Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"On 14 June 1775, Congress "Resolved, That six companies of expert riflemen, be immediately raised in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia… [and] as soon as completed, shall march and join the army near Boston, to be there employed as light infantry, under the command of the chief Officer in that army.""

The delegates then prescribed an oath of enlistment that required the soldiers to swear: "I have, this day, voluntarily enlisted myself, as a soldier, in the American continental army, for one year, unless sooner discharged: And I do bind myself to conform, in all instances, to such rules and regulations, as are, or shall be, established for the government of the said. Army."

The next day Congress voted to appoint George Washington "to command all the Continental forces" and began laying the foundation for "the American army.""

“Reality cannot be ignored except at a price; and the longer ignorance is persisted in, the higher and more terrible becomes the price that must be paid.”

– Aldous Huxley

"To be alive at all is to have scars."

–John Steinbeck

1. Pentagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 13, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, June 13, 2024

4. U.S. and Allies Scrounge for Patriots—or Any Air Defenses—to Help Ukraine

5. Bilateral Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine

6. FACT SHEET: U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement

7. Will Biden’s Help for Ukraine Come Fast Enough and Last Long Enough?

8. Opinion | Here’s Why Ukraine Should Seek Peace

9. In the search for hostages, U.S. is Israel’s key intelligence partner

10. Ukraine is finally getting to hit Russia hard with its 'wonder-weapons,' and that's turning the tide of the war: military expert

11. GOP green lights FY25 defense bill, but more social fights ahead

12. G7 leaders strike deal on using Russian assets to back $50B loan to Ukraine

13. G7 vows action against 'unfair' China business practices

14. G7 leaders to talk both AI’s risks and opportunities at summit

15. GOP green lights FY25 defense bill, but more social fights ahead

16. The Terrorist Threat to America is Growing

17. US set to hand off direction of Ukraine defense campaign to NATO

18. CNA launches in North America as part of international expansion

19. Intelligence & the Changing Landscape of Irregular Warfare

20. NATO Gets Serious in the Face of Russia’s Threats

21. Why China Is Sabotaging Ukraine

22. The Coming Military AI Revolution

1. Pentagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic

Quite a report. Please go to the link to read the article in the proper format and to view the graphics and tweets.

If accurate, this kind of reporting is the reason why we are afraid of information. As we have long said, it is easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist than it is to put an idea between his ears. This will impact our attempts to conduct an overt information campaign. More antibodies against information will be created by this report.

I bet this article could be rewritten based on the facts in the article to tell a different story. I can see the spin that is in this article. Will a discerning reader?

I wonder if this will affect LTG Braga if he is nominated for a 4th star.

Excerpts:

In uncovering the secret U.S. military operation, Reuters interviewed more than two dozen current and former U.S officials, military contractors, social media analysts and academic researchers. Reporters also reviewed Facebook, X and Instagram posts, technical data and documents about a set of fake social media accounts used by the U.S. military. Some were active for more than five years.

Clandestine psychological operations are among the government’s most highly sensitive programs. Knowledge of their existence is limited to a small group of people within U.S. intelligence and military agencies. Such programs are treated with special caution because their exposure could damage foreign alliances or escalate conflict with rivals.

Over the last decade, some U.S. national security officials have pushed for a return to the kind of aggressive clandestine propaganda operations against rivals that the United States’ wielded during the Cold War. Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, in which Russia used a combination of hacks and leaks to influence voters, the calls to fight back grew louder inside Washington.

In 2019, Trump authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to launch a clandestine campaign on Chinese social media aimed at turning public opinion in China against its government, Reuters reported in March. As part of that effort, a small group of operatives used bogus online identities to spread disparaging narratives about Xi Jinping’s government.

COVID-19 galvanized the drive to wage psychological operations against China. One former senior Pentagon leader described the pandemic as a “bolt of energy” that finally ignited the long delayed counteroffensive against China’s influence war.

The Pentagon’s anti-vax propaganda came in response to China’s own efforts to spread false information about the origins of COVID. The virus first emerged in China in late 2019. But in March 2020, Chinese government officials claimed without evidence that the virus may have been first brought to China by an American service member who participated in an international military sports competition in Wuhan the previous year. Chinese officials also suggested that the virus may have originated in a U.S. Army research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland. There’s no evidence for that assertion.

Mirroring Beijing’s public statements, Chinese intelligence operatives set up networks of fake social media accounts to promote the Fort Detrick conspiracy, according to a U.S. Justice Department complaint.

China’s messaging got Washington’s attention. Trump subsequently coined the term “China virus” as a response to Beijing’s accusation that the U.S. military exported COVID to Wuhan.

“That was false. And rather than having an argument, I said, ‘I have to call it where it came from,’” Trump said in a March 2020 news conference. “It did come from China.”

Pentagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-covid-propaganda/?utm

The U.S. military launched a clandestine program amid the COVID crisis to discredit China’s Sinovac inoculation – payback for Beijing’s efforts to blame Washington for the pandemic. One target: the Filipino public. Health experts say the gambit was indefensible and put innocent lives at risk.

By CHRIS BING and JOEL SCHECTMAN Filed June 14, 2024, 9:45 a.m. GMT

WASHINGTON, DC

At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. military launched a secret campaign to counter what it perceived as China’s growing influence in the Philippines, a nation hit especially hard by the deadly virus.

The clandestine operation has not been previously reported. It aimed to sow doubt about the safety and efficacy of vaccines and other life-saving aid that was being supplied by China, a Reuters investigation found. Through phony internet accounts meant to impersonate Filipinos, the military’s propaganda efforts morphed into an anti-vax campaign. Social media posts decried the quality of face masks, test kits and the first vaccine that would become available in the Philippines – China’s Sinovac inoculation.

Reuters identified at least 300 accounts on X, formerly Twitter, that matched descriptions shared by former U.S. military officials familiar with the Philippines operation. Almost all were created in the summer of 2020 and centered on the slogan #Chinaangvirus – Tagalog for China is the virus.

This post, identified by Reuters, matched the messaging, timeframe and design of the U.S. military’s anti-vax propaganda campaign in the Philippines, former and current military officials say. Social media platform X also identified the account as fake and removed it.

TRANSLATION FROM TAGALOG

#ChinaIsTheVirus

Do you want that? COVID came from China and vaccines came from China

(Beneath the message is a picture of then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte saying: “China! Prioritize us first please. I’ll give you more islands, POGO and black sand.” POGO refers to Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators, online gambling companies that boomed during Duterte’s administration. Black sand refers to a type of mining.)

“COVID came from China and the VACCINE also came from China, don’t trust China!” one typical tweet from July 2020 read in Tagalog. The words were next to a photo of a syringe beside a Chinese flag and a soaring chart of infections. Another post read: “From China – PPE, Face Mask, Vaccine: FAKE. But the Coronavirus is real.”

Podcast: Pentagon’s anti-vax campaign

After Reuters asked X about the accounts, the social media company removed the profiles, determining they were part of a coordinated bot campaign based on activity patterns and internal data.

The U.S. military’s anti-vax effort began in the spring of 2020 and expanded beyond Southeast Asia before it was terminated in mid-2021, Reuters determined. Tailoring the propaganda campaign to local audiences across Central Asia and the Middle East, the Pentagon used a combination of fake social media accounts on multiple platforms to spread fear of China’s vaccines among Muslims at a time when the virus was killing tens of thousands of people each day. A key part of the strategy: amplify the disputed contention that, because vaccines sometimes contain pork gelatin, China’s shots could be considered forbidden under Islamic law.

The military program started under former President Donald Trump and continued months into Joe Biden’s presidency, Reuters found – even after alarmed social media executives warned the new administration that the Pentagon had been trafficking in COVID misinformation. The Biden White House issued an edict in spring 2021 banning the anti-vax effort, which also disparaged vaccines produced by other rivals, and the Pentagon initiated an internal review, Reuters found.

“I don’t think it’s defensible. I’m extremely dismayed, disappointed and disillusioned to hear that the U.S. government would do that.”

Daniel Lucey, infectious disease specialist at Dartmouth’s Geisel School of Medicine.

The U.S. military is prohibited from targeting Americans with propaganda, and Reuters found no evidence the Pentagon’s influence operation did so.

Spokespeople for Trump and Biden did not respond to requests for comment about the clandestine program.

A senior Defense Department official acknowledged the U.S. military engaged in secret propaganda to disparage China’s vaccine in the developing world, but the official declined to provide details.

A Pentagon spokeswoman said the U.S. military “uses a variety of platforms, including social media, to counter those malign influence attacks aimed at the U.S., allies, and partners.” She also noted that China had started a “disinformation campaign to falsely blame the United States for the spread of COVID-19.”

In an email, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it has long maintained the U.S. government manipulates social media and spreads misinformation.

Manila’s embassy in Washington did not respond to Reuters inquiries, including whether it had been aware of the Pentagon operation. A spokesperson for the Philippines Department of Health, however, said the “findings by Reuters deserve to be investigated and heard by the appropriate authorities of the involved countries.” Some aide workers in the Philippines, when told of the U.S. military propaganda effort by Reuters, expressed outrage.

Briefed on the Pentagon’s secret anti-vax campaign by Reuters, some American public health experts also condemned the program, saying it put civilians in jeopardy for potential geopolitical gain. An operation meant to win hearts and minds endangered lives, they said.

“I don’t think it’s defensible,” said Daniel Lucey, an infectious disease specialist at Dartmouth’s Geisel School of Medicine. “I’m extremely dismayed, disappointed and disillusioned to hear that the U.S. government would do that,” said Lucey, a former military physician who assisted in the response to the 2001 anthrax attacks.

The effort to stoke fear about Chinese inoculations risked undermining overall public trust in government health initiatives, including U.S.-made vaccines that became available later, Lucey and others said. Although the Chinese vaccines were found to be less effective than the American-led shots by Pfizer and Moderna, all were approved by the World Health Organization. Sinovac did not respond to a Reuters request for comment.

Health workers and the government struggled to get Filipinos vaccinated against COVID-19, despite mobile sites like this one, operating in May 2021 in Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines. At that time, the Philippines had one of the worst inoculation rates in Southeast Asia. The primary vaccine available then was Sinovac. REUTERS/Lisa Marie David

Academic research published recently has shown that, when individuals develop skepticism toward a single vaccine, those doubts often lead to uncertainty about other inoculations. Lucey and other health experts say they saw such a scenario play out in Pakistan, where the Central Intelligence Agency used a fake hepatitis vaccination program in Abbottabad as cover to hunt for Osama bin Laden, the terrorist mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 2001. Discovery of the ruse led to a backlash against an unrelated polio vaccination campaign, including attacks on healthcare workers, contributing to the reemergence of the deadly disease in the country.

“It should have been in our interest to get as much vaccine in people’s arms as possible,” said Greg Treverton, former chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, which coordinates the analysis and strategy of Washington’s many spy agencies. What the Pentagon did, Treverton said, “crosses a line.”

‘We were desperate’

Together, the phony accounts used by the military had tens of thousands of followers during the program. Reuters could not determine how widely the anti-vax material and other Pentagon-planted disinformation was viewed, or to what extent the posts may have caused COVID deaths by dissuading people from getting vaccinated.

In the wake of the U.S. propaganda efforts, however, then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte had grown so dismayed by how few Filipinos were willing to be inoculated that he threatened to arrest people who refused vaccinations.

“You choose, vaccine or I will have you jailed,” a masked Duterte said in a televised address in June 2021. “There is a crisis in this country … I’m just exasperated by Filipinos not heeding the government.”

Then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte pleaded with citizens to get the COVID vaccine. “You choose, vaccine or I will have you jailed,” a masked Duterte said in this televised address in June 2021.

When he addressed the vaccination issue, the Philippines had among the worst inoculation rates in Southeast Asia. Only 2.1 million of its 114 million citizens were fully vaccinated – far short of the government’s target of 70 million. By the time Duterte spoke, COVID cases exceeded 1.3 million, and almost 24,000 Filipinos had died from the virus. The difficulty in vaccinating the population contributed to the worst death rate in the region.

A spokesperson for Duterte did not make the former president available for an interview.

Some Filipino healthcare professionals and former officials contacted by Reuters were shocked by the U.S. anti-vax effort, which they say exploited an already vulnerable citizenry. Public concerns about a Dengue fever vaccine, rolled out in the Philippines in 2016, had led to broad skepticism toward inoculations overall, said Lulu Bravo, executive director of the Philippine Foundation for Vaccination. The Pentagon campaign preyed on those fears.

“Why did you do it when people were dying? We were desperate,” said Dr. Nina Castillo-Carandang, a former adviser to the World Health Organization and Philippines government during the pandemic. “We don’t have our own vaccine capacity,” she noted, and the U.S. propaganda effort “contributed even more salt into the wound.”

The campaign also reinforced what one former health secretary called a longstanding suspicion of China, most recently because of aggressive behavior by Beijing in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Filipinos were unwilling to trust China’s Sinovac, which first became available in the country in March 2021, said Esperanza Cabral, who served as health secretary under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Cabral said she had been unaware of the U.S. military’s secret operation.

“I’m sure that there are lots of people who died from COVID who did not need to die from COVID,” she said.

To implement the anti-vax campaign, the Defense Department overrode strong objections from top U.S. diplomats in Southeast Asia at the time, Reuters found. Sources involved in its planning and execution say the Pentagon, which ran the program through the military’s psychological operations center in Tampa, Florida, disregarded the collateral impact that such propaganda may have on innocent Filipinos.

“We weren’t looking at this from a public health perspective,” said a senior military officer involved in the program. “We were looking at how we could drag China through the mud.”

As the COVID pandemic swept through the Philippines, a man lit a candle atop a tomb in a flooded cemetery there in October 2021. Many citizens were hesitant to be vaccinated. REUTERS/Lisa Marie David

A new disinformation war

In uncovering the secret U.S. military operation, Reuters interviewed more than two dozen current and former U.S officials, military contractors, social media analysts and academic researchers. Reporters also reviewed Facebook, X and Instagram posts, technical data and documents about a set of fake social media accounts used by the U.S. military. Some were active for more than five years.

Clandestine psychological operations are among the government’s most highly sensitive programs. Knowledge of their existence is limited to a small group of people within U.S. intelligence and military agencies. Such programs are treated with special caution because their exposure could damage foreign alliances or escalate conflict with rivals.

Over the last decade, some U.S. national security officials have pushed for a return to the kind of aggressive clandestine propaganda operations against rivals that the United States’ wielded during the Cold War. Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, in which Russia used a combination of hacks and leaks to influence voters, the calls to fight back grew louder inside Washington.

In 2019, Trump authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to launch a clandestine campaign on Chinese social media aimed at turning public opinion in China against its government, Reuters reported in March. As part of that effort, a small group of operatives used bogus online identities to spread disparaging narratives about Xi Jinping’s government.

COVID-19 galvanized the drive to wage psychological operations against China. One former senior Pentagon leader described the pandemic as a “bolt of energy” that finally ignited the long delayed counteroffensive against China’s influence war.

The Pentagon’s anti-vax propaganda came in response to China’s own efforts to spread false information about the origins of COVID. The virus first emerged in China in late 2019. But in March 2020, Chinese government officials claimed without evidence that the virus may have been first brought to China by an American service member who participated in an international military sports competition in Wuhan the previous year. Chinese officials also suggested that the virus may have originated in a U.S. Army research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland. There’s no evidence for that assertion.

Mirroring Beijing’s public statements, Chinese intelligence operatives set up networks of fake social media accounts to promote the Fort Detrick conspiracy, according to a U.S. Justice Department complaint.

China’s messaging got Washington’s attention. Trump subsequently coined the term “China virus” as a response to Beijing’s accusation that the U.S. military exported COVID to Wuhan.

“That was false. And rather than having an argument, I said, ‘I have to call it where it came from,’” Trump said in a March 2020 news conference. “It did come from China.”

President Donald Trump explained his repeated use of the terms “Chinese virus” and “China virus” during a White House COVID briefing in March 2020. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

China’s Foreign Ministry said in an email that it opposed “actions to politicize the origins question and stigmatize China.” The ministry had no comment about the Justice Department’s complaint.

Beijing didn’t limit its global influence efforts to propaganda. It announced an ambitious COVID assistance program, which included sending masks, ventilators and its own vaccines – still being tested at the time – to struggling countries. In May 2020, Xi announced that the vaccine China was developing would be made available as a “global public good,” and would ensure “vaccine accessibility and affordability in developing countries.” Sinovac was the primary vaccine available in the Philippines for about a year until U.S.-made vaccines became more widely available there in early 2022.

Washington’s plan, called Operation Warp Speed, was different. It favored inoculating Americans first, and it placed no restrictions on what pharmaceutical companies could charge developing countries for the remaining vaccines not used by the United States. The deal allowed the companies to “play hardball” with developing countries, forcing them to accept high prices, said Lawrence Gostin, a professor of medicine at Georgetown University who has worked with the World Health Organization.

The deal “sucked most of the supply out of the global market,” Gostin said. “The United States took a very determined America First approach.”

To Washington’s alarm, China’s offers of assistance were tilting the geopolitical playing field across the developing world, including in the Philippines, where the government faced upwards of 100,000 infections in the early months of the pandemic.

U.S. and Allies Scrounge for Patriots—or Any Air Defenses—to Help Ukraine

Zelensky has begged for protection from Russian attacks, but complexity limits the number of systems available

https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-and-allies-scrounge-for-patriotsor-any-air-defensesto-help-ukraine-0c4509b0?mod=hp_lista_pos4

By Daniel Michaels

in Brussels and Nancy A. Youssef

in Washington

June 13, 2024 11:46 am ET

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with a Patriot missile-defense system in Kyiv last year. PHOTO: UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE/ZUMA PRESS

The U.S. will send Ukraine an additional Patriot missile-defense system to protect against Russian attacks, U.S. defense officials said. But shortages of the highly effective equipment and a continuing systems modernization are prompting U.S. officials to urge Ukraine to seek air defenses from other allies.

Patriot batteries, which have helped protect Ukrainian troops and civilian assets over recent months, including around Kyiv, are complex assemblages of networked elements, including radar, launchers and interceptor systems. Each can fire dozens of interceptor missiles in a single engagement with attacking planes, missiles or rockets.

In a sign of the complexity, the Netherlands is ready to offer Ukraine Patriot components but doesn’t have all the necessary elements for a whole system, Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren said, referring to the situation as “the Patriot puzzle.”

“We took a step forward by announcing already that we will be able to make available one radar and three launchers,” Ollongren said at a meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense ministers in Brussels. “Other countries are now looking at what they can do—if we can assemble a whole system.”

Within NATO, 11 countries use Patriots and are cooperating to help Ukraine, Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson said.

How a Patriot battery tracks and intercepts targets

ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION

RADAR

Radar detects and tracks missiles and other targets.

Radar sends data to remote Engagement Control Station.

ECS receives the data and sends it to the Patriot Launching Station.

