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Quotes of the Day:
"Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare, and it is a phenomenon that goes by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, ‘little wars,’ and low-intensity conflict. The term irregular warfare seems best to capture the wide variety of these ‘little wars.’"
– Robert Kaplan
An AI (MIcrosoft Copilot) overview of WIlliam Donovan's thinking on unconventional warfare, special operations, and guerrilla warfare:
Unconventional Warfare: Donovan emphasized the importance of psychological warfare in conjunction with conventional forces to prevent the carnage of trench warfare seen in World War I. He envisioned a unified approach to support conventional unit operations, creating a "new instrument of war."
Special Operations: He believed in a phased approach to operations against an enemy, starting with propaganda as the “arrow of initial penetration,” followed by special operations including sabotage and subversion, then commando raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements.
Guerrilla Warfare: Donovan’s strategy for guerrilla warfare was part of a broader vision for special operations. He saw it as a critical phase following propaganda and special operations, aimed at disrupting and resisting enemy forces from behind their lines.
"People should not be overawed by the power of modern weapons. It is the value of human beings that in the end will decide victory."
– General Vo Nguyen Giap
1. HRNK Co-Chair Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett Receive Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation Dissident Human Rights Award
2. Sung-Yoon Lee, Sue Mi Terry Join HRNK's Board of Directors
3. Woman was denied top-secret US security clearance for being a close relative of dictator
4. [New faces of Assembly] Architect behind ‘audacious initiative’ believes in denuclearized North Korea
5. America and the new ‘axis of evil’
6. Short-Term Gain for Long-Term Pain: Why a North Korea Deal Could Come At a High Price
7. Trump sticks to his guns on Korea troop withdrawal
8. South Korea ‘sensing geopolitical uncertainty’ avoids committing in potential Taiwan crisis, maintains mainland China ties
9. The Fight Over THAAD in Korea
10. Transitional Justice in South Korea: A Turn to the Courts?
11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Recruitment for the world's longest military service (2) Bribery in the military selection process... an unbridgeable gap between rich and poor before military life even begins
12. An ‘East Asian NATO’ is forming
13. Anti-terrorism alert raised for 5 overseas S. Korean diplomatic missions
14. China further repatriates hundreds of N. Korean defectors: civic group
15. N. Korea dismantles S. Korean building near shuttered Kaesong complex
16. N. Korea holds 1st meeting of police officials in 12 years amid drive to tighten social control
17. 50 UN members eye alternative to disbanded North Korea monitoring panel
18. Chongjin's bowling alleys, inns, and hotels criticized as "hotbeds of non-socialist behavior"
19. Dennis Halpin, advocate for North Korean refugees and comfort women, dies at 75
1. HRNK Co-Chair Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett Receive Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation Dissident Human Rights Award
Congratulations to Dr Katrina Lantos Swett. It is an honor to serve on the HRNK board under her leadership. Please read her incredible bio in the award announcement below.
Let me share my congratulatory note to her:
Dear Katrina,
Congratulations. This is quite an honor. And I think I can speak for all of us former Cold Warriors and say that your work and people like you and your father have made a huge impact in countering communism more so than military operations. You made great contributions to helping us win the Cold War though there is still more work to be done to rid our world of the scourge of communism which continues to victimize innocent people. And of course your work goes far beyond communism fighting against totalitarian dictatorships helping oppressed people. You are an inspiration to us all. You truly live up to our Special Forces Motto, "de oppresso liber" - To Free The Oppressed.
Thank you for your leadership and all that you do for humanity.
HRNK Co-Chair Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett Receives
Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation
Dissident Human Rights Award
https://mailchi.mp/71723c6229c1/kls-voc-award?e=c98f36ce8f
May 1, 2024
Dear Friends of HRNK,
On behalf of HRNK's Board of Directors and staff, I am delighted to congratulate our Board Co-Chair Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett on being the recipient of this year’s Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation's (VOC) Dissident Human Rights Award. Please find the text of VOC's announcement enclosed below.
The inspiring and greatly deserved selection of Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett brings honor to her family, colleagues, the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice, the countless victims of communism and dictatorship she has helped, rescued, supported, and represented over the years, and to all of us who personally experienced the horrors of communist dictatorship.
Greg Scarlatoiu
Executive DirectorThis year, VOC is proud to present our Dissident Human Rights Award to Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett.
Dr. Lantos Swett serves as President of the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice, established in 2008 to continue the legacy of her father, the late Congressman Tom Lantos, who served as Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and was the only Holocaust survivor ever elected to the US Congress.
Under her leadership, the Lantos Foundation has become a distinguished and respected voice on key human rights concerns ranging from advancing rule of law and freedom of religion and belief globally, to fighting for Internet freedom in closed societies, to combating the persistent and growing threat of antisemitism and Holocaust denial.
Dr. Lantos Swett is the former Chair and Vice Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and teaches Human Rights and American Foreign Policy at Tufts University. She currently serves as Co-Chair of the Board of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and the Budapest based Tom Lantos Institute.
Dr. Lantos Swett also serves on the Advisory Board of UN Watch, the annual Anne Frank Award and Lecture, and the Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership and Public Policy. She serves as Co-Chair of the International Religious Freedom Summit, which held its inaugural gathering in 2021.
Dr. Lantos Swett has dedicated her career to advocating for human rights, religious freedom, and democracy worldwide, particularly for those oppressed under communist and totalitarian regimes. It is with great pleasure that we bestow upon Dr. Lantos Swett the prestigious Dissident Human Rights Award in recognition of her exceptional courage and advocacy.
2.Sung-Yoon Lee, Sue Mi Terry Join HRNK's Board of Directors
Congratulations. Glad to have them join our board. They will make important contributions to north Korean human rights.
Sung-Yoon Lee, Sue Mi Terry Join HRNK's Board of Directors
https://mailchi.mp/bd7363affcf4/board-announcement-0430?e=46d109134b
April 30, 2024
Dear Friends of HRNK,
HRNK is delighted to announce that Dr. Sung-Yoon Lee and Dr. Sue Mi Terry have joined HRNK's Board of Directors. We look forward to their contributions to our work and mission.
Their full biographies are enclosed below. On behalf of HRNK's Board Members and staff, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome Dr. Lee and Dr. Terry to HRNK.
Greg Scarlatoiu
Executive DirectorSung-Yoon Lee is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Previously, he taught Korean history and politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has also served as a Faculty Associate at the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations in the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.
He is the author of The Sister: The Extraordinary Story of Kim Yo Jong, North Korea’s Most Powerful Woman (London: MacMillan, 2023).
Dr. Lee’s essays on the international politics of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia have been published multiple times in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Christian Science Monitor, CNN, and other outlets. He is a regular contributor to The Hill.
Dr. Lee has testified as an expert witness at the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Asia Hearings on North Korea policy and has advised senior officials and elected leaders, including the President of the United States. He has also testified as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in the Warmbiers v. DPRK case, in which the plaintiffs were awarded $501 million, and on behalf of the defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (LA) in the USA v. Christopher P. Ahn extradition hearing.
Dr. Lee has a B.A. in American and British literature from the New College of Florida, and obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
Sue Mi Terry is senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She researches and writes on policy issues relevant to the Korea Peninsula, U.S.-Korean relations, and security issues in Northeast Asia. Terry is one of the world’s leading experts on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia, with extensive experience in intelligence, policymaking, academia, and think tanks. She previously served at CFR as a national intelligence fellow from 2010 to 2011.
Terry was most recently director of the Asia program and the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center from 2021 to 2023. She was a senior fellow with the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies from 2017 to 2021. From 2015 to 2017, she was managing director for Korea at Bower Group Asia. Terry was a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute from 2011 to 2015.
Terry was deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council from 2009 to 2010. From 2008 to 2009, she was the director of Korea, Japan, and Oceanic Affairs at the National Security Council under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Terry served as a senior analyst at the CIA from 2001 to 2008, where she produced hundreds of intelligence assessments.
She has taught at Tufts University, Georgetown University, the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Seoul National University, and the University of Chicago, where she was a 2019 Pritzker Fellow at the Institute of Politics.
Terry is a producer of Beyond Utopia, an acclaimed documentary film about refugees escaping North Korea that won the 2024 DuPont-Columbia Award for excellence in broadcast journalism, was shortlisted for an Academy Award and nominated for a BAFTA Award. She is also co-author of the 2023 book South Korea’s Wild Ride: The Big Shifts in Foreign Policy from 2013 to 2022. She has written numerous articles in prominent publications including Foreign Affairs, New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and Chosun Ilbo.
Terry has testified multiple times before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, as well as the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. A former MSNBC commentator, she is a regular guest on television, radio, and podcasts, including CNN, ABC, PBS, BBC, and NPR.
Terry received a B.A. in political science from New York University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Born in Seoul and raised in northern Virginia, she now lives with her family in New York City.
3. Woman was denied top-secret US security clearance for being a close relative of dictator
A very interesting story made very interesting by the possibility that this person is a relative of Kim Jong Un.
There is a lot to criticize about the security clearance process. It is time consuming, invasive, and frustrating for many. (despite having a security clearance for more than 3 decades, when I went through the process recently I had to go through three separate interviews due to the amount of foreign contacts I had).
I think it is important to note that no American has a right to a security clearance. Yes this person is an American citizen of apparently upstanding character. Many naturalized American citizens receive security clearances. But the granting of a security clearance is a decision by the government based on a thorough process.
The foundation of the security clearance process is about assessing risk. Risk to the nation, risk to national security, risk to sensitive information. And possibly in this case, potential risk to the individual. That may seem odd or unusual; however, if this person is a relative of Kim Jong Un I am sure the north Korean security services are tracking her and her family. And even with a name change and actions to protect the family's identity and connection to Kim Jong un we should not assume that the security services cannot find out who she is. If she has held a security clearance (Secret level as noted in the article) from before 2015 then her information was likely compromised in the OPM hack by China. I am sure he CHinese would be happy to share her identity and personal information with Kim Jong Un's security services. So while this decision probably limits her employment prospects the adjudicators are probably have made a prudent risk assessment.
Woman was denied top-secret US security clearance for being a close relative of dictator | CNN Politics
CNN · by Haley Britzky · April 30, 2024
TommL/E+/Getty Images
CNN —
An unnamed woman was denied a top-secret security clearance this year due to being a “close” relative of an authoritarian dictator of an unnamed country, according to a publicly available document from the Defense Department’s Office of Hearings and Appeals.
The administrative judge in the case ultimately decided to deny the clearance in what appears to be an extraordinary case because the applicant is related to “an extremely bad and dangerous person, a dictator of a country that is hostile to the United States.”
More than 1.2 million people had top-secret security clearance as of October 2017, CNN previously reported.
The applicant, who is not named, is in her 30s and married to an American citizen born in the US, and has worked for defense contractors for several years, the document says. She and her family moved to the US in the 1990s when she was young and became US citizens; they are not in contact with any of their family still living in the country in question — referred to only as “Country X” in the document.
The judge said that Country X “supports international terrorism, and it conducts cyberattacks and espionage against the United States.”
“Applicant was born a citizen of Country X,” the record says. “A close family member (cousin, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew) is the dictator of Country X. Applicant’s parents and their children, including Applicant, immigrated to the United States in the 1990s when she was young. They all became U.S. citizens.”
The family all changed their names upon getting to the US, though the applicant told the court her mother “still fears retaliation.”
The document say that the woman in question already has a secret security clearance and no concerns have been raised over her handling of sensitive information.
‘A model employee’
“This is a difficult case because Applicant is intelligent, honest, loyal to the United States, a model employee, and a current clearance holder with no evidence of any security problems,” the administrative judge on the case, Edward Loughran, wrote in the document. “She credibly testified that her connections to Country X and its dictator could not be used to coerce or intimidate her into revealing classified information.”
“There is nothing about her that makes her anything less than a perfect candidate for a security clearance except her family connections to a dictator, Loughran said.
Administrative decisions on security clearance eligibility are regularly posted publicly by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals.
Dr. Marek Posard, a military sociologist at the RAND Corporation, told CNN the information in the records suggested the person in question could be from North Korea.
“It sounds like this is Kim Jong Un’s cousin,” Posard said. “The thing is, they mention a dictator and state terrorism. Only four countries are on the state terrorism list — two are involved in cyber, and one is particularly retaliatory, which is the DPRK (North Korea).”
