assessed that North Korean artillery “cannot be fired accurately.” Finally, a Ukrainian defense intelligence official said in late February that half of the artillery, which is from the 1970-80s, “does not function, and the rest require either restoration or inspection before use.”
The evidence from Telegram tells a similar story.
An early indicator of North Korean ammunition arriving in Russia dates back to October 29, 2023, roughly a month after Kim’s summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. First to come were the highly coveted 152mm artillery shells. Figures 1a-1d present the North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on their Telegram channel and reposted on a Ukrainian military-themed Telegram channel. North Korean 152-mm shells for Russia bear an official name 1-52D, as seen on the shells themselves, as well as their packaging.
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Figure 1d. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1a. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1b North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1c. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1d. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1a. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1b North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1c. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1d. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
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The second indication of the arrival of North Korean ammunition was on November 2, 2023, which was even more important. Leaked Russian documents present firing instructions for a wide variety of North Korean arms, which supports the hypothesis of their wide-scale incorporation into the Russian army. The list includes:
- 120-mm mortar shell, titled Product 120-1
- 122-mm rocket for the BM-21 “Grad” rocket artillery system, titled Product 122-1-RS
- 122-mm HE-frag shell, titled Product 122-1
- 152-mm HE-frag shell, titled Product 152-1
According to the analysis conducted by the Ukrainian channels, firing instructions are almost identical to those of the standard USSR/Russian army munitions, with percentage adjustment on the range for mortar shells (Figures 2a-2d). Furthermore, the source concludes that 122-mm and 152-mm HE-frag artillery shells supplied by North Korea, based on the firing instructions and tables, are identical copies of the Soviet-made OF-462 and OF-540 shells. In addition to this, the source states that according to preliminary information (derived from the comment section in the Russian Telegram channels), the projectiles are thin-walled (compared to the Soviet/Russian ones), which makes them of poorer quality. However, the information was not confirmed in any way by the documents.
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Figure 2d. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2a. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2b. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2c. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2d. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2a. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2b. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2c. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2d. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
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As early as two months into the shipments, the first concerns about the quality of the shells began to arise. On November 12, 2023, Ukrainian channels shared pictures taken from Russian Telegram, that depict North Korean 120-mm mortar shells (Product 120-1). The shells are very similar to the Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shell family (Figures 3a and 3b). However, due to lower quality and different charges, the shells have a different range, which is indicated in the aforementioned firing instructions.
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Figure 3b. North Korean 120-mm mortar shells, similar to Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6821)
Figure 3a. North Korean 120-mm mortar shells, similar to Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6821)
Figure 3b. North Korean 120-mm mortar shells, similar to Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6821)
Figure 3a. North Korean 120-mm mortar shells, similar to Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6821)
Figure 3b. North Korean 120-mm mortar shells, similar to Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6821)
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Evidently, due to Russia’s inability to cover its artillery consumption, imports from other countries are present alongside imports from North Korea. On April 3, 2024, Ukrainian channels presented pictures, published by a Russian Telegram channel, that show a side-by-side comparison of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. The North Korean ammunition has a distinctive blue paint coating. Iranian shells, on the other hand, are green and are believed to be better than North Korean due to better weight distribution and more convenient gunpowder rings. In addition to this, a firing table for Iranian mortar shells in English is provided by the source (Figures 4a, 4b and 5).
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Figure 4b. Side-by-side comparisons of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
Figure 4a. Side-by-side comparisons of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
Figure 4b. Side-by-side comparisons of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
Figure 4a. Side-by-side comparisons of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
Figure 4b. Side-by-side comparisons of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
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Figure 5. A firing tale in English for Iranian mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
Mortar shells were not the only low-quality products supplied by North Korea. On April 11, 2024, a Ukrainian channel presented evidence of the extremely poor quality of other North Korean supplies. Specifically, the DPRK-supplied 122-mm HE-frag shells (Product 122-1, copy of the Soviet OF-462 shell). According to the analysis, projectiles for the barrel artillery, provided by North Korea, are extremely old. Evidence of this is the absence of paint on the driving band and bourrelet, as well as very few markings. This distinguishes these North Korean projectiles from newer ones (produced in the 2000s-2010s), which have the entire structure of the projectile painted and at least some markings present. Evidently, the analysis in the source suggests that the artillery and mortar shells are being bought from the old stockpiles of the DPRK from various periods. The source poses a question: how many shells from stockpiles will Kim Jong Un be willing to sell to Russia, and what is the state of the production of new ammunition in the DPRK?
Another Ukrainian channel published more evidence on the same day. Pictures found on the Russian channel (Figures 6a-6c) focus on the North Korean 120-mm mortar shells (Product 120-1, copy of the Soviet OF-843/843B). As the source claims, Russian troops complain about the extremely poor quality of the shells. Indicators of poor quality are: 3 layers of distinctive blue paint, the body that has defects due to poor casting quality, and the tails of the mortar shells that are covered in a “centimeter layer of solidol [lubricant/oil-based grease].”