Interceptor missile canister

Antenna

INTERCEPTOR

Interceptors are fired either manually or remotely from the ECS.

LAUNCHING STATION

Launching Station houses remote operating module, launcher and up to 16 interceptor missiles.

Launching Station receives targets’ location from ECS through the station’s antenna.

Note: Diagram is not to scale

Source: Army Recognition

Jemal R. Brinson and Peter Champelli/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Air defenses for Ukraine are a top issue at the NATO gathering. The meeting includes sessions with Ukrainian representatives and planning for NATO’s annual summit, in Washington next month, where allies will unveil a range of commitments to Ukraine for its fight against Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky intensified calls for more air-defense systems this spring after Russia’s military ramped up bombing of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city. He said the country needs at least seven more Patriot systems.

Zelensky has pleaded in public and private for more systems, saying that two are needed just to protect Kharkiv, in its northeast, near Russian territory. Russia has long used ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as explosive drones, against Ukrainian cities. In recent months, Moscow’s forces have increased their use of massive glide bombs, launched from aircraft behind the front lines.

Air defense has become essential for Ukraine as a way to protect from Russian attacks on critical infrastructure and civilian targets and to keep Moscow’s air force out of unoccupied parts of the country. Ukraine has an arsenal of Soviet-era missile defense and other Western-donated systems.

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The Patriot surface-to-air missile system has become a critical piece in the Ukrainian military’s arsenal. WSJ takes an in-depth look at how it works and some of its disadvantages. Photo composite: Eve Hartley

Ahead of this week’s meetings in Brussels, U.S. officials in Washington said they would provide one Patriot battery, and Germany recently said it too would supply one. The second U.S. Patriot battery is expected to arrive within weeks, one official said. The first U.S.-provided Patriot arrived in Kyiv just over one year ago.

The U.S. made the decision to send the particular additional Patriot, in part, because a unit assigned to it was planning to return home from a deployment near the Polish-Ukraine border. Pentagon officials decided that the troops would return home but that the Patriot assigned to them would stay in the region and move to Ukraine. There, Ukrainian-trained forces would operate the system, the officials said.

Despite the decision to send an additional battery to Ukraine, “there will be no change in our Patriot coverage in Poland,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters Thursday in Brussels, suggesting that the U.S. would transport another battery to Poland.

President Biden approved the move, the officials said.

A Patriot battery usually requires 90 people to operate, and Ukrainian personnel have received training, U.S. defense officials said. NATO countries’ equipment varies.

“When you look at what countries have in their inventories, some of them have the battery but not the interceptors. Some of them have the batteries for training but not for deployment. Some of them have the batteries but don’t have the personnel to man the batteries,” said a senior Defense Department official.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defense minister, at a military training ground in Germany this week. PHOTO: JENS BUTTNER/PRESS POOL

“The host of issues with just pulling them from allies and handing them over to Ukraine…is really complicated and a lot of hours are spent trying to piece these systems together,” the official said.

As a result, the official said, the U.S. is urging Ukraine and NATO allies to look at giving Kyiv European-made systems and older U.S. air-defense equipment.

“It’s a combination of systems and if we—and they—rely only on Patriot, I think we will come up short,” the official said. The current U.S. modernization “requires us to pull systems back from the field,” the official said, explaining that even in the U.S. “it’s extremely complicated.”

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said this week that as well as the additional Patriot system Berlin will deliver—its third to Ukraine—it would offer German-made Gepard and Iris-T systems.

Iris-T, a U.S.-Norwegian Nasams system is a ground-launch interceptor system roughly similar to the Patriots. But the cutting-edge U.S. system is Ukraine’s most valued because its range is longer than any of the other systems and it can tackle ballistic and hypersonic missiles in a way the others can’t.

Alistair MacDonald and Jane Lytvynenko contributed to this article.

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com

5. Bilateral Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine

Compare this to our Mutual Defense Treaties which are barely 2 pages long or less).

And of course this can be terminated by a successor administration. despite it being a 10 year agreement.

Bilateral Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · June 13, 2024

Preamble

The United States of America and Ukraine (hereinafter, the “Parties”):

Underscoring their shared commitment to a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace;

Affirming that the security of Ukraine is integral to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region;

Recognizing the need to preserve and promote Ukraine’s sovereignty, democracy, and capacity to deter and respond to current and future external threats;

Affirming their desire to expand their defense and security cooperation and their trade and investment ties, and to deepen the overall friendly relations between them;

Building on the existing security partnership with Ukraine facilitated under the Strategic Defense Framework between the United States Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, signed August 31, 2021, and the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed November 10, 2021;

Recalling longstanding security cooperation between the Parties and the United States’ provision of military and security assistance, supporting Ukraine with the arms, equipment, and training necessary to defend itself against Russia’s aggression;

Welcoming Ukraine’s efforts to attain a just and sustainable peace and emphasizing the Parties’ commitment to seeking a just end to the war, founded on the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter and a respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters, and recognizing Ukraine’s inherent right of self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter;

Reaffirming that Ukraine’s future is in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); reiterating their support for the declaration of Allies at the 2023 Vilnius Summit that Allies will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met emphasizing the importance of its deepening integration into the Euro-Atlantic community; and underlining the centrality of reform to support and strengthen Ukraine’s defense, prosperity, recovery, rule of law, and democracy;

Emphasizing the importance of holding Russia to account for its aggression against Ukraine, including by supporting Ukraine in seeking compensation for the damage, loss, and injury resulting from Russia’s aggression, such as support envisaged by the Statute of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and holding accountable those responsible for war crimes and other international crimes committed in or against Ukraine, consistent with international law;

Highlighting the United States’ ongoing efforts to use sanctions and export controls to increase the costs to Russia for its aggression against Ukraine and to work with its partners to explore all possible avenues by which immobilized Russian sovereign assets could be made use of to support Ukraine, consistent with domestic and international law; and

Upholding the shared commitments made under the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine on July 12, 2023 (hereinafter “Joint Declaration of 2023”);

Have agreed to the following:

Article I: Principles of Cooperation

This Agreement is based on the following principles and beliefs shared by the Parties:

Cooperation between the Parties is based on the principle of full respect for the independence and sovereignty of each of the Parties, and full respect for obligations of the Parties under international law and for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

Cooperation between the Parties is enhanced by their shared commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, transparency, and accountability.
Cooperation between the Parties is intended to bolster Euro-Atlantic security, stability, and prosperity by enhancing deterrence and defense integration and interoperability.

Article II: Defense and Security Cooperation

The Parties’ cooperation in the areas of defense and security is based on their shared commitment to stability and peace in Europe.

It is the policy of the Parties to work together to help deter and confront any future aggression against the territorial integrity of either Party. The security-related commitments in this Agreement are intended to support Ukraine’s efforts to win today’s war and deter future Russian military aggression. It is the policy of the United States to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense and deterrence capability.

Any future aggression or threat of aggression against the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of either Party would be a matter of grave concern to the other Party.

In the event of future armed attack or threat of armed attack against Ukraine, the Parties shall, at the request of either Party and in accordance with their respective laws, immediately meet, where possible within 24 hours, at the most senior levels to determine appropriate next steps and additional defense needs. The Parties may mutually decide to develop and implement additional appropriate defense and deterrent responses, including in the economic, military, and/or political realms. Such responses may include the imposition of economic and other costs on the aggressor state through steps that may include, among other things, potential sanctions or export controls. The Parties stand ready to share available and appropriate information and intelligence immediately in response to such an event, and to consult with signatory countries of the Joint Declaration of 2023 on additional, joint responses.

In order to further strengthen the security of the Parties and stability in Europe, and to deter threats against them, the Parties agree:

To further implementation of existing security agreements and arrangements, including those concerning research and development, science and technology cooperation, manufacturing of defense products, the protection of classified defense information, and end-use monitoring.
To meet on a regular basis to further mutual awareness of emerging threats, with a view to working towards enhancing the integration of defensive systems and deterrent capacities of the Parties across all domains, and furthering Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO.
To further bolster their defense and security cooperation as a means of building a Ukrainian future force that maintains a credible defense and deterrence capability, which may include:

Training and military education programs;

Provision of defense articles and services;
Combined military maneuvers and exercises;
Increased defense industrial cooperation consistent with applicable agreements and arrangements between the Parties;
Continued joint planning to confront threats to the Parties, including guiding principles, respective rules of engagement, and command and control, as appropriate;
Cooperation to promote cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure;
Cooperation to develop Ukraine’s capabilities to counter Russian and any other propaganda and disinformation;

h) Cooperation to promote regional peace and security in the Black Sea;

i) Cooperation to support unexploded ordnance removal and demining; and

j) Other cooperation as may be mutually decided upon by the Parties.

To coordinate on a regular basis – and no less than annually – on military and defense matters, including defense industrial base development. This coordination shall include a particular focus on combined efforts to deter and confront threats of aggression against Ukraine.

The Parties agree to advance the appropriate sharing of intelligence and to promote enhanced cooperation between their intelligence services, with the scope and procedure of cooperation determined by their respective entities responsible for intelligence and security. The United States intends to assist with capacity building for Ukraine’s intelligence institutions, including with respect to counterintelligence capabilities.

Each Party reaffirms its commitments to comply with its obligations under international law, including the law of armed conflict.

It is the policy of the United States to support providing sustainable levels of security assistance for Ukraine in support of the objectives outlined in the Bilateral Security Agreement and associated implementation arrangements. To this end, the United States intends to seek from the United States Congress appropriation of funds to help sustain a Ukrainian credible defense and deterrent capability, in war and peace.

Article III: Cooperation on Economic Recovery and Reform

Recalling the trade and investment agreements and arrangements in place between the Parties, the Parties intend to cooperate to:

Seek opportunities to provide technical assistance and build capacity to support Ukraine’s economic needs stemming from Russia’s war of aggression.
Support recovery efforts to strengthen Ukraine’s economic stability and resilience, including by supporting Ukraine’s energy security and its vision of a modern, cleaner, more decentralized energy system that is integrated with Europe.
Strengthen the resilience and security of Ukraine’s civilian nuclear energy sector, cognizant of their collaboration under the September 21, 2023, Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States regarding Collaboration on Ukrainian Energy System Resilience.
Identify strategic investment opportunities that mutually benefit the Parties, and encourage the development of projects, including those that can attract private and public investment in Ukraine, that support Ukrainian and American economic development and partnership, such as in the areas of defense production and infrastructure.
Continue support for implementation of Ukraine’s effective reform agenda, including strengthened good governance, anti-corruption, respect for human rights, and rule of law necessary to advance towards its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Article IV: Institutional Reforms to Advance Euro–Atlantic Integration

The Parties shall cooperate to advance Ukraine’s democratic, economic, defense, and security institutions in order to advance Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and modernization according to European Union (EU) and NATO democratic principles and standards, and to prioritize NATO’s shared values and the interoperability of Ukraine’s security and defense forces.

The Parties shall cooperate to advance Ukraine’s implementation of reforms to its democratic, economic, defense, and security institutions in line with its EU accession goals, NATO adapted Annual National Program priorities, and obligations and commitments under agreements and arrangements with the International Monetary Fund.

Accordingly, among other reforms, Ukraine shall undertake efforts towards:

Strengthening Ukrainian justice sector reform to promote the independence and integrity of the judiciary;
Implementing robust anti-corruption measures, including strengthening all independent state anti-corruption institutions such as the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine;
Implementing reforms in law enforcement, security, tax, and customs institutions to resolve jurisdictional issues, and to improve transparency and accountability and strengthen the rule of law;
Bolstering corporate governance to meet Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development principles in state-owned and defense enterprises to encourage foreign investor confidence and investment;
Adopting NATO standards of transparency, accountability, and competition in the management and oversight of security and procurement policy and practice;
Transforming defense planning and resource management systems to increase transparency, improve efficiency, and increase interoperability with NATO;
Reorganizing command and control structures in accordance with NATO principles to increase interoperability and ensure effective civilian oversight; and
Modernizing defense human resource management and military education systems to align with NATO principles and standards.

The Parties reaffirm their support for Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements. The United States reaffirms that Ukraine’s future is in NATO.

Article V: Just Peace

The Parties recognize that Ukraine will not be secure until its sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored through a just peace that respects Ukraine’s rights under international law, including the UN Charter. The Parties therefore shall cooperate to advance a just and lasting peace that has broad global support. The United States welcomes Ukraine’s ongoing efforts, including through Ukraine’s Peace Formula, to engage the international community in establishing the principles of a just and sustainable peace.

Article VI: Annexes and Implementing Arrangements

The Parties may enter into further agreements or arrangements as necessary and appropriate to implement this Agreement.

The Parties intend that cooperation in the specific areas described in Articles II and III, including support for Ukraine’s Armed Forces and other security and defense forces, be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the attached annex and with any separate implementing arrangements entered into by the Parties.

Article VII: Disputes and Implementation

Any divergence in views or disputes regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved only through consultation between the Parties and shall not be referred to any national or international court, tribunal, or other similar body, or any third party for settlement.

All cooperation and activities under this Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the respective domestic laws of the Parties and shall be subject to the availability of funds.
The Parties intend for this Agreement to reinforce other agreements and arrangements that exist between the Parties. The Parties shall implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with those other agreements, and taking into account those other arrangements.

Article VIII: Amendment

This Agreement may be amended and supplemented through mutual written agreement of the Parties.

Article IX: Entry Into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by both Parties. This Agreement shall remain in force 10 years from entry into force and may be extended by mutual written agreement of the Parties.

Article X: Registration With the United Nations

The Parties intend to register this Agreement with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter within 60 days of its entry into force.

Article XI: Termination

Either Party may terminate this Agreement by providing a written notification through diplomatic channels to the other Party of its intent to terminate this Agreement. The termination shall take effect 6 months after the date of such notification.

In this regard, although a Party may terminate this Agreement, any implementing agreement or arrangement entered into between the Parties consistent with the terms of this Agreement shall continue to remain in effect under its own terms, unless otherwise specified in the terms of the specific implementing agreement or arrangement.

The Parties recognize this Agreement as supporting a bridge to Ukraine’s eventual membership in the NATO Alliance.

In the event that Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, the Parties shall meet and confer on the future status of this Agreement.

Done at Puglia, Italy, this 13th day of June, 2024, in two originals in the English language, being an authentic version of the Agreement. A Ukrainian language version of the Agreement shall be prepared, which shall be considered equally authentic upon an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Parties confirming that the Ukrainian version of the Agreement attached to the notes conforms with the signed English version of the Agreement. Thereafter, in the event of divergence or ambiguity between the two language texts, the English version shall prevail.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: FOR UKRAINE:

_________________________ _________________________

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR. VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY

President of the United States of America President of Ukraine

Annex to the Bilateral Security Agreement

Between the United States of America and Ukraine

Pursuant to Article VI of the Bilateral Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine (Agreement) and in implementation of the provisions of Articles II and III of the Agreement,

The United States of America (United States) and Ukraine (together, Participants or both sides) have reached the following understandings:

Implementation of Article II: Defense and Security Cooperation

The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. To ensure Ukraine’s security, both sides recognize Ukraine needs a significant military force, robust capabilities, and sustained investments in its defense industrial base that are consistent with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards. The United States intends to provide long-term materiel, training and advising, sustainment, intelligence, security, defense industrial, institutional, and other support to develop Ukrainian security and defense forces that are capable of defending a sovereign, independent, democratic Ukraine and deterring future aggression.

Ukraine deeply appreciates the significant assistance the United States has provided since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In addition to United States bilateral support, both sides acknowledge the critical and substantial contributions of the security assistance that other partner nations intend to provide Ukraine and the need for coordination among Ukraine’s partners to synchronize support and appropriately share the responsibility for meeting shared goals. Both sides also recognize the need for Ukraine’s security and defense forces to be sustainable over time, and expect Ukraine to gradually assume responsibility for an increasing share of its defense needs.

To implement this annex, the Participants intend to consult on security and defense forces requirements through channels such as the U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Defense Consultations process to ensure Ukraine adopts a Western-based military standard, interoperable with NATO. Security assistance requests are expected to be evaluated for sustainability, alignment with a jointly understood future force structure, effectiveness in meeting defense objectives, and complementarity with assistance from other allies and partners.

A. Ukraine’s Future Force Capabilities

The United States commits to support Ukraine in developing a modern, NATO-interoperable force that can credibly deter and, if necessary, defend against future aggression. Ukraine’s future force is expected to rely on both modern and legacy equipment. To support the sustainability of Ukraine’s security and defense forces, both sides intend to standardize equipment across its formations.

The United States intends to support Ukraine’s military strength and the development and transformation of its military capabilities across the full spectrum of combat functions through the supply of weapons, equipment, training, and other assistance, in coordination with partners, including in the following domains:

Air and Missile Defense: Building upon the range of air defense capabilities that the United States has provided to date, including the Patriot system, the United States commits to support Ukraine’s development of a layered, integrated air and missile defense system. Both sides intend to pursue further steps to transition to a modern air defense architecture for Ukraine over time, with associated radars, interceptors, and support equipment across the spectrum of tactical- to strategic-level capabilities.
Fires: The United States commits to support Ukraine’s development of a joint fires capability, to include the acquisition of ground-based systems, munitions, and targeting capabilities to employ indirect and long-range fires, as well as unmanned aerial systems. Both sides intend to pursue the procurement of stockpiles of ammunition for Ukraine’s use, in coordination with allies and partners, while developing Ukraine’s domestic ammunition production capacity.
Ground Maneuver: The United States commits to support Ukraine’s development of movement and maneuver doctrine and capabilities, to include sustainment of legacy armored, mechanized, and motorized capabilities, and to work with allies and partners to support the acquisition of modern platforms to support Ukraine’s maneuver force requirements.
Air: The United States commits to coordinate with Ukraine, and work principally through an allied consortium, on the modernization of Ukraine’s Air Force, including working toward procurement of squadrons of modern fighter aircraft, sustainment, armament, and associated training to support fourth generation fighter capability (including, but not limited to, F-16 multi-role aircraft), as well as other air domain capabilities such as transport and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms (including unmanned).
Maritime: The United States, in coordination with allies and partners, commits to support the improvement of Ukraine’s capacity to defend its territorial waters and promote Black Sea regional security through capabilities that could include coastal defense systems; maritime domain awareness; unmanned systems; and surface vessels, including patrol and riverine craft, naval firepower, maritime mine countermeasures, and other weapons that will help strengthen maritime security in the Black and Azov Seas and help Ukraine exercise sovereignty over its territorial seas and sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone.
Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection: The United States commits to support Ukraine’s capacity to increase the cybersecurity and protection of its critical infrastructure and government information resources, including by strengthening its cyber defenses against malicious cyber activities by Russia and other hostile state and non-state actors. Both sides commit to work together to improve Ukraine’s ability to detect and remediate intrusions by malicious actors, including through technical assistance from the United States. The United States intends to assist Ukraine to improve the cyber resilience of its critical infrastructure, especially energy facilities, against aerial strikes, and to support the quick restoration of destroyed infrastructure, including by providing material and technical assistance.
Command and Control: The United States commits to support Ukraine’s development of command and control capability through both materiel and non-materiel support. Both sides recognize that incorporating NATO-interoperable communications systems, doctrine, and organization are needed to improve sensing, early warning, and timely resource allocation for Ukraine’s combat operations.
Sustainment: The United States, in coordination with allies and partners, commits to support Ukraine’s capacity to sustain and independently support its forces over the long term, maximizing its operational freedom of action. Such efforts could include support to logistics, personnel services, and health service support, in line with Western force generation models.

