Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"No political theory is adequate unless it is applicable to children as well as to men and women...The two principles of justice and liberty...will not give much guidance as regards education."

– Bertrand Russell

The day knowledge was preferred to wisdom and mere usefulness to beauty. . . . Only a moral revolution -- not a social or a political revolution -- only a moral revolution would lead man back to his lost truth.

– Simone de Beauvoir

“The old terms must be invented with new meaning and given new explanations. Liberty, equality, and fraternity are no longer what they were in the days of the late-lamented guillotine. This is what the politicians will not understand; and that is why I hate them. They want only their own special revolutions- external revolutions, political revolutions, etc. But that is only dabbling. What is really needed is a revolution of the human spirit.”

– Henrik Ibsen

1. China's military isn't just putting on a show of force. It's rehearsing for the real deal, an assault on Taiwan.

2. Taiwan Must Control Its Own Destiny

3. International Criminal Court Prosecutor Threatens United States Senators

4. Revolutionizing National Security: Unleashing the Power of Nested Objectives

5. Can the U.S. Defend South Korea and Taiwan Simultaneously?

6. Wreck of America’s most lethal World War II sub found near the Philippines

7. Names of special ops soldiers killed in Black Hawk crash added to Fort Liberty memorial

8. China testing ability to ‘seize power’ in second day of military drills around Taiwan

9. Foreign fighters training anti-regime forces in Myanmar

10. Xi Jinping’s Recipe for Total Control: An Army of Eyes and Ears

11. It’s Not Just Ideology: Why The US Is Hard-Wired To Be Hostile To Autocratic Regimes

12. Moral bankruptcy: The world chooses to sustain Hamas monsters - opinion

13. Campus Protests Reflect Impatience With U.S. Foreign Policy

14. Regaining Our Standing as a Maritime Nation

15. Ukrainian Echoes From America’s War for Independence

16. The U.S. Built a $320 Million Pier to Get Aid to Gazans. Little of It Has Reached Them.

17. Gen. Mattis on foreign influence operations: The US has never been 'more vulnerable'

18. ‘Four services and four arms’ lifts CCP control over information warfare

19. U.S. Intelligence Deserves the Distrust It Is Generating

20. Ex-Google CEO Eric Schmidt predicts AI data centers will be ‘on military bases surrounded by machine guns’

21. Plans for China's invasion of Taiwan could be thwarted by a leading European chipmaker's "kill switch," which can remotely deactivate sophisticated chipmaking equipment

22. Call For Papers: Second Annual Irregular Warfare Colloquium

23. Mysterious shooting outside Army Special Forces residence in North Carolina raises questions

24. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 24, 2024

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2024

26. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 24, 2024

27. STRATEGY CENTRAL EXCLUSIVE: Wedemeyer's “20 Laws of Military Planning” Discovered During Recent Pentagon Remodel

1. China's military isn't just putting on a show of force. It's rehearsing for the real deal, an assault on Taiwan.

Here is a map on X/Twitter from Ian Ellis Jones at this link: See the map at this link if it does not come through in the message. https://x.com/ianellisjones/status/1793492050681471401https://x.com/ianellisjones/status/1793492050681471401

Other maps from Ian Ellis Jones at this link: https://images.app.goo.gl/ohfSF1iWH7ccMGJV6https://images.app.goo.gl/ohfSF1iWH7ccMGJV6

I am reminded that we used exercises in the Middle East in late 2002 to position US forces in the region before the invasion of Iraq. I remember hearing a sarcastic comment from a military planner about the exercises. He said the post exercise redeployment plan flows through Baghdad.

When you look at this map we should ask, if they are in these positions now what actions cna Taiwan take to defend itself? What actions could we and other allies take to support the defense of Taiwan given the proximity of the PLA to Taiwan?

China's military isn't just putting on a show of force. It's rehearsing for the real deal, an assault on Taiwan.

Business Insider · by Chris Panella

Military & Defense

Chris Panella

2024-05-24T16:21:56Z

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A screen grab captured from a video shows the Taiwan army conducting military exercises following China's large-scale joint military drill around Taiwan on May 23, 2024. TAIWAN Military News Agency, Ministry of National Defense, R. O. C. / HANDOUT

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China says its large-scale exercise surrounding Taiwan is a test of its ability to conduct a real assault.
The two-day drills are a joint force effort, coming directly after the inauguration of Taiwan's new president.
An invasion is just one of the many strategies China can employ to force Taiwan into submission.

China's large-scale military drills around Taiwan aren't just a show of force in response to the remarks of the democratic island's new president. It's also a kind of rehearsal.

China says the joint force live-fire exercise, lasting two days, is a test of its ability to launch a full-scale, lethal assault on Taiwan and ultimately force it to succumb to Beijing's rule.

This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army exercise "Joint Sword" began Thursday morning, focusing on "joint sea-air combat readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets," Chinese state media reported.

BBC China Correspondent Stephen McDonell posted a segment from CCTV showing the intended purpose of the simulated airstrikes during the exercise, during which live missiles were used. The report identified potential critical targets as ports and airports, among other points.

Giant fireballs explode into the air following an attack on #Taiwan in this graphic on #China Central Television CCTV which just went to air in a story about the People’s Liberation Army exercises over the last two days. pic.twitter.com/Z1FdXUvXmN

— Stephen McDonell (@StephenMcDonell) May 24, 2024

On Friday, the Chinese military's Eastern Theater Command said that it was continuing the drills to "test the ability to jointly seize power, launch joint attacks and occupy key areas."

In other words, China is using these drills to see how its forces would effectively execute an assault against the island of Taiwan in addition to demonstrating to Taiwan that it has the ability to pull off such an operation.

JADE GAO/AFP via Getty Images

As China's Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard conduct training operations around Taiwan's main island, as well as offshore islands, Taiwan has been sounding the alarm, sending out its forces to observe the exercises closely for signs of escalation.

NATIONAL REVIEW MAY 24, 2024

Taiwan Must Control Its Own Destiny

BY BING WEST

https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/05/taiwan-must-control-its-own-destiny/

Any objective observer would counsel Taiwan to tend to its own freedom, and not rely upon America to do it.

Chairman Xi Jinping has promised to control Taiwan within this decade. Yet like Germany, Taiwan does little for itself; it complacently relies on America for protection. Taiwan spends only a token 2.6 percent of its GDP on defense. War games show that only American forces (including aircraft striking from Japanese bases) can repel an amphibious assault on Taiwan. That means both Japan and the U.S. must be willing to fight World War III, shouldering hundreds of thousands of casualties and economic chaos.

Unlike in the case of Germany, however, America has not pledged to fight for Taiwan. Congress has never passed a binding resolution. When President Joe Biden offhandedly said we would fight, his staff publicly walked back his words. He sends cooing emissaries to Taiwan, but his actions show no resolve. He insists Ukraine not strike inside Russia with US-provided weapons. And for four years, he has reduced our navy. Equally uncommitted, former president Donald Trump has refused to declare whether he would fight for Taiwan. He has consistently criticized those under America’s security umbrella who don’t pay their “fair share”. Many in Congress and the media will argue against going to war for a Taiwan that does so little for itself. In a showdown, our next president will be hard-pressed to persuade the public to enter into a major war with unpredictable escalation.

On balance, there’s a good chance that either Biden or Trump will stay out of the fight and treat Taiwan as Ukraine was treated — offering arms from a safe distance. Any objective observer would counsel Taiwan to tend to its own freedom, and not rely upon America to do it.

Without America in the fight, however, Taiwan’s defenses are currently inadequate. If Taiwan falls, the U.S. is cut off from Japan and South Korea and ceases to be the dominant power in Asia.

Is there a way out? Absolutely. Taiwan must show America that it has sacrificed its comfort to provide for its own defense. It must increase its defense budget to 7 percent, matching China’s. That will cause political turmoil, but so too will going the way of Hong Kong. As critical, Taiwan must seize the revolution in naval warfare pioneered by Ukraine. By employing unmanned drones, Ukraine drove the Russian navy from the lower Black Sea. Drones are ubiquitous in combat.

This year, impoverished Ukraine aims to produce a million drones. Taiwan can easily exceed that number, and then use them to great effect. For an amphibious assault, China would have to bring together more than 2,000 ships (rivaling D-Day 1944) and transit 100 miles of flat ocean, with no hiding place. Deploying swarms of 1,000 drones targeting each Chinese ship would dramatically advantage the defender. Granted, Xi can still destroy Taiwan’s infrastructure and economy. But like Khrushchev after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, he would be deposed in historic disgrace after failing to seize the island.

Taiwan cannot rely upon the U.S., which is dribbling out thousands of drones (not even hundreds of thousands) because our congressional-military-industrial complex is sclerotic. Like all its weapons, U.S. drones are far too expensive to procure in bulk. The Pentagon has also imposed severe humanitarian restrictions on developing AI weapons. Taiwan itself is even more laggard, budgeting for 700 “military grade” and more than 7,000 “commercial grade” drones for its armed forces. This feeble gesture amounts to 1 percent of Taiwan’s skimpy military budget. Taiwan currently has $19 billion in backlogged orders of highly costly and out-of-date weapons from the U.S. It should reallocate at least $4 billion to develop a suite of 1 million drones, varying from simple kamikazes to AI-enhanced predators.

Once the amphibious assault — Xi’s rook — is taken off the geopolitical chessboard, he loses much of his military leverage. Xi still retains a menu of “gray zone” stratagems, including imposing a blockade to strangle Taiwan. Such bullying tactics at sea can be stymied by the operational superiority of our navy, provided our own president is so resolved.

Subverting Taiwan from within remains plausible. Cold War II, in all its economic, political, cyber, and military dimensions, will persist for decades. But Taiwan can give itself a dramatic edge with AI-enhanced drones, which have changed the face of naval warfare. “The way to prevent war with China,” Alex Karp, CEO of the defense-focused tech firm, Palantir, said recently, “is to ramp up . . . tech startups that produce software-defining weapons systems that scare the living f*** out of our adversaries.”

Yet Taiwan, while leading in the delivery of civilian high-tech software chips, lags in bringing AI to its own military. On a scale of 100, the Global AI Index ranks China at 62, and Taiwan at an anemic 25. That can be quickly changed. Because of government insistence, for instance, inside two years Singapore rocketed from tenth to third place on the AI index. Taiwan can do the same. It has abundant capital, skilled labor, and an installed production base.

Global AI Index in a Glance

AI IP WAVE0:00/12:441× On 28th June 2023, Tortoise media released the fourth edition of their Tortoise Global A...

To radically improve its deterrent requires Taiwan both to increase and to reallocate its defense budget. Its political and military leaders will refuse to do so. Penurious Ukraine is producing one million drones. Taiwan, afflicted with the Pentagon’s constipation, is fiddling to produce one-fiftieth that number Taiwan is foolishly gambling the next U.S. president — Trump or Biden/Harris — will continue to do all the heavy lifting.

This is both unwise and unworthy of a free people. To quote Pericles from the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC, “Freedom is the sure possession of those alone who have the courage to defend it.” The drone revolution provides Taiwan with its best chance to defend its freedom. Impoverished Ukraine is producing one million drones. But smug Taiwan, afflicted with the Pentagon’s pricey constipation, won’t produce one-fiftieth that number. Taiwan has chosen to remain vulnerable. A 1938 Sudetenland crisis will come for Taiwan. So foolish, because so avoidable.

Military historian Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, has written a dozen books about America’s recent lost wars.

3. International Criminal Court Prosecutor Threatens United States Senators

What is interesting here is that Elliot Abrams is able to base this article on a single tweet from the ICC prosecutor. The influence of X/Twitter.

But this prosecutor should be removed by the court if the ICC wants to retain any semblance of credibility and legitimacy. There is no better exemplar of the adage of "absolute power corrupts, absolutely" from Lord Acton than this ICC prosecutor.

International Criminal Court Prosecutor Threatens United States Senators - Council on Foreign Relations

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has threatened 12 United States senators for their criticisms of his effort to arrest Israeli leaders.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams

May 24, 2024 10:38 am (EST)

cfr.org

International Criminal Court Prosecutor Threatens United States Senators | Council on Foreign Relations

Many critics thought the International Criminal Court had gone too far when its prosecutor asked for arrest warrants against Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

But as the saying goes, “you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.”

Now, the prosecutor’s office has threatened to prosecute criticism of…himself. Those who seek to defend Israel and stop the malicious, deeply antisemitic action against its leaders and against the Jewish state are now being told that their words and actions may also be a crime.

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This may sound like something out of Alice in Wonderland, but it is an effort not only to limit freedom of speech but to limit the constitutional powers of the United State Congress.

After the prosecutor called for the arrest warrants for top Israeli officials, 12 United States Senators wrote to the ICC. The full text of the letter is below. The final paragraphs read:

If you issue a warrant for the arrest of the Israeli leadership, we will interpret this not only as a threat to Israel’s sovereignty but to the sovereignty of the United States.

The United States will not tolerate politicized attacks by the ICC on our allies. Target Israel and we will target you. If you move forward with the measures indicated in the report, we will move to end all American support for the ICC, sanction your employees and associates, and bar you and your families from the United States. You have been warned.

The reaction of the Prosecutor’s office came in a tweet, whose text is also below. The key language is this: “When individuals threaten to retaliate against the Court or Court personnel….such threats, even when not acted upon, may also constitute an offence against the administration of justice under Art. 70 of the Rome Statute….”

Wow.

The 12 United States senators are already criminals, according to the ICC Prosecutor, for writing their letter—even if absolutely nothing else happens. Note that the Prosecutor writes of “individuals” who may threaten the ICC, whereas the senators write as U.S. government officials about possible official U.S. government actions. In plain language, the Prosecutor is arguing that he and the ICC are above criticism. Forget freedom of speech or national sovereignty. To say that the United States, which is not a party to the Rome Statute, might react to punish the ICC for illegal and immoral actions it and its employees may take is not permitted.

Suppose for a moment that the U.S. Congress passes the new legislation the 12 senators threatened, along the lines of the ASPA—the American Servicemembers Protection Act. That was 2002 legislation to protect U.S. military and other personnel from prosecution by the ICC. ASPA gave the president power to use “all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any U.S. or allied personnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court.” ASPA has been colloquially known as “The Hague Invasion Act.”

Voting for such legislation even if it does not pass would clearly, in the view of the ICC prosecutor, be a crime—a form of retaliation and threat prohibited to every inhabitant of Earth by the Rome Statute. So much for the Constitution, for national sovereignty, for self-government, for freedom of speech. The ICC apparently stands above all of that—even for citizens and governmental bodies in countries, such as the United States, that have not signed the Rome Statute and thereby agreed to be subject to the ICC.

This attempted power grab is breathtaking, and should be summarily rejected by citizens and governments around the world. For the United States, this effort to criminalize Senate action and even a call for Senate action should have been met with immediate rejection by Attorney General Garland and President Biden. Silence in this case can be interpreted as consent, and much more is required.

As that term “The Hague Invasion Act” suggests, no one knows how far the ICC is prepared to go—or how far Americans are prepared to go to defend ourselves. What would happen if the lawless prosecutor, Karim Khan, followed his call for arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant with an effort to indict the 12 senators? Would Garland and Biden then react? Would Majority Leader Schumer? What if the senators travelled to a country that has joined the Rome Statute? Would they be jailed and sent to the Hague?

One assumes that the judges of the ICC are not crazy enough to go down this road, even if Karim Khan is. But then, it was widely assumed that the ICC would not move against a democracy such as Israel—and who would have predicted that the prosecutor would threaten United States senators for “threatening” to pass legislation he does not like?

================================================================================================

LETTER TO ICC PROSECUTOR FROM 12 UNITED STATES SENATORS

Mr. Karim A. A. Khan KC

Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal Court

Oude Waalsdorperweg 10 The Hague, The Netherlands

Dear Mr. Khan,

We write regarding the reports that the International Criminal Court (ICC) may be considering issuing international arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials. Such actions are illegitimate and lack legal basis, and if carried out will result in severe sanctions against you and your institution.

The ICC is attempting to punish Israel for taking legitimate actions of self-defense against their Iranian-backed aggressors. In fact, in your own words, you witnessed “scenes of calculated cruelty” conducted by Hamas in Israel following the October 7 attacks. These arrest warrants would align the ICC with the largest state sponsor of terrorism and its proxy. To be clear, there is no moral equivalence between Hamas’s terrorism and Israel’s justified response.

The ICC is also prohibited by its charter from proceeding in any case unless the relevant government is unwilling or unable to police themselves. You yourself have said that “Israel has trained lawyers who advise commanders and a robust system intended to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law.” By issuing warrants, you would be calling into question the legitimacy of Israel’s laws, legal system, and democratic form of government.

Issuing arrest warrants for the leaders of Israel would not only be unjustified, it would expose your organization’s hypocrisy and double standards. Your office has not issued arrest warrants for Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or any other Iranian official, Syrian President Bashar al Assad or any other Syrian official, or Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh or any other Hamas official. Nor have you issued an arrest warrant for the genocidal General Secretary of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, or any other Chinese official.

Finally, neither Israel nor the United States are members of the ICC and are therefore outside of your organization’s supposed jurisdiction. If you issue a warrant for the arrest of the Israeli leadership, we will interpret this not only as a threat to Israel’s sovereignty but to the sovereignty of the United States. Our country demonstrated in the American Service-Members’ Protection Act the lengths to which we will go to protect that sovereignty.

The United States will not tolerate politicized attacks by the ICC on our allies. Target Israel and we will target you. If you move forward with the measures indicated in the report, we will move to end all American support for the ICC, sanction your employees and associates, and bar you and your families from the United States. You have been warned.

/s/

Tom Cotton

Mitch McConnell

Marsha Blackburn

Katie Boyd Britt

Ted Budd

Kevin Cramer

Ted Cruz

Bill Hagerty

Pete Ricketts

Marco Rubio

Rick Scott

Tim Scott

================================================================================================

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4. Revolutionizing National Security: Unleashing the Power of Nested Objectives

I had the honor of studying under the late Terry Deibel and to be part of the military faculty at the National War College in his last years of teaching. We lost one of our nation's great contemporary strategic thinkers in 2015.

The "Deibel Model" remains one of the best and most practical descriptions of strategy.

Thank you to Strategy Central (Home of StratBot AI) for this article. https://www.strategycentral.io/stratbot

Excerpts:

This article underscores the necessity of defining specific, clear, and actionable objectives within the National Security Strategy (NSS) to achieve the desired end states of defending the homeland, fostering economic prosperity, and projecting American values. The NSS, often seen as nebulous and politically driven, requires transformation by incorporating well-defined objectives to serve as a practical guide for subordinate elements of power, including the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC).

Nesting national security objectives within a hierarchical framework ensures alignment and coherence from the NSS to the GCC Theater Campaign Plans. This approach would enhance the effectiveness of military and other national power elements in the geopolitical environment, making daily missions clearer. The solution involves rigorous staff work, logical testing, and war gaming to ensure robust strategies can achieve intended outcomes.

Ultimately, this calls for a systematic and logical approach to strategy formulation that can adapt to changing conditions while maintaining a clear focus on enduring national security interests. Implementing these recommendations will strengthen the United States' strategic posture and enhance its ability to navigate the complexities of the international system.

Revolutionizing National Security: Unleashing the Power of Nested Objectives

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/revolutionizing-national-security-unleashing-the-power-of-nested-objectives?postId=9ddfc3fd-4734-4f6b-8543-fa5882237c58&utm

strategycentral.io · May 25, 2024

How Nesting Objectives with National Security Interests

Could Make America More Secure

MOVING FROM MUDDLED TO POWERFUL

Have you ever read the National Security Strategy (NSS) and felt confused about its goals? Phrases like "defend the homeland" or "prosperity" seem vague and disconnected from reality. Intuitively, we understand that at the highest level, we should defend the homeland, expand prosperity, and protect our way of life. But it often seems difficult to fathom how the NSS connects means and ways to achieve those lofty ends. If logic fails, perhaps we are going on faith that if the NSS end states are achieved, the elements of national power (DIME: Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics) did their collective job. All is well.

If we performed a social media-styled survey of the NSS, the results would surely find a common dismissal of the NSS as a useless document, seeing it as vacuous and politically driven. However, this dismissal might overlook its ultimate prize: a defended, prosperous nation with an uninterrupted way of life and global values. It is an important and serious document. Achieving these conditions is no small feat, and the military plays a critical role. The NSS serves as the United States' strategic "North Star," yet it seems to lack specific objectives that create the conditions for defending, prospering, and protecting/projecting values. It needs improvement to act as the national strategic navigational tool it is meant to be.

This article offers a specific solution. Imagine if the NSS listed specific objectives under "Homeland Defense" and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) nested its objectives under the NSS. Imagine doing this for each national security interest. This would transform the Geographic Combatant Commands' (GCC) ability to align their objectives with the NSS and NDS, eliminating much of the current guesswork.

Few have articulated how to develop an NSS, and Dr. Terry Deibel, a former National Defense University (NDU) professor, whose analysis remains timeless and the best interpretation to date. This article will unveil Dr. Deibel's definition of national security interests, outline the need for clear objectives under each interest, and provide an example of how to "nest" objectives within the hierarchy of U.S. strategies.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES FOR SPECIFIC INTERESTS

Consider the extensive conditions required for our nation to be defended or prosperous, from nuclear threats to pandemics to open trade routes. The NSS provides some big ideas and grand endstates but does not provide an exhaustive list of objectives necessary to achieve these endstates. Adding such objectives to the NSS would transform it into a clear guide for subordinate elements of power, enabling government and industry to create the conditions necessary to secure the country. This is true for each element of national power. However, this article will focus on the military.

Explaining interests and objectives is essential to fully understanding the NSS and the power of well-thought-out and logic-tested supporting objectives. Something not well understood in the national security community is that the four national security interests are permanent. However, the objectives are transient in the ongoing quest to defend the nation, be prosperous, and protect and project values.

Identifying what a nation aims to achieve (opportunities) and analyzing the geopolitical environment to identify threats and opportunities for each interest is a necessary first step. This analysis should form the foundation of our premier strategic document, the NSS, which aims to create the most favorable geopolitical environment for the United States to survive and thrive. These desired conditions must provide a well-defined and achievable focus for strategy development, addressing threat mitigation and exploiting opportunities to advance them.

If the NSS defined the four national security interests and developed clear, achievable objectives, subordinate commands could build their objectives to support the NSS with clarity and directness of purpose. With a solid and reliable set of NSS objectives, the NDS, NMS (National Military Strategy), and GCCs could develop coherent, achievable, and specific subordinate objectives that collectively realize the desired conditions. This ensures the strategy remains focused, viable, and aligned with the nation's well-being from the GCCs to the White House.

Sometimes, domestic political considerations may lead an administration to define a political aim without thorough analysis, potentially issuing an unachievable policy that negatively impacts security conditions. In such cases, strategists must rigorously analyze the situation, considering the costs, risks, and constraints affecting the viability of political aims. Planners should explicitly state outcomes or conditions to be avoided and, if necessary, argue against the feasibility of the national leadership's political aim. Arguing from the viewpoint of keeping synergy of objectives and presenting logical evidence to advise the White House would likely be more successful than winging it on a gut feeling.

DR. DEIBEL’S DISTINGUISHED DEFINITION

In the strategy world, names like Gray, Hart, Huntington, and Mearsheimer are well-known. Dr. Terry L. Deibel, while less recognized, significantly contributed to understanding strategy at the national level. Joining the National War College in 1978, he served for 32 years as a professor of national security strategy. He is best known for the "Deibel Model," a principal archetype for developing strategic plans. His book, "Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft" (Cambridge Press, 2007), continues to guide American strategists, arguing that national security interests must define strategic ends and be translated into clear, coherent, achievable political aims and specific objectives.

Deibel meticulously explores strategic formulation, defining interests, categorizing them, and examining their relationship to threats and opportunities, including prioritization. In this definition, he explains how time, grammar, identity, morality, and power converge. Deibel categorizes national interests into four broad areas: physical security, economic prosperity, value preservation at home, and value projection overseas. He emphasizes that interests under these categories become objectives for subsequent strategies, with hierarchical nesting justifying the objectives as steps toward fulfilling long-term ends.

Defend the homeland (physical security) is the primary duty of any government, protecting the state from external threats. Economic prosperity ranges from survival necessities to surplus resources for advancement, essential for funding defense and promoting growth, often requiring trade. Value preservation involves maintaining the nation’s culture, traditions, and way of life, ensuring they do not perish. Value projection extends beyond national boundaries, aiming to create an international environment compatible with the nation's internal culture and political system, rooted in national identity.

Deibel asserts that foreign policy must reflect national identity to be acceptable to citizens, emphasizing the importance of integrating security and material concerns with moral and ethical considerations. The need to distort the international system diminishes by embedding values into core interests. Both realists and liberals can operate based on moral, ethical, security, and economic needs.

Deibel's "Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft" offers a comprehensive guide to U.S. foreign policy strategy, emphasizing strategic thinking and practical policy-making. He underscores the importance of clear strategic logic, involving understanding foreign policy purposes, defining national interests, and aligning means with ends. Deibel presents a framework for developing foreign policy strategies, including assessing the international environment, identifying national interests, setting clear objectives, and determining the necessary resources and methods. He stresses the critical relationship between means (resources, capabilities, methods) and ends (goals, objectives), warning against mismatches that can lead to strategic failures.

The next section will develop an example of connecting these two vital strategy elements using Deibel's understanding of interests and objectives.

THE FOUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND PROPOSED OBJECTIVES

The four national security interests are permanent, but the objectives are transient in the ongoing quest to defend the nation, be prosperous, and protect and project values. Subordinate objectives of national security interests adapt to contemporary conditions as the nation pursues new opportunities, encounters evolving threats, and experiences economic and societal changes. The challenge lies in viewing environmental changes through the lens of enduring interests and adjusting subordinate objectives accordingly.

The four enduring interests serve as ideal conditions requiring adjustments over time to maintain a heading toward those conditions. The following are the four enduring national security interests and proposed objectives that help clarify what must be achieved to create conditions of physical security, prosperity, and values protection and projection:

1) Physical Security. Ensure the survival of the American people and territory of the United States from external attack. Prevent externally caused injury or destruction of life or property within the territory of the United States and protect American citizens or possessions abroad.

Subordinate National Security Objectives:

Defend American territory and citizens from space, air, sea, land, information, or virtual attack.
Prevent the use and deter and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as catastrophic conventional terrorist or cyber-attacks, against the United States or its military forces abroad.
Prevent the use and slow the global spread of nuclear weapons, secure nuclear weapons and materials, and reduce further proliferation of intermediate and long-range delivery systems for nuclear weapon
Maintain a regional and global balance of power that promotes peace and stability through domestic American robustness, U.S. international primacy and the strengthening and defending U.S. alliance systems,
Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on U.S. borders
Protect citizens and property from natural disasters and the American people from pandemics, serious diseases, famine, and other natural calamities that cause large-scale damage or loss of life.
Protect critical infrastructure from cyber or physical attacks that threaten lives, industry, the power grid, or defensive capabilities.
Maintain lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies.
Prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders.
Repel terrorism, transnational crime, and drug trafficking.

2) Economic Prosperity. Coordinate domestic economic policy and administration with foreign policy so as to expand, enrich, and deepen American economic capabilities that are sustainable, feasible, and acceptable in the pursuit of the American way of life.

