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Quotes of the Day:
"As far as we can discern, the sole purpose of human existence is to kindle a light of meaning in the darkness of mere being."
– Carl Jung
"Education costs money. But then so does ignorance."
– Sir Claus Moser
"It is impossible to begin to learn that which one thinks one already knows."
- Epictetus
1. Opinion: The Biden Administration’s Chicken Kiev Complex
2. Ukraine Asks for U.S. Help in Striking Targets Inside Russia
3. ‘Cold War 2.0’: George Takach on the Evolving World Order
4. Green Beret A-Teams Training On FPV Drones Being Driven By War In Ukraine
5. Officers with Higher Rank Get Better Care than Those with Lower Ranks at Military Hospitals, Study Finds
6. What Makes American Exceptionalism Less Than ‘Exceptional’ – OpEd
7. She left the CIA in frustration. Now her spy novel is racking up awards.
8. Incoming Taiwan president Lai to pledge steady approach to relationship with China
9. Taiwan’s foreign minister says China and Russia are supporting each other's ‘expansionism’
10. Taiwan is selling more to the US than China in major shift away from Beijing
11. Ex-military surgeons embrace new mission: stop Americans from bleeding to death
12. China’s gray zone social media war comes to America
13. Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking
14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2024
15. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 17, 2024
16. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 17, 2024
1. Opinion: The Biden Administration’s Chicken Kiev Complex
Instead of fear couched by pragmatism perhaps we need confidence couched by pragmatism.
Opinion: The Biden Administration’s Chicken Kiev Complex
The Cold War instilled in many American politicians a craven stance toward Moscow’s belligerence. Experience shows that fear couched by pragmatism is a losing approach.
kyivpost.com · by Stash Luczkiw · May 18, 2024
For those who don’t remember: Chicken Kiev (as it was spelled at the time), in the context of geopolitics, refers to an Aug. 1, 1991 speech by then-US President George H.W. Bush in the capital of what was still the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
The Berlin Wall had fallen nearly two years earlier; East and West Germany had only been reunified for eight months. Independence movements were stirring within the Soviet Union, particularly in the Baltic states and Ukraine.
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President Bush had come to the USSR essentially to support Mikhail Gorbachev’s programs of glasnost and perestroika. So he made a side trip to Kyiv to warn Ukrainians about “suicidal nationalism,” suggesting that the best, most pragmatic course for Ukrainians would be to hew to Gorbachev’s center and tread lightly with their aspirations for freedom.
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In short, Bush was worried about the Soviet Union falling apart and getting drawn into a chaotic conflict. As such, he backed Gorbachev’s “policies of glasnost, perestroika, and democratization” which “point toward the goals of freedom, democracy, and economic liberty.”
Seventeen days after Bush’s speech, Communist hardliners mounted a coup d’état and sequestered Gorbachev, who was vacationing at his Crimean dacha.
The coup failed almost immediately. Gorbachev was disgraced. Boris Yeltsin took the reins of power. Exactly 23 days after the Chicken Kiev speech, Ukraine declared independence. By New Year’s Day of 1992, the USSR had officially ceased to exist.
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Blinken is on a surprise trip to Kyiv weeks after Washington approved a $61 billion package of aid for the country following months of delays in Congress.
Unfortunately, Blinken’s maladroit circumlocution testified to the Biden administration’s own Chicken Kiev complex.
Blinken’s “Rockin’ in the Free World” visit
Fast-forward 32-plus years and Ukraine is now witnessing a poignant reiteration of that Chicken Kiev episode.
Against the background of an existential threat posed by a revanchist Moscow which has proven in no uncertain terms that it wants to eliminate any semblance of a free and sovereign Ukraine, America is again reluctant to help Kyiv for fear of Russia descending into chaos.
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US Secretary of State Antony Blinken came to Kyiv for a brief visit this past week. He gave a speech with much praise for Ukrainian courage and resilience. He reiterated the rhetoric of President Joe Biden’s wanting Ukraine to “win” (of course, without defining what “winning” might mean; and since Biden and his acolytes have already said that Ukraine “has already won” it leaves us semantic watchdogs rather dissatisfied). But in the same speech, after a litany of niceties, Blinken basically scolded Ukraine about its endemic corruption. (Voices in Kyiv say he read Zelensky the riot act in private and told him that the White House wants this war over by the election in November – but, then again, Kyiv is full of voices these days.)
Later in the evening, Blinken – that staunchest of Ukraine supporters among Biden’s ambivalent-with-regard-to-Kyiv inner circle – played guitar at a night club, jamming with a local band. He sang “Rockin’ in the Free World,” by the great Canadian singer-songwriter Neil Young: “We got a kinder, gentler machine-gun hand…”
Then came the very cringe-worthy May 15 press conference, with Blinken squirming and jotting down notes to help him avoid saying anything unpleasant. He was asked twice about Washington’s insistence that Ukraine not use any US-provided weapons to strike Russian territory. For a little background: Russia’s current Kharkiv offensive could have been summarily blunted had Ukraine been able to use US-made ATACMS with cluster munitions on Russian troop concentrations just over the border.
Unfortunately, Blinken’s maladroit circumlocution testified to the Biden administration’s own Chicken Kiev complex.
First, Blinken repeated that America was “committed to helping ensure Ukraine winning this war” – which means nothing since the Biden administration has already defined the current situation as a win. When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last visited Washington, Biden stood next to him and said: “For you to be here today, again, today, nearly two years later [after Feb. 24, 2024] and for Ukraine to be staying strong and free, is an enormous victory already.”
Then Blinken spouted the formulaic: “We have not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine, but ultimately Ukraine has to make decisions for itself.”
When pressed again about the possibility of letting Ukrainians hit Russian territory with US-made arms, in sync with Britain’s policy, Blinken deflected the question: “Again, we are determined that Ukraine win this war and succeed for its people and for its future. We’ve been clear about our own policy, but again, these are decisions that Ukraine has to make, Ukraine will make for itself. And we’re committed to making sure that Ukraine has the equipment it needs to succeed on the battlefield.”
Translated from diplomat-speak, “win” and “succeed” mean the situation on the ground today, with Ukraine de facto renouncing its lost territory. And “battlefield” – a crucial word in this context – means not Russia proper. In other words, the handcuffs are still on.
If there was any doubt about what Blinken meant – since many news outlets jumped the gun and interpreted Blinken’s comments as a green light – then that was clarified the following day at the Pentagon.
The question, verbatim, to Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh was: “So, we’ve heard a number of times from the US officials that [the] US does not want Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia with American weapons. In the wake of [the] Russian offensive and attacks on Kharkiv, does [the] US consider changing that approach? Because that’s what Ukrainians are asking for. It’s very difficult for them to respond to these attacks that come literally from across the border when Russians know that they can basically be safe there.”
The somewhat oxymoronic response was: “Yeah, we haven’t changed our position. We believe that the equipment, the capabilities that we are giving Ukraine, that other countries are giving to Ukraine should be used to take back Ukrainian sovereign territory.”
When asked to clarify whether the handcuffs were a “request” or a “binding condition,” the Pentagon press secretary said: “Again, I would reiterate that, in every single Ukraine defense contact group that the [US] Secretary [of Defense] convenes, the weapons that are provided, again, it’s for use on the battlefield. And the Secretary, in his conversations with [Ukrainian Defense] Minister Umerov, talks through how best those capabilities can be used, and we believe that is within Ukrainian territory.”
Translation: Don’t hit Russian territory with US weapons. “Battlefield” here means “Ukrainian sovereign territory.”
This approach to limiting Ukraine’s ability to inflict damage on the army trying to annihilate it is entirely consistent with what the “Russia experts” in the Biden administration are lobbying for: cut a deal with Moscow; keep Russia from falling apart; pressure Kyiv to cut its losses.
The approach is also entirely consistent with Bush Sr.’s Chicken Kiev speech.
It only took 17 days for the personality of Boris Yeltsin to put the kibosh on Bush’s principled liberal-democratic pabulum.
America’s idealist pragmatists
In all fairness to George H.W. Bush, if one reads the Chicken Kiev speech in its entirety, one has to admit that it is a remarkable work of rhetoric exalting the pragmatic American tradition of enabling liberal democratic ideals to flourish.
For example, the quote about “suicidal nationalism” is skillfully qualified in the full text: “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.”
What liberal democrat in his or her right mind would support any nationalism “based upon ethnic hatred”?
The rest of the speech is an eloquent testimony to that levelheaded, rational approach to geopolitics that characterized Bush Sr. and a host of American political figures from George Washington to the Roosevelts to Biden. And Biden has surrounded himself with eminently competent professional diplomats and political technicians like CIA Director William Burns and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who either know Russia well or rely on the wits of Russia specialists like Samuel Charap and others in the ivory tower shelters of Thinktankdom.
But Bush Sr. was laughably wrong in his assessment. In his speech he said: “We will determine our support [for the stable Soviet center as opposed to the reckless independent republics] not on the basis of personalities but on the basis of principles.” It only took 17 days for the personality of Boris Yeltsin to put the kibosh on Bush’s principled liberal-democratic pabulum.
And now the current Biden administration is laughably wrong in its scarcely veiled drive to contain Vladimir Putin without letting Russia fall apart.
Geopolitics has one hard and fast law: All empires come to an end.
The dissolution of the USSR was the death rattle of the Russian Empire. The US thought it had won the Cold War definitively, that the “end of history” had arrived, or at least was nigh. Whereas Putin thought otherwise; he saw it as a “catastrophe” that necessitated a tactical retreat. Now he’s on the offensive again. And the US must face the implacable reality of the Russian Empire’s death throes courageously, without the mealy-mouthed hedging found in Chicken Kiev’s rhetoric.
Negotiations with Putin on Putin’s terms – i.e., “what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable” – may seem pragmatic. But it’s only as pragmatic as trying to placate a rabid game-bred pit bull with a doggie biscuit.
And for those who think Donald Trump might somehow cut a better deal than the Biden administration, that his personality will supersede the principles he is bereft of, let’s remember that Trump is the most principled of human beings, and his highest principle is himself. He will sacrifice Ukraine and America in a heartbeat if it serves his greater glory.
Like the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire will disintegrate, and the United States will need to fully commit to its rhetoric rather than play safe behind the guise of some speechwriter’s pretty rhetoric or a representative’s cringe-worthy dissembling.
The alternative is nothing less than the end of the liberal-democratic order.
kyivpost.com · by Stash Luczkiw · May 18, 2024
2. Ukraine Asks for U.S. Help in Striking Targets Inside Russia
Escalation. Fear of escalation. Do we want Ukraine to successfully defend itself and win or are we going to be fearfully pragmatic?
Is fear of escalation the "prime directive" of our national security and foreign policy?
Ukraine Asks for U.S. Help in Striking Targets Inside Russia
Biden administration has restricted Kyiv from using U.S.-made weapons in Russian territory
https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-asks-for-u-s-help-in-striking-targets-inside-russia-c1aeac22?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
By Nancy A. Youssef
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and Michael R. Gordon
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Updated May 17, 2024 5:59 pm ET
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. PHOTO: ANDREW KRAVCHENKO/BLOOMBERG NEWS
Ukraine has asked the Biden administration to help identify targets in Russia for Kyiv to strike using its own weapons. It has also asked the U.S. to lift restrictions on the use of American provided weapons against military objectives inside Russia, U.S. and defense officials said.
The request comes as Russia had made its biggest territorial gains in Ukraine in nearly 18 months in the northeast region of Kharkiv. Other U.S. officials said that Ukraine’s request, which was made over the past week, was being reviewed.
If the U.S. were to agree to such changes, it could mark a major policy shift by the administration, which has long sought to reduce the risk of military escalation between Washington and Moscow while backing Ukraine.
“They did ask [the United States] for help to strike into Russia,’’ Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr.told reporters traveling with him to Europe. “It wasn’t specific to a weapons system but additional help in striking the Russians.”
Russia’s assault across the border earlier this month has forced Ukraine to divert troops and resources from other parts of the country, putting strains on an already outmanned force that has been long waiting for additional U.S.-provided weapons.
A woman in Kharkiv, Ukraine, surveys the destruction after an airstrike earlier this week. PHOTO: LIBKOS/GETTY IMAGES
A White House spokesman said that current U.S. policy doesn’t support providing such targeting assistance or using American-weapons inside Russia. “We don’t encourage or enable attacks inside of Russia, which has been our longstanding policy,” the spokesman said.
The U.S. has provided the ATACMS surface-to-surface missile and other weapons systems, with the proviso that they not be used to strike targets on Russian territory. That stipulation, which Ukraine agreed to as a condition of receiving the weapons, was intended to reduce the risk that the conflict could escalate into a direct clash between the U.S. and Russia.
Russia’s foreign ministry warned in September 2022 that the U.S. would “cross a red line” and would be considered a “direct party to the conflict” in the Kremlin’s eyes if it supplied longer-range missiles to Kyiv.
Since then, however, Russia has turned to North Korea for ballistic missiles and to Iran for drones and used the weapons to step up attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure.
The U.S. prohibition—and its refusal to supply intelligence that Ukraine could use to attack targets in Russia with Ukraine’s own drones and weapons systems—has constrained Kyiv’s ability to attack Russia’s command posts and where its troops gather on the Russian side of the border.
Russia is moving forces and resources toward northeast Ukraine from the safety of its own territory nearby as it steps up attacks in the Kharkiv region.
Ukraine’s military said Friday that it was fending off fresh Russian assaults in the Kharkiv area, concentrated in the border city of Vovchansk, where Russia controls northern parts, and villages between the border and Kharkiv.
“Our soldiers are inflicting serious losses on the occupiers,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on a visit earlier this week to the regional capital Kharkiv. “This axis remains extremely difficult, we’re strengthening our units.”
A spokesman for Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, which is responsible for strikes in Russia, didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Brown said that while it doesn’t appear Russia is launching a “large incursion” into Kharkiv, it is aiming, in part, to create a buffer for the Russian border city of Belgorod, which Ukraine forces struck in mid-March.
Russian servicemen marched on Red Square in Moscow during a Victory Day military parade last week. PHOTO: ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Last month, Congress passed a long-awaited foreign-aid package, which included more than $60 billion for Ukraine, ending a nearly six-month suspension of the U.S. providing weapons to Ukraine. While some of the newly-sent weapons have reached Ukraine’s front-line troops, others won’t arrive until June, U.S. defense officials said.
During a visit to Kyiv last week, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken deflected a reporter’s question about whether the U.S. would consider lifting its restrictions on Ukraine’s use of U.S.-provided weapons. “We have not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine, but ultimately Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it’s going to conduct this war,” he said.
Earlier this month, as Russia claimed territory in northeast Ukraine, the U.K. suggested Ukraine had the right to use British-supplied weapons against targets in Russia.
“Just as Russia is striking inside Ukraine, you can quite understand why Ukraine feels the need to make sure it’s defending itself,” Foreign Secretary David Cameron said at the time. A Russian spokesman described the U.K.’s position as a “direct escalation of tension around the Ukrainian conflict.”
Alan Cullison in Kyiv and James Marson in Brussels contributed to this article
Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com
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Appeared in the May 18, 2024, print edition as 'Kyiv Seeks America’s Help With Hitting Targets in Russia'.
3. ‘Cold War 2.0’: George Takach on the Evolving World Order
Yes we need to suspend our hubris and learn from our allies (while ensuring we always protect and live up to our fundamental values).
Conclusion:
In this regard, democracies like the U.S., Canada, and most of the European countries have a lot to learn from our Asian partners in Japan and Taiwan, who have done better defending against social media disinformation from China and Russia. Again, the message for all the democracies has to be: “None of us is as strong as all of us!”
‘Cold War 2.0’: George Takach on the Evolving World Order
thediplomat.com · by Kenji Yoshida
“Innovations like artificial intelligence and semiconductor technology are expected to be pivotal battlegrounds in this New Cold War era.”
By
May 18, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
As the war in Ukraine enters its third year and tensions escalate across the Middle East and beyond, global security concerns are reaching new heights. Reflecting on the mounting geopolitical frictions, the term “Cold War 2.0” is gaining traction within foreign policy discourse.
In his latest book, “Cold War 2.0,” Canadian attorney and writer George Takach provides readers with insight into the contours of this emerging era. He argues that the second Cold War, sparked by Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine and its 2014 annexation of Crimea, is evolving into an intensified state of antagonism.
Against this backdrop, China emerges as a pivotal hegemonic force. The pressing question of whether President Xi Jinping will escalate military tensions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea will determine the trajectory of the future global order.
Takach recently engaged with The Diplomat to elaborate on some of the key points in his book.
Can you explain why 2014 is the starting point of Cold War 2.0?