The United States and Ukraine intend to collaborate on force development through a range of multi-national capability coalitions, including through air force and artillery coalitions co-led by the United States.

The United States additionally commits to consideration of support for Ukraine’s civiliandefense forces, which are critical components of Ukraine’s overall defense. The United States and Ukraine commit to deepening partnerships between national guard and border security services.

In furtherance of Article II of the Agreement, in the event of future armed attack or the threat of armed attack against Ukraine, the United States, at the request of the Government of Ukraine and in consultation with allies and partners, intends to coordinate on the potential need to rapidly increase the scope or scale of United States security assistance to Ukraine, including potentially the provision of additional weapon systems and equipment, and other materiel, as well as the exchange of information with Ukraine.

B. Training and Exercises

The United States intends to pursue a long-term training program for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other security and defense forces throughout the term of this annex. The United States plans to expand its capacity to provide both individual and collective training, and to coordinate with allies and partners to ensure complementarity of training programs. The United States intends to incorporate Ukrainian trainers and subject matter experts into the program, promote institutionalization of Western training practices and doctrine, and create the conditions for the transition of training efforts to Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian service members.

Training is intended to be supported by an extensive exercise program to build interoperability. The United States plans to invite Ukrainian security and defense forces to join United States exercises and to support Ukrainian participation in multilateral exercises when appropriate.

The United States intends to consider opportunities for training Ukrainian service members in the United States as appropriate.

If and when security conditions allow, both sides plan to consult on possible training and exercise programs in Ukraine.

In line with this training, Ukraine commits to incorporating standard NATO doctrine and combined arms concepts at all echelons of its security and defense forces, and to ensuring the proper employment and sustainment of new capabilities.

The United States supports enabling increased Ukrainian attendance at Department of Defense (DOD) institutions of professional military education, including through the International Military Education and Training program.

C. Defense Industrial Base Development Cooperation

Both sides recognize that the recovery of Ukraine’s economy and industry would support Ukraine’s ability to shoulder more of the material and financial burdens of its defense over time. The United States commits to work with allies and partners to support Ukraine’s economic recovery and bolster Ukraine’s defense industrial base, including through cooperative defense research and development. Ukraine commits to developing and reforming its defense industry to support and sustain the needs of its security and defense forces.

Both sides intend to engage with international partners and their respective defense industries to support increased Ukrainian production over the long term of necessary armaments, ammunition, and equipment, supporting Ukraine’s development of a level of readiness for and deterrence against future aggression. The United States intends to work with Ukraine to enable Ukrainian entities to repair key systems and produce parts to facilitate efficient repair through the provision of raw materials and technical expertise, financing, and licensing for technology transfer. The United States intends to support Ukraine in solving challenges, including in the supply of critical materials and components needed for weapons, military equipment, and munitions manufacturing.

Both sides commit to implementing the Statement of Intent on Co-production and Technical Data Exchange, signed December 6, 2023, at the United States-Ukraine Defense Industrial Base Conference in Washington, D.C., working to increase cooperation between the United States and Ukraine and facilitating the movement of investment deals more quickly through systems.

Ukraine commits to strengthen foreign direct investment controls based on national security considerations.

The Participants intend to seek private industry partnerships in key priority areas of defense production, including but not limited to the manufacturing of air defense systems and supporting munitions, artillery ammunition of multiple calibers, supporting barrels and other components, and manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles.

The United States intends to facilitate United States-Ukraine defense industrial cooperation, including codevelopment, coproduction, and supply of Ukraine’s defense industrial base requirements.

Ukraine commits to continuing its reform of state defense conglomerate JSC Ukrainian Defense Industry to align with international business best practices and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development standards.

Both sides commit to implement their Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Agreement.

D. End Use Monitoring/Accountability

The United States reaffirms its commitment to work with allies and partners to facilitate international coordination to mitigate the risk of diversion of advanced conventional weapons through the U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe. This includes supporting Ukrainian, allied, and partner efforts to conduct end-use monitoring. To implement Article II of the Agreement, Ukraine further reaffirms its commitment to ensuring the security of United States-provided defense articles and technology in accordance with DOD’s Golden Sentry enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) requirements.

This includes:

Providing timely and comprehensive expenditure and loss reports for all EEUM items on at least a quarterly basis;
Continuing to afford United States DOD personnel maximum access and transparency in support of EEUM verification activities, including site visits to Ukrainian weapons depots, as appropriate, and full visibility into Ukrainian logistics management platforms; and
Fully implementing the concept of operations for the use of handheld scanning devices to self-report EEUM inventories at locations where United States personnel are unable to travel.

As security conditions allow, Ukraine further commits to:

Conducting a comprehensive inventory of all remaining EEUM items in Ukraine’s possession;
Providing DOD with access to military installations across Ukraine at which EEUM items are stored, to allow for the resumption of all in-person verification activities; and
Supporting future EEUM requirements the United States may identify to maintain reasonable assurances of the security of advanced conventional weapons in a postwar environment.

The Participants intend to continue the exchange of information on threats related to illicit arms proliferation.

E. Unexploded Ordnance Removal and Demining

The United States intends to coordinate with international partners to support unexploded ordnance removal and demining assistance in affected regions in Ukraine, encompassing both humanitarian and combat demining efforts. This support may include assisting civilian populations affected by landmines, explosive remnants of war, and the hazardous effects of unexploded ordnance, through developing Ukraine’s domestic capacity for humanitarian demining, land-based and underwater explosive ordnance disposal, and physical security and stockpile management of conventional munitions.

Both sides recognize the importance of a coordinated and robust demining program to Ukraine’s long-term recovery potential, due to the contamination of Ukraine’s territory with explosive ordnance as a result of Russia’s war.

F. Other Areas of Security and Defense Cooperation

The Participants intend to deepen their close cooperation on additional areas of mutual concern, in support of their national security and to enhance Ukraine’s overall interoperability with NATO and other relevant international security bodies. These additional areas include but are not limited to countering disinformation and malign influence campaigns; counterterrorism efforts against international terrorist organizations; arms control; the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and cooperation to strengthen resilience against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risks.

The Participants intend to further develop their intelligence cooperation through information sharing, education, training, experience exchanges, and other forms of cooperation as appropriate.

Implementation of Article III: Cooperation on Economic Recovery and Reform

A. Accountability

The Participants reaffirm their commitment to holding the Russian Federation to account for its actions in Ukraine, including damage, loss, and injury causedto individuals and entities, as well as to the state of Ukraine, as a result of Russia’s internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the UN Charter.

The Participants intend to seek to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and other international crimes committed in or against Ukraine, consistent with international law, and to support the full and fair investigation of alleged international crimes through independent, effective, and robust legal mechanisms.

The United States intends to support Ukraine in seeking the immediate release and return of all unlawfully detained and forcibly transferred civilians, primarily Ukrainian children, and to contribute to international efforts to hold accountable, consistent with international law, those responsible for the illegal deportation and displacement of Ukrainian civilians.

B. Immobilization of Russian Sovereign Assets

The United States intends to hold Russian sovereign assets in United States jurisdiction immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine. The United States, working with its partners, intends to explore all possible avenues by which immobilized Russian sovereign assets could be made use of to support Ukraine, consistent with domestic and international law.

C. Sanctions Actions

The Participants recognize the value of sanctions in raising the cost of Russia’s war of aggression, degrading Russia’s sources of revenue, and impeding Russia’s effort to build its capability for aggression, including by restricting the Russian Federation’s access to the finance, goods, technology, and services it is utilizing in its aggression.

The Participants intend to continue to work to ensure that the costs to Russia for its aggression continue to rise, including through sanctions and export controls.

Final Provisions

A. Periodic Review

The United States and Ukraine commit to periodic, high-level review of the cooperation described in this annex. The United States supports the use of existing mechanisms, such as the Strategic Partnership Dialogue, Bilateral Defense Consultations, and other bilateral engagements, to track regular progress. Both sides support engagements at higher levels once every 12-18 months dedicated to reviewing joint progress of this annex as a whole, and to charting specific objectives for future cooperation under this annex.

This periodic review process should be used to evaluate progress on mutually decided elements of cooperation and to establish new objectives once each side has successfully achieved their mutually decided goals. Specific objectives should be established on at least an annual basis through civilian or military channels as appropriate.

B. Legal Status and Funding of Annex

Nothing in this annex is intended to give rise to rights or obligations under domestic or international law.

The United States and Ukraine intend to implement the commitments under this annex consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriated funds.

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whitehouse.gov · by The White House · June 13, 2024

6. FACT SHEET: U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement

FACT SHEET: U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · June 13, 2024

On June 13th, 2024, President Biden and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy signed a historic U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement reflecting the close partnership between our two democracies. Today, the United States is sending a powerful signal of our strong support for Ukraine now and into the future. Through this agreement, the United States will work with our partners to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself now and to deter future aggression. By doing so, we will bolster Ukraine’s security, which is central to European security and to American security.

More than two years after Russia’s brutal and unprovoked assault on Ukraine, today, President Biden is stating unequivocally that United States and its partners will stand with Ukraine as it fights for its freedom and for the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.

With the signing of this 10-year agreement, the United States and Ukraine will work together to:

Build and maintain Ukraine’s credible defense and deterrence capability. The agreement lays out a vision for a Ukrainian future force that is strong, sustainable, and resilient. The United States and Ukraine will deepen security and defense cooperation and collaborating closely with Ukraine’s broad network of security partners. We will support the full range of Ukraine’s current defensive needs now and over the long term by helping Ukraine win the war and strengthening its deterrence capabilities against future threats. Together, we will expand intelligence sharing, enhance interoperability between our militaries in line with NATO standards, and work with our allies and partners to position Ukraine as a long-term contributor to European security.
Strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its fight over the long term, including by building on efforts to bolster in Ukraine’s defense industrial base, and supporting its economic recovery and energy security.
Accelerate Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, including through Ukraine’s implementation of reforms to its democratic, economic, and security institutions in line with its EU accession goals and NATO’s program of reforms.
Achieve a just peace that respects Ukraine’s rights under international law, is underwritten by broad global support, upholds the key principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, and includes accountability for Russia’s actions.
Consult in the event of a future Russian armed attack against Ukraine at the highest levels to determine appropriate and necessary measures to support Ukraine and impose costs on Russia.

This agreement, together with the mutually reinforcing security agreements and arrangements Ukraine has signed with a broad network of partners under the G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, is a key part of Ukraine’s bridge to NATO membership. As President Biden said in Vilnius last year and as NATO allies have agreed, Ukraine’s future is in NATO. We are not waiting for the NATO process to be completed to make long-term commitments to Ukraine’s security to address the immediate threats they face and deter any aggression that may occur.

The United States will continue to work a broad coalition of Allies and Partners to continue to impose costs on the Russian Federation so long as its aggression against Ukraine continues.

In 2024, the United States Congress appropriated $61 billion to respond to the war in Ukraine in a bipartisan show of support for Ukraine. To realize the goals laid out in this agreement and accompanying annex, the Biden Administration will work closely with the U.S. Congress to build on the national security supplemental and develop sustainable levels of assistance to Ukraine over the long term. We will continue to with our allies and partners, including the 15 other countries that have already completed their own bilateral security agreements and the 16 additional countries that are negotiating agreements with Ukraine, to maintain a balanced division of responsibility and burden-sharing to meet the necessary capabilities for Ukraine’s future force.

We are sending the clearest possible message today: the United States stands with the people of Ukraine as they defend their freedom and democracy. Ukraine can count on the enduring strength of the U.S.-Ukrainian partnership.

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whitehouse.gov · by The White House · June 13, 2024

7. Will Biden’s Help for Ukraine Come Fast Enough and Last Long Enough?

The subheading asks the two critical questions.

Will Biden’s Help for Ukraine Come Fast Enough and Last Long Enough?

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · June 13, 2024

News Analysis

The president signed a 10-year security pact with Ukraine and promised, with E.U. help, a $50 billion loan. But will the money arrive in time to turn the tide, and will the deal outlast the election in November?

Listen to this article · 8:19 min Learn more

President Biden and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine announced they had signed a 10-year security pact at the Group of 7 Summit in Italy on Thursday.Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

David E. Sanger, who has covered superpower confrontation and the American presidency for three decades, is traveling with President Biden at the Group of 7 summit in Bari, Italy.

June 13, 2024, 7:12 p.m. ET

During 27 months of war in the heart of Europe, President Biden has consistently resisted pressure from many of his allies to let Ukraine into NATO, convinced that it was the one step that could quickly result in American troops being sent into direct combat with Russia, a war he fears could escalate and even turn nuclear.

So on Thursday, he rolled out a new set of alternative steps, each designed to demonstrate to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, and to the Ukrainians, that the United States and its allies have no intention of packing up and leaving, as they did in Afghanistan, even if Ukraine remains outside NATO for years.

He signed a 10-year security pact — albeit one with vague commitments and an early exit option — with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. Mr. Biden portrayed the agreement as a long-term guarantee of continued arms, intelligence support, advice and technology to win the current war and deter a new one.

And he said the United States would take the lead in providing a loan of about $50 billion to Ukraine to rebuild its devastated ports and power plants, buy weapons and close its budget gap. The money is to be repaid from interest generated from $300 billion in assets that Mr. Putin, inexplicably, left in Western financial institutions before his February 2022 invasion.

“Our goal is to strengthen Ukraine’s credible defense and deterrence capabilities for the long term,” Mr. Biden said moments after he and Mr. Zelensky signed the accord on the southwest coast of Italy, where the Group of 7 industrialized nations opened their annual leaders conference.

The town of Lyman, in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, has been frequently shelled by Russian forces since early spring.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

“We’re not backing down," he added, warning Mr. Putin that “he cannot wait us out.”

Mr. Zelensky thanked Mr. Biden warmly, even though the security pact and loan were far short of what he wanted at this grave moment in the war. Mr. Zelensky has made no secret of the fact that it is hard to focus on Ukraine’s long-term prospects when he is desperately worried about surviving the short term in the face of relentless, if incremental, Russian advances.

But the bigger worry for Ukraine’s increasingly embattled leader, and for all of Europe, is that the accords themselves may not survive the outcome of the American election and Europe’s recent one.

The security pact, based on similar, decade-long commitments to Israel, contains no funding — just an American commitment to work with Congress to secure the tens of billions of dollars that would be required. That most likely means another bruising fight on Capitol Hill, where a bare majority of Republicans in Congress had for months opposed any more commitments of funds and the arms they buy before funding was approved in April.

But the bigger concern for Mr. Zelensky is that Mr. Biden, with whom his relationship has often been contentious, might be at his last Group of 7 summit. And buried in the fine print of the security agreement they signed with flair lies this paragraph: “Either Party may terminate this Agreement by providing a written notification through diplomatic channels” that would “take effect 6 months after.”

That is exactly the kind of loophole that former President Donald J. Trump exploited with the Iran nuclear agreement, which he abandoned in 2018. Mr. Trump has made no secret of his disdain for Ukraine or his desire to rid the United States of a huge financial commitment there. Instead, he has insisted he could end the war in 24 hours — presumably by telling Mr. Putin he can keep the territory he has already seized.

Ukrainian troops firing rockets from a high-precision Multiple Launch Rocket System toward Russian positions in eastern Ukraine in March 2023. The rocket system, developed by the United States, was acquired for use by the British Army and sent to Ukraine.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

“It’s an agreement that really captures the moment,” said Seth G. Jones, director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a prominent research institute in Washington, who just returned from a visit to Ukraine. “On the one hand, it’s a useful step to establish a long-term relationship with Ukraine. On the other hand, it is very much short of what the Ukrainians really want: real NATO membership” that, unlike the piece of paper both men signed with such flair, is hard to revoke.

The $50 billion loan, if disbursed this year, is harder for a future president to reverse. And the money is coming just in time: Ukraine’s budgetary situation is so dire that it has been forced to sell some state assets.

Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen, an architect of the loan plan that leaves Russia’s principal untouched but uses the interest it earns, said at an event in New York on Thursday that it demonstrated to Mr. Putin that Ukraine’s allies were “completely united.”

“We intend to give Ukraine the resources it needs to wage an effective war against Russia and to support their direct budget needs, and we’re going to provide a very meaningful chunk of resources,” she said.

“This is the first tranche, and if necessary there’s more behind it,” Ms. Yellen said. “In a sense, we’re getting Russia to help pay for the damage it’s caused.”

The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said on Thursday that all the members of the Group of 7 countries would participate in the loan, and the European Union might contribute up to half the money, a senior European official said. Washington would make up the difference.

But the loan is in a race against time and Russia’s destructive capability.

For the first two years of the war, it was assumed time was on Ukraine’s side — that Mr. Putin would have to back down if the war stretched on too long. Now, no one is so sure that is still the case.

Until recent days, the Russians for months appeared to have the momentum — though now they have been slowed after Mr. Biden, reversing himself, allowed Ukraine to shoot American-provided weapons onto the Russian side of the border near Kharkiv. Mr. Biden and his aides called it a “common sense” move, denying Mr. Putin the chance to attack Ukraine without fear of retribution.

The reversal was also born of the fear that the Ukrainian leader was running out of options. He is clearly short of troops and air defenses. He may be short of time.

The streets of Kharkiv lay in darkness on Thursday, following a series of Russian strikes on Ukraine’s power grid. Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times

Ukraine’s currently precarious position is notably different from what it was a few months into the war in 2022, when it seemed as if Russia’s military was collapsing. In 2023, there was hope that a Ukrainian “counteroffensive” would push Moscow’s forces out of the country. It flopped.

On Thursday, for all the talk of sticking with the war “as long as it takes,” there was little discussion, at least within earshot of reporters, of what a realistic endgame might look like. The new security accord refers to a “just and lasting peace” without defining what that means — or what happens if a just peace is in tension with a lasting one.

Mr. Putin also seems to have a remarkably high tolerance for pain — or at least the suffering of his troops.

More than 1,000 Russian soldiers were either killed or wounded on average each day in May, senior NATO and Western military officials said on Thursday. Ukraine’s forces are increasingly stepping up offensive operations as more Western military aid finally reaches the battlefield, after months of delay.

One Western military official said that Russia’s assault against the northeast city of Kharkiv has “culminated” and was not expected to continue to advance in the immediate future, and that Ukrainian strikes on artillery bases inside Russia were beginning to degrade its attacks.