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Figure 6c. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6a. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6b. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6c. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6a. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6b. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6c. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
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While there are reports that North Korean factories are producing only new munitions for Russia, evidence from Russian Telegram channel administrators shows that only a portion of the munitions shipped by North Korea appear to be new. From all the evidence we were able to gather, we could only find a handful of pictures from Russian sources that showcase shells in good condition that are believed to be newly produced specifically for Russia. For instance, there is an example from January 12, 2024, which showcases a side-by-side comparison of three 122mm shells: Iranian, North Korean, and Russian (Figure 7). In the comment section, there is another picture of a North Korean shell with a production date/title: LOT 21/2023. The shell is believed to have been produced in 2023, hence the different gray paint coating instead of the older blue version. However, as seen in Figure 8, the quality of the shell is still quite poor, with lubricant markings on the bottom of the shell.
Even larger Ukrainian military outlets have been paying attention to the low quality of North Korean shells. According to the sources, North Korean-supplied 152-mm HE-frag shells failed to impress the Russian Army while undergoing quality control (Figures 10a-10d). The shells apparently have differing amounts of gunpowder, resulting in varying combustion dynamics and alternate ranges for the projectiles, as well as open sealing covers, which could lead to the presence of moisture in the shells.
Finally, the dates indicated in some of the picture sources are open to scrutiny. Some of the pictures presented were traced to the channels where they were originally posted and, consequently, the first time they surfaced online: Figures 8, 9a and 9b and Figures 1a-1d. Figures 8, 9a and 9b are the most recent, taken on April 11, 2024, and depict the poor quality of 120-mm North Korean mortar shells. Another piece of evidence that is quite up-to-date is a post on X made by a Russian person (presumably a soldier) who customizes shells for a price. The date of the post is May 2, and the shell depicted is a North Korean 122-mm HE; however, there is snow on the ground, which means that the picture was likely taken earlier, perhaps in the winter or late spring of this year. Despite the difficulty of pinpointing the exact dates of the images, it is unlikely that there is a large time lag between the day the original pictures surfaced and the day they were reposted. Ukrainian Telegram channels are incentivized to repost pictures from Russian propaganda channels as quickly as possible. This highlights the problematic nature of the North Korean shells used by Russia and raises international awareness about North Korean illicit arms shipments.
Based on these sources, at least two conclusions may be drawn. First, North Korea has supplied Russia with either old ammunition from North Korea’s stockpiles (shipments without markings and with scuffs), or new shells, but of extremely low quality. So far, there are no indications of high-quality, newly manufactured munitions made specifically for Russia. Even most new shells are oversimplified copies of Soviet/Russian designs. Although we cannot hold out the possibility that North Korea is specifically sending defective armaments, it is entirely plausible that the armaments shipped to Russia are an indicator of the quality of North Korea’s ammunition stockpiles and production capacity. If true, this has major implications for North Korea’s conventional warfighting capacity. Second, no matter how desperate Russia may be for artillery, its military and political leaders are likely frustrated with the low quality of the armaments. Moscow probably has or will implore Pyongyang to provide newer, higher-quality munitions.
Conclusion
A backdrop for all of this is that Russia is increasing its capacity to produce its own munitions. While in 2023 and even early 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sources indicated that Russia could not cover its daily 10,000-12,000 shells consumption that sometimes reaches 40,000-80,000 shells, since March-April 2024, more intelligence agencies began to ring alarms that Russia is now on track to outpace its three million shells per year target and cover its own deficit by the end of 2024.
Because both Russia and North Korea deny the arms transfers and because of the general opacity of Russia’s military strategy, it remains unclear exactly how the munitions are being used. It is possible that North Korea’s artillery shipments are crucial for filling urgent Russian deficits, and it is also possible that they are merely adding additional capacity to help overwhelm Ukrainian positions with constant barrages. In either case, Russia would no longer rely on North Korea’s help quite so much if it revved up its industrial capacity. This would likely dramatically reduce or even end the quid pro quo exchange that sees Russia provide North Korea with hard currency, oil, food, weapons, and technology.
For now, Kim and Putin remain united in a marriage of convenience because of their anti-West dispositions and need to set up systems of exchange and support outside the US-dominated global financial system and rules-based order. Therefore, even if the relationship cools, a breakup is unlikely. Until then, as long as Russia’s industrial capacity is unable to match its military’s demand for deadly munitions, the primary beneficiary will remain Kim Jong Un.