Subordinate National Security Objectives:

Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment).
Promote the exportation of American goods and trade policy that attracts potential buyers and investors to American business.
Maximize US GDP growth from international trade and investment.
Enhance exports of specific economic sectors.
Prevent the nationalization of US-owned assets abroad.
Boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors.
Balance bilateral trade deficits.
Ensure safe passage of global sea and air trade routes.
Protect international rule of law that ensures business trade deals and contracts sanctity.

3) Protect American Values at Home. Preserve the nation’s internal system of government, values, and civic culture against change coerced or imposed by an external source.

Subordinate National Security Objectives:

Ensure the survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
Ensure the U.S. government remains formed and operational as per the design of the U.S. Constitution.
Ensure the U.S. government remains sovereign over U.S. territory.
Protect the integrity of the democratic system, elections, voter rights, and freedom to choose the government representatives that are of, by, and for the American people.
Protect against foreign interference and propaganda jeopardizing our democratic system, beliefs, and practices.
Ensure citizens are educated in the political process founded in the Constitution, trained in the expectations of living a civic life within a democracy, and taught how to participate in democracy.
Promote pluralism, the values of patriotism, pride in the nation, and duty to promote the rule of law, human rights, dignity, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

4) Project American Values Overseas. Use democratic principles, the rule of law, capitalism, and traditional morality as a basis for operating in the international system.

Subordinate National Security Objectives:

Support major international institutions that promote peace, stability, and prosperity.
Promote pluralism, freedom, democracy, and capitalism in strategically important states as much as is feasible without destabilization.
Promote the well-being of US allies and partners and work with the international community to protect them from external aggression.
Promote democracy, prosperity, and stability in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Mexico.
Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.
Discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries.

SUBORDINATE OBJECTIVES TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

With National Security Interests defined and supplied with objectives, it is easier to see what is required to create desirable conditions. The next challenge would be creating subordinate objectives for the NDS, NMS, and GCC Theater Campaign Plans. This can be illustrated by taking one of the national security interests and filling in possible subordinate objectives. We will use physical security, the NDS, NMS, and GCC for this example:

PHYSICAL SECURITY - Subordinate National Security Objectives:

NSS: Defend American territory and citizens from space, air, sea, land, information, or virtual attack.
NDS: Deter and prevent attacks on sovereign territory from the five domains by hostile nations and protect citizens from harm in and out of United States Territory.
NMS: Develop capabilities to defend the homeland and citizens at home and abroad.
GCC: Utilize a network of allies and partners to deter and, if necessary, defeat regional threats to the homeland.
NSS: Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, as well as catastrophic conventional terrorist or cyber-attacks, against the United States or its military forces abroad.
NDS: Seek out, dismantle, destroy, or deter the use of CBRN materials held by nations that threaten U.S. interests.
NMS: Build a Joint Force capable of deterring the use of CBRN, dismantling illegal CBRN retention, and destroying CBRN material wherever required.
GCC: Deploy specialized Joint Force to conduct counter CBRN operations with regional Allies and Partners to dismantle and destroy illegal CBRN material.
NSS: Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed state on U.S. borders.
NDS: Conduct Competitive Campaigning to deter, degrade, and compel emerging hostile powers to avoid conflict with the United States while partnering with regional allies to support Mexico’s stability.
NMS: Work with the Military Industrial Base to generate material and weapons to support the Joint Force in competition and conflict. Work with the DIME elements to reinforce institution building for Mexico’s security force development.
GCC: Utilize a network of allies and partners to deter and, if necessary, defeat regional threats to the homeland. Conduct stability operations in Mexico as needed.

This seems simplistic, like nested dolls encapsulating one objective in the next higher objective. Despite the apparent simplicity, this is not commonly practiced. The current set of military strategies does not present a clear and logical extension of supporting objectives from the NSS to the GCC Theater Campaign Plans. Casual observers might find general ideas and nebulous language that could be mistaken as mutually supporting elements, but the linkage between current strategies cannot withstand rigorous scrutiny.

The problem lies in structural and logical issues. Most strategies follow a structure from "Problem" to "Task" to "Objective" to "Endstate," or worse, "Problem" to "LOE" (Lines of Effort) to "Endstate." This allows for a broad inclusion of various elements under LOE with little logic or supporting argument stringing together the problem, action required, and end state to create the complete set of conditions each interest demands. For example, stating that Integrated Deterrence will defend the homeland requires far more elucidation and specificity than found in the current NDS. This is a recipe for failure and a critical weakness in our national security.

This issue can be addressed with a low-cost solution: better staff work and logical application when determining if a strategy can achieve the desired end state. An outside assessment team, led by mathematicians, should logic-test the strategy and recommend improvements. Following this, rigorous war games should be conducted to reveal any weaknesses. The President (NSC) and the Secretary of Defense should mandate this process and review the results to ensure national security is not compromised by sloppy work.

IMPLICATIONS OF GETTING OBJECTIVES WRONG

Aligning interests and objectives is crucial for effective strategy formulation. Misidentifying interests can lead to flawed strategies, posing significant risks in developing subordinate strategies, campaigns, and plans. Flawed strategies based on misguided constructs waste resources, provoke unnecessary conflicts, and drain political will during peacetime.

In wartime, strategies not grounded in realistic assessments of logic, facts, political will, resources, and national priorities put the nation at risk. Confusion of interests can lead a state into strategic quicksand, as seen with the Iraq invasion in 2003 and the prolonged engagement in Afghanistan. A sound strategy, informed by theory, history, logic, and facts, is essential for navigating toward our most desired state of security.

CONCLUSION

This article underscores the necessity of defining specific, clear, and actionable objectives within the National Security Strategy (NSS) to achieve the desired end states of defending the homeland, fostering economic prosperity, and projecting American values. The NSS, often seen as nebulous and politically driven, requires transformation by incorporating well-defined objectives to serve as a practical guide for subordinate elements of power, including the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC).

Nesting national security objectives within a hierarchical framework ensures alignment and coherence from the NSS to the GCC Theater Campaign Plans. This approach would enhance the effectiveness of military and other national power elements in the geopolitical environment, making daily missions clearer. The solution involves rigorous staff work, logical testing, and war gaming to ensure robust strategies can achieve intended outcomes.

Ultimately, this calls for a systematic and logical approach to strategy formulation that can adapt to changing conditions while maintaining a clear focus on enduring national security interests. Implementing these recommendations will strengthen the United States' strategic posture and enhance its ability to navigate the complexities of the international system.

IN MEMORIAM

Terrence James Deibel (May 13, 1961 – February 10, 2015) passed away from cancer at age 53. Dr. Deibel graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University, L'Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, Switzerland, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His academic career included teaching at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Deibel was renowned for his research in strategic thinking. The national security community was fortunate to have a man of his drive and talent shed light on the difficult process of developing a national security strategy. His work lives on in us all; we have to read his work and apply it for a more secure America.

strategycentral.io · May 25, 2024

5. Can the U.S. Defend South Korea and Taiwan Simultaneously?

I think this is fundamentally the wrong question but it is indicative of how we Americans think. It is all about us and what we can and will do. But Dr. Bennett does recognize the importance of allies and enhancing their cooperation but I really want to highlight the headline the headline editor used and how that illustrates our America only thinking.

Taiwan and Korea together may be the ultimate wicked (military) problem of the 21st Century. Given the combination of both the tyranny of distance (US distance from the combat theaters) and the tyranny of proximity (distance [proximity] of the threats [China and north Korea] to the objectives [Taiwan and South Korea]) it may be impossible for the US alone to defend both.

The proper question may be can the US AND its allies defend Taiwan and South Korea?

Now let's think through how China and north Korea interpret this article and what opportunities they see and might exploit? Does this give them confidence?

And then ask the ultimate questions: How can we prevent war in Taiwan and on the Korean peninsula?

Can the U.S. Defend South Korea and Taiwan Simultaneously?

The U.S. currently lacks the military capability to defend South Korea, Taiwan, and other allies simultaneously. To ensure security in Northeast Asia, the U.S. needs to increase its military investments and enhance allied cooperation.

nationalinterest.org

Can the U.S. Defend South Korea and Taiwan Simultaneously? | The National Interest

May 24, 2024 Topic: Security Region: Americas Blog Brand: The Buzz

by Bruce W. Bennett Follow @bwbennett on Twitter L

Summary: The U.S. currently lacks the military capability to defend South Korea, Taiwan, and other allies simultaneously. To ensure security in Northeast Asia, the U.S. needs to increase its military investments and enhance allied cooperation.

-This includes augmenting both conventional and nuclear forces and developing a clear strategy to deter adversaries.

-The U.S. has shifted from building forces capable of defending two theaters simultaneously, relying instead on strategic ambiguity.

-However, growing threats from adversaries like China and North Korea necessitate a return to more robust military preparations and enhanced alliances.

-South Korea, in particular, needs to bolster its military capabilities, including improved reserve training and air force dispersal strategies.

The United States right now lacks the military capabilities needed to defend South Korea, Taiwan, and other allies all at the same time. Defending its allies and partners in Northeast Asia will require greater U.S. military investment and greater allied cooperation.

The Urgent Need for Enhanced U.S. Military Investment in Northeast Asia

The United States should significantly augment both the quantity and quality of its conventional and nuclear forces, both at home and in the region. It must also enhance its commitments and strategies for dealing with foreign challenges, convincing adversary leaders that they will not find U.S. and allied gaps to exploit.

In recent decades, the United States has abandoned building military forces, supplies, and logistics capable of defending even two theaters simultaneously – doing so is viewed as just too expensive. Washington bet on strategic ambiguity to deter adversaries while maintaining significant but limited military capabilities. In the post-Cold War era, where no major adversary posed a serious threat to the United States, that approach worked well enough, and it allowed the U.S. to moderate its military expenditures.

But times have changed. Declared adversaries of the United States are pursuing substantial military capability enhancements. Meanwhile, the United States is struggling to maintain existing military capabilities in bulk. For example, the United States deferred nuclear force modernization for several decades despite adversary modernization programs. The planned U.S. modernization program reduces the number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. A recent bipartisan congressional commission found the program inadequate.

To meet its global security requirements, the current U.S. administration has been quite clear that it needs global allies and partners. This is especially true relative to Chinese threats, against which the United States requires allied assistance in both military and economic terms. But the U.S. will not have the needed allies and partners unless it also commits to their national security.

Some U.S. voices are turning away from allies and partners. For example, some feel that the United States should substantially reduce its security commitments to South Korea and give Seoul the responsibility for maintaining its security against North Korea. But doing so could well convince the South Koreans to not support the United States in dealing with China, and that would not be in the U.S. interest. Alliances are designed to achieve mutual security, not just U.S. security.

To manage growing adversary threats, the United States and its allies and partners each need to significantly enhance their own military capabilities, then work closely together to integrate those capabilities. While it might be tempting to defer military improvements because of the financial cost, like the United States did before World War II, in future conflicts the U.S. is unlikely to have the kind of recovery period it had in the early years of World War II to rebuild its military capabilities and industrial base. It may have no recovery period at all.

Some U.S. adversaries appear to be searching for U.S. and allied capability gaps. Thus in 2024 North Korea has claimed successful hypersonic missile tests; it hopes these missiles will overcome U.S. missile defenses. Fortunately, the United States already has some Patriot capability against such threats, while the U.S. and Japan have agreed to develop interceptors to counter hypersonic glide vehicles. But these capabilities will not be cheap.

In June 2023 the United States released a National Intelligence Estimate extract that suggests North Korea is most likely to use its nuclear weapons for coercive purposes. Washington faced a similar concern in the 1970s. It worried that the Soviet Union might employ limited nuclear attacks against the United States, with the Soviets hoping their nuclear capabilities could deter a massive U.S. retaliation. In response, the United States developed limited nuclear options (LNOs) that allowed a U.S. president to respond proportionally to any Soviet limited nuclear attack while imposing unacceptable costs on the Soviet Union. Threatened LNO abilities helped deter such Soviet attacks.

The United States once again needs a declaratory nuclear doctrine and strategy that includes LNOs.

On the South Korean side, its biennial Defense White Paper has for decades argued that to defend South Korea, the United States would provide 690,000 troops and 2,000 aircraft, among other resources. This has been an exaggeration for many years. But it helped South Korea feel comfortable reducing its army from 560,000 active duty personnel to 365,000 in 2022. That number has fallen further since then, the result of both unfavorable demographics and of political decisions to reduce the amount of time draftees must serve.

While South Korea’s army has a large number of reserve personnel, almost all of those reserves train no more than three days a year. That is not nearly enough to develop the unit cohesion needed for most military operations – including stabilization of North Korea, should South Korea-led unification ever become a reality.

Expanding the active-duty manpower of the South Korean army is neither demographically nor politically feasible. Thus, as I have argued before, the Republic of Korea Army needs a two-track reserve system: one track as done currently, and another where reserve soldiers are trained more like U.S. Army reserve personnel. American reserves train one weekend a month and two weeks each summer, or roughly 10 times the current annual level of South Korean army reserves.

Reservists would be allowed to choose their track, with those selecting the second track receiving a government scholarship that covers their college tuition even through graduate school. These reservists could then be trained to join active-duty army units when mobilized, substantially augmenting those forces.

South Korea’s Defense Reform 2020 plan, adopted in 2005, sought a turn to technology to deal with anticipated reductions in South Korean military manpower. It planned a total defense budget of 621 trillion won between 2006 and 2020 to cover all defense costs. Yet by 2020 the Ministry of National Defense had received only 522 trillion won, about 100 trillion won short of the plan. And because manpower costs actually increased, much of the reduction came out of South Korean military acquisition, significantly reducing the tradeoff between planned technology and manpower.

Many of South Korea’s limited military technology advances have favored the Republic of Korea Air Force – the U.S. F-35 and the Korean KF-21 fighter aircraft are examples. This approach made sense in confronting North Korea, allowing airpower to offset ground force reductions. But the growing North Korean nuclear threat makes much of that capability vulnerable, because it is largely located at a small number of airfields. Indeed, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been very clear that those airfields would be targets for nuclear weapons in future conflicts.

To counter this threat, South Korea’s air force needs to disperse at least some of its combat aircraft to civilian airfields even in peacetime, increasing the locations that a surprise North Korean nuclear attack would have to neutralize. It could man these dispersal airfields primarily with ROK Air Force reserve personnel who serve more days each year, like in the second-track army reserve proposed above. Highway landing strips could also be developed around both its main combat air bases and these dispersal air bases, as was done with the Swedish BAS 90 program during the Cold War. This would provide even greater air force resilience in a conflict.

The enhanced defense programs suggested here would cost money. But in a world where adversaries are increasing their military capabilities and presenting greater threats, the deterrence required for peace demands advanced, credible U.S. and allied capabilities. Abandoning the security of some U.S. allies to make up for inadequate U.S. and allied military investments is a dangerous, short-sighted approach.

About the Author: Dr. Bruce W. Bennett

Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.

All images are Creative Commons.

NLAW: The Missile That Destroyed Countless Russian Tanks in Ukraine

November 21, 2023

by Maya Carlin

nationalinterest.org

6. Wreck of America’s most lethal World War II sub found near the Philippines

Yamashita's gold? Unfortunately the timing doesn't appear to line up for that.

Wreck of America’s most lethal World War II sub found near the Philippines

Stars and Stripes · by Wyatt Olson · May 24, 2024

A multidimensional photogrammetry model created by The Lost 52 Project shows the wreck of the USS Harder off the coast of the Philippines, where it was recently found by the project. (The Lost 52 Project)

An organization on a quest to find and memorialize all 52 U.S. submarines lost during World War II has located the wreck of the USS Harder, a sub credited with sinking the most enemy warships during that conflict.

The Naval History and Heritage Command confirmed the wreck site using data collected and provided by Tim Taylor, the CEO of Tiburon Subsea and The Lost 52 Project, according to a command news release Thursday.

Taylor founded The Lost 52 after discovering his first lost U.S. submarine in 2010.

Taylor told NBC News on Wednesday that the Harder was found in the South China Sea near the coast of the Philippines.

“Resting at a depth of more than 3,000 feet, the vessel sits upright on her keel relatively intact except for the depth-charge damage aft of the conning tower,” the Heritage Command said in the news release.

“Submarines by their very design can be a challenge to identify, but the excellent state of preservation of the site and the quality of the data collected by The Lost 52 allowed for [the Heritage Command] to confirm the identity of the wreck as Harder.”

The Lost 52 project has previously located the wreckage sites of USS Grayback, USS Stickleback, USS R-12, USS S-26, USS S-28 and USS Grunion.

The USS Harder, nicknamed “Hit ‘em HARDER,” was renowned for its “particularly audacious attacks,” Samuel Cox, the retired Navy rear admiral who now directs the Heritage Command, said in the news release.

The sub completed six successful patrols in just over a year before it was last seen off the coast of Luzon, Philippines.

On its fifth patrol, regarded as its most successful, Harder sank three Japanese destroyers and heavily damaged two others, all over the span of only four days.

The sub’s frequent attacks “resulted in Adm. Ozawa’s Mobile Fleet departing Tawi-Tawi [Philippines] a day ahead of schedule,” the Heritage Command news release states. “The premature departure upset the Japanese battle plans and forced Ozawa to delay his carrier force in the Philippine Sea, contributing to the defeat suffered by the Japanese in the ensuing battle.”

In mid-August 1944, Harder and two other U.S. subs jousted with Japanese vessels over several days.

Japanese records state that on Aug. 24, 1944, Harder fired three torpedoes at escort ship CD-22, which it evaded, the Heritage Command said.

The escort ship then dropped a series of depth charges in Dasol Bay, Luzon. The fifth depth charge attack is believed to have sunk Harder, the Heritage Command said.

The Navy declared Harder, along with its crew of 79, to be presumed lost in January 1945.

The sub was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its first five patrols.

Harder’s commander, Samuel D. Dealey, received the Navy Cross four times while commanding and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Stars and Stripes · by Wyatt Olson · May 24, 2024

7. Names of special ops soldiers killed in Black Hawk crash added to Fort Liberty memorial

Let us take a moment on Memorial Day and remember these Americans and all those who have given their last full measure to defend our unalienable rights: Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.

Names of special ops soldiers killed in Black Hawk crash added to Fort Liberty memorial

fayobserver.com

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command added five new names to its memorial wall during a ceremony Thursday, bringing to 1,273 the total number of command soldiers who died in the line of duty.

The five USASOC soldiers, with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment based at Fort, Cambell, Kentucky, were killed Nov. 10 when the Black Hawk helicopter they were on crashed in the Mediterranean Sea.

“They rapidly and bravely deployed without hesitation and volunteered to be upfront where the mission is hard,” Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, commander of USASOC, told the crowd gathered at Fort Liberty for Thursday’s ceremony. “They were willing to put their own lives in danger to answer the call and follow their passion to be a force of good in this world.”

The fallen are:

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Stephen R. Dwyer

Dwyer, 38, from Clarksville, Tennessee, commissioned from West Point as a fire support officer, then six years later became a warrant officer and went to flight school; first flying Black Hawks with the 101st Airborne Division, before piloting the MH-60L, known as a DAP or direction action penetrator.

“He never met a stranger as his humility, charisma and attitude made him legendary with his company ranks,” Braga said. “He loved flying. He loved people, loved rugby.”

Dwyer is survived by his wife Allie; son Duke, 7; son Brody, 5; mother Gail, father Steve; brothers Christopher and Timothy and sister Marie, Braga said.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Shane M. Barnes

Following Thursday’s ceremony, Barnes' family said the Sacramento, California, native joined the Army because he came from a law enforcement service family.

“If you asked Shane, he’d say “Top Gun,” was his inspiration,” his father said.

When he was in fourth grade, his mother said, Barnes wore his grandfather’s flight suit for Halloween and after 9/11, it “cemented he wanted to protect” his country.

Barnes’ parents said that while in flight school, he met his wife. He was 34 when he was killed.

His widow, Samatha Barnes, said she doesn’t want her daughters to grow up being sad.

“I want them to know how much he loved her and if he could be here, he would, but what he chose to do, he was willing to do that,” she said.

Staff Sgt. Tanner W. Grone

Grone, 26, was intelligent, dedicated to helping his team and a calm, competent leader for soldiers in his charge, Braga said.

“When flying with Tanner, pilots and crew chiefs alike instantly felt more at ease knowing Tanner was there with them,” he said.

Originally from Gorham, New Hampshire, he is survived by his mother Erica, father Steve and sister Emily.

Sgt. Andrew P. Southard

Southard, 27, fit in with his teammates and was “someone trusted to executive even the most complicated tasks with honor and integrity,” Braga said.“His infectious smile and professional drive made him a force within the unit, someone who was present, someone who was positive and devoted to his team and mission."

From Apache Junction, Arizona, Southard is survived by his wife Ashley; daughter, Hailey, 2; son Jack, 5; son Warren, 9; and his parents Kim and Frank.

Sgt. Cade M. Wolfe

Wolfe, 24, was known for his “quick smile, wit and strong work ethic,” often staying late for work, Braga said.

The Mankato, Minnesota, native was “always dedicated to getting one more thing done, smiling the entire time, even when he tried to be serious” and “couldn’t help but break into laughter,” Braga said.

Wolfe is survived by his wife Danielle; mother Julie; father Scott; stepmother Heather; stepfather Dave and brother Cooper.

“These men responded to the worst day of someone’s life, to a country and population in need,” Braga said. “It was not something for which they wanted to receive accolades or for something which they ever expected recognition. … They lived their passion. They lived their creed.”

Family

Braga said that all of USASOC’s fallen teammates are memorialized in battlefields, cemeteries and on statues around the world, but also by men and women around the world.

He promised each Gold Star family their loved ones would not be forgotten, as their memories are shared with younger soldiers.

He told the families they are part of USASOC’s family, too.

Another Gold Star family at Thursday's ceremony were the parents of Staff Sgt. Mark Alan Stets Jr.,39, who was killed Feb. 3, 2010, by an improvised explosive device while in Pakistan.

Stets was a senior psychological operations sergeant assigned to Company C, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group.

His parents, Nancy and Mark Stets Sr., came from Virginia Beach to attend Thursday's ceremony. They said their son grew up "playing Army," but first joined the Navy.

Nancy Stets said that her son was on his way to the dedication of a girls school in Pakistan when he and four other soldiers were killed.

"Even though they’re in a dangerous place, doing dangerous things, you don’t expect that to happen," she said.

He left behind a wife and three teenage daughters.

The Stets said ceremonies like Thursday's help keep their son's memory alive.

"Every time we come down here, somebody comes out of the woodwork that knew Mark," his father said.

For the first time in the 14 years since their son's death, they said, they met a soldier this week who was serving with their son at the time of his death.

"Soldiers that are involved in the loss of one of their teammates, they have to bury them, and so it makes it hard for them," Stet's mother said. They carry wounds of war that we don’t see."

Staff writer Rachael Riley can be reached at rriley@fayobserver.com or 910-486-3528.

fayobserver.com

8. China testing ability to ‘seize power’ in second day of military drills around Taiwan

What appears to be an operational map someone shared with me:

Excerpts:

A conflict over Taiwan would be catastrophic, and likely involve other countries in the region and beyond. In response to the drills, representatives from Japan, the US, South Korea and Australia called for calm. The US state department told Taiwan’s Central News Agency that it was closely monitoring the situation, while Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, warned that “the risk of an accident, and potential escalation, is growing”.

The EU said it had “a direct interest in the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan strait” and opposed “any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion”.

A spokesperson for the UN secretary general, António Guterres, said the organisation was following developments in the Taiwan strait and urged “relevant parties to refrain from acts that could escalate tensions in the region”.

On Chinese social media the drills made up at least three of the top 10 trending topics on the tightly controlled Weibo platform, with most visible comments highly supportive of “unifying” Taiwan. In Taiwan, there was no visible panic or negative effect on the stock market. Many people instead focused on a controversial bill that has sparked physical fights in parliament. Critics say the bill threatens the functioning of government.

China testing ability to ‘seize power’ in second day of military drills around Taiwan

PLA says exercises launched in response to president’s inauguration will test capacity to ‘launch joint attacks and occupy key areas’

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · May 24, 2024

China has conducted mock missile strikes against Taiwan on a second day of military drills, which it said was testing its ability to “seize power”, and inflict punishment for “separatist acts” after the inauguration of the island’s new president.

The exercises, which involved Chinese military units from the air force, rocket force, navy, army and coastguard, were announced suddenly on Thursday morning, with maps showing five approximate target areas in the sea surrounding Taiwan’s main island. Other areas targeted Taiwan’s offshore islands, which are close to the Chinese mainland.

China’s defence ministry said the drills on Friday were testing its military’s capability to “seize power” and occupy key areas, in line with Beijing’s ultimate goal of annexing Taiwan. Taiwan’s government and people reject the prospect of Chinese rule, but China’s ruler, Xi Jinping, has not ruled out the use of force to take the island. Western intelligence has claimed Xi has told the People’s Liberation Army to be capable of an invasion by 2027.

How significant are China’s military drills around Taiwan?

On Friday, China’s state broadcaster said jets loaded with live ammunition, and formations of bombers had run mock strikes against Taiwanese targets. CCTV said missiles launches were also practised and an accompanying animation highlighted the cities of Taipei, Hualien, Taitung and Kaohsiung as targets. Fiery PLA propaganda mentioned its Dongfeng ballistic missiles, but without specific suggestions they would be used in the drills.

Citing a Taiwan security official, Reuters reported the planes had also run mock bombings of “foreign vessels” in the Bashi Channel, which runs between Taiwan and the Philippines.

It was not immediately clear what vessels were targeted – the waters around Taiwan hold lots of commercial traffic – but in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan there would be pressure on foreign militaries including the US and Japan to get involved.

China’s coastguard said it had run “enforcement drills” off Taiwan’s east coast, and at least three coastguard vessels were seen on online ship trackers, patrolling Taiwan’s south-west. The Taiwan official also told Reuters the coastguard had conducted “mock inspections” of civilian boats in the east and about 24 warplanes approached close to Taiwan, but none entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone extending 24 nautical miles offshore.

On Thursday Taiwan detected 35 PLA navy and coastguard ships and 49 warplanes, of which 35 crossed the median line, the de facto border between China and Taiwan.

China launches drills around Taiwan after inauguration of new president – video

In response, Taiwan has scrambled jets, deployed navy vessels to monitor the PLA, and moved anti-ship missile systems to coastal areas. On Friday its defence ministry released footage it said showed its airforce tracking a Chinese H-6 bomber and a J-16 fighter jet.

Taiwan’s foreign minister, Lin Chia-lung, said Taiwan would make no concessions because of the drills “because it concerns the development of democracy in Taiwan”.

The rhetoric has been high but these drills are smaller in scale than those held in 2022 and 2023. Beijing did not declare any no-fly zones, and no live fire was used on Thursday except in practice areas on the Chinese mainland, according to Taiwan’s military.

On Thursday China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, said: “Taiwan independence forces will be left with their heads broken and blood flowing after colliding against the great … trend of China achieving complete unification,” according to a Reuters translation.

An editorial in China’s official state media on Friday said the drills were “legitimate, timely and entirely necessary, as ‘Taiwan independence’ acts in any form cannot be tolerated”. It said China’s countermeasures were “inevitable” after the “serious provocation” of Lai’s inauguration speech.

Lai was inaugurated as Taiwan’s president on Monday after winning democratic elections in January. Lai and his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, are from the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive party (DPP), which Beijing considers separatist.

In his inauguration speech Lai affirmed Taiwan’s sovereignty, promised to defend it, and urged China to end hostilities. Any speech by a president belonging to the DPP, short of capitulating to Beijing’s position that Taiwan belongs to China, was likely to provoke an angry response.