But a senior NATO official, who provided an assessment at a briefing, said Russia was expected to “wage a pretty significant push” in coming weeks in a likely bloody rebuttal to any of Ukraine’s revived military capabilities. And Russia, the official said, would love nothing better than to mar the celebration of NATO’s 75th anniversary in Washington next month.

“None of us should be under the illusion that it’s going to be an easy summer,” the official said.

Only after surviving that, and the coming election, will Mr. Biden and Mr. Zelensky be able to jointly think about what Ukraine’s long-term future might look like. Otherwise, all bets are off, including how long the partnership they agreed to on Thursday will actually last.

Lara Jakes contributed reporting from Brussels, Eric Schmitt from Washington and Steven Erlanger from Bari, Italy.

David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · June 13, 2024

8. Opinion | Here’s Why Ukraine Should Seek Peace

Excerpts:

Ukraine has pledged never to cede territory. This is supported by international law that forbids the seizure of territory by force, and Ukraine should not surrender its lawful claim to its land. But to secure a lasting cease-fire, it may need to recognize that Russia has control, though not sovereignty, over portions of four Ukrainian regions and Crimea — and halt its quest to seize back occupied areas by force.

Admittedly, this would be a difficult and painful concession and should be conditional on Russia not launching any major attacks. If Russia remains peaceful, Ukraine may need to wait for a better opportunity to reclaim all its territory, like the one Germany found in 1989 when the fall of the Berlin Wall opened the way for reunification.

As part of a peace agreement, Ukraine may also have to pause its NATO application and promise not to join for a number of years, say five to 10. This is made easier because NATO members are still far from united on allowing a nation at war into the alliance, especially given fears that membership could result in a NATO war with nuclear-armed Russia. Still, it would be a major concession.

Opinion | Here’s Why Ukraine Should Seek Peace

The New York Times · by A. Walter Dorn · June 14, 2024

Guest Essay

Here’s Why Ukraine Should Seek Peace

June 14, 2024, 1:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

Dr. Dorn is a professor of defense studies at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

After more than two years of death and destruction, neither side in the war in Ukraine appears close to victory: Russia will not achieve its imperial conquest of Ukraine, and Ukraine will most certainly not be able to regain control of all the territory occupied by Russia. Sooner or later, both sides will have to agree to a cease-fire and come up with a peace agreement.

That is a welcome prospect. An accord will not only reduce the killing, suffering and enormous cost of the war but will also, in the long run, make Ukraine stronger and better able to defend itself and its democracy. Crucially, it will reduce the chance of a dangerous escalation.

Many in the West argue that making concessions to Russia for a peace agreement would amount to appeasing an aggressor and only encourage further attacks. But it is not appeasement. Ending the war will allow Ukraine to rearm and integrate further into Europe and the West, actually increasing deterrence. Russia has already failed to achieve its initial war aims and will need to make significant concessions of its own as part of any agreement.

The peace conference in Switzerland this weekend, convened by Ukraine to muster diplomatic support for its cause, can provide a much needed opportunity to examine whether an accord is reasonable and achievable. Russia has expressed willingness to negotiate, though it has not been invited to the conference because Ukraine suspects that Russia will just use the meeting for show. But the host, Switzerland, envisages that Russia will be at future conferences.

No one will know how peace negotiations will fare unless the process is started. When compared with a never-ending war that is swallowing lives and resources at an alarming rate, even an imperfect settlement would be better. So, what could Ukraine reasonably hope to achieve and what kind of concessions would it have to make?

Ukraine has pledged never to cede territory. This is supported by international law that forbids the seizure of territory by force, and Ukraine should not surrender its lawful claim to its land. But to secure a lasting cease-fire, it may need to recognize that Russia has control, though not sovereignty, over portions of four Ukrainian regions and Crimea — and halt its quest to seize back occupied areas by force.

Admittedly, this would be a difficult and painful concession and should be conditional on Russia not launching any major attacks. If Russia remains peaceful, Ukraine may need to wait for a better opportunity to reclaim all its territory, like the one Germany found in 1989 when the fall of the Berlin Wall opened the way for reunification.

As part of a peace agreement, Ukraine may also have to pause its NATO application and promise not to join for a number of years, say five to 10. This is made easier because NATO members are still far from united on allowing a nation at war into the alliance, especially given fears that membership could result in a NATO war with nuclear-armed Russia. Still, it would be a major concession.

But Ukraine can still sign bilateral treaties with individual NATO members for security support — something it has already started to do, for example, with France, Germany and Britain. Future security guarantees will need to include strong provisions for supplying weapons and intelligence to Ukraine, and help to prevent cyberattacks. That said, Ukraine’s allies would probably not be allowed to place military bases on its soil.

Any peace agreement would also need strong measures to prevent another outbreak of conflict. This could involve a demilitarized zone and mutual notifications of exercises and military maneuvers. Early warning, continuous monitoring and transparency are much easier in the age of satellite surveillance, especially of the type currently provided by the United States. International inspections and a United Nations buffer force, made up of troops from non-NATO countries, would also make future incursions harder to launch.

Admittedly, an armistice or peace agreement would give Russia time to regroup and rearm its forces. But Ukraine could do likewise. It would also mean that all prisoners of war could be returned, not just in the small groups being negotiated by the parties so far. War crimes investigations and trials would proceed, however.

Most important is that a tentative peace, even if interrupted by violations, would finally give the people of Ukraine time to rebuild their lives and their country. Millions of refugees could return home and start to repopulate the depleted country. The United States could sponsor a reconstruction effort much like the Marshall Plan. Europe could lead a rebuilding and integration effort. Peace would make it easier for Ukraine to join the European Union.

There are other benefits, too. Ukraine would continue its fight against corruption, having already put a halt to the dominant role of Ukrainian oligarchs. Democratic life could resume after the end of martial law. Ultimately, successful rebuilding will demonstrate to Russians a better alternative to the dictatorship they are under. That could be Ukraine’s and the West’s greatest victory.

To make a peace deal more acceptable to Russia, it could be offered sanctions relief, contingent on compliance with the agreement. Russia could then trade its oil and gas at market prices, though Western countries could institute mechanisms for the immediate reimposition — the so-called snapback — of sanctions if needed. Russia would regain access to its withheld gold and foreign currency reserves in the West.

Violations of any future agreement can be expected, of course, but the level of violence would still be far less than the current war. And if President Vladimir Putin of Russia does escalate to full war, Ukraine will be better able to respond. Importantly, Mr. Putin has now learned a hard lesson that invading Ukraine is not an easy task and taking over the country appears impossible. In the interim, Ukraine’s allies should maintain a steady flow of arms and increase diplomatic and economic support to strengthen the country’s position at a future bargaining table.

Since Ukraine and Russia will continue to be neighbors for decades and centuries to come, the countries must come to some mutual arrangements for peaceful resolution of disputes. And if the current killing goes on for years before a settlement is reached, people will wonder why so many people had to die first. The best way to honor those killed in war is to secure a sustainable peace so that others need not make the same sacrifice.

A. Walter Dorn is a professor of defense studies at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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The New York Times · by A. Walter Dorn · June 14, 2024

9. In the search for hostages, U.S. is Israel’s key intelligence partner

In the search for hostages, U.S. is Israel’s key intelligence partner

U.S. intelligence agencies have provided an extraordinary amount of support to their Israeli counterparts. That assistance has helped find the missing but also raised concerns about the use of sensitive information.

By Shane Harris

June 14, 2024 at 2:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · June 14, 2024

The daring and deadly hostage rescue that Israeli military forces mounted in Gaza last Saturday relied on a massive intelligence-gathering operation in which the United States has been Israel’s most important partner.

Since the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, the United States has ramped up intelligence collection on the militant group in Gaza and is sharing an extraordinary amount of drone footage, satellite imagery, communications intercepts and data analysis using advanced software, some of it powered by artificial intelligence, according to current and former U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials.

The result is an intelligence-sharing partnership of rare volume, even for two countries that have historically worked together on areas of mutual concern, including counterterrorism and preventing Iran from building a nuclear weapon.

In interviews, Israeli officials said they were grateful for the U.S. assistance, which in some cases has given the Israelis unique capabilities they lacked before Hamas’s surprise cross-border attacks. But they also were defensive about their own spying prowess, insisting that the United States was, for the most part, not giving them anything they couldn’t obtain themselves. That position can be hard to square with the obvious failures of the Israeli intelligence apparatus to detect and respond to the warning signs of Hamas’s planning.

The U.S.-Israel partnership is, at times, tense. Some U.S. officials have been frustrated by Israel’s demand for more intelligence, which they said is insatiable and occasionally relies on flawed assumptions that the United States might be holding back some information.

In a briefing with reporters at the White House last month, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Washington “has provided an intense range of assets and capabilities and expertise.” Responding to a May 11 Washington Post report, Sullivan said that the intelligence is “not tied or conditioned on anything else. It is not limited. We are not holding anything back. We are providing every asset, every tool, every capability,” Sullivan said.

Other officials, including lawmakers on Capitol Hill, worry that intelligence the United States provides could be making its way into the repositories of data that Israeli military forces use to conduct airstrikes or other military operations, and that Washington has no effective means of monitoring how Israel uses the U.S. information.

The Biden administration has forbidden Israel from using any U.S.-supplied intelligence to target regular Hamas fighters in military operations. The intelligence is only to be used for locating the hostages, eight of whom have U.S. citizenship, as well as the top leadership of Hamas — including Yehiya Sinwar, the alleged architect of the Oct. 7 attacks, and Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’s military wing. The State Department in 2015 designated both men as terrorists. Three of the eight U.S. hostages have been confirmed dead, and their bodies are still being held in Gaza, according to Israeli officials.

This article is based on interviews with more than a dozen current and former U.S. and Israeli officials in Washington, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Most of them spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence operations.

The United States provided some of the intelligence used to locate and eventually rescue four Israeli hostages last week, The Post has reported. The information, which included overhead imagery, appears to have been secondary to what Israel collected on its own ahead of the operation, which resulted in the deaths of more than 270 Palestinians, according to Gaza health officials, making it one of the deadliest single events in the eight-month-old war.

Before the Oct. 7 attacks, the U.S. intelligence community did not consider Hamas a priority target, current and former officials said. That changed almost immediately following the group’s attacks on Israel, which killed more than 1,200 civilians and soldiers and netted upward of 250 hostages.

Personnel from the U.S. military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) began working alongside CIA officers in the agency’s station in Israel, according to U.S. officials. And personnel from the Defense Intelligence Agency began meeting with their counterparts in the country “on a daily basis,” one U.S. official said.

The State Department also sent a special hostage envoy who met publicly with Israel’s lead official overseeing hostage rescue efforts. FBI agents also are working in Israel to investigate Hamas attacks on U.S. citizens and assisting in hostage recovery efforts.

In the first weeks of the war, Israeli officials in charge of locating the hostages in the densely populated Gaza Strip requested specific information from the United States to help bridge gaps in what they knew from their own sources, current and former U.S. and Israeli officials said. This included specific pieces of information, as well as technologies and expertise for analyzing large volumes of imagery and overlaying different images to create more detailed pictures, including in three dimensions, of the terrain in Gaza.

They provided some “capabilities to us that we never had before Oct. 7,” said one senior Israeli official, who declined to provide details. But a second senior Israeli official indicated that the United States has provided highly detailed satellite imagery that Israel lacks.

Boots on the ground

Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, stressed that U.S. forces did not participate in the mission to rescue the four hostages. “There were no U.S. forces, no U.S. boots on the ground involved in this operation. We did not participate militarily in this operation,” Sullivan told CNN’s “State of the Union” on Sunday. He noted that “we have generally provided support to the [Israel Defense Forces] so that we can try to get all of the hostages home, including the American hostages who are still being held.”

In addition to intelligence, that support has consisted of members of JSOC, the elite Special Operations force which has deep experience in hostage rescues. Members of the group have been working in Israel, in partnership with U.S. intelligence officers, since shortly after the war began, U.S. officials said.

In October, JSOC forces in the region were prepared to deploy in Gaza to rescue U.S. citizens that Hamas was holding, said current and former U.S. officials familiar with planning for what would have been an exceptionally dangerous mission.

“If we managed to unilaterally get information that we could act on, and we thought we could actually get U.S. people out alive, we could act, but there was genuinely very little information specifically about U.S. hostages,” one official said.

The details of the rescue operation, which was prepared by members of JSOC based in Cyprus, were previously reported by journalist Jack Murphy on his Substack, “The High Side.”

Last week’s successful hostage rescue relied on precise information about the captives’ location. That level of “actionable” intelligence is something Israel has lacked for years in Gaza, owing to an overreliance on technology and a failure to build a network of human spies on the ground. The paucity of human intelligence, in part, was responsible for Israel’s failure to detect and understand Hamas’s planning for the Oct. 7 attacks, current and former officials in the country said.

Recent efforts to locate the hostages have underscored the importance of human intelligence. In May, Israeli forces recovered the remains of some hostages after the interrogation of a Hamas fighter, who pointed soldiers to their location, Israeli officials said. Interrogations of prisoners captured since the war began have become an important component of the overall intelligence picture, officials said.

Israeli intelligence analysts also have found useful pieces of intelligence among the servers, computers, cellphones, notebooks and other documents recovered from Hamas hideouts or command posts, officials said. U.S. analysts have helped mine those sources for clues about hostage whereabouts, they noted. One senior Israeli official said that the fusion of information obtained from electronic and physical records with other sources of intelligence has helped Israel locate hostages during two rescue operations that preceded the one last week.

Signals in the noise

Before the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel blanketed Gaza in electronic surveillance, in some cases monitoring Hamas members via their phones. “We were up on every toilet in Gaza. If you were sleeping with your wife, we heard you,” said a former senior Israeli intelligence official.

But the intelligence apparatus also became overly reliant on technology to collect intelligence, while analysis atrophied, current and former Israeli officials said. Historically, the role of the military’s much-celebrated Unit 8200 was to collect information and share it with other elements of the Israeli intelligence community, one current and one former member said. Experts with the unit added their own analysis and point of view. The former member said he regularly interacted with his colleagues from Mossad and Shin Bet, respectively responsible for intelligence and state security.

“This has changed in recent years,” said the former member, who served in a senior leadership position. Unit 8200 used to make decisions on who received which piece of information. Now, he said, it has made a priority of developing new technology and contributing its intelligence haul to what’s known as “the pool,” a repository from which other intelligence elements can take information.

Other current and former officials echoed this critique, saying that Israel’s electronic spies forgot how to do basic intelligence functions. The community was awash in data, but lacking in analysis of it. “The system became spoiled,” the former member said.

In a statement, a spokesperson for the IDF called those criticisms “false” and said they “harm the war effort of service members, who have been working for the past [eight] months, in both near and far arenas, to assist the forces on the ground, in the air and at sea, and to protect the people of Israel.”

Compounding the problem, Israeli officials had locked onto a “conceptzia,” or fundamental conception that Hamas was more interested in getting rich and ruling Gaza than attacking Israel. The term — coined after the disastrous intelligence failure to anticipate the surprise 1973 Yom Kippur War — has become a shorthand in Israeli security circles for the strategic failure to recognize the true nature of the threat Hamas posed. Officials ignored what, in hindsight, seem like obvious warning signs, including military training maneuvers by Hamas fighters that senior leaders dismissed because they didn’t comport to the overarching theory about the group’s intentions.

“We thought Hamas wouldn’t dare attack,” a former senior intelligence official said. The Oct. 7 attacks have shattered that idea and made Hamas a top priority for Israel, as well as its partners in the United States.

Rules of the road

Any intelligence the United States provides, or gives Israel direct access to, is only to be used for hostage-location efforts and tracking down Hamas leadership, U.S. and Israeli officials said. Israel is prohibited from using any U.S. information for targeting regular Hamas members in any military operations, including airstrikes.

The rules for how the intelligence is provided and used are spelled out in long-standing formal arrangements that are scrutinized by lawyers in the U.S. intelligence community, as well as new directives from the White House following the Oct. 7 attacks.

But practically speaking, Israel is on its honor not to use U.S.-supplied intelligence for proscribed purposes, current and former U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence-sharing relationship said. Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, has questioned how administration officials can be sure that Israel isn’t using the intelligence it receives as part of its military campaign against Hamas, which has resulted in tens of thousands of civilian casualties.

Crow, an Army combat veteran, co-authored legislation enacted last year requiring the director of national intelligence to notify Congress if intelligence that the United States gave another country results in civilian casualties.

“Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu is pursuing a failed strategy in Gaza. The terrible civilian toll, famine, and lack of a coherent strategy are deeply concerning,” Crow said in a statement to The Post. “I will continue to conduct robust oversight to ensure intelligence sharing is in line with U.S. interests.”

Some officials noted that the information concerning possible hostage locations could also have a dual purpose: Hostages will be surrounded by Hamas fighters, who are guarding them and using them as human shields. Some officials worry that the United States doesn’t have sufficient oversight to ensure that Israel isn’t using hostage intelligence as de facto targeting information for those lower-level Hamas members.

Israeli agencies “are very careful not to use what the U.S. gives them operationally if that’s not allowed,” said one serving member of Unit 8200, the signals intelligence organization. “Intelligence sharing with the United States is very good. There are direct relationships at the working level, and it’s important to preserve them.”

Harris reported from Washington, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Missy Ryan and Ellen Nakashima in Washington contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · June 14, 2024

10. Ukraine is finally getting to hit Russia hard with its 'wonder-weapons,' and that's turning the tide of the war: military expert

Ukraine is finally getting to hit Russia hard with its 'wonder-weapons,' and that's turning the tide of the war: military expert

https://www.businessinsider.com/war-expert-ukraine-finally-hitting-russia-with-its-wonder-weapons-2024-6

Story by ktan@businessinsider.com (Kwan Wei Kevin Tan) • 19h • 3 min read

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy standing in front of a Patriot anti-aircraft missile system during his visit to a military training area in Germany on June 11, 2024. Jens Büttner/Pool via Getty Images

Things are starting to look up for Ukraine, a retired UK colonel said on Wednesday.
Ukraine has notched a couple of wins after it was allowed to hit Russian military targets directly.
Vladimir Putin, for his part, has also threatened to retaliate against Ukraine's Western allies.

Letting Ukraine attack Russian military targets directly with its "wonder-weapons" is beginning to turn the tide of the war in Kyiv's favor, says a retired UK colonel.

"For too long, Ukraine has had to fight the invading Russians with one hand tied behind its back," Hamish de Bretton-Gordon wrote in a commentary for The Telegraph that was published on Wednesday.

The former soldier held multiple appointments in his 23-year military career with the British Army. Besides serving as the UK's Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Regiment's commanding officer from 2004 to 2006, de Bretton-Gordon also led NATO's Rapid Reaction CBRN Battalion from 2005 to 2007.

"At last, however, that is beginning to change. From now, with permissions granted from various Western countries — but most crucially the United States — Ukraine can strike targets far deeper into Russia," de Bretton-Gordon said.