Figure 7. Side-by-side comparisons of three 122-mm shells from Iran, North Korea and Russia. A production date LOT 21/2023 was noted in the Telegram channel’s comment section. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1741)
Figure 8. Another picture from Telegram, showcasing the poor quality of the shell. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1741?comment=28519)
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Figure 9b. Two D-30 towed 120-mm howitzers with damaged barrels. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1487)
Figure 9a. Two D-30 towed 120-mm howitzers with damaged barrels. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1487)
Figure 9b. Two D-30 towed 120-mm howitzers with damaged barrels. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1487)
Figure 9a. Two D-30 towed 120-mm howitzers with damaged barrels. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1487)
Figure 9b. Two D-30 towed 120-mm howitzers with damaged barrels. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1487)
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Figure 10d. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461)
Figure 10a. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461)
Figure 10b. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461)
Figure 10c. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461)
Figure 10d. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461)
Figure 10a. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461)
Figure 10b. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461)
12. Russia and North Korea’s military deal formalizes a bustling arms trade
Excerpts:
Russia, its munitions stocks running low in its war with Ukraine, has been relying on its few remaining allies for resupply, while isolated North Korea is always looking for ways to earn money.
Shunned by the West over his invasion of Ukraine, Putin is seeking partners who share his anti-Western stance, including China, Iran and North Korea. This week, Kim extolled the “firm alliance” with Moscow and openly backed Putin’s war against Ukraine — the strongest support for Russia’s invasion from any foreign leader.
Kim similarly is facing increasing economic sanctions and isolation because of his nuclear ambitions. He needs food, fuel, cash and weapons technology — all of which Russia can provide.
Although it is unclear what North Korea has received in return so far, there are indications that Russian technology was used in North Korea’s recent efforts to launch a spy satellite into space, South Korean parliamentary intelligence committee member Yoo Sang-bum told reporters last year, citing the nation’s intelligence agency.
More about this story: C4ADS found no evidence that the Russian-flagged ships offloaded any cargo at Vostochny during December, and the trade data did not record any explosives leaving the port that month, said Andrew Boling, who manages research on state-sponsored threats in the maritime space at C4ADS.
The Post and C4ADS’s analysis excluded ships not capable of carrying munitions-filled containers and vessels arriving from Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, which have all sharply criticized Russia’s war against Ukraine. The analysis ruled out vessels coming from China, because there is no accusation of Chinese munitions being used in Russia.
Russia and North Korea’s military deal formalizes a bustling arms trade
Russian trade data shows how cash-strapped Pyongyang is transporting shipping containers to munitions-hungry Moscow to help it sustain its war against Ukraine.
By Joyce Sohyun Lee and Michelle Ye Hee Lee
June 22, 2024 at 5:00 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Joyce Sohyun Lee · June 22, 2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a mutual defense pact this week, vowing to “immediately provide military assistance” to the other in the case of an attack. The deal formalizes an arrangement that has strengthened since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine: Munitions-hungry Moscow and cash-strapped Pyongyang, both under heavy international sanctions, are more than happy to do business.
Two days before the meeting, the U.S. State Department estimated that North Korea had supplied more than 11,000 containers of munitions to Russia since September.
A new analysis of internal Russian trade data illuminates how shipments of suspected North Korean munitions were distributed through Russia.
The data, obtained by the global security nonprofit C4ADS and provided to The Washington Post, covers shipments from August through January and shows that more than 74,000 metric tons of explosives were distributed from two ports in Russia’s Far East to 16 sites mainly along the country’s western borders near Ukraine. That weight is equal to about 1.6 million artillery shells of the type Russia has used in the war.
According to C4ADS, the sites the goods arrived at indicated they were munitions, despite the documentation referring to them as explosives.
The data does not include the origin of the shipments, but an analysis by The Post and C4ADS found evidence of Russian ship movements between North Korea and Russia during the same period.
“This is the closest thing to proof of Russian-North Korean connection when it comes to munitions transfers, and this proves that the Russians and North Koreans were lying” in denying the transfers, said Go Myong-hyun, senior research fellow at Seoul’s Institute for National Security Strategy, which is affiliated with South Korea’s intelligence agency.
“It really gives more credibility to the fact that North Korea is helping Russia to conduct its war in Ukraine,” Go said. “Unless we have photos, or the North Koreans say, ‘Look, we’ve been transferring shells to Russia,’ or something like that, this is the best we can get.”
Analysis of satellite imagery and marine traffic data by The Post and C4ADS shows that Russian-flagged vessels linked to the country’s military were docked in the North Korea port of Rajin and then later at the Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai. Most of the explosives departed to sites in Russia within a week of arrival, according to the data.
These vessels — the Lady R, the Angara, the Maria and the MAIA-1 — are owned by Russian companies closely linked to the country’s military. While it is impossible to verify exactly what the ships were carrying, the United States and South Korea have previously publicly named the four vessels as involved in transporting North Korean weapons to Russia based on satellite imagery and press reports.