In 2014, Vladimir Putin occupied Ukraine’s eastern territories and ultimately annexed Crimea, blatantly disregarding international norms. Around the same time, China escalated its assertive actions in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan. This stands in sharp contrast to China’s earlier conduct in the 1970s and ‘80s when it exhibited greater adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since 2014, the two prominent autocratic countries have exhibited a growing reluctance to adhere to the rule-based order.
How is the current era distinct from the first Cold War?
In the original Cold War, the principal players were the United States and the Soviet Union. However, in the emerging new Cold War, the United States finds itself in a rivalry with China. Unlike the Soviet Union, China possesses a remarkable level of economic prowess and integration on the global stage.
Moreover, a notable change lies in the role of technology. Innovations like artificial intelligence and semiconductor technology are expected to be pivotal battlegrounds in this New Cold War era.
After witnessing the drawn-out war in Ukraine, will China’s Xi Jinping take direct military action vis-a-vis Taiwan?
Much like Ukraine posed a challenge to Russia, the flourishing of liberal democracy in Taiwan is a persistent thorn in Xi Jinping’s side. In my analysis, I anticipate that China may be poised to launch a full-scale invasion of the island by 2034.
During my recent visit to Taiwan, conversations with locals revealed a sobering reality: In the event of a Chinese assault, the island could only hold out for a mere two to three weeks without substantial support from the U.S. and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
Certainly, there exists a fundamental disparity between the situations in Taiwan and Ukraine. In war simulations I’ve examined, the grim reality emerges. Within a matter of weeks, the United States could potentially suffer the loss of two battleships and 20 support vessels, comprising a tragic toll of 25,000 fallen soldiers. In the case of Ukraine, no body bags are returning home to the United States.
Such harrowing projections underscore the high stakes and formidable challenges involved in any confrontation over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Likewise, they underscore the critical importance of bolstering Taiwan’s defenses and strengthening alliances to deter potential Chinese military aggression.
In your book, you emphasize technology as a key component of the New Cold War. How so?
Consider the Ukraine offensive in the Black Sea against Russian fleets. Ukrainian drones, at a fraction of the cost of traditional weaponry, effectively neutralized Russian naval power, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of their grain exports.
These advancements in military technology are proving invaluable in defensive operations, as seen in the deployment of naval vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems. Equipped with automated AI systems, these vessels can swiftly identify and intercept incoming missile threats with remarkable precision. The ongoing development of surface and subsurface drones further underscores the rapid evolution of military capabilities.
The U.S. Air Force (and eventually others) is increasingly turning to AI technology for enhanced performance as well. In a recent simulation conducted by the U.S. Air Force, AI systems outperformed conventional jet fighters in a hypothetical dogfight scenario. I suggest that the era of traditional fighter pilots may be drawing to a close. Expensive and complex aircraft like the F-35 are likely to be supplanted by more efficient and technologically advanced alternatives.
The Pentagon’s newly devised Replicator Program – aimed at swiftly assembling and deploying inexpensive drones within 18 to 24 months – aptly encapsulates our present circumstances.
It’s essential, however, to acknowledge a caveat: While technological progress brings significant benefits, it also presents risks. These innovative weapons systems may potentially fall into the hands of rogue states and non-state actors, posing a considerable threat to global security.
Are China and Russia on par with the new technologies?
Russia and China still lag behind in military technology. U.S. President Joe Biden’s stringent sanctions and export controls against China are widening this gap further. Xi Jinping may believe that seizing control of Taiwan’s TSMC semiconductor chip fabrication plants would give China dominance in the semiconductor trade, but the reality is far from it.
Consider chip manufacturing: It’s a highly sophisticated process that relies on contributions from multiple countries. While the fabs are in Taiwan, essential components like the ASML ultra-advanced chip-making machine come from the Netherlands, lasers (a key component of the ASML machine) from Germany, wafers and industrial gases from Japan, memory chips from South Korea, and chip design from the U.S. This interconnectedness creates a situation where the national interests of democracies in North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific are closely intertwined. Essentially, when it comes to acting together in order to prevail in Cold War 2.0, the key phrase for the world’s democracies is: “None of us is as strong as all of us.”
The other great strength of democracies is that we collectively have many stronger companies (than autocracies) involved in today’s leading technologies: artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductor chips, quantum computing, and biotechnology. I spent a lot of time in the book talking about how important these four technologies will be to the outcome of Cold War 2.0.
Also, democracies allow for the key process of “competitive displacement,” where a new technology or innovation is allowed to overtake an earlier technology. This happens only rarely in an autocracy because of the iron grip of the autocrat on the economic system. Moreover, China typically supports only one major tech player in each vertical domain, while the democracies (especially taken together) boast numerous contenders.
All these key technologies are undergoing massive innovation almost daily. NVIDIA, for example, recently unveiled groundbreaking technologies that will revolutionize how AI systems are trained and used. This will be critical because, under the export ban of these systems from the democracies, these new developments will not be equally shared with China, ultimately hurting China’s ability to keep up with the democracies in civilian and military capabilities.
Ironically, though, these restrictions, by widening the technological gap between China and the democracies, may push Xi towards more drastic measures concerning Taiwan.
Finally, what other steps must the democracies take in order to prevail in Cold War 2.0?
We must improve the administration and enforcement of the sanctions that stop the flow of technologies from democracies to autocracies – even today, semiconductor chips made in democracies are finding their way into drones fired by Russia against Ukraine. We in the democracies have to stop giving the autocrats the technologies they can then use to hang us.
Also, while it gives me no pleasure to say this, all the democracies will have to spend more on defense over the coming years and probably decades (the first Cold War lasted 40 years; the new one might last as long). That means less can be spent on education, healthcare, and pensions for the elderly, but sadly this is what it means to be dragged into Cold War 2.0 by the autocrats; the democracies simply have to pay more for the insurance policy called “national security.” It still costs much less than the alternative, as we are learning in Ukraine.
Finally, we must strengthen our own institutions of democracy, including the operation of elections, the support for human rights, and the practice of the rule of law. Technologies like social media are threatening to undermine each of these. We have to ensure that citizens in democracies are well equipped to defend against the cognitive warfare measures launched against the democracies by the autocracies.
In this regard, democracies like the U.S., Canada, and most of the European countries have a lot to learn from our Asian partners in Japan and Taiwan, who have done better defending against social media disinformation from China and Russia. Again, the message for all the democracies has to be: “None of us is as strong as all of us!”
Jason Morgan of Reitaku University contributed to this report.
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Kenji Yoshida
Kenji Yoshida is an associate correspondent with JAPAN Forward based in Seoul, South Korea.
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thediplomat.com · by Kenji Yoshida
4. Green Beret A-Teams Training On FPV Drones Being Driven By War In Ukraine
Drones should be an important force multiplier for an ODA and the indigenous forces they train, advise, and equip.
But retired General Clarke is right. We all must now look up. The battlefield is no longer a 360 degree plane - it is sphere.
Excerpts:
“I’ve been in the Army for 38 years, and in my entire time in the Army on battlefields in Iraq, in Afghanistan, Syria, I never had to look up,” now-retired U.S. Army Gen. Richard Clarke, then head of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), said at the annual Aspen Security Forum in July 2022, just months after Russia’s full-on invasion of Ukraine. “I never had to look up because the U.S. always maintained air superiority and our forces were protected because we had air cover. But now with everything from quadcopters – they’re very small – up to very large unmanned aerial vehicles [UAV], we won’t always have that luxury.”
“The cost of entry into this, particularly for some of the small unmanned aerial systems, is very, very low,” he continued. “I think that this is something that’s gotta continue to go up in terms of our priority for the protection, not just of our forces that are forward today – that’s the current problem – but what’s gonna come home to roost. Some of these technologies could be used by our adversaries on our near abroad or even into our homeland.”
For Army Green Berets and other U.S. special operators, drones of all types will only continue to become increasingly ubiquitous components of operations, including foreign training engagements well beyond Ukraine. In February and March, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) released pictures showing other members of the 10th SFG(A) using FPV-type drones as part of the latest iteration of the Trojan Footprint exercise. Trojan Footprint is SOCEUR’s premier annual special operations training event in the region and also includes the participation of various allies and partners.
...
There are also growing pushes across the branches of the U.S. armed forces for new and expanded counter-drone capabilities, another area where America’s military is still very much playing catch-up. In a report accompanying their recent draft NDAA, members of the House Armed Services Committee advocated for more “innovative counter-unmanned aerial systems detect and defeat capabilities,” including ones leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, and demanded a joint briefing from the Army, Navy, and Air Force on what is being done now in this regard.
Altogether, it is not at all surprising that the Green Berets from the 10th SFG(A) were keen to secure specialized drone training ahead of their upcoming rotation, especially with the prospect of a JCET or similar engagement inside Ukraine proper. Adding various drone-related skills to pre-deployment workups only looks set to become more and more normalized for both special operations and conventional forces.
Green Beret A-Teams Training On FPV Drones Being Driven By War In Ukraine
twz.com
Green Beret FPV drone training is the latest example of a growing uncrewed future, and the U.S. lag in fielding its own capabilities.
byJoseph Trevithick| PUBLISHED May 17, 2024 1:42 PM EDT
News & FeaturesLand
A US Army Green Beret operates a first-person view drone during an exercise in Greece in 2024. SOCEUR
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An ‘A-Team’ of U.S. Army Green Berets will receive specialized drone training, including about using first-person view (FPV) types, ahead of an upcoming scheduled rotational deployment. This will help the Special Forces soldiers be better prepared to train foreign allies and partners on the use of uncrewed aerial systems, including potentially in Ukraine. It will also prepare them to be able to use those capabilities for their own local surveillance and force protection purposes while forward deployed in dangerous locales.
The explicit inclusion of drone skill sets in the pre-deployment workup for the Green Berets underscores how the war in Ukraine has brought the value of drones and appreciation for the threats they pose fully mainstream. At the same time, it also highlights how the U.S. military is still lagging behind in many ways when it comes to this reality. This is particularly apparent in the slow pace at which the branches of America’s armed forces have been moving to acquire FPV-type and other kinds of kamikaze drones, despite them now often being discussed as having nearly the same level of significance as artillery on Ukrainian battlefields.
The Army announced earlier this month that it had hired private contractor Flymotion to provide drone and non-standard vehicle training services to a Green Beret A Team from the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), or 10th SFG(A), out of Fort Carson, Colorado. Since Flymotion received a sole-source deal, Army officials had to provide detailed justifications for not using typical competition contracting processes.
“10th SFG(A) is requesting a contractor to provide non-personal services on non-standard vehicle operations, evasive maneuvers, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancec] in convoy operations, ISR platform build, drone employment, FPV drone operations, to include vehicles for mobility training and drones/components for drone operations,” the Justification & Approval (J&A) document or the sole-source contract explains. “Through this training, they aspire to mitigate risk and enhance mission effectiveness in an OCONUS JCET [Outside the Continental United States Joint Combined Exchange Training] environment as well as semi-permissive and hostile areas to which Special Forces Companies may deploy (in particular Ukraine) utilizing internal Detachment surveillance (Unmanned Aircraft Systems-UAS) technology.”
“The impact if the training opportunity is not granted is that 10th SFG(A) 2nd Bn [Battalion] would lose the ability to train drone and vehicular operations prior to their validation exercise in May 2024 and SOTF 10.1 rotation, thus loosing [sic; losing] the capability to teach and apply these critical skills,” the contracting document continues. “This training is part of an already approved validation pathway for 10th SFG 2nd Bn and, if denied, will greatly disrupt the ODA’s ability to apply the training to further validation events.”
An FPV drone being flown by a U.S. special operator (not seen) during an exercise in Europe earlier this year. SOCEUR
ODA refers to an Operational Detachment Alpha, more commonly known as an A-Team, the smallest standardized Army Special Forces unit.
Flymotion was picked because “generally, the following issues existed for most vendors: they lacked the technical expertise to provide [the desired] instruction… ; they utilized drones manufactured in China which is against installation policies; they did not offer military solutions for training; and they did not provide training with complexities of European Theatre in mind,” the J&A adds.
The Joint Combined Exchange Training mentioned in the J&A is a kind of very small and short-duration training engagement that Army Green Berets and other U.S. special operations forces conduct regularly in various countries around the world. JCETs typically focus on practicing relatively basic skill sets, as well as exchanging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and are primarily conducted with members of foreign special operations and other elite units.
Members of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) take part in a JCET in Albania with elements of that country’s special operations forces in February 2024. SOCEUR
Whether or not there is any actual plan for the 10th SFG(A) A-Team to make a JCET or JCET-like deployment to Ukraine proper during its upcoming rotation is unknown. The War Zone has reached out to the Army and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) for more information.
It has been reported in the past that small teams of U.S. special operations forces have operated inside Ukraine out of the Embassy in Kyiv conducting training and advise-and-assist missions away from the front lines, as well as providing force protection for visiting dignitaries. American special operators, including members of the 10th SFG(A), are also known to be helping train Ukrainians in neighboring countries like Poland. American officials have just recently been publicly discussing the potential for larger in-country training efforts down the road.
Discussions about operating highly maneuverable FPV drones and other kinds of uncrewed aerial systems would undoubtedly be an important part of any future training engagement with Ukrainian forces inside the country or anywhere else. The use of FPV-type kamikaze drones, as well as other lower-end weaponized types, has become a fixture on both sides of the battlefield in Ukraine. The conflict has brought the value of and threats posed by lower-end drones fully into the mainstream consciousness.
“I think you’re seeing essentially a new type of trench warfare in Ukraine from that perspective,” Gabe Camarillo, the Under Secretary of the Army, said today at an online talk hosted by the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington. Camarillo was speaking more specifically about the speed at which innovation in drone technologies is being observed in Ukraine, as well as the development of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures.
“The [primary] way that both [the Ukrainians and Russians] are overcoming this [countermeasures] is with mass,” he added. “And, so, the ability to achieve effects by having such low-cost capabilities that… you were able to flood the zone.”
At the same time, drones, and especially the threat that armed types present on and off the battlefield, are not in any way limited to the ongoing war in Ukraine, nor is this really new. The barrier to entry is also low, meaning that smaller nation states and even non-state actors, from terrorists to criminal gangs, are among those increasingly availing themselves of these capabilities to varying degrees. These are all things that The War Zone has been highlighting for years.
“I think what we’re seeing, and not just in Ukraine, but really around the world, is that the availability and the impact of small unmanned aerial systems and the threats that they present on the battlefield is here to stay,” Army Undersecretary Camarillo said today at the CNAS talk. “It is an evolution of a scale that is rapidly increasing to change the battlefield. So, in a nutshell… [this threat] is complex, ubiquitous, and is really transforming what the battlespace looks like.”
“It is very difficult to remain concealed in this environment. It is a very contested and congested battlespace,” he continued. “We know that electromagnetic signature[s], the availability of ISR capabilities brought about by these UAVs, really prevents any forces from being largely concealed or massed together.”
All of this is well known to the U.S. special operations community, too.
“I’ve been in the Army for 38 years, and in my entire time in the Army on battlefields in Iraq, in Afghanistan, Syria, I never had to look up,” now-retired U.S. Army Gen. Richard Clarke, then head of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), said at the annual Aspen Security Forum in July 2022, just months after Russia’s full-on invasion of Ukraine. “I never had to look up because the U.S. always maintained air superiority and our forces were protected because we had air cover. But now with everything from quadcopters – they’re very small – up to very large unmanned aerial vehicles [UAV], we won’t always have that luxury.”
“The cost of entry into this, particularly for some of the small unmanned aerial systems, is very, very low,” he continued. “I think that this is something that’s gotta continue to go up in terms of our priority for the protection, not just of our forces that are forward today – that’s the current problem – but what’s gonna come home to roost. Some of these technologies could be used by our adversaries on our near abroad or even into our homeland.”
For Army Green Berets and other U.S. special operators, drones of all types will only continue to become increasingly ubiquitous components of operations, including foreign training engagements well beyond Ukraine. In February and March, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) released pictures showing other members of the 10th SFG(A) using FPV-type drones as part of the latest iteration of the Trojan Footprint exercise. Trojan Footprint is SOCEUR’s premier annual special operations training event in the region and also includes the participation of various allies and partners.
A member of 10th SFG(A) in Greece piloting an FPV drone during this year’s Trojan Footprint exercise. SOCEUR
The ever-growing pervasiveness of drones is a reality that applies to the rest of the U.S. military, too. Just when it comes to the Army, new efforts to acquire and field FPV drones, as well as types tethered to vehicles, are set to become formal programs of record in the 2025 Fiscal Year, one of the service’s senior officials recently told Defense One. The FPV types could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance missions, or be equipped with small munitions or payloads to conduct kinetic and non-kinetic attacks on enemy forces. They could take on other roles, as well.