Currently, the four countries listed by the US as sponsors of state terrorism are Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Syria.
The Washington post reported in 2016 that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s aunt and her three children immigrated to the US in 1998. The judge who made the final decision said in the document that Country X “considers people who leave their country to be traitors, and the country has taken retaliatory actions against some of them.”
The application for clearance came to Loughran in October 2023, and the case was ultimately decided in January. The records are intentionally vague with details regarding the applicant and her family, as Loughran notes it is “impossible to be too specific about Applicant and her family without exposing her identity.”
Judge noted ‘undivided loyalty’ to US
Posard noted that the judge is “very careful not to trash the applicant” in the document. Indeed, Loughran emphasized repeatedly that there was no reason to question the applicant’s loyalties to the US — she expressed “her undivided loyalty and allegiance to the United States,” the records say. Loughran also notes that he has an “extremely favorable view of Applicant as a person.”
“Applicant submitted letters attesting to her excellent job performance and strong moral character. She is praised for her trustworthiness, professionalism, reliability, and discretion in the handling of national security information. She is recommended for a security clearance … She is a good person who happens to be related to an extremely bad and dangerous person, a dictator of a country that is hostile to the United States,” Loughran wrote.
Posard also noted that it’s not particularly surprising that the woman was previously granted secret clearance, saying circumstances may have changed in the intervening period including the geopolitical situation.
“One thing people forget is it’s not like you get the keys to the kingdom,” Posard said of a secret clearance, which is the second lowest level security clearance available. In October 2017, more than 2.8 million people had security clearances — more than 1.6 million of them had confidential or secret clearance, and nearly 1.2 million had access to top secret information.
Ultimately, Loughran declined her eligibility request for a top-secret clearance on the terms that her connection to the dictator “creates a potential conflict of interest and a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, and coercion.”
Posard said the rejection likely has “nothing to do with this young woman,” but is due to the level of risk the US is willing to accept with giving her a clearance.
“It’s not just the risk to the individual, it’s also their distant social network … Sometimes when we think about the clearance process, it’s not that something is wrong with you as an individual, it’s that a risk could be created through your network that could be exploited in ways we don’t think about,” he said.
“It’s no fault of her own,” he added, “but if the DPRK wants to exploit that … that’s the kind of stuff we have to be thinking about ahead of time.”
CNN · by Haley Britzky · April 30, 2024
4. [New faces of Assembly] Architect behind ‘audacious initiative’ believes in denuclearized North Korea
Kim Gunn is a good man. I was fortunate to get to know him while he was the special representative.
[New faces of Assembly] Architect behind ‘audacious initiative’ believes in denuclearized North Korea
m.koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · May 1, 2024
In this series, The Korea Herald sits down with newcomers who were chosen by South Koreans to serve on the National Assembly for the next four years, to talk about their visions and takes on issues in Seoul and beyond. -- Ed.
Kim Gunn (right) poses for a photo with Takahiro Funakoshi of Japan (center) and Sung Kim of the US at a trilateral meeting on issues related to North Korea held in Karuizawa, Nagano prefecture, Japan on July 20, 2023. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Newsis)
The complete denuclearization of North Korea is not only the ultimate goal but also a viable aim of the security efforts of South Korea and the US, according to Kim Gunn, who was until recently Seoul’s top nuclear envoy.
Kim, who was elected by proportional representation in the April election for the National Assembly, told The Korea Herald on Tuesday that nuclear arms were an ambition that North Korea could not sustain and that the door to denuclearizing the country was still open, despite its multiplying portfolio.
The lawmaker-elect helped architect the “audacious initiative” -- President Yoon Suk Yeol’s signature policy package to get North Korea to denuclearize --, which he said was the “sum of decades of efforts” to disarm the country.
“The defining characteristic of the audacious initiative is that it is all-encompassing and comprehensive -- on top of economic offers, it also addresses North Korea’s security concerns, which the regime blames as the reason for its weapons program,” he said.
Kim said it was “only a pipe dream” for North Korea to bet on becoming a nuclear weapons state.
“North Korea thinks it can emulate what it perceives as China’s success with ‘Two Bombs and One Satellite,’” he said, referring to the Beijing project for building nuclear bombs and an artificial satellite during the Cold War.
He said North Korea “seems to have bought the Chinese narrative” that China was able to earn a seat on the United Nations Security Council and restore relations with the US by scaling up its nuclear capacities, undeterred by international sanctions.
“North Korea is sticking to nuclear program because it thinks by becoming threatening enough, the international community will be forced to recognize it as a partner,” he said.
“What North Korea doesn’t understand is that the US pursued rapprochement with China at the time to keep the Soviet threats in check. But there are no strategic advantages the US could gain from accepting a nuclear North Korea.”
On the high support among South Koreans for getting nuclear weapons to deter North Korea, as suggested by some polls, he said the country’s “strategic experts and leaders can do a better job of assuring the public of the safety and security of our country.”
“We can do that by building people’s confidence in the measures we have put in place to create an environment where North Korea can’t dream of ever using nuclear weapons, including our fortified alliance with the US,” he said.
According to polls conducted this year and last, more than 70 percent of South Koreans said they supported the idea of arming the country with its own nuclear weapons.
Kim said a nuclear-armed South Korea -- which he was careful to stress “departs from mainstream thinking in both Seoul and Washington” -- would make North Korea far less likely to give up its nuclear ownership and increase the chances of a nuclear game of chicken unfolding between the Koreas.
On claims from the rival Democratic Party of Korea that Donald Trump returning to the White House would risk South Korea being sidelined in possible US negotiations with North Korea, he said he disagreed.
He said that he does not think the results of the US presidential election in November would “discontinue or disrupt” the nuclear deterrence efforts being undertaken together with the Joe Biden administration against North Korea.
“What the summits in Singapore and Vietnam showed is that no matter which administration is in power, the US stands firm in its commitment to the denuclearization of North Korea. That is the unchanging principle that North Korea can’t get around,” he said.
He pointed out that the summits with the US then happened after North Korea demonstrated some willingness to denuclearize. But North Korea was “a lot more adamant in its nuclear pursuits,” and unlikely to be handed such opportunities “if it is intent on being as inflexible as it is now.”
“If Trump takes office and North Korea says it is open to negotiate, then great. South Korea and the US governments will work closely and coordinate our responses to get the best possible results,” he said.
Kim said that Yoon’s push for closer relationships with allies, criticized by opponents as hurting ties with China and Russia, was increasingly the “choice South Korea has to make.”
“In the past, South Korea dreamed of being a ‘constructive facilitator’ and balancing among countries. That can be an effective approach when there aren’t clear sides,” he said. “Unlike then, there is a marked rivalry now and the mood is confrontational. The times call for picking a side.”
He said that “making a clear stance and being included in the herd of liberal democracies” was what will protect South Korea from “being bullied” by its authoritarian neighbors like China.
“We have to be able to clearly state when something is in our interest. For example, we shouldn’t be afraid to look China in the eye and say peace in the Taiwan Strait is important to us.”
As a member of the Assembly, he said he would continue the efforts he orchestrated as part of the government to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and enhance South Korea’s diplomatic standing.
While at the helm of South Korea’s peace initiatives, he said one of the main focuses was to cut off North Korea’s ability to source funds from hacking and other tactics on cyberspace.
“North Korea has turned to illegal cyber activities to finance its weapons development. Our government officials are working with their US counterparts to tackle these cyber threats,” he said. “There are things the Assembly can do to complement or accelerate these efforts.”
One of the items on his agenda would be to get the bill passed for building a centralized system for defending against cyber threats from adversaries, he said. The cyber security bill has been left pending in a committee for the last four years and unlikely to be considered before the Assembly term expires at the end of May.
Kim said that in the Assembly, where he is expected to serve on the foreign affairs committee, he wished to work for bipartisan cooperation in advancing such bills and other legislative efforts that “serve national interests.” “Politics must stop at water’s edge,” he said.
Kim, a lawmaker-elect with the ruling People Power Party, speaks with The Korea Herald in an office near the National Assembly in Yeouido, central Seoul, on Tuesday. (Lee Sang-sub/The Korea Herald)
Kim Gunn is a seasoned diplomat who built his career around North Korean nuclear diplomacy and security issues affecting the Korean Peninsula. He was South Korea’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs for nearly two years before he left the post to run for a National Assembly seat in February. Since joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1989, he has played key roles in Seoul’s nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang. He served as a secretary at South Korea’s embassies in both the US and China, which are major players in North Korean nuclear affairs. He was also the ambassador to the UK and the deputy minister for political affairs.
m.koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · May 1, 2024
5. America and the new ‘axis of evil’
Excerpts:
The regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran are in closer cahoots than ever. North Korea is suspected of shipping drones and missiles to Iran, along with the technology for Iran to manufacture the weapons on its own, as Iran’s conflict with Israel boils over. Iraq, meanwhile, has existed under the heavy shadow of Iran since the demise of the Saddam regime in 2003.
Bush has every right to say, “I told you so.” His words endure as flatly and boldly today as they were when uttered 22 years ago. Let us not, however, dwell on his prescience (and that of his aide, David Frum, to whom the phrase is attributed). What counts, as we recognize the collaboration between Iran and North Korea, is our will to stand up against each of these very different, geographically distant but closely bound dictatorships — and their much larger friends.
Behind these two nasty actors, one under hardline communist hereditary rule in Northeast Asia, the other an “Islamic Republic” in the Middle East, are two far more powerful forces: Russia and Communist China. It is through them that missiles, drones and other weaponry linked to North Korea are able to slip into the hands of Iran’s “Islamic revolutionary guard,” which uses them to terrorize not only their own people but the entire region — notably Israel.
America and the new ‘axis of evil’
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4629258-thehill-com-opinion-international-4629258-axis-of-evil-iran-north-korea-china-russia-america/
BY DONALD KIRK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/29/24 2:00 PM ET
The term “axis of evil” came up just once in George W. Bush’s 3,000-word State-of-the-Union address in 2002, but that was enough for the words of the former president to be known forever after as his “Axis of Evil” speech.
Critics of our 43rd president — more outspoken than they had ever been of his father, George H. W. Bush, the 41st president — loved this reference, not for the truth in the phrase but for the ammunition it gave them, deriding his decision the next year to send troops into Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein. How ridiculous, they believed, to think Iran, Iraq and North Korea could all have been conspiring in an evil “axis.”
While we no longer hear too many voices denouncing the phrase today, more than two decades later, it’s difficult to deny the hard truth in his words. Bush wound up his brief allusion to the evil they might create with the warning, “They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.”
Regrettably, his enduring words have come back to haunt us.
The regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran are in closer cahoots than ever. North Korea is suspected of shipping drones and missiles to Iran, along with the technology for Iran to manufacture the weapons on its own, as Iran’s conflict with Israel boils over. Iraq, meanwhile, has existed under the heavy shadow of Iran since the demise of the Saddam regime in 2003.
Bush has every right to say, “I told you so.” His words endure as flatly and boldly today as they were when uttered 22 years ago. Let us not, however, dwell on his prescience (and that of his aide, David Frum, to whom the phrase is attributed). What counts, as we recognize the collaboration between Iran and North Korea, is our will to stand up against each of these very different, geographically distant but closely bound dictatorships — and their much larger friends.
Behind these two nasty actors, one under hardline communist hereditary rule in Northeast Asia, the other an “Islamic Republic” in the Middle East, are two far more powerful forces: Russia and Communist China. It is through them that missiles, drones and other weaponry linked to North Korea are able to slip into the hands of Iran’s “Islamic revolutionary guard,” which uses them to terrorize not only their own people but the entire region — notably Israel.
To date, the Iranians have got to be severely disappointed by the utter failure of their barrage on Israel earlier this month. The lesson is that Israel, with a huge assist from its American ally as well as Jordan, showed Iran and its North Korean de facto ally how inept they were at doing much real damage. The only victim was a 7-year-old Arabic girl, living in a Palestinian village inside Israel, severely wounded and fighting for life. The Iranians must wonder why they failed so miserably.
Now, however, is no time to breathe easy. The “axis of evil” that Bush described just five months after 9/11, the slaughter of nearly 3,000 innocent people by the Arab terrorists who flew hijacked airliners into New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, now extends from Tehran via Moscow and Beijing to Pyongyang.