The influx of North Korean ammunition helped shift the war back in Russia’s favor, said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It has been one of the “critical factors affecting the conduct of operations and who has the advantage in a war characterized by attrition,” Kofman said.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a British think tank that also uses satellite imagery to monitor movements between North Korea and Russia, saw the same patterns. The group found 27 shipments between the North Korean port of Rajin and the two Russian ports between roughly the same period, estimating that thousands of containers had been moved, although the contents of the containers remain unknown.
The shipments went to 16 sites across Russia, 12 of them near known ammunition storage facilities, according to the trade data, which C4ADS obtained from a person with access to documentation in the Russian transportation and logistics industry, whom The Post is not identifying due to safety risks. This indicated to experts that these explosives were likely to be munitions.
The facilities near the sites listed in the data are affiliated with artillery and rocket storage, and some can store artillery and other armored vehicle rounds, said Dara Massicot, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who reviewed the findings at the request of The Post.
There also were facilities that report to the department within Russia’s Ministry of Defense that oversees the procurement of weapons for the Russian military, known as GRAU, and those facilities typically store artillery rounds, rockets, missiles and many other types of ammunition, Massicot said.
“While we cannot be sure of what exactly they are delivering, the explosive labels … and delivery to storage bases near Ukraine and to sensitive GRAU ammunition storage facilities elsewhere across Russia, suggests these shipments are likely delivering a variety of ammunition types to Russia, from artillery rounds to rockets,” Massicot said.
Satellite images show visible changes at several of these sites. From September through December, containers appeared near the ammunition depots. New protective berms indicating expanded storage areas were also seen at these sites.
“A massive buildup of berms, commonly used to isolate explosives, indicate the explosives are likely munitions,” said Margaux Garcia, a Russia analyst at C4ADS. “Additionally, the fact that these shipments are traveling west toward the Russia-Ukraine border suggests that Russia intends to use these munitions in the war effort.”
More than five shipments were also sent to the JSC Voskresenskiy Agregatniy Zavod (VAZ) missile-assembly factory, which is about 40 miles outside Moscow and has been sanctioned by the United States.
Russia, its munitions stocks running low in its war with Ukraine, has been relying on its few remaining allies for resupply, while isolated North Korea is always looking for ways to earn money.
Shunned by the West over his invasion of Ukraine, Putin is seeking partners who share his anti-Western stance, including China, Iran and North Korea. This week, Kim extolled the “firm alliance” with Moscow and openly backed Putin’s war against Ukraine — the strongest support for Russia’s invasion from any foreign leader.
Kim similarly is facing increasing economic sanctions and isolation because of his nuclear ambitions. He needs food, fuel, cash and weapons technology — all of which Russia can provide.
Although it is unclear what North Korea has received in return so far, there are indications that Russian technology was used in North Korea’s recent efforts to launch a spy satellite into space, South Korean parliamentary intelligence committee member Yoo Sang-bum told reporters last year, citing the nation’s intelligence agency.
More about this story: C4ADS found no evidence that the Russian-flagged ships offloaded any cargo at Vostochny during December, and the trade data did not record any explosives leaving the port that month, said Andrew Boling, who manages research on state-sponsored threats in the maritime space at C4ADS.
The Post and C4ADS’s analysis excluded ships not capable of carrying munitions-filled containers and vessels arriving from Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, which have all sharply criticized Russia’s war against Ukraine. The analysis ruled out vessels coming from China, because there is no accusation of Chinese munitions being used in Russia.
Michelle Ye Hee Lee reported from Seoul.
The Washington Post · by Joyce Sohyun Lee · June 22, 2024
13. DPRK Workers Meet to Pledge Revenge on U.S. Imperialists
north Korea is preparing for the anniversary of the north Korean attack on the South on June 25th, 1950.
DPRK Workers Meet to Pledge Revenge on U.S. Imperialists
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1719036781-12709438/dprk-workers-meet-to-pledge-revenge-on-u-s-imperialists/
Date: 22/06/2024 | Source: Rodong Sinmun (En) | Read original version at source
Workers and trade union members in the DPRK met at the Sinchon Museum on Thursday to pledge revenge with the approach of June 25, the day of struggle against U.S. imperialism.
Pak In Chol, chairman of the Central Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, made a report to be followed by speeches.
The reporter and speakers bitterly condemned the U.S. imperialists as the root cause of all misfortune and pains on the planet and harasser of justice and peace, saying that the war ignited by the U.S. imperialists in the 1950s was a massacre unprecedented in the world history of wars.
They said that though more than 70 years have passed since the ceasefire, they can never forget the thrice-cursed crimes committed by the U.S. imperialists who stained the country with blood.
They stressed the need to fulfill the mission and duty of the working class in further bolstering up the self-defensive war deterrence, the strongest strength to punish the U.S. imperialists and their followers keen on the moves to stifle the DPRK, obsessed with anachronism.