“Drones might provide an edge in reconnaissance, communication extension relays, electronic warfare, and lethal strikes,” Army Lt. Col. Michael Brabner, who is in charge of smaller drone efforts within the Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (MCDID) at the service’s Maneuver Center of Excellence, explained, according to Defense One. “His office has worked with the 82nd Airborne [Division] to rig Skydio RQ-28A quadcopters to drop live M-67 fragmentation grenades.”
Members of the US Army with a standard unarmed RQ-28A. US Army
If it were to be signed into law in its present form, the latest draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act, for the 2025 Fiscal Year from the House of Representatives would also compel the Army to establish a dedicated drone and counter-drone branch just like the ones it has for things like more traditional aviation, armor, and air defense.
The entire U.S. military is looking at an increasingly uncrewed future down to the lowest levels. Earlier this month, the Pentagon announced that an Army effort to acquire Switchblade 600 loitering munitions and a maritime-focused drone boat swarm project were among the first tranche of submissions picked to receive special attention through its Replicator initiative. Replicator aims to help accelerate the development and fielding of thousands of uncrewed and also highly autonomous systems in just a matter of years.
There are also growing pushes across the branches of the U.S. armed forces for new and expanded counter-drone capabilities, another area where America’s military is still very much playing catch-up. In a report accompanying their recent draft NDAA, members of the House Armed Services Committee advocated for more “innovative counter-unmanned aerial systems detect and defeat capabilities,” including ones leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, and demanded a joint briefing from the Army, Navy, and Air Force on what is being done now in this regard.
Altogether, it is not at all surprising that the Green Berets from the 10th SFG(A) were keen to secure specialized drone training ahead of their upcoming rotation, especially with the prospect of a JCET or similar engagement inside Ukraine proper. Adding various drone-related skills to pre-deployment workups only looks set to become more and more normalized for both special operations and conventional forces.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
5. Officers with Higher Rank Get Better Care than Those with Lower Ranks at Military Hospitals, Study Finds
This Is painful to read and acknowledge. We tell ourselves things like good leadership is officers always eating last. But I guess by eating last we can get better medical care first? (terrible sarcasm I know)
Perhaps it is because of my rank but my wife as an immigrant has always preferred military medical care over civilian medical care because she feels that military doctors and staff treat her better as an immigrant than the civilian medical community.. In fact my wife is the one who wanted us to retire and live outside of Fort Belvoir to continue the excellent medical care we have always received. Of course Tricare has pushed us more and more into civilian care but that just makes my wife appreciate military medical care even more. But I guess I am really naive because I never thought it was because of my rank. I just thought (and still do believe) that military doctors are good people taking care of the troops and their families.
Officers with Higher Rank Get Better Care than Those with Lower Ranks at Military Hospitals, Study Finds
military.com · by Patricia Kime · May 17, 2024
Officers who outrank their military physicians and personnel who have been recently promoted receive better attention and care in Defense Department health facilities than lower-ranking service members, new research on military emergency room visits has found.
The study, published Thursday in the journal Science, also found racial bias in treatment and care in military ERs, with white physicians "exerting less effort" on Black patients.
While the study also found that white physicians treated higher-ranking Black patients with more care, their treatment was still only on par with lower-ranking white patients. Black military doctors treated lower-ranking patients of either race fairly equally, the study found, but they provided high-ranking Black patients "off-the-charts" care.
The researchers, with the University of Texas at San Antonio and Carnegie Mellon University, conducted the study to further understand implicit bias in health care in civilian settings as well as military care. Stephen Schwab, the study's co-author, said that, while bias regarding gender and race is often the subject of research, the role that power dynamics play in medical services is less understood.
The military, with its obvious rank structure, presents opportunities to understand this relationship, he said.
"The military is doing everything it can to reduce these biases. Part of it is understanding the scope of the issue. It's not just race and gender, it's also power and wealth," Schwab, a retired Army lieutenant colonel who now works at the University of Texas at San Antonio, said in an interview with Military.com on Friday.
For the study, the researchers examined data from 1.5 million emergency department visits in the military health system, looking at the rank of a patient compared with the doctor's rank and examining treatment response, including resources expended such as medical tests, imaging and certain prescriptions, and outcomes, such as hospital admissions at the time of the ER visit or within 30 days afterward.
They found that higher-ranking patients received 3.6% more physician effort and resources and were 15% less likely than lower-ranking patients to have poor outcomes.
Lower-ranking patients seen by doctors attending to higher-ranking patients at the same time were 3.4% more likely to have poorer outcomes, according to the study.
"Our findings indicate that power confers nontrivial advantages: 'High-power' patients (who outrank their physician) receive more resources and have better outcomes than equivalently ranked 'low-power' patients. Patient promotions even increase physician effort. Furthermore, low-power patients suffer if their physician concurrently cares for a high-power patient," the researchers wrote.
The military health system serves nearly 1.3 million active-duty personnel of all ranks, in addition to military family members, retirees and their families, in 51 hospitals and 424 clinics. The active-duty force is 18% officer and nearly 82% enlisted, 82.5% male and 17.5% female. Roughly 69% of the force is white, while 31.2% identify as a person of color.
The research looked at how physicians responded to or treated officers of higher rank than themselves, as well as equal and lower-ranked officers, and enlisted personnel.
Additional trends that were observed included a finding that male physicians are more rank-conscious and respond to a patient's "power" more than female doctors did and showed more sex-based discrimination than female physicians.
Male physicians also were significantly more responsive to higher-ranking female patients than male patients, possibly because high-ranking women are still fairly uncommon across the services, perhaps eliciting "more respect and attention," the research said.
Schwab said the findings demonstrate that physicians are "human" and, as such, are susceptible to implicit bias. But there may be other factors at play, such as a high-ranking patient demanding care or unknowingly drawing it as leadership.
The concern with such bias is what Schwab called "the spillover effect": If physicians are spending more time with their peers or those of higher rank, then other patients are getting less attention.
"The effort has to come from somewhere," Schwab said.
Schwab said the research was supported by the military health system through access to records and data support. The study, he added, lends value to medicine as a whole because it is an opportunity to show that implicit bias exists in the profession and the perception of power plays a role.
As a retired financial officer for the military health system, Schwab said he recognized that he likely received more attentive health care in the system from his colleagues than other troops.
"It's hard to tell [bias] as an individual patient because you get the care you get, but I definitely felt I received more respect because of my circumstances," Schwab said.
He said the study was not designed to place blame on physicians; instead, it was meant to raise awareness of implicit bias to influence education and training.
"We want people to recognize that these implicit biases exist, and we can address them by developing physicians that are more representative of society or improving training for our physicians," Schwab said.
A spokesman for the Defense Health Agency said the organization is reviewing the article and its supporting materials but would not comment on the findings until they could be thoroughly reviewed.
DHA spokesman Peter Graves said the agency "is committed to delivering the highest quality of care to all of our patients, regardless of rank, race, color, sex, gender identity, religion, age or any other demographic."
"We always expect the same high standards to be applied to every patient in an exceptional way, anytime, anywhere, always," Graves said.
military.com · by Patricia Kime · May 17, 2024
6. What Makes American Exceptionalism Less Than ‘Exceptional’ – OpEd
Conclusion:
Most people these days subscribe to an exceptionalist kind of nationalist narrative which says that their country is somehow unique to world history. This kind of narrative is reinforced by a government-run bureaucracy subservient to the corporate lobby. As a rule, there are no exceptions. Period. I don’t believe that people are either particularly good or bad; they are mostly interested in themselves. That’s neither a good nor a bad thing. It’s just that you cannot expect too much from a normal human being. However, education and culture can play a major role in enabling people to act in humane and kinder ways. The only exceptions are those who go against the grain of human nature, which is essentially cruel, rapacious and with a voracious appetite for destruction. This is the reason why we admire men and women like Simone Weil, Mahatma Gandhi and John XXIII. They make an important point. It is hard to die for others. It is harder to live for others.
What Makes American Exceptionalism Less Than ‘Exceptional’ – OpEd
https://www.eurasiareview.com/18052024-what-makes-american-exceptionalism-less-than-exceptional-oped/
May 18, 2024 0 Comments
By Prakash Kona
It was reported on September 15th 2023 that the U.S., Britain and Canada are imposing more sanctions on Iran right before the one-year death anniversary of Mahsa Amini who lost her life thanks to Iran’s morality police. I would like to know if the resistance movement in Iran made such a request to the governments of the US, Canada and Britain to impose sanctions on “people and entities” of their country, thus adding to the difficulties they are already suffering? I want to know if resistance movements outside Iran with Iranians in it made such a request? Or ordinary people of developing nations made such a request? Or someone in the Global South? I mean, who asked the US, Britain and Canada to decide that they can punish the people of Iran as a way of expressing their sympathies with the Iranian masses? Who is the “morality police” here: the hated regime in Iran or the US, Britain and Canada? Or both? What makes these countries so exceptional that they can play with the destinies and wellbeing of others?
People are not exceptional. Period. Any theory of exceptionalism defies the crudest definition of human nature. We have to accept without raising too many questions the simple fact of life that there is one Nikola Tesla, one Charlie Chaplin and one Noam Chomsky. Some people are exceptional for reasons that cannot always be logically explained. It might have something to do with the best or the worst of circumstances. This does not change the role that the individual will play in altering the tracks of history. It has never been otherwise since the beginning of the human story on this planet. There is no evidence to vaguely suggest that it’s going to be any different in the years to come.
But when exceptionalism is associated with place of birth or being a member of a social group, then we have a serious problem. Why would someone born in the United States be any more exceptional than one born in Nepal or in Burundi, which is supposed to be the poorest country in the world? Opportunities may vary but life goes on and people are creative when it comes to survival. The average human being is provincial everywhere; I don’t think an individual easily transcends the barriers placed by circumstances of birth and upbringing. Only an exceptional mind is able to achieve the kind of a cosmopolitan imagination that Shakespeare possessed in the Elizabethan era. George Carlin couldn’t have put it better when he says:
“I could never understand ethnic or national pride because, to me, pride should be reserved for something you achieve or attain on your own, not something that happens by accident of birth. Being Irish isn’t a skill. It’s a f——g genetic accident. You wouldn’t say, “I’m proud to be 5’11”. I’m proud to have a predisposition for colon cancer. So, why the f–k would you be proud to be Irish or proud to be Italian or American or anything?…Here’s another slogan you run into all the time. “God bless America.” Once again, respectfully, I say to myself, “What the f–k does that mean?” God bless America. Is that a request? Is that a demand? Is that a suggestion?… It’s delusional thinking. It’s delusional thinking, and Americans are not alone with this sort of delusions. Military cemeteries around the world are packed with brainwashed, dead soldiers who were convinced God was on their side.”
(I too come from a part of the world where exceptional people are the rule, an exceptionally petty-minded lot, painfully insecure, envious, thankless and to add to these royal qualities, a fanatical dedication to the pursuit of money and power at the expense of a million other things that could make a person happy without reason.)
The exceptionalist narrative is at the heart of the American dream. Somehow it means that they have a history, unlike any other history on this planet, one worthy of emulation. The Disinformation Age: The Collapse of Liberal Democracy in the United States (2017) by Eric Cheyfitz (2017) goes deep into the subject of what American Exceptionalism means in the 21st century. Cheyfitz throws light on the relationship between American imperialism and the violence towards the poor and the weak at home. American foreign policy in the Global South cannot be separated from the domestic policy; one effortlessly translates into another. As Cheyfitz puts it:
“Foreign policy will not change until domestic policy does because the two are in a dialectical relationship, grounded in the narrative of American Exceptionalism. I define exceptionalism as a mode of imagining a history outside of history, as a way of reading history ahistorically in order to create a coherent narrative—one that appears to be without contradiction—that we call the Nation. I understand that nations are narratives that rationalize, or idealize, the material force of the state. That is what is implied in the formation of the nation-state, a synthesis of rhetorical and material power. The state, then, requires the narrative of the nation to cover its tracks. The nation is the state’s alibi.” (20) (my emphasis)
The attempts to “erase history” even while evoking or laying claim to it is, in essence, “the language of American Exceptionalism—grounded in the rhetoric of the American Dream” (6). There is dramatic irony to this erasure of history by a racist and classist nation for audiences living in the Global South. The irony is that it’s a nation that is psychologically distant from what is happening in the underdeveloped parts of the world. The ideal of a nation intricately bound to the idea of freedom for the individual, serves as a narcissistic trap, preventing Americans from seeing that the march of history is not towards some kind of a utopia, a perfect world that does not have to deal with the complexities of human nature. On the contrary, treachery and betrayal played a significant role in legitimizing the occupation of what is today the United States of America.
In an earlier book The Poetics of Imperialism:Translation and Colonization from The Tempest to Tarzan (1991), Eric Cheyfitz rightly points out:
“Thus, those of us who live within the privilege of Western patriarchy live in an increasingly narrow psychic and social space. For we cannot afford to enter most of the social spaces of the world; they have become dangerous to us, filled with the violence of the people we oppress, our own violence in alien forms that we refuse to recognize. And we can afford less and less to think of these social spaces, to imagine the languages of their protest, for such imagining would keep us in continual conflict, in continual contradiction with ourselves, where we are increasingly locked away in our comfort. Terrorizing the world with our wealth and power, we live in a world of terror, afraid to venture out, afraid to think openly. Difference and dialogue are impossible here. We talk to ourselves about ourselves, believing in a grand hallucination that we are talking with others” (xx).
This “grand hallucination that we are talking with others” is reproduced in panel discussions on third world and working class issues that we see on official channels on television and on the internet, which is repeated by experts and parroted by so-called professionals, media pundits and research scholars in journals and at conferences in universities. The grand hallucination continues. We are talking to ourselves about ourselves. Ironically we persist in imagining that we are talking with others. Anyone who has read Freud knows that hallucinations are not without histories. Stereotypes perpetuate hallucinations and in turn are perpetuated by them. In this hallucination there is no space for either difference or dialogue. The rest of the world does not care for these hallucinations at the heart of American Exceptionalism. Their quest for freedom is in an entirely different direction. The idea of freedom in the Global South is predominantly about economic justice. As Cheyfitz puts it:
“Whereas in its call for democratic political forms the narrative of American Exceptionalism was on the cutting edge of history in 1776 and 1787, its use today finds it utterly out of touch with history in a world that no longer looks toward but past it to other narratives in order to imagine new forms of democracy, particularly those that envision forms of economic justice.” (56)
In a telling instance of mass deception by the power elite, Cheyfitz brilliantly illustrates how people were fooled into believing that credit was somehow the same thing as income.