China-Taiwan relations: what’s behind the tensions – in 30 seconds

A conflict over Taiwan would be catastrophic, and likely involve other countries in the region and beyond. In response to the drills, representatives from Japan, the US, South Korea and Australia called for calm. The US state department told Taiwan’s Central News Agency that it was closely monitoring the situation, while Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, warned that “the risk of an accident, and potential escalation, is growing”.

The EU said it had “a direct interest in the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan strait” and opposed “any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion”.

A spokesperson for the UN secretary general, António Guterres, said the organisation was following developments in the Taiwan strait and urged “relevant parties to refrain from acts that could escalate tensions in the region”.

On Chinese social media the drills made up at least three of the top 10 trending topics on the tightly controlled Weibo platform, with most visible comments highly supportive of “unifying” Taiwan. In Taiwan, there was no visible panic or negative effect on the stock market. Many people instead focused on a controversial bill that has sparked physical fights in parliament. Critics say the bill threatens the functioning of government.

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · May 24, 2024

9. Foreign fighters training anti-regime forces in Myanmar

But those few (those happy few) punch well above their weight (in terms of training, advice, and assistance). But we do not need an influx of foreign fighters looking for adventure and fame.

De Oppresso Liber -not to "free the oppressed" but rather "to help the oppressed free themselves."

MYANMAR CRISIS

Foreign fighters training anti-regime forces in Myanmar

Numbers too small so far to be game changing in overall battle situation

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Foreign-fighters-training-anti-regime-forces-in-Myanmar?utm

A British fighter helping train resistance forces in Chin State, Myanmar. (Photo by PDF Zoland)

LORCAN LOVETT, Contributing writer

May 23, 2024 09:31 JST

BANGKOK -- Three years after Myanmar's military seized power in February 2021 and arrested its democratically elected leaders, foreign fighters have made their first known appearance with anti-regime forces in several parts of the country, giving a small boost to battle training and aiming to enhance the capabilities of resistance forces.

About a dozen foreigners are thought to have taken up arms against the regime, not as mercenaries but as adventurers receiving rations and accommodation at most. That estimate is based on interviews with resistance sources and foreign fighters, and is small in comparison to large conflicts elsewhere.

Analysts told Nikkei Asia that they are unlikely to have a significant impact on Myanmar's broader battlefield dynamics. But international volunteer fighters who spoke with Nikkei Asia hope their fighting experience can benefit established ethnic armed groups and newer resistance forces pushing back the regime in what analysts describe as a potentially decisive year for the spiraling, nationwide conflict.

The world of foreign fighters in Myanmar is secretive and murky, with the rare few who do agree to speak insisting on anonymity.

Jason, in his early 30s, is one. He served in the British army from 2009 for four years as an infantryman, including combat duties in Afghanistan, which led him to question the U.K.'s role in the conflict. Seeing an opportunity to support the underdog, he fought for Ukraine after Russia's invasion.

Earlier this year, a Burmese friend introduced Jason to the resistance in Myanmar. Initially wary of unwittingly engaging with regime-aligned militia, he found the resistance fighters to be remarkably kind and dedicated.

"They're probably the nicest people I've ever met," Jason told Nikkei.

After often starting their uprisings with little more than hunting rifles and slingshots -- and certainly no foreign military assistance -- ethnic armed groups and other resistance forces have gone on to take numerous military-held bases and small towns.

Nikkei has seen photos and video showing Jason using a sniper rifle and semi-automatic weapons against regime positions, but it has not been told about the results.

Jason described the fighting as "very up-close," involving "many small arms" and "old-school" trench and compound assaults. Barrel bombs dropped by the Myanmar Air Force to burn villages and farmhouses have been a new experience for him, however.

The British veteran believes that some tactical adjustments could help save fighters' lives as they take on a far more heavily armed adversary.

"You are always going to get deaths, but you can at least limit the chances," he said. One tactic would be to use smoke grenades to conceal fighters advancing across open spaces toward trenches.

"If the resistance can get hold of smoke, it will change the game for them, because they are more on the offensive now," he added.

Resistance forces are increasingly setting their sights on towns and cities held by the Myanmar military. The Naypyitaw regime has retaliated with scorched-earth tactics and indiscriminate airstrikes.

Jason said the resistance forces are better placed to teach him about jungle warfare. He sees his role as to help them with flanking maneuvers, ambushes, assaults in urban areas and other offensive tactics. He plans to organize an "in-depth, as quick as we can, infantry course" with the help of at least six former servicemen he will recruit from Australia, Canada, the U.K. and U.S. in the coming months.

Just as in Ukraine, arms and ammunition shortages are the main problem afflicting opposition forces nationwide. "They do not have it easy," he said.

Myanmar's military is well-trained and "should not be underestimated," but frontline conditions have become "a lot worse" for its troops. "Morale has tanked and they are scared of the resistance," he said.

Azad, left, a U.S. national flanked here by an unnamed British fighter in Chin State, western Myanmar. Their U.S.-made weapons are a Ruger .338 bolt-action sniper rifle, left, and a Colt AR-pattern 5.56mm assault rifle. An analyst told Nikkei Asia that the weapons would not have been captured from regime forces. (Photo by PDF Zoland)

Azad, 24, a U.S. national with no formal military background, has been fighting alongside resistance forces in western Myanmar's Chin State for three months. He is planning courses on infantry skills, patrols and sniper training among other combat elements.

Azad operates with a British veteran who declined to disclose any information. Previously, he spent four years as a volunteer fighter with Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The two conflicts are similar "in so for as they are both asymmetric warfare," he said.

The presence of foreigners willing to take on risk has encouraged local people, he said over a phone from Chin State. The danger mostly comes from aerial bombardments.

"The troops are often unable to leave their strongholds," said Azad. "The junta is bombing and burning down towns in the east. Lots of people fleeing those towns are coming to join the guerrillas."

Miemie Winn Byrd, a Myanmar-born American scholar and former U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, said resistance successes are encouraging more foreigners to join the fight back.

"The fact that some people are willing to volunteer is a psychological boost for Myanmar people, because they feel like they have been forgotten," she said.

She said the resistance needs more national-level coordination of combat and intelligence, and more psychological and civilian protection operations.

"I am sure foreign volunteers can help on a tactical level," said Byrd. "But being able to integrate all those lines of effort across the country would almost be game-changing assistance."

Anthony Davis, a Bangkok-based analyst and expert on Myanmar's security situation, said that parts of Myanmar, notably eastern Karen State, have a long history of ex-foreign military adventurers operating in an independent capacity with ethnic insurgents. But he said the unexpected scale of the conflict after the military takeover, and the media attention it has attracted, have created more potential for foreign individuals to participate.

"Given current numbers of foreign fighters and trainers in Myanmar, the impact at the strategic level is zero," he said. "Even at the tactical level the impact of foreigners sharing niche skill-sets is still effectively imperceptible."

However, he believes that if their numbers were to swell from single digits into scores, and foreigners were to form their own combat units,"for reasons of language if no other," fighting alongside their Myanmar hosts, "we would then get into geopolitical territory that becomes problematic."

China would perceive the presence of even small international units as a foreign-sponsored threat, he said, likely raising concerns among Western countries and Myanmar's neighbors.

10. Xi Jinping’s Recipe for Total Control: An Army of Eyes and Ears

And I think Xi would like to export these capabilities to other regimes.

My thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

Xi Jinping’s Recipe for Total Control: An Army of Eyes and Ears

By Vivian Wang

Reporting from Beijing

May 25, 2024, 12:01 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Vivian Wang · May 25, 2024

Reviving a Mao-era surveillance campaign, the authorities are tracking residents, schoolchildren and businesses to forestall any potential unrest.

Listen to this article · 14:10 min Learn more

Volunteers from a neighborhood committee keeping watch on a Beijing street in April. “Stability maintenance” — a catchall term for containing social problems and silencing dissent — has increasingly become a preoccupation in China under Xi Jinping.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

May 25, 2024, 12:01 a.m. ET

The wall in the police station was covered in sheets of paper, one for every building in the sprawling Beijing apartment complex. Each sheet was further broken down by unit, with names, phone numbers and other information on the residents.

Perhaps the most important detail, though, was how each unit was color-coded. Green meant trustworthy. Yellow, needing attention. Orange required “strict control.”

A police officer inspected the wall. Then he leaned forward to mark a third-floor apartment in yellow. The residents in that unit changed often, and therefore were “high risk,” his note said. He would follow up on them later.

“I’ve built a system to address hidden dangers in my jurisdiction,” the officer said, in a video by the local government that praised his work as a model of innovative policing.

This is the kind of local governance that China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, wants: more visible, more invasive, always on the lookout for real or perceived threats. Officers patrol apartment buildings listening for feuding neighbors. Officials recruit retirees playing chess outdoors as extra eyes and ears. In the workplace, employers are required to appoint “safety consultants” who report regularly to the police.

A police chart showed the details of one building’s residents. The New York Times blurred personal information.Credit...Tongzhou Propaganda Department via Douyin

The Chinese Communist Party has long wielded perhaps the world’s most sweeping surveillance apparatus against activists and others who might possibly voice discontent. Then, during the coronavirus pandemic, the surveillance reached an unprecedented scale, tracking virtually every urban resident in the name of preventing infections.

Now, it is clear that Mr. Xi wants to make that expanded control permanent, and to push it even further.

The goal is no longer just to address specific threats, such as the virus or dissidents. It is to embed the party so deeply in daily life that no trouble, no matter how seemingly minor or apolitical, can even arise.

Mr. Xi has branded this effort the “Fengqiao experience for a new era.” The Beijing suburb in the propaganda video, Zhangjiawan, was recently recognized in state media as a national exemplar of the approach.

“Fengqiao” refers to a town where, during the Mao era, the party encouraged residents to “re-educate” purported political enemies, through so-called struggle sessions where people were publicly insulted and humiliated until they admitted crimes such as writing anti-communist poetry.

Mr. Xi, who invokes Fengqiao regularly in major speeches, has not called for a revival of struggle sessions, in which supposed offenders were sometimes beaten or tortured. But the idea is the same: harnessing ordinary people alongside the police to suppress any challenges to the party and uphold the party’s legitimacy.

The party casts this as a public service. By having “zero distance” from the people, it can more quickly gather suggestions about, say, garbage collection or save residents the trouble of going to court over business disputes. Instead, conflicts are hashed out by party mediators.

Mr. Xi frequently points to the Fengqiao experience as proof that the party is responsive to people’s needs and desires, even as he has smothered free expression and dissent.

A police vehicle at the entrance of an apartment complex in Zhangjiawan, a suburb of Beijing. Such visible signs of police presence can be unnerving, but some residents also report feeling safer.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

It is also an effort to assert his political legacy. Top officials have hailed Fengqiao as an example of Mr. Xi’s visionary leadership, while scholars have described it as “a model for showcasing Chinese governance to the world.”

The campaign strengthens Beijing’s repressive abilities at a time of mounting challenges. With China’s economy slowing, protests about unpaid wages and unfinished homes have increased. Tensions with the West have led Beijing to warn of omnipresent foreign spies. The party has also tightened scrutiny of groups like feminists, students and L.G.B.T. rights activists.

In the name of Fengqiao, the police have visited Tibetans, Uyghurs and other minority groups in their homes, promoting party policies. Companies have been required to register their employees in police databases. Government workers have given “anti-cult” lectures at churches. Police officers and judges have been installed in elementary schools as “deputy principals of law,” keeping files on students’ perceived risk levels.

But by blocking even mild or apolitical criticism, the party could also erode the very legitimacy it is trying to project.

A Mao Idea, Repurposed

Mr. Xi’s interest in the Fengqiao experience dates back two decades, to when he was still ascending the ranks of power.

The year was 2003, and Mr. Xi had just been named party secretary of Zhejiang Province in China’s east. China’s economic opening had brought great wealth to the province, but also led to rising crime. Mr. Xi was looking for a solution. According to official media reports, he turned to a small Zhejiang town called Fengqiao.

The town had entered party lore in the 1960s, after Mao exhorted the Chinese people to confront “class enemies,” such as landlords or rich farmers. In the official telling, Fengqiao residents at first clamored for the police to make arrests. But local party leaders instead urged the residents themselves to identify and “re-educate” the enemies.

Ultimately, nearly 1,000 people were labeled reactionaries, according to Fengqiao officials. They and their families had trouble finding work, going to school or even getting married. Mao declared the “Fengqiao experience” a model for the country. Not long after, he launched the Cultural Revolution, another mass movement that led to a decade of bloodshed.

After Mao died, the phrase fell out of favor, as his successors distanced themselves from the chaos of his rule.

Mr. Xi, though, embraced the phrase. His first visit to Fengqiao in 2003 was to the local police station, where he inspected an exhibition about the 1960s. Months later, he visited again and praised the idea of nipping problems in the bud. “Though the situation and responsibilities we face have changed, the Fengqiao experience is not outdated,” he said.

Mr. Xi’s call for more social control was part of a broader shift by the party, amid the rapid change of the 2000s, toward “stability maintenance” — a catchall term for containing social problems and silencing dissent.

In Zhangjiawan, a faded propaganda poster showing President Xi Jinping and the slogan “People have faith, the country has power, there is hope for the nation.”Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

After Mr. Xi became top leader in 2012, he redoubled that focus. Mentions of Fengqiao in state media became ubiquitous. Then came the coronavirus pandemic — and the government began tracking individuals’ movements down to the minute.

It did so partly through technology, requiring residents to download mobile health apps. But it also leaned on old-fashioned labor. Using a method called “grid management,” the authorities divided cities into blocks of a few hundred households, assigning workers to each. Those workers went door to door to enforce testing requirements and quarantines, sometimes by sealing people into their homes.

State media hailed China’s early success in containing Covid as proof of the Fengqiao experience’s continued utility. Chinese research papers described Fengqiao-style policing during the pandemic as a model for crisis management around the world.

When people began to chafe at the restrictions — culminating in nationwide protests in 2022 — the granular approach proved its utility in another way, as the police used facial recognition cameras and informants to track down participants.

“The architecture is there,” said Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College who recently published a book about China’s surveillance state. “After three years of lockdowns, seeing how the system works probably gave them a lot of insights.”

A Push to Penetrate Daily Life

The Covid controls are gone. The stepped-up surveillance is not.

It is clear now that the government’s heightened intrusiveness during the pandemic was an acceleration of a longer-term project. Mr. Xi’s goal is to deploy the masses to bolster the party, as Mao had done, but without the turmoil. That is where technology and the police come in, to ensure people never slip out of control.

“This is the next iteration” of the party’s obsession with stifling unrest, said Suzanne Scoggins, a professor at Clark University in Massachusetts who has studied Chinese policing.

And Beijing is pushing to expand it rapidly. It has encouraged local governments to hire many more workers to watch assigned grids. Last month, the party also issued its first-ever top-level guidance on the management of such workers, calling for stronger ideological training and formalized rewards and punishments.

Those new grid monitors will supplement the extensive ranks of China’s surveillance workers, which on top of uniformed police and party workers also include as many as 15 million ordinary people recruited as local government informants, according to Professor Pei’s research.

A volunteer from a neighborhood committee keeping watch on a street while feeding goldfish. Such workers are especially visible on holidays or during major political meetings, ensuring that public order is maintained.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Beijing also deploys vast numbers of “security volunteers,” mostly retirees, during important political meetings or holidays. They are tasked with ensuring the streets look orderly: steering homeless people into shelters, scolding those who litter and alerting the police if they see suspected protesters.

On a recent Thursday in central Beijing, two residents stood on the sidewalk wearing red vests and name tags. They would be there for two hours in the morning and two in the afternoon, guarding their assigned grid unit of three apartment buildings, said one of them, Qi Jinyou, 76. Other duos were stationed regularly down the block.

Mr. Qi had joined about a year ago, after neighborhood officials called residents at home to recruit. In return, he received gifts like tissues or toothpaste. But he also felt a sense of duty: “We have to protect, right? Safety first.”

In Zhangjiawan, the Beijing suburb held up as a model of Fengqiao’s successes, some residents praised the increase in patrols. Near a billboard depicting a smiling Mr. Xi, a meat seller named Wang Li said that neighborhood officials often inspected for fire hazards like loose electrical wires, or reminded residents to go for health checkups.

Seeing police cars on patrol when she got off work late, she said, “I feel more at ease.”

‘To Grind You Down’

Others have seen how the approach can be used to try and compel obedience.

On the outskirts of Zhangjiawan, the government is demolishing and redeveloping several villages into a tourist attraction. By January, 98 percent of the roughly 1,700 households had agreed to relocate, thanks to village representatives who had visited homes more than 1,600 times, according to a social media post by the local government touting how the Fengqiao experience had “taken root.”

They “won trust with their professionalism, and intimacy with their sincerity,” the government said.

A site of a demolished village in Zhangjiawan features a billboard with official slogans promoting the renovation of “shantytowns.”Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

A villager named Ms. Mu was one of the holdouts. Standing outside the low-slung house that her family had lived in for more than 20 years, she surveyed the fields where neighboring buildings had already been flattened.

Party officials and representatives of the developer had repeatedly called and visited her family, urging them to move out, but she felt the compensation was too low.

“They don’t have a proper conversation with you. They just send people to grind you down,” said Ms. Mu, who asked that only her surname be used.

One night, as negotiations dragged on, men were stationed outside their home to intimidate them, she said. Their water supply was also cut off during the demolition of nearby buildings, but local officials did not seem to care about that, Ms. Mu said: “Not a single village official has come to ask, how can we help with this water problem?”

She and her siblings now drive into town to fill bottles with tap water.

The risks of empowering low-level officials to fulfill sweeping political mandates became especially clear during the pandemic. Under pressure to prevent infections, neighborhood workers at times prevented residents from buying groceries or seeking medical care.

Even high-profile political activists, for whom surveillance has long been routine, have felt the controls intensify. Wang Quanzhang, a human rights lawyer who was released from more than four years in prison in 2020, said that 30 or 40 people were watching his home in Beijing at any given time. He shared photographs of groups of men in black clothing sitting inside his building and following him on the street.

Several landlords had forced him to move out, under official pressure, he said. The authorities had also pressured schools not to let his 11-year-old son enroll, he added.

“We didn’t think that when they couldn’t chase us away from Beijing, they would start targeting our child,” he said. “After the epidemic, it’s gotten worse.”

The Cost of Control

The success of this labor-intensive approach hinges upon the zeal of its enforcers. That has often worked to the advantage of the party, which uses financial incentives, appeals to patriotism and sometimes threats, such as to their jobs, to mobilize officials and ordinary people alike.

But the reliance on an army of paid workers could also be the surveillance apparatus’s central weakness, as the slowing economy forces local governments to tighten budgets.

Already, some community workers and police officers have complained on social media of being overworked.

Even propaganda about Fengqiao has acknowledged the toll of making officials responsible for ever-smaller issues. One state media article lauded a police officer who, to resolve a dispute between neighbors, helped unclog a blocked pipe. “Suddenly, a large amount of sewage and feces sprayed onto his head and body,” the article said. The residents, the article continued, “felt both pity and gratitude.”

The party’s tightening grip could also stifle the dynamism that it needs to revive the economy. A fried chicken vendor in Zhangjiawan, who gave only her surname, Ma, said she had not made enough money to pay her rent for three months, in part because constantly patrolling officers prohibited her from setting up her cart on the sidewalk.

Selling Chinese breakfast crepes and grilled noodles outside a residential complex, in Zhangjiawan, in April. Some vendors have complained that officials have made their lives harder by policing where they can set up.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

“If the economy suffers, then there will be security problems,” she said. “People need to eat. If they get anxious, things will get messy.”

Siyi Zhao contributed research from Seoul.

Vivian Wang is a China correspondent based in Beijing, where she writes about how the country’s global rise and ambitions are shaping the daily lives of its people. More about Vivian Wang

See more on: Xi Jinping, Mao Zedong

The New York Times · by Vivian Wang · May 25, 2024

11. It’s Not Just Ideology: Why The US Is Hard-Wired To Be Hostile To Autocratic Regimes

Interesting analysis. Does this help support the argument for the need for a bigger and stronger US Navy?

The hostility toward autocratic regimes like the former Soviet Union (or Russia today) and the People’s Republic of China displayed by the U.S. is thus better explained by its maritime empire heritage rather than any ideological differences. Autocratic regimes in today’s world seek to achieve stability by creating an equilibrium in which they are dominant—a conservative characteristic of the past empires on which they are modeled. Maritime empires, by contrast, thrived on change. They displayed a higher tolerance for risk and had a propensity to upset existing economic norms—attributes well adapted to modern capitalist economies where no steady-state equilibrium has yet emerged. That, combined with maritime empires’ preferences for alliance building and networks of influence, rather than direct domination, is the international framework in which the U.S. is most comfortable but is also one whose ancient origins have rarely been fully appreciated.

It’s Not Just Ideology: Why The US Is Hard-Wired To Be Hostile To Autocratic Regimes – OpEd

By Thomas J. Barfield

eurasiareview.com · May 23, 2024

The U.S. was born out of ideas and the geopolitical schemes of competing maritime empires, forging a foreign policy approach that dominates its foreign relations today.

Considering whether modern states are empires tells us almost nothing useful about either modern states or empires. A better question is what policies and structures pioneered by empires are still employed by states today, and how.

As the 20th century opened, long-established empires still governed the majority of Eurasia’s territory and population, but they all collapsed by the end of World War I. The European and Japanese colonial empires that escaped destruction then dissolved after World War II. After being the world’s dominant polities for two and a half millennia, empires were now extinct. The term empire itself turned pejorative; polemical rather than analytical. But while empires no longer existed, they left an enduring legacy: sets of distinctive templates for organizing very large polities with diverse populations. They also provided different strategic models for projecting power on the world stage.

Although the United States was the first nation designed on abstract principles of governance rather than inherited institutions, it drew on imperial models to realize them. America’s expansive concept of universal citizenship to unite its diverse population was distinctly Roman in origin, one that emerged in no other empire. American foreign policy, by contrast, employed a distinctly non-Roman maritime empire template that sought economic rather than territorial advantages. While the United States inherited its maritime tradition from Great Britain, in the post-1945 era its international policies bore a stronger resemblance to those of imperial Athens. Athens created the world’s first maritime empire (Arche) in the 5th century BC by building an alliance system to defend the Greeks against Persian aggression. It then used that base to establish an economic sphere in which it was the dominant player, becoming the region’s largest and richest city-state. In a remarkably similar way, the United States also created a postwar military alliance system designed to protect its members from aggression by the Soviet Union that served as a common multinational trading bloc with the American economy at its center.

Citizenship in the United States: E Pluribus Unum

The 18th-century founders of the U.S. were quite familiar with the classical Western history of ancient Greece and Rome. They embraced the principles of democratic governance developed by the Greeks but broke their city-state limitations with the adoption of the Roman imperial model of universal citizenship. As with Rome, American citizenship was designed to transcend existing parochial political identities (in this case America’s original 13 colonies), replacing them with an all-embracing national identity. And again, similar to the Roman Empire, American citizenship would not be restricted by national origin, race, or religion, although such invidious distinctions (particularly race) would play a negative role in the country’s domestic politics. Eager to attract settlers to a land short of labor, the U.S. made the naturalization of foreigners a regular practice and encouraged their immigration to its shores. It automatically conferred citizenship on children born in the country regardless of the status of their parents, precluding the emergence of permanent non-citizen minorities who were residents of a state but without rights in it. The anomaly of allowing a slave population to exist in its Southern states was resolved in a bloody civil war (1861-1865) and subsequent amendments to the Constitution that extended citizenship to all former slaves and their descendants. In 1924, Congress finally passed a law recognizing the country’s original Native American inhabitants as birthright citizens too.

Universal citizenship proved highly effective in uniting a population that had no common origin. The U.S. government was careful never to define “an American” as anything other than a legal category. This was reinforced by the Constitution’s prohibition of any religious tests for serving in public office and vesting rights in individuals rather than communities. It was an imperial way of thinking designed to avoid the religious and ethno-nationalist communal conflicts that plagued Europe. The potential for such conflicts was, and is, never absent in the United States. Existing communities invariably asserted that newer immigrants could never become “real Americans,” only to join with the two generations later to complain about more recent arrivals. In my own city of Boston, the influx of Catholic Irish immigrants provoked violent outrage by Yankee Protestants of English descent. Fifty years later, both English-speaking groups agreed that it was poor non-English speaking Italians and East European Jews who could never become real Americans like themselves. After the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 removed national-origin restrictions, an influx of Asian and Hispanic immigrants provoked renewed concerns that these people would never become real Americans either. Yet by 2018, 14 percent of the U.S. population was foreign-born, close to the record high set in the 1890s, and the once-alien foods they brought with them (from hot dogs to pizza to burritos) became American by popular consumption.

Sustaining America’s Arche

By 1853, the U.S. had taken possession of all the enormous territories between its Atlantic and Pacific coasts; the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 gave it control of around 10 million square kilometers. Yet despite being one of the largest countries on earth, the United States never viewed itself as a land power. (Even in the 21st century, its demographic and economic centers of gravity remained on the east and west coasts.) Instead, outside of North America, the United States adopted a maritime empire template for its international relations that gave sea power priority over land power, viewed economic hegemony as more desirable than territorial hegemony, and deemed indirect political domination more sustainable than direct political domination when wielding power abroad. By the end of the 19th century, the U.S. would become one of the world’s leading industrial and trading powers, although it had to contend with a domestic tradition of isolationism that was particularly strong after the end of World War I.

The maritime empire template first manifested itself in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine that declared the Americas an exclusive U.S. sphere of influence. This imposed a form of indirect domination by the U.S. over the newly independent states in Latin America and the Caribbean without touching these territories. The three-month Spanish-American War in 1898 was primarily a maritime conflict too. Here, the U.S. Navy fought simultaneously in both the Caribbean and the Pacific, sinking the Spanish fleets based in Cuba and the Philippines and delivering marine expeditionary forces ashore to expel the garrisons defending them.

However, this maritime empire template did not assume global significance until after World War II when the U.S. abandoned its previous isolationism and replaced Great Britain as the West’s dominant power. Its only rival was the Soviet Union. The Soviets followed a typical imperial land power template by taking direct control of all the countries they occupied in Eastern and Central Europe and using proxy regimes to incorporate them into their command economy. By contrast, the U.S. employed an indirect maritime strategy that would have been familiar to the ancient Athenians: seek economic rather than territorial hegemony through an alliance system that protected its member states from aggression and allowed their economies to grow rapidly. Unlike the maritime Athenian Empire, however, the U.S. also possessed a large and self-sustaining domestic economy in North America that could bankroll its high defense spending without extorting payments from its allies, as Athens had unpopularly done.

The U.S. was not interested in recreating a closed trading system with subject colonies like that of the dissolving maritime British Empire. That required both considerable expense and local administrations to maintain. (It also generated anti-colonial political movements, of which the American Revolution had been one of the first.) Instead, the U.S. constructed a postwar international system from which it benefited militarily and economically. The system also benefited its allies enough to make it self-sustaining. The American arche consisted of overlapping networks of military and economic alliances that spanned the globe. The military alliances were designed to provide protection against possible Soviet aggression through mutual defense treaties, including the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Western Europe, and bilateral agreements with Japan (1951 and 1960) and Korea (1953) in northeast Asia. These were the linchpins of a system that allowed the stationing of American forces within these sovereign nations, and were part of a much vaster system of secondary alliances that even 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union included 800 military bases of various types in 70 countries. Connected by sea and air routes, this network allowed the U.S. to project its power worldwide without maintaining excessively large numbers of troops abroad. Its success in the aftermath of World War II was based on turning former enemies, Germany and Japan, into close allies and major economic powers after installing democratically run governments in these countries and financing their reconstruction.