They called upon the workers and trade union members to become manifold fortresses and shields defending the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea headed by the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un at the cost of their lives, tightly holding a rifle in one hand and a hammer in the other.
Rodong Sinmun
14. Regarding Self-reliance As Treasured Sword of Prosperity
Compare this propaganda to the reality inside north Korea.
Regarding Self-reliance As Treasured Sword of Prosperity
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1719036782-519424640/regarding-self-reliance-as-treasured-sword-of-prosperity/
Date: 22/06/2024 | Source: Rodong Sinmun (En) | Read original version at source
Work of Preparing Technical Force Should Be Done by Themselves
One June day of Juche 102(2013) the respected General Secretary Kim Jong Un inspected the Changsong Foodstuff Factory.
Making the rounds of the factory, he asked how many wild fruits they had harvested in the year before and expressed satisfaction at the fact that the factory normalized the production with wild fruits such as acorn and wild grape.
After hearing that officials of a factory in Pyongyang helped their trial run and other unit also lent a helping hand the respected General Secretary said that those factory and unit should help the Changsong Foodstuff Factory continuously.
Officials of the factory were very grateful for the benevolence of the respected General Secretary.
Looking up to him, they recollected the benevolent images of President Kim Il Sung and Chairman Kim Jong Il who bestowed all the love and affection on people in Changsong County.
Presently, the respected General Secretary said that the Changsong Foodstuff Factory should do well the work of training technicians and skilled workers by themselves.
His instructions convinced them that if they only rely on other’s help, they could be wrapped with dependence and if so, they would be easy to give up in a tiny difficulty.
Looking at those officials, the respected General Secretary warmly said that Changsong County should do work of preparing technical force of the Changsong Foodstuff Factory in a responsible way.
Receiving the instructions of the respected General Secretary, the officials realized once again his great trust and expectation that they would be ones strong in self-reliance and hasten the bright future.
Afterwards the factory waged a vigorous campaign to train the technicians and skilled workers on their own and thus the rank of technicians and skilled workers increased rapidly and a great upsurge was made in production.
Intention Officials Kept Deep in Their Minds
One July day of Juche 107(2018) the respected General Secretary Kim Jong Un inspected then Samjiyon County.
Looking round the construction sites of the county, he gave precious instructions.
When he was in the Rimyongsu area, he said that various types of dwelling houses and buildings should be placed in a diverse and peculiar way along the side of the ravine, preserving the characteristics of nature and topography, adding that the people in Samjiyon County should fulfill their duty as masters in the construction of Samjiyon County.
And he earnestly said that through the construction of the county, not only the appearance of the county but also the ideological spiritual world should be transformed.
As a matter of fact, the officials were not far-sighted enough to think that the construction of the county should be a course of educating the people with the spirit of the anti-Japanese revolutionary forerunners who defeated the Japanese imperialists by manufacturing the Yongil Bomb with empty hands and cultivating their mental strength of self-reliance.
His instructions involved the deep meaning that the people in Samjiyon County, who live in the area of Mt Paektu, should be high in ideological and mental conditions and stand in the van of face-lifting their regions.
That day the officials made a firm pledge to prepare the people as ones strong in mental strength and forerunners of self-reliance as befits the people in the area of Mt Paektu in which the tradition of self-reliance was created.
Rodong Sinmun
15. N. Korean soldiers cross border for 3rd time in June: JCS
The last patrols.
N. Korean soldiers cross border for 3rd time in June: JCS
The Korea Times · June 21, 2024
North Korean soldiers build a bridge in the demiliterized zone that separates two Koreas in this photo released by Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 18. Yonhap
North Korean troops working in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas have briefly crossed the border into the South before returning to their side after the South fired warning shots, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said Friday.
The North Korean soldiers crossed the Military Demarcation Line within the DMZ in the central section of the border at around 11 a.m. Thursday, the JCS said in a message to reporters.
The South Korean military conducted warning broadcasts and fired warning shots, prompting the North Korean soldiers to return to their side of the border, it said.
It marked the third border violation by the North this month after similar incidents involving a group of 20 to 30 North Korean soldiers in other areas of the central section of the border on June 9 and June 18, respectively. The JCS earlier said both cases appeared to be unintentional.
A JCS official said the latest incident also appears to be accidental, adding the soldiers soon resumed their jobs and continued working into the night after returning to the North.
Hundreds of troops were working in the nearby area when the small number of soldiers briefly crossed the border, according to the official.
"Similar situations may occur going forward as North Korean soldiers are carrying out the activities across several locations within the DMZ," the official said, adding the military is responding in a stern, principle-based manner.
The border violations came as North Korea has been deploying large numbers of troops in front-line areas since April to conduct an array of activities, such as planting mines, erecting walls assumed to be anti-tank barriers and reinforcing roads.