In a sense, North Korea and Iran are proxies for Russia and China, weaponizing resources and forces for wars that suit the interests of Moscow and Beijing. These two giants like nothing better than to see Washington caught up in a war for Israel while political factions quarrel in Congress over funds for fighting the Russians in Ukraine and supporting Taiwan against the constant threat of mainland Chinese forces. That’s to say nothing, of course, of the need for building up America’s own extended armed forces, already stretched thin around the world.
In the midst of all these dangers, we need to thank Bush for having perceived realistically the risks America faced 22 years ago. The danger, if anything, is far graver now than it was then, as the U.S. and its allies stand up against dictatorships that would destroy America’s friends and allies — and the freedom and democracy that is all so easily taken for granted.
Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He is currently a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea, and is the author of several books about Asian affairs.
6. Short-Term Gain for Long-Term Pain: Why a North Korea Deal Could Come At a High Price
We must never let the regime establish a dominant position on the Korean peninsula.
But Kim will continue his blackmail diplomacy and political warfare strategies while developing advanced military capabilities to support coercion, attempt to break the alliance, while preparing to use force to dominate the peninsula. We must recognize, understand, expose, and attack Kim Jong Un's strategy.
Excerpts:
Last year, the U.S. Intelligence Community reported that Kim primarily plans to use his nuclear weapons for coercive purposes. He will presumably be using nuclear weapons and other means to weaken or decouple the U.S.-ROK alliance. If he can figure out how to do so, the North’s nuclear coercion capabilities could then give the North the ability to dominate the peninsula without occupying the ROK—a form of “unification.”
Kim may be prepared to reduce his provocations and provide a more peaceful atmosphere on the peninsula in exchange for what would be longer-term gains for the North. But is short-term peace worth making it possible for North Korea to establish a dominant position on the Korean peninsula in the coming years?
Short-Term Gain for Long-Term Pain: Why a North Korea Deal Could Come At a High Price
North Korea may be prepared to reduce his provocations and provide a more peaceful atmosphere on the peninsula in exchange for what would be longer-term gains for Pyongyang. But is short-term peace worth making it possible for North Korea to establish a dominant position on the Korean peninsula in the coming years?
The National Interest · by Bruce W. Bennett · May 1, 2024
North Korea’s increased threats and provocations are leading many U.S. experts to hope that some form of diplomacy will be able to prevent North Korean attacks and especially the North’s threatened use of its nuclear weapons. However, negotiators should be careful that North Korea doesn’t gain long-term advantages in exchange for promises of better behavior in the near term.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has been very clear that he will never negotiate North Korean denuclearization. Kim may be prepared to agree to reduce his threats and provocations, but I believe that in exchange he will be seeking the means to eventually achieve peninsula dominance.
What would Kim be seeking? Just before his father passed away in 2011, the senior Kim wrote final instructions to his son about leading North Korea. Among his instructions, the most important was: “We must unify Korea. The unification of the peninsula is the ultimate goal of our family.”
Some may question the importance of this objective given Kim’s recent renunciation of unification. But note that Kim only renounced unification resulting from ROK efforts to cause the Kim regime to collapse so the ROK could absorb the North and make the North part of a liberal democracy. In contrast, Kim announced that the North had a contingency for “completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annex[ing] it as part of the [North Korean] territory.” Kim said he would do so “by mobilizing all physical means and forces, including nuclear forces.”
Still, Kim likely fears that sending his ground forces into the ROK could cause enough “ideological contamination” of his personnel that it could thoroughly undermine his regime. So this option would likely be reserved for cases where Kim fears military overthrow, something his military cannot do if thoroughly embroiled in war with the ROK.
Alternatively, Kim has threatened to “annihilate South Korea if Seoul attempts to use force against North Korea, calling South Korea his country’s ‘principal enemy.’” Annihilation would be difficult to accomplish without substantial use of nuclear weapons. Kim clearly means this to be a deterrent threat, consistent with one of his father’s directives: “The continuous development and procurement of nuclear weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, and chemical biological weapons is the only way to preserve peace on the Korean peninsula.”
What might Kim have to gain from negotiating with the U.S.? Kim wants to dominate the peninsula and subjugate the ROK to demonstrate his power to internal audiences and to remove the ROK as a serious threat to his regime. But it is almost impossible to achieve these objectives as long as the U.S.-ROK alliance continues.
While there is little likelihood that Kim would gain any useful concessions from a re-elected Biden, he might hold out hope that a second Trump administration would consider weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance because Trump has questioned the utility of the alliance and has threatened U.S. troop withdrawal, something Kim would very much like.
Kim may also be prepared to offer fewer provocations if Trump agrees to significantly curtail U.S./ROK exercises as he did at the 2018 Singapore Summit—Kim understands that such exercises are the lifeblood of the alliance. And Kim may hope that Trump would be willing to reduce sanctions against North Korea, thereby giving Kim the resources to accomplish his dream of exponentially increasing his nuclear weapons. But Kim is unlikely to negotiate with Trump if he risks humiliation like Kim suffered after the 2019 Hanoi summit with the then-president.
Last year, the U.S. Intelligence Community reported that Kim primarily plans to use his nuclear weapons for coercive purposes. He will presumably be using nuclear weapons and other means to weaken or decouple the U.S.-ROK alliance. If he can figure out how to do so, the North’s nuclear coercion capabilities could then give the North the ability to dominate the peninsula without occupying the ROK—a form of “unification.”
Kim may be prepared to reduce his provocations and provide a more peaceful atmosphere on the peninsula in exchange for what would be longer-term gains for the North. But is short-term peace worth making it possible for North Korea to establish a dominant position on the Korean peninsula in the coming years?
About the Author: Dr. Bruce W. Bennett
Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.
Images: KCNA/North Korean State Media.
The National Interest · by Bruce W. Bennett · May 1, 2024
7. Trump sticks to his guns on Korea troop withdrawal
The fastest way to war in Asia is to withdraw US troops from the Korean peninsula.
Breaking the ROK/US alliance is one of the key conditions Kim Jong Un seeks in order to dominate the Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. Withdrawing US troops supports Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
Trump sticks to his guns on Korea troop withdrawal - Asia Times
He wanted to do it in his 1st term, but Secretary of State Pompeo talked him into making it ‘a 2d-term priority’
asiatimes.com · by Bradley K. Martin · May 1, 2024
Interviewed by Time magazine’s Eric Cortellessa on April 27 for a cover story entitled “How far Trump would go,” Donald Trump was asked, “Would you withdraw troops from South Korea?”
Without giving a yes or no answer, and citing incorrect figures, he repeated his previous arguments. His reply appeared to indicate that, if elected, he would resume his first-term negotiating stance of holding the threat of withdrawal over Seoul’s head in order to extract higher payments.
According to Time’s transcript of the interview, the former president and current presidential contender replied in these words:
Well, I want South Korea to treat us properly. As you know, I got them to – I had negotiations, because they were paying virtually nothing for 40,000 troops that we had there. We have 40,000 troops, and in a somewhat precarious position to put it mildly, because right next door happens to be a man I got along with very well, but a man who, nevertheless, he’s got visions of things.
That man “next door” would be North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. There was reason during Trump’s White House term to think that the president would acquiesce to Kim’s call for troop withdrawal, hoping for a deal formally ending the Korean War.
President Donald J. Trump shakes hands with Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un Sunday, June 30, 2019, as the two leaders meet at the Korean Demilitarized Zone. Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead
Trump in that portion of the Time interview had his figures wrong. Time’s fact-checkers note that “the actual number” of the troops is not 40,000 but 28,500.
According to the transcript, Trump added:
And I told South Korea that it’s time that you step up and pay. They’ve become a very wealthy country. We’ve essentially paid for much of their military, free of charge. And they agreed to pay billions of dollars. And now probably now that I’m gone, they’re paying very little. I don’t know if you know that they renegotiated the deal I made. And they’re paying very little. But they paid us billions, many billions of dollars, for us having troops there. From what I’m hearing, they were able to renegotiate with the Biden administration and bring that number way, way down to what it was before, which was almost nothing.
Trump’s figures here were wrong again – as was what he was “hearing” had happened during the Biden administration.
Time’s fact-checkers note: “During his presidency, Trump demanded that South Korea increase its contributions to host US troops in the country. In early 2019, the country’s contribution increased by more than 10%, from $830 million annually to $924 million. Trump had requested the country pay as much as $5 billion dollars—a 500% increase and a “non-starter” for South Korea, as Reuters reported at the time. In 2021, the two countries agreed that South Korea would pay $1 billion that year—a 13.9% increase from its annual payments in 2019 and 2020, with costs increasing by 6.1 percent per year until 2025. The US and South Korea are currently re-negotiating a new cost-sharing agreement to begin in 2026.”
Trump continued:
Which doesn’t make any sense, Eric. Why would we defend somebody? And we’re talking about a very wealthy country. But they’re a very wealthy country and why wouldn’t they want to pay? They were actually, they were a pleasure to deal with. Not easy initially, but ultimately, they became a pleasure to deal with. And they agreed to pay billions [of] dollars to the United States for our military being there. Billions, many billions.
Daniel Sneider, a Stanford lecturer in East Asian Studies, via email takes issue with “Trump’s account of the host nation support negotiations with South Korea, which took place toward the end of his term,” calling what Trump said “a deliberate lie.” Sneider adds:
According to Mark Esper, who served as his defense secretary at that time, and backed up by former Trump administration defense officials, Trump wanted to demand a five-fold increase in Korean support payments for US forces.
Esper, as he recounted in his memoirs, proposed instead to increase Korean payments from 30 percent of the cost of stationing US forces to 50 percent. After a year of talks, the South Korean administration agreed – “only to have President Trump undermine his own negotiators and reject it at the eleventh hour.”
The Biden administration moved quickly to negotiate the support agreement along reasonable terms, assuring that the security alliance wouldn’t be threatened.
The Korea portion of the interview, brief as it was, made headlines in South Korea. “Some of Trump’s former advisers have commented that he mentioned withdrawing from South Korea behind closed doors,” noted a Washington dispatch published May 1 by the Seoul daily Hankyoreh.
“Based on Trump’s comments in the interview, if he is reelected this November, it is probable that he will use the threat of pulling US troops out of Korea as leverage in a new round of negotiations designed to further increase South Korea’s contribution to defense costs.”
Trump in the Time interview repeated his threat to NATO members that he accuses of not carrying their weight financially. He was asked: “Sir, you have said that you’re willing to let Russia ‘do whatever the hell they want’ to NATO countries that don’t spend enough on their defense. If Putin attacked a NATO state that you believe was not spending enough on their defense, would the US come to that country’s assistance?”
Trump’s reply:
Yeah, when I said that, I said it with great meaning, because I want them to pay. I want them to pay up. That was said as a point of negotiation. I said, Look, if you’re not going to pay, then you’re on your own. And I mean that. And the question was asked to me: If we don’t pay? It was asked to me long before this event. Do you know that, after I said that, do you know that billions of dollars poured into NATO? Do you know that?
The questioner persisted and after further discussion Trump elaborated:
Look, that’s the way you talk as a negotiator. I’m negotiating because I want them to pay. I want Europe to pay. I want nothing bad to happen to Europe, I love Europe, I love the people of Europe, I have a great relationship with Europe. But they’ve taken advantage of us, both on NATO and on Ukraine.
The author of The Art of the Deal didn’t say the NATO threat had been only a negotiating stance. But even if it was, that does not appear always to have been the case with Trump’s Korea troops withdrawal threat. As was President Jimmy Carter before him, there’s evidence that Trump was serious in thinking withdrawal a good idea. White House Chief of Staff John Kelly reportedlly talked him out of it once, but Kelly didn’t last much longer in the job.
Sneider’s analysis is that Trump is still serious about troop withdrawal. “Now Trump is telling us, via Time Magazine, that he is ready, if not eager, to go back to where he left off,” Sneider says. “But it is important to understand that this is not simply a bid to extract more money from Korea, though Trump undoubtedly thinks that is a key goal.
“Rather” Sneider says, “this demand is a clear pathway to the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. His Time interview essentially argues that the American military presence in Korea is not needed, and he signals his intention to resume a courtship of North Korea’s dicatator Kim Jong Un.”
Sneider says that, here again, it is “useful to listen to what his former defense secretary [Esper], who strongly opposes Trump’s return to office,” wrote in his memoirs:
North Korea was an immediate problem for the United States, Japan and South Korea, but to me how our three nations worked together to deal with China in the coming years was the bigger issue. Our bases in both countries were great locations to position American forces as we looked ahead. For these reasons, I became very uneasy when Trump talked bout the need to pull all US forces completely out of Korea.