“In terms of the exceptionalist narrative, what took place over this thirty-year period was the displacement of the term income by the term credit. That is, millions of people came to believe or convinced themselves that credit was income, when credit only simulated income. Within this movement, the exceptionalist narrative, always distanced from reality as ideology, lost all touch with reality in the sense that credit, while ultimately dependent on income, is in and of itself negative income. In this context, credit became a simulacrum of income, a sign without a referent. That is, to say the obvious: when the creditor demands the debt, all credit stops and income is necessary to pay the debt. The story of the 2008 crash is that, up until the catastrophic moment, people hallucinated credit as income in what they took for an infinitely expanding housing market with infinitely rising housing prices that could provide the collateral for credit they were not making as income. When credit crashed and there was no income to back it up, that is, when credit could not magically become income (either because jobs were lost or actual income could not cover the debt), the exceptionalist narrative became Disinformation, which is to say the two key terms—credit and income—that had made sense of the narrative were erased. Simply put, millions of Americans found themselves actually or virtually homeless and/ or jobless, that is, without income, in deep debt, and so without the possibility of further credit.” (62-63)
This is the tragedy of freedom that comes from above and that is not earned by those below. The persons giving the freedom from above are also scripting the terms and conditions of the freedom. They take it as their right and privilege to lie to the masses. It’s usually done with a rather abused word ‘choice.’ As if somehow people are given the choice to decide their fate. As if the poor are poor because they’ve chosen to be poor, while the rich are rich because they worked on their choices, rather than their privileges. That’s how the masses are disinformed and made to believe that they own their lives and their bodies, when clearly they don’t. There is little doubt that no justice comes closer to reality than economic justice. This is something that is never spoken about because it would mean freeing the poor from their alienation. They would be the owners of their labor. That’s not what the rich and the greedy middle classes want. Human rights are made to be synonymous with property rights. Everything that comes freely from Mother Nature such as the land we work on, clean air and water – collective wealth – must be turned to private property. To have is to be free. The only real freedom is the one that private property owners possess. Property gives them the right to be considered human. In the absence of property, people are less than human. As Cheyfitz observes,
“The right to property and property rights, not the right to “the means of acquiring and possessing property,” is at the heart of the American way; and human rights are merely a function of property rights. Recognizing this, we enter the heart of darkness. The less property one has, the less human one is. Ask the Americans who are jobless or homeless or without health insurance. Globally, the fact that between eight and eighteen million people die every year from poverty-related causes bears witness to the equation of humanness and property about which we are thoroughly disinformed in the narrative of American Exceptionalism.” (68)
This wholesale condemnation of the poor at home and outside along with the exclusion of indigenous people is what in essence American foreign policy is all about. In the same vein, Cheyfitz makes the connection between Israeli and American exceptionalism. “American Exceptionalism finds its counterpart and precursor in Israeli exceptionalism; both are narratives of settler colonialism that claim originality through the displacement and demonization of Indigenous peoples” (83). The demonization or idealization, which is the counterpart of the former, of individuals and groups is always about an outsider, who, for some inexplicable reason is opposed to the American way of life. Israel is doing exactly the same thing by repeating the falsity that the Muslim Arabs or Palestinians are opposed to their existence. Cheyfitz rightly observes,
“the extent to which colonial American history, the substratum of exceptionalist narratives, is constructed from the paranoid fantasies of the invading settlers: fantasies of terrorism (the “war on terror”) that the U.S. continues to construct as I write. This is not to deny that either the Puritans had or the U.S. has enemies. It is, rather, to emphasize that what the Puritan and the U.S. war on terror construct in order to justify preemptive violence is an unmotivated global enemy bent on the total destruction of an imagined innocent, beleaguered community, the proverbial “homeland.” That this “homeland” was itself wrested through colonial violence from its Indigenous inhabitants is denied in exceptionalist history (Disinformation). This is the point of Apess in his Eulogy. This is the point of Hamas and Fatah in Gaza and the West Bank. This is the point of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Not to take this point is to erase history (the complex intersection of conflicting narratives) and thus to make negotiations, not to say justice, increasingly difficult if not impossible.” (97)
But American kids are never taught the history of genocide, slavery and colonialism, except as the result of an unfortunate accident that could have been averted with a little bit of foresight. Wrongs are committed by some bad apples in a field that essentially produces edible fruit. Far from it, the results of American support for Israel in its occupation of Palestinians Territories speaks for an ugly and inhuman past. Cheyfitz notes correctly that in the context of
“official American history—by and large what is emphasized in the schools, promulgated by the major media, and circulated in political speeches by the two major parties—is itself nothing but a system of erasures. Thus, when someone calls attention to what has been erased, to that unexceptional history of colonial and imperial violence, which erases the difference the exceptionalist narrative claims from its European past, he or she risks marginalization and/or vilification, the latter if the voice is centrally public.” (128)
What is it which ensures that the “system of erasures” is perpetuated in such a manner that anyone who challenges it is immediately ostracized from mainstream discourse? People are fed with illusions that make it look like the past does not matter any longer. What matters is the present and the future. The point however is that the present and the future need to come to terms with the past in an honest manner in order to make social and economic justice a reality. Americans need to honestly acknowledge that, “At the center of this illusion is the official denial of Native genocide, the fact that the United States of America is built on stolen Indian land” (267). As Cheyfitz points out, “the origin of American Exceptionalism in the legalization of “Indian-hating.” But in conjunction with that origin, it is equally important to emphasize that, in continuing the force of European imperialism, the United States from its beginnings denigrated and then repressed Indigenous epistemologies. Ironically, it is these epistemologies that always offered, as they continue to do so, solutions to the crisis of socioeconomic inequality that the U.S. and the world have been facing historically. This crisis has now been brought to a tipping point by the fact of climate change and the threat to sustainability it poses. We cannot afford to miss the irony here, if I can put it in its simplest terms: it is only what the West has othered that can save the West from itself. (275) (my emphasis)
It is others who can save us from too much of ourselves. Anti-semitic Europeans had a lot to learn from the Jews that they persecuted for centuries. Likewise, it is the turn of the Israeli Jews to learn from the Arab Palestinians, whose lands they have unjustly occupied. The most important lesson being peaceful coexistence. Americans have something to learn from the victims of their foreign policy in the Global South. Americans also have something to learn from the poor at home. Indians have something to learn from their neighbors. Maybe our neighbors have something to share with us, something that can put an end to the general backwardness of South Asians. We all have something to learn from one another. Nations of the west need to understand that they cannot make life impossible for people in other parts of the world and then complain about the refugee or immigrant problem. It is not the fault of refugees and illegal immigrants that they are victims. The average citizen of the west needs to understand that, when you make their countries unlivable for them, they have to escape to survive. This means that, sooner or later, they end up at your doorstep.
Most people these days subscribe to an exceptionalist kind of nationalist narrative which says that their country is somehow unique to world history. This kind of narrative is reinforced by a government-run bureaucracy subservient to the corporate lobby. As a rule, there are no exceptions. Period. I don’t believe that people are either particularly good or bad; they are mostly interested in themselves. That’s neither a good nor a bad thing. It’s just that you cannot expect too much from a normal human being. However, education and culture can play a major role in enabling people to act in humane and kinder ways. The only exceptions are those who go against the grain of human nature, which is essentially cruel, rapacious and with a voracious appetite for destruction. This is the reason why we admire men and women like Simone Weil, Mahatma Gandhi and John XXIII. They make an important point. It is hard to die for others. It is harder to live for others.
References:
Prakash Kona
Prakash Kona is an independent scholar who, until December 2022, was a professor at The English and Foreign Languages University (EFLU), Hyderabad, India. He was “removed from service” for making allegations of corruption against an unscrupulous university administration and is currently challenging his dismissal in the court of law.
7. She left the CIA in frustration. Now her spy novel is racking up awards.
An interesting turn of events at the end. Good on the CIA for coming around to her. I will give you the spoiler alert in the excerpt here, *Buried lede: the CIA has employees who are writers!)
Even with that acclaim, Berry was still surprised when the CIA invited her to speak with Invisible Ink, a group of agency employees who are also writers.
“I was not exactly a poster child for the place,” Berry said. “But they assured me they valued authenticity over filtered plaudits, which were words I never thought I’d hear.”
Return
Last September, Berry was sitting in her car in the ocean of parking spaces sprawling outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. Even with her invitation, she felt “nervous as hell,” she said. “I did feel like it was a family reunion where I was estranged from my family.”
But Berry then met her agency contact, a member of Invisible Ink, who had asked her to come and speak. She was taken into a conference room where she spoke to about a dozen current agency staff members to discuss writing, publishing and working with the agency’s review board.
As she was leaving, Berry was asked to film a video about the career paths of officers after the agency. She agreed.
“This was such a formative part of my life,” she said. “They are people who have had that same singular experience as me.” Going back to the CIA, Berry said, “felt like I had rebuilt this broken bridge.”
In the meantime, she’s working away on a new novel. It’s another spy tale.
She left the CIA in frustration. Now her spy novel is racking up awards.
I.S. Berry scored rave reviews and awards for her literary debut, “The Peacock and the Sparrow,” a novel mined from her time at the CIA.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2024/05/16/is-berry-peacock-and-sparrow/?utm
By Kyle Swenson
May 16, 2024 at 6:00 a.m. EDT
Ilana Berry in front of a bullet-hole-riddled wall in Sarajevo, Bosnia, where she worked as an intelligence analyst for the Defense Department in 1999. (Family photo)
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She felt each boom like an electric jolt as she was trying to sleep in her Alexandria, Va., apartment.
It was August 2006, and Ilana Berry was then a 30-year-old Central Intelligence Agency case officer. Outside, construction crews were beginning work on the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, knocking down the old expanse to make way for a new six-lane roadway.
But each rumble threw Berry off the steady anchors of time and place, hurling her back to her last year stationed in war-rocked Baghdad. There, she had spent sleepless nights alone in a trailer as insurgent mortars and rockets screamed into the Green Zone, the central area of the Iraqi capital where the American military, diplomatic and intelligence staffs were housed.
“I remember waking up and having the worst panic attack of my life,” she recalled. “I called my parents to say that we are all under attack.”
To cope, Berry began tracking when the crews would do demolitions and set an alarm for herself to stay awake. She began writing, caging the emotional fallout of her time in Iraq into the tidy frames of sentences. That writing would kick off a sequence of events that would pit her against the agency’s bureaucracy and end in her resignation.
But it would also start her second act as a celebrated, award-winning novelist — one that would be eventually be invited back to the CIA.
War zone
Ilana Berry in Bahrain around 2012-2013. (Family photo)
Berry applied to join the CIA while attending law school at the University of Virginia, believing it would combine her interests in international relations and intelligence work with her sense of patriotic mission.
Raised outside D.C., she was a 1994 graduate of Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology. She spent time in the Balkans after graduating from Haverford College, an experience that led to a position as an intelligence analyst with the Defense Department. “I loved the work of intel, and I wanted to make it my career,” Berry said. “So the CIA is the place to go, right?”
After being accepted, she trained at Camp Peary near Williamsburg, Va., known as “The Farm.” Much of that training was about logistics — how to conduct surveillance, how to know if you are being surveilled. But the more in-depth psychological elements made Berry wonder if she was in the right place.
“Your whole training is basically how to find people’s vulnerabilities,” Berry said. “What are their motivations? Is it flattery or vanity or revenge, or do they hate their boss? That was never an easy fit for me.”
But Berry graduated with high marks and volunteered to be stationed in Iraq for a year-long assignment. She arrived in 2004 as doubts were beginning to stain America’s initial reasoning for toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime. Among the CIA team, there was a growing realization that there were no weapons of mass destruction in the country — the main justification for the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion.
Berry found that the CIA trailers didn’t have the armored protections or safety protocols in place like their military counterparts. But when she advised CIA headquarters about the danger, she was ignored, she said.
“We weren’t taking the precautions that we should have been,” Berry said. “And it was clear we knew we weren’t.”
One specific incident left Berry with doubts about the CIA’s mission. She got a tip from an Iraqi informant about a possible suspect involved in the 2003 truck bombing of the U.N. Baghdad headquarters that left 22 people dead, including the commissioner for human rights at the time. Berry’s tip led to the suspect being taken into custody, but he claimed he was not involved. Still, he was carted off to a detention facility. Berry later heard from other officers that they were unsure of his guilt, and she worries he may have been wrongfully pulled into the maze of America’s post-9/11 detention system.
In response to Berry’s allegations about her time in Iraq, a CIA agency spokesperson did not address specific complaints or allegations but said the agency “is absolutely committed to fostering a safe, respectful, and equitable workplace environment for all our employees, and we have taken significant steps to ensure that, including strengthening the Agency’s handling of issues when they arise.”
The living conditions. The murky mission. All that seemed to Berry to fuel rampant alcoholism at the CIA station. “Baghdad really screwed me up,” she said.
Back home
Her tour done but still living with the emotional aftershocks in Virginia, Berry kept writing. “My goal was never to publish my account of Baghdad,” she said. “It was to make sense of what happened.”
She had volunteered to go next to Afghanistan and was enrolled in Farsi-language classes. During that time, Berry volunteered to the agency that she had been writing about her experience.
According to agency regulation, all current and former CIA employees must submit any writing they plan on releasing to the CIA’s Publication Classification Review Board, which determines whether a potential book or screenplay or writing contains classified information. After the agency learned Berry was working on a memoir, she submitted the manuscript.
When her writing came back, it was covered in redactions that Berry felt made little sense. “They redacted my height and weight,” she said. “They redacted the color of the sky. These are clearly things that are not classified.”
Berry felt the pushback was all due to the unflattering light the account showed the agency. Her complaints in Iraq had already begun to hurt her prospects at the CIA. Her follow-up assignment in Afghanistan was pulled. She channeled her frustration into an appeal over her manuscript.
“I fought every single redaction, if for no other reason than to stick it to them that this was wrong,” she said.
Mark Zaid, a D.C. attorney who regularly represents CIA officers and helped Berry with her appeal, said he believes the board’s difficult responses were tied to the protective stance the agency assumed at the time. “There is a deep-seated paranoia and ignorance among security officers,” he said. “Their internal processes are geared for damage control, no matter whether there is damage or not.” Zaid later hired Berry into his law firm as an of counsel attorney.
In response to questions about Berry’s past conflicts with the review board, an agency spokesperson said the “CIA does not comment on details regarding specific prepublication reviews.” The spokesperson added that “the Board is open to authors’ requests to reconsider content they believe is unclassified.”
Eventually, the review board agreed with most of Berry’s appeal and removed most of the redactions from her manuscript.
By then, she had already resigned from agency, frustrated with the fight and her experiences in Iraq. She was married and a new mother. Though she had won the right to publish her account, she no longer wanted her own story — and the trauma and personal doubt she had put in writing — out there.
Write what you know
Despite her clash with agency, piling the mixed feelings about her time as a spy into a memoir reminded Berry how much she enjoyed writing. As she launched herself into a new career as an attorney and later followed her husband to Bahrain in 2012, Berry kept at it. Now it was fiction, but Berry found all her sentences echoed back to her time in Iraq.
The pages that would eventually become “The Peacock and the Sparrow,” a novel featuring a weary CIA officer caught in the turbines of Middle Eastern political change, include themes mined straight from Berry’s time at the agency. Its first lines plunge a reader into the morally ambiguous head space Berry learned in her training. “It was the ability to please that you learned as a spy: smoking a cigarette, offering compliments you didn’t mean, falling down drunk from having accepted too many vodkas,” Berry writes.
The novel’s CIA protagonist, Shane Collins, faces the same indifference from higher-ups that Berry said she saw in Iraq. She funneled the same problematic behavior she witnessed — the drinking, the war-zone infidelities — into her main character. The gnawing doubts about the guilt of the bombing suspect also popped up as a plot point.
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Perhaps the most surprising element in her new work as a novelist was how easy it was to submit the manuscript to the review board. They demanded no significant redactions.
“Time had passed, and I had built up a good relationship with the board,” Berry said.
Berry’s debut novel, “The Peacock and the Sparrow,” was released by Atria Books in May 2023 under the pen name I.S. Berry. The book was feted by both the New Yorker and NPR on their annual lists of the best books of the year. This month, the novel also won the Mystery Writers of America’s Edgar Allan Poe Award for best first novel by an American novelist, a significant industry award whose past recipients include Viet Thanh Nguyen and Tana French.
Even with that acclaim, Berry was still surprised when the CIA invited her to speak with Invisible Ink, a group of agency employees who are also writers.
“I was not exactly a poster child for the place,” Berry said. “But they assured me they valued authenticity over filtered plaudits, which were words I never thought I’d hear.”
(Atria)
Return
Last September, Berry was sitting in her car in the ocean of parking spaces sprawling outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. Even with her invitation, she felt “nervous as hell,” she said. “I did feel like it was a family reunion where I was estranged from my family.”
But Berry then met her agency contact, a member of Invisible Ink, who had asked her to come and speak. She was taken into a conference room where she spoke to about a dozen current agency staff members to discuss writing, publishing and working with the agency’s review board.
As she was leaving, Berry was asked to film a video about the career paths of officers after the agency. She agreed.
“This was such a formative part of my life,” she said. “They are people who have had that same singular experience as me.” Going back to the CIA, Berry said, “felt like I had rebuilt this broken bridge.”
In the meantime, she’s working away on a new novel. It’s another spy tale.
CORRECTION
A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that Berry visited Invisible Ink last February. It was last September. The article has been corrected.
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By Kyle Swenson
Kyle Swenson is a reporter with The Washington Post's social issues team. He previously worked at the New Times Broward-Palm Beach and Cleveland Scene. He is the author of "Good Kids, Bad City." Twitter
8. Incoming Taiwan president Lai to pledge steady approach to relationship with China
Incoming Taiwan president Lai to pledge steady approach to relationship with China
Yahoo · by Yimou LeeMay 17, 2024 at 7:03 PM·3 min read21Link Copied
By Yimou Lee
TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan's next president, Lai Ching-te, will pledge to secure stability by maintaining the status quo in the island's relationship with China in his inauguration speech on Monday, an incoming senior security official said.
Lai, who succeeds President Tsai Ing-wen after having been her vice president for the past four years, will have to deal with a China that has ramped up pressure - including almost daily military incursions near its airspace - on democratic Taiwan to accept its sovereignty, a claim strongly rejected by Taipei.
Lai, 64, has repeatedly offered to hold talks with China but has been rebuffed by Beijing, which has not renounced using force to bring Taiwan under its control. Lai and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) say only Taiwan's people can decide their future.
"We will talk about our stable and steady approach, continuing the fundamentals laid down by President Tsai," the incoming official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told a briefing in Taipei.
"We will make sure that Taiwan plays an indispensable role in the global economy and geopolitics while maintaining the status quo and working with all parties to ensure the status quo will not be eroded."