Buttressed by new global multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (1944), the International Monetary Fund (1945), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), the U.S. supported the creation of the European Common Market (which eventually became the European Union). This was less a matter of altruism and had more to do with the employment of a maritime empire strategy that viewed the emergence of stronger allied partners as a net plus rather than potential rivals. In an improvement on ancient Athens’s approach, the U.S. relied as much on the self-interest of its members to keep the system functioning as it did on its own power. This dual military/economic network would see off the Soviet Union in 1991 and maintain itself afterward. Its success as a strategy was best appreciated by contrasting it with failed U.S. policies that veered from the maritime empire template and drew the country into counterproductive land wars in Vietnam and Iraq.

In one important area, the U.S. broke with the maritime empire template that had created cosmopolitan economies while retaining insular ruling elites in Athens, Venice, Holland, and Great Britain. Universal citizenship, immigration, and capitalist economic disruption combined to produce a political system in the U.S. where the elites who set the U.S. policy eventually reflected the diversity of the population, albeit with a considerable lag time. That diversity was also reflected in America’s soft power influence that was rivaled historically only by Athens in ancient Greece because, beginning in the mid-20th century, the U.S. became the place to be for those producing cultural and scientific innovations. Part of the attraction was its rich economy, secure private property rights, and freedom of expression, but the U.S. also benefited from the arrival of refugee artists, scholars, and scientists fleeing persecution or prejudice in their own homelands. This put the U.S. at the forefront of many fields that the country otherwise would have been unlikely to develop (or develop as quickly) without them. Whether in Hollywood, New York, or Silicon Valley, the ability to attract talented people who became American citizens by choice was an element that was missing in even the most economically cosmopolitan maritime empires of the past. The U.S. was certainly the first to make culture itself a profitable export.

Does understanding which tools a contemporary world power like the U.S. borrowed from extinct empires translate into understanding its global relations today? Yes, because these were grounded in a set of largely unarticulated economic and cultural principles that to them seemed natural and required no explanation and, hence, are often overlooked. For example, in a world where autocracy was the norm, maritime empires (except for Portugal, which was founded by a king) were distinguished by their representative governments. Athens was a democracy, Carthage, Venice, and Holland were republics, and Britain was governed by a parliament. This was a structure in which the state encouraged the accumulation of private wealth and protected it from arbitrary confiscation. Both elements were attractive to the 18th-century founders of the U.S., who combined the limited role of government and respect for private property espoused by John Locke along with an open economy championed by Adam Smith.

The hostility toward autocratic regimes like the former Soviet Union (or Russia today) and the People’s Republic of China displayed by the U.S. is thus better explained by its maritime empire heritage rather than any ideological differences. Autocratic regimes in today’s world seek to achieve stability by creating an equilibrium in which they are dominant—a conservative characteristic of the past empires on which they are modeled. Maritime empires, by contrast, thrived on change. They displayed a higher tolerance for risk and had a propensity to upset existing economic norms—attributes well adapted to modern capitalist economies where no steady-state equilibrium has yet emerged. That, combined with maritime empires’ preferences for alliance building and networks of influence, rather than direct domination, is the international framework in which the U.S. is most comfortable but is also one whose ancient origins have rarely been fully appreciated.

About the author: Thomas J. Barfield is professor of anthropology at Boston University. His new book, Shadow Empires, explores how distinctly different types of empires arose and sustained themselves as the dominant polities of Eurasia and North Africa for 2,500 years before disappearing in the 20th century. He is a renowned historian of Central Eurasia and the author of The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic Architecture, and Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (revised and expanded second edition 2022, Princeton University Press).
Source: This article is distributed by Human Bridges, first published in the Sentinel Post.

eurasiareview.com · May 23, 2024

12. Moral bankruptcy: The world chooses to sustain Hamas monsters - opinion

Conclusion:

Instead of disarming Hamas and securing the hostages' release, which would immediately end the war, the world ensures the continued existence of Hamas monsters.

Moral bankruptcy: The world chooses to sustain Hamas monsters - opinion

The ICJ ruling on Rafah is ensuring a future with Hamas's terrorism.

By AVRAHAM BLOCH

MAY 24, 2024 17:29

Updated: MAY 24, 2024 17:46

Jerusalem Post

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has issued an order to stop Israeli military operations in the Rafah area. The order, which targets the State of Israel, carries severe implications for the country.

Today's hearing was not at the International Criminal Court (ICC) but at the ICJ. The ICJ is the judicial arm of the United Nations (UN), with all UN member states, including Israel, as members. The ICJ has two primary functions: issuing judgments in disputes between states and providing advisory opinions at the request of the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council. While advisory opinions are non-binding, judgments or orders in state disputes are binding.

In this case, South Africa and other countries filed a lawsuit against Israel, falsely alleging "genocide" in the Gaza conflict. Today's ruling addressed a request to halt the war in Rafah, which South Africa amended to encompass the entire Gaza Strip.

The court partially accepted South Africa's request and ordered the cessation of Israeli military operations in Rafah. This decision, made before the hostages were returned to Israel and Hamas was disarmed, may be influenced by the court's composition, including anti-Israeli Lebanese judge Nawaf Salam.

Armed and masked Palestinians patrol and enforcing the law in the street in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, March 1, 2024 (credit: ABED RAHIM KHATIB/FLASH90)

The order's implications are significant. Legally, Israel is obligated to comply. However, the ICJ has no enforcement mechanism, placing the responsibility on the UN Security Council. Article 94 of the UN Charter allows states that filed the lawsuit to request the Security Council enforce the order if Israel does not comply. The Council could impose sanctions on Israel or even use force.

Potential warrants against Israeli leaders

This ICJ decision might affect the ICC's decision on international arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and could exacerbate rising antisemitism worldwide.

On a personal note: While international judicial institutions are morally bankrupt, our enemies still hold our brothers and sisters in Gaza's terror tunnels. After the October 7 massacre, where Jews were tortured, slaughtered, and burned, and Jewish women were raped as a war tactic, the world chooses not to combat this evil but to target Israel.

Instead of disarming Hamas and securing the hostages' release, which would immediately end the war, the world ensures the continued existence of Hamas monsters.

Jerusalem Post

13. Campus Protests Reflect Impatience With U.S. Foreign Policy

Mr. French misses the point in his final paragraph. It is not "bad apples." It is the malign actors, state sponsored and non-state actors, who are exploiting these protests to create further division in the US. They are manipulating these students who think they are doing good. Our failure to understand this and address it is what damages our nation. The malign actors are in fact driven to use animosity and hatred toward Jewish people to subvert America. We ignore this at our peril.

Excerpts:

And this has been the key problem that campus demonstrators have sought to crack: Complaints about the fate of Palestinians—whether amid the present conflict or more existentially, in terms of the resolution of their enduring statelessness—are treated like undeliverable mail, returned to sender, as administration after administration provides blanket support for Israel, even as its settlements grow, while blithely mouthing formulaic and unactionable theoretical support for a two-state solution.

With his nearly unreserved capacity for public support of Israel—which is led by a cabinet that, even beyond Hamas, appears to be opposed to working with the Palestinian Authority, and some of whose members support emptying Gaza or annexing it outright—Biden appears to be incapable of understanding just how tight a corner he is backing himself into. It is right and proper to denounce antisemitism, but in raising his voice in anger about the ongoing protests in general, he risks losing a great deal of the youth vote that he appears to desperately need in the upcoming electoral battle with Trump, the presumptive Republican Party nominee.

There are, of course, bad apples in every crowd, but these are not protests driven by animosity or hatred toward Jewish people. They are an expression of refusal to accept killing on such a large scale, and of impatience with a U.S. foreign policy that has long claimed a moral right to lead the world, and yet has proved ineffective in achieving more just outcomes in a part of the world that the United States has long treated as a top priority.

Campus Protests Reflect Impatience With U.S. Foreign Policy

The Biden administration’s disavowal of students’ concerns will only make things worse.

Howard French

Howard W. French

By Howard W. French, a columnist at Foreign Policy.

Foreign Policy · by Howard W. French

U.S. Foreign Policy
United States
Howard W. French

May 24, 2024, 10:45 AM

Throughout the academic year that is now concluding on U.S. university campuses, there has been a contentious debate about the language used in protests over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of the most hotly disputed terms is the Arabic word intifada, which in a political context means “popular uprising.” As students have chanted slogans such as “globalize the intifada” at protests against Israel’s offensive in Gaza, commentators have alternately denounced their language as antisemitic, defended it as an anodyne statement of support for Palestinian resistance, and sought to parse its meaning through linguistic and historical interpretation.

Yet even amid this battle over slogans, the students have achieved something momentous: Their protest movement—to an unprecedented degree—has globalized the cause of protecting Palestinian lives from the onslaught of Israeli bombing and securing statehood for Palestinians. Evidence of this abounds, from the spread of protests to campuses in Europe and elsewhere to the powerful criticism of U.S. weapons aid to Israel that was conveyed in a speech given in President Joe Biden’s presence at last weekend’s baccalaureate ceremony at Morehouse College, one of the United States’ most prestigious historically Black colleges.

The Cannes Film Festival also become a backdrop for protest, with Australian actress Cate Blanchett wearing a gown that appeared to incorporate elements of the Palestinian flag. More recently, Spain, Ireland, and Norway recognized Palestinian statehood, adding three wealthy European states to a list of more than 140 countries that recognize Palestine—a list that is dominated by the global south. And on Friday, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel must immediately stop its military offensive in the Gaza city of Rafah.

Historically, certain positions in U.S. foreign policy have enjoyed such strong bipartisan support that they seldom generate fundamental national debate and are rarely reexamined by the mainstream media. Throughout most of the Cold War, the premier instance of this kind of consensus was Americans’ treatment of competition with the Soviet Union as an existential matter. Until former President Donald Trump’s administration, other examples of these positions included U.S. support for NATO and, albeit less often discussed, Washington’s Asian alliances, especially with Japan.

As pillars go, Washington’s longtime and largely unquestioned support for Israel has been on a level commensurate with commitments such as these: so deep and solid that they are nearly impervious to discussion and debate.

Like nothing before, the protests that have recently roiled U.S. campuses have changed this.

Here comes the moment for some sincere throat clearing. I have no difficulty whatsoever condemning Hamas’s sickening attack on Israeli civilians on Oct. 7, 2023. I also readily accept the premise that Israel has the right to defend itself, along with the unfortunate reality that no conceivable response could have fully avoided the death of innocent civilians in Gaza. This cannot be taken, however, as a license for mass casualties. I also support Israel’s right to exist as a state. What that means in practice is complicated; how Zionism should be defined, how Israeli laws should be written and applied, and what kind of dispensation is reserved for non-Jewish citizens of that country are all topics that Israelis and Jews worldwide actively debate. They are all beyond the scope of this column.

Where student protesters have rendered a tremendous service is in saying that with the offensive in Gaza—with its possibly underestimated 35,000-person death toll; its destruction of housing, hospitals, schools, and infrastructure on an almost unimaginable scale; its repeated displacement of the population to clear the way for further offensives; its attacks on relief workers and journalists; its restrictions on the press; and its vice-like control on humanitarian food deliveries to the point where mass starvation now threatens—Israel has gone too far.

Washington’s failure to find a strong voice on these topics has driven citizens to action. So has the associated reticence or timidity of much of the U.S. media, where the leading newspapers (some of which have issued guidelines discouraging the use of the word “Palestine”) are far more comfortable obsessing over the daily theatrics of Trump’s ongoing legal battles.

In a democracy, action does not and should not only take place at the ballot box. Student protests are part a tradition of citizen activism in the United States, and putting aside the very occasional incidence of violence and hate speech (each from a variety of directions), the demand for action to relieve the plight of Palestinians falls within a venerable and necessary heritage.

Unfortunately, the U.S. establishment’s disavowal of the current movement and refusal to hear protesters’ concerns—or in the case of canceled graduation ceremonies and student speeches, the refusal to even allow students’ words to be spoken publicly—have only made things worse.

Here, Biden has led in the precisely wrong direction. In response to the announcement on Monday that the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) would seek arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials, Biden angrily rejected the notion of any “equivalence” between the leaders of Hamas, for whom warrants were also requested, and Israel’s leaders. In saying this, Biden revisited details of some of the most gruesome charges against Hamas for its Oct. 7 attack.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has alarmingly gone one step further than Biden, undermining U.S. claims to support a rules-based international order by saying that the administration would support a push in the U.S. Congress to sanction the ICC for its pursuit of arrest warrants. France, by contrast, quickly stated support for the ICC in its “fight against impunity.” Even the chancellor of Germany, one of Europe’s most stalwart supports of Israel and closest allies of the United States, said that his country would arrest Netanyahu if the ICC issues a warrant against him.

Many problems arise from Biden’s statement. First, the ICC made no equivalence between Israel’s leaders and those of Hamas, other than the principled claim at the heart of its filing, which asserts that the leaders of both parties are responsible for crimes for which they must answer before international law.

Secondly, by revisiting the warranted horror of Hamas’s butchery of Israelis, Biden is inviting the very sorts of parallels that he claims are unwarranted. As someone who covered catastrophic, revenge-driven wars in Africa earlier in my career, I learned long ago that comparative moral claims amid abominations are dubious exercises. But throughout this crisis, Biden has found the time and passion to conjure details about the suffering of Israelis to a degree that he has simply never shown himself willing or capable of doing with regard to unthinkably devastated Palestinians.

And this has been the key problem that campus demonstrators have sought to crack: Complaints about the fate of Palestinians—whether amid the present conflict or more existentially, in terms of the resolution of their enduring statelessness—are treated like undeliverable mail, returned to sender, as administration after administration provides blanket support for Israel, even as its settlements grow, while blithely mouthing formulaic and unactionable theoretical support for a two-state solution.

With his nearly unreserved capacity for public support of Israel—which is led by a cabinet that, even beyond Hamas, appears to be opposed to working with the Palestinian Authority, and some of whose members support emptying Gaza or annexing it outright—Biden appears to be incapable of understanding just how tight a corner he is backing himself into. It is right and proper to denounce antisemitism, but in raising his voice in anger about the ongoing protests in general, he risks losing a great deal of the youth vote that he appears to desperately need in the upcoming electoral battle with Trump, the presumptive Republican Party nominee.

There are, of course, bad apples in every crowd, but these are not protests driven by animosity or hatred toward Jewish people. They are an expression of refusal to accept killing on such a large scale, and of impatience with a U.S. foreign policy that has long claimed a moral right to lead the world, and yet has proved ineffective in achieving more just outcomes in a part of the world that the United States has long treated as a top priority.

Foreign Policy · by Howard W. French

14. Regaining Our Standing as a Maritime Nation

I guess we can no longer overcome the tyranny of distance.

Excerpt:

China, now a bona fide maritime nation, has made significant investments in its merchant fleet and can call on over 5,000 merchant vessels during war. The US has around 80. We must expand our commercial fleet to align with our strategic interests. That means acquiring more ships and enhancing our ability to build, maintain, and quickly repair them. Above all, we cannot prevail without a significant number of merchant marine officers who are ready and obligated to serve the nation when called upon.

To that end, there must be a thorough and honest assessment of current merchant mariner capacity. Our pool of mariners is aging, and there is a decline in the number of young men and women pursuing maritime careers. Building more ships will make a difference, but greater focus, effort, and coherence by the Administrations and Congress on the logistical realities of our time are needed.

At the top of the list should be the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) at Kings Point, New York. As a former commandant of the U.S. Naval Academy, I know that Kings Point must receive sufficient investment for programs and facilities that reflect its significance, placing it on par with the other federal service academies. Its infrastructure hasn't been upgraded since it was established by FDR during WWII. The outdated facilities discourage the brightest individuals from enrolling.

Like Annapolis, USMMA, which produces over 80% of our Strategic Sealift Officer Force, requires careful, thoughtful, and continuous attention. Like our other service academies, it is not just a college; it is an institution vital to our national security.

On this Maritime Day, let us remember the extraordinary contributions and sacrifices of our merchant mariners, past and present, the "fourth branch" of our citizens who go in harm's way. Beyond remembering, it's time to give them what's needed to deliver victory as they have so admirably and valiantly done before.

Regaining Our Standing as a Maritime Nation

By Gary Roughead

May 23, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/05/23/regaining_our_standing_as_a_maritime_nation_1033460.html?mc_cid=4c5bde089f&mc_eid=70bf478f36&utm

Photo: The Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8) prepares to conduct a replenishment at sea. (Military Sealift Command)

Alternative historical fiction is a popular genre in America, where readers explore possibilities such as Napoleon deciding not to invade Russia or a Confederate victory in the Civil War, pondering the hypothetical impact on world history. In honor of Maritime Day 2024, let's consider what would have happened if the United States had fought the Second World War without a strong Merchant Marine and the tens of thousands of courageous mariners who delivered crucial supplies, troops, and weapons across dangerous waters.

It's clear: we would have lost the war or failed to achieve a decisive victory.

During WWII, an estimated 250,000 mariners served, and nearly 10,000 gave their lives, resulting in a higher per capita casualty rate than any of the armed services. Over 700 Merchant Marine ships were sunk by enemy attacks, and hundreds of mariners were held as prisoners of war.

FDR recognized the indispensable role of the Merchant Marine, which he considered the "fourth arm of defense" on par with the navy, army, and air force.

As we observe current global instability and brutal Eurasian conflicts, who will be the visionary leader and advocate who ensures the readiness of our Merchant Marine for the challenges ahead? Its current state is far from adequate.

The distinction between admirals, generals, and media commentators who freely opine on strategy and theory neglects or casually assumes away the hard reality of logistics. Lately, the strategists have not fared well in deterring conflicts, and the logistic shortcomings in Ukraine and the Middle East are glaring. While those deficiencies are apparent, they pale in comparison to a potential war in the Pacific.

Policymakers properly acknowledge China as the pacing threat, but so few seriously consider the critical importance of logistics and the availability of highly trained and militarily obligated maritime personnel. Decades of war in the Middle East have conditioned us to the luxury of uncontested sea and airspace. We enjoyed large support bases close to combat operations. Our fleet had uninterrupted access to intact and secure port facilities. Even as we flow supplies to Ukraine, it's along Europe's modern road and highway systems.

A war in the Western Pacific is a vastly different game, one difficult for Americans with a faded understanding of past conflicts to comprehend. Our Merchant Marine will operate in vast contested waters. The potential ship and human loss will be staggering. Instead of moving supplies short distances on well-established road systems, our mariners will face a 6,000-mile journey across the Pacific, scores of enemy submarines, and barrages of missiles far in excess of the sporadic Red Sea attacks. If the war is over Taiwan, in addition to military supplies, sealift will be vital to the survival of that democracy, delivering fuel and food through a formidable gauntlet.

The People's Liberation Army knows that sealift is key to our success. While many debate the vulnerability of our aircraft carriers, they gloss over that our combat power will be short-lived without robust sealift and persistent combat logistics in a war at sea.

Regrettably, we are no longer a true maritime nation; we are now a naval nation.

China, now a bona fide maritime nation, has made significant investments in its merchant fleet and can call on over 5,000 merchant vessels during war. The US has around 80. We must expand our commercial fleet to align with our strategic interests. That means acquiring more ships and enhancing our ability to build, maintain, and quickly repair them. Above all, we cannot prevail without a significant number of merchant marine officers who are ready and obligated to serve the nation when called upon.

To that end, there must be a thorough and honest assessment of current merchant mariner capacity. Our pool of mariners is aging, and there is a decline in the number of young men and women pursuing maritime careers. Building more ships will make a difference, but greater focus, effort, and coherence by the Administrations and Congress on the logistical realities of our time are needed.

At the top of the list should be the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) at Kings Point, New York. As a former commandant of the U.S. Naval Academy, I know that Kings Point must receive sufficient investment for programs and facilities that reflect its significance, placing it on par with the other federal service academies. Its infrastructure hasn't been upgraded since it was established by FDR during WWII. The outdated facilities discourage the brightest individuals from enrolling.

Like Annapolis, USMMA, which produces over 80% of our Strategic Sealift Officer Force, requires careful, thoughtful, and continuous attention. Like our other service academies, it is not just a college; it is an institution vital to our national security.

On this Maritime Day, let us remember the extraordinary contributions and sacrifices of our merchant mariners, past and present, the "fourth branch" of our citizens who go in harm's way. Beyond remembering, it's time to give them what's needed to deliver victory as they have so admirably and valiantly done before.

Admiral Roughead (U.S. Navy, ret.) is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy whose naval career culminated in serving as the Chief of Naval Operations, the senior officer in the U.S. Navy and a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Previously he held six operational commands and is one of only two officers in the Navy’s history to have commanded both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

15. Ukrainian Echoes From America’s War for Independence

Excerpts:

Americans then and Ukrainians today share many aspirations. They seek to live securely in their countries, enjoy democratic and economic freedoms, and oust foreign oppressors. They see their fight as benefiting not only themselves but a broader cause of liberty.

For these aspirations to be fulfilled, the West cannot shirk its duty any more than Ukraine’s courageous people can.

Ukrainian Echoes From America’s War for Independence

By Eugene A. Procknow & William Courtney

May 23, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/05/23/ukrainian_echoes_from_americas_war_for_independence_1033471.html?mc_cid=4c5bde089f&mc_eid=70bf478f36&utm

Photo: F-16 fighter jets of the Romanian Air Force and the Romania based European F-16 Training Center (EFTC), which also trains Ukrainian pilots, perform a fly-by at the Black Sea, Defense, Aerospace and Security (BSDA) international exhibition in Bucharest, Romania, Wednesday, May 22, 2024. (AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)

Ukraine’s fight for freedom has significant echoes from America’s war for independence that could help Americans better understand and assess the war in Ukraine.

A Gallup poll shows that 36 percent of Americans think the U.S. is doing too much to help Ukraine defend against Russia’s aggression. But some of these skeptics might be more supportive if they understood how much it resembles our struggle nearly 250 years ago.

American and European support for Ukraine – over $100 billion this year – is vital. Without it, Ukraine may be unable to fend off a much larger aggressor. Europeans see Russia’s war as a direct threat to their security. A victory by Moscow could embolden Russian chauvinists and risk wider war, posing new challenges to America’s security.

Five parallels might be especially relevant:

Foreign aid can be decisive

In the American Revolution, Continental soldiers fired French arms and wore French-made uniforms, used in America’s first capture of a British Army at Saratoga, New York. In the last major battle of the war at Yorktown, Virginia, Continental and French armies, protected by the French navy, defeated British forces. Western aid is no less essential to Ukraine’s defense. This year, the West is spending well over $100 billion on arms such as artillery, air defense, and combat aircraft (F-16s), as well as on economic and humanitarian aid.

Imperial arrogance can be consuming

In 1774, the British Parliament infuriated American colonists by adopting the Coercive Acts, known to Americans as the Intolerable Acts. In response to the Boston Tea Party, they closed the Port of Boston, revoked Massachusetts’ charter, and assigned coveted Ohio Valley lands to Quebec. The Acts led to the first shots of war at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. Showing no less insensitivity, the Kremlin touts the falsehood that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people,” and Russia seeks to deny Ukraine’s right to remain an independent country.

Aggression can unify victims

When the Revolutionary War erupted, as many as 30 percent of Americans remained loyal to England. During the fighting, many switched sides or left America for other parts of the British Empire. This left the U.S. more unified. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 64 percent of Ukrainians identified themselves above all as Ukrainians rather than another identifier. Six months later, it was 85 percent.

Wars have uncertain outcomes

Over their eight-year Revolutionary War, Americans often courted with failure. In 1776, a wind shift might have allowed the British to capture General Washington’s army at the Battle of Brooklyn. On the cusp of victory in 1783, the Continental Army might have mutinied over long-delayed pay. War in Ukraine also has unpredictable elements. At the outset, Russia’s army seized a large swath of eastern Ukraine but was routed trying to capture Kyiv. At present, the combatant's armies are stalemated on land, but Russia has lost a third of its Black Sea Fleet to ingenuous Ukrainian attacks.

Economic power complements military force

British occupation and naval blockades of U.S. cities imposed severe economic pain. In return, American privateers harassed and destroyed British merchant shipping. Almost 1,700 U.S. ships did so much damage that British maritime insurance rates skyrocketed, and some naval forces had to be diverted to protect the home front. Due to Western sanctions and war privations, Russia’s economy today is over 5 percent smaller than predicted before the full-scale war. The economy is far underperforming other energy exporters. Hinting at the war’s rising cost, Putin recently made an economist his new defense minister, to put the military and the economy “in sync.”

While there are important parallels, America then and Ukraine now have some different war experiences. The American Revolution spread armed conflict to Asia, Africa, and Europe, whereas the war in Ukraine has not escalated to other regions. In North America, the British fired mostly on military targets, whereas in Ukraine, Russia also wages war on civilians. Ukraine remains focused on regaining its lost territory. It does not attempt to conquer new lands, in contrast to the Americans in their 1775 Canadian invasion and 1779 campaign against the Iroquois Nation.

Americans then and Ukrainians today share many aspirations. They seek to live securely in their countries, enjoy democratic and economic freedoms, and oust foreign oppressors. They see their fight as benefiting not only themselves but a broader cause of liberty.

For these aspirations to be fulfilled, the West cannot shirk its duty any more than Ukraine’s courageous people can.

Eugene A. Procknow is an author and military historian focused on the American revolutionary era. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND research organization, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia.

16. The U.S. Built a $320 Million Pier to Get Aid to Gazans. Little of It Has Reached Them.

Additional photos and graphics at the link.

Logistics is hard in a conflict zone and the "pier" is no silver bullet.

The U.S. Built a $320 Million Pier to Get Aid to Gazans. Little of It Has Reached Them.

Challenges to distributing food, water and other supplies continue; good alternatives to ground crossings prove elusive

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-u-s-built-a-320-million-pier-to-get-aid-to-gazans-little-of-it-has-reached-them-f14e0175?mod=latest_headlines

By Stephen KalinFollow

and Nancy A. YoussefFollow

Updated May 25, 2024 12:01 am ET

An ambitious U.S. effort to get aid into Gaza via a floating pier in the Mediterranean Sea has gotten off to a sluggish start, facing many of the same logistical challenges that have throttled broader attempts to ease the humanitarian crisis in the besieged Palestinian enclave.

The Pentagon spent $320 million and engaged 1,000 soldiers and sailors to open a major maritime corridor last week, delivering on President Biden’s promise in March that the U.S. military would install a temporary dock off the Gaza coast for cargo ships to unload food, water and other supplies. Fourteen ships from the U.S. and other countries are involved in a mission supported by humanitarian groups and several nations including Israel.

But in the first week of operations, only 820 tons of aid was delivered through the pier, of which around two-thirds reached distribution points within Gaza, the Pentagon said Thursday. That is roughly equivalent to 71 truckloads—far below the initial target of 90 truckloads a day, and about 15% of the estimated minimum daily need for a population of more than two million people facing crisis-level acute food insecurity.

A ship near the U.S.-built floating pier off the Gaza shore, as seen from southern Gaza last weekend. PHOTO: MOHAMMED SABER/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

Gazans gathered near the shore hoping to obtain aid delivered through the floating pier last week. PHOTO: RAMADAN ABED/REUTERS

Around a dozen trucks from the pier never made it to their destinations inside Gaza, according to United Nations officials, who said that desperate Gazans commandeered the aid and that the trucks couldn’t use alternative routes due to Israeli restrictions—familiar problems plaguing aid operations in the strip.