I was able to make my best case against such moves by reminding him that I had a global posture review under way — which I did — but that only bought me time. [Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo jumped in once to help, saying “Mr President, you should make that [withdrawing US forces from Korea] a second-term priority.” This placated him. Trump responded with “Yeah, yeah, second term,” as a Cheshire Cat smile came across his face. I knew, however, it was something I couldn’t implement.
asiatimes.com · by Bradley K. Martin · May 1, 2024
8. South Korea ‘sensing geopolitical uncertainty’ avoids committing in potential Taiwan crisis, maintains mainland China ties
But South Korea may not have a choice, It may not be able to sit out a conflict and I think it is naive of anyone to think so.
I hate to seem critical and like I am attacking this professor, but this statement illustrates the author's lack of knowledge of military operations. It makes no sense to send ROK troops to Taiwan. No one is asking them to do so and there is no value to dodging so.
Excerpt:
If South Korean troops were sent to Taiwan, Park predicted that Seoul would have little wiggle room.
But Professor Lee does a good job of parroting Chinese talking points.
South Korea ‘sensing geopolitical uncertainty’ avoids committing in potential Taiwan crisis, maintains mainland China ties
- With wars raging in Ukraine, the Middle East, and an emboldened North Korea, it is prudent Seoul not get involved in a potential Taiwan crisis, one expert said
- The analyst added, a war in the Taiwan Strait could lead to a full-blown conflict, due to growing North Korea-Russia ties, and a North Korean-Chinese leaders’ meeting
+ FOLLOWPublished: 8:00am, 2 May 2024
South China Morning Post · May 2, 2024
Seong-Hyon Lee, visiting scholar at the Harvard University Asia Centre, said South Korea’s reservations in getting involved in a Taiwan crisis stemmed from “uncertainty” as wars rage in Ukraine and the Middle East, and November’s US elections loom.
“South Korea is sensing geopolitical uncertainty,” he said, noting that Seoul was “toning down the rhetoric” on Taiwan so as not to inject uncertainty that could “easily turn into volatility”.
Such prudence, Lee noted, was also observed by the US during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in late April, as well as Japan.
Before Blinken’s three-day visit to China, US officials pointed to a period of relative calm in the Taiwan Strait over the past few months, after years of aggressive Chinese military manoeuvres and threats.
01:45
Taiwan drives away mainland Chinese coastguard in series of tense exchanges
Taiwan drives away mainland Chinese coastguard in series of tense exchanges
During Blinken’s visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined Chinese concerns about US policies on the South China Sea and Taiwan, adding that mainland China’s “core interests are facing challenges”.
Just hours after Blinken departed on Saturday, Taiwan reported a sudden surge of military activity, with a dozen Chinese warplanes flying sorties close to the island.
Lee said that given the defeat of President Yoon’s People Power Party during last month’s National Assembly elections, the South Korean leader needed “to show that he can manage relations with China”, especially ahead of a trilateral leadership summit between China, Japan and South Korea later this month.
Jae-Jeok Park, an associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at South Korea’s Yonsei University, said North Korea could take advantage of a Taiwan crisis, by taking over disputed islands near the Northern Limit Line, the maritime border between the two Koreas.
President of South Korea Yoon Suk-yeol needs to show he can manage his ties with Beijing. Photo: TNS
“Preparing against a possible attack from North Korea is helping the US in Taiwan indirectly,” Park said, noting that Washington could then utilise its forces without worrying about North Korean provocation.
“Sending troops to Taiwan is not the only way we can support the US in Taiwan. Preventing North Korea from attacking South Korea is an indirect and important way to support the US in Taiwan,” Park said.
If South Korean troops were sent to Taiwan, Park predicted that Seoul would have little wiggle room.
“South Korea would not have space to consider China’s strategic position … [Seoul] would have no choice but to side with the US,” Park said.
Alexander M. Hynd, a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of New South Wales in Australia, said that under the US-South Korea alliance, Seoul was keen to maximise its diplomatic independence from America while holding onto Washington’s security guarantee.
“It is not in South Korea’s interests to commit itself prematurely to joining a US military action,” said Hynd, who specialises in Asia-Pacific’s international relations and politics.
“If the US were later seen to put pressure on South Korea to change its stance on this issue, then South Korea could not only use this as bargaining leverage with Washington, but also minimise the diplomatic fallout in Beijing,” Hynd said.
Chinese state tabloid the Global Times in August called on South Korea to “remain rational and clear-headed” not only for its own sake but also for the interests of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.
Calling on Seoul to oppose all forms of the “new Cold War” ahead of the Camp David Summit between the US, Japan and South Korea held in August, the editorial accused Washington and Tokyo of having “hidden motives” and “manipulating events in the shadows”.
Full-fledged war in Taiwan
Unlike the ongoing war in Ukraine, Lee said a war in the Taiwan Strait was unlikely to be a limited but would likely be a full-blown conflict, due to the growing ties between North Korea and Russia, and the expected summit between the North Korean and Chinese leaders later this year.
“North Korea is likely to be more emboldened” by attacking South Korea to divert US attention, Lee added.
Pyongyang had shipped about 7,000 containers filled with munitions and other military equipment to Russia since last year to help support Moscow’s war in Ukraine, defence minister Shin said in March.
In return, Russia had provided North Korea with food, raw materials and parts used to make weapons, as well as assisting in Pyongyang’s illegal satellite launches.
Last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s meeting with China’s No 3 official Zhao Leji in Pyongyang was seen as a sign that Kim might be preparing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping this year.
“South Korea will be facing not just nuclear-armed North Korea, but also Russia and China that are backing North Korea,” Lee said, noting that in a Taiwan war, South Korea would be at the forefront of the “northern theatre” facing North Korea and Russia, while the US and Japan would be facing the “southern theatre” near the Taiwan Strait.
“It will be a difficult war for every party involved, and the best hope is to prevent it from happening,” Lee warned.
South China Morning Post · May 2, 2024
9. The Fight Over THAAD in Korea
Counterpunch reminds us this issue is still alive though it does not acknowledge that it is being done so by professional agistorators who work for anti)Us political organizations that are also pro-north.
It is fascinating how the author (mis)interprets US doctrinal writings to suit his agenda (support his parroting of Chinese talking points)
This tells the whole story.
Excerpt:
Yoon and Biden have underestimated the determination of the Korean progressive movement, which is unswayed by recent developments. If anything, the setbacks have energized them. On April 27, the seventh anniversary of the introduction of THAAD in Soseong-ri, activists held a demonstration at the site to proclaim their undying opposition, shouting, “We will be with you until the day THAAD is dismantled!” [37]
One of the speakers, student Lee Ki-eun, pointed out that THAAD’s radar is intended to defend the United States and Japan. “It is completely for foreign powers.” She added, “What is Korea? At the forefront of the confrontation with North Korea and China, the lives of our people are sacrificed for foreign powers.” Lee urged her audience: “With greater determination, with an even greater life force like a bursting prairie fire, let’s continue the anti-THAAD struggle!” [38]
The anti-THAAD battle is part of a broader movement by Korean progressives against the deepening military alliance with the United States and Yoon’s colonial mindset that sacrifices Korean sovereignty and the welfare of the Korean people on the altar of U.S. imperialism. As Ham Jae-gyu of the Unification Committee declared at the rally, “The Japanese colonial period merely passed the baton to U.S. imperialism, and subjugation by imperialism is accelerating. The United States is trampling every corner of Korea.”
MAY 1, 2024
https://www.counterpunch.org/2024/05/01/the-fight-over-thaad-in-korea/
BY GREGORY ELICH
Photograph Source: The US Army – Public Domain
Since the U.S. military brought its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea in 2017, it has met with sustained local resistance. THAAD is the centerpiece of the numerous actions the United States has undertaken to enmesh South Korea in its hostile anti-China campaign, a course that Korean peace activists are fighting to reverse.
In a unanimous decision at the end of March, South Korea’s Constitutional Court dismissed two challenges lodged by residents of Seongju County against the deployment of THAAD. [1] Since its arrival, the THAAD system has met with recurring demonstrations in the nearby village of Soseong-ri. The hope in the Yoon and Biden administrations is that the court’s decision will dishearten opponents of THAAD. In this expectation, they are already disappointed, as anti-THAAD activists responded to the court’s decision by vowing to “fight to the end.” [2]
Although protestors have regularly held rallies on the road leading to the THAAD site, swarms of Korean police cleared them away to allow free passage for U.S. military supply trucks. Opposition to THAAD has angered U.S. officials, leading the Biden administration to dispatch Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Seoul to deliver the message that it deemed the situation “unacceptable” and progress on establishing the base needed to accelerate. Austin also raised objections to protests by residents in Pohang over noise from U.S. Apache attack helicopters conducting live-fire exercises. [3] Predictably, the Yoon administration responded by prioritizing U.S. demands over the welfare of the Korean people and promised “close cooperation for normalizing routine and unfettered access to the THAAD site” and “improvement of the combined training conditions.” [4]
THAAD is billed as an anti-missile defense system consisting of an interceptor missile battery, a fire control and communications unit, and an AN/TPY-2 X-band radar. The ostensible purpose of THAAD in Seongju is to counter incoming North Korean missiles, but serious doubts exist about its efficacy in that role. In terms of coverage, THAAD’s position in Seongju puts it in range to cover the main U.S. military base in South Korea, Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, but out of range to protect Seoul, which at any rate is indefensible due to its proximity to the border. Even so, it is questionable how much utility the system offers even for Pyeongtaek. THAAD’s missiles are designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles at an altitude of 40 to 150 kilometers. The THAAD battery would have less than three and a half minutes to detect and counter-launch against a high-altitude ballistic missile fired from the farthestpoint in North Korea. By then, the incoming missile would have fallen below the lower-end altitude range of 40 kilometers, leaving it invulnerable to interception. [5] That would be the best-case scenario, as in the event of a war, the North Koreans are not likely to be so accommodating as to launch ballistic missiles from as far away as possible.
Furthermore, the THAAD battery in Seongju is equipped with six launchers and 48 interceptor missiles. With a thirty-minute THAAD battery launcher reload time, incoming missiles would not take long to deplete THAAD’s ability to respond, even under the most accommodating circumstances.
An upgrade was recently made to integrate THAAD with Patriot PAC-3 defense to intercept ballistic missiles at a lower altitude. This enhancement is of doubtful utility, as the radar’s response would still be constrained by the short flight time of an incoming missile. For all the hype about the successful interception of Iranian missiles fired at Israel, the Patriot’s showing in a more suitable scenario was less than stellar. It had an advantage there, as Iranian and Yemeni launch sites were situated much farther away from their target than in the Korean case. Yet, out of 120 Iranian ballistic missiles, the Patriot system shot down only one. The others were intercepted primarily by U.S. warplanes. [6]
North Korea’s development of a solid-fuel hypersonic intermediate-range missile has added another unmeetable challenge for THAAD. Because of its proximity, it is doubtful that North Korea would target US forces with high-altitude ballistic missiles in case of war. Instead, it would likely rely on its long-range artillery, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles, flying well below the lower limit of THAAD’s altitude coverage.
Despite its doubtful defensive effectiveness on the Korean Peninsula, the United States attaches enormous importance to THAAD’s deployment in South Korea, which suggests an unstated motivation. A clue is provided by the stationing in Japan of two stand-alone AN/TPY-2 radars without an accompanying THAAD system. [7] In other words, it is the radar that matters to the U.S. military, and the linkage to THAAD interceptors is primarily a pretense made necessary by popular feeling in Korea. What makes the AN/TPY-2 special is its ability to operate in two modes. In terminal mode, it feeds tracking data to the THAAD missile battery, allowing it to target an incoming ballistic missile as it descends toward its target. In forward-based mode, the THAAD missile battery is not involved, and the role of the radar is to detect a ballistic missile as it ascends from its launching pad, even from deep into China. In this mode, the radar is integrated into the U.S. missile defense system and sends tracking data to interceptor missiles stationed on U.S. territory and Pacific bases. [8] As a U.S. Army publication points out, when in forward-based mode, a field commander may use the radar system “to concurrently support both regional and strategic missile defense operations.” [9]
There are hints that preparations may already be underway to establish the conditions necessary for THAAD to operate in forward-based mode. Last year, South Korea and Japan agreed to link their radars to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. [10] The ostensible purpose is to enhance the tracking accuracy of missiles fired from North Korea, but the concept applies equally well to Chinese missiles. It is not a stretch to imagine that if South Korean and Japanese radars have been linked to the United States, the same may be true with the THAAD’s AN/TPY-2. Certainly, if the U.S. Army switches the mode, it will not be informing South Korean authorities, so sure are the Americans that they can freely treat Korean sovereignty with contempt. Switching an AN/TPY-2 radar from one mode to the other takes only eight hours, a quick process that is opaque to outsiders. [11]
An anti-ballistic missile system can easily be overwhelmed by a full-scale enemy attack. The system’s primary purpose is to support a first-strike capability, in which the United States takes out as many of the enemy’s missiles as possible, leaving the anti-ballistic missile system to counter the few surviving missiles. In essence, that makes the radar in the THAAD system a first-strike weapon. The closer the radar is stationed to an adversary’s ballistic missile launch, the more precise the tracking provided to the U.S.-based anti-missile system. South Korea is ideally located for the AN/TPY-2, where its radar can cover much of eastern China. [12] The effect is to enlist South Korea, willingly or not, in U.S. war plans against China. When residents in Seongju argue that THAAD makes them a target, they are not mistaken.