Last month, Politico reported that the Biden administration had given Ukraine its permission to use US-provided weapons on Russian targets in Kharkiv. Russian forces launched an assault on the region in May as part of a summer offensive on Ukraine's second largest city.

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"Whilst it is still obliged to prioritize the Kharkiv front by the nature of the permissions granted (Washington is still too afraid to give Kyiv carte blanche to fire anywhere), there is evidence that it has freed up the Ukrainian armed forces to use the other weapons it had in reserve to strike elsewhere," de Bretton-Gordon noted in his commentary.

The former colonel listed several Ukraine's recent military accomplishments, which included drone assaults on Russian naval vessels at Taganrog Bay and the Akhtubinsk airfield in southern Russia. The latter attack resulted in the destruction of Russia's latest stealth aircraft, the Su-57 fighter bomber.

"For too long Kyiv was fighting an uneven battle, putting it in the impossible position of seeing Russia massing troops across its own border, unable to hit them," de Bretton-Gordon said. "Now that has changed, I think the Kharkiv front will begin to turn back in Kyiv's favor."

The recent turn of events, de Bretton-Gordon said, wasn't something that Russia could simply withstand by relying on attritional warfare.

"Russia cannot sustain the industrial level of casualties it is currently facing — over 500,000 so far. I don't care how good Russia's industrial complex is. In the modern era that figure is simply not sustainable," he said.

But Ukraine's accomplishments in the battlefield could risk further Russian escalation.

Last month, Russian leader Vladimir Putin hinted that European countries who'd encouraged Ukraine to attack Russia directly could face reprisals.

"So, these officials from NATO countries, especially the ones based in Europe, particularly in small European countries, should be fully aware of what is at stake," Putin told reporters on May 28.

"They should keep in mind that theirs are small and densely populated countries, which is a factor to reckon with before they start talking about striking deep into the Russian territory," he added.

Representatives for Ukraine's and Russia's defense ministries didn't immediately respond to requests for comment from BI sent outside regular business hours.

If you enjoyed this story, be sure to follow Business Insider on Microsoft Start.

11. GOP green lights FY25 defense bill, but more social fights ahead

GOP green lights FY25 defense bill, but more social fights ahead

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · June 13, 2024

House Republicans advanced plans for an $833 billion defense bill next year that once again includes limits on abortion access for troops and scales back diversity training in the ranks, controversial social stances that drew strong objections from Democratic lawmakers.

Similar amendments on the social issues were included in House Republicans’ appropriations bill last summer — but ultimately stripped out of the final compromise budget measure — and again in the defense authorization bill draft being debated on the chamber floor this week.

None of the provisions are likely to become law given opposition from the White House and Senate Democrats, but Republican lawmakers insisted the moves are needed to refocus defense leaders on their military missions and responsibilities.

“Today’s bill ensures our armed forces have the weapons and tools they need to confront any foe anywhere in the world,” said House Appropriations Committee Chairman Tom Cole, R-Okla.

Junior enlisted would see only a small pay boost under Senate plan

A Senate panel supports an extra 1% pay bump for young enlisted troops next year, far less than what House lawmakers want.

The measure includes funding for a 4.5% pay raise for troops in 2025 and another 15% average raise for junior enlisted service members, a move which drew praise from Republicans and Democrats on the panel.

But the final 34-25 party line vote was largely a reflection of what Democratic lawmakers complained were non-defense fights in the military spending measure.

“As written, this bill does more to divide us than to unite us,” said Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio. “It contains partisan riders unrelated to defense policy that overwhelmingly make this critical bill a tool for division, not support that our service members rightfully expect and need.”

Rep. Betty Betty McCollum, D-Minn., offered an amendment to strip 24 major provisions of the bill — “funding for reproductive health, LGBTQ+ rights, diversity programs, climate inclusion programs, COVID prevention programs, freedom of speech” and more — that was ultimately voted down by the Republican majority.

The appropriations legislation is expected to move to the House floor in coming weeks, where it likely faces a similar path to last year’s bill: The addition of more conservative amendments followed by a legislative roadblock in the Senate over the social issue provisions.

When the Senate will advance its own draft of the appropriations bill remains unclear. Last year, disagreements between the two chambers delayed passage of the budget bill until six months into the new fiscal year, causing planning and accounting headaches for federal agencies.

Lawmakers have only a few weeks of legislative time left to avoid pushing the FY25 defense budget decision into next fiscal year. The House and Senate each only have seven weeks of session left in Washington scheduled between now and the November presidential election.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

12. G7 leaders strike deal on using Russian assets to back $50B loan to Ukraine

G7 leaders strike deal on using Russian assets to back $50B loan to Ukraine

By MICHAEL STRATFORD

06/13/2024 10:22 AM EDT

Updated: 06/13/2024 02:47 PM EDT

Politico

The details still need to be worked out, but the accord offers the chance to lock in longer-term funding for Ukraine’s war effort.

The Group of Seven leaders will commit to begin disbursing the $50 billion to Ukraine this calendar year, an official said. | Alex Brandon/AP

06/13/2024 10:22 AM EDT

Updated: 06/13/2024 02:47 PM EDT

President Joe Biden and key allies have struck a deal to use the profits of frozen Russian assets to back a $50 billion loan to help Ukraine’s war effort and economic reconstruction.

The agreement in principle, reached at the gathering of Group of Seven leaders in Italy, follows months of intense negotiations among the U.S. and European allies over how to tap the value of some $300 billion of Russia’s sovereign assets that were immobilized in Western financial institutions shortly after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The deal offers the G7 the chance to lock in longer-term funding for Ukraine’s war effort and insulate the money from electoral politics on both sides of the Atlantic, including the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November. It marks a win for the Biden administration, which wants to send a signal of enduring Western support for Ukraine as it battles for survival against Russia.

“We have political agreement at the highest levels for this deal to happen,” a senior Biden administration official told reporters on Thursday.

The agreement among the G7 nations is set to be memorialized in a declaration at the gathering, but the mechanism of how precisely the complex financing vehicle will be structured still needs to be negotiated.

“The G7 intends to provide financing that will be serviced and repaid by future flows of extraordinary revenues stemming from the immobilization of Russian sovereign assets” held in the West, according to the text of the declaration, which was obtained by POLITICO.

The declaration sets “the end of the year” as the deadline to finalize an agreement and work through the technical details.

The leaders will commit to begin disbursing the $50 billion to Ukraine this calendar year, according to the U.S. official. The financing will consist of a package of loans from individual countries that are pooled together, the official said.

The U.S. is willing to provide a loan of up to the full $50 billion amount, but the official said that share would likely be reduced by commitments from other countries. “The idea here is to share risk,” the official said.

The official said the Biden administration would rely on loan authority it already has through the U.S. Agency for International Development to make the U.S. portion of the loan.

Congress, as part of the foreign aid package earlier this year, authorized Biden to seize outright Russian assets held in the U.S., though that money reflects a small minority — about $5 billion — of the country’s sovereign assets that are immobilized in the West.

The compromise emerging from the G7 meeting in Italy comes after the U.S. initially was discussing the seizure of the sovereign assets parked in Western institutions, but that became a nonstarter for many European leaders concerned about the legality and threat of retaliation from Russia.

The G7 communique on Russian assets will make clear that the option to seize assets outright remains on the table, the U.S. official said.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, who has been rallying support among G7 countries on the issue for months, again argued the case for creating a reliable source of financing for Ukraine in a New York Times op-ed Thursday, calling it “urgently” needed.

“As Russia continues to move to a permanent war footing and Ukraine faces a sizable future funding gap, Mr. Putin is betting that he can wait out the coalition until Ukraine runs out of money and bullets,” she wrote.

Biden was to hold a joint press conference with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Thursday. The U.S. and Ukraine earlier announced a security deal that commits long-term support for Kyiv’s defense.

Adam Cancryn, Barbara Moens, Gregorio Sorgi and Clea Caulcutt contributed to this report.

Politico

13. G7 vows action against 'unfair' China business practices

G7 vows action against 'unfair' China business practices

https://www.reuters.com/world/china-dominate-final-day-g7-pope-lead-ai-discussions-2024-06-14/

By Thomas Escritt and Crispian Balmer

June 14, 20247:00 AM EDTUpdated 2 min ago

SummaryCompanies

G7 warns of action against China over business practicesPope to join G7 summit for first timeTalks come after Ukraine loan deal on first day

BORGO EGNAZIA, Italy, June 14 (Reuters) - Leaders of the Group of Seven vowed on Friday to tackle what they called unfair business practices by China that were undermining their workers and industries, according to a draft statement on the final day of their annual summit.

The G7 also warned of action against Chinese financial institutions that helped Russia obtain weaponry for its war against Ukraine.

The leaders of Italy, the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Japan were on Friday discussing concerns surrounding China's excess industrial capacity, that Western governments say is distorting local markets.

Pope Francis was then due to make an historic appearance at the summit in southern Italy to discuss artificial intelligence.

The draft statement, seen by Reuters, stressed the G7 was not trying to harm China or thwart its economic development but would "continue to take actions to protect our businesses from unfair practices, to level the playing field and remedy ongoing harm."

The U.S. this week imposed fresh sanctions on China-based firms supplying semiconductors to Russia amid worries over Beijing's increasingly aggressive stance against Taiwan and run-ins with the Philippines over rival maritime claims.

"China is not supplying weapons (to Russia) but the ability to produce those weapons and the technology available to do it, so it is in fact helping Russia," U.S. President Joe Biden told reporters at the summit on Thursday after signing a bilateral security pact with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

During the first day of their meeting in southern Italy, the G7 nations agreed on a deal to provide $50 billion of loans for Ukraine backed by interest from frozen Russian assets - hailing the accord as a powerful signal of Western resolve.

In the draft, G7 leaders also promised sanctions against entities that helped Russia circumvent sanctions on its oil by transporting it fraudulently.

Item 1 of 5 British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Italian President Sergio Mattarella, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel pose for a family photo as theyarrive to attend a dinner at Swabian Castle in Brindisi, Italy, June 13, 2024. Italian Presidency/Handout via REUTERS

[1/5]British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Italian President Sergio Mattarella, European Commission President Ursula von... Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab Read more

ABORTION WORDING ROW

The draft reiterated commitments made at the G7 meeting in Japan last year on sexual and reproductive rights but did not directly mention the word abortion.

The issue has caused a dispute between France and Italy after Rome - which holds the G7 rotating presidency - demanded the removal of a reference to "safe and legal abortion" from the final statement.

The pope will be joined by 10 other heads of state and government, including the prime minister of India and the king of Jordan, as the G7 throws open its doors to outsiders to show it isn't an aloof, exclusive club.

Besides his speech on AI, the Pope will hold multiple bilateral meetings, including with Biden, Zelenskiy and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan.

"It is a historic day. We will welcome the Holy Father. It is the first time for a pontiff at a G7. I am proud it will happen under the Italian presidency," Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni told reporters on Thursday.

Leaders will also discuss immigration, a crucial issue for Meloni who is pushing Europe to help her curb illegal flows from Africa and who has launched a flagship plan to boost development in the continent to tackle the root cause of the departures.

Many of the leaders will leave Italy late on Friday, including Biden, and Meloni said they had already agreed on the summit's conclusions, to be approved at the end of the day.

On Saturday, there will be room for bilateral meetings for those staying on, ahead of a final news conference from Meloni.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here.

Additonal reporting by Andrew Gray, Angelo Amante, John Irish and Andrea Shalal; Writing by Keith Weir Editing by Rod Nickel and Christina Fincher

14. G7 leaders to talk both AI’s risks and opportunities at summit

G7 leaders to talk both AI’s risks and opportunities at summit

JUNE 13, 2024 6:00 AM CET

BY MARK SCOTT AND GIAN VOLPICELLI

Politico · June 13, 2024

National leaders will discuss how to both govern the technology and harness it for growth.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni will push discussions linked to the emerging technology during an hour-and-a-half-long session. | Pool photo by Joe Giddens via Getty Images

June 13, 2024 6:00 am CET

When leaders of the G7 countries gather for their annual two-day summit in southern Italy on Thursday, hot topics will include the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Middle East conflict, global migration — and artificial intelligence.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni will push discussions linked to the emerging technology during an hour-and-a-half-long session on Friday, which will include other global leaders like U.S. President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Pope Francis will also attend.

The meeting is expected to focus on how best to govern tools — like OpenAI's ChatGPT service — and how to harness AI for countries' economic growth and broader development goals, primarily in Africa, according to five officials with direct knowledge of the upcoming summit who were granted anonymity to speak candidly.

"I am not sure if we are adequately aware of the implications of technological development whose pace is much faster than our capacity to manage its effects," Meloni told the United Nations General Assembly in September.

"The applications of this new technology may offer great opportunities in many fields, but we cannot pretend to not understand its enormous inherent risks," she added.

Artificial intelligence has become a major geopolitical talking point among G7 leaders ever since so-called generative AI captured the public's imagination in late 2022.

Since then, the European Union has passed a comprehensive rulebook to oversee the technology, while the United States has published a White House executive order on AI to similarly place guardrails about how AI develops. International efforts, including the pope's Rome Call and other initiatives within U.N. agencies, have also tried to create global voluntary standards for AI.

U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby touted the pope’s joining a session on artificial intelligence.

“This will be an important moment for our countries to come together and develop our shared approach to harnessing the benefits of AI while at the same time managing the risks to our national security impacts that may have to our workforces, and inequality,” Kirby said.

On the outskirts of Fasano, a small town in southern Italy that will host the G7 summit, leaders will double down on these AI governance efforts. That includes promoting the so-called Hiroshima AI Process, G7-led efforts specifically aimed at corralling the growth of generative AI. The Vatican is also expected to urge governments and companies to sign up to its separate efforts to create ethical guidelines for the technology's use.

Not all of the G7's work will be focused on governance.

Meloni, Italy's prime minister, has advocated for small businesses to use AI to improve their productivity and ward off possible job losses as the technology becomes widely adopted. In March, G7 digital ministers agreed to work together to find ways for firms in each country to better adopt AI.

Italy, which holds the rotating one-year G7 presidency, is keen to promote a "toolkit" designed to encourage AI take-up in government and public administration. Rome has also championed using AI to help emerging economies, especially those in Africa, to meet their development goals. Leaders from Egypt, Algeria and Kenya are also expected to attend this week's summit.

Friday's discussions will also focus on helping these countries tap into potential uses of AI, as well as include them in the wider discussions to police the emerging technology.

Eric Bazail-Eimil contributed reporting from Washington.

Politico · June 13, 2024

15. GOP green lights FY25 defense bill, but more social fights ahead

Why are we so afraid of these issues in the culture war? It seems that so many of these issues are created just to sow division and are more emotional than substantive. Our adversaries are probably thinking that they could not be receiving greater effects from their disinformation efforts. They are probably now saying that they need to simply follow Bonparte's guidance: Do not interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.

GOP green lights FY25 defense bill, but more social fights ahead

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · June 13, 2024

“Today’s bill ensures our armed forces have the weapons and tools they need to confront any foe anywhere in the world,” said House Appropriations Committee Chairman Tom Cole, R-Okla.

Junior enlisted would see only a small pay boost under Senate plan

A Senate panel supports an extra 1% pay bump for young enlisted troops next year, far less than what House lawmakers want.

But the final 34-25 party line vote was largely a reflection of what Democratic lawmakers complained were non-defense fights in the military spending measure.

About Leo Shane III

16. The Terrorist Threat to America is Growing

Conclusion:

It’s not yet clear how the arrests this past weekend fit into this threat matrix. But as Wray’s testimony suggests, it is clear the jihadists’ threat to the homeland has not been extinguished.

The Terrorist Threat to America is Growing

The arrests of several natives of Tajikistan is the latest in a troubling trend.

thedispatch.com · by Tom Joscelyn · June 13, 2024

Federal agents arrested eight men with suspected ties to ISIS last weekend in Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. There is still much we don’t know about the counterterrorism operation, and it’s possible that information in the first news reports isn’t entirely accurate. But it is also possible that the arrests are highly significant—an indication that the terrorist threat to Americans at home is growing once again, as FBI Director Christopher Wray warned in recent congressional testimony.

According to CBS News, the eight men are natives of the Central Asian country of Tajikistan who entered the U.S. through the southern border sometime since the beginning of 2023. They were allowed to stay in the country after passing initial background checks. Subsequent intelligence revealed they may have connections to ISIS-K (or ISIS-Khorasan), a branch of ISIS’s international network based in Afghanistan that orchestrated deadly mass casualty attacks in Iran and Russia earlier this year. The FBI reportedly wiretapped the men and discovered that at least one of them was discussing bombs. The FBI and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement then coordinated the arrests, and the men are being held on immigration charges as the investigation continues.

The arrests are potentially significant for several reasons. First, ISIS and ISIS-K have repeatedly relied on jihadists from Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan, to carry out international terrorist operations. Since the beginning of the year, Tajik ISIS terrorists have killed more than 200 people in Iran and Russia.

Second, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan left the Taliban (al-Qaeda’s most important ally) in control of a country teeming with transnational threats. Even though ISIS-K and the Taliban are enemies, the Taliban has been unable or unwilling to cut off ISIS-K’s international tentacles.

Third, the arrests could exacerbate the political tensions over America’s border. At least one of the arrested men reportedly used the Biden administration’s Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) One app to gain entry to the U.S. The CBP One app is intended to allow asylum-seeking migrants to set up appointments for vetting and potential entry into the country. But, if accurate, then the reporting on use of the One app is another indication that suspected terrorists are trying to exploit this system for their own nefarious purposes.

Fourth, U.S. officials have long argued that the main terrorist threat to Americans inside the U.S. comes from lone individuals—extremists with no formal allegiances or ties to organizations based overseas. But if the Tajiks arrested over the weekend were indeed colluding on behalf of ISIS, the threat is evolving once again—to include organized cells that could be far more lethal than individual actors.

Even if there is less to the reporting on these detentions than it first appears, the threat posed by ISIS’s Central Asian contingents is clearly growing.

Tajiks play a significant role in ISIS’s international plotting.

Tajik jihadists have long played a role in ISIS’s international operations. In July 2018, for instance, five young ISIS recruits drove their vehicle into foreign cyclists touring Tajikistan then jumped out of the car and stabbed the cyclists. They killed four people, including two Americans. At the time, combining vehicular assaults with stabbing attacks was a common ISIS technique, employed by ISIS loyalists everywhere from Ohio to London. ISIS promoted the attack in Tajikistan by releasing a video of the five ISIS youths swearing their allegiance to the so-called caliphate’s then-ruler, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The attack in Tajikistan was an indication of ISIS’s growing ability to attract recruits from there. In July 2019, a United Nations expert monitoring team reported that a prominent Tajik jihadist, Sayvaly Shafiev (also known as “Mauaviya”), served on the shura (leadership) council for ISIS-K. The U.N. team explained that Shafiev led a “contingent of approximately 200 fighters” from Central Asia in eastern Afghanistan, where he was recruiting more “Tajik fighters” and raising “funds using online propaganda in the Tajik language.”