The official said, however, the new government will face a "more difficult and complex" reality at home and abroad because China has staged "more provocative" military incursions that have alarmed Taiwan on a daily basis and launched influence campaigns to split public opinion in Taiwan.
"We will continue to make it clear to the international society that it is the other side which keeps destroying international order and ruining the opportunities for cross-strait exchanges," the person said.
China's Taiwan Affairs Office, which this week said "Taiwan region's new leader" had to make a clear choice between peaceful development or confrontation, did not respond to a Reuters request for comment.
In the run-up to Lai's election victory in January, Beijing repeatedly denounced him as a supporter of formal independence for Taiwan, framing the vote as a choice between war and peace.
China says any move by Taiwan to declare formal independence would be grounds to attack the island. The government in Taipei says Taiwan is already an independent country, the Republic of China, and that it does not plan to change that. The Republican government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong's communists.
In the days leading up to Lai's inauguration, China has escalated its daily military activities, including staging mock attacks on foreign vessels near Taiwan, sources have previously told Reuters.
The incoming official said Lai will pledge to further modernise Taiwan's defence and continue programmes to manufacture its own military aircraft and ships.
"Our goal is to make sure a conflict will never happen," the official said.
Lai, widely known by his English name William, also faces a big domestic challenge given the DPP lost its parliamentary majority in the January election.
Lawmakers fought with each other in chaotic scenes in parliament on Friday as the two main opposition parties pressed ahead with controversial reforms to the chamber, including making false statements in the legislature a criminal offence.
Lai, writing on Facebook in the early hours of Saturday, called for "rational" debate so harmony can be restored and a consensus obtained.
(Reporting by Yimou Lee; Editing by Edwina Gibbs)
Yahoo · by Yimou LeeMay 17, 2024 at 7:03 PM·3 min read21Link Copied
9. Taiwan’s foreign minister says China and Russia are supporting each other's ‘expansionism’
Taiwan’s foreign minister says China and Russia are supporting each other's ‘expansionism’
AP · by SIMINA MISTREANU · May 17, 2024
Taiwan’s foreign minister says China and Russia are supporting each other’s ‘expansionism’
1 of 7 |Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu speaks during an interview with The Associated Press at his ministry in Taipei, Taiwan, Friday, May 17, 2024. (AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying)
CHRISTOPHER BODEEN
SIMINA MISTREANU
Mistreanu is a Greater China reporter for The Associated Press, based in Taipei, Taiwan. She has reported on China since 2015.
twittermailto
AP · by SIMINA MISTREANU · May 17, 2024
10. Taiwan is selling more to the US than China in major shift away from Beijing
Taiwan is selling more to the US than China in major shift away from Beijing
AP · May 17, 2024
WASHINGTON (AP) — Whether it’s tapioca balls or computer chips, Taiwan is stretching toward the United States and away from China — the world’s No. 2 economy that threatens to take the democratically ruled island by force if necessary.
That has translated to the world’s biggest maker of computer chips — which power everything from medical equipment to cellphones — announcing bigger investments in the U.S. last month after a boost from the Biden administration. Soon afterward, a Taiwanese semiconductor company said it was ending its two-decade-long run in mainland China amid a global race to gain the edge in the high-tech industry.
These changes at a time of an intensifying China-U.S. rivalry reflect Taiwan’s efforts to reduce its reliance on Beijing and insulate itself from Chinese pressure while forging closer economic and trade ties with the United States, its strongest ally. The shift also is taking place as China’s economic growth has been weak and global businesses are looking to diversify following supply chain disruptions during the pandemic.
In a stark illustration of the shift, the U.S. displaced mainland China as the top destination for Taiwan’s exports in the first quarter of the year for the first time since the start of 2016, when comparable data became available. The island exported $24.6 billion worth of goods to the U.S. in the first three months, compared with $22.4 billion to mainland China, according to Taiwan’s official data.
Meanwhile, the island’s investments in mainland China have fallen to the lowest level in more than 20 years, dropping nearly 40% to $3 billion last year from a year earlier, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs. Yet, Taiwan’s investments in the U.S. surged ninefold to $9.6 billion in 2023.
Washington and Taipei signed a trade agreement last year, and they’re now negotiating the next phase. U.S. lawmakers also have introduced a bill to end double taxes for Taiwanese businesses and workers in the U.S.
“Everything is motivated by ... a desire to build Taiwan’s deterrent capability and their resilience, all in support of maintaining the status quo and deterring China from being tempted to take ... action against Taiwan,” Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink said.
The world’s biggest computer chip maker, TSMC, announced last month that it would expand its U.S. investments to $65 billion. That came after the Biden administration pledged up to $6.6 billion in incentives that would put the company’s facilities in Arizona on track to produce about one-fifth of the world’s most advanced chips by 2030.
Apart from its U.S. investments, TSMC is putting money into Japan, a staunch U.S. supporter in the region. Foxconn, a Taiwanese conglomerate known for being Apple’s main contractor, is building manufacturing capacity in India, while Pegatron, another Taiwan business that makes parts of iPhones and computers, is investing in Vietnam.
King Yuan Electronics Corp., a Taiwanese company specializing in semiconductor testing and packaging, said last month that it would sell off its $670 million stake in a venture in the eastern Chinese city of Suzhou. KYEC cited geopolitics, the U.S. export ban on advanced chips to China and Beijing’s policy of seeking self-sufficiency in the technology.
“The ecological environment of semiconductor manufacturing in China has changed, and the market competition has become increasingly severe,” KYEC said in a statement.
Exports of semiconductors, electronic components and computer equipment from Taiwan to the U.S. more than tripled from 2018 to reach nearly $37 billion last year. It’s not just tech: The island more than tripled exports of tapioca and its substitute, key ingredients in boba milk tea, to the U.S. between 2018 and 2023 and is shipping more fruits, tree nuts and farmed fish.
The recent trade data reflect “the strategy from both Taiwan and the U.S. to reorient that trade in an effort to de-risk from China,” said Hung Tran, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.
The share of Taiwan’s exports to mainland China and Hong Kong fell from about 44% in 2020 to less than one-third in the first quarter of 2024. That was “a very big movement,” Tran said. “And I think that the share (of exports to mainland China and Hong Kong) will probably continue to decline.”
Since the 1990s, Beijing has tried to balance its claim over the island with favorable economic and trade policies, aiming to foster closer ties that could make it harder for Taiwan to break away.
When the independent-leaning Democratic Progressive Party gained power in Taiwan in 2016, the new government put forward a policy to distance the island from the mainland and boost economic ties with other countries in the region, especially in Southeast Asia. Unhappy Beijing turned to its economic leverage to try to bring Taiwan to heel.
It has restricted travel by mainland tourists to the island and suspended imports of Taiwanese seafood, fruits and snacks. In 2021, China banned Taiwan-grown pineapples over biosecurity concerns, devastating Taiwanese farmers whose exported fruit nearly all went to the mainland.
Ralph Cossa, president emeritus of the Honolulu-based foreign policy research institute Pacific Forum, said Beijing’s actions have helped push the island away.
Chinese President “Xi Jinping is tactically clever but strategically foolish in many of the decisions he has made; his loyalty tests on Taiwan businessmen and other heavy-handed business practices and decisions have been a major contributor to the success of Taiwan’s” policy to distance itself from China, he said.
And that policy will continue with Lai Ching-te, the island’s new president, Cossa said.
____
AP data reporter Aaron Kessler in Washington and videojournalist Johnson Lai in Taipei contributed.
AP · May 17, 2024
11. Ex-military surgeons embrace new mission: stop Americans from bleeding to death
Another contribution of the military, and in this cae military medicine (and more specifically special operations medicine) to the US and the world.
I listened to the whole blood presentation at the Special Operations Medical Association conference this past week. It was fascinating even for a non-medical professional.
And as an addition to the negative article on military medicane and rank - we should remember that these doctors developed these techniques not save high ranking officers but rather to save the lives of the young troops at the tip of the sphere.
Ex-military surgeons embrace new mission: stop Americans from bleeding to death
NBC News · by Cynthia McFadden, Kevin Monahan and Alexandra Chaidez
A movement to revolutionize the treatment of trauma patients in the U.S. can be traced to an infamous battle fought in East Africa more than 30 years ago.
Dr. John Holcomb was an Army trauma surgeon deployed to Somalia when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down over the city of Mogadishu in 1993. With dozens of soldiers bleeding out and no hospitals available, the head doctor told Holcomb to prepare for a “walking blood bank.”
“I had never heard of such a thing,” Holcomb recalled.
Dr. John Holcomb in Somalia in 1993.Courtesy Dr. John Holcomb
Members of the medical team laid down, rolled up their sleeves and soon their blood was being delivered directly to wounded soldiers. The medical staff then got up and continued working.
That experience, which demonstrated how getting blood to trauma patients as quickly as possible saves lives, left a lasting impression. Holcomb is now among a group of former military surgeons on a mission to make blood available to patients in those critical moments when they’re en route to a hospital.
Currently, 99% of rescue services in the U.S. don’t stock their ambulances and helicopters with blood. The result: tens of thousands of people bleed out each year from injuries they could have survived, medical experts say.
Dr. John Holcomb sits in an ambulance that carries whole blood on board.Meridith Kohut for NBC News
“The difference between life and death in most trauma cases is what happens before patients get here,” said Holcomb, a trauma surgeon with the University of Alabama, Birmingham (UAB). “If they arrive alive, our chances of saving them are excellent.”
Even though ample research supports Holcomb’s position, the obstacles to outfitting rescue vehicles with blood are formidable. The primary one comes down to money. Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance don’t pay for blood until patients get inside the hospital, and the ambulance companies generally say they are unable to bear the cost without cutting back on other services.
But in the last decade, Holcomb and a group of former military doctors, medics and nurses — who call themselves the “whole blood mafia” — have used persuasion and persistence to increase the number of communities where rescue vehicles carry blood.
Dr. John Holcomb and Eric Bank with Harris County Emergency Services demonstrate how blood and plasma can be administered in a properly equipped ambulance.Meridith Kohut for NBC News
In 2016, the number was zero. Now, it includes 152 emergency medical service agencies in 23 states, according to Dr. Randall Schaefer, a retired Army trauma nurse and steering committee member of the Prehospital Blood Transfusion Initiative Coalition.
It still amounts to only 1% of all the rescue services in the country, but the doctors leading the charge are not the type who give up easily.
“Through individual efforts we are making gains, but it’s really slow,” said Dr. Jeffrey Kerby, a former Air Force trauma surgeon who is now the head of trauma surgery at UAB and the chair of the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma.
“It would be accelerated to an incredible degree,” he added, if the insurance providers would reimburse for the use of blood in rescue vehicles.
“If we can just get them to focus on this one treatment, that will have such an impact on lives saved,” Kerby said.
He puts the number at about 40,000. Holcomb estimates it could save the lives of at least 60,000 people. “And that’s conservative,” he said.
Dr. Jeffrey Kerby is a former Air Force trauma surgeon.Courtesy Dr. Jeffrey Kerby
A ‘magical’ treatment
Trauma is the No. 1 cause of death in the U.S. for people between the ages of 1 and 45. Numerous medical studies conclude that no other single intervention has a greater impact on survival than a patient getting blood prior to their arrival at a hospital.
Yet, the overwhelming majority of ambulances and rescue helicopters in the U.S. administer crystalloid, a version of saline water, to bleeding patients. Holcomb argues that crystalloid is not just a poor substitute for blood — it can do more harm than good.
“The data says this very clearly,” Holcomb said. “Not only is crystalline ineffective in a bleeding patient, it can cause severe complications.”
Eric Bank demonstrates how blood can be administered in a properly equipped ambulance.Meridith Kohut for NBC News
Whole blood transfusions were common until the 1970s when component parts — platelets, plasma, red blood cells — became the only readily available products. That was largely because blood banks could serve more patients, particularly those suffering from cancer, by breaking down the blood. Selling component parts could also be good for business.
Even today, whole blood is only available at 50% of the nation’s trauma hospitals.
But the experience of the former trauma surgeons on the battlefield showed them the value of whole blood transfusions. And when they returned home, they began pushing to make it more available in the individual communities where they settled, places like Katy, Texas, and at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.
“There is a whole group of doctors, nurses and medics who’ve seen this with our own eyes,” Holcomb said. “They’ve seen patients come back from death’s doorstep, white, pale, bleeding to death. They give them whole blood and they see them come to life in front of you.”
Among the first places to have an integrated whole blood program was San Antonio, which has become a model for the rest of the nation.
The story of how it came to be begins in 2001 when Dr. Donald Jenkins was an Air Force trauma surgeon stationed on a desert island off the coast of Oman.
He was there to provide medical support for the U.S. air base. But his responsibilities changed dramatically when the U.S. invaded Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.
“We had to prepare to care for up to 50 simultaneous casualties,” Jenkins said.
He had read about using whole blood — as opposed to platelets or plasma — for trauma patients but had no training in it. “It was not a thing,” he said.
The arrival of the wounded soldiers posed a serious challenge. With few other options, Jenkins pulled out from his back pocket a “NATO emergency war surgery handbook,” which described how to administer whole blood, a section co-written by Holcomb.
“We did it literally on the fly in the desert with no experience, no guidance outside of that that had been written basically in World War II,” Jenkins said. But the results were “magical.”
Dr. Donald Jenkins, second from left, training with South African defense forces.Courtesy Dr. Donald Jenkins
Some 15 years later, Jenkins led the effort to get blood onto rescue vehicles in San Antonio. He did so by coming up with a novel approach to overcome the lack of insurance reimbursement.
The city or county that oversees the EMS system pays the upfront cost — about $500 — of getting a unit of blood and must put up the money to buy refrigeration units to keep it cold on board. But if it goes unused and has been properly maintained, they can exchange it for a brand-new bag of blood – universal donor type O – at no cost.
The system takes a similar approach to tackle another hurdle: where to get the blood in the first place. Blood donation centers signed on to a plan in which they provide blood to rescue services, and if it goes unused for two weeks, the blood can be returned. If it is deemed safe after testing, then it goes to the area trauma center.
“And we have another three weeks of shelf life to be able to use it,” said Jenkins, a trauma surgeon with University Health and professor at UT Health San Antonio, who noted that the rate of blood waste is under 1%.
Since its inception, Jenkins estimates that the program has saved the lives of at least 2,000 people.
One of those is a 12-year-old girl named Mayah Zamora. She was in the fourth grade at Robb Elementary in Uvalde when a mass shooter opened fire in her school in May 2022. Mayah suffered gunshot wounds to her chest, arm and hands, but she was one of the lucky ones. The rescue helicopter that flew her to University Hospital in San Antonio gave her blood on the way.
After 66 days and 20 surgeries, she left the hospital and returned to normal life. Without the whole blood transfusion in the helicopter, she would not have made it, her doctors said.
A prehospital blood transfusion also saved the life of a 6-year-old Florida girl last January.
Izzy Niemczyk, 6, is wheeled to an ambulance on Jan. 19.Courtesy Neal Niemczyk
About a week after she received a tonsillectomy, Izzy Niemczyk started spitting up blood. Then she fainted in her father’s arms. A clot had burst, and she was bleeding out. Her father, Neal Niemczyk, who was the district chief for the Palm Beach County Fire Department, checked her vitals and immediately called 911.
“Make sure they bring whole blood,” he told the 911 dispatcher, according to a recording reviewed by NBC News.
The county had launched the program in April 2022, and Niemczyk was intimately familiar with it.
Izzy received a transfusion in the ambulance, with both of her worried parents looking on.
“I am not kidding you when I tell you 30 seconds after that first pump, she went from being unconscious to being alert and looking around,” Niemczyk said. “That’s when I knew everything was gonna be fine.”
“It’s remarkable what it can do. It truly is,” he added. “I’m thankful that I live in Palm Beach County Fire rescue zone and that we were there that day.”
Neal Niemczyk with his 6-year-old daughter, Izzy.NBC News
But the overwhelming majority of Americans live in places where rescue vehicles are not equipped with any blood at all. Kerby, the head of trauma surgery at UAB, said he’s especially worried about the 40 million who live more than an hour away from a trauma center.
He pulled up a map on his computer that illustrated the areas where there is no such medical facility. Vast areas of the country, particularly in the South and West, were covered in dark blue, representing those places nowhere near a trauma center.
“If that was a map of your cellphone service, people would be losing their minds,” he said.
Dr. Jeffrey Kerby with maps showing the locations of trauma centers.NBC News
So Kerby and the other “whole blood mafia” members press on, eager to provide information to any community interested in making blood available in its rescue vehicles.
In just the last two months, ambulances began carrying blood in counties in North Carolina, West Virginia and Pennsylvania. Several more municipalities are now poised to do so in Georgia and elsewhere.