The Yoon administration is taking integration with the U.S. missile defense system one step further in planning to spend an estimated $584 million to procure American SM-3 interceptor missiles, suitable for protecting the United States and its bases in the Pacific.[13] The SM-3 interceptors are to be deployed on South Korean Aegis destroyers, which will need to be upgraded at additional cost to handle them. [14]
Residents in Seongju are also concerned about potential health risks associated with living adjacent to the THAAD installation. Radars transmit pulses of high-frequency electromagnetic fields, and the AN/TPY-2 radar generates radio frequencies of 8.55 to 10 GHz. [15] According to the World Health Organization, radio frequency waves below 10 GHz “penetrate exposed tissues and produce heating due to energy absorption.” [16] One study observes that radars generate pulsed microwaves “in very high values of peak power compared to mean power emitted.” To evaluate risk, one must also take peak values into account. In that case study, exposure levels for 49 workers were assessed, where it was noted that “peak values are about 200 – 4000 times higher than corresponding mean values.” Although recorded mean values fell below exposure limits that could have caused thermal effects, the peak values suggested potential non-thermal impacts, and “peak power density frequently exceeded the reference level and were correlated with nervous system effects.” [17]
The AN/TPY-2 relies on a phased array antenna. The U.S. Army publication on Ground-based Midcourse Defense Operations warns, “Dangerous radio frequency power levels exist on and near antennas and phased-array radars during operations. Radio frequency electromagnetic radiation may cause serious burns and internal injury. All personnel must observe radio frequency danger indications and stay outside designated keep out zones.” It adds that the keep out zone can vary according to power output “but may extend out from a radar face in excess of 10 kilometers and sweep more than 70 degrees on each side from the system bore sight.” [18] In other words, the extent of risk depends heavily on the radar’s power output and disposition.
Where the radar is aimed matters; the extent of human exposure is sharply reduced outside of the direct path of the primary beam. The U.S. Army’s AN/TPY-2 forward-based operations field manual specifies three search plans for the radar while in that mode. The “standard operations mode,” named Autonomous Search Plans, “normally provides multiple search sectors,” and in general, the larger the ballistic missile named area of interest, “the larger the search volume of the radar sector.” [19] Since China constitutes a vast area of interest, the THAAD radar in forward-based mode potentially exposes a wide range of the local population to radiation.
Shortly after THAAD was brought to South Korea, the Daegu Regional Environmental Office attempted to ascertain the environmental impact through periodic measurements; results registered at safe levels at a point in time when the THAAD system was not yet fully implemented. However, the Environmental Office noted that the radar’s power output level and vertical and horizontal angles were unknown “due to military secrecy.” [20] While the low measurements were suggestive, they were essentially meaningless without knowing what radar settings were being measured.
Since the arrival of THAAD in 2017, the local population’s concerns about possible health impacts from electromagnetic radiation had gone unanswered until June 21 last year, when the Ministry of Defense issued a press release announcing the result of its THAAD environmental impact assessment. The Ministry of Environment judged the impact as “insignificant.” [21] The press release reported that the highest measurement registered was 0.018870 watts per square meter (W/㎡), far below the limit for human exposure.
An earlier series of tests in Gimcheon City, at four locations northwest of the radar, produced a slightly higher but comparable measurement to the Seongju test, definitely within a safe limit. The tests were conducted over one year, ending in May 2023. The highest and maximum readings were registered at the farthest location, 10.2 kilometers from the radar. [22] However, as in the earlier Daegu test, nothing about how the radar operated was known.
At first glance, the Seongju test result would appear to allay concerns over the radar’s health impact. But has it? The most striking aspect of the press release is its lack of transparency. No information is provided other than a single result. The Ministry of Defense withheld information because it would be “likely to significantly harm the vital interests of the state if disclosed.” [23] It is unclear how revealing details about the test conditions, such as the radar’s angle, would pose a security risk. More likely, United States Forces Korea preferred to hide the details from public view so that the test could be conducted in a way sure to produce safe readings.
Unlike the earlier Gimcheon report, which identified the populated areas where measurements had been taken, the Seongju environmental impact assessment “was done for the entire base, including the site negotiated by the Daegu Regional Environmental Office.” [24] The phrasing suggests that no measurements were taken outside of the THAAD base, an odd choice given the concerns of nearby residents. Even within that limitation, less than thirty percent of the base was included in the assessment. [25]
Several factors can produce dramatically different results when measuring radiation. The public’s only knowledge of the Seongu test is that radiation poses no risk in an unknown set of conditions. Risk remains a mystery in other scenarios. We do not know which mode(s) the test included. It is probable that only the terminal mode was involved, aligning with the fiction that the radar’s purpose is purely defensive. Estimated ranges for the AN/TPY-2 vary but are consistently far higher when set to forward-based mode. Therefore, a test in forward mode could be expected to produce a higher electromagnetic radiation reading, as the longer the range, the higher the average power the radar has to generate. [26]
There are also the factors of angle and direction. The press release was silent on these matters, as well. In none of the measurements was it known in which direction the radar was pointed. In terminal mode, the radar would presumably point north. The forward-based mode should have the radar directed toward China in a different and much broader range of directions. Furthermore, the AN/TPY-2 can be set at any angle ranging from ten to 60 degrees. [27]Presumably, the angle would be positioned much lower in forward-based mode than in terminal mode, resulting in a more direct environmental impact on the ground.
The highest radiofrequency radiation is in the path of the radar’s main beam. Outside of that, there is a sharp drop-off, typically at levels thousands of times lower. [28] If measurements are taken outside the line of the beam, then results would be misleadingly low. Also unknown are the positions of the radar in various planned operation scenarios. What populated areas would be situated directly in line of the beam? Without that information, let alone corresponding measurements, potential risk remains unknown.
The U.S. Army conducted the Seongju test, and the South Korean Air Force, partnering with the Korea Radio Promotion Association, measured the radiation. [29] There was no outside involvement in planning or conducting the test. Lacking independent outside oversight, the U.S. military chose the test conditions based on the motivation to produce a reassuring finding. In coordination with selected third parties, the Ministry of Environment’s sole role was to review the measurements handed to them by the South Korean military.
In its recent decision, the Constitutional Court dismissed every point in the two appeals that challenged the deployment of THAAD. The petition filed by Won Buddhists charged that THAAD violated their freedom of religion by requiring them to obtain permission from the military to conduct religious activities and meetings and by restricting pilgrimages. Similarly, the petition by residents argued that security restrictions imposed on farmers required them to seek permission from the police to work their fields. To both complaints, the court ruled that restricted access to a religious site and farmland does not apply to the constitution, as a joint U.S.-Korean commission had decided to deploy THAAD in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty. The court summarized its point by asserting, “If the exercise of public authority has no effect on the legal status of the applicants, there is no possible violation of their fundamental rights in the first place.” It was a curious framing for the court to adopt in that it ignored the impact on residents who could no longer conduct their activities in a normal manner. In dismissing the challenges relating to health concerns and noise pollution, the court cited the Ministry of Defense’s environmental test press release in evidence. Finally, in rejecting the challenge that THAAD would make Seongju a target in times of war, the court made the specious claim that since the system is defensive, it cannot be said that it “is likely to threaten the peaceful existence of the people by subjecting them to a war of aggression.” [30] Chinese complaints about the nature of THAAD are well known in South Korea; the judges could hardly have been unaware of how deployment has been perceived in the People’s Republic of China.
Following close on the heels of the publicized environmental test result, the court’s decision surely had Washington in a jubilant mood. South Korea’s military promised to “work closely with the U.S. side to faithfully reflect the opinions of the U.S. side so that the project can proceed.” [31] They plan to expedite the steps needed to “normalize” the base and ensure its permanent emplacement.
THAAD can be considered a microcosm representing everything unsettling about the U.S.-South Korea military alliance. It is a relationship serving American geostrategic objectives in which Koreans play a subservient role, often acting against their interests. As East Asian specialist Seungsook Moon explains, “While there have been variations and changes in the U.S. relationships with host countries over time, the military relationship between the USA and South Korea has been persistently neocolonial.” Moon adds that, in “maintaining the boundary between us and them,” the South Korean state “imposes the unequal burden of hosting the missile defense system on lower-class and rural citizens” and “exacerbates class inequality by diminishing these citizens’ quality of life and human security.” [32] The costs of U.S. militarism are also offloaded onto Koreans in other ways, as well, including communities impacted by toxic pollution from active and abandoned American bases. Those living near live-fire practice exercises must endure unbearable noise levels, while crimes committed by American soldiers victimize residents near bases.
As for South Korea as a whole, the presence of U.S. bases in the context of American hyper-militarized confrontation with China and North Korea poses an ongoing danger of dragging the nation into war. Indeed, the United States is quite explicit about the role it assigns to South Korea. Shortly after taking office, in a revealing statement, President Biden declared, “When we strengthen our alliances, we amplify our power.” [33] That leaves no doubt about whose interests allied nations are expected to serve. In South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, the United States has found an ideal lackey, a true believer who eagerly prioritizes American demands over the welfare of his people. It has long been a U.S. goal for its alliance to expand beyond the Korean Peninsula. With Yoon in power, the United States had been progressing toward moving the alliance in that direction. Austin and South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik recently announced that the alliance is committed to “operate across the region with greater bilateral and multilateral political-military alignment to realize this vision of a true global comprehensive strategic Alliance…” [34]
The U.S. objective is total economic, diplomatic, and military domination of the Asia-Pacific. When Yoon met with Biden last year, he signaled his support for that policy, including the usual anti-China euphemisms. [35] Biden and Yoon have also been ramping up regional tensions with a nearly nonstop series of aggressive full-scale military exercises intended to intimidate and threaten North Korea and China. [36]
Yoon and Biden have underestimated the determination of the Korean progressive movement, which is unswayed by recent developments. If anything, the setbacks have energized them. On April 27, the seventh anniversary of the introduction of THAAD in Soseong-ri, activists held a demonstration at the site to proclaim their undying opposition, shouting, “We will be with you until the day THAAD is dismantled!” [37]
One of the speakers, student Lee Ki-eun, pointed out that THAAD’s radar is intended to defend the United States and Japan. “It is completely for foreign powers.” She added, “What is Korea? At the forefront of the confrontation with North Korea and China, the lives of our people are sacrificed for foreign powers.” Lee urged her audience: “With greater determination, with an even greater life force like a bursting prairie fire, let’s continue the anti-THAAD struggle!” [38]
The anti-THAAD battle is part of a broader movement by Korean progressives against the deepening military alliance with the United States and Yoon’s colonial mindset that sacrifices Korean sovereignty and the welfare of the Korean people on the altar of U.S. imperialism. As Ham Jae-gyu of the Unification Committee declared at the rally, “The Japanese colonial period merely passed the baton to U.S. imperialism, and subjugation by imperialism is accelerating. The United States is trampling every corner of Korea.” [39]
Notes.
[1] https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/news/197154
[2] Kwan Sik Yoon, “Anti-THAAD Group: ‘The Constitution Does Not Protect Basic Rights…We Will Fight to the End,” Yonhap, March 29, 2024.
[3] Oh Seok-min, “S. Korea, U.S. Working Closely on How to Improve THAAD Base Conditions: Seoul Ministry,” Yonhap, March 29, 2021.