The JCS earlier estimated the North to have mobilized hundreds of soldiers in 10 different locations within the DMZ for such activities. It said the North appears to be pushing ahead with the work despite multiple casualties caused by mine explosions in the area. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · June 21, 2024
16. Putin and Kim are creating a crisis—Can the US and China rein them in?
I have been hearing a number of Korean analysts talk about the opportunity for US-China cooperation this week. I remain skeptical, very skeptical.
Excerpts:
The case for U.S.-China coordination
The United States, China, ROK, Japan, and virtually every other state in the region seeks stability, peace, and the ultimate elimination of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. There’s a strong case for collaboration before the Russian-North Korean partnership takes the region further away from these objectives.
The world is facing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that Washington and Beijing have not been able to work together on these conflicts and are often at cross-purposes raises the question of how one might expect U.S.-China cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.
Yet the brewing crisis in Northeast Asia is different: there’s so much more at stake for China’s direct security interests, as well as those of the United States and its closest Asian allies. Perhaps most disturbing for Beijing is that while it may be able to control escalation dynamics in the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea as a direct party in the conflicts, it can’t say the same for Russian-backed North Korean adventurism.
Enhanced U.S.-ROK-Japan military deterrence is necessary but insufficient to meet the growing challenge posed by Russia and North Korea’s alignment. It will also take clear and credible threats and assurances from the United States and China to shape Pyongyang and Moscow’s behavior. Collaboration doesn’t suggest that all steps, if any, need to be taken jointly. After all, Washington and Beijing have different relationships and points of leverage with North Korea and Russia. But quiet discussions on how the two sides might signal redlines and revamp a dead diplomatic process that neutralizes the threat posed by North Korea are in urgent order.
Putin and Kim are creating a crisis—Can the US and China rein them in? | Brookings
Russian and North Korean collusion has never played out favorably for China.
Patricia M. Kim
June 21, 2024
The Brookings Institution ·
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The newly inked Russia-North Korea security pact has spiked anxiety around the world about Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s growing partnership and its implications for the Korean Peninsula, Ukraine, and beyond. While some have pointed to the past week’s developments as more evidence of a hardening “alignment of evil” that includes Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran, the reality is that the pact might do more to fracture than solidify any burgeoning axis.
With regional tensions rising, history could very well repeat itself: China could be drawn into a crisis or even a full-blown war on the Korean Peninsula that it has no interest in fighting, be left to clean up the mess given Moscow’s preoccupation in Europe, and suffer major setbacks to its actual priorities as a result.
China’s top objectives for the Korean Peninsula—no crisis or chaos—are actually more in line with the interests of Washington and its allies than with Pyongyang and Moscow. Before a crisis strikes, the United States and China, along with South Korea and other regional stakeholders, should work together to rein in the Putin-Kim collaboration and revamp diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea emboldened
The newly signed Russia-North Korea security pact is deliberately ambiguous by design. The text states that the two sides will provide “military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay” if one party falls into a “state of war” due to an “armed invasion” by one or more countries. This raises the question of what counts as a “state of war” and the threshold that would need to be met for the mutual security clause to be triggered. Furthermore, the type of support to be rendered by either party is left quite open—“military and other assistance” could refer to anything from intelligence sharing to sending troops on the ground.
This ambiguity is likely intended to keep the United States and its allies uncertain about what might trigger the mutual defense clause and to instill caution as a result. And the vague wording on the types of assistance also gives Pyongyang and Moscow flexibility in their obligations to one another. It’s also quite possible that Moscow and Pyongyang have different interpretations and expectations of what they’ve promised each other.
Nevertheless, a grave concern is that with a Russian “security guarantee” or at least the facade of one in hand, North Korea may be emboldened to intensify its provocations based on the calculation that the United States and its allies will respond with greater caution now that they have to take a potential Russian reaction into account.
Putin unlikely to restrain Kim
Even more concerning is that Moscow has little incentive to restrain its junior partner from engaging in actions that destabilize Northeast Asia. In fact, Putin could very well welcome a North Korean provocation on the Korean Peninsula that forces the United States to turn its attention away from Europe, where Russia is continuing its relentless war against Ukraine.
It’s also conceivable that Russia and North Korea—both of whom have much to gain from another Trump presidency—might initiate an “October surprise” in an attempt to tilt the U.S. presidential elections in Trump’s favor. After all, the former president has openly expressed fondness for both Kim and Putin. Trump has also suggested that he would strike a deal with Pyongyang that allows it to keep its nuclear weapons and that he would cut U.S. aid to Ukraine immediately upon election.
Chinese, Russian, and North Korean interests diverge
These developments have rattled not just the United States and its allies, but also China. Beijing is rapidly losing its influence with Pyongyang relative to Moscow, all the while paying the diplomatic costs of being associated with the two pariah states.