But in some places the bureaucratic hurdles are steep. At least a handful of states have laws that prohibit paramedics from administering blood on their own. And the insurance issue remains a significant barrier everywhere.
The trauma doctors leading the charge for whole blood are pushing for a move away from the “transport not treatment” model for ambulances. Schaefer, the former combat nurse, is working to gather research to present to Congress and federal agencies later this year.
Dr. John Holcomb, a former Army trauma surgeon, with an ambulance equipped with whole blood in Katy, Texas.Meridith Kohut for NBC News; Courtesy Dr. John Holcomb
After serving as an Army trauma surgeon for 23 years, Holcomb still thinks about the soldiers who lost their lives in Somalia but could have been saved had more blood been available.
“Nobody comes home from the battlefield the same. We all come home different in some way,” he said, his voice low and somber. “And I think one of the things that many docs, nurses and medical students do is they take that experience and try to turn some good.”
Cynthia McFadden
Cynthia McFadden is the senior legal and investigative correspondent for NBC News.
Kevin Monahan
Kevin Monahan is a producer for the NBC News Investigative Unit.
Alexandra Chaidez
Alexandra Chaidez is an associate producer with the NBC News Investigative Unit
NBC News · by Cynthia McFadden, Kevin Monahan and Alexandra Chaidez
12. China’s gray zone social media war comes to America
Chinese political warfare (unrestricted warfare, three warfare). Can we keep up? CAn we compete? Can we defend ourselves?
China’s gray zone social media war comes to America - Asia Times
A possible proportionate US response would be to target a weak spot of the CCP regime: its fear of losing legitimacy
asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · May 18, 2024
China employs various “gray zone” tactics – moderately aggressive actions that are not egregious enough to provoke conventional military retaliation – against multiple adversaries. One such tactic is deployed within the United States: undeclared influence operations through social media.
Chinese government-linked activity has recently become more worrisome. Previously the principal danger was People’s Republic of China (PRC) propaganda lulling the US into uncritical acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) foreign policy agenda. Now, the Chinese government is adding its weight to the forces tearing at America’s national fabric from the inside.
Until recently, the main thrust of PRC-sponsored messaging aimed at Americans through social media was to cultivate a positive image of China and its current government and to promote Beijing’s point of view on China-related controversies such as Taiwan’s political relationship with China, Chinese treatment of Uighurs and Tibetans, and the restriction of civil liberties in Hong Kong.
The content of social media posts was similar to what Chinese diplomats based in the US were saying when they gave public speeches and TV interviews or wrote editorials for newspapers.
This contrasted with the messaging promoted by the Russian government, which generally disparaged the US government and amplified highly divisive US domestic social and political issues, suggesting the Russian goal was to foment political instability in America.
This seemed consistent with the respective Russian and Chinese relationships with the US. Vladimir Putin wanted to hurt the United States. He held deep grudges over
- the loss of Russia’s great power status in the 1990s;
- humiliating US treatment of Russia through the expansion of NATO and disregard for Russian sensibilities as America waged conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Syria;
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the publication in 2016 of the so-called Panama Papers, which Putin said was an attempt by the US government to embarrass him; and
- US sanctions against Russia for its annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Putin likely would welcome an American fall into anarchy and economic collapse.
China, on the other hand, needed Americans to continue buying Chinese goods, educating Chinese students and transferring cutting-edge technology to China. Hence the goal of Chinese strategic messaging was to defeat any threats to business as usual with the United States.
The attempt to foster positive US attitudes toward China has continued. During the 2022 election campaign in the United States, PRC-linked entities promulgated messaging supportive of China-friendly candidates in a few electoral races. TikTok has promoted short videos to millions of its users that support the PRC propaganda lines about Xinjiang and other controversial political issues.
But now there is an even darker aspect of PRC messaging.
The US director of national intelligence notes “growing [PRC] efforts to actively exploit perceived US societal divisions,” through which “the PRC aims to sow doubts about US leadership [and] undermine democracy.”
According to Clint Watts, general manager of Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center, “More recently, [PRC government] efforts have shifted to exploiting existing partisan divides in the US,” including “the Chinese actually going into US audience spaces, masquerading as Americans and posting inflammatory content around current events or social issues or political issues.”
A report by Microsoft published in April 2024 found efforts by the PRC to “spread conspiratorial narratives on multiple social media platforms.” Accounts that appear to be CCP-affiliated “post about divisive US domestic issues such as global warming, US border policies, drug use, immigration and racial tensions.”
As an example, these posts said the deadly August 2023 wildfires in Maui, Hawaii resulted from the US military testing a “weather weapon.” Chinese-linked accounts also published speculation that the US government caused the derailment of a train in Kentucky in November 2023 and was “hiding something” in the aftermath.
Microsoft concluded that the apparent objective of such posts is “encouraging mistrust of and disillusionment with the US government.” In another report also published in April 2024, Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center assessed that Chinese government-sponsored social media activity “aims to destabilize” the US and other democracies.
The change in the content of PRC-promoted messaging in the social media that Americans consume has two important drivers.
The first was the coronavirus pandemic. Just before the virus began to severely impact the United States in early 2020, US President Donald Trump was praising the Chinese government for its counter-pandemic response and touting a bilateral agreement that was supposed to end the “trade war” and restore normalcy to US-China trade relations.
As US fatalities mounted, however, Trump blamed China for unleashing a “plague” on the US. The PRC government responded by ratcheting up its criticism of the US government.
Chinese officials and government-controlled media not only decried the botched management of the pandemic in the US but extended the critique to add the argument that America’s political system is broken and that the US does not deserve a role in global leadership. Heavier emphasis on these themes in PRC strategic communication became a new norm.
A second boost came from Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine that started in February 2022. The war pulled China into stronger diplomatic support for its “no limits” quasi-ally. This has led to closer alignment between Russian and Chinese propaganda messaging. The Chinese government, for example, repeats the Russian position that NATO is responsible for causing the war.
As the conflict in Ukraine has deepened the sense among the democracies of an increasingly dangerous authoritarian bloc, Russia and China are further incentivized to work to delegitimize US influence and the international appeal of the liberal political model that threatens both Xi Jinping and Putin.
Researchers have found large numbers of China-linked social media accounts spreading pro-Trump and anti-Biden messaging, suggesting that China prefers Trump over Biden as the next US president.
For the Russian government, there is no question which of the two major party presidential candidates in the upcoming US election is preferable. Trump has consistently maintained a friendly and respectful stance toward Putin and often criticized US aid for Ukraine as well as the NATO alliance.
For Beijing, however, the question is more complicated.
Biden has major predictable downsides for the PRC. He would continue to frustrate Chinese desires for freer access to US markets and technology. The Biden administration maintained the Trump-era tariffs against Chinese imports and restricted China’s access to advanced technologies. Biden’s team has also repaired and strengthened US alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, obstructing PRC domination.
But Trump is a wild card for China. The Chinese like that he is transactional and seems to lack either a strategic or ideological vision demanding a US policy of what the Chinese would call “containment.” Trump is respectful toward Xi and has sometimes uncritically absorbed CCP views such as “Korea actually used to be a part of China.”
On the other hand, Trump brought advisors into the White House during his first term who dramatically toughened US policy toward China. Trump himself has at times harshly criticized China, as during the pandemic. He recently said he might increase tariffs on Chinese imports into the US to over 60%. At his worst, Trump might be worse for China than Biden.
Has the top leadership in Beijing now decided that China’s interests are best served if America descended into chaos? That is unlikely given that CCP officials continue to emphasize that their wish is for Washington to stop worrying about national security and allow China maximum opportunity to extract wealth and know-how.
But they also want Americans to feel less confident in promoting the liberal democratic model of governance worldwide. Chinese leaders want to fortify their country against demands for political liberalization.
This is part of the reason why the PRC government keeps harping on the importance of the “Bali consensus” in US-China relations. According to Beijing, this “consensus” is a list of five policy renunciations that Biden agreed to during his meeting with Xi in Bali in 2022, one of them his assurance that “the United States does not seek to change China’s system.” (There is no parallel list of policies that China renounces in the Chinese summary of the meeting, and the US official readout does not include a list of five US renunciations.)
That the Chinese government is involved in such a campaign is both ironic and expected.
It is ironic because Beijing so often and so strenuously insists that “China never interferes in the affairs of other countries.” PRC officials specifically deny that China ever has or ever will attempt to influence the US electoral process, saying the accusation indicates American “paranoia” and a penchant for “slinging mud at China to divert attention” from US governance failures.
Yet a surreptitious Chinese attempt to subvert an adversary’s government is not surprising, because the Chinese government is itself obsessed with the danger of subversion. The 2013 internal PRC government memo Document No 9 summarizes the Xi regime’s fear of “Western anti-China forces” overthrowing China’s political system by smuggling in liberal ideas and values.
The document emphasizes that CCP authorities must “ensure that the media leadership is always firmly controlled by someone who maintains an identical ideology with the Party’s Central Committee” and “allow absolutely no opportunity or outlets for incorrect thinking or viewpoints to spread.”
PRC leaders and government-controlled media speak often of the threat posed by “color revolutions” and routinely blame “hostile foreign forces” or “black hands” for causing unrest within China that actually results from discontent with Chinese colonization or CCP repression.
If the Chinese government thinks subversion from the outside is potentially effective, Beijing will not fail to employ the same tactic against its own adversaries.
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The many broken promises from PRC officials, including Xi, to behave ethically in international affairs demonstrate bad faith and cynicism. To dissuade Beijing from continuing to meddle in American politics, a US response is justified.
As with other Chinese gray zone operations, however, hitting back is problematic. The PRC does not have real elections or open debate about domestic political issues, and the social media outlets that the PRC exploits to reach American audiences are banned in China.
A possible proportionate US response would be to target a weak spot of the ruling regime: its fear of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese public.
Xi’s government has already suffered a decrease in prestige because of widespread public pessimism about the government’s ability to successfully manage China’s economy, plus fresh bad memories of the government’s counter-Covid policy, which included draconian lockdowns followed by acquiescence to a mass die-off.
In 2012, a New York Times article documented the immense wealth built up by family members of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao. The expose clearly jabbed a raw nerve in Zhongnanhai; the Chinese government scrambled to censor the story and discussion of it, officially called it false and later expelled a New York Times reporter as retaliation.
Current top-ranking Chinese leaders are similarly vulnerable to damaging revelations about their personal hypocrisy (such as, for example, sending their children to colleges in the United States) from a credible foreign source.
In normal times, the US could disregard Chinese social media influence operations as insignificant. Unfortunately, this Chinese push occurs at a time when US domestic politics are highly polarized, conspiracy theories are widely believed and procedures and institutions vital to the proper functioning of US democracy are under stress.
PRC interference reinforces harmful trends that already have momentum. Under such circumstances, this malign influencing activity might contribute to outcomes that not only would be bad for America but that even Beijing might regret.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.
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asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · May 18, 2024
13. Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking
A long read.
Excerpt:
I train a historian’s microscope on some of the inner deliberations in past episodes. By recovering a few glimpses of other times in which there were rapid recalculations, quick turns, and surprises, we gain humility and better sift the possibilities now.
I start by introducing the challenge of gauging serious risks in the past, focusing on an oft-forgotten crisis involving Yugoslavia in 1951. I next explain what the anti-American partnerships tend to have in common. I review the twisty and surprising way that the original “Axis” developed into 1941. I then summarize the interactions that led to war with the United States, a war that the Axis powers had hoped to avoid, or at least postpone, when 1941 began. I also summarize how the anti-American partnership solidified and worked in the period of maximum danger of World War III, between 1948 and the end of 1962. Recalling these experiences conditions us for possible recalculations by U.S. adversaries and painful shocks.
Vol 7, Iss 3 Summer 2024
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Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking
https://tnsr.org/2024/05/confronting-another-axis-history-humility-and-wishful-thinking/
tnsr.org · by Philip Zelikow · May 16, 2024
It is not yet clear when and how the present-day crisis will resolve.
We are in an exceptionally volatile, dynamic, and unstable period of world history. During the next two or three years, the situation will probably settle more durably in one direction or another: wider war or uneasy peace. There is a serious possibility of worldwide warfare. Because of the variety of contingencies and outcomes, some involving nuclear arsenals, this period could be more difficult to gauge and more dangerous for the United States than the prior two episodes.
I train a historian’s microscope on some of the inner deliberations in past episodes. By recovering a few glimpses of other times in which there were rapid recalculations, quick turns, and surprises, we gain humility and better sift the possibilities now.
I start by introducing the challenge of gauging serious risks in the past, focusing on an oft-forgotten crisis involving Yugoslavia in 1951. I next explain what the anti-American partnerships tend to have in common. I review the twisty and surprising way that the original “Axis” developed into 1941. I then summarize the interactions that led to war with the United States, a war that the Axis powers had hoped to avoid, or at least postpone, when 1941 began. I also summarize how the anti-American partnership solidified and worked in the period of maximum danger of World War III, between 1948 and the end of 1962. Recalling these experiences conditions us for possible recalculations by U.S. adversaries and painful shocks.
In the past, these changes occurred for reasons that outsiders often did not understand or expect. Enemy leaders changed course, sometimes sharply, as they saw successes or reverses in other parts of the world. This suggests that the outcome of the war in Ukraine might strongly affect the wider course of world history.
Assessing the anti-American coalition today, I look at the Chinese vision for peaceful coexistence. Rather than treat this as an analogy to the era of Cold War detente in the early 1970s, it may be more useful to recall the vision of “peaceful coexistence” that Nikita Khrushchev articulated during the late 1950s, which was a prelude to heightened confrontation.
I fear that the legacy of American success in its past global confrontations can encourage wishful thinking now. I note how different America’s circumstances and capabilities are today, as it balances the danger of simultaneous conflicts worldwide. The most serious risks may be those that place the burden on America to escalate in a crisis, in these changed circumstances. I illustrate this point in the Taiwan context.
A frequent answer to such dilemmas is to engage in wishful thinking, usually a call for general American rearmament and reinvigorated power projection. But, absent another great shock, these plans are unlikely to be enacted soon enough and would take a number of years to bear fruit, even if they are well conceived. And, precisely because some allied movements to build up arsenals have gotten underway, the period of maximum danger may be in the short term — the coming one, two, or three years. U.S. and allied leaders should concentrate on how they will cope with forces more readily available. Since the worst case would be a traumatic defeat, U.S. leaders will need to develop more practical plans than seem evident now, with some potentially painful tradeoffs.
I call attention to the neglected significance of economic deterrent tools, amid so much attention to military instruments. Since use of the military instruments will cause economic calamity anyway, there is no good reason not to give much more attention to these economic tools.
I’m relatively optimistic over the medium and long term, but deeply worried about the challenge of getting through the next few years.
A Serious Possibility: The Promise and Peril of Gauging Risk
On Tuesday, March 20, 1951, the CIA’s new board of national estimates, then led by William Langer and Sherman Kent, distributed a new national intelligence estimate. It was on the “Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951.”
Both the Soviet government and the CIA analysts who were studying it foresaw that such an invasion of Yugoslavia could lead to the intervention of the Western powers. And as everyone understood, this would risk general war.
Tracking evident military preparations, the CIA’s board of national estimates came to believe the Soviets and their satellites had laid the groundwork for an invasion of Yugoslavia. But they saw no indication of timing or imminence. So, led by Langer and Kent, they concluded, “Although it is impossible to determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility.”
Langer and Kent were historians. One of the more eminent world historians in the country, Langer had taught at Harvard and would return there. Kent had taught at Yale and would remain at the CIA. Both were already deeply experienced in wartime political and military analysis, in the Office of Strategic Services and after.
Later that week, Kent strolled from CIA headquarters, which was then in downtown DC, over to the State Department to discuss this estimate with Paul Nitze, the director of policy planning. Kent recalled that Nitze asked, “What did you people mean by the expression ‘serious possibility’? What kind of odds did you have in mind?”
Kent replied, “I told him that my personal estimate was on the dark side, namely that the odds were around 65 to 35 [percent] in favor of an attack.” Nitze “was somewhat jolted by this; he and his colleagues had read ‘serious possibility’ to mean odds very considerably lower.”
The Soviet invasion didn’t happen and the danger was largely forgotten. Kent’s worry about the “dark side” became rueful anecdote. However, he was closer to the mark than he knew.
To me, a serious possibility of worldwide warfare may be only in the 20–30 percent range. But that assessment is not reassuring.
Two months before he helped write the National Intelligence Estimate, in January 1951, there had been a top-secret conference in Moscow. The American analysts had known nothing of it. There, Stalin had told key leaders, including from satellite countries, to prepare urgently, on a crash basis, to invade Yugoslavia. He told them to prepare for the possibility of general war.