[4] Press Release, “54th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 3, 2022.
[5] Yoon Min-sik, “THAAD, Capacity and Limitations,” Korea Herald, July 21, 2016
[6] Lauren Frias, “US Fighter Jets, Destroyers, and Patriot Missiles Shot Down Loads of Iranian Weapons to Shield Israel From an Unprecedented Attack,” Business Insider, April 15, 2024.
Vera Bergengruen, “How the U.S. Rallied to Defend Israel From Iran’s Massive Attack,” Time, April 15, 2024.
[7] “U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress,” p. 39, Congressional Research Service, June 6, 2023.
[8] https://sldinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Mobile-Radar.pdf
[9] ATP 3-27.3, “Ground-based Midcourse Defense Operations,” U.S. Army, October 30, 2019.
[10] Jesse Johnson, “Japan, South Korea, U.S. Begin Sharing Real-time Data on North Korean Missiles,” The Japan Times, December 19, 2023.
[11] Park Hyun, “Pentagon Document Confirms THAAD’s Eight-hour Conversion Ability,” Hankyoreh, June 3, 2015.
[12] https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/an-tpy-2.htm
[13] Eunhyuk Cha, “South Korea Approves Procurement of SM-3 for Ballistic Missile Defense,” Naval News, April 26, 2024.
[14] Younghak Lee, “South Korea to Upgrade KDX-III Batch-I Ships to Operate SM-3 and SM-6,” Naval News, November 19, 2023.
[15] “AN/TPY-2 Transportable Radar Surveillance Forward Based X-Band Transportable [FBX-T],” GlobalSecurity.org.
[16] “Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health: Radars and Human Health,” Fact Sheet N 226, World Health Organization.
[17] Christian Goiceanu, Răzvan Dănulescu1, Eugenia Dănulescu, Florin Mihai Tufescu, and Dorina Emilia Creangă, “Exposure to Microwaves Generated by Radar Equipment: Case Study and Protection Issues,” Environmental Engineering and Management Journal, April 2011, Vol. 10, No. 4, p 491-498.
[18] ATP 3-27.3, “Ground-based Midcourse Defense Operations,” U.S. Army, October 30, 2019.
[19] ATP 3-27.5: “AN/TYP-2 Forward Based Mode (FBM) Radar Operations,” U.S. Army, April 16, 2012.
[20] Press Release, “성주 사드기지 소규모 환경영향평가 협의 완료,” Daegu Regional Environment Agency Environmental Assessment Division, September 4, 2017.
[21] Song Sang-ho, “S. Korea Completes Environmental Assessment of U.S. THAAD Missile Defense Base,” Yonhap, June 21, 2023.
[22] “사드기지 소규모 환경영향평가 후속조치 기술지원 결과,” Republic of Korea Ministry of Environment, undated report.
[23] https://www.peoplepower21.org/peace/1927732
[24] Press Release, “전 정부서 미룬 사드 환경영향평가 완료, 윤정부 ‘성주 사드기지 정상화’에 속도,” Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, June 21, 2023.
[25] https://www.peoplepower21.org/peace/1927732
[26] “Radar Navigation and Maneuvering Board Manual,” National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 2001, p. 24
https://www.furuno.com/en/technology/radar/basic/
[27] “Shielded from Oversight: The Disastrous US Approach to Strategic Missile Defense – Appendix 10: Sensors, Union of Concerned Scientists, p. 9.
[28] J. Kusters, “X-band Wave Radar Radiation Hazards to Personnel,” General Dynamics Applied Physical Sciences, November 26, 2019.
https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/radiation-radar
[29] “Science Prevails Over Wild Rumors,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 21, 2024.
[30] “2017헌마372: 고고도미사일방어체계 배치 승인 위헌확인고고도미사일방어체계 배치,” Constitutional Court of Korea, March 28, 2024.
[31] Press Release, “전 정부서 미룬 사드 환경영향평가 완료, 윤정부 ‘성주 사드기지 정상화’에 속도,” Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, June 21, 2023.
[32] https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211022884
[33] “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” The White House, February 4, 2021.
[34] Press Release, “Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 13, 2023.
[35] “Leaders’ Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” The White House, April 26, 2023.
[36] Simone Chun, “Unprecedented US War Drills and Naval Deployment Raise Fear of War in Korea,” Truthout, April 7, 2024.
[37] https://spark946.org/party/kor_en?tpf=board/view&board_code=3&code=27545
[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VMb3eLbBve0
[39] https://worknworld.kctu.org/news/articleView.html?idxno=504477
Gregory Elich is a Korea Policy Institute board member. He is a contributor to the collection, Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy (Haymarket Books, 2023). His website is https://gregoryelich.org Follow him on Twitter at @GregoryElich.
10. Transitional Justice in South Korea: A Turn to the Courts?
In an ideal world all of this would have been preparation for admistrinerting transition justice in north Korea. But as far as I can tell most of those working on transitional justice have political agendas to push their historical narratives and many of their continued actions seem to be moving far away from justice.
Excerpts:
What next for South Korea’s transitional justice project? The appetite to address past human rights abuses remains strong, at least among left-wing politicians. One possibility is a shift to addressing transitional justice in the courtroom.
In a number of recent cases, plaintiffs successfully sought compensation from the state for past human rights violations, including torture, kidnapping, and the commission of atrocities by Korean troops during the Vietnam War. In each of these cases, judges found statutes of limitations to be inapplicable. More of these lawsuits are sure to come, and when making their cases, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be able to rely on the findings of the various truth commission reports published over the years.
With truth commission reports having now established an accepted historic narrative, a more controversial type of lawsuit is also emerging: blasphemy cases for those who embrace historical falsehoods (in the eyes of the courts). In December 2021, the National Assembly passed amendments to the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement, providing for imprisonment of up to five years for disseminating false information about the Gwangju massacre. Left-wing parliamentarians also introduced a law to prohibit distortion of history or acts praising Japanese colonialism, with penalties of up to 10 years in prison, but the bill did not pass.
Transitional Justice in South Korea: A Turn to the Courts?
thediplomat.com
It seems as if the era of truth commissions may be winding down. What next for Korea’s transitional justice project?
By Andrew Wolman
May 01, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
South Korea experienced a particularly tumultuous modern history. Over the course of the 20th century, it faced subjugation and oppression under Japanese colonial authorities, three years of deadly violence during the Korean War, and finally saw the nation’s hopes of freedom extinguished by successive authoritarian regimes. When democracy arrived in the late 1980s in the wake of mass protests, the population naturally had a pent-up desire to address the many massacres and human rights violations that they had suffered prior to transition.
During the early post-transition years, there were few criminal prosecutions of those responsible for past atrocities, despite the efforts and hopes of many activists. The one notable trial was that of former leaders Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo in 1996, but it was only partially successful. While both were convicted of corruption, military insubordination, and subversion of the constitutional order, they were pardoned and released from prison relatively soon afterward.
Instead, Korean politicians turned their attention to truth commissions as a way of investigating past human rights violations, establishing victim-status, and clearing the names of those falsely accused. In fact, at least 15 truth commissions have been created since 1996, addressing a remarkably wide range of issues. Most of these commissions have had narrow mandates, addressing a particular issue or incident. Examples include the Commission on Confiscation of Properties of Pro-Japanese Collaborators and the Commission for Truth-Seeking and Honor Restoration for Victims of Jeju April 3 Events.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, on the other hand, was broadly tasked with investigating the anti-Japanese independence movement, Korean War massacres, human rights violations during the period of authoritarian rule, and killings by hostile forces. The Commission completed its final report in 2010, but was relaunched in December 2020 for a three-year period, which was later extended until May 2025.
These truth commissions were in many ways successful initiatives. They gave victims a much-needed voice, corrected false narratives about events such as the 1980 Gwangju massacre, and publicly acknowledged a myriad of previously little-known human rights violations from the authoritarian era. They also uncovered the participation of U.S. actors in some of these violations.
With the Truth and Reconciliation Commission entering its final year, though, and the recent closure of the Presidential Truth Commission on Deaths in the Military, it seems as if the era of truth commissions may be winding down. With a few notable exceptions, the major atrocities and human rights violations from the pre-1987 period have already been investigated.
What next for South Korea’s transitional justice project? The appetite to address past human rights abuses remains strong, at least among left-wing politicians. One possibility is a shift to addressing transitional justice in the courtroom.
In a number of recent cases, plaintiffs successfully sought compensation from the state for past human rights violations, including torture, kidnapping, and the commission of atrocities by Korean troops during the Vietnam War. In each of these cases, judges found statutes of limitations to be inapplicable. More of these lawsuits are sure to come, and when making their cases, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be able to rely on the findings of the various truth commission reports published over the years.
With truth commission reports having now established an accepted historic narrative, a more controversial type of lawsuit is also emerging: blasphemy cases for those who embrace historical falsehoods (in the eyes of the courts). In December 2021, the National Assembly passed amendments to the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement, providing for imprisonment of up to five years for disseminating false information about the Gwangju massacre. Left-wing parliamentarians also introduced a law to prohibit distortion of history or acts praising Japanese colonialism, with penalties of up to 10 years in prison, but the bill did not pass.
Despite criticism from free speech advocates, anti-blasphemy cases are beginning to have an impact – last year Jee Man-won was given a two-year prison sentence for asserting that North Korea was behind the Gwangju protests. More recently, Yonsei University professor Lew Seok-choon was prosecuted for referring to the “comfort women” – sex slaves used by the Japanese army – as voluntary prostitutes. Lew was acquitted, but his case is currently being appealed by prosecutors.
Finally, the possibility remains that courts can be used once again for criminal prosecutions of those responsible for past violations. This is of course more far-fetched: with Chun and Roh’s deaths within a month of each other in 2021, the worst offenders can no longer be tried, and it can be assumed that most other potential defendants will also have passed away. The issue of statute of limitations also remains a challenge.
Nevertheless, Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung had expressed the desire to restart prosecutions, and influential scholars have argued that statute of limitations should not apply in cases of state violence. A recent law expressly specified that the statute of limitations should not apply to crimes against humanity or crimes disrupting the constitutional order that were committed during the Gwangju massacre.
Whether or not the courtrooms end up providing an adequate venue for battles over the past, it is clear that the abuses of the past remain salient to Korean politicians and segments of the public. The Korean left, in particular, is still dominated by human rights lawyers who came of age during the fight for democracy. The focus on transitional justice may only change when the younger generation, who lack direct experience with the repressive regimes of pre-1987 Korea, takes its place in the political spotlight.
Authors
Guest Author
Andrew Wolman
Dr. Andrew Wolman is a senior lecturer at City Law School, City, University of London. Prior to joining City, Wolman taught human rights and international law at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, in Seoul, Korea. Wolman’s research is focused on human rights and refugee law in East Asia; the international response to North Korean human rights violations, and the implementation of international human rights law at the local level.
thediplomat.com
11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Recruitment for the world's longest military service (2) Bribery in the military selection process... an unbridgeable gap between rich and poor before military life even begins
A fascinating look into the "recruitment" (conscription) system in north Korea.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Recruitment for the world's longest military service (2) Bribery in the military selection process... an unbridgeable gap between rich and poor before military life even begins
asiapress.org
Young soldiers standing guard from inside a barbed wire fence. It appears that covering one's nose with a mask is an annoyance everywhere. This photo was taken of Sinuiju from the Chinese side of the border in July 2021 (ASIAPRESS)
Across North Korea, urban areas are full of recruits for the upcoming recruitment season. The gap between rich and poor is evident in the scenes filled with departing children and parents wishing them well, an ASIAPRESS reporting partner in the northern part of the country said. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)
◆ How new recruits are selected by the military
In North Korea, the recruitment and enlistment process for new recruits is known as chomo. The Ministry of Defense's Organization Mobilization and Recruitment Bureau (formerly known as the Ministry of Defense’s Reserve Forces Division) is in charge of chomo. This organization, which is the South Korean equivalent of the Military Service Administration, calculates the number of new recruits needed for each branch of the Korean People's Army and conducts recruitment through subordinate organizations called military mobilization units in provinces, cities, and counties across the country.
The military mobilization departments in each province, city, and county conduct physical tests and interviews with students graduating from local advanced middle schools (equivalent to high schools) to select the final recruits. Almost all male students are enlisted unless they have been recommended for admission to a university or vocational school.