To be sure, Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang share deep grievances about what they see as a U.S.-dominated global order. All three seek to erode Washington’s power and influence. But a key difference between Beijing and its two partners is that it seeks to achieve such an end without setting the world on fire or completely derailing its profitable ties with the world’s developed countries.
China needs a stable environment to deal with its myriad economic challenges at home and to manage trade tensions and de-risking efforts by Western states. China wants to move up the technology and innovation ladder and accelerate its military modernization, which Beijing believes is essential for compelling unification with Taiwan. In contrast, neither Russia nor North Korea has promising economic prospects or believes it benefits from a stable global order. This is why both countries have exclusively embraced violently disrupting the status quo.
In private conversations, Chinese observers, like their South Korean and American counterparts, express concerns about their lack of visibility on the military technology transfers being made between Russia and North Korea and the short- to long-term consequences of such transfers. They also share fears that Putin may be encouraging Kim to take destabilizing actions to distract the United States, raising the risk of war on China’s doorstep.
The last thing Beijing wants is U.S. attention shifted from Europe to Asia. Beijing is already uncomfortable and incensed by enhanced nuclear coordination between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), deepening U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation, and the many other steps the Biden administration has taken to strengthen alliance cooperation and deterrence in the region.
China left holding the bag?
China may soon find itself paying the costs of North Korean adventurism like it did at the beginning of the Cold War when the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC), encouraged by Moscow to advance the communist cause in Asia, agreed to support the North Korean regime next door. Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, gladly took advantage of Soviet and Chinese backing to pursue his ambitions of absorbing the entire Korean Peninsula. He kicked off the first hot conflict of the Cold War which led to the death of an estimated five million civilians and soldiers, including hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops.
This was at a time when the Chinese communists faced the urgent task of consolidating their rule at home and rebuilding China’s war-torn economy. Instead, they were forced to pivot their attention to the Korean Peninsula and direct almost half of their state budget to military spending. Mao Zedong also lost an opportunity to invade Taiwan—a goal that continues to elude Beijing today—after the United States sent the 7th Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait.
To add insult to injury, the Chinese counted on Soviet air cover and weapons as part of their agreement with Moscow to help the North Koreans. But Josef Stalin waffled on his commitments at critical moments and the burden of assisting the North Koreans fell heavily on Beijing’s shoulders.
While the PRC then is not the same as the PRC today, and the power dynamics among all of the states have shifted, Russian and North Korean collusion has never played out favorably for China.
The case for U.S.-China coordination
The United States, China, ROK, Japan, and virtually every other state in the region seeks stability, peace, and the ultimate elimination of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. There’s a strong case for collaboration before the Russian-North Korean partnership takes the region further away from these objectives.
The world is facing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that Washington and Beijing have not been able to work together on these conflicts and are often at cross-purposes raises the question of how one might expect U.S.-China cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.
Yet the brewing crisis in Northeast Asia is different: there’s so much more at stake for China’s direct security interests, as well as those of the United States and its closest Asian allies. Perhaps most disturbing for Beijing is that while it may be able to control escalation dynamics in the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea as a direct party in the conflicts, it can’t say the same for Russian-backed North Korean adventurism.
Enhanced U.S.-ROK-Japan military deterrence is necessary but insufficient to meet the growing challenge posed by Russia and North Korea’s alignment. It will also take clear and credible threats and assurances from the United States and China to shape Pyongyang and Moscow’s behavior. Collaboration doesn’t suggest that all steps, if any, need to be taken jointly. After all, Washington and Beijing have different relationships and points of leverage with North Korea and Russia. But quiet discussions on how the two sides might signal redlines and revamp a dead diplomatic process that neutralizes the threat posed by North Korea are in urgent order.
AUTHOR
Patricia M. Kim
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center
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The Brookings Institution · by Angela Stent, Yun Sun, Adrianna Pita
17. The Putin-Kim summit produced an unusual — and speedy — flurry of glimpses into North Korea
Photos at the link: https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-russia-kim-putin-summit-images-7ff8b8b5f8b327a58d54ad6f2e2f4794
The Putin-Kim summit produced an unusual — and speedy — flurry of glimpses into North Korea
AP · June 20, 2024
The imagery from Pyongyang emerged quickly, notable in its variety — glimpses into North Korea in near-real time that showed its leader, Kim Jong Un, grinning and glad-handing with Russian President Vladimir Putin and showing him around the capital of one of the world’s least accessible nations.
For those who follow the happenings of the Kim family’s three-generation rule, the coverage of the Kim-Putin meeting this week — visuals released only by the respective propaganda arms of each government — represented an extraordinary flurry of views into a nation where imagery that feels even remotely off the cuff, not vetted and edited ad nauseam, is rare.