“It is not flowing at the rate that any of us would be happy with, because we always want more,” national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Wednesday, adding that the U.S. was working to get “necessary security arrangements in place” to prevent looting.

One step to improving aid to Gaza came Friday when Biden secured a commitment from Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi to resume shipments of U.N.-provided assistance for civilians in the southern part of the strip.

That aid is funneled through Egyptian territory to the Kerem Shalom crossing in Israel. Egypt had been holding back that assistance to try to pressure Israel to end its Rafah operation. Another border crossing at Rafah remains closed.

U.S. officials have said that the floating pier, soon after achieving its initial target, would expand capacity to enable 150 trucks a day to enter Gaza, assisting at least 500,000 people a month. Sullivan denied that the current lower levels indicated poor planning, blaming it instead on “a dynamic environment.”

The pier has begun operating at a critical time in the nearly eight-month war, with Israeli military advances in Rafah obstructing passage through the two southern border crossings, which were the conduits for most of the aid entering the Gaza Strip. The maritime corridor—and a continuing air-drop campaign—was meant to supplement ground deliveries, which are cheaper and more efficient. If the sea route is able to ramp up and the Rafah campaign drags on, though, the pier could potentially provide a vital lifeline to a population facing famine.

Scaling up the operation could prove difficult.

The maritime corridor is a cumbersome system with multiple potential bottlenecks. Food, medical supplies and other goods from around the world are sent by air or sea to the island nation of Cyprus, where the aid is screened and packaged onto shipping pallets in the small port of Larnaca. A large military or commercial ship then transports the pallets some 200 miles across the Mediterranean Sea to a floating platform built by the U.S.

There, the pallets are put into trucks, which are driven onto smaller military vessels that carry them about 6 miles to a floating U.S.-built causeway secured to the beach by Israeli army engineers. The trucks drive a few hundred feet down the causeway and onto the beach. In a zone protected by Israeli soldiers, aid workers transfer the pallets onto a separate fleet of trucks that are used by aid groups to complete the final leg to warehouses and distribution points inside Gaza.

Weather poses a particular threat. Choppy waters in the Mediterranean Sea could damage the pier and make it unsafe for people to be on it, military officials have warned. Storms delayed installation of the pier for several days and could interrupt operations again. The summer is expected to be mostly calm, but if the pier survives until September it will likely have to stop operations around then and be dismantled.

Palestinians near Nuseirat rushed trucks transporting international humanitarian aid that had arrived via the floating pier. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A Palestinian boy carried a box on the Nuseirat refugee camp beach road last weekend, after the trucks were stormed. PHOTO: SAHER ALGHORRA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The pier is an “extraordinary measure” by the U.S. government, said Michelle Strucke, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for global partnerships including humanitarian affairs and disaster response. But she said it was rendered ineffective by distribution issues on the ground and Israel’s lack of an effective deconfliction system to protect aid operations from military activities. Israel says it doesn’t target aid workers, and after a deadly incident last month the defense minister said the military would coordinate directly with aid groups.

The complex pier operation also adds a dangerous new dimension to Washington’s involvement in the Gaza war, which includes supplying Israel with billions of dollars of weapons. While U.S. officials say American forces won’t step foot in Gaza, the pier pushes them to the edge of a chaotic battlefield. Engineering work on the pier came under mortar fire a month ago by “various terrorist organizations,” according to the Israeli military.

Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, has said it would treat U.S. forces at the pier as an occupying force. Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are hostile to the U.S. and have launched drones and missiles at ships in the Red Sea in response to the war in Gaza, say air-defense systems make the pier a military base. Both are implicit threats to attack.

Displaced Gazans waited to collect food at a street kitchen in a camp in Deir al-Balah last week. PHOTO: AHMAD SALEM/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Three U.S. troops have been injured at sea already, said Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, deputy head of U.S. Central Command. Two of them have returned to duty, and one is being treated at an Israeli facility, he said without providing details. A U.S. defense official described the third troop as seriously wounded.

The danger to aid workers—more than 260 of whom have been killed over the course of the war, according to the U.N.—was highlighted last month when seven workers from World Central Kitchen, a charity founded by celebrity chef José Andrés, were killed in Israeli airstrikes on their convoy as it was delivering aid from a makeshift pier the group had built to receive sea deliveries.

The Israeli military controls the major ground arteries, and aid groups say their convoys often get held up at checkpoints for hours despite having pre-cleared the route. Israel says it is doing everything it can to ensure aid reaches Gaza.

The lack of a clear authority on the ground to secure aid distribution poses other problems. In a February incident, more than 100 people were killed when Israeli forces opened fire during a stampede of people rushing to get aid from a convoy. Aid groups assess that a surge of aid providing consistent supply for many days is the only way to reassure desperate people and convince them to allow trucks to transit safely.

Months of insufficient aid deliveries to Gaza, following Israel’s launch of the war in response to the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attack, have pushed parts of Gaza into famine. More aid began entering in April after the U.S. and other foreign governments pressured Israel to open new ground crossings and ease restrictions on existing ones.

But after Israel launched military operations in Rafah this month, the level of aid deliveries collapsed, and southern Gaza is now at increased risk of famine. The U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees suspended food distribution in Rafah on Wednesday because of inadequate supplies and insecurity.

Gordon Lubold contributed to this article.

Write to Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com

Appeared in the May 25, 2024, print edition as 'Costly Pier Brings Little Aid'.

17. Gen. Mattis on foreign influence operations: The US has never been 'more vulnerable'

Excerpts:

And yet, because of the divisive state of U.S. politics and culture going into the 2024 election, “we’re going to have people who are trying to increase the tribalism, increase the distrust between Americans. And right now with the level of ideological disarray in our country, in Beijing and Moscow, the leaders are cheering us on as we tear each other down and we use scorching rhetoric,” he said, adding that they will “take it to the limit of what they can do to make distrust between you.”

That said, Mattis has great confidence in the cybersecurity of the nation’s election infrastructure, saying he believes there’s a “99.9% chance” there won’t be actual meddling in the voting systems and that vote counts will be accurate.

Mattis also touched on the evolving domain of cyber within the U.S. military. While he wasn’t a fan of an idea that’s growing in popularity to split cyber out from the services and create a new, independent military branch to support it, he did call for the nation’s leaders to find a model that would give the Department of Defense and U.S. Cyber Command a bigger role in the case of a cyberattack on the homeland and its critical infrastructure.

I am glad he is talking about election integrity. Every American of both parties (and independents) should be focused on this and reinforcing the integrity of elections rather than trying to undermine it for partisan purposes. Election confidence has been needlessly undermined for partisan purposes. So much damage has been done to our election system by unfounded accusations of election interference by the other party. The threats are external and we should focus on that.

Gen. Mattis on foreign influence operations: The US has never been 'more vulnerable'

In a wide-ranging discussion, Mattis touched on the United States' vulnerability to meddling in the 2024 election, the evolution of cybersecurity as a domain of the U.S. military, and the impact of emerging tech on defense, among other things.

BILLY MITCHELL

MAY 23, 2024

defensescoop.com · by Billy Mitchell · May 23, 2024

A former defense secretary gave a stark warning Wednesday about how vulnerable he believes the nation is to foreign influence amid the upcoming 2024 election cycle.

Retired Gen. Jim Mattis said during a special appearance at DefenseTalks, presented by DefenseScoop, that while election systems and voting infrastructure are perhaps the most secure they’ve ever been against cyberattacks, “the bigger problem and the one that I think that we are very vulnerable to right now is the influence operations.”

“When it comes to influence operations, I think I’ve never seen the country more vulnerable and a more lucrative place for the enemy to go after than right now,” Mattis, who led the Pentagon during the early part of the Trump administration, said in an on-stage interview.

Mattis pointed out that this isn’t a secret, with evidence of Russia and China in particular revving up their “propaganda machines,” not only targeting the U.S. but other democracies like France and Germany as well, with disinformation. And increasingly those adversaries are using advanced tech, like artificial intelligence, to boost those influence ops.

And yet, because of the divisive state of U.S. politics and culture going into the 2024 election, “we’re going to have people who are trying to increase the tribalism, increase the distrust between Americans. And right now with the level of ideological disarray in our country, in Beijing and Moscow, the leaders are cheering us on as we tear each other down and we use scorching rhetoric,” he said, adding that they will “take it to the limit of what they can do to make distrust between you.”

That said, Mattis has great confidence in the cybersecurity of the nation’s election infrastructure, saying he believes there’s a “99.9% chance” there won’t be actual meddling in the voting systems and that vote counts will be accurate.

Mattis also touched on the evolving domain of cyber within the U.S. military. While he wasn’t a fan of an idea that’s growing in popularity to split cyber out from the services and create a new, independent military branch to support it, he did call for the nation’s leaders to find a model that would give the Department of Defense and U.S. Cyber Command a bigger role in the case of a cyberattack on the homeland and its critical infrastructure.

Beyond that, he also talked down the notion that recent advances in technology have dramatically shifted the nature of defense and warfare, saying “the fundamental nature of warfare has not yet changed in the last 10,000 years.”

“The promise of these technologies is just enormous right now. And I’m no Luddite, I want the highest tech, the most reliable technology in the world,” Mattis said. However, he contended that “history would tell you that technology has not delivered ever with the promise it seems to, except perhaps with the nuclear weapons at the end of World War II.”

That said, he warned: “You have to stay alert with artificial intelligence and machine learning — that could actually change” things in big ways, though that remains to be seen.

Ultimately, regardless of the technology at hand — whether that’s the use of tanks in World War II or drones in today’s conflicts — the most important element is integration, Mattis said.

“You’ve got to look at technology as one tool in the toolbox. Take full advantage of it, but make certain you’re integrating it right. And that has to do with innovation, it has to do with the thinking, the education of the officers and NCOs in your military,” he said. “There’s a lot that goes into something like that, not just about technology alone.”

Written by Billy Mitchell

Billy Mitchell is Senior Vice President and Executive Editor of Scoop News Group's editorial brands. He oversees operations, strategy and growth of SNG's award-winning tech publications, FedScoop, StateScoop, CyberScoop, EdScoop and DefenseScoop. Prior to joining Scoop News Group in early 2014, Billy embedded himself in Washington, DC's tech startup scene for a year as a tech reporter at InTheCapital, now known as DC Inno. After earning his degree at Virginia Tech and winning the school's Excellence in Print Journalism award, Billy received his master's degree from New York University in magazine writing while interning at publications like Rolling Stone.

defensescoop.com · by Billy Mitchell · May 23, 2024

18. ‘Four services and four arms’ lifts CCP control over information warfare

Excerpts:

So what does this all mean? Is this a change in nomenclature or does it represent something more significant? Typical for the opaque military system in China, no real explanation has been provided. China’s defense ministry described the creation of the three forces and disbandment of the SFF as ‘part of efforts to optimise the PLA’s overall force structure’.

While breaking down PLA intra-agency stovepipes is a likely motivation, the restructure also represents an effort to raise the profile of key PLA capabilities in an era in which information, space and cyber operations are increasingly important. The disbandment of the SSF has removed a level of bureaucracy between the CMC (which Xi chairs) and the three new forces (arms). It allows the CMC direct visibility, management and resourcing of space, cyber and information capabilities in the PLA.

‘Four services and four arms’ lifts CCP control over information warfare | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Joe Keary · May 24, 2024

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone its largest restructure in nearly a decade, with Chinese President Xi Jinping placing key military organisations responsible for information warfare directly under the control of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Committee (CMC).

On 19 April, the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) was officially disbanded. Established in December 2015, the short-lived SSF was focused on bringing together space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. Reporting directly to the CMC, it sought to achieve synergies between roles and capabilities related to the information domain. Now, three new forces have been created to replace it: the Aerospace Force (ASF), Cyberspace Force (CSF), and Information Support Force (ISF).

Xi also officially launched the ISF on 19 April. It will be responsible for construction and implementation of joint information support for the PLA (that is, communications facilitation rather than intelligence-related capabilities). While they are yet to be formally unveiled, the new Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force are likely to be redesigns of the former SSF Aerospace Systems and Network Systems departments.

Together the three organisations will manage offensive and defensive PLA information capabilities, including communications networks, global and space-based ISR capabilities, offensive and defensive cyber and electronic warfare. They will operate alongside the Joint Logistics Support Force, which was established back in 2016.

Highlighting the concept of ‘four services and four arms’, PLA spokesman Senior Colonel Wu Qian said ‘with the latest reform, the PLA now has a new system of services and arms under the leadership and command of the CMC. There are four services, namely the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Rocket Force, and four arms, including the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, the Information Support Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force.’

So what does this all mean? Is this a change in nomenclature or does it represent something more significant? Typical for the opaque military system in China, no real explanation has been provided. China’s defense ministry described the creation of the three forces and disbandment of the SFF as ‘part of efforts to optimise the PLA’s overall force structure’.

While breaking down PLA intra-agency stovepipes is a likely motivation, the restructure also represents an effort to raise the profile of key PLA capabilities in an era in which information, space and cyber operations are increasingly important. The disbandment of the SSF has removed a level of bureaucracy between the CMC (which Xi chairs) and the three new forces (arms). It allows the CMC direct visibility, management and resourcing of space, cyber and information capabilities in the PLA.

An article published in the PLA’s official newspaper on April 20 outlined that ‘victory in modern warfare is dictated by information dominance. Modern conflicts are competitions between systems and structures, where control over information equates to control over the initiative in war.’ Perhaps learning lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the PLA no longer sees information warfare as a tactical or operational resource but as a strategic outcome, in which military operations support goals in the information domain. Placing the three new forces directly under the control of China’s Central Military Commission reflects this emphasis.

The fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping personally presented the ISF with a military banner at its inauguration demonstrates his personal interest and investment. He described the ISF as ‘a new, strategic branch of the military’ and said it will ‘play a crucial role in advancing the Chinese military’s high-quality development and competitiveness in modern warfare’.

Commentators have suggested other motivations for the reorganisation. This includes CMC dissatisfaction with the performance of the SSF, including its failure to deliver expected efficiencies. Others have pointed to possible corruption within the SSF or suggested that the SSF may have always been a transitory organisation, intended to develop disparate elements of the PLA. Any or all of these factors could be at play.

It will take time to fully understand the impact of the redesign and the exact activities that each new force will undertake. Regardless, we can remain assured that dominance in information warfare will remain a key goal for Xi Jinping, the CMC and the PLA. This is important to consider as Australia looks to its own interactions with the PLA, including the recent unsafe interactions in the East China Sea.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Joe Keary · May 24, 2024

19. U.S. Intelligence Deserves the Distrust It Is Generating

Although the author claimed in an email to friends that this is not meant as a partisan piece it will certainly be interpreted that way, I expect this article will be used in campaign rhetoric. Are the allegations true? I am sure where you stand depends on where you sit.

Excerpts;

But President Obama sought to change the demographics and the political complexion of the federal work force, and intelligence leaders such as CIA director John Brennan (2013-2017) made clear that they intended to change the organizational cultures of agencies in politically significant ways. They succeeded brilliantly, with overt activism in defense of Obama/Brennan changes beginning in 2016, when Trump emerged as a potential threat to the “progress” that Obama’s policies allegedly had achieved.

This radical change became glaringly obvious when former CIA deputy director Michael Morell invoked his CIA credentials in a New York Times op-ed to rationalize endorsing Hillary Clinton for president while harshly criticizing Trump. Morell then became one of the “talking heads,” along with Brennan, former director of national intelligence James Clapper, former CIA director Michael Hayden, and several dozen less-senior people whom the mainstream liberal press promoted as legitimate observers of everything relevant to their anti-Trump campaign. In 2018, senior CIA officer Peter Usowski noted that partisan activism by former CIA officers, whose last titles always precede their names in public discourse, was likely to be seen widely as activism by the agency proper. Usowski’s insightful observation was ignored.

May 24, 2024

U.S. Intelligence Deserves the Distrust It Is Generating

By John A. Gentry

americanthinker.com

On May 16, Foreign Policy magazine published an article by three experienced intelligence officers, including one who has chronically politicized U.S. intelligence, who argued that the U.S. intelligence community (IC) is getting a bad rap at a critical point in history for unfortunate, unjustified reasons. Only the first part of the assertion is correct. Far more accurate would have been a judgment that the declining respect for the IC reflected in polls is a direct result of the recent partisan political activism and dishonesty of ostensibly respectable senior former intelligence officers and many inaccurate “leaks” by current intelligence officers, mainly against candidate and then President Donald Trump.

This activism is new. For many decades the organizational culture at the CIA, most importantly given its role of supporting presidents, was that intelligence officers inform all presidents as best they can in apolitical ways, whatever the receptivity of presidents to intelligence or the accuracy of their complaints about intelligence. People believed politicization of any sort — from the political Right or Left — damages the usefulness of intelligence and agency interests. Insightful intelligence officers such as the CIA’s Martin Petersen knew that intelligence had to perform well constantly to maintain presidential confidence and that errors in judgment and lapses in integrity had severely negative, long-term consequences. There was no need for an intelligence norm equivalent to the military’s normative prohibition on political activism by former generals and admirals because intelligence officers rarely were politically active. There had never been a General Douglas MacArthur-like challenge to presidential authority.

But President Obama sought to change the demographics and the political complexion of the federal work force, and intelligence leaders such as CIA director John Brennan (2013-2017) made clear that they intended to change the organizational cultures of agencies in politically significant ways. They succeeded brilliantly, with overt activism in defense of Obama/Brennan changes beginning in 2016, when Trump emerged as a potential threat to the “progress” that Obama’s policies allegedly had achieved.

This radical change became glaringly obvious when former CIA deputy director Michael Morell invoked his CIA credentials in a New York Times op-ed to rationalize endorsing Hillary Clinton for president while harshly criticizing Trump. Morell then became one of the “talking heads,” along with Brennan, former director of national intelligence James Clapper, former CIA director Michael Hayden, and several dozen less-senior people whom the mainstream liberal press promoted as legitimate observers of everything relevant to their anti-Trump campaign. In 2018, senior CIA officer Peter Usowski noted that partisan activism by former CIA officers, whose last titles always precede their names in public discourse, was likely to be seen widely as activism by the agency proper. Usowski’s insightful observation was ignored.

It got worse. Among the worst ways, Morell admitted to the House Judiciary Committee that he and former CIA operations officer Marc Polymeropoulos connived in October 2020 with the Joe Biden campaign in the person of Antony Blinken to debunk an accurate New York Post story that Hunter Biden’s laptop computer, abandoned at a repair shop, contained information suggesting that he and Joe Biden may have corruptly sold influence abroad. Morell and Polymeropoulos wrote a prospective open letter suggesting that the laptop’s contents, which the FBI had already determined were genuine, had “all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation.” Fifty-one former intelligence officers signed the letter. The insinuation worked. Politico, which had published earlier politically-oriented open letters, obligingly converted the linguistic obfuscation of the letter into a definitive statement of Russian culpability in its headline. With intelligence help, Joe Biden won his election, averting an “October surprise.” One recipient of a Morell-Polymeropoulos pitch told me the explicit goal of the solicitation was to help Biden, not recruit expertise about Russian disinformation techniques.

Brennan was nearly as bad. In op-eds and tweets, he repeatedly bashed Trump, charging that Trump was a dupe of Russian President Vladmir Putin, calling him treasonous, and comparing him to swindler Bernie Madoff. Brennan also, while still CIA director, urged CIA employees to be politically active, arguably coming at least close to violating the 1939 Hatch Act that prohibits political activities by serving government employees.

Hayden, who published a fine book in 2016, published an emotional anti-Trump diatribe in 2018 that is riddled with errors. Titled The Assault on Intelligence, it documents no such thing. Trump largely ignored intelligence and the federal workforce generally. In October 2023, Hayden tweeted that Senator Tommy Tuberville should be removed “from the human race,” which led Tuberville to report Hayden to the U.S. Capitol police and others as an assassination threat.

The list of outrageous claims is long. Some, like many of Brennan’s, were simply outlandish. Many others were untrue. Many activist partisans, who accurately noted Trump’s casual respect for facts, wantonly misrepresented Trump and their own motives and actions. Several prominent critics, including Brennan, Clapper, and the FBI’s James Comey and Andrew McCabe, were accused pointedly of lying. Use of favorable versions of “truth” became a frequent tool of the politicization of intelligence. Chronic, blatantly obvious dishonesty is not conducive to public confidence in people who claim to speak “truth to power.”

Serving intelligence officers politicized in different ways. Unable to appear on MSNBC or write op-eds, they leaked often incorrect information — falsehoods designed to damage Trump. Leaks surged early in the Trump administration and evidently remained at lofty levels. These included incorrect reports that Trump received briefings in early 2020 about the dangers of COVID and did nothing to address the problem. The Defense Department refuted the assertions. More significantly, the IC’s analytic ombudsman reported that China analysts in the IC withheld information from the White House that they believed might help Trump administration officials — a potential national security threat.

Given this history, intelligence partisans of recent years unsurprisingly are again misrepresenting the legacy of activism of recent years. But it is hard to know how much is purposeful dishonesty and how much is self-delusion. National Intelligence University faculty incongruously argued in 2021 that Hollywood fables were to blame in part for growing public distrust of intelligence and that intelligence should better tout its value.

Hence, public confidence in intelligence, rationally, is declining. A Rasmussen poll released in October 2023 found that only 36% of American voters believed that intelligence agencies behaved in an impartial manner, while 51% said the agencies have their own political agendas. And 65% believed it likely that the agencies are influencing corporate media’s coverage of political issues. Another Rasmussen poll released in March 2024 showed that most Americans think the IC is trying to influence the 2024 presidential election. Per Peter Usowski, this is an understandable fear given the actions of Morell, Brennan, Comey, and many others since 2016, whether senior intelligence executives now orchestrate politicization directly or not. While many intelligence professionals lament the activism quietly, some have spoken against the politicization. For example, former CIA counterintelligence chief Mark Kelton observed that widespread worry in 2015, when Brennan was director, about “fraying professional discipline” of the workforce turned into a “tsunami” of leaks in the Trump years.

It is axiomatic in many walks of life that trust is earned slowly but can be destroyed easily. Hard, honest work done consistently over a long time is the only way to rebuild trust in intelligence. Restoration of the longstanding norms of apolitical public service and establishment of new norms of civil-military-like conduct are essential to restoring trust. But current and former intelligence officers first need to recognize that they caused the problem and accept that the task of rebuilding confidence in intelligence is theirs alone. There is, however, no evidence that many of them yet see the problem. Instead, the ideology and interests that led intelligence officers to oppose Trump in 2016 seem likely to reappear, especially given that Trump seems to recognize that he ignored management of the federal workforce in 2017-2021 and appears determined to remedy his error if he wins in November. Many of the activist former officers have irreparably damaged their credibility, but others seem likely to emerge.

In another election year, citizens should remember that intelligence activism of any sort by current or former intelligence officers reflects gross violations of longstanding, effective norms that intelligence people well understand. Citizens should remember, too, that the politicizers try to deflect responsibility for their actions and are practiced in doing so.

John A. Gentry is a former CIA analyst and author of Neutering the CIA: Why US Intelligence Versus Trump Has Long-Term Consequences. Follow him at @gentry_johna.

Image: CIA

americanthinker.com

20. Ex-Google CEO Eric Schmidt predicts AI data centers will be ‘on military bases surrounded by machine guns’

A pretty sensational headline. But perhaps it is justified.

Excerpts:

He then pondered the consequences of agents “develop[ing] their own language to communicate with each other.”

“And that’s the point when we won’t understand what the models are doing,” Schmidt said, adding: “What should we do? Pull the plug?”

“It will really be a problem when agents start to communicate and do things in ways that we as humans do not understand,” the 69-year-old former executive said. “That’s the limit, in my view.”

Schmidt said that “a reasonable expectation is that we will be in this new world within five years, not 10.”

He added that tech companies have been working with Western governments on regulating the new technology.

Schmidt said that Western companies dealing in AI are “well-run” and have “exposure to lawsuits” — thus minimizing risk.

“It is not as if they wake up in the morning saying let’s figure out how to hurt somebody or damage humanity,” he said.

But Schmidt warned that “there are evil people” in the world who “will use your tools to hurt people.”

Ex-Google CEO Eric Schmidt predicts AI data centers will be ‘on military bases surrounded by machine guns’

By Ariel Zilber

Published May 23, 2024, 2:47 p.m. ET

New York Post · May 23, 2024

Google’s former chief executive officer, Eric Schmidt, predicted that the most powerful artificial intelligence systems will be housed on military bases surrounded by machine guns in the US and China.

“Eventually, in both the US and China, I suspect there will be a small number of extremely powerful computers with the capability for autonomous invention that will exceed what we want to give either to our own citizens without permission or to our competitors,” Schmidt told Noema Magazine in an interview that was published on Tuesday.

Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt said that advanced AI computers will be housed on military bases in the US and China. Getty Images for TIME

The former Google boss who headed the search engine from 2001 to 2011 said that AI systems will gain knowledge at such a rapid pace within the next few years that they will eventually “start to work together.”

Schmidt, whose net worth has been valued by Bloomberg Billionaires Index at $33.4 billion, is an investor in the Amazon-backed AI startup Anthropic.

He said that the proliferation of AI knowledge in the next few years poses challenges to regulators.

“Here we get into the questions raised by science fiction,” Schmidt said.

He identified AI “agents” as “large language model[s] that can learn something new.”

“These agents are going to be really powerful, and it’s reasonable to expect that there will be millions of them out there,” according to Schmidt.

Schmidt warned that regulators will have a hard time mitigating risks inherent in the rapid advancement of AI within the next few years. REUTERS

“So, there will be lots and lots of agents running around and available to you.”

He then pondered the consequences of agents “develop[ing] their own language to communicate with each other.”

“And that’s the point when we won’t understand what the models are doing,” Schmidt said, adding: “What should we do? Pull the plug?”

“It will really be a problem when agents start to communicate and do things in ways that we as humans do not understand,” the 69-year-old former executive said. “That’s the limit, in my view.”

Schmidt said that “a reasonable expectation is that we will be in this new world within five years, not 10.”

He added that tech companies have been working with Western governments on regulating the new technology.

Schmidt said that Western companies dealing in AI are “well-run” and have “exposure to lawsuits” — thus minimizing risk.

“It is not as if they wake up in the morning saying let’s figure out how to hurt somebody or damage humanity,” he said.

But Schmidt warned that “there are evil people” in the world who “will use your tools to hurt people.”

Schmidt, 69, is said to be worth more than $33 billion. POOL/AFP via Getty Images

“All technology is dual use,” he said. “All of these inventions can be misused, and it’s important for the inventors to be honest about that.”

Schmidt said that the problem of spreading misinformation through AI as well as deepfakes is “unsolvable.”

“There are some ways regulation can be attempted. But the cat is out of the bag, the genie is out of the bottle,” he said.

Last year, a group of tech leaders from OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Anthropic and other labs warned that future AI systems could pose a threat to humanity that would be deadlier than pandemics and nuclear weapons.

“Mitigating the risk of extinction from A.I. should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks, such as pandemics and nuclear war,” the statement by the nonprofit Center for AI Safety read.

New York Post · May 23, 2024

21. Plans for China's invasion of Taiwan could be thwarted by a leading European chipmaker's "kill switch," which can remotely deactivate sophisticated chipmaking equipment

Hmmm......