After this process, all 17-year-olds who have been selected for enlistment come to the provincial capital around March - after they graduate from school - and are assigned to a unit designated by their military mobilization department and head to boot camp near the unit's garrison. For many recruits, this is the first time in their lives that they will be separated from their parents for an extended period of time, and many of them will likely not see their parents at all during their military service.
◆ Recommendations by local youth leagues are required for people to join the military
An ASIAPRESS reporting partner in the northern part of the country said that starting with this year's graduating class, there is a new system that requires students to be endorsed by a youth league organization in order to join the military.
"Students who have done bad things in society, have been sanctioned by the law for watching South Korean dramas or decadent propaganda, or have been unfaithful to the youth league, have had their recruitment applications pushed back by a year because the youth league will not sign off on their applications."
*The full name of the youth league is the "Socialist Patriotic Youth League." It is a mass organization under the Workers' Party of Korea that includes students in middle and high schools and working young people up to the age of 34.
"Three to eight people at each school (in my area) were excluded from the draft, and the parents went around bribing the guidance officers at the school's youth league to get the issue resolved."
◆ Many parents pay bribes to get their kids into comfortable postings
Meanwhile, the reporting partner said that during the enlistment season, the city is jam-packed with enlistees and their parents from all over the country, and that officials at the military mobilization department are busy taking bribes to ensure that their children can serve in a good unit.
"I've heard of bribes ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 Chinese yuan to get into a good unit, such as the military police, the security bureau, or the secret police."
* 1,000 Chinese yuan is about 190,000 South Korean won.
The reporting partner went on to say that bribes are also required to get assigned to Pyongyang or to a well-supplied unit, such as the missile unit, which is favored by parents because they may have the opportunity to meet Kim Jong-un himself.
North Korean soldiers caught on camera in China with a super-telephoto lens. The date of the photograph is unknown, but the masks and plain clothes suggest it was sometime in the summer of 2020. From a video in the YouTube channel Unhabyeul TV.
◆ Some even sell their bikes just to get money to travel to enlist
Another reporting partner in the same area said that, during the chomo season, she feels the disparity between children from families with money and those who do not.
"...those who can afford (to travel to the unit assignment centers) spend money as they please, but those who can't afford it can't even get their parents to come with them (to the meeting place), so they sleep alone in other people's houses, paying 8,000 won a night."
* 1,000 North Korean won is about 158 South Korean won.
Recruits from rural areas have to travel to larger cities to join the army, and usually their parents come with them and stay with them until they are assigned to a unit. However, in many cases, the parents are unable to come along because they have difficulty paying for room and board.
"I heard from an acquaintance who earns money by providing room and board for recruits that there was a kid who came all by himself from a rural area, and he said that he felt sorry taking money from the kid. He had sold his father's bicycle to pay for the trip here."
Young soldiers bathing and washing clothes on the banks of the Yalu River. They are all thin. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, July 2017, by ISHIMARU Jiro (ASIAPRESS)
These stark differences in recruits' lives even before they join the military are likely to be even more pronounced after enlistment.
The military is the backbone of North Korea's institutions and defense and also makes the threats that the international community is concerned about. Even small changes in the military can provide important clues about North Korea as a whole. ASIAPRESS will continue to follow trends in the North Korean military closely. (To be continued in the next installment)
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
asiapress.org
Back in the day we proposed NEATO. (Northeast Asia Treaty Organization). But it had no legs. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_Asia_Treaty_Organization#:)
From that most authoritative source, Wikipedia: NEATO: "United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles considered the possibility of forming such an alliance in the 1950s to balance against communist power and influence in Northeast Asia. ... In lieu of the Northeast Asia Treaty Organization, the United States resorted to the San Francisco System, focusing on separate bilateral alliances with the countries of Northeast Asia."
But conditions are much different in 2024 than they were in the 1950s.
Excerpts from the article below:
The next administration would do well to propose a full-fledged Pacific Security Alliance, with Asian members carrying full economic and personnel burden-sharing. The future Asian security organization should be supported by U.S. global-reach aerial transportation and intelligence capabilities, naval operational prowess and space-based reconnaissance capabilities. But unlike NATO members, which for decades relied on America’s security muscle, there should be no security free-loading.
The U.S. needs help tackling China’s territorial ambitions through a strategy of collective deterrence, especially with conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and the Red Sea stretching American defense capabilities thin. Missing this historic opportunity would be a huge mistake.
An ‘East Asian NATO’ is forming
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4636136-an-east-asian-nato-is-forming/
BY ARIEL COHEN & WESLEY ALEXANDER HILL, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 05/01/24 3:00 PM ET
Photographer: Al Drago/Bloomberg
Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Philippines’ president, US President Joe Biden, and Fumio Kishida, Japan’s prime minister, arrive for a trilateral meeting at the White House in Washington, DC, US, on Thursday, April 11, 2024.
Last month, Washington hosted one of the most significant shifts in the world’s security architecture since the collapse of the Soviet Union. On April 11, an unprecedented trilateral summit brought together U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines, potentially setting the stage for a spectacular shift in Asia’s Sino-American balance of power.
Before this summit, East Asian security was primarily upheld through a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and its partners. America has defense treaties with the Philippines, Japan and South Korea that do not include all other actors. This “hub and spokes” alliance system is now undergoing an upgrade. In its place, a “webbed” system of collective security is emerging, valuing intra-regional security cooperation in addition to bilateral contacts between the U.S. and its allies.
In short, we may be witnessing the dawn of a nascent “East Asian NATO.”
This shift is not limited in scope or confined to Japan and the Philippines, and it goes well beyond the summit held in Washington. After years of slowly thawing ties with America, Vietnam upgraded the relationship late last year, ushering in a new, more security-focused partnership. While not as groundbreaking as the agreements now taking shape between the U.S. and its other partners, this move is another marker of shifting attitudes and a growing interest in containing China. For years, Vietnam refrained from elevating ties for fear of sparking blowback from Beijing, its primary trading partner, and Russia, a key arms provider. The fact that Vietnam changed tack indicates that concerns about China’s actions in the South China Sea are sufficiently widespread to override past sentiments.
Further evidence is visible in the growing ties between Japan and South Korea. Despite historical animosity that once poisoned any agreements involving the two nations, Tokyo and Seoul are today in a broad geopolitical alignment. Their relationship hit new milestones last year, as South Korea, the U.S. and Japan for the first time held an Indo-Pacific Dialogue to discuss China’s forward-leaning strategy in the South China Sea. Several initiatives emerged, including trilateral aerial cooperation, real-time data sharing on missile launches and revived maritime collaboration, setting the stage for further military integration.
None of this should come as a surprise, as Seoul has also been the victim of Chinese truculence over recent few years. Most notably, a Chinese jet entered South Korea’s Air Defense Identification Zone without warning last year. Bold moves like these have done little to quell fears that China acts as it pleases. For South Korea, this attitude may represent an existential threat, as more than 90 percent of its trade moves through the South China Sea. If a conflict were to break out between China and its neighbors, the effects on the South Korean economy would be cataclysmic.
Beijing has denounced this strategic evolution, yet China’s claims of victimhood are likely to fall on deaf ears, as Beijing has encroached upon its neighbors’ territory. Even rulings by impartial tribunals, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, have failed to deter Beijing, signaling to others that this behavior is the new norm. The use of escalating tactics, such as the deployment of water cannons by the Chinese coast guard against Philippine vessels, has deepened fears and pushed countries like Japan and the Philippines to embrace previously taboo policies.
Even Japanese pacifism is waning. Japan is increasingly diluting the reach and extent of Article 9 of its constitution, which states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” Recent decisions include hikes to Tokyo’s defense spending, with plans to reach 2 percent of GDP, and the loosening of defense export restrictions.
More surprising still is the Philippines’ embrace of Japan as a potential security partner, as historical enmity between these two often seemed like an insurmountable obstacle on the road to greater cooperation. As is often the case, all that was needed was a common foe.
Given the stakes and China’s unceasing aggression, it is no surprise that attitudes are changing. Now it is up to the U.S. to build on these gains. This year’s presidential election will likely have an outsized impact on what happens next. Still, some troubling trends will likely persist whoever occupies the White House.
Free trade orthodoxy, for instance, is unlikely to make a triumphant return, no matter who wins in November. Even if proposed trans-Pacific trade deals don’t include China, any attempts to forge a free trade zone are unlikely to gain traction. Bipartisan willingness to scuttle foreign investments or buyouts of American companies by allies like Japan is misplaced. Japan does not pose a security threat, and Japanese carmakers have been in the U.S. for decades without incident.
Still more misguided is America’s unwillingness to follow through on legislative changes that might supercharge its alliance, building on diplomatic efforts in East Asia. One notable example is shipbuilding, as federal law prohibits the full use of Japan’s and South Korea’s shipbuilding capabilities for a much-needed U.S. naval buildup. This status quo, too, is unlikely to change regardless of the election outcome.
The next administration would do well to propose a full-fledged Pacific Security Alliance, with Asian members carrying full economic and personnel burden-sharing. The future Asian security organization should be supported by U.S. global-reach aerial transportation and intelligence capabilities, naval operational prowess and space-based reconnaissance capabilities. But unlike NATO members, which for decades relied on America’s security muscle, there should be no security free-loading.
The U.S. needs help tackling China’s territorial ambitions through a strategy of collective deterrence, especially with conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and the Red Sea stretching American defense capabilities thin. Missing this historic opportunity would be a huge mistake.
Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations. Wesley Alexander Hill the lead analyst and international program manager for the Energy, Growth, and Security Program at the International Tax and Investment Center.
13. Anti-terrorism alert raised for 5 overseas S. Korean diplomatic missions
Anti-terrorism alert raised for 5 overseas S. Korean diplomatic missions
The Korea Times · May 2, 2024
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul / Korea Times file
South Korea heightened its anti-terrorism alert status for five of its diplomatic missions by two levels on Thursday, in response to recent intelligence indicating North Korea's attempted acts of terrorist attacks against South Korean diplomats.
The government convened a meeting and decided to raise the state of its four-tier alert from "attention" to the third-highest level of "alert," for the five missions, officials said.
The five missions are the South Korean Embassy in Cambodia, the South Korean Embassy in Laos, the South Korean Embassy in Vietnam, the South Korean Consulate in Vladivostok, and the South Korean Consulate in the northeastern Chinese city of Shenyang.
The alert level is issued when there is likelihood of terrorism, the government said.
In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly reaffirmed its stance against all forms of terrorism.
North Korea has a track record of staging terror attacks against South Korea in the past few decades, including the 1987 midair bombing of a South Korean airliner near Myanmar that killed all 115 people aboard.
The attack prompted the United States to put North Korea on its terrorism blacklist, but Washington removed Pyongyang from the list in 2008 to facilitate talks on ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.
In 2017, the U.S. redesignated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · May 2, 2024
14. China further repatriates hundreds of N. Korean defectors: civic group
China should be sanctioned for this. It is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses.
China further repatriates hundreds of N. Korean defectors: civic group | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 2, 2024
SEOUL, May 2 (Yonhap) -- Chinese authorities have resumed the forced repatriation of hundreds of North Korean defectors detained in China, a Seoul human rights group claimed Thursday, despite Seoul's repeated calls to stop the act.
Around 200 North Korean defectors detained at a facility in the northeastern province of Jilin that borders North Korea were sent back to the North against their will on April 26, the North Korean People's Liberation Front said, citing families of such refugees and local sources.
If confirmed, China appears to have resumed the mass repatriation of the North's defectors after deporting around 600 defectors to their repressive home country following the end of the Asian Games in Hangzhou in October 2023.
The National Intelligence Service, South Korea's spy agency, said it has been tracking the possibility that China could further repatriate North Korean defectors.
"The government has a stance that North Korean defectors staying overseas should not be forcefully repatriated against their will," said an official at the unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs.
Concerns over China's forced repatriation of such refugees have increased as North Korea started to reopen its border in August last year after it imposed strict COVID-19 lockdowns in early 2020.
China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees and regularly repatriates those who are caught trying to defect to the North, where they can face harsh punishment.
This photo, taken on Oct. 24, 2023, shows a human rights activist holding a press conference in Seoul to explain the route on which North Korean defectors are repatriated by China to their home country. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 2, 2024
15. N. Korea dismantles S. Korean building near shuttered Kaesong complex
Can the regime hide all evidence of South Korea?