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, right, drives a car with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sitting in front passenger seat at a garden of the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang, North Korea Wednesday, June 19, 2024. I(Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
The pair marched on the red carpet in Kim Il Sung Square, named after the current leader’s grandfather and the nation’s founder. They gazed upon a sea of balloon-toting children. They reviewed a military parade and eyed a crowd waving pompoms. They saw — but were not shown interacting with — groups of North Korean citizens, who if the past is any indication were meticulously vetted before getting anywhere near the scene.
Those images were vivid and plentiful, but they represented the predictable output of an experienced propaganda apparatus.
Far more striking were the in-between moments that managed to peek through — also calibrated carefully, but revealing a smidgen more about the North and its leader than most imagery does. From stills and videos made by both Russian and North Korean state media operations (independent journalists were not given access to cover Putin’s visit), the images were many and varied.
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, Russian President Vladimir Putin, center left, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, center right, walk together on the red carpet upon Putin's arrival at the Pyongyang International Airport in Pyongyang, North Korea, on early June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, right, hug during the departure ceremony at an international airport outside Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, talks with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, center right, on Putin's arrival at the Pyongyang International Airport in Pyongyang, North Korea, on early June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, a motorcade with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un head to the state guest house in Pyongyang, North Korea, on early June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
Here was Kim showing Putin a bust he’d had made of the Russian leader as a gift. Here were the two leaders hugging, looking at horses and Korean Pungsan dogs, leaning in for informal conversations, laughing at a “gala concert.” And here were cutaways to the background of a state dinner — complete with camera dollies, rooms before the leaders entered and other outtake-style shots that surface less often in North Korea’s home-grown imagery.
One of the most impactful sequences came from Kremlin pool video, filmed just before Putin’s arrival in Pyongyang. It showed Kim on the tarmac with his hands behind his back, silhouetted against the airport gate and a scarlet welcome sign behind him, pacing and awaiting his counterpart’s presence. It was easy to imagine that Kim Jong Un was, for a moment, not the packaged leader of an authoritarian government but a weary man waiting for a plane after dark.
Perhaps most noteworthy was the sense that all this was coming at the world in almost real time — mostly through Russian pool imagery. The North Korean government’s own images usually present its leader and nation as stilted, rigid and slightly out of sync — and photos usually emerge well after an event takes place.
Also at play: Imagery from the North’s main propaganda organ, the Korean Central News Agency, has occasionally been digitally manipulated before being transmitted; stringent vetting is required before it can be used.
Part of what made this week’s images so compelling was the occasional appearance of spontaneity. The overwhelming share of imagery out of North Korea feels staged — because so much of it is. Awkward and deferential people typically surround Kim, as they did his father and grandfather. And often Kim appears awkward himself.
But in these frames and footage, amid the fast-moving nature of the week’s events, that set-piece feel sometimes seemed absent. And it made North Korea appear more like other places, rather than reinforcing the “hermit kingdom” image.
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, Russian President Vladimir Putin, center left, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, center right, ride on an open car, as they parade during the official welcome ceremony at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
Photos and video can distance us. They can draw us nearer. They can humanize. They can show, to the many, places that only the few see. And sometimes, collectively, they can offer some small epiphanies about a place, its people, even its leader.
To look at this week’s photos and video from Pyongyang is to know just a bit more about what makes North Korea tick — even if that wasn’t the primary intent of the propagandists who created them.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, foreground right, attend the official welcome ceremony in the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Wednesday, June 19, 2024. (Vladimir Smirnov, Sputnik, KremlinPhoto via AP)
Pyongyang citizens look at news on a ceremony held to welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin, at the Kaeson Station of Pyongyang Metro in Pyongyang, North Korea Thursday, June 20, 2024. (AP Photo/Jon Chol Jin)
People, holding portraits of Russian President Vladimir Putin, greet and applaud as a motorcade with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un move past in a street in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Gavriil Grigorov, Sputnik, Kremlin Photo via AP)
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, right, drives a Russian Aurus limousine as Russian President Vladimir Putin sits on the left during their meeting in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Gavriil Grigorov, Sputnik, Kremlin Photo via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, front right, and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, center, chat at a garden of the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang, North Korea Wednesday, June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, right, presents a pair of Pungsan dogs to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, second left, at a garden of the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang, North Korea on June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, right, and Russia's President Vladimir Putin, left, walk through a garden of the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang, North Korea on June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, right, shows a gift to Russian President Vladimir Putin, front, at the state guest house in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un attend a gala concert in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin hold a meeting at the state guest house in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un smile as they walk after the talks in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Wednesday, June 19, 2024. (Gavriil Grigorov, Sputnik, Kremlin Photo via AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un walk together during the departure ceremony at an international airport outside Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Gavriil Grigorov/Sputnik, Kremlin Photo via AP)
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Ted Anthony, director of new storytelling and newsroom innovation for The Associated Press, was the AP’s Asia-Pacific news director from 2014 to 2018 and visited North Korea multiple times in that role. Follow him at http://www.twitter.com/anthonyted
AP · June 20, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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