Excerpts:

For context, Taiwan is the world's hub for semiconductor chips, which are used in a wide array of devices, including smartphones and laptops. China wants to invade Taiwan, claiming the island is part of its territory and wants to reclaim it. If this were to happen, the imminent damage that would occur is unimaginable.

Luckily, the new revelation that both ASML and TSMC's tech has a "kill switch" will make it easier to control and prevent China from manufacturing sophisticated chips that can be used for military advances.

Elsewhere, the US government is mounting pressure on the Netherlands to implement measures that will prevent ASML from exporting AI chips to China. Likewise, the chip brand has indicated that it'll no longer service equipment that it was previously shipping to China.

Plans for China's invasion of Taiwan could be thwarted by a leading European chipmaker's "kill switch," which can remotely deactivate sophisticated chipmaking equipment

windowscentral.com · by Kevin Okemwa · May 24, 2024

What you need to know

In November 2023, the US government imposed exportation rules preventing NVIDIA and AMD from supplying China with AI chips due to security concerns.
Top semiconductor brands ASML and TSMC have reportedly disclosed that they can hinder China's chipmaking machines remotely should they manage to invade Taiwan.
The Biden-Harris administration is mounting pressure on the Netherlands to implement measures that will prevent ASML from exporting AI chips to China.

Generative AI is quickly taking over the tech world, owing to its fast adoption across organizations and companies. The rapid growth of the technology is raising security concerns among major stakeholders, including the Biden-Harris administration. This has prompted exportation rules that prevent chip brands like NVIDIA and AMD from shipping AI chips to China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam.

In the past, the US government explained that stringent exportation rules weren't in force to weaken China's economy. It's more of a safeguard and preventative measure that mitigates the misuse of sophisticated AI technology that could potentially be used to foster military advances.

But there's a better and more effective way to approach this issue. According to a Bloomberg report, ASML and TSMC have a super secret way to remotely access and disable high-tech chipmaking machines. This would especially come in handy in the event that China decides to pursue Taiwan.

Two sources with knowledge about the matter disclosed to Bloomberg that the US government has privately expressed security concerns to its Dutch and Taiwan partners.

For context, Taiwan is the world's hub for semiconductor chips, which are used in a wide array of devices, including smartphones and laptops. China wants to invade Taiwan, claiming the island is part of its territory and wants to reclaim it. If this were to happen, the imminent damage that would occur is unimaginable.

Luckily, the new revelation that both ASML and TSMC's tech has a "kill switch" will make it easier to control and prevent China from manufacturing sophisticated chips that can be used for military advances.

Elsewhere, the US government is mounting pressure on the Netherlands to implement measures that will prevent ASML from exporting AI chips to China. Likewise, the chip brand has indicated that it'll no longer service equipment that it was previously shipping to China.

windowscentral.com · by Kevin Okemwa · May 24, 2024

22. Call For Papers: Second Annual Irregular Warfare Colloquium (IW Center)

Looking for junior scholars.

May 13, 2024

Call For Papers: Second Annual Irregular Warfare Colloquium

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/news/announcement/call-for-papers-second-annual-irregular-warfare-colloquium/

Pursuant to its mandate to facilitate research on irregular warfare and strategic competition, and engage with U.S. and international universities, the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) is pleased to invite proposals for the second annual Irregular Warfare Colloquium, to be held in the Washington, DC, area on September 26-27, 2024.

For more details and submission guidelines, please download the guidance document here.

Call For Papers:

Second Annual Irregular Warfare Colloquium

Pursuant to its mandate to facilitate research on irregular warfare and strategic competition, and engage with U.S. and international universities, the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) is pleased to

invite proposals for the second annual Irregular Warfare Colloquium, to be held in the Washington, DC, area on September 26-27, 2024.

The IWC serves as the central mechanism for developing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) irregular warfare (IW) knowledge and advancing the department’s understanding of IW concepts and doctrine in collaboration with key allies and partners. To that end, we have developed this selective colloquium aimed at building a strong cohort of 12-14 junior scholars working on IW-related projects and connecting them with senior scholars and practitioners in the field.

Presenters selected for participation in the colloquium will be placed in small groups with presenters from other academic institutions who share similar research interests and complementary capabilities. Attendees will be expected to give a brief presentation of their research—whether completed or in-progress—to serve as the basis for peer discussions and planning for further research.

¢ Themes

Themes of particular interest to the Center for this colloquium include cyber operations; information and influence operations; resistance movements and occupation; proxy warfare; great power competition below the threshold of war; and women, peace, and security. Nominees should propose topics that explore one or more of these themes and explain how their research might enhance the ability of the United States, its allies, and its partners, to address the challenges posed by irregular warfare.

¢ Participants

Graduate students, postdocs, and faculty are invited to apply. Participation is open to students and faculty from both U.S. and international colleges and universities.

Proposals should include a CV and a 200-word maximum abstract outlining the project and its contributions to the study of IW. Proposals received by June 21, 2024 will receive full consideration, with decisions to be announced in July.

The IWC brings together IW stakeholders from across the DOD, interagency, academia, industry, and allies and partners to advance our understanding of IW. Its lines of effort are to amplify and collaborate to build an innovative and adaptable global networked IW community of interest; To Strategically illuminate current and future irregular threats, crises, and obstacles; and to address current and future irregular threats to the US, allies, and partners by providing optionality.

Please send submissions to joshua.a.hastey.ctr@mail.mil.

For more information please visit www.irregularwarfarecenter.org

23. Mysterious shooting outside Army Special Forces residence in North Carolina raises questions

Excerpts:

Two Chechen men who spoke broken English were found near the soldier's home. The family alleges the suspected intruder, 35-year-old Ramzan Daraev of Chicago was taking photos of their children. When confronted near a power line in a wooded part of the property, an altercation ensued and Daraev was shot several times at close range. A second man, Dzhankutov Adsalan, was in a vehicle some distance from the incident and was questioned by authorities and then released. The Moore County Sheriff's office is leading the investigation.

....

The shooter has been identified as a Colonel with the U.S. Army who resided at the location of the shooting.

U.S. Special Operations soldiers around the country have experienced strange interactions in recent years that they say involve suspicious surveillance of them and their families. Many believe that U.S. military bases have become an increasing target of foreign probes.

Mysterious shooting outside Army Special Forces residence in North Carolina raises questions

Chechen power company subcontractor found shot in North Carolina near Army colonel’s home

By Jennifer Griffin , Liz Friden Fox News

Published May 23, 2024 8:15pm EDT

foxnews.com · by Jennifer Griffin , Liz Friden Fox News

A mysterious shooting in North Carolina north of Fort Liberty, formerly Fort Bragg, not far from where some of America’s most elite U.S. Special Operations forces live and train is under investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division as well as local police. The shooting in Carthage, North Carolina occurred May 3 at 8:15 p.m. following a phone call about a suspected trespasser near a Special Forces soldier's property.

Two Chechen men who spoke broken English were found near the soldier's home. The family alleges the suspected intruder, 35-year-old Ramzan Daraev of Chicago was taking photos of their children. When confronted near a power line in a wooded part of the property, an altercation ensued and Daraev was shot several times at close range. A second man, Dzhankutov Adsalan, was in a vehicle some distance from the incident and was questioned by authorities and then released. The Moore County Sheriff's office is leading the investigation.

The FBI told Fox News, "Our law enforcement partners at the Moore County Sheriff's Office contacted the FBI after a shooting death in Carthage. A special agent met with investigators and provided a linguist to assist with a language barrier for interviews."

THIS APPEARS TO BE FOREIGN NATIONALS FOCUSED ON US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: DAN HOFFMAN

Sheriff Ronnie Fields said in a statement: "The caller indicated that an individual was observed taking photographs on the property and had become aggressive towards a resident outside their home…. The deceased was found approximately 250 yards from the roadway, along a powerline on the residential property. Identification was not initially found on Daraev; however, his identity was later confirmed through family members and an international identification located in his vehicle."

The shooter has been identified as a Colonel with the U.S. Army who resided at the location of the shooting.

U.S. Special Operations soldiers around the country have experienced strange interactions in recent years that they say involve suspicious surveillance of them and their families. Many believe that U.S. military bases have become an increasing target of foreign probes.

A mysterious shooting near Fort Liberty, formerly Fort Bragg, is under investigation. (Photo by Melissa Sue Gerrits/Getty Images)

The shooting incident two weeks ago in Carthage could have been a case of mistaken identity. The two Chechens had no personal identification. They did have two cell phones with Russian language contacts and camera equipment. They were not wearing any uniforms for the power company that reportedly employed them.

Sheriff Ronnie Fields said Daraev was working as a subcontractor for Utilities One, a company based in New Jersey, at the time of his death. Investigators are still working to verify his official employment and immigration status.

At the time of the incident, Daraev was not in possession of any utility equipment, utility clothing, or identification. The incident has been reported to the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

KILMEADE VISITS FORT LIBERTY, HOME OF XVIII US AIRBORNE CORPS

Sources tell Fox News that "power company employment is often a cover for status/action" that U.S. intelligence agents use for surveillance of foreign targets overseas.

In a separate incident 18 months ago, Moore County experienced another mysterious shooting attack that targeted two electrical distribution substations. Damage from the attack left up to 40,000 residential and business customers without power in North Carolina for nearly 2 weeks. The power outage primarily affected communities heavily populated by U.S. Special Operations families. Less than two weeks prior to the Moore County substation incident, the FBI sent a report to private industry warning of an increase in reported threats to electric infrastructure from people who espouse "racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist ideology." The FBI took over that investigation, which remains unsolved.

Daraev's family launched a Change.org petition called "Justice for Ramzan Daraev" which has already received more than 11,000 signatures adding, "Ramzan left Russia, not realizing that the greatest injustice against him would be done in a free country where in theory he should have received protection."

Moore County, home to Fort Liberty, has seen two suspicious shootings in the past two years. (Photo by ALLISON JOYCE/AFP via Getty Images)

This May 3 shooting in Carthage may simply have been a case of mistaken identity, but members of the Special Operations community are asking why two Russian-speaking Chechens were taking photos near an elite Army special forces residence at 8:15 pm on a Friday night some 10 minutes after sunset and why the FBI is not the lead in the investigation.

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The FBI tells Fox News the Bureau has not opened a counterintelligence investigation and that, "The local investigation has not uncovered evidence of a federal crime," adding "the FBI is in regular contact with the sheriff's office investigators and are prepared to investigate if a federal matter comes to light."

foxnews.com · by Jennifer Griffin , Liz Friden Fox News

24. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 24, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-24-2024

Key Takeaways

Tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Yuan on May 21 and May 24 to protest the advancement of a controversial legislative reform bill in the Legislative Yuan.
The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to “punish” Taiwan for the election of President Lai Ching-te and what the PRC deemed separatist “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. PRC and ROC media cited analysts who said that the exercise’s name, Joint Sword 2024A, suggests that there may be additional exercises in the series later this year.
The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted “law enforcement” drills that entered restricted waters around the Taiwanese Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. The CCG coordinated the drills with PLA joint exercises on May 23 and May 24. The CCG also carried out drills east of Taiwan on May 24.
The PRC announced new sanctions on three US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan.
The PRC referenced UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization’s 2024 annual assembly.
The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) released new law enforcement procedures on May 15 likely as part of PRC efforts to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 24, 2024

May 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 24, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 24 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

Tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Yuan on May 21 and May 24 to protest the advancement of a controversial legislative reform bill in the Legislative Yuan.
The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to “punish” Taiwan for the election of President Lai Ching-te and what the PRC deemed separatist “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. PRC and ROC media cited analysts who said that the exercise’s name, Joint Sword 2024A, suggests that there may be additional exercises in the series later this year.
The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted “law enforcement” drills that entered restricted waters around the Taiwanese Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. The CCG coordinated the drills with PLA joint exercises on May 23 and May 24. The CCG also carried out drills east of Taiwan on May 24.
The PRC announced new sanctions on three US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan.
The PRC referenced UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization’s 2024 annual assembly.
The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) released new law enforcement procedures on May 15 likely as part of PRC efforts to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Yuan on May 21 and May 24 to protest the advancement of a controversial legislative reform bill in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan (LY) began voting on the joint Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reform bill on May 17, which would grant the LY the ability to call on anyone to testify before an investigative committee, establish penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in responses, confirm political appointments, and mandate the president to give an annual national address on the state of the union.[1] The “Contempt of Congress” aspect of the bill is a focal point of the controversy, as it entails punishment such as fines and jail time for individuals whose compliance with LY investigators’ inquiries is deemed unsatisfactory, including government officials. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators opposed the reform bill in the LY on May 17, which climaxed in a physical confrontation between members of the legislature. Mass demonstrations took place outside the LY on May 21 and 24 as the general assembly continued voting on the bill’s provisions.[2] The LY is set to continue voting on the bill on May 28.

DPP legislators have criticized the bill as unconstitutional and labeled it a political tool that the KMT and TPP will abuse to expand their power. DPP Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming articulated the threat that the bill poses to the executive branch, calling it a “limitless expansion of powers” and a “constitutional monster” whose purpose was to weaponize the legislature.[3] KMT Caucus Deputy Secretary-General Lin Szu-ming, one of the main authors of the reform bills, earlier highlighted the LY’s need to possess “strong weapons” to supervise the government.[4] DPP Caucus Secretary-General Rosalia Wu stated on April 1 that the DPP will fight against the law with all its strength, and would request action from the justices of the Constitutional Court if the bill passed the LY.[5]

The DPP China Affairs Department highlighted the Contempt of Congress aspect of the bill among a series of KMT actions that benefitted CCP interests.[6] DPP legislator Puma Shen criticized the Contempt of Congress law during LY proceedings on May 24 for granting legislators excessive penal authority and claimed that the law could be used arbitrarily to punish those with opposing views, including individuals that the CCP might accuse of separatism.[7] Ker claimed that the bill amounted to Taiwan’s “Hong Kong-ization,” referring to the territory’s democratic backsliding and political assimilation with the PRC.[8] The DPP argues that the law carries national security risks, as military or government officials could be compelled to disclose confidential information during questioning from an LY investigative committee or face indictment under the law.[9] The bill includes a stipulation that exempts sensitive national security information from disclosure.[10]

The DPP and protestors are also condemning the KMT and TPP for using opaque and undemocratic methods to advance the reforms in the legislature. The DPP accused the KMT of automatically advancing the bill to the general assembly without proper review in the relevant committee on April 15.[11] The KMT and TPP introduced an amended version of the bill on the morning of May 17, which the parties did not make available to the public or disseminate to the general assembly before initiating voting.[12] TPP Caucus Whip Huang Kuo-chang stated in an interview on May 17 that the amended version was “top secret.”[13] Huang later pushed back against the DPP and protesters’ accusations of opacity and circumvention of legislative procedures and criticized the DPP for using violence to obstruct the bill’s advancement.[14]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu expressed the party’s strong resolve to achieve its political objectives in defiance of what it views as an uncooperative DPP. Chu stated on May 19 that the KMT would no longer be “restrained and courteous” in its fight to achieve reform and invoked the KMT’s mandate to carry out the public’s expectations for reform, which is based on the party’s dominant presence in the LY.[15] Chu criticized the DPP on May 22 for staging the protests to obstruct democracy and the will of the majority.[16] KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi, who spearheaded the bill’s sponsorship, vowed on May 24 to finalize its passage next week after the LY proceedings continued into the night.[17]

The PRC framed ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural address as hostile and provocative for cross-strait relations. Lai took office on May 20, marking the start of the DPP’s third consecutive term in power. Lai’s inaugural address emphasized the importance of upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy.[18] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua rejected Lai’s assertions of Taiwan’s sovereignty and self-determination as “separatist fallacies” that made clear his desire to realize Taiwan’s formal independence.[19] Chen described Lai as a separatist zealot who poses a danger to cross-strait peace and does not represent mainstream public opinion in Taiwan. Chen criticized countries that sent representatives to attend Lai’s inauguration and warned against foreign interference in Taiwan that violates the recognition of the PRC as the sole government of China.[20] Chen specifically called out the United States for having diplomatic relations and “official exchanges” with Taiwan. There were no official government representatives in the US delegation and the United States does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking at a foreign ministers’ summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, stated that nothing can stop the PRC from reunifying with Taiwan, and that “separatists will be nailed to a pillar of shame.”[21]

PRC state broadcaster CCTV claimed widespread disapproval of Lai’s alleged independence-minded rhetoric in Taiwan.[22] The segment featured spokesperson Yu Chih-pin of Taiwan’s New Party, a pro-unification party that grew out of the KMT, who framed the DPP as the antagonist in cross-strait relations and criticized Lai for stating that “neither side of the strait was subordinate to the other.” The piece highlighted a Taiwanese poll released on May 20 that showed more than half of respondents did not have confidence in Lai’s ability to manage cross-strait relations.[23]

China

The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to “punish” Taiwan for the election of President Lai Ching-te and what the PRC deemed separatist “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC) carried out two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan on May 23-24. The exercises, titled “Joint Sword 2024A,” took place in nine distinct locations in the waters to the north, south, and east of the main island of Taiwan and around the Taiwanese islands of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin. ETC spokesperson Senior Colonel Li Xi said that the ETC was organizing services including the army, navy, air force, and rocket force for the joint drills. Li said the drills would focus on joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets. He also said the exercises would involve the patrol of vessels and planes closing in on areas around Taiwan and “integrated operations” inside and outside the island chain to test the joint combat capabilities of the ETC’s forces.[24] The ETC also released a map of the exercises on May 23 that showed PLA Navy (PLAN) warship formations approaching Taiwan from five directions on all sides of the main island.[25]

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 49 PLA aircraft around Taiwan on May 23, the first day of the joint exercises. 35 of the aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered the north, central, and southwest parts of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).[26] It did not report on the number of ships that day. The MND again reported 49 PLA aircraft along with 19 PLAN vessels and 7 Chinese Coast Guard vessels around Taiwan on May 24, the second day. 35 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ that day.[27]

ETC spokesperson Li said the second day of the exercise on May 24 drilled vessel-aircraft coordination, sea assault, and land attack, and tested the forces' combat capabilities including multi-domain coordination and joint strike. PLA Rocket Force units conducted mock fire strikes with modularized long-range rocket systems in eastern Fujian Province, which faces the Taiwan Strait. PLAN warships around Taiwan conducted mock strikes on maritime targets. PLA bombers and fighter jets took off carrying live missiles.[28] The ETC also released a video showing a 3D simulation of strikes on the Taiwanese cities of Taipei, Hualien, and Kaohsiung by PLA air, naval, and rocket forces.[29]

The political purpose of this exercise is to punish Taiwan for its election of Lai as president and what the PRC deemed “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. The exercises began three days after Lai’s inauguration as president of Taiwan. ETC spokesperson Li said that the drills serve as a “strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces” and a “stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”[30] TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua elaborated in stating that the exercise was a punishment for “provocations seeking independence” in Lai’s inauguration speech on May 20.[31] Ministry of National Defense (MOD) spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian claimed that Lai “seriously challenged the one-China principle, blatantly sold the ‘two-state theory,’ and attempted to ‘seek independence through force’ and ‘seek independence through foreign forces’” as soon as he took office. Wu warned that “every time ‘Taiwan independence’ provokes, our countermeasures will be pushed forward until the complete reunification of the motherland is achieved.”[32]

The exercises also signal a message of deterrence both to Taiwan’s DPP administration and to “external forces” that support Taiwan to not make further moves toward Taiwan’s independence. The military purpose of the exercise is to improve the joint interoperability of various services under the ETC, including joint sea-air patrols, joint battlefield control operations, and joint precision strikes.[33] These capabilities are integral to executing several of the PLA’s joint operational war plans as identified in PLA military texts, including Joint Firepower Strike Operations against Taiwan, Joint Blockade Operations against Taiwan, and Joint Attack Operations against Taiwan.[34]

PRC state media, including Xinhua and Global Times, cited PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS) expert Tong Zhen who said that the exercise demonstrated the PLA’s ability to “strike all directions of the island without any blind spots,” pinning down Taiwan from all sides.[35] PLA National Defense University (NDU) Professor Major General Meng Xiangqing noted in an article in the English-language state newspaper China Daily that the Joint Sword 2024A exercises were larger in scale, number of troops, and area covered than previous exercises and made several “breakthroughs.” First, PLA ships reached the Taiwanese outlying islands of Wuqiu and Dongyin for the first time. Second, PLA ships and planes came “as close as ever” to the main island of Taiwan in their combat-readiness patrols. Third, the drill showed joint and integrated operations to seize “comprehensive control of the sea, land, and air,” including cooperation with the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and “many new forces” including “network forces, information support forces, and information systems.”[36] Lieutenant Colonel Zhang Chi of the NDU’s Centre of Strategic Studies wrote in the same article that the drills to the north, south, and east of Taiwan have specific meanings. The drills to the north send warning signals to “important political and military targets,” including the ruling DPP, based in Taiwan’s capital Taipei in northern Taiwan. The exercise to the south is a “political attack” and an “economic blockade” of the city of Kaohsiung, which is a DPP stronghold and Taiwan’s largest port as well as an important garrison for Taiwan’s maritime forces. The exercise to the east is aimed at blocking the “lifeline for Taiwan’s energy imports,” a possible escape route for Taiwan’s “independence forces,” and support lines for the United States and allies to aid Taiwan. All these lines rely mainly on the eastern Taiwanese port of Hualien.[37]

The exercises are comparable to the PLA’s large-scale exercises around Taiwan in August 2022 in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the Joint Sword exercises in April 2023 after then-Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen met then-US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. The 2022 exercises featured a larger number of military assets and involved the firing of ballistic missiles over Taiwan. Those exercises initially lasted five days from August 4-7, with additional drills until August 10.[38] The 2023 exercises lasted three days, compared to the two days of Joint Sword 2024A. The Joint Sword 2024A exercise expanded the area of operation compared to previous joint exercises, however, operating in nine distinct areas including around Taiwan’s outlying islands compared to six areas not including outlying islands during 2022. Joint Sword 2024A also came closer to Taiwan’s east coast than previous exercises.[39]

The MND condemned the exercises and called them an “irrational provocation” that would destabilize regional peace and security.[40] Taiwan President Lai and representatives of the DPP, KMT, and TPP all condemned the PLA drills.[41]

PRC and ROC media cited analysts who said that the exercise’s name, Joint Sword 2024A, suggests that there may be additional exercises in the series later this year. Follow-on exercises would be named Joint Sword 2024B, Joint Sword 2024C, and so on.[42] The PLA held only one Joint Sword exercise in 2023, the first in the series.[43]

The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted “law enforcement” drills that entered restricted waters around the Taiwanese Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. The CCG coordinated the drills with the PLA Joint Sword exercises on May 23 and May 24. The CCG also carried out drills east of Taiwan on May 24. CCG spokesperson Gan Yu announced the drills on May 23 and said they were intended to test the Fujian CCG’s joint patrol, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities. The CCG released maps that showed its patrol routes around the islands. The maps showed a route that passed within 2.8 nautical miles north of Wuqiu and another route that passed within 3.1 nautical miles east and south of Dongyin.[44] The routes entered the “restricted waters” around the islands but not the “prohibited waters.”[45] The CCG also conducted patrols in restricted waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin on May 24 but did not release a map that day.[46] Taiwan does not claim territorial waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin partly due to their proximity to the PRC. It instead designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around the islands, which it treats as equivalent to "territorial waters" and a "contiguous zone," respectively. The Fujian CCG has conducted similar patrols that intruded into prohibited and restricted waters around the Taiwanese island of Kinmen on multiple occasions since February 2024.[47] The PRC does not recognize any “restricted” or “prohibited” waters around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The CCG also carried out law enforcement exercises in waters east of Taiwan on May 24. The exercises focused on training in verification, identification, warning, and expulsion and testing joint patrol and emergency response capabilities. It released photos of the exercises but no map.[48] It is not clear how close the CCG vessels came to Taiwan’s coast.

The PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times cited an unnamed “source close to the matter” who said this was the first time CCG vessels had entered the “restricted waters” around Dongyin and Wuqiu. The source said the exercise and the published maps sent a message of deterrence to Taiwan. The source said the PRC might replicate the “Kinmen model” if the Taiwan government remains “obstinate,” which could include entering the prohibited waters around the Wuqiu and Dongyin islands or boarding and inspecting Taiwanese vessels in the waters around the islands. The source said Wuqiu and Dongyin are of “high strategic importance” and military value because they are close to the mainland PRC, oversee key transportation routes in the Taiwan Strait, and are the front line for Taiwan’s defense operations. The same source also said the CCG patrols showed heightened coastguard-military coordination, as PLA forces concurrently carried out exercises around the islands.[49] PRC authorities did not release maps showing the precise movements of the PLA forces. NDU Professor Major General Meng Xiangqing noted in his China Daily article that PLA forces also approached the islands of Dongyin and Wuqiu for the first time during the Joint Sword 2024A exercises. He said the exercises near those islands sent a warning that if “‘Taiwan independence’ forces escalate their provocation, the PLA may enter the ‘prohibited waters to carry out inspections of Taiwan ships in the area and conduct combat-readiness patrols.”[50] There are no known instances of the PRC using military forces to inspect Taiwanese ships in this way.

Wuqiu and Dongyin are administratively part of Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu regions, respectively. The CCG’s patrols around Wuqiu and Dongyin mark the seventh and eighth CCG intrusions into the restricted waters of Kinmen or Matsu in May 2024.[51] The CCG has normalized patrols in restricted waters around the main islands of Kinmen since an incident on February 14 in which two PRC fishermen drowned while fleeing from a Taiwan Coast Guard pursuit.[52] These CCG patrols serve to erode Taiwan’s control over waters around its territory.