N. Korea dismantles S. Korean building near shuttered Kaesong complex | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 2, 2024
SEOUL, May 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to have taken down a building located near the now-shuttered inter-Korean factory park in the North Korean border city of Kaesong, the unification ministry said Thursday.
The dismantled building had been built outside the factory park by a South Korean company for investment purposes, a ministry official told reporters, without providing further details.
The official said the building had never been in use even when the Kaesong Industrial Complex was normally running before South Korea suspended its operation in February 2016 in response to the North's nuclear and long-range missile tests.
Earlier this week, the Voice of America, a Washington-based news outlet, reported that the building located some 50 meters from the factory park entrance had been dismantled, citing satellite imagery.
Once a symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation, the Kaesong complex was home to more than 120 small South Korean plants that produced garments and other labor-intensive goods by employing more than 54,300 North Korean workers.
Amid frosty inter-Korean relations, North Korea blew up the joint liaison office in the Kaesong complex in June 2020 in anger over Seoul's failure to stop North Korean defectors from sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border.
This Dec. 18, 2023, file photo taken from the South Korean border city of Paju, 37 kilometers northwest of Seoul, shows the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a now-shuttered joint industrial park in the North's namesake border city. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 2, 2024
16. N. Korea holds 1st meeting of police officials in 12 years amid drive to tighten social control
Control by the regime is paramount to its survival. The people and information are the existential threats to the regime. They are a greater threat than the ROK and US militaries.
(LEAD) N. Korea holds 1st meeting of police officials in 12 years amid drive to tighten social control | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 2, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in last 2 paras)
SEOUL, May 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has held a meeting of chiefs of branch public security stations earlier this week, state media reported Thursday, in an apparent move to tighten the country's grip on social discipline.
North Korea held the fifth national conference of heads of branch public security stations in Pyongyang from Tuesday to Wednesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
It marked the first time that the North has convened such a meeting since November 2012.
North Korea's branch public security stations are the lowest-tier organization under the Ministry of Public Security and similar to South Korea's police substations.
The North's organizations are tasked with maintaining public safety and protecting people's lives, but they actually carry out surveillance on anti-regime activities.
At the conference, Public Security Minister Ri Thae-sop called for the enhanced role of such organizations as the "main bases" for social security.
He underscored the need to "stage uncompromising struggle against all illegal activities that could hamper economic development and an improvement of people's life," according to the KCNA.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on May 2, 2024, shows the North holding the fifth national conference of heads of branch public security stations from April 30 to May 1 in Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korea is stepping up its campaign to tighten social discipline to block the inflow of outside information amid deepening economic difficulties.
The country adopted laws aimed at strengthening internal control in recent years, including the law enacted in 2020 to "reject the reactionary ideology and culture" and the act adopted in 2023 to protect the Pyongyang dialect and culture.
In particular, the anti-reactionary ideology law calls for sentencing up to 10 years of hard labor for people who bring and distribute outside culture and information. Punishment is known to be tougher in cases of those watching and spreading South Korean dramas, movies and music.
Seoul's unification ministry said the North apparently held the meeting of public security officials to elicit their loyalty toward leader Kim Jong-un and tighten social control.
"This indicates that lots of deviant behaviors and unlawful activities have occurred (in North Korea)," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 2, 2024
17. 50 UN members eye alternative to disbanded North Korea monitoring panel
50 UN members eye alternative to disbanded North Korea monitoring panel
UN panel probing the North’s nuclear, missile sanctions violations dissolved after Russia vetoed mandate renewal.
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nkorea-un-sanctions-05012024234437.html
By Taejun Kang for RFA
2024.05.01
Taipei, Taiwan
Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, United States, delivered a joint statement on behalf of 50 U.N nations on May 1, 2024.
Screenshot/Reuters
Fifty U.N. members, including the United States, Japan, and South Korea, are considering alternatives to ensure continued “objective and independent” monitoring of sanctions on North Korea after the recent dissolution of a panel investigating suspected violations, they said in a statement.
The joint statement, delivered by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Wednesday, emphasized the need for impartial analysis to address North Korea’s unlawful development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
The U.N. panel of experts, tasked with investigating violations of sanctions related to North Korea’s prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs, was officially dissolved on Tuesday. This followed the U.N. Security Council’s failure to renew the panel’s mandate on March 28 due to a veto by permanent council member Russia.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield stressed that the sanctions on North Korea remain in effect, reiterating the Security Council’s consistent demand for the North to comply with its obligations under multiple Security Council resolutions.
When asked about possible alternatives to the disbanded panel, Thomas-Greenfield said countries are considering various possibilities. She added that the U.S. is working closely with South Korea and Japan to propose ideas for the rest of the member states to consider.
The panel, which consists of eight experts drawn from the permanent members of the Security Council, is tasked with assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee to investigate alleged violations of sanctions by North Korea, and has issued in-depth reports twice a year on the sanctions violations.
The Security Council has extended the panel’s mandate for one year each March by passing a resolution. Its mandate expired at the end of April.
Russia’s use of its veto follows accusations from the U.S., South Korea and others that North Korea is supplying Russia with weapons to use in its war in Ukraine – an accusation that both countries have denied.
But the panel, in a report released in March, gave details, with photographs, of Russia’s arms dealings with North Korea in violation of sanctions. The panel said it was investigating reports of the arms transfers.
Edited by Mike Firn.
18. Chongjin's bowling alleys, inns, and hotels criticized as "hotbeds of non-socialist behavior"
There can be no pleasure in the Socialist Workers Paradise.
Chongjin's bowling alleys, inns, and hotels criticized as "hotbeds of non-socialist behavior" - Daily NK English
Officials managing cultural and recreational facilities must now undergo inspections to show they are improving the people’s welfare
By Jong So Yong - May 2, 2024
dailynk.com · by Jong So Yong · May 2, 2024
A new bowling center was built in the North Korean city of Chongjin, KCNA reported on Apr. 19, 2024. (Screengrab from a KCNA report)
The people’s committee of North Hamgyong Province has criticized local cultural and recreational facilities as hotbeds of non-socialist behavior and has begun drawing up measures to address them, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Monday that the provincial people’s committee “convened a meeting on Apr. 20 to discuss measures to deal with the transformation of local cultural and recreational facilities intended to improve the cultural lives of the people into bad facilities where non-socialist behavior predominates.”
According to the source, the meeting in question criticized how new bowling alleys, hotels, department stores, inns and restaurants — mostly in the city of Chongjin — host non-socialist behavior that is completely at odds with the founding mission of improving the people’s cultural lives and convenience.
The provincial people’s committee said the state ordered the operation of bowling alleys, hotels, department stores, inns and restaurants to provide the people with cultural and recreational facilities to make their lives happier. However, behavior at odds with this intention was taking place, it said, with individuals and agencies using the facilities to fill their pockets.
“The meeting chastised the officials managing the facilities, saying minors engage in widespread unhealthy behavior at accommodation facilities like inns and hotels and young people unreservedly gamble by putting money on games at bowling alleys, but the officials were simply making money by turning a blind eye,” the source said.
In response to the problem, the provincial people’s committee — criticizing how capitalist lifestyles were infiltrating local cultural and recreational facilities — decided to strictly manage the facilities per state directions and bolster supervision of the businesses.
Thus, officials managing and operating cultural and recreational facilities now must undergo continuous inspections to ensure they are operating the facilities to improve the people’s welfare per their original mission.
The provincial people’s committee plans to teach provincial residents, especially students and young people, how to use cultural and recreational facilities properly.
“The meeting was held to prevent social and cultural regression resulting from the misuse of cultural and recreational facilities intended to promote the cultural and recreational development of the people,” the source said. “The meeting beseeched all relevant agencies and individuals to perform their responsibilities and roles fully.”
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jong So Yong · May 2, 2024
19. Dennis Halpin, advocate for North Korean refugees and comfort women, dies at 75
I am saddened to hear this. He was a good man who worked tirelessly on Korean issues.
Dennis Halpin, advocate for North Korean refugees and comfort women, dies at 75
Former State Department official drew on his Catholic faith to promote human rights in both Koreas over five decades
https://www.nknews.org/2024/05/dennis-halpin-advocate-for-north-korean-refugees-and-comfort-women-dies-at-75/
Chad O'Carroll May 2, 2024
Dennis Halpin | Image: Photo courtesy of Halpin’s family
Dennis Halpin, a former State Department official who drew on his deep Catholic faith to advocate for human rights in both North and South Korea, died on Friday at his home in Virginia. He was 75.
He was battling end-stage kidney disease and had suffered strokes, according to his son Sean Halpin.
Halpin’s ties to the Korean Peninsula spanned over five decades, beginning in Feb. 1971 when he arrived in Seoul as a Peace Corps volunteer.
He returned to South Korea for a second time as a young foreign service officer, working at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul from 1978 to 1982 and again at the U.S. Consul in Busan from 1989 to 1993.
During his first embassy stint, he served as the Blue House site officer when then-South Korean President Park Chung-hee held a banquet for visiting U.S. President Jimmy Carter in 1979. He was also an official observer at the 1980 trial of Kim Dae-jung, the future ROK president whose death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to U.S. interventions.
Throughout his career, Halpin was committed to advocating for human rights in the two Koreas, even personally offering a path to sanctuary for North Korean refugees in China while serving as a State Department official in Beijing in the 1990s, his son Sean Halpin told NK News.
“In March 1996, when a Korean American man, Henry Kim, approached my father in the American Embassy in Beijing, inspired by the teachings of his Catholic faith, he did not turn his face from the man when he pleaded for the U.S. government’s assistance to save his brother’s family who was fleeing certain death from North Korea,” his son said. “All other faces turned away from Henry but not my father, Dennis Halpin.”
Dennis Halpin attending a memorial ceremony in Daejeon in June 2010 to honor those killed in the sinking of the Cheonan corvette | Image: Photo courtesy of Halpin’s family
Later in life, Halpin maintained his interest in the Koreas by writing for NK News, including dozens of columns between 2015 and 2021 that provided commentary on North Korean politics, human rights and the DPRK’s international relations.
In his writing, Halpin accurately forecasted the risk Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, posed to the regime just months before his assassination in Kuala Lumpur airport in Feb. 2017. He also predicted Kim Jong Un would push then-U.S. President Donald Trump into “crisis mode” early in his presidency.
Halpin cited his experience on the House Foreign Affairs Committee when then-Democratic Ranking Member Tom Lantos engaged in diplomacy to help sell Muammar Gaddafi on the Libyan denuclearization deal, writing that the dictator’s later torture and murder at the hands of rebel forces meant such a strategy was unlikely to work now with Kim Jong Un.
As Trump’s own relationship with Kim evolved, Halpin believed that a Cold War-style containment policy, similar to the one directed against the former Soviet Union, might be the only viable approach to dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea in the long term.
Halpin adjacent to defector-author Kang Chol-Hwan, circa 2012 | Image: Photo courtesy of Halpin’s family
During his years as a staff member of the U.S. Congress, Halpin continued to advocate for human rights in Korea, focusing on cases like the so-called Korean comfort women who Japan forced into sexual slavery before and during World War II.
North Korea observers who worked alongside Halpin praised his advocacy for human rights in both Koreas.
“He was always concerned about human rights, due in part to his strong Catholic faith but also his humanist impulses,” said Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who served with Halpin at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul in the early 1980s.
As South Korea became more democratic, “Dennis’ concern turned to the much more dire circumstances in North Korea,” Fitzpatrick said.
Dennis Halpin, 1948-2024 | Image: Photo courtesy of Halpin’s family
Joshua Stanton, a sanctions specialist and author of the One Free Korea blog, said it was his “honor to be a friend of Dennis Halpin for almost my entire post-military residence in Washington” and that he respected Halppin’s work on DPRK human rights.
“Dennis lived by, and was driven by, his Catholic faith and his Lockean conviction that all human beings are born with natural rights and that any state that denies them to its subjects reveals its contempt for humanity everywhere,” Stanton said. “When more Americans in both parties stood for those ideals, however imperfectly, we were a better country for it.”
Halpin’s family will host a Catholic Funeral Mass on May 18 at 11:30 a.m. at St. Mary of Sorrows Catholic Church in Fairfax, VA.
An additional Buddhist service will be held on May 19 at 11 a.m. at Bub Hwa Sa Temple in Annandale, VA. Donations for a local Korean Buddhist temple in VA are being accepted in Halpin’s memory via GoFundMe.
Edited by Bryan Betts
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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