Even as ISIS was recruiting Tajiks inside Afghanistan, it was seeking ways to deploy them abroad.

In April 2020, German authorities arrested four Tajik members of ISIS. The men were allegedly plotting attacks against American servicemembers and the U.S. Air Force. The Germans said the Tajiks were acquiring weapons, including bomb components, at the time of their arrest. Importantly, the Germans also claimed that the cell was receiving direction from ISIS leaders in Afghanistan and Syria—underscoring the global connectivity and reach of ISIS’s network.

On January 3 of this year, an ISIS-K cell carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings in Kerman, Iran, that killed about 100 people. At least one of the suicide bombers was a Tajik national. The terrorists struck during a memorial service for Qassem Soleimani, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards commander (IRGC) who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Iraq in 2020 and who had overseen countless terrorist operations of his own during his decades serving the Iranian regime. The Iranian government tried to blame America and Israel for the bombings, even though the U.S. government warned the Iranians beforehand that ISIS-K was planning an attack.

The ISIS-K bombings in Kerman were not the first time ISIS has struck inside Iran. The Iranian regime has long maintained cozy relations with the Taliban, and has also harbored senior al-Qaeda leaders for more than two decades. However, ISIS has sought to distinguish itself from its Sunni jihadist rivals in both of those groups by killing Shiite civilians inside Iran and elsewhere around the globe. Since 2011-12, the Iranian regime has also deployed paramilitary forces and militias to Syria, where they have often clashed with ISIS’s men while seeking to buttress Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This is another reason ISIS seeks to target Iranians inside their own country.

Elsewhere, on January 28, two masked ISIS gunmen opened fire at the Santa Maria Roman Catholic Church in Istanbul, killing one person and wounding another. Turkish authorities identified one of the gunmen as a Tajik and the other as a Russian.

Then, on March 22, a cell of four Tajik ISIS gunmen stormed the Crocus City Hall near Moscow, killing more than 140 people and wounding hundreds more. In the aftermath of the attack, the Russian government reportedly arrested 11 to 12 Tajiks and one Russian citizen, accusing them of acting as a support network for the terrorists. As was the case before the attack in Iran, the U.S. government reportedly warned Russian officials that ISIS-K was planning a terrorist attack inside Russia, and even identified the Crocus City Hall as a potential target. ISIS has been at war with al-Assad’s regime in Syria for more than a decade. And throughout much of that period, Vladimir Putin has provided vital military and other assistance. By terrorizing Russian civilians inside their home country, ISIS and ISIS-K likely sought to punish the Kremlin. The Russian government is also allied with the Taliban, which ISIS-K opposes, providing another pretext for the group to seek targets inside and near Moscow.

A growing threat inside the U.S.

The ISIS attack in Moscow prompted renewed fears of a large-scale attack inside the U.S. Testifying before Congress in April, FBI Director Christopher Wray warned there was an “increasingly concerning … potential for a coordinated attack here in the homeland, akin to the ISIS-K attack we saw at the Russia Concert Hall a couple weeks ago.”

Wray’s use of the phrase “coordinated attack” is noteworthy. U.S. officials have warned for years that the principal threat to Americans here at home comes from “lone” extremists or terrorists who could strike without any real operational assistance from their ideological compatriots abroad. Now, ISIS’s growing transnational capabilities have American officials concerned about the possibility of a bigger, coordinated attack orchestrated from abroad once again.

It’s not yet clear how the arrests this past weekend fit into this threat matrix. But as Wray’s testimony suggests, it is clear the jihadists’ threat to the homeland has not been extinguished.

Tom Joscelyn

Tom Joscelyn is a senior fellow at Just Security.

thedispatch.com · by Tom Joscelyn · June 13, 2024

17. US set to hand off direction of Ukraine defense campaign to NATO

US set to hand off direction of Ukraine defense campaign to NATO

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · June 13, 2024

A Ukrainian soldier fires a rifle under the supervision of a Norwegian army instructor during training of Ukrainian recruits by NATO allies in the United Kingdom in March 2023. NATO this week will agree to a plan that will put the alliance in charge of efforts to arm and train the Ukrainian military, marking a shift away from an effort that so far has been an American-led endeavor. (NATO)

The U.S. and its allies will agree this week to a plan to put NATO in charge of efforts to arm and train the Ukrainian military, marking a shift away from what so far has been an American-led endeavor.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, speaking before the start Thursday of a two-day ministerial conference, said defense chiefs are gathered in Brussels to put the finishing touches on a concept expected to be met with final approval at NATO’s July summit in Washington.

“What I can say today is that we now have very broad agreement … that NATO takes a leading role in the coordination of security assistance and training,” Stoltenberg said.

In recent months, there has been a push at NATO headquarters to take control of the initiative, which was launched by the Pentagon in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

It’s not clear whether the NATO-led effort will mean the dissolution of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein Group, which is meeting at NATO headquarters this week.

Austin, speaking Thursday after the 23rd meeting of his group, gave no sign that the Ramstein format would be ending anytime soon. Austin also said the new influx of Western arms has helped Ukraine blunt some of Russia’s recent gains inside the country.

“We remain determined to keep supporting Ukraine while ensuring our own military readiness at this challenging moment,” Austin said.

Meanwhile, the new NATO plan will have implications for the U.S.-led initiative at the Army’s Europe headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany, which has been the focal point of efforts to equip Ukraine.

The Security Assistance Group for Ukraine, known as the SAG-U, has been under American command since it was launched in 2022 at U.S. European Command headquarters in Stuttgart.

It later moved to Wiesbaden, remaining under the leadership of EUCOM’s Gen. Christopher Cavoli. While Cavoli would still be in charge, it would be in his capacity as NATO’s top military commander rather than his EUCOM role, Stoltenberg said.

Using NATO’s command structure will generate “a more robust, more predictable framework” for supporting Ukraine, Stoltenberg said.

The idea of putting NATO in charge emerged in April when Stoltenberg floated the idea at an alliance ministerial meeting. At the time, Washington was at a partisan impasse on defense spending, with lawmakers at odds about future support for arming Ukraine.

The situation raised concerns about the reliability of American backing for Ukraine and also sparked interest inside NATO about taking on a larger role.

“We of course appreciate what the United States and other allies have done. It’s unprecedented,” Stoltenberg said. “At the same time, we saw that the United States spent six months agreeing (on) a supplemental for Ukraine.”

Likewise, allies in Europe have made promises on weapons shipments that have not been delivered, he said.

“If we turn this into not voluntary contributions but NATO commitments, of course it will become more robust, it will become more reliable,” Stoltenberg said.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, allies have provided about $43 billion in military support to Ukraine each year, Stoltenberg said.

In Brussels, defense leaders are meeting for the final time before the heads of state of member countries convene in Washington next month.

In addition to final approval on NATO’s larger role in supporting Ukraine, allies also are expected to come to agreement on a long-term funding plan for Ukraine.

At an April foreign ministers’ meeting, a $100 billion fund was under consideration, but the final figure hasn’t been finalized.

While Ukraine will be a focal point of the Washington summit in July, Kyiv’s aim of being welcomed into the alliance as an official member is off the table for now.

Still, allies will agree to “strong language” on Ukraine’s eventual membership, Stoltenberg said.

“It’s not for me to go into the details on the exact wording, but I expect that that language will be even clearer in our commitment that Ukraine will become a member of the alliance,” Stoltenberg said.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · June 13, 2024

18. CNA launches in North America as part of international expansion

CNA - Channel News Asia.

Hee Eun Kim (president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy) and I attended this event last night. I have long received CNA news updates about Asia.

What is unique and important about this Singapore based news organization is that they have excellent journalists embedded throughout Asia who are experts on specific countries and the region, speak the languages, and yet provide all reporting in English. We watched summaries of four documentaries that are well worth watching: one on the PLA and its military developments, one on Chinese migration/illegal immigration over the US southern border, one on US bases in the Philippines, and one on the move of the Singapore bird sanctuary (see the descriptions in the article below). I recommend everyone watch the two Chinese documentaries and the Philippines one. We were able to have some in depth and fascinating conversations with the producers.

I have never been a big YouTube watcher but I will be watching their East Asia news tonight daily (I already watched it this morning). If we are pivoting to Asia and want to be informed with expert reporting on the region we should be watching CNA.

CNA launches in North America as part of international expansion

CNA’s content is available for North American viewers on a curated edition of the website, a live YouTube stream, and will soon be on television.

Daniel Heng, executive producer of CNA current affairs programme Insight, speaks during CNA's North American launch in Washington DC.

Listen to this article

5 min

This audio is generated by an AI tool.

Darrelle Ng

14 Jun 2024 02:53PM

(Updated: 14 Jun 2024 04:24PM)

Bookmark

WASHINGTON DC: CNA launched in North America on Thursday (Jun 13) as part of its international expansion plans amid efforts to grow its global audience.

CNA is now available for the North American audience on a curated edition of the website and a live YouTube stream.

Viewers will also be able to watch CNA on a free ad-supported streaming television (FAST) channel within the next 12 months.

The broadcaster offers viewers the latest news from Asia, as well as award-winning documentaries and current affairs programmes.

About 200 guests, including members of the United States Congress, academia, business leaders and think tanks attended the event at the Willard InterContinental hotel, located just two blocks away from the White House, in Washington DC.

Singapore Ambassador to the United States Lui Tuck Yew speaks during CNA's North American launch in Washington DC.

Singapore Ambassador to the United States Lui Tuck Yew, who was at the event, said CNA’s expansion into North America comes at a timely moment, during an election year in America and complex geopolitical ties across the globe.

“CNA can provide an alternative that offers a more nuanced and contextualised understanding of the complexities we (in Asia) face, as well as the sensitivities, the challenges and the relationships in our part of the world,” he said during the launch.

Mediacorp’s editor-in-chief Walter Fernandez said he was “thrilled” to bring CNA’s diverse range of content, told from an Asian perspective, to the North American audience. CNA is owned by Mediacorp, Singapore's national media network.

“CNA offers timely ground reporting and nuanced analysis of Asia through its news bulletins and documentaries, helping a global audience to understand Asia,” he said.

“Against the backdrop of AI-fuelled disinformation campaigns, coupled with a worrying habit of news avoidance, having high quality and trusted media sources which the public and global decision makers can turn to is paramount.”

AWARD-WINNING PROGRAMMING

At the launch, CNA showcased exclusive award-winning content that viewers in North America will soon be seeing on their screens.

Producers also shared behind-the-scenes experiences and offered insider perspectives on their stories.

Among the screenings was ‘Walk The Line’, a multi-part documentary on the treacherous route taken by Chinese migrants across South and Central America to enter the US illegally via its southern border, hoping to live the American dream.

“This is really a story that ties the two biggest and most powerful countries in the world together in one story,” said CNA correspondent and the documentary’s producer Wei Du.

“When we put the documentary on YouTube, a sizeable portion of the viewers came from the US, so we understand there is a lot of hunger in this market for content about Asia, and now we have this opportunity to showcase it to a greater audience.”

CNA producer Wei Du (R) speaks about her documentary Walk The Line during CNA's North American launch in Washington DC.

The launch event was hosted and moderated by CNA contributors and correspondents and will be advertised across the capital city this week.

Apart from Walk The Line, content available on CNA for North American viewers include:

Daily news updates from the Asian region on the Asia Tonight programme and an in-depth look into developments from Greater China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula on East Asia Tonight programme.
Insight – An acclaimed investigative documentary that analyses political, social and economic issues impacting Asia and the rest of the world.
The Great Migration: A New Eden – A programme showcasing a year-long journey with a team of specialists moving 3,500 birds into Asia’s largest bird park in Singapore. The programme won the gold award at the World Media Festivals.
Preparing For Dangerous Storms: Inside the People’s Liberation Army – A three-part series on the world’s largest army taking measures to ensure technology, energy, and food self-sufficiency in China. The documentary won the gold award for best documentary in the global issues category at the World Media Festivals.

CNA’S INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION

CNA was established in March 1999. The news channel has correspondents in 15 major cities across Asia, and is supported by 23 bureaus in North America, Europe, and Africa.

Mediacorp, during CNA’s 25th anniversary celebration in March, announced plans to scale up growth and reach new audiences in regional and international markets.

“We are making deliberate inroads in these regions because surveys have shown there is a significant audience in the US, Canada and the United Kingdom who are hungry for news and documentaries about Asia – in particular, China, Japan, and Korea,” said chairman Niam Chiang Meng.

Mediacorp said CNA fills a crucial gap in the North American market by delivering authentic narratives and firsthand perspectives from the Asian region, with an aim to enrich audiences' understanding of Asia.

This includes in-depth coverage of the region’s political scene, business developments, lifestyle trends as well as human-interest features which reflect the diversity of Asia.

Earlier this year, CNA launched its FAST channel in the UK with six hours of programming repeated throughout the day with news updates, in-depth current affairs content, and documentaries.

19. Intelligence & the Changing Landscape of Irregular Warfare

Intelligence & the Changing Landscape of Irregular Warfare

Join us July 17 & 18

DATE & TIME

July 17-18, 2024

LOCATION

BAE Systems

2941 Fairview Park Drive

Falls Church, VA 22042

Join us for discussions, panels, and demonstrations as we hear from experts while navigating the ever-changing landscape of Irregular Warfare and the role of Intelligence and Cybersecurity.

Featured Panel Discussions:

-Uncrewed Systems

-Cybersecurity

-Counterintelligence & OSINT

-Defense Industrial Base

Maren Brooks, Keynote Speaker

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism

With over 20 years of experience in National Security, Maren has served under 3 Presidents in the National Security Council and led key initiatives at the State Department and National Counterterrorism Center.

Peter Belk, Keynote Speaker

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness

Currently, Peter advises on Total Force Readiness. Previously, he served as the U.S. Northern Command Deputy Director of Operations and the U.S. Special Operations Command Deputy Director for Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Concepts. He has held key positions at the National Security Council and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

20. NATO Gets Serious in the Face of Russia’s Threats

NATO Gets Serious in the Face of Russia’s Threats

Members are working to develop regional plans and standardize procurement across the alliance.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-gets-serious-in-the-face-of-russias-threats-ukraine-weapons-procurement-b26b40b6?utm

By Daniel Silverberg and Elena McGovern

June 13, 2024 5:05 pm ET

Ukrainian soldiers take part in a military exercise at a training camp in England, March 24, 2023. PHOTO: KIN CHEUNG/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Russia is menacing Europe, not only with its war against Ukraine but through its proposal to redraw maritime borders in the Baltic Sea. But recent developments within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provide reason for optimism. Its partners are beginning to coordinate on overall defense strategy and weapons procurement, representing a major shift in how NATO operates. This new framework will benefit the alliance long-term.

The effort, known as the Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic, will create a unified campaign plan, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has put it, to “defend every inch of alliance territory.” It will also change how the U.S. defense industry sells platforms and services to NATO. Defense manufacturers and investors should pay attention.

The initiative emerged in 2020 against a backdrop of historically fractured military planning within the alliance. Most allied nations since NATO’s founding have pursued defense procurement individually, with limited regard for how certain weapons or systems would contribute to the overall NATO mission. As a result, NATO-member militaries are severely lacking in interoperability.

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscored the challenge this has created. While alliance members have the will to defend NATO territory, the relatively decentralized nature of procurement has meant that on some occasions European weapons platforms and munitions sent to Ukraine have been incompatible with other NATO member munitions. Allied manufacturers produce at least 14 different types of 155mm artillery systems, for instance, creating coordination challenges.

This situation is changing for the better. Building on the framework created in 2020, NATO leaders at the Vilnius Summit in Lithuania last summer laid out specific regional-defense plans that would cover the entire alliance territory. In military parlance, these regional plans serve as umbrellas over “subordinate strategic plans,” which detail common defense objectives across air, land, maritime, space, cyber and special operations. These plans specify what each NATO partner must do in the event of crisis across multiple regions and in specific domains.

The U.S. Mission to NATO wrote in an Instagram post last fall that these regional plans represent “an unprecedented level of military planning, particularly given the pace and scope of modern military operations.” If executed well, they will ensure the right players have the right capabilities and strategies to defend NATO territory.

A key challenge will be making sure NATO partners pursue the necessary training and procurement to execute their plans—no small feat given that members use different standards and plans to procure weapons. Ideally, each country would align its procurement with the military requirements derived from these broader regional plans. Challenges in Ukraine have also demonstrated that supply chains will need to be ready to deliver arms to NATO members quickly, while weapons manufacturers should be given incentives to standardize key components such as munitions so that members’ national defense systems are compatible with each other, allowing allies to fight a war together.

The Defense Production Action Plan, which alliance leaders agreed on at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, is intended to do exactly this—and that is welcome news. Member countries met at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year to discuss how to create common manufacturing capabilities. It’s good to see NATO countries coordinating more closely on what they’re buying rather than going it alone. This will require greater industry coordination with NATO, including through the NATO Industrial Advisory Group and the Defense Industrial Production Board.

The move to standardize weapons production isn’t merely bureaucratic hype; it has immediate battlefield implications for Ukraine. Germany currently can’t procure 155mm shells for Ukrainian artillery if those platforms don’t correspond. Other countries can’t provide key air-defense components or precision missiles if there’s no uniformity in procurement. A standardized procurement process would change that.

While there’s been much gloom surrounding NATO and Ukraine in recent years, these new developments in strategy and procurement should spark hope. On the eve of the alliance’s 75th-anniversary summit next month, NATO looks stronger, more unified and better prepared. That’s worth celebrating.

Mr. Silverberg and Ms. McGovern are co-heads of Capstone’s national-security team.

WSJ Opinion: U.S. Defense Response to Indo-Pacific Security Threat Too Slow

Play video: WSJ Opinion: U.S. Defense Response to Indo-Pacific Security Threat Too Slow

In his final appearance before the House Armed Services Committee on March 20, 2024, Navy Admiral John Aquilino repeatedly referenced the need to 'speed up' the U.S. defense effort in the Indo-Pacific, with China's military expanding on a 'scale not seen since WWII,' and growing cooperation between China, Russia and Iran setting up a new 'axis of evil.' Images: AP/Zuma Press

Appeared in the June 14, 2024, print edition as 'NATO Gets Serious in the Face of Russia’s Threats'.

21. Why China Is Sabotaging Ukraine

Excerpts:

Even if both sides were ready to talk, it is hard to see how they could reach a bargain. The parties will likely never agree over the status of Russian-occupied territories, and were they to agree to disagree they would still have to contend with unrelated, unacceptable demands. The Kremlin, for instance, would insist that any deal to end the war be contingent on the West stopping its flow of military support to Ukraine, leaving the country at Putin’s mercy and allowing Moscow to invade again. For Kyiv, this is understandably a nonstarter.