The PRC announced new sanctions on three US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced that it was adding General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Boeing’s Defense, Space & Security unit to an “Unreliable Entity List” for selling arms to Taiwan. MOFCOM made the announcement on May 20, the same day Lai Ching-te was inaugurated as President of Taiwan. The PRC forbids entities on the Unreliable Entity List from conducting export and import business with the PRC and from making new investments in the PRC. The sanctions also ban senior managers of the companies from entering or staying in the PRC. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon’s Missile and Defense division have been on the Unreliable Entity List since February 2023.[53] The PRC previously froze the assets of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems held in the PRC in April 2024. It imposed sanctions on Boeing Defense, Space, and Security President and CEO Ted Colbert in September 2022 over Boeing’s sale of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.[54]

The PRC opened an anti-dumping investigation against polyoxymethylene (POM) copolymers from the United States, European Union, Japan, and Taiwan. The PRC Ministry of Commerce launched the investigation on May 19 after six major PRC POM copolymer producers applied for the investigation on April 22.[55] POM copolymer, also known as polyformaldehyde copolymer or acetal copolymer, is a thermoplastic resin widely used in various industries ranging from auto parts to electronics.[56] Imports supplied nearly 45 percent of the PRC’s POM copolymer demand in 2022. The EU, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States were the third through sixth largest sources of the material, respectively, in the first quarter of 2024.[57]

PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times denied Western media speculation that the “regular and normal anti-dumping investigation” was retaliatory. It said the application to begin the investigation predated US President Joe Biden’s new tariffs on the PRC and that the broader anti-dumping investigation in this industry actually began in 2016, leading to duties on POM copolymer imports from South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia in 2017.[58] The article claimed that US media speculation that the investigation was retaliatory shows that the United States fears PRC countermeasures to the new tariffs.[59]

The PRC referenced statements from the UN Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures to bolster its opposition to unilateral Western sanctions. The special rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Alena Douhan, visited the PRC from May 6 to May 17. She met with government departments, enterprises, civil groups, and other entities in Beijing, Shenzhen, and Xinjiang to study the negative impact of unilateral sanctions on the PRC. Douhan concluded that unilateral sanctions against the PRC as well as the “over-compliance” of foreign businesses with those sanctions have harmed the human rights of “vulnerable groups” by increasing unemployment and causing other economic disruptions in affected regions like Xinjiang. She claimed that any “unilateral sanctions” that are not retaliatory and implemented without authorization of the UN Security Council are illegal. She further said that all secondary sanctions imposed on individuals and entities as punishment for circumventing sanctions regimes on third countries are illegal. She said that unilateral sanctions should not be used as a foreign policy tool and a means of economic coercion.[60]

The PRC is using Douhan’s credentials as a UN expert to strengthen its rhetoric against Western sanctions and human rights narratives. PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Miao Deyu, MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin, and state media such as Xinhua and Global Times publicized and echoed Douhan’s views that “unilateral coercive measures” against the PRC violate international law and human rights.[61] Wang urged “relevant countries” to immediately lift their “illegal unilateral sanctions.”[62]The claim that unilateral sanctions are illegal and the conflation of economic development with human rights, which are core premises in the special rapporteur’s mandate and reports, parallel longtime CCP rhetoric.[63]

The Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures is not an impartial expert or authority, however, and the PRC may have shaped the outcome of her study to support PRC narratives. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) created the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures in 2014 to study the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and to work with UNHRC and other bodies to minimize the negative effects of unilateral coercive measures.[64] Iran introduced the mandate for the special rapporteur on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.[65] The United States and most of its allies opposed the mandate.[66] A Special Rapporteur is an unpaid independent expert that the UN Human Rights Council appoints to produce reports on a specific theme. Douhan is a professor of international law at Belarus State University who took up the post of Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights in 2020.[67] She has previously urged the lifting of unilateral sanctions on Qatar, Iran, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Syria.[68] A 2022 report by the nonprofit UN Watch found that Douhan received a $200,000 donation from the PRC government in 2021.[69]

The PRC used UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which admitted the PRC to the UN as the sole representative of China and expelled the ROC from the UN in 1971, to block Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization’s 2024 annual assembly. PRC officials including the PRC ambassador to the United Nations and spokespeople for the MFA and TAO have claimed that the resolution confirms the “one China principle” in international law by definitively establishing the PRC as the only legal government of all of China, of which Taiwan is a part.[70] The MFA cited the resolution on May 13 and May 24 when explaining the PRC’s decision to block Taiwan from participating in the World Health Organization’s 2024 World Health Assembly (WHA), which begins on May 27. It argued that because Taiwan is part of China and the PRC is the sole legal representative of China, Taiwan cannot participate in international organizations without permission from the PRC's central government. It claimed that Taiwan’s DPP government has “stubbornly adhered to the separatist stance of ‘Taiwan independence’” since it took power in 2016 and thus invalidated the political basis for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. [71] The PRC has repeatedly cited Resolution 2758 in its reasoning for blocking Taiwan’s participation in the WHO since 2017.[72] Taiwan participated as an observer in the WHA under the name “Chinese Taipei” during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou from 2009-2016, however.[73]

PRC officials strongly criticized statements by US officials such as State Department China Coordinator Mark Lambert and various US senators which refuted the PRC’s interpretation of UNGA 2758.[74] An MFA spokesperson claimed on May 20 that “some people in the United States maliciously spread fallacies” in arguing that the UN resolution did not resolve Taiwan’s status and does not prevent Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. The spokesperson said such “absurd and dangerous” arguments “not only challenge China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also challenge “international justice and conscience” and the post-war international order.”[75] The same spokesperson claimed on May 15 that the US “distorting and slandering” of UNGA Resolution 2758 showed that the United States uses international law inconsistently to maintain its “hegemony.”[76]

Broader international acceptance of PRC arguments that interpret UNGA Resolution 2758 as an international legal consensus that Taiwan is part of the PRC would serve to further undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. It would hamper Taiwan’s international participation, lend legitimacy to PRC coercive actions against Taiwan as a “domestic issue,” and lend credence to PRC arguments that the United States and other countries’ engagement with Taiwan without PRC consent is illegal.

The PRC’s use of UNGA 2758 in tandem with the 1992 Consensus to block Taiwan from participating in international organizations could also support its legal argument for its broader effort to legitimize the KMT over the DPP as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan. It did not block Taiwan’s participation in the WHO during the KMT administration of Ma Ying-jeou because Ma and his party officially accept the “1992 Consensus” that Taiwan and mainland China are part of “one China.” The PRC may return to this more permissive policy under the next KMT administration in Taiwan, with the argument that the KMT recognizes the supposed “international legal consensus” of the One China principle and the DPP does not.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Foreign Minister’s Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. The SCO is a Eurasian regional cooperation organization that the PRC and Russia established in 2001 with several central Asian countries. It now also includes India, Pakistan, and Iran.[77] The Foreign Minister’s meeting was primarily in preparation for a full SCO summit in July. Wang called on the SCO the bolster security cooperation, information sharing, joint operations, and personnel training. He accused “a few countries” of pursuing hegemony, forming “small circles,” interfering with and suppressing other countries, “decoupling,” and even fueling the “three forces” in the region with the aim of suppressing the strategic autonomy of the Global South.[78] The “three forces” is a reference to terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Wang did not specify which countries he was talking about, but most of his rhetoric echoed criticisms the PRC commonly directs at the United States. Wang met individually with many other foreign ministers at the summit including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.[79] Lavrov confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping would meet again at the SCO meeting in Astana on July 3-4.[80]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) released new law enforcement procedures on May 15 likely as part of PRC efforts to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea. The CCG released the Coast Guard Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures (CGALEP), which states that the CCG can arrest and detain foreigners illegally entering or exiting PRC territorial boundaries for up to 30 days without trial. The CCG has the option to extend detentions up to 60 days in “complicated cases.”[81] The procedures will come into force on June 15.[82] The CCG announced the new procedures as the PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in the South China Sea, such as Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoal, amid heightened tensions with the Philippines. The PRC deployed research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal in May, potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from last month when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to reclaim Sabina Shoal.[83] The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough Shoal in May in an attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying fishermen near Scarborough Shoal.[84]

The CCG could use the new law enforcement procedures to justify the arrest and detainment of non-PRC nationals and vessels, such as Philippine resupply ships or Filipino fishermen, within the boundaries of PRC territorial claims. The Philippine civilian group Atin Ito sent a convoy to resupply Filipino fishermen near Scarborough Shoal from May 14 to May 16. An advance party of the Atin Ito convoy delivered 1,000 liters of fuel and 200 food packs near Scarborough Shoal on May 16.[85] The convoy leaders declared the mission accomplished on May 16 in light of this news and decided not to sail closer to Scarborough Shoal.[86] The CCG also fired water cannons and collided with Philippine ships in March while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal.[87] These confrontations show the situations in the South China Sea under which the CCG could detain Philippine nationals under the CGALEP. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. condemned the CGALEP and called it “completely unacceptable to the Philippines” and pledged “to always protect our citizens.”[88]

The map below depicts the PRC's claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands within the “nine-dash line” maritime boundary with the 12-nautical mile territory boundary depicted around each of the maritime features that the PRC claims. The map does not depict contiguous zones, economic zones, and continental shelves that the PRC also claims because these do not constitute territorial waters.[89] These island groups include the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands), Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands), Pratas Island (Dongsha Islands), as well as Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (Zhongsha Islands).[90] In addition to territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of each maritime feature, the PRC claims straight baselines around the Paracel Islands as a group, which means it considers waters between these islands to be its internal waters even when they are more than 12 nautical miles from any individual island. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 that there is no legal basis for the PRC’s nine-dash line claims and that the PRC’s actions had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights.[91] The PRC rejected the ruling.[92]

Europe

The PRC threatened to impose retaliatory tariff controls on European agricultural goods in response to EU subsidy investigations into PRC firms. This threat is part of a PRC campaign to dissuade the European leaders from implementing more hawkish economic policies that run counter to the PRC’s interests. The China Chamber of Commerce to the EU stated on May 18 that it “was informed… if the EU continues its actions [subsidy investigations into PRC firms in the electronic vehicle, wind turbine, and security equipment sectors], the Chinese side will have no choice but to implement a series of retaliatory measures.” It also stated that “European wine and dairy products may find themselves caught in the crossfire.”[93] The PRC wine and dairy imports are less than three percent of all of the PRC’s imports from the EU.[94] EU Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski’s visit to the PRC in late April aimed to increase food exports to the PRC.[95] The PRC threat of agricultural tariffs is one means to oppose this EU policy goal and coerce it into eliminating investigations into PRC companies at minimal cost to the PRC. The PRC is the EU’s third largest export market for agricultural products, at six-point-four percent, however.[96]

Russia

United Kingdom Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the PRC “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.[97] Shapps stated that this evidence is a “significant development” as the PRC has previously presented itself as a “moderating influence” but did not provide further information about the supposed intelligence. Sullivan stated during a press conference that he has previously warned that the PRC may supply Russia with lethal military assistance but that the US has “not seen that to date.”[98] Sullivan stated that he will speak with his British counterparts to ensure that the US and UK have a “common operating picture” and to clarify Shapps' comment.

The PRC has provided non-lethal assistance to Russia to support its defense industrial base since at least 2023. Over 90 percent of Russian microelectronics imports came from the PRC in 2023, for example. These dual-use materials are key for manufacturing weapons.[99] The CCP also provided Russia with military assistance such as rifles and smokeless powder at varying points in 2023.[100] United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in April and May 2024 that the PRC provided dual-use components, such as machine tools, to the PRC as part of “invaluable support to Russia’s defense industrial base.”[101]

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024

Key Takeaways:

Western media continues to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine, although Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions illustrate that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state.
Russian sources that have spoken to Western media have also offered mutually contradictory characterizations of Putin's stance on negotiations.
These Russian sources notably highlighted territorial concessions as part of Putin's alleged envisioned ceasefire but have sparsely addressed the wider strategic objectives of Putin's war in Ukraine.
A ceasefire does not preclude Russia from resuming its offensive campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood, and Russia would use any ceasefire to prepare for future offensive operations within Ukraine.
Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin will likely view anything short of Ukrainian capitulation as an existential threat to Russia's ability to fight such a war.
The Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations at critical moments in the war to influence Western decision-making on support for Ukraine and to continue efforts to extract preemptive concessions from the West.
Putin directly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president on May 24, the latest in a series of efforts to dismiss Zelensky's authority to engage in or reject negotiations with Russia and undermine Ukrainians' trust in Zelensky.
Unnamed Russian government officials and sources within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin told the independent Russian outlet The Moscow Times that the ongoing effort to remove senior Russian defense officials and uniformed commanding officers will likely continue in the coming weeks and months.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful missile strikes against military targets in Russian-occupied Ukraine on May 23 and 24.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian early warning radar system in Krasnodar Krai, Russia on the morning of May 23.
The Ukrainian military command continues to address Ukraine's manpower challenges.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a military assistance package worth $275 million on May 24 to help Ukrainian forces repel Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on May 24 that NATO member states should consider lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Svatove, Kreminna, and Donetsk City.
The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 23 that Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Lytvynenko stated that Russia recruited more than 385,000 military personnel in 2023.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 24, 2024

May 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2024

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 24, 2024, 8:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on May 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Western media continues to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine, although Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions illustrate that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state. Reuters reported on May 24 that four Russian sources who currently work or have worked with Putin stated that Putin is ready to negotiate a ceasefire that recognizes the current frontlines and that Putin is prepared to present the current amount of occupied Ukrainian territory as a Russian military victory to the Russian public.[1] Western media reported similar interest from Putin in a negotiated ceasefire or settlement based on statements from unspecified Russian sources with some level of alleged connection to Putin or the Kremlin in December 2023 and January and February 2024.[2] Western media has cited limited unspecified US and international officials as confirming that Putin has expressed interest in a ceasefire, although other Western media has reported that US sources have denied that there has been any official Russian outreach to the US on the matter.[3]

The Kremlin routinely feigns interest in meaningful negotiations as part of a longstanding information operation that aims to persuade the West to make concessions on Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it is unclear if the unspecified Russian sources talking to Western media are advancing these efforts or accurately portraying Putin's interests and viewpoints.[4] ISW cannot determine the veracity of the Russian sources' claims about Putin's intentions, and these private anonymous statements contrast sharply with Russian official public rhetoric and action. Putin and the Kremlin have notably intensified their expansionist rhetoric about Ukraine since December 2023 and have increasingly indicated that Russia intends to conquer more territory in Ukraine and is committed to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity completely.[5] Russian forces have conducted offensive operations in recent months that aim to make operationally significant advances and collapse the frontline, have opened a new front in Kharkiv Oblast (which Russia has not claimed through illegal annexation), and have sought to cause long-term damage to Ukrainian warfighting capabilities and economic potential in regular large-scale missile and drone strikes.[6] These military operations suggest that the Kremlin is more interested in achieving its long-term goal of maximalist victory in Ukraine than in any settlement that would immediately freeze the frontline where it is currently located.

Russian sources that have spoken to Western media have also offered mutually contradictory characterizations of Putin's stance on negotiations. Reuters reported that a Russian source stated that Putin aims to take as much territory as possible in order to compel Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate, but another Russian source assessed that Putin is unwilling to negotiate with Zelensky.[7] Russian sources also told Reuters that Putin believes that the West will not give Ukraine enough weapons but understands that making any "dramatic" Russian advances would require another Russian nationwide mobilization.[8] Delays in Western security assistance have severely constrained Ukrainian defensive capabilities in recent months, and if Putin believes that there are limits to Western support for Ukraine, then he would logically conclude that such constraints could reemerge in the medium term and allow Russian forces with their current capabilities to make "dramatic" gains without conducting a wider mobilization of manpower or the Russian economy.[9] A Russian source stated that Putin is concerned that a longer war will generate more dissatisfied veterans with poor job prospects and economic situations that could generate domestic tensions, although this assessment is at odds with Russia's ongoing chronic labor shortages and the Kremlin's effort to prepare Russian society for a long war effort.[10] These contradictions cast further doubt on the accuracy with which these Russian sources are reflecting Putin's actual thinking.

These Russian sources notably highlighted territorial concessions as part of Putin's alleged envisioned ceasefire but have sparsely addressed the wider strategic objectives of Putin's war in Ukraine. Reuters reported that its Russian sources stated that Putin views Russia maintaining control over currently occupied Ukrainian territory as a non-negotiable basis for negotiations, and previous Western reporting about Putin's openness to negotiations has similarly highlighted Russian territorial desires.[11] Bloomberg reported in January that two unspecified sources close to the Kremlin stated that Putin signaled to senior US officials that he may be willing to drop demands for Ukraine’s “neutral status” and even may ultimately abandon his opposition to Ukraine’s NATO accession.[12] Russian demands for Ukrainian “neutrality” and a moratorium on NATO expansion have always been and continue to be one of Putin’s central justifications for his invasion of Ukraine and any hypothetical concession on these demands would represent a major strategic and rhetorical retreat on Putin’s behalf that Putin is extremely unlikely to be considering at this time.[13] Putin also launched his invasion of Ukraine to replace the Ukrainian government with one he determined appropriate and to "demilitarize" the Ukrainian military so that Russia could unilaterally impose its will on Ukraine in the future without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.[14] Russian sources that have talked about a ceasefire to Western media have not mentioned these two goals, which Kremlin officials regularly reiterate.[15] The repeated focus on the recognition of occupied Ukrainian territory as Russian territory does not indicate that Russia would drop these wider strategic objectives, however. A ceasefire that cedes currently occupied territory would concretize the idea that Ukrainian territorial integrity is negotiable, a precedent that the Kremlin would most certainly revisit to push for further territorial concessions and contest the idea of Ukrainian statehood altogether.[16]

A ceasefire does not preclude Russia from resuming its offensive campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood, and Russia would use any ceasefire to prepare for future offensive operations within Ukraine. Russia’s military intervention in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 violated numerous Russian international commitments to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Russia’s recognition of Ukraine as an independent state in 1991 and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in which Russia specifically committed not to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.[17] There is no reason to assess that the Kremlin will respect any new agreement obliging Russia to not violate Ukrainian sovereignty or territorial integrity. A ceasefire would provide Russia with the opportunity to reconstitute degraded forces, divert manpower to large-scale expansion and reform efforts instead of ongoing fighting in Ukraine, and allow Russia to further mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB) without the constraints of immediate operational requirements in Ukraine.[18] Russia could use a ceasefire to prepare a force more suitable to pursue a subsequent series of offensive operations in pursuit of regime change, demilitarization, and conquest in Ukraine. A ceasefire would provide Ukraine opportunities of its own to address force generation and defense industrial capacity, to be sure, but the Kremlin may not unreasonably expect that a frozen frontline will make support for Ukraine less urgent and salient for the West and allow Russia to outpace Ukraine in preparing for a resumption of hostilities.

Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin will likely view anything short of Ukrainian capitulation as an existential threat to Russia's ability to fight such a war.[19] Russian military leaders planning a war against NATO will have to assume that Ukraine might enter such a war on NATO’s behalf regardless of Ukraine’s membership status.[20] A front with NATO along Russia's entire western border with Europe presents the Russian military with serious challenges, as ISW has previously assessed, whereas a Ukrainian defeat would give Russia the ability to deploy its forces along Europe's entire eastern flank from the Black Sea to Finland.[21] Russian victory in Ukraine would not only remove the threat of Ukraine as a potential adversary during a possible conventional war with NATO but would also provide Russia with further resources and people to commit to a large-scale confrontation with NATO. Regardless of how Russian victory would partition Ukraine between Russian annexation and the Kremlin-controlled puppet state that would follow Putin's desired regime change, Russia would have access to millions more people it could impress into military service and the majority of Ukraine's resources and industrial capacity. Putin and the Kremlin therefore likely view victory in Ukraine as a prerequisite to being able to fight a war with NATO and any ceasefire or negotiated settlement short of full Ukrainian capitulation as a temporary pause in their effort to destroy an independent Ukrainian state.

The Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations at critical moments in the war to influence Western decision-making on support for Ukraine and to continue efforts to extract preemptive concessions from the West. The Kremlin has repeatedly engaged in a large-scale reflexive control campaign that aims to influence Western decision-making.[22] Reflexive control is a key element in Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit and relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia.[23] Kremlin officials claimed that Russia was open to negotiations in December 2022, likely to delay the provision of Western tanks and other equipment essential for the continuation of Ukrainian mechanized counteroffensives.[24] Western reporting on Putin's alleged interest in negotiations in Winter 2023-2024 coincided with prolonged debates in the US about security assistance for Ukraine, and the Kremlin may have feigned interest in a ceasefire at this time to convince Western policymakers to pressure Ukraine to negotiate from a weakened position and agree to what would have very likely been a settlement that heavily favored Russia.[25] The Kremlin may again be feigning interest in negotiations in order to influence the ongoing Western debate about lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia and convince Western policymakers that changes in these restrictions may lead to Russian unwillingness to negotiate in the future. The Kremlin may also be feigning interest in negotiations again to preemptively influence any future Western discussions about the provision of the additional aid that Ukrainian forces will need to contest the initiative and launch their own counteroffensive operations in the medium term. ISW continues to assess that the consistent provision of key Western systems will play a crucial role in Ukraine's ability to contest the theater-wide initiative and conduct future counteroffensive operations.[26] US officials have recently stated that the resumption of US security assistance will help Ukrainian forces withstand Russian assaults throughout the rest of 2024 and that Ukrainian forces will look to conduct counteroffensive operations to recapture territory in 2025.[27]

Putin directly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president on May 24, the latest in a series of efforts to dismiss Zelensky's authority to engage in or reject negotiations with Russia and undermine Ukrainians' trust in Zelensky. Putin stated during a press conference with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus on May 24 that Russia is willing to negotiate with Ukraine but that the "legitimacy of the current [Ukrainian] head of state has ended," referring to a Russian information operation falsely claiming that Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president of Ukraine after his term was set to expire on May 20.[28] Putin claimed that the Ukrainian parliament and constitutional court need to examine the Ukrainian constitution to determine the legality of officials remaining in office past their stated terms, which Putin described as an internal Ukrainian matter (about which he nevertheless chose to opine).[29] Putin's invocation of the Ukrainian constitution while explicitly denying Zelensky's legitimacy is odd because the Ukrainian constitution explicitly allows a sitting president to postpone elections and remain in office past the end of his term during times of martial law.[30] Zelensky's decision to postpone the March 2024 elections is in full accordance with the Ukrainian constitution. While Putin seems to lack an understanding of Ukrainian law, his statements advance a broader Russian information operation that aims to degrade Ukrainians' trust in Zelensky by portraying him as the sole obstacle to a negotiated peace in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is trying to foment domestic unrest in Ukraine centered around distrust in the Ukrainian government under Zelensky. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on February 27 that Russia is running an information operation entitled "Maidan 3" that uses multiple rhetorical lines to undermine domestic trust and international support for the Ukrainian government, undermine Zelensky's legitimacy, sow panic, and incite conflict.[31] GUR Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov warned on April 27 that "Maidan 3" has "advanced" and aims to disguise pro-Russian actors, ideals, and movements as social tensions and other issues to influence Ukrainian society.[32] The GUR warned that the "Maidan 3" operation will peak in March-May 2024, and GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov similarly warned on May 23 that Russia will continue to intensify the "Maidan-3" operation through July 2024.[33] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on May 20 that anonymous online accounts called on groups of hundreds of Ukrainian Telegram users to participate in "Maidan-3" demonstrations in Kyiv's Independence Square on May 21, including some offering payments of 1,000 hryvnia (just under $25) per hour.[34] RFE/RL noted that all these Telegram groups chose the May 21 date to coincide with the end of Zelensky's first presidential term had Ukraine held elections in March 2024.[35] RFE/RL reported that a similar information operation is occurring on TikTok, both calling on users to demonstrate against Zelensky and spreading propaganda claiming that Zelensky is no longer a legitimate president.[36]

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to eventually declare a Kremlin-backed actor as Ukrainian president instead of Zelensky. Putin stated on May 24 that Russia seeks to understand who the "legitimate [Ukrainian] authorities" are before engaging in negotiations, implying that the Kremlin could declare a figure of its choice as "legitimate" at some point in the future.[37] Independent monitoring project Belarusian Hajun reported that the plane of former pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych--who fled Ukraine to Russia during the 2014 EuroMaidan protests against his rule--notably arrived in Minsk on May 24, coinciding with Putin's and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov's visit to Minsk for extensive Union State negotiations.[38] It is unclear why Yanukovych would be in Minsk or with whom he met. Western and Ukrainian media have floated Yanukovych as a possible Kremlin-picked replacement for Zelensky had the initial days of the Russian invasion forced Ukraine to capitulate.[39] Yanukovych last visited Minsk in March 2022, and Ukrainian intelligence told Ukrainska Pravda that the trip was for the Kremlin to prepare Yanukovych for a "special operation" to be reinstated as president of Ukraine.[40]

Unnamed Russian government officials and sources within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin told the independent Russian outlet The Moscow Times that the ongoing effort to remove senior Russian defense officials and uniformed commanding officers will likely continue in the coming weeks and months.[41] The Moscow Times, citing unnamed sources, reported on May 24 that the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) recent arrests of five high-ranking defense officials are likely the first of dozens or hundreds of anticipated arrests. Russian authorities have notably arrested five senior Russian MoD officials and former military commanders since April 24, including Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov, former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of the Main Communications Directorate Lieutenant General Vadim Shamarin, and Head of the Russian MoD's Department for State Procurement Vladimir Verteletsky.[42] A source told The Moscow Times that the FSB is "mopping up" defense officials associated with former Defense Minister and recently appointed Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and that the FSB could only conduct this type of operation with Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval. The source claimed that "more arrests await us," and an unnamed acting Russian government official claimed that these arrests could spiral into the largest effort to remove Russian military officials in modern Russian history. The official suggested that Russian authorities will arrest up to hundreds of defense officials of various unspecified ranks this year. Another acting Russian government official claimed that the FSB hopes to install FSB-affiliated officials in the Russian MoD and take control of the MoD's budget.