So, as it turns out, the Soviet bloc preparations in 1951 and 1952 were very real. Historians still do not know why the Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia did not happen.
Stalin may have been deterred. NATO had, after all, reacted strongly to the “serious possibility.” Washington had rushed massive U.S. military aid to Yugoslavia. That was quite a remarkable and rapid move, and a somewhat shocking one as it was in aid of a communist dictatorship. Some analysts had advised against such Yugoslav aid. They had worried that such aid might provoke the Soviet invasion. But the policy went ahead. NATO also prepared its own contingency military plans for a Yugoslav war, centering on the Ljubljana Gap (in present-day Slovenia). The plans included contingencies for possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons. Soviet agents may have been aware of these plans.
In 1951, as the U.S. government looked around at other dangers beyond Korea, there was only one main vector for possible enemy escalation. It was in Europe. In 2024, the situation is more complicated. Today, my measure of “serious possibility” is more Nitze’s than Kent’s. To me, a serious possibility of worldwide warfare may be only in the 20–30 percent range. But that assessment is not reassuring.
Today the United States has to examine at least four main vectors for enemy escalation. These could involve Russia, China, Iran (including Israel), and North Korea, on their own or linked in some way.
The Ties that Sometimes Bind
All three of the major anti-American partnerships during the last hundred years were founded on a common core. In each case, the partners believe that the United States is the leader or anchor of a domineering imperial or neo-imperial system. They believe this hegemonic system strains in every way to block or strangle their nation’s aspirations. They rally others to their cause, to the resistance, others who also feel oppressed.
That is the core. Beyond that core, though, the partnerships may not have any master plan or planners. Historically, the partners rarely trusted each other. They often do not even like each other.
Historical analogies are only useful for suggesting what is possible, not what is probable. They are better for opening minds with questions, not for closing minds with presumed answers. Recalling this history of past anti-American partnerships illustrates opportunism, constant strategic calculation and recalculation, divided counsels, and the potential for quick, dramatic changes.
The American view of the history draws a clear separation between the Axis powers of the 1930s and 1940s and the Communist bloc during the high Cold War. Yet U.S. adversaries see these conflicts differently.
From their point of view these sets of struggles had a lot of continuity. To them, in both cases strange bedfellows got together to resist domineering imperialists, to achieve true independence, and gain control of, or at least a rightful share in running, the reigning world order. That is why many in India sympathize with their countrymen who joined Imperial Japan to fight Britain. And, today, many in South Africa (and India) sympathize with their old friends, the Russians.
The anti-imperialists, the anti-hegemonists, all focus on America as the anchor and symbol of what they resent — the supposed confinement, power wrapped in pieties, opposing national assertion by new great powers. In the 1930s and 1950s, the British and French empires shared this role as objects of resentment and targets for revolution. Like the old, the new anti-hegemonists all glorify war and sacrifice in their public culture.
The anti-American leaders like Putin and Xi do not have as much personal experience of war and violence as leaders like Adolf Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong, or Benito Mussolini did (though there are some exceptions in Iran). The new generation of anti-American leaders are feeling their way. They are trying out a manner of behavior, an attitude that they have read about, perhaps admired, and certainly wondered about. They are wondering if it is their historical mission to usher in a new age of what they may think of as necessary violence. We in America, for our part, are trying to keep such a new age at bay.
By 1933, there were four major powers who resented the prevailing world order. Japan had launched a limited war against China in 1931, expanded it in 1932–33, and expanded it to all-out war in 1937.
It was Italy that then followed Japan’s lead in starting a war for new empire. After the bloody conquest of Ethiopia, it was Italy that became the Spanish fascists’ heavyweight ally in the Spanish Civil War, though the Germans supplied an air contingent.
Late to rearm, the Germans were latecomers to the fight against the prevailing world powers. The Soviets, who shared such grievances, bided their time and, in 1939, put their support up for bids.
Back then, common resentments did not necessarily cement the core. The old Axis was slow to come together tightly. They never were that close in the practical dimensions of defense-industrial cooperation, though the German-Soviet industrial partnership was important while it lasted.
For their part, it was Britain and France who thought Germany would be deterred. They had evidence that the German high command thought it would lose a new war against Britain and France.
By contrast, today in 2024, key countries in the anti-American partnership have been working quite closely together in defense-industrial cooperation — extending across Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. They have now been cooperating for a longer time, and in more ways, than was the case among any of the future Axis countries of the 1930s.
In the old Axis, there was plenty of distrust. The Italians generally disliked the Germans. They had recently fought them in the Great War. Italy had its own aspirations, both in Africa and in the Adriatic/Mediterranean world. Mussolini remained neutral when European war began in 1939. Japan was neutral too.
When Germany invaded Poland, that plan had been hatched exclusively in Berlin. It didn’t have a long gestation. Poland had been friendly toward Hitler in 1938. But it would not become a German satellite. Hitler settled on an invasion plan against Poland in the spring of 1939.
That same spring, Italy had its own plans. It moved across the Adriatic to invade Albania.
For their part, it was Britain and France who thought Germany would be deterred. They had evidence that the German high command thought it would lose a new war against Britain and France. Their evidence was accurate. Some top generals even plotted to kill Hitler to prevent such a suicidal war. Yet, though he paused for a few days after getting the news from Italy and realizing that the British and French were determined, Hitler was not deterred.
As the Axis was taking shape and war loomed in 1939, Britain and France did maneuver to try to win the Soviet Union over to their side. The French were serious. But the British were not. The Soviets were not. And the Poles, with their history, wanted nothing to do with the Soviet Union or the Red Army.
The British of 1939 treated the negotiation of such an alliance with the Soviet Union as play-acting. The British hoped their play-acting with the Soviets might actually be an inducement for Hitler. They hoped it might persuade Hitler to make another deal (Munich-style) that might avert war at Poland’s expense. They hoped Hitler would accept their invitation to send Hermann Goering to London to make this deal with Neville Chamberlain. Instead, Hitler sent Joachim von Ribbentrop to Moscow.
When Germany invaded Poland, its closest partner was the Soviet Union. Moscow had a more active partnership with Hitler, economically and militarily, than Rome or Tokyo did. The Soviet Union supplied vital raw materials. Germany, in return, provided a wish list of advanced military designs and manufactured goods.
Stalin was not naïve about Hitler. But, as Stalin explained to his colleagues at the time, he was coming to regard the Nazi leader as a strategic partner in a wider effort for the ‘have-nots’ to take down the great European powers, including the British Empire.
Stalin felt he also had to oppose the Japanese imperialists. The Soviet Union fought two border wars with Japan in 1938 and 1939 and was a key arms supplier for Nationalist China. Until 1938, Nationalist China’s other key arms supplier was Nazi Germany. This made sense to both the Soviets and the Germans. After all, Nationalist China then regarded itself as a kindred revolutionary and anti-imperialist state, opposing predations from Japanese and British imperial interests.
The other revisionist powers, Italy and Japan, remained carefully neutral until June 1940, when France fell. That event reshaped the emergent Axis. It is when Italy fully joined Germany. Italy then took a piece of France and turned its attentions to Greece. Italy did this without Germany’s interest or approval. Germany then had to conquer all the Balkan countries who were not already its allies, and intervene in north Africa, as Italy got in trouble and German oil in Romania seemed threatened by British moves toward the Balkans.
Japan joined what had become an “Axis,” but it did not join the war. Stalin used his partnership with Hitler to neutralize the Japanese threat to the Soviet Union. In exchange for a treaty of neutrality with Japan, Stalin cut off his assistance to China.
The whole story, from 1937 through June 1941, was then one where there was a revisionist core. Yet that core then was looser and less harmonized than the one that exists now.
Thus, in the autumn of 1940, it appeared that the Axis might coalesce to include all four of these major powers. In November 1940, Stalin agreed to Germany’s proposal that the Soviet Union become the fourth major Axis power. He had conditions in Europe (to do with Finland, Bulgaria, and the Dardanelles), the Middle East (from the trans-Caucasus to the Persian Gulf), and Japan (north Sakhalin). Japan and Italy were generally supportive.
The last two concessions were a good fit for German plans, but Hitler would not make further concessions in Europe. Hitler did not engage with Stalin’s requests. Hitler’s high command, particularly the Army staff, had offered him plans that promised a rapid defeat of the Soviet Union. Hitler endorsed them.
So, the final form of the “Axis” crystallized only in 1941. The potential Axis had split. But no one in the free world could take credit for that.
The whole story, from 1937 through June 1941, was then one where there was a revisionist core. Yet that core then was looser and less harmonized than the one that exists now. Its leaders displayed a capacity for strategic opportunism, wishful thinking, rapid turnabouts, and decisive action.
That sort of twisty plotline played out again in its last great chapter of maneuver, the choices that led to war against the United States.
The Choices to Attack America
The Axis, against old empires and creators of new ones, thought they had to throw off and balance American economic and cultural power and be able to confront its military power if that materialized. They also disliked the Roosevelt administration.
But the Axis powers all respected American industrial potential. They hoped America would decide to stay in its hemisphere and mind its own business. They were not sure just when or whether they should do anything that would bring the United States into the war. Thus, though each side started from a posture of basic hostility, they had to make new choices. The United States decided to arm Germany’s enemies. And it decided not to abandon beleaguered China.
In the neutral U.S. government of 1941, no one seriously contemplated any political outreach to Hitler. Instead, Franklin D. Roosevelt did try hard to find an accommodation with Japan. His efforts in the first half of 1941 were entirely fruitless. In July, emboldened by German successes, Japan moved into southern Indochina. The United States cut off vital oil supplies.
At all times Japan was prepared to negotiate about Indochina. It was even prepared to forego the great plans for the southward advance into resource-rich British and Dutch colonies. But Japan was not prepared to yield its domination of China.
When Konoe’s government failed in its diplomacy with America, the Japanese recalculated again. An entirely new cabinet took power in October 1941. It had a new prime minister and yet another foreign minister. Tokyo redoubled its efforts, diplomatically and militarily. The new government decided that it would either conclude a deal by the end of November — even a temporary one — or it would go to war.
Yet for the United States, that determination created an acute global dilemma. The United States had prioritized Germany as the likely main enemy. Its strategy for Japan was deterrence. By October 1941, it became more and more apparent that the U.S. deterrent strategy might fail. So Roosevelt seriously considered a temporary deal to relax sanctions on Japan, at China’s expense.
The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy supported such a deal, if only to buy time. They feared they might be embroiled in the wrong war against the wrong enemy on the wrong side of the world. The possible deal, called a “modus vivendi,” leaked. Amid the domestic furor and British and Chinese complaints during that fateful last week of November, Roosevelt decided: No deal.
Roosevelt’s reasoning was complex and global. The U.S. decision to turn down the deal with the Japanese was meant to prevent a Chinese collapse. It thus helped pin down a million Japanese troops that the Americans thought might otherwise be deployed against the Soviets.
Fortunately, for reasons that no outsider really understood at the time, Hitler declared war on the United States. This German declaration was a kind of surprise. Throughout 1941 Hitler had deliberated on when or whether either Germany or Japan should go to war with the United States, vacillating back and forth.
Hitler did regard the United States as an ultimate enemy. But, contrary to what some historians have contended, Hitler — who paid close attention to microeconomic issues — had a deep regard for the military and industrial potential of the United States.
Once the United States adopted its enormous Lend-Lease program in March 1941, Hitler assumed, as Putin now does, that he was effectively in a kind of war with the United States. Yet Hitler wished to put off any direct warfare with the United States.
By late October 1941, Hitler still seemed willing to put up with American provocations and leave the ultimate war against America to “the next generation.” In early November, his foreign minister was pointing the Japanese toward the British and Dutch, urging them to avoid any attack on America.
But Hitler had not declared war on the United States because of nihilistic fanaticism. He had carefully calculated. He had calculated wrong.
With its final diplomatic cards having just been laid on the table in Washington, having set an internal deadline for a war decision, Japan began final preparations for possible war with America. On Nov. 20, Japan asked Germany to join in. Hitler therefore also had that request pending.
Finally, the latest news of German military progress in the Soviet campaign seemed to clear the way. Berlin did not expect to conclude the Soviet campaign in 1941, regardless of whether or not German forces took Moscow. But Berlin did assess that the Red Army was essentially broken. Germany’s 1942 campaigns would just have to mop up. That remained the prevailing assessment in Hitler’s headquarters until Dec. 18.
So, toward the last week of November, Hitler had said yes to Tokyo. Japan, disappointed by its final diplomatic failure in Washington, set loose its war plans. Elated by their attack on Pearl Harbor, Hitler then made his declaration of war on Dec. 11.
It was only about a week after that, in the second half of December, that Hitler started receiving the full news of the weight of the Soviet counteroffensive, even though those attacks had actually begun on Dec. 5. This rough news from the East was joined by other unpleasant disillusionments, about the U-boat program and developments in war industry.
Confiding to his intimates on Jan. 15, 1942, Hitler worried aloud that he might have erred. He wondered if the odds might now favor an eventual American victory. But Hitler had not declared war on the United States because of nihilistic fanaticism. He had carefully calculated. He had calculated wrong.
The Early Cold War and the Next Stage of Enemy Partnerships
Whatever one’s view of the possibilities for a cooperative world order after the defeat of the Axis, a revisionist partnership was soon reforged. The revisionists were again unified by opposition to what they saw as an oppressive imperialist/capitalist order, led by the United States, which they argued was in league with the decaying European empires and revived reactionary forces in Germany and Japan.
This anti-American partnership was at its height between 1948 and 1962. Again, this was a time of strategic opportunism, profound miscalculation, rapid decisions, and decisive action.
The new partnership coalesced as the Chinese communists defeated the nationalists and won their civil war in 1948–49. Codified in a public partnership announced in Moscow in 1949, the Stalin-Mao partnership certainly had its own legacy of distrust. Stalin had hedged his bets until 1947, and perhaps even later than that. But by 1949 all was forgiven between Stalin and Mao. Stalin’s position was firmly preeminent. His satellites understood what party discipline meant.
In January 1950, Stalin decided to approve the invasion of South Korea. He summoned North Korean leader Kim Il Sung to Moscow so Stalin could personally and secretly explain his reasoning and plans in detail. Listen to Stalin’s explanation of how he sized up the situation:
China is no longer busy with internal fighting and can devote its attention and energy to the assistance of Korea. If necessary, China has at its disposal troops which can be utilized in Korea without any harm to the other needs of China. The Chinese [civil war] victory [in 1949] is also important psychologically. It has proven the strength of Asian revolutionaries, and shown the weakness of Asian reactionaries and their mentors in the West, in America. Americans left China and did not dare to challenge the new Chinese authorities militarily. [This U.S. stance had surprised Mao, who had expected a large, direct U.S. military intervention in the civil war.]
Now that China has signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR, Americans will be even more hesitant to challenge the Communists in Asia. According to information coming from the United States, it is really so. The prevailing mood is not to interfere. Such a mood is reinforced by the fact that the USSR now has the atomic bomb and that our positions are solidified in Pyongyang.
Mao did indeed endorse the plan. There are striking features of the Soviet-Chinese planning of this period worthy of notice and reflection. First, the Soviet-Chinese planning occurred at a time when both countries were still very badly damaged, in every possible way, by their recent wars. There were members of the leadership group in both countries who were anxious to first heal such wounds. These men were also apprehensive about new wars that might involve the United States. They were overruled.
Second, the pace of Soviet-Chinese planning was remarkably rapid and decisive. The Berlin blockade came in 1948. The Chinese won the civil war in 1949 and the Soviets tested an atomic bomb. Settling the failed Berlin blockade, Stalin concluded his defense alliance with Mao.
And finally, they planned three major operations in east Asia in 1950: a North Korean invasion of the South with China pledged to back the play if needed; a Chinese invasion of Taiwan later in the year; and a Viet Minh revolution against the French in Indochina, using Chinese sanctuaries, advisers, and weapons.
In September 1950, Stalin decided that China should join the Korean war and defeat the Americans. China’s homeland would be sheltered from American counterattack by the Soviet alliance.
In 1950, the United States ended up fighting in Korea, blocking the Taiwan move with naval forces, and reluctantly deciding to support the French in Indochina. Washington reversed its earlier decisions, in 1949, that it would not do any of these things.
This American resolve may have surprised Stalin. He had a chance to evaluate this and recalculate. He and Mao also began thinking hard about what they thought would be the coming revival of Japanese or German power.
Stalin’s reaction was to double down. In September 1950, Stalin decided that China should join the Korean war and defeat the Americans. China’s homeland would be sheltered from American counterattack by the Soviet alliance.