China’s relations with Ukraine’s allies—both the United States and Europe—are another stumbling block. Any complex negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will have to involve Kyiv’s partners. Moscow will want to have at least some one-on-one negotiations with Washington—since the Kremlin sees the United States as a principal party to the conflict—and China will want to link the termination of the war with fixing at least some aspects of its bilateral ties to the West. But both endeavors will cause issues. For moral reasons, it will be difficult, though not entirely impossible, for Washington to negotiate with Moscow without Ukrainians in the room. The United States will not abandon its approach to competition with China, be it on export controls, the beefing up of U.S.-led alliances in the Indo-Pacific, or tariffs on Chinese products. And Beijing’s actions regarding Ukraine, including its efforts to undermine the Swiss conference, have eroded trust in China in key Western capitals. That trust has been all but destroyed in the European capital most crucial to an agreement: Kyiv.

Finally, China has no proven track record when it comes to complex negotiations. A much-touted deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran was really negotiated from the bottom up, with Riyadh and Tehran giving Beijing the opportunity to portray itself as a mediator. China has never taken the lead in major crisis diplomacy. And its inertia, lack of diplomatic imagination, and refusal to risk failure—particularly when Xi’s prestige is in jeopardy—will most likely prevent it from the kind of innovation needed to find a solution. Indeed, it is unclear whether China actually believes that it can put a stop to the hostilities or if it is merely posturing.

For Americans concerned about the United States being usurped by Beijing, the latter country’s lack of capacity may seem like good news. But it does not mean Washington will have it easier. In fact, China’s failure could make the United States’ endeavors more difficult. The war in Ukraine may be a drain on the West’s resources and on the economies of developing countries, but it suits Beijing’s interests just fine. China has gained power over Russia, all while paying minimal economic and diplomatic penalties. China, then, may stay the course. It can continue to ridicule the West’s approach to the war and call for diplomacy without trying to achieve much in reality.

Why China Is Sabotaging Ukraine

Beijing Has No Interest in a Peace Agreement It Can’t Help Broker

By Alexander Gabuev

June 14, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Alexander Gabuev · June 14, 2024

For a moment last August, it seemed that Beijing was finally ready to distance itself from its “no limits partnership” with Moscow. That month, Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent his special envoy for the war in Ukraine, Li Hui, to discuss Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s peace formula with diplomats from several countries, including Ukraine and the United States. The formula calls for Russia to withdraw to Ukraine’s 1991 borders, send its war criminals to international tribunals, and pay reparations to Kyiv. The plan clearly represents Kyiv’s favored conclusion to the conflict, and merely by engaging with it, Beijing suggested that it might be ready to play hardball with Moscow.

But China’s first public participation in discussions about that formula was also its last. On May 31, Beijing announced that it would not be joining some 90 other countries at a June 15–16 peace summit in Switzerland to debate, based on Zelensky’s proposal, how to end the war. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, explained that Beijing would attend the summit only if Russia were a participant and if any plan presented would receive a hearing. For Ukraine, both requirements are nonstarters.

Xi, it seems, will not abandon his troublesome Russian partner or even pay lip service to aiding Kyiv. Instead, China has chosen a more ambitious, but also riskier, approach. It will continue to help Moscow and sabotage Western-led peace proposals. It hopes to then swoop in and use its leverage over Russia to bring both parties to the table in an attempt to broker a lasting agreement.

This gambit is unlikely to work. Neither Russia nor Ukraine appears anywhere close to being ready for serious peace talks—at least for now. Kyiv and its partners do not trust China to operate in good faith. And Beijing has very little experience in pulling off the kind of major, international negotiations it wants to spearhead here.

But these obstacles are unlikely to sway Xi. He has little to lose if the war in Ukraine goes on. China will therefore continue to be a stick-in-the-mud: indirectly helping Russia, derailing Kyiv-led diplomatic initiatives, and pretending to engage in diplomacy instead of genuinely trying to work with other parties to find a solution.

CLOSER AND CLOSER

For Beijing, ties to Russia are of great strategic significance. China and Russia share a 2,600-mile border, and Russia provides China with cheap natural resources and even some advanced military technologies. Xi also benefits from having a like-minded authoritarian among the UN Security Council’s permanent members.

There are still limits to Chinese-Russian relations. Western markets are essential to the health of the Chinese economy, and they give Beijing access to cutting-edge technology. As a result, Beijing has been careful to avoid crossing Washington’s redlines. But China does operate on the basis that everything which isn’t forbidden is allowed. Beijing may not be shipping lethal aid to Russia, but many Russian operators and their partners in China and Central Asia use China as a staging ground for industrial products key to Russia’s embattled economy, such as machine tools and chips. In two years, trade between the countries has increased by more than 60 percent, to a record $240.1 billion.

The White House, aware of its economic power, has tried using sanctions to stop this cooperation. In December 2023, it issued an executive order threatening to apply secondary sanctions on any international bank found to be even unknowingly clearing payments for the Russian military industry. Later, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken made trips to China and outlined to Chinese leaders and financial institutions the grave consequences they would face for violations. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, meanwhile, visited Europe to brief allies on the issue and called on them to put pressure on Beijing.

China expects that the peace summit will fail.

These measures have had some effect. According to customs data, Chinese exports to Russia decreased by double digits throughout March, April, and May. An overwhelming majority of Chinese banks have started to take an extremely cautious approach when clearing any Russia-related transactions. Some have abandoned dealings with Russian entities altogether. But it is unclear whether these measures will stop the flow of products which have been identified by Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU as essential to the Kremlin’s military industry—and which China ships to Russia in massive quantities.

Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow are continuing to lay the foundations for a deeper and more durable economic relationship. During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to China on May 16, Chinese and Russian state railroad companies signed an agreement to expand cross-border infrastructure that will help facilitate Russian exports to the east. On the same trip, Putin likely greenlit a scheme to ship more Russian gas to Central Asia so that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could have more gas to ship to China, thus enabling Moscow and Central Asian governments to increase their profits. Following his trip, Putin called the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to tell them about the visit, something he has never done before. On June 7, Gazprom signed contracts that would expand Russian gas exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

Beijing and Moscow also discussed ways to clear sensitive exports from China to Russia. To do so, they could designate specialized banks that are largely immune to U.S. restrictions. Such banks would not connect themselves to the global financial system and have correspondence accounts only in Russia, settling all payments in yuan and rubles through China’s international payment system. Their transactions would be cloaked under multiple layers of shell companies. The United States could try to target this system by tracking down suspicious transactions and sanctioning the banks, but that would be difficult because all the payments would bypass U.S.-dollar and other Western payment systems. China, after all, used a similar scheme with its Kunlun bank to effectively evade sanctions on Iran.

Economics isn’t the only area in which China and Russia are deepening their relations. They are also presenting an increasingly unified diplomatic front. Putin and Xi have now visited each other three times since the war in Ukraine began and displayed great mutual fondness. During a visit to Moscow in March 2023, Xi told Putin that “there are changes happening, the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years,” and suggested that the Chinese and Russian leaders should “drive those changes together.” When saying goodbye to Putin this May, Xi embraced him twice on camera—something he rarely does. The message of closeness was intentional and clear.

MY WAY OR THE HIGHWAY

Putin and Xi may have a genuine affinity for each other, but Beijing also has a self-interested reason to side with Moscow in peace endeavors: China has its own peace initiative, and so it wants to sabotage the United States and Europe’s efforts. On May 23, a week after the most recent meeting between Xi and Putin and a week before China declined to attend the Swiss peace summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Celso Amorim, chief adviser on national security to the president of Brazil. In a joint statement on settling the Ukraine crisis, they called for an international peace conference in which both Russia and Ukraine would be represented and all peace plans would be reviewed. (Not surprisingly, Brazil has also refused to send high-level officials to the Swiss conference, and may send no one at all.)

Beijing knows that, for now, its proposal will go nowhere. But it has reasons to believe that the June summit will end in a diplomatic impasse that will be difficult to conceal, despite the best efforts of the organizers and Ukraine’s partners. Even if the summit’s participants can create a concluding joint statement that is cogent and pro-Ukraine, there is no way for them to impose it on the Kremlin. In fact, since many key countries of the global South will send only low-level delegations to the summit or else skip it altogether, the practical effect of the meeting’s communiqué will be even more modest than that of the UN General Assembly’s 2022 resolutions criticizing Russian aggression.

In other words, China expects that the peace summit will fail. It believes the meeting will do nothing to advance peace or to rally the world behind Ukraine’s maximalist demands. That failure may give Beijing a shot to make itself a central player in diplomatic efforts, or at least pretend to be one—perhaps by partnering with friendly countries that have a proven track record in Ukraine-related talks. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example, have facilitated discreet talks on prisoner swaps. Turkey was instrumental in reopening the Black Sea to grain shipments. All three states are on good terms with Beijing.

There’s a reason why China feels confident that it can present itself as a major broker. Beijing has the ultimate trump card: the ability to bring Russia to the table. Russian officials may have initially given China’s initiatives the cold shoulder in 2023, but they have since thanked Beijing multiple times for its proposal and signaled their readiness to negotiate if China’s approach is accepted. Putin himself expressed these sentiments in a statement to Russian journalists as he departed Beijing. “We have said more than once that we believe that China is sincerely striving to settle this problem,” Putin said. “It offers different options and is very flexible.” These comments suggest that Putin may have even reached an understanding with Xi, wherein Russia agrees to negotiate if called on by Beijing in exchange for China pledging not to travel to Switzerland.

If Beijing can indeed either directly or indirectly create a cease-fire agreement, it could work wonders for the government’s geopolitical standing. By stopping the killing and destruction, China would be celebrated in both the global South and in many European countries. Beijing would also be subject to less U.S. and European criticism of its support for Putin’s aggression. At the same time, because a cease-fire would not resolve the territorial dispute between Moscow and Kyiv, the issue of reparations to Ukraine, or accountability for war crimes, Western sanctions would continue—ensuring that Russia remains economically dependent on Beijing. And because any pause in hostilities will not stop Russia from expanding its military, a cease-fire will not obviate the need for the United States to dedicate resources to Europe. Washington’s bandwidth in the Indo-Pacific—including in the schedules of its most senior national security officials—would therefore remain limited.

DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR

China may have formidable leverage over Russia and, as a result, influence in any negotiations. But the most ambitious scenario, in which Beijing plays a leading role in the war’s termination, is highly unlikely to materialize. For the time being, both Kyiv and Moscow have no appetite to stop fighting. The Russians believe that Ukrainian defensive lines will eventually crumble due to limited manpower and Western support. Ukraine and its backers hope that Russian advances on the battlefield will remain incremental and exact an unsustainably high cost, which will force Moscow to reconsider its objectives. Neither thinks the conflict will be endless.

Even if both sides were ready to talk, it is hard to see how they could reach a bargain. The parties will likely never agree over the status of Russian-occupied territories, and were they to agree to disagree they would still have to contend with unrelated, unacceptable demands. The Kremlin, for instance, would insist that any deal to end the war be contingent on the West stopping its flow of military support to Ukraine, leaving the country at Putin’s mercy and allowing Moscow to invade again. For Kyiv, this is understandably a nonstarter.

China’s relations with Ukraine’s allies—both the United States and Europe—are another stumbling block. Any complex negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will have to involve Kyiv’s partners. Moscow will want to have at least some one-on-one negotiations with Washington—since the Kremlin sees the United States as a principal party to the conflict—and China will want to link the termination of the war with fixing at least some aspects of its bilateral ties to the West. But both endeavors will cause issues. For moral reasons, it will be difficult, though not entirely impossible, for Washington to negotiate with Moscow without Ukrainians in the room. The United States will not abandon its approach to competition with China, be it on export controls, the beefing up of U.S.-led alliances in the Indo-Pacific, or tariffs on Chinese products. And Beijing’s actions regarding Ukraine, including its efforts to undermine the Swiss conference, have eroded trust in China in key Western capitals. That trust has been all but destroyed in the European capital most crucial to an agreement: Kyiv.

Finally, China has no proven track record when it comes to complex negotiations. A much-touted deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran was really negotiated from the bottom up, with Riyadh and Tehran giving Beijing the opportunity to portray itself as a mediator. China has never taken the lead in major crisis diplomacy. And its inertia, lack of diplomatic imagination, and refusal to risk failure—particularly when Xi’s prestige is in jeopardy—will most likely prevent it from the kind of innovation needed to find a solution. Indeed, it is unclear whether China actually believes that it can put a stop to the hostilities or if it is merely posturing.

For Americans concerned about the United States being usurped by Beijing, the latter country’s lack of capacity may seem like good news. But it does not mean Washington will have it easier. In fact, China’s failure could make the United States’ endeavors more difficult. The war in Ukraine may be a drain on the West’s resources and on the economies of developing countries, but it suits Beijing’s interests just fine. China has gained power over Russia, all while paying minimal economic and diplomatic penalties. China, then, may stay the course. It can continue to ridicule the West’s approach to the war and call for diplomacy without trying to achieve much in reality.

ALEXANDER GABUEV is Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

Foreign Affairs · by Alexander Gabuev · June 14, 2024

22. The Coming Military AI Revolution

Conclusion:

While technology alone does not guarantee the outcome of war, throughout history, militaries that best innovate have a decisive advantage on the battlefield.37 The American military has long enjoyed technological superiority over its adversaries, however, this advantage is now diminishing. China’s national-level focus on AI innovation has manifested in significant technological advancements, enabling the PLA toward achieving its goal of becoming a world-class military. Within this ongoing geopolitical rivalry, the competition to harness the power of AI will shape the global balance of power for years to come.

Preserving U.S. miliary overmatch requires an acceleration of AI development across the DOD. Strengthened partnership with the private sector is essential to making the progress needed to outpace the PLA. Although China’s military-civil fusion strategy has yielded impressive results, the most capable AI companies reside in the United States. These firms, with their highly skilled workforce and cutting-edge research, have the potential to produce the most advanced military applications of AI. The United States’ market-based system holds a distinct advantage in fostering innovation, but the DOD must continue to adapt to fully harness its potential. The ongoing Replicator initiative represents the DOD’s biggest bet in AI development. Its success is crucial for the future of the U.S. military.

While new technologies are always under development, rarely do they pose as much potential as AI. Military advantage is normally gained by the side that better understands the environment, the enemy, and themselves. Battles are typically won by commanders who make timely, well-informed decisions. AI is a technology that will enable all of this.

The military AI revolution has only begun. How it proceeds—and whether the United States ultimately prevails—will depend upon the urgency with which we approach this opportunity, the adaptability of our organizations, and the perseverance of our people. The potential of AI is limitless but only if we have the foresight to understand it and the fortitude to embrace the challenge.

The Coming Military AI Revolution

armyupress.army.mil

Col. Joshua Glonek, U.S. Army

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A video screen plays footage of Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers on a robot from Chinese robot maker Jiangsu Eastern Gold Jade Intelligent Robot Company at the World Robot Conference in Beijing on 15 August 2018. (Photo by Mark Schiefelbein, Associated Press)

The simple fact is that we see everything the enemy is doing and they see everything we are doing. In order for us to break this deadlock we need something new, like the gunpowder which the Chinese invented and which we are still using to kill each other.

—Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Former Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander in Chief

The U.S. military’s long-held technological overmatch is quickly eroding.1 Over the past twenty-five years, China has invested heavily in its military—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—putting it on a path to “complete national defense and military modernization by 2035” and to transform the PLA into a “world-class military by the middle of the century.”2 China’s increased military strength now presents a formidable challenge to the U.S.-led international order, and to the security of U.S. allies and partners.3

One technology in particular will determine the preeminence of military forces in the coming decades: artificial intelligence (AI). With the advent of self-driving cars and ChatGPT, AI has moved beyond the realm of science fiction and is now beginning to proliferate throughout society. This disruptive technology is also creating new opportunities for military forces. Dual-use applications of AI provide tools to quickly analyze large amounts of data, enhance links between sensors and shooters, and increase decision-making speed. The U.S. military must embrace this transformative technology and accelerate the development of innovative applications of AI to preserve its technological edge, deter adversary aggression, and, if necessary, prevail in armed conflict.

Soldiers employ AI to analyze collected data and prepare for a tactical-level operation. (AI image by Col. Joshua Glonek, U.S. Army)

The coming military AI revolution is situated squarely within the wider geopolitical competition between the United States and China. The stakes of this competition are high and the outcome uncertain. China believes the United States is a superpower in decline. As the PLA grows in strength, its actions are becoming more aggressive. Over the last two years, the United States has documented over 180 instances of dangerous PLA air intercepts against U.S. allies and partners.4 The South China Sea remains a contentious flashpoint, with China asserting illegitimate territorial claims and continuing to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan.5 Tensions are high, and the risk of conflict is real.

Succeeding in this great power competition—and deterring war—will require the U.S. military to preserve its technological advantages. Achieving this, however, demands a groundbreaking innovation effort as China is quickly closing the gap. Determined to “intelligentize” warfare, the PLA is rapidly pursuing an entirely new generation of AI-enabled military systems.6 In support, the Chinese Communist Party is marshalling a significant amount of state and private resources toward this effort. Progress is continuing to accelerate.

A soldier considers employment of a variety of weapons and support systems either individually or in a coordinated action. The battlefield of the future will be characterized by a range of AI-driven weapons platforms and support systems, including unmanned aircraft and tactical vehicles. (Illustration by Jamie Lear, U.S. Army)

In response, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked on its own path of military modernization. Accelerating the adoption of AI is now a major priority for the DOD, as it seeks to harness the innovation power of the American private sector, home to the world’s leading AI companies. By fielding AI-enabled systems at scale and employing them on the battlefield in new ways, the U.S. military intends to offset the PLA’s progress and remain the world’s unmatched superpower.

The consequences of the coming military AI revolution are enormous. If developed effectively, AI will permeate across all military systems and processes. Enormous efficiency gains will be realized as AI reduces the demands on humans to process data, preventing cognitive overload and enabling more thorough analysis. Situational awareness will grow, operations will become more precise, and decisions will be better informed. The speed of warfare will increase. Those with the best AI tools will be constantly exploiting the initiative, while those without will struggle to make sense of what is happening.

As the military AI revolution proceeds, it’s incumbent on all members of the profession to prepare. From general to private, we will all have a role to play in the transformation of the force that will occur over the coming years. We must embrace what is new and adapt to the changing environment. As Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet once stated, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”7 Douhet’s words, written over a century ago, still resonate powerfully today.

A Brief History of AI

Although AI may seem like a relatively new phenomenon, British mathematician Alan Turing first devised the theory in 1950. Having played a key role in the development of computers, Turing believed AI would be achieved once machines became capable of generating answers to questions that were indistinguishable from human responses.8 For the next two decades, AI researched flourished as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funded the creation of AI labs at several major universities.9 Despite this initial flurry of AI research, the lack of computational power and data storage found in primitive computers led many to believe continued advancements were no longer feasible. As a result, funding was significantly reduced for most AI research.