A source close to the Kremlin claimed that these arrests indicate that the FSB is "triumphing" over the Russian MoD and that the arrests are part of the FSB's effort to convince Putin that the Russian MoD is responsible for the failures during the initial weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Kremlin has undoubtedly debated which department deserves the blame for the Russian military's initial failures in Ukraine, but it is unclear if Putin remains interested in assigning blame for the initial months of the invasion over two years later.[43] Moreover, the FSB is one of the most logical arms of the Russian government to conduct these arrests as it is tasked with addressing domestic security issues, counterintelligence, economic crimes, and surveillance of the Russian military.[44] While Putin has been known to balance his favor between siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence) and encourage infighting, it is at least as likely that the FSB's involvement in the ongoing removal of high-ranking Russian defense officials and military officers is due to its mandated responsibilities as guided by the Kremlin and not as part of a wider FSB conspiracy to gain control of or divert blame to the MoD.[45]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful missile strikes against military targets in Russian-occupied Ukraine on May 23 and 24. Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense system, destroying four of its missile launchers and its radar station in occupied Obrizne, Donetsk Oblast.[46] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces used ATACMS missiles in the strike.[47] Geolocated footage published on May 23 shows a strike near occupied Alushta, Crimea, and Ukrainian Crimean-based "Atesh" partisan group stated that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military communications center.[48] "Atesh" stated that the strike likely significantly damaged equipment and possibly destroyed the control center. Crimean occupation administration head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified target in Simferopol and an empty commercial property near Alushta.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched up to 16 missiles toward Crimea, including ATACMS, and that some missiles penetrated Russian air defense systems.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed three ATACMS missiles over Crimea and three naval drones in the Black Sea overnight.[51]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian early warning radar system in Krasnodar Krai, Russia on the morning of May 23. Ukrainian and Russian sources posted photos of the aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike on a Voronezh-DM ground-based early warning radar station on the territory of the Russian 818th Radio Technical Center near Armavir, Krasnodar Krai.[52] The sources noted that Russian forces used the radar to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at a range of up to 6,000 kilometers.[53] Radio Svoboda published satellite imagery from shortly after the strike showing damage to the radar system.[54]

The Ukrainian military command continues to address Ukraine's manpower challenges. Head of the Ukrainian General Staff's Main Department of Defense Planning Brigadier General Yevgeny Ostryanskyi stated on May 24 that the Ukrainian military command plans to reduce the General Staff's personnel by 60 percent and reallocate the personnel following a functional survey of the General Staff in February and March 2024.[55] Ostryanskyi stated that the General Staff will disband 25 percent of its elements and will transfer the other 35 percent to other branches of the Ukrainian military. Ostryanskyi stated that the Ukrainian military command plans to re-staff operational and tactical level management bodies and combat military units, presumably by reallocating these personnel, in order to conduct rotations on the frontline. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 22 that the Ukrainian military was optimizing its military organization structures to simplify and maximize the quality and efficiency of Ukraine's force management.[56] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 17 that consistent rotations for frontline units are an important step in improving Ukrainian morale and noted that Ukraine must sufficiently staff its units in order to conduct counteroffensive operations in the future.[57]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a military assistance package worth $275 million on May 24 to help Ukrainian forces repel Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[58] The package includes HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition, Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; anti-tank systems, precision aerial munitions, mines, and other parts and equipment.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on May 24 that NATO member states should consider lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.[59] Stoltenberg stated that these restrictions make it difficult for Ukrainian forces to defend against the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW continues to assess that Western limitations on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia have created a sanctuary in Russia's border area from which Russian aircraft can conduct glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions and where Russian forces and equipment can freely assemble before entering combat.[60]

Key Takeaways:

Western media continues to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine, although Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions illustrate that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state.
Russian sources that have spoken to Western media have also offered mutually contradictory characterizations of Putin's stance on negotiations.
These Russian sources notably highlighted territorial concessions as part of Putin's alleged envisioned ceasefire but have sparsely addressed the wider strategic objectives of Putin's war in Ukraine.
A ceasefire does not preclude Russia from resuming its offensive campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood, and Russia would use any ceasefire to prepare for future offensive operations within Ukraine.
Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin will likely view anything short of Ukrainian capitulation as an existential threat to Russia's ability to fight such a war.
The Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations at critical moments in the war to influence Western decision-making on support for Ukraine and to continue efforts to extract preemptive concessions from the West.
Putin directly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president on May 24, the latest in a series of efforts to dismiss Zelensky's authority to engage in or reject negotiations with Russia and undermine Ukrainians' trust in Zelensky.
Unnamed Russian government officials and sources within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin told the independent Russian outlet The Moscow Times that the ongoing effort to remove senior Russian defense officials and uniformed commanding officers will likely continue in the coming weeks and months.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful missile strikes against military targets in Russian-occupied Ukraine on May 23 and 24.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian early warning radar system in Krasnodar Krai, Russia on the morning of May 23.
The Ukrainian military command continues to address Ukraine's manpower challenges.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a military assistance package worth $275 million on May 24 to help Ukrainian forces repel Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on May 24 that NATO member states should consider lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Svatove, Kreminna, and Donetsk City.
The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 23 that Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Lytvynenko stated that Russia recruited more than 385,000 military personnel in 2023.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian officials continue to monitor the Russian force grouping deployed near the border with Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts. Ukrainian General Staff Main Operational Directorate Representative Colonel Ihor Prokhorenko stated on May 24 that the situation is stable in Sumy Oblast and that Ukrainian forces are allocating reserves and equipment to the area in response to unspecified Russian plans.[61] Prokhorenko stated that Russian forces are increasing the size of their grouping along the border with Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts but did not provide any specific figures.[62] Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Artyukh stated that Russia currently does not have sufficient forces near the border to conduct offensive actions into Sumy Oblast.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City on May 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Prokhorenko reported that although the battlefield situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast is "difficult," Ukrainian forces have "halted" Russian offensive operations and are counterattacking in the area.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced between 100 and 500 meters in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[65] Russian forces continued assaults near Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and on the eastern side of the Travyanske Reservoir (north of Lyptsi).[66] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Lytvynenko told the Financial Times in an article published on May 24 that Russia has deployed 50,000 Russian troops "across the border" (likely referring to Belgorod Oblast) and that Ukraine cannot fully rule out that Putin may attempt to seize Kharkiv City in the future even though Russia is currently pursuing more limited goals in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[67] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on May 2 that Russia had deployed roughly 35,000 troops to the border area in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts and that Russian forces intend to establish a grouping between 50,000 to 75,000 troops in size in the area.[68] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 5 that the Russian military has gathered about 50,000 troops in the Northern Grouping of Forces in Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk oblasts, with 31,000 troops in Belgorod Oblast.[69] Elements of the Russian 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[70] ISW previously observed reports of the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade defending against cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts in March 2023.[71]

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City, although the situation in Vovchansk has reportedly stabilized as of May 24. Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced up to a destroyed bridge that crosses the Vovcha River southeast of Tykhe (just east of Vovchansk).[72] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are "tied up" in street battles within Vovchansk.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced between 200 and 350 meters in the Vovchansk direction, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[74] Russian milbloggers noted that the frontline has recently become stagnant within Vovchansk, and one milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to cross the Vovcha River during a reconnaissance-in-force operation near the bridge connecting Yuriya Haharina and Pryvokzalna streets in western Vovchansk.[75] The milblogger noted there are competing claims regarding the situation around the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk and that it is currently unclear who controls the plant. Russian forces continued assaults near Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) and Tykhe.[76]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Svatove and continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on May 24. Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within eastern Berestove (northwest of Svatove) and north of the settlement.[77] Additional geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains along a windbreak east of Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove).[78] The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces achieved partial tactical success near Ivanivka (northwest of Svatove) and that the Kupyansk direction was the most active sector of the front.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Ivanivka and gained a foothold on the eastern outskirts of the settlement, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[80] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) recently gained a foothold in northern Berestove and that elements of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) have been unsuccessfully attacking towards Stelmakhivka from Kolomychikha (northwest of Svatove and immediately southeast of Stelmakhivka).[81] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are currently attempting to reach the northern outskirts of Stelmakhivka from the direction of Berestove and the southern outskirts of Stelmakhivka from Kolomychikha simultaneously.[82] Russian forces also continued offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Kyslivka; west of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka; and southwest of Svatove near Novovodyane, Novoyehorivka, and Kovalivka.[83]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna and continued offensive operations in the Kreminna area on May 24. Geolocated footage published on May 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to windbreaks east of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna).[84] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[85] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are attacking Ukrainian positions east of Terny and southeast of Novosadove (northwest of Kreminna) and that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are trying to break through Ukrainian defenses near Makiivka.[86]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on May 24 near Vyimka (south of Siversk) and near Spirne and Ivano-Darivka (both southeast of Siversk).[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a Ukrainian fortified area and advanced along a railway line south of Spirne, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[88]

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Chasiv Yar on May 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further into Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[89] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces have identified weak points in Kanal Microraion and failed to establish a foothold but that additional available Russian forces may achieve success in the area in the future.[90] Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov posted footage on May 24 of Ukrainian forces repelling an at least reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized attack near Chasiv Yar and reported that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed 10 Russian armored vehicles in the area.[91] Another Ukrainian source reported on May 24 that Russian forces are recovering after conducting mechanized and infantry attacks near Chasiv Yar on May 22 and 23.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sources are circulating old footage of Russian mechanized assaults, however, and no other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a mechanized attack near Chasiv Yar in the past day.[93] Russian forces also continued attacks southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[94] A Russian milblogger reiterated claims that Russian forces seized Andriivka but complained that Russian forces are unable to consolidate positions inside the settlement without also seizing Klishchiivka.[95] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are fighting near Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar); elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are fighting near Bohdanivka and Kalynivka (both northeast of Chasiv Yar); elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) reinforced by elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC), 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC), and 83rd VDV Brigade are fighting near Klishchiivka; and elements of the 98th VDV Division reinforced with elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps are fighting near Kanal Microraion.[96] Elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue to fight near Chasiv Yar.[97]

Russian forces reportedly continued to advance northwest and west of Avdiivka on May 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 550 meters deep along an 800-meter-wide front north of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) and pushed Ukrainian forces from the ponds immediately north of the settlement.[98] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka and southwest of Ochertyne) and southwest of Umanske (west of Avdiivka). ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however.[99] Russian forces also continued attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Novoselivka Persha, Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, and Novopokrovske and west of Avdiivka near Netaylove.[100] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight warned that Ocheretyne remains a dangerous area for Ukrainian forces as Russian forces have massed to advance either north of the settlement or northwest to Vozdyzhenka.[101] Mashovets and a Russian milblogger stated that elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 27th Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 41st CAA, CMD) are operating near Ocheretyne.[102]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on May 23 shows that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further southwest of Novomykhailivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[104] Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka and Kostyantynivka.[105] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) reportedly continue to operate near Krasnohorivka.[106]

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on May 24. Russian milbloggers claimed that small Russian groups on motorcycles advanced within Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka), where fighting continues.[107] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly fighting in Staromayorske.[108]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 24, but there were no changes to the frontline in the area. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Robotyne, northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), and towards Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[109] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[110]

Positional fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on May 24.[111] Russian and Ukrainian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Krynky to establish positions elsewhere in east bank Kherson Oblast, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have left positions in and near the settlement.[112] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian forces maintain their limited tactical bridgehead in Krynky.[113]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against Kharkiv Oblast on the night of May 23 to 24. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with an S-300 missile, and Ukrainian state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast with an unspecified number and type of munitions.[114] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash noted that Russian forces have paused Shahed-136/131 strikes in Ukraine in recent days but are operating a large number of reconnaissance drones over Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts to support ballistic missile strikes.[115]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 23 that Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Lytvynenko stated that Russia recruited more than 385,000 military personnel in 2023.[116] Russian open-source platform To Be Precise reported on May 23 that the number of prisoners in Russia decreased by about 58,000 between 2022 and 2023, likely due to Russian force generation efforts to recruit prisoners to fight in Ukraine.[117] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 15 that Russia recruits about 30,000 military personnel per month.[118]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian authorities continue efforts to return children whom Russian authorities have illegally deported to Russia back to Ukrainian-controlled territory. Ukrainian Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets stated on May 23 that Ukrainian authorities returned seven Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied areas to Ukrainian-controlled territory.[119] Founder of the Save Ukraine charitable organization Mykola Kuleba stated on May 24 that Ukrainian authorities returned 10 more Ukrainian children from occupied areas.[120] Kuleba stated that the youngest child in the group is nine months old. Kuleba stated that the Save Ukraine organization has returned 345 children to Ukrainian-controlled territory. Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova attempted to deny on May 22 Russia's role in forcibly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia, claiming that six Ukrainian children aged six to 17 years old returned from Russia to Ukraine due to Russian efforts and a Qatari-brokered deal.[121]

Kremlin officials continue to implement programs aimed at Russifying occupied Ukraine and erasing Ukrainian culture and identity. Russian Minister of Culture Olga Lyubimova claimed on May 24 that Russian authorities need to create exhibitions in occupied Ukraine about these territories' "recent history" and open children's centers in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[122]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin security officials continued to falsely claim that Ukraine was directly involved in the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.[123] ISW remains confident that the Islamic State (IS) conducted the Crocus City Hall attack and has yet to observe independent reporting or evidence to suggest that an actor other than IS was responsible for or aided the attack.[124]

Kremlin officials continue to promote information operations targeting Moldova. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov claimed that "instruments of external governance" control Moldovan authorities and that Moldova is losing its national identity and statehood.[125] Bortnikov claimed that NATO is "dragging" Moldova into a military confrontation with Russia and Belarus. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly claimed that NATO is trying to "pull" Moldova into the alliance and that Moldova is abandoning its language and nationality.[126] Zakharova also promoted boilerplate Kremlin narratives targeting Moldovan President Maia Sandu's alleged repressive administration. The Kremlin has intensified information operations against Moldova in recent months while simultaneously increasing its ties to pro-Russian opposition Moldovan politicians, such as US-sanctioned Ilan Shor and Gagauzia Governor Yevgenia Gutsul.[127] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to destabilize Moldovan democracy and society, prevent Moldova's accession to the EU, and justify future hybrid or conventional military operations against Moldova.[128]

A Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian-style "foreign agents" law in Georgia is not pro-Russian and is necessary for Georgian security and independent governance.[129] Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili stated on May 18 that the bill is "fundamentally Russian" and contradicts both Georgia's constitution and all European standards.[130] Kremlin officials and officials from the Georgian ruling Georgia Dream party have recently promoted established Kremlin information operations related to the "foreign agents" law.[131]

Kremlin officials criticized the approval of a resolution in the United Nations (UN) on May 23 establishing an annual day to commemorate the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya claimed that the resolution will push the region towards confrontation.[132] Zakharova made similar claims and alleged that the resolution is a Western attempt to rewrite history.[133] Russian milbloggers also denied the Srebrenica genocide.[134] The 1995 genocide of Muslim Bosniaks by the Bosnian Serb Army in Srebrenica during the Bosnian War is well-documented.[135] Serbia has denied that the Srebrenica genocide occurred.[136] Russia has cultivated ties with Serbia since the early 2000s.[137]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met in Minsk on May 24 and discussed bilateral cooperation and efforts to expand the Union State framework.[138] Putin and Lukashenko emphasized the importance of bilateral technological, economic, energy, and defense cooperation, particularly in the wake of Western sanctions and perceived Western "hostility" towards Russia and Belarus.[139] Lukashenko claimed during a press conference that this year will "determine a lot" in Ukraine and that Russia and Belarus are "in no hurry" to resolve the situation in Ukraine.[140] Recently appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov also met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin to discuss bilateral defense and military-technical cooperation.[141]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

26. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 24, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-24-2024

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip: There is particularly intense fighting between the IDF and Hamas in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, despite the IDF killing the local Hamas commander there in October 2023.
Iran: Iran’s political factions have begun to maneuver and prepare for the presidential election in June 2024 to replace Ebrahim Raisi.
Yemen: The Houthis are coordinating their actions vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.
West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian militias in at least three locations across the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel.

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 24, 2024

May 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, May 23, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

An Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officer described particularly intense fighting between the IDF and Hamas in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip in recent days.[1] This fighting highlights that Hamas remains active and combat-effective in Jabalia, despite the IDF killing Hamas’ Jabalia Refugee Camp Battalion commander in October 2023.[2] The IDF officer said that Palestinian fighters are bolder in Jabalia than in other parts of the Gaza Strip and that Palestinian fighters have established “fighting compounds” that enable them to rapidly traverse through buildings rather than exposing themselves in the streets to Israeli forces. Israeli officers have said in recent days that the fighting in Jabalia has been some of the “most violent” in the war.[3] Palestinian militias have sustained an unusually high rate of attacks there since IDF sent units to Jabalia on May 11 to clear the area.[4] The fighting since then indicates that Hamas is conducting a deliberate defense of the area against the IDF.[5]

The fighting in Jabalia indicates that Hamas could remain combat-effective in other parts of the Gaza Strip even after the IDF kills local Hamas commanders. Hamas has organized its military wing like a conventional military and has developed a deep bench of experienced military commanders to run it. Hamas therefore has junior commanders that can and are ready to assume command of units after their senior commanders are killed. Hamas uses this conventional military structure to continue fighting, despite intense Israeli military pressure.

Israeli negotiators and international mediators will reportedly convene in Paris to restart negotiations over a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. US Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns will meet Mossad Chief David Barnea and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani in Paris, according to anonymous US and Israeli officials speaking to Axios.[6] An Israeli official speaking to CNN similarly said that an Israeli delegation would soon travel to Paris.[7] A US official said that Egypt remains heavily involved in the negotiations, although it is unclear whether any Egyptian officials will participate in the meetings in Paris.[8]

Egypt has dismissed Western reports that an Egyptian intelligence official secretly modified the most recent ceasefire deal before sending it to Hamas.[9] Israel had approved the deal before the Egyptian intelligence official, Ahmed Abdel Khaleq, altered the text and sent it to Hamas. Khaleq currently leads the Egyptian mediation efforts in the ceasefire talks.[10] Khaleq was the first individual in his position to participate in a Hamas-organized event in Khan Younis in July 2018, during which he met Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar.[11] Khaleq also participated in the 2011 deal that involved Israel releasing over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including Sinwar.[12]

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Israel to halt its clearing operation into Rafah on May 24.[13] The Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry and National Security Council responded with a joint statement saying that Israel will continue its efforts to bring humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip and that Israel has and will continue to avoid conducting military operations that harm Gazan civilians.[14]

Iran’s political factions have begun to maneuver and prepare for the Iranian presidential election in June 2024 to replace Ebrahim Raisi. Iranian reformist politicians, including former President Mohammad Khatami, have argued in recent days that the election needs political diversity to encourage voter turnout.[15] These reformists are responding to how Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has allowed hardliners to marginalize moderates and reformists to an unprecedented level in recent years. Moderate and reformist figures argued that Khamenei allowing them to compete in elections would drive electoral participation, which has dropped to record lows in recent years. Reform Front spokesperson Javad Emam stated that reformist politicians will convene on May 26 to discuss the upcoming election.[16] Social media accounts have suggested that former Parliament Speaker and prominent moderate Ali Larijani plans to run as a candidate in the election.[17]

Iranian hardliners appear to be similarly organizing themselves ahead of the election. Social media accounts reported on May 24 that prominent hardliner Saeed Jalili plans to register as a candidate.[18] This rumor comes after an Iranian opposition outlet reported that elements in the regime have tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from running.[19] These elements include some moderates, such as Ali Larijani. They also include several hardliners, such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and adviser to the supreme leader Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani.

Members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance are continuing to coordinate their actions vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war. Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, who is the secretary general of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH), held a phone call with Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi on May 24 to discuss the war.[20] The two discussed coordination and force readiness, according to the KH readout. Hamidawi and Abdulmalik may have discussed efforts to impose an unofficial economic blockade on Israel, given that Abdulmalik gave a speech on May 16 calling on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to join the Houthis in attacking international shipping around the Mediterranean Sea.[21] The call also comes after CTP-ISW observed on May 23 that Iran is capitalizing on the presence of senior Axis of Resistance officials in Tehran for Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral to coordinate and cohere their approaches to the war.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip: There is particularly intense fighting between the IDF and Hamas in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, despite the IDF killing the local Hamas commander there in October 2023.
Iran: Iran’s political factions have begun to maneuver and prepare for the presidential election in June 2024 to replace Ebrahim Raisi.
Yemen: The Houthis are coordinating their actions vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.
West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian militias in at least three locations across the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces recovered the bodies of three hostages in Jabalia refugee camp on May 23.[23] Hamas fighters killed the hostages during the October 7, 2023, attack before taking the bodies into the Gaza Strip.[24] The IDF 75th Battalion (7th Armored Brigade) killed Hamas lookouts and then located the tunnel shaft, where Hamas fighters kept the bodies.[25] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the tunnel shaft is close to a Hamas tunnel where Israeli forces recovered four other hostages’ bodies on May 16 and May 18.[26] Israel estimates that Hamas is holding around 125 hostages in the Gaza Strip.[27]

The IDF 99th Division continued operations along the Netzarim corridor in southern Gaza City on May 24. Israeli forces directed airstrikes and tank fire targeting nearby Palestinian fighters.[28] Hamas fighters mortared Israeli forces along the Netzarim corridor.[29]

The IDF killed the deputy commander of Hamas’ National Security Forces in the Gaza Strip, Diaa al Din al Sharafa, in the central Gaza Strip on May 23.[30] The IDF said that he was responsible for "managing the mechanism that secures the borders of the Gaza Strip” and prevented Gazans from evacuating combat zones. The Gazan Interior Ministry confirmed that an Israeli airstrike killed Sharafa.[31]

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in eastern Rafah on May 24.[32] Israeli forces destroyed weapons depots and tunnel shafts in the area. Palestinian militias conducted improvised explosive device (IED), mortar, and small arms attacks in northeastern Rafah and at the Salah al Din gate.[33]

US CENTCOM has continued cooperating with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations to deliver aid to Gazans via the temporary pier.[34] CENTCOM has delivered 820.5 metric tons of aid to the beach, 506 metric tons of which has been transferred to the UN distribution warehouse in the central Gaza Strip as of May 22. The director of USAID's Levant Response Management Team, Daniel Dieckhaus, said that 506 metric tons of aid is enough food to “feed tens of thousands of people for a month.”[35] He also said that the quantity of aid brought through the maritime corridor will continue to grow. The United Nations resumed transportation and distribution of humanitarian aid arriving through the US-built pier after a two-day pause on May 23. The United Nations implemented the pause after an incident in which Palestinians intercepted aid trucks.[36]

Three US soldiers sustained non-combat-related injuries while supporting the US-constructed pier operation.[37] CENTCOM Deputy Commander Admiral Brad Cooper said that two of the injuries were minor.[38] The third soldier is undergoing care at an Israeli hospital after sustaining an injury on a ship at sea.[39]

The United States is considering appointing a US official to serve as the top civilian adviser to a primarily Palestinian force in the Gaza Strip after the war ends.[40] Four anonymous US officials told Politico that the adviser would be based in the Middle East but would never enter the Gaza Strip.[41] The adviser would be of Arab and/or Palestinian descent and work closely with the commanding officer of the local force. The White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State are continuing private discussions about the adviser's potential role. The anonymous US officials said that this adviser is one of many ideas that US officials are considering for a post-war scenario in the Gaza Strip. One of the US officials said that recent conversations between the United States, Israel, and other unspecified Middle Eastern partners are focused on transitioning to “a more political phase and stabilization phase.” US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan recently met with senior officials in Israel and Saudi Arabia.[42]

Palestinian militias have conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's information cutoff on May 23.[43] Israeli Army Radio reported that Palestinian fighters fired two rockets from Gaza City, which landed in open areas in Israel.[44] Alarms sounded in Ofakim for the first time since January 2024.[45] The IDF Air Force struck the area in Gaza City, from which Palestinian fighters had fired the rockets.[46]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 23.[47] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[48]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 23.[49] Hezbollah claimed that three of the attacks were in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes into southern Lebanon.[50]

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a televised speech during a memorial ceremony for late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on May 24.[51] Nasrallah said that Raisi and his late foreign affairs minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, were committed to supporting the Axis of Resistance with arms, training, and funding.[52] Nasrallah also boasted that the Israel-Hamas war has driven Israel into international isolation, citing Ireland’s, Norway’s, and Spain’s recognition of Palestinian statehood and the International Criminal Court requesting arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant.[53] Nasrallah added that Netanyahu should ”expect surprises from our resistance,” presumably referring to Hezbollah.[54]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted two drone attacks targeting Eilat and Haifa port since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on May 23.[55] The IDF reported that Israeli fighter jets intercepted four drones in total.[56]

The Houthis claimed three separate attacks targeting vessels in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea.[57] The Houthis targeted the Panamanian-flagged MSC Alexandria with a surface-to-surface missile off the coast of Yemen. The Houthis also claimed that they conducted a complex attack targeting the Panamanian-flagged YANNIS in the Red Sea with a one-way attack drone and surface-to-surface missiles. CENTCOM reported that Houthi fighters launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea on May 23.[58] No damage or injuries were reported from the attack. The Houthis also claimed a surface-to-surface missile attack targeting the Liberian-flagged ESSEX in the Mediterranean Sea, although.[59]

An unnamed senior European diplomat expressed concern to Reuters regarding the Iranian nuclear program.[60] The diplomat stated that Iran has not slowed down its nuclear program nor has it demonstrated “goodwill” to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A separate European official stated that unspecified countries have prepared a resolution against Iran to be presented in the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on July 3.[61]

27. STRATEGY CENTRAL EXCLUSIVE: Wedemeyer's “20 Laws of Military Planning” Discovered During Recent Pentagon Remodel

Please note the caveat at the end of this article. A little levity after reading so much depressing news this week. From Strategy Central.

See the "actual" memo at the link: https://www.strategycentral.io/post/strategy-central-exclusive-wedemeyer-s-20-laws-of-military-planning-discovered-during-recent-pent?utm

STRATEGY CENTRAL EXCLUSIVE: Wedemeyer's “20 Laws of Military Planning” Discovered During Recent Pentagon Remodel

strategycentral.io · May 23, 2024

In a surprising turn of events, a recent remodeling of a Dunkin' Donuts located within the Pentagon has led to the discovery of a set of documents that outline what experts are calling the "20 Laws of Military Planning." The documents, found hidden within the walls of the establishment, are believed to date to World War II and offer a comprehensive framework for strategic military planning.

The document appears to be addressed to General George Marshall from the planner behind the 1941 Victory Plan, Major Albert Wedemeyer. Many have attributed Wedemeyer as the genius behind the plan that harnessed American industrial capacity and led to its victory in the Second World War.

The discovery has sparked considerable interest among military historians and strategists, who are keen to analyze the contents of the documents. Preliminary assessments suggest that these laws encapsulate a wide range of strategic considerations, from the allocation of resources to the importance of intelligence gathering and the role of diplomacy in military strategy. The 20 laws are reprinted here in their original form:

Simpson’s Law – No one reads anything.
The Law of COB – Senior officers must only give guidance for projects at the end of day, ideally on Friday afternoon.
Galletti’s Law – Upon any person taking TDY or leave, a crisis will instantly erupt in their portfolio.
Grayson’s Law – Every 24 months, every staff section will completely redesign its calendar to coincide with what the senior most leader did when they were a captain.
Miller’s Law – Every 24 months, every staff will undergo a major organizational redesign.
The Stepbrothers Law – Every 24 months every staff will reorganize its workspace. However, this will never coincide with an organizational redesign (see Miller’s Law).
Aaron’s Law – It will take a minimum of 14 versions of any document before it is signed.
Sugar’s Law – All staff officers must live within a continual cycle called the “wheel of despair” which consists of mounting frustration - explosive rage - shared suffering - sarcastic humor - cynicism and apathy - and re-evaluation of life choices. Although the officer may exit the wheel temporarily by taking TDY or going on leave, the only way to escape the wheel is PCS or retirement.
Clemente’s Corollary (see Sugar’s Law) – If a staff officer escapes the wheel of despair by retiring, within 12 months they will take a contracting job and re-enter the wheel.
Darryl’s Law – When any senior officer leaves an assignment their pet project will instantly die. However, no one involved in the project will realize this for at least 12 months (e.g., a Zombie project)
Law of Planning Hate – As more changes are made to a plan, the more a planner will hate what they have written. When the planner reaches a point where they hate every word of the plan, it is a good sign as this means it is close to final approval.
First Rule of SAMS Club – Within 15 minutes of first meeting a SAMS or SAAS trained planner they must mention that they are a graduate of that school. Additionally, in every meeting they will say the word design an average of 6.93 times.
Under no circumstances should you ever [REDACTED].
Donoso’s Law – In the event of a senior officer does not know what to do, they will at once call for an assessment or study. In rare cases, a “Double Donoso” occurs where a senior leader asks for an “assessment of the assessments.”
Puzzo’s Law – Anyone associated with special operations, even on a temporary basis, has the choice of wearing civilian PT clothes at all times.
Bae’s Paradox - Whatever a company grade officer complains about most is what they will be assigned responsibility for when promoted to field grade.
Binder’s Law: No matter how many IT upgrades or how the knowledge management process changes, the staff will still be required to produce binders for senior leaders. These binders will have a shelf life of 7-10 years before anyone is comfortable shredding the documents in them, even though they are all on the portal or shared drive.
Ariel’s Law: No two senior leaders, especially who replace one another will desire the same font in presentations and papers.
Gem’s Law: Nobody will ever perfect a ghost email, or how to embed one ghost email into another.
[REDACTED].

The Pentagon has yet to release an official statement regarding the find, but sources close to the matter indicate that a team of experts is currently examining the documents to ascertain their authenticity and potential implications for contemporary military strategy. An unnamed Major on the Joint Staff was tasked to convert these historical documents into a detailed PowerPoint briefing. However, this briefing has been rescheduled multiple times by the requesting senior leader and it is uncertain when it will occur.

This unexpected discovery not only sheds light on historical strategic planning processes but also opens up discussions on how these principles can be adapted and applied to modern-day challenges. As the analysis of the documents continues, the military community eagerly awaits further insights that could enhance our understanding of strategic planning and its evolution over time.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please note that the preceding article detailing the discovery of the "20 Laws of Military Planning" during a remodeling of a Dunkin' Donuts outlet at the Pentagon is a work of satire. The story, including the discovery of historical documents and their implications for military strategy, is entirely fictional and intended for entertainment purposes only. No such event occurred, and the details provided should not be interpreted as factual. This satirical piece aims to engage readers with a humorous take on the unexpected intersections between everyday life and the realms of military planning and strategy.

strategycentral.io · May 23, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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