Alan Turing (1912–1954) at Princeton University in 1936. Turing was an English mathematician, computer scientist, cryptanalyst, and theoretical biologist. He is widely considered to be the father of theoretical computer science and one of the founding fathers of artificial intelligence. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

AI development experienced a resurgence in the 1980s as advanced microprocessors enabled greater computing power. Consistent with a concept called “Moore’s law,” the capacity of computer chips continued to grow exponentially, doubling approximately every two years.10 These more powerful semiconductors allowed computer scientists to access larger databases, enabling more sophisticated algorithms. A new series of programs known as “expert systems” were developed, which, for the first time, were able to replicate the decision-making of humans.11 Expert systems contained an extensive collection of knowledge and facts about a specific topic. These programs could solve narrowly defined problems that would otherwise require human subject-matter experts. For example, the DOD employed expert systems to develop maintenance software that enabled users to input diagnostic data and receive a report on the underlying cause of the malfunction, as well as recommended solutions.12 Although expert systems excelled at bespoke applications, they were incapable of engaging in problem-solving beyond their preprogrammed knowledge.13

The next wave of AI progress came in the 1990s with the creation of machine learning. Unlike expert systems that had to be manually programmed, machine learning algorithms used training data to “learn” how to perform tasks and solve problems.14 This allowed developers to fine-tune the models’ parameters to achieve desired outcomes, resulting in highly flexible AI programs that could perform well in new environments. Further progress was made with the development of “deep learning” algorithms that used neural networks loosely modeled on those of the human brain. Combining deep learning with massive datasets has enabled “computer vision,” which is the basis for a variety of applications from self-driving vehicles to facial recognition programs.15

IBM engineer Arthur Samuel with an early machine-learning computer he developed circa 1962 that improved at the game of checkers the more games it played. Samuel laid the groundwork for a series of breakthroughs in artificial intelligence at IBM during the 1990s. (Photo courtesy of IBM)

The most recent breakthrough in AI was introduced to the world in November 2022 when OpenAI released its ChatGPT Large Language Model program. The Large Language Model capitalizes on the fact that natural language is arranged in a sequential order, creating logical connections between the words in a sentence. By reading a very large number of sentences during training, these models become effective in predicting the arrangement of words in a coherent manner.16 Ask ChatGPT to write a book report, create a business plan, or compose poetry and it will do so near instantaneously with a high degree of effectiveness. And because words are simply a form of data, these new techniques are not limited only to language. New applications of generative AI are emerging with the capability to create images and videos, compose music, and write computer code.

In recent years, advancements in AI have led to significant achievements. In 2016, Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo computer program defeated world champion Go player Lee Sedol in a five-game match. During the second game, AlphaGo made an unorthodox move that onlooking experts initially thought was a mistake. As the game progressed, it became apparent that the “mistake” proved pivotal to the machine’s victory.17 Yet another milestone was achieved in 2020 when an AI-agent decisively defeated an elite human fighter pilot in a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency-sponsored virtual dogfight competition. When asked about his repeated losses, the human pilot responded, “The standard things that we do as fighter pilots aren’t working.”18 These feats are not only stunning demonstrations of AI prowess in complex scenarios, but they also show how AI is capable of learning new techniques and strategies that outwit even the best humans.

The Race to Develop Military AI

Across a variety of narrow applications, AI is already winning. Both the United States and China understand this and are racing to incorporate AI into their military strategies. In 2018, the DOD released its first Artificial Intelligence Strategy, intended to accelerate the adoption of AI by the U.S. military. The report highlighted the fact that China was “making significant investments in AI for military purposes,” which “threaten to erode our technological and operational advantages.”19 In 2019, China published a defense white paper, which argued a “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics” was underway.20 Aided by new advancements in emerging technologies, the report emphasized the importance of AI in future warfare as big data, cloud computing, and the internet of things were “gathering pace in the military field.”21 The idea that AI would transform the character of warfare was now at the forefront of both nations’ military strategy.

Unlike some important military innovations of the past such as the longbow, gunpowder, or the tank, which had relatively specific uses, AI is a general-purpose technology with a diverse array of applications. More akin to the advent of electricity, which generated advances in lighting, heating, transportation, and communications, AI will diffuse across many other technologies, greatly increasing their capability and effectiveness. Today, in both the U.S. and Chinese defense sectors, there is a proliferation of AI research and development pursuing a variety of military uses, including autonomous vehicles, intelligence collection, predictive logistics, cybersecurity, and command and control. The outcome of the AI race will not be decided based upon one specific application but rather will be determined by the side that can best integrate AI across a variety of systems and processes in all domains of warfighting.

China’s approach to developing military technology is a strategy of military-civil fusion characterized by direct military involvement in research and development with private Chinese businesses synchronized by centralized government control. (AI image by Gerardo A. Mena Jr., Army University Press)

The United States has long been the world leader in the development of military hardware, enabled by a strong culture of innovation and well-established defense industrial base. In recent years, China has made significant progress with a deliberate state focus on military modernization. Both nations, however, are facing a new challenge in the race for AI-enabled military systems. Unlike many technological innovations of the past that were developed through government-sponsored research programs, the most cutting-edge AI technology today currently resides in the private sector. Gaining access to this technology requires the DOD and PLA to forge new partnerships with commercial firms to develop dual-use applications. Traditional defense contractors and state-owned enterprises in both the United States and China simply can’t keep up with the pace of AI innovation in the private sector.

China’s approach to solving this problem is to exploit the power of the state to deepen public-private integration through a strategy of military-civil fusion.22 Over recent years, several facets of the strategy have successfully contributed to closer integration between the PLA and private Chinese businesses. These include the establishment of joint laboratories to facilitate dual-use research among military, academic, and commercial enterprises; creation of the Agile Innovation Defense Unit, which focuses on providing the PLA access to commercial technologies; and PLA sponsorships of challenges and competitions intended to promote creative solutions to military problems.23 Furthermore, military-civil fusion is proving successful in expanding the PLA’s reach into the commercial sector. One recent study from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology found that the PLA acquired the majority of its AI-related equipment from private Chinese technology companies, not legacy state-owned enterprises.24 While corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies remain limitations of China’s authoritarian system, impressive progress has been made thus far.

In contrast to the Chinese top-down approach, the U.S. strategy is to leverage its vibrant and innovative market-based economy to generate new AI-enabled military technologies. In doing so, the DOD seeks to rebalance the force away from legacy combat platforms that are exquisite, manned, and high cost toward a new generation of systems that are expendable, autonomous, and relatively inexpensive. Through an initiative dubbed “Replicator,” the DOD has established a goal of fielding these systems at a scale of “multiple thousands, in multiple domains, within the next 18–24 months.”25 Intended to offset the PLA’s conventional advantage in mass, Replicator seeks to complement U.S. conventional capabilities with large concentrations of AI-enabled systems that can effectively operate in highly contested environments.

In a different approach to that of the People’s Liberation Army, the U.S. Department of Defense is largely reliant on private enterprise and economic competition between competing private businesses in its programs of defense technology development. This approach assumes free enterprise promotes greater freedom in creativity and innovation. (Illustration courtesy of DroneXL, https://www.dronexl.co)

Serving as the lead for the development of these technologies is the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), which was created to foster closer partnership between the DOD and the private sector. In 2023, the DIU was elevated to a direct reporting unit to the secretary of defense in order to “catalyze engagement with and investment into private sector communities where commercial technology can be adapted and applied to meet our warfighters’ requirements.”26 In places like Silicon Valley, the best commercial AI companies in the world possess the expertise to develop dual-use applications of their technologies but are often hindered by the DOD’s cumbersome acquisition procedures. DIU helps to overcome this challenge by streamlining the process, drawing more nontraditional companies into the defense sector. This enables greater innovation, a wider variety of AI applications, and faster adoption of these systems into the military. As the Replicator initiative proceeds, DIU will play a leading role in coordinating the development of AI technologies that are tailored to the needs of the military services and combatant commanders.

Seeing through the Fog of War

Military operations are characterized by a prevailing “fog,” which exists due to the inherent uncertainty of war.27 The inability to predict how battle will unfold is part of war’s essential nature and cannot be completely eliminated. Some of the fog, however, is the result of an enormous amount of data and information that cannot be processed fast enough to clearly understand its meaning. After action reviews from combat training centers routinely highlight the shortcomings of units that become overwhelmed by cascades of information. Rarely are staffs able to effectively synthesize the abundance of data in ways that bring clarity to the overall situation. The question “who else needs to know?” is commonly asked, as a technique to offset the tendency of information to remain isolated in functional “stovepipes.” Despite the development of knowledge management procedures designed to better identify, organize, store, and disseminate information, the fundamental problem of data overload still exists.

A soldier uses a handheld device to employ artificial intelligence for data analysis to guide rapid planning and execution of tactical-level operations. (AI image by Gerardo A. Mena Jr., Army University Press)

On today’s modern battlefield, sensors are nearly ubiquitous, constantly streaming information to military command posts. Staffs struggle to keep pace with the sheer volume of data that is available: information, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets provide data on enemy forces through a combination of imagery, video feeds, signal intercepts, and electromagnetic detections; friendly forces provide status updates and requests for support over a variety of command-and-control systems; and other factors, such as changes to the weather, the presence of civilians on the battlefield, or the introduction of disinformation, add further complexity to the operational environment. The flood of available data can create a state of “analysis paralysis” that stymies effective decision-making. By the time decisions are finally made, they are no longer relevant to the current conditions.

This is where AI can help. Today’s AI systems and the high-power computers that run them can process vast quantities of data at unprecedented speeds. Tasks that would normally take humans days or weeks can be done by AI in a matter of seconds. Take the banking industry, for example. Financial institutions use AI to track credit card usage in real time. When irregular buyer behavior is identified, transactions are denied before fraud can occur.28 Compared to traditional methods that rely on manual human verification, the resulting efficiency gains are enormous. Furthermore, AI systems are proving more accurate than human experts in a variety of areas. For example, in the medical field, machine learning systems are demonstrating greater accuracy in predicting cancer than highly trained clinicians.29 Applying these same technologies to common military tasks can produce similar gains in efficiency and effectiveness. In essence, AI can help clear some of the fog of war.

These productivity gains will ultimately enable more rapid and effective decision-making, a critical advantage in warfare. John Boyd characterized military competition through a process known as the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop.30 Boyd’s idea was that whichever side executed the process faster could get inside an opponent’s decision cycle and achieve a relative military advantage. AI systems will greatly accelerate the OODA loop process by increasing situational awareness, rapidly processing large amounts of information, calculating decision options, and automating operations. Intelligence analysts will use computer vision to filter through scores of images and videos to locate enemy forces. Operators will employ autonomous swarms of drones to overwhelm enemy defenses. Logisticians will use data analytics to optimize resupply missions or equipment maintenance. Military planners will use large language models to draft operations orders and generate decision briefs. Cyber warriors will leverage machine learning to identify anomalies and deny adversary network intrusions. These are just a few of the many coming military applications of AI.

Determining just how fast the OODA loop accelerates will depend, in part, on the level of trust humans place in AI. As with any new technology, AI is subject to error and will require refinement over time as it continues to evolve and mature. For the foreseeable future, there is good reason to maintain human control and oversight, also known as “human in the loop.” For one, AI demonstrates the ability to “hallucinate,” producing outputs or answers that are plausible but nevertheless do not correspond to reality.31 This occurs when an AI model makes a statistical inference based on its training data that leads to inaccurate results when applied to a real-world environment. For an AI program aiding in military activities, the consequences of a spurious output could be severe. Another challenge with many AI models is that they lack “explainability,” meaning the system is unable to describe the logic and data underlying its conclusions.32 As a result, decisions appear to be made inside a “black box,” preventing users from tracing the system’s thought process. This lack of transparency will require trust in military AI to be built over time through experience. AI is also vulnerable to spoofing where an adversary could adjust data inputs, leading the model to draw false conclusions.33 Imagine using computer vision software for targeting that is manipulated into concluding that friendly forces or civilians are enemy high-payoff targets. For all these reasons, most near-term applications of military AI will likely augment, rather than replace the role of humans.

In the global operational environment of the future, AI will play a significant role in military analysis and decision-making at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command and control. (Illustration by NIWC Pacific, 7 April 2018)

Although the United States and China have enacted AI governance, cultural differences may influence the speed of adoption. A recent survey found that 78 percent of Chinese citizens believed AI had more benefits than drawbacks, as opposed to only 35 percent of Americans.34 In 2020, the DOD adopted a series of ethical principles for the use of AI intended to guide the development of new technologies in a safe and responsible manner.35 The PLA has not released a similar set of principles and appears to be less constrained by the risks posed by AI. In contrast to the robust debate in the United States on the ethics of employing autonomous military systems, discussion of this topic is largely absent from Chinese open sources.36 These contrasting perspectives in AI ethics and regulation may influence the rate at which the United States and China adopt and integrate AI into their respective militaries. While the United States appears more cautious and deliberate in its approach, China seems to be less constrained by the potential risks of AI.

Conclusion

While technology alone does not guarantee the outcome of war, throughout history, militaries that best innovate have a decisive advantage on the battlefield.37 The American military has long enjoyed technological superiority over its adversaries, however, this advantage is now diminishing. China’s national-level focus on AI innovation has manifested in significant technological advancements, enabling the PLA toward achieving its goal of becoming a world-class military. Within this ongoing geopolitical rivalry, the competition to harness the power of AI will shape the global balance of power for years to come.

Preserving U.S. miliary overmatch requires an acceleration of AI development across the DOD. Strengthened partnership with the private sector is essential to making the progress needed to outpace the PLA. Although China’s military-civil fusion strategy has yielded impressive results, the most capable AI companies reside in the United States. These firms, with their highly skilled workforce and cutting-edge research, have the potential to produce the most advanced military applications of AI. The United States’ market-based system holds a distinct advantage in fostering innovation, but the DOD must continue to adapt to fully harness its potential. The ongoing Replicator initiative represents the DOD’s biggest bet in AI development. Its success is crucial for the future of the U.S. military.

While new technologies are always under development, rarely do they pose as much potential as AI. Military advantage is normally gained by the side that better understands the environment, the enemy, and themselves. Battles are typically won by commanders who make timely, well-informed decisions. AI is a technology that will enable all of this.

The military AI revolution has only begun. How it proceeds—and whether the United States ultimately prevails—will depend upon the urgency with which we approach this opportunity, the adaptability of our organizations, and the perseverance of our people. The potential of AI is limitless but only if we have the foresight to understand it and the fortitude to embrace the challenge.

Notes

Epigraph. “Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief on the Breakthrough He Needs to Bear Russia,” The Economist (website), 1 November 2023, https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia.

National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), 10, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s ‘World-Class Military’ Ambitions: Origins and Implications,” Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 85, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1735850.
Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” in Defense Budgeting for a Safer World: The Experts Speak, ed. Michael Boskin, John Rader, and Kiran Sridhar (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2003), 37.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2023: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], 2023), 139.
Ibid., 140.
Elsa Kania, “Artificial Intelligence in China’s Revolution in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no. 4 (2021): 515, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.1894136.
Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, ed. Joseph Harahan and Richard Kohn (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 30.
Michael Wooldridge, A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence: What It Is, Where We Are, and Where We Are Going (New York: Flatiron Books, 2020), 24.
Rockwell Anyoha, “The History of Artificial Intelligence,” Science in the News Special Edition: Summer 2017, 28 August 2017, https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.
Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology (New York: Scribner, 2022), 31.
Rekha Jain, “Expert Systems: A Management Perspective,” Vikalpa 14, no. 4 (1989): 17, https://doi.org/10.1177/0256090919890404.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities for Weapon Systems, GAO-22-104765 (Washington, DC: U.S. GAO, 2022), 5, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104765.
Pamela McCorduck, Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence (Natick, MA: A. K. Peters, 2004), 511.
U.S. GAO, Artificial Intelligence, 5.
Mustafa Suleyman, The Coming Wave: Technology, Power, and the 21st Century’s Greatest Dilemma (New York: Crown Publishing, 2023), 60.
Ibid., 63.
Wooldridge, A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence, 128.
Patrick Tucker, “An AI Just Beat a Human F-16 Pilot in a Dogfight – Again,” Defense One, 20 August 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/08/ai-just-beat-human-f-16-pilot-dogfight-again/167872/.
U.S. DOD, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance our Security and Prosperity (Washington, DC: U.S. DOD, 2018), 5, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019), 5, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.
Ibid., 5.
Alex Stone and Peter Wood, China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Chinese Strategists (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2020), 26, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2217101/chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy/.
China’s Pursuit of Defense Technologies: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 118th Cong. 48 (2023) (statement of Elsa Kania, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security).
Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy, Harnessed Lightning: How the Chinese Military Is Adopting Artificial Intelligence (Washington, DC: Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2021), 32, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/harnessed-lightning/.
“Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks’ Remarks: ‘Unpacking the Replicator Initiative’ at the Defense News Conference (As Delivered),” U.S. DOD, 6 September 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3517213/deputy-secretary-of-defense-kathleen-hicks-remarks-unpacking-the-replicator-ini/.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, “Realignment and Management of the Defense Innovation Unit,” 4 April 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/04/2003192904/-1/-1/1/REALIGNMENT-AND-MANAGEMENT-OF-THE-DEFENSE-INNOVATION-UNIT.PDF.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 101.
J. P. Pressley, “Why Banks Are Using Advanced Analytics for Faster Fraud Detection,” BizTech, 25 July 2023, https://biztechmagazine.com/article/2023/07/why-banks-are-using-advanced-analytics-faster-fraud-detection.
Bo Zhang, Huiping Shi, and Hongtao Want, “Machine Learning and AI in Cancer Prognosis, Predictioin, and Treatment Selection: A Critical Approach,” Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 16 (2023): 1779, https://doi.org/10.2147/JMDH.S410301.
Brian R. Price, “Colonel John Boyd’s Thoughts on Disruption: A Useful Effects Spiral from Uncertainty to Chaos,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies 14, no. 1 (2023): 99, https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20231401004.
Herbert S. Lin, ed., The Stanford Emerging Technology Review 2023: A Report on Ten Key Technologies and Their Policy Implications (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2023), 26, https://setr.stanford.edu/.
Ibid., 25.
Ibid., 26.
Nestor Maslej et al., Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2023 (Stanford, CA: Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, 2023), 322, https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/.
“DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,” U.S. DOD, 24 February 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.
James Johnson, “Artificial Intelligence and Future Warfare: Implications for International Security,” Defense and Security Analysis 35, no. 2 (2019): 158, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800.
Andrew Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023), 3.

Col. Josh Glonek, U.S. Army, is an Army War College Fellow at Stanford University, where he researches artificial intelligence and strategic competition between the United States and China. He holds a BS from West Point and an MPP from the University of Chicago. In recent assignments, Glonek served as the division operations officer for the 10th Mountain Division; commander of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment; and the chief speechwriter to the secretary of defense.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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