We can eavesdrop again on how Stalin sized up this new situation, writing very secretly to Mao:
1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war;
2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans;
3) the USA will be compelled to yield in the Korean question to China behind which stands its ally, the USSR …;
4) for the same reasons, the USA will not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries …
Overcoming sharp disagreements among China’s leaders, Mao went forward with the plan to join the war. The Chinese offensive was barely contained. The U.S. seriously considered nuclear escalation in Asia and mobilized for World War III.
Then, as mentioned earlier, in January 1951 Stalin accelerated planning for an imminent invasion of Yugoslavia. Later that year, Stalin paused.
A tense equilibrium seemed to slowly develop during 1951 and 1952. Why? Perhaps it was the product of further Chinese defeats in Korea. Maybe the scale of U.S. and NATO aid for Yugoslavia helped. Then there was the scale and rapidity of the Western mobilization for general war, the extensive deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons, and the Western determination evident in the appointments of Dwight Eisenhower and Bernard Montgomery to lead the newly mobilized NATO forces.
The Anti-American League Now
“Everything is changing now, changing very fast.” Those were Putin’s words a year after he had begun the full invasion of Ukraine. In some periods of history, events seem to accelerate. My working hypothesis is that, as 2022 began, the anti-American partnership was in an upbeat mood. They thought that, since 2014, their various limited offensive moves had worked and that the West was bribable or tearing itself up.
The free world’s adversaries had their “coming out” party in 2022. That was a bad year for them. The free world did well that year.
In 2023, however, its adversaries did much better, especially by their lights. They feel it. They also feel the momentum of the rising tide of violence around the world.
The course of 2024 is still unsettled. It is still too soon to judge how the war will develop in Ukraine or in the Middle East.
Under their current leaders, America’s principal adversaries — China and Russia — are fundamentally revisionist powers. Their leaders regard themselves as men of destiny, with values and historical perspectives quite different from the consumerist or social metrics that suffuse much of the world. During the last two years they, Iran, and North Korea have intensified their common work to shore up weaknesses in each other’s defense-industrial bases, with Russia the most active entrepreneur.
All feel boxed in by extensions of American power they regard as fragile, though formidable in parts. All have long been preparing for a great reckoning. They wonder: Is now the time? If not soon, when?
It is possible to argue a relatively benign case in which the conflicts do not get much worse during 2024, or even 2025. There are economic worries. There are factions in all the adversary countries, especially in the administrative and business class, whose outlook is narrowly focused and fundamentally inertial. Their outlooks might seem sensible to us.
The default assumption in national assessment is to hypothesize the position of governments and generalize about their national interests. Yet all the relevant governments have factions that may disagree quite fundamentally about what the interests are, how they should be pursued, and what risks should be accepted.
These factional debates are difficult for outsiders to see or gauge. Their outcomes often crystallize opportunistically and unpredictably around somebody’s proposal or some external development that forces choices.
The United States does not have the strategic initiative in the present conflict. It is reacting to choices made by others, which its analysts may not anticipate and understand.
The joint British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956 is mainly remembered now as a mistake by the British government. Yet the plan was actually developed by factions in the French and Israeli governments. Washington knew nothing of it. The French and Israelis developed their plan at a time that the United States had justifiably concluded that the crisis was being settled with diplomacy.
The United States does not have the strategic initiative in the present conflict. It is reacting to choices made by others, which its analysts may not anticipate and understand. U.S. and allied planners can hope for the best and plan for the worst.
Under the category of “best,” there are two families of relatively benign expectations, which are not necessarily consistent. One is that America’s adversaries think they are already doing pretty well. They find current trends satisfactory. They will watch as Ukrainian resistance ebbs and fractures, as “the West” grows tired and quarrels, and as Israel tears itself apart. Meanwhile they will keep building their strength.
Or, some may think U.S. adversaries have been sobered by recent setbacks, problems at home, and demonstrations of U.S. and allied resolve. They find current trends unsatisfactory, but tolerable. So they may decide to retrench, cope with sanctions regimes, let the Russo-Ukrainian war peter out, and consolidate their position across Eurasia and in the global South.
Both of these kinds of reassuring arguments are plausible. They are plausible enough that they are likely already being voiced by factions in Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran.
Yet some enemy factions likely have a different view. They find current trends infuriating. These Russians and Iranians see no way out of jail. They find the prospect of stalemate against their main adversaries to be intolerable. These Chinese see a slow buildup of encircling alliances, a rearming Japan, a slowly mobilizing Taiwan, and American plans for high-tech countermoves and containment. These enemy factions would be searching for plausible moves of their own.
Under the category of “worst,” I believe that, on current trend lines, Putin is content to grind away against Ukraine, whose forces are depleted and exhausted and whose economy withers. Putin sees no reason, yet, to think he must conclude the war.
Why is this so important for situations beyond Ukraine? The Ukraine war has already created a more fluid strategic environment. It has already caused a visible closing of ranks on both sides.
Putin has already traveled to Tehran for personal confidential conversations with Iran’s leaders, where the ascension of Ebrahim Raisi in June 2021 began a period of intensifying relations with other members of what Iran regards as the “resistance” front. Putin’s discussions with Xi have surely been “strategic” (the Russian government’s description).
I believe the anti-American partnership has probably decided to double down. They are probably preparing in earnest for a period of major confrontation. My view on this rests on my analysis of the history presented above as well as some key assessments of Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, and — to a lesser extent — Pyongyang.
Xi and Putin regard themselves as world-historical men of destiny. They believe they are capable of decisive, strategic action. Xi ranks himself with Mao and Stalin. Putin evokes the memory of Peter the Great. In China, Russia, and Iran the information and decision environments are cloistered.
In China, Russia, and Iran the propaganda ministries have already been preparing their populations for a time of war, great sacrifice, and existential struggle. Russia is becoming hyper-militarized. In China, most visible are the full cinemas watching blunt messages in massively popular and costly movies that were deliberate government projects, such as The Battle at Lake Changjin (the highest-grossing Chinese film of all time), its recent sequel (also one of the highest-grossing movies of all time), and Full River Red (last year’s top film).
Iran’s leaders similarly feel they are in an existential struggle for the survival of the revolution at home, while they are also engaged in their war with Israel. I believe that some Iranians have now stored up so much resentment and hatred that they may be desperate to do almost anything to get at Israel.
The North Korean intentions seem driven, but as opaque as usual. My working hypothesis is that they are preparing for a period of conflict and that they are wondering about possible opportunities to play an important role.
In each capital there are arguments for retrenchment on one side and, on the other, for more militancy. The more militant factions have likely been arguing and speculating about ways to turn over the table.
Beijing’s outlook both the most important and the most difficult to assess, since its government has visibly sought a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. I think it is most likely that Beijing has assessed that the die has been cast for a period of escalating confrontation.
The “San Francisco Vision”
On Dec. 4, 2023, the Chinese embassy in Washington sent a letter to select Americans explaining their government’s view of the just-concluded summit with President Joe Biden in San Francisco (actually in Woodside, in San Mateo County). The Chinese regarded the summit as “historic,” that it “fostered a future-oriented San Francisco vision.”
In the Chinese version, they offer a path of mutual respect. Each side can “coexist in peace and pursue win-win cooperation.” Biden, the embassy explained, seemed to agree. He told them, they say, that the United States “does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to change China’s system, does not seek to revitalize its alliances against China, does not support ‘Taiwan independence’, and has no intention to have a conflict with China.”
For its part, China says it is prepared to carry out its side of the San Francisco vision. China hopes the United States would do likewise, including that it will “abide by the one-China principle [and] stop arming Taiwan.”
Beijing seems to now be making an offer strikingly similar to the offer Moscow made back then. They offer peaceful coexistence, if only “the US will develop a right perception toward China, see China as its partner rather than rival.”
In 2023, Chinese leaders made a strategic choice to replace defiant “wolf warriors” with peace offerings, extending olive branches, inviting mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence. In this strategy, the burden of choice thus shifts to the United States and others to decide whether to accept these offers.
This Chinese articulation of their San Francisco vision bears a striking, eerie resemblance to the “spirit of Camp David.” That phrase, of Soviet coinage, arose in September 1959. The context was the first year of the second Berlin crisis. Eisenhower was doing all he could with diplomacy to ease the danger of war. He invited Khrushchev to the United States, to Camp David — a marked sign of respect. Khrushchev accepted, believing that he could persuade Eisenhower to give way on Berlin. Eisenhower did not give way, but his language was reassuring, looking toward a major international conference planned for the spring of 1960, in Paris.
The spirit of Camp David lasted for about six months. It became obvious that the West would not concede its position in Berlin, a standoff of global importance to both sides. The May 1960 Paris conference dissolved in acrimony. To many outsiders it made no sense that Khrushchev would not accept the status quo in Berlin. But the truly dangerous phases of the standoff were still to come.
Beijing seems to now be making an offer strikingly similar to the offer Moscow made back then. They offer peaceful coexistence, if only “the US will develop a right perception toward China, see China as its partner rather than rival.” And again, I believe, the Chinese will prefer to seem to be placing the burden of choice — on the status of Taiwan — on the United States.
To Americans it may seem like it is the Chinese who are the troublemakers, trying to disturb the status quo. That was John F. Kennedy’s argument to Khrushchev in their one meeting, in Vienna in June 1961. Khrushchev did not agree. He and the East Germans would only be asserting their legal rights, he explained. It was the United States that would then have to challenge that and start the war.
China’s leaders today respect American military and technological capabilities. They do not appear to be confident of victory in any scenario. These anxieties should not reassure us. They appear to take the Biden administration’s alliance and defense buildup plans quite seriously. From their point of view, the American-led enemy mobilization has already begun.
Chinese analysts might then offer several reasons for taking necessary actions sooner rather than later. Their actions will not cause a geopolitical break, because they believe this break has already occurred.
They see America already energetically organizing, with some effect, its global coalition to impose containment and strategic decoupling through technology and trade controls. For now, in this wartime environment, the European governments are deferring to the Americans, though many of their business leaders disagree.
They might also see that Americans and Europeans feel economically and financially fragile. They will be fearful of initiating a conflict that will immediately trigger an apocalyptic global economic and financial crisis. And if there is such a storm, Chinese leaders may believe they are better able to weather it. They have already been helping to establish a parallel global trading system to accommodate Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other victims of American sanctions.
And, of course, they cannot help but miss that the Ukraine crisis has shocked America into trying much harder to ramp up its defense-industrial base. This is a worrying development for China. The Americans might transform their capacity to produce long- or mid-range standoff precision munitions. But it will take some time for the Americans to do this. Even an extra year or two may make a difference.
Further, Japan is rearming. This could have huge consequences. It too will take time. To Chinese leaders, the Japanese turn may seem particularly ominous. Japan has also overcome historical grievances that have blocked close military and intelligence cooperation with South Korea.
The Americans now have a huge backlog of approved arms sales to Taiwan. Yet, for now, almost none of this has been delivered. Chinese leaders will prefer that none of it ever is. The Americans have secured planned bases in the Philippines. But they are not yet ready to use them. And the Americans are orchestrating new military combinations and exercises with their AUKUS partnership, the Quad, Japan, and South Korea.
What about China’s most important partner? Right now, Putin’s grip on power seems firm. That may not last indefinitely. For now, Putin’s firm position means that China can rely on the Eurasian reserve of strategic resources that he represents, especially oil.
Beijing probably now regards the East Asian divide against them as already taking shape, with hostile forces starting to gather strength — with particular worries about Japan. The U.S. rallying of partners during 2022 and 2023 is probably reframing the way the Chinese now see their choices. These U.S. policy successes may strengthen the case of factions urging action sooner rather than later.
The Novelty of America’s Position
A year before Pearl Harbor, on Dec. 14, 1940, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, penned a long letter to his old friend, Roosevelt. Grew had known Roosevelt since prep school days at Groton. He was the only U.S. ambassador in the world who would open his letter to the president with, “Dear Frank.”
“History has shown,” Grew wrote, “that the pendulum in Japan is always swinging between extremist and moderate positions.” Grew thought a “showdown” seemed to be coming — “the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.”
More than a month later, on Jan. 21, 1941, after he had delivered a landmark fireside chat to the nation on Dec. 29, Roosevelt found time to send a long letter back to his old friend. To Roosevelt, “the fundamental proposition was that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict.”
It is really hard, cognitively and institutionally hard, to hold open a doorway to the emptiness of what we don’t know and adapt to changing circumstances.
Over time and in separate settings the U.S. government has laid down plans that, if not “hard-and-fast,” may be cumulatively unsustainable in the present global situation.
The United States needs to be able to double-down in Europe while, in Asia and the Middle East, recalibrating how to “most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.” This view is not driven by abstract notions of regional importance. It is driven by practical analysis of the stress tests.
Americans are used to thinking of their defense position as mighty. The civilian population watches news about faraway wars and roots for this or that team — and they are always far away. Humility is applauded in principle. It is hard to practice it. It is not hard just because of arrogance or complacency. It is so hard because people are drowning in information and commentary. It is really hard, cognitively and institutionally hard, to hold open a doorway to the emptiness of what we don’t know and adapt to changing circumstances.
China is preparing for war. I am not saying it seeks a war. But, publicly and privately, the Chinese Communist Party is mobilizing its country for one.
One lesson to them from the Ukraine war is the shallow and fragile character of the U.S. defense-industrial base. Chinese manufacturing capacity now exceeds both the United States and Europe put together.
Also, three of these adversaries each have numerous nuclear weapons. Another, Iran, is on the verge. Pakistan, which is not a friendly country, has plenty of nuclear weapons too. All the nuclear-armed states believe they may now be able to deter American attacks against their homeland. All of them — including Iran — believe they are effectively invulnerable to being invaded. They may therefore feel greater freedom to design and wage limited wars.
Americans may be presented with novel scenarios, bracketed by nuclear dangers, in relation to interests most of them do not care much about. Most living Americans no longer have a palpable memory of battlefield or national vulnerability. The magnitude of the 9/11 shock to American sensibilities proves the point in a way, and for younger Americans that is now vague history. U.S. adversaries believe, rightly or wrongly, that they are tougher, and that their societies are tougher, readier to follow orders and handle hardship, than America’s.
The Burden of Escalation Might Be on the United States
My working hypothesis is that its adversaries will not initiate a direct attack on the United States. No Pearl Harbor. Instead, such adversaries may see this as a time when it is America that will be restrained from initiating direct military actions in response to adversary moves that do not directly attack the United States.
China has fought America before. Their reading of this history is very different from the way these conflicts are usually taught in the United States. China has gone to war with the United States in Korea and in Vietnam and it has extended control over the South China Sea without a war.
In Korea, the Chinese war was unofficial, conducted by “Chinese people’s volunteers.” The Soviet Union had promised a defense umbrella to ward off U.S. counterattacks against the Chinese homeland. That worked.
In Vietnam, the Chinese war was covert, conducted by hundreds of thousands of troops and workers operating only in North Vietnam and Laos. North Vietnam dispatched arms and troops to help conquer South Vietnam. This plan was launched in 1959. At least through 1966, China sheltered North Vietnam from conventional counter-invasion by the United States. China warned the United States that any such invasion would meet a full Chinese counterattack, Korea-style. These warnings worked. They effectively kept the United States at bay and confined the war’s parameters in the way China wished.
In the South China Sea, the Chinese conquest did not meet military opposition. The occupation was conducted first as a civilian assertion of territorial rights. China strenuously denied any plans to militarize its outposts in the South China Sea. It then proceeded to full militarization, tolerating the occasional international protest cruises.
From the Chinese point of view, in an ideal case China might make its moves after being publicly provoked. In the 2021 Nancy Pelosi case, for instance, international opinion would have blamed the United States for causing the crisis. The Biden administration had to work hard to manage that crisis.
In the indirect control scenario China can then force the other countries (or Taiwan) to decide whether or how to challenge such a realization of the “one China” the world formally recognizes.
Another kind of opportunity for decisive action, from China’s perspective, could be any U.S. attempt to make actual delivery of notable U.S. military equipment into Taiwan (ideally some kind of missiles — hence China could have its version of the America’s 1962 Cuban missile “quarantine”).
As an illustration of how to apply historical precedents to illuminate the challenge of global readiness, consider the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. This commitment is morally and politically justifiable. It may be hard to sustain, in practice. I see three main plausible scenarios:
- Pearl Harbor. China combines an invasion of Taiwan with an attack on U.S. installations, at least in Guam, and possibly on Japanese territory as well. The United States, and possibly Japan, are immediately at war with China, with high likelihood of rapid escalation to general war.
- Korea 1950. China attacks Taiwan, probably associated with preparations for invasion. Though, as in South Korea in 1950, the U.S. defense commitment is ambiguous, the brazen character of the attack raises the odds of at least U.S. and Japanese intervention, and all prepare for the possibility of escalation to general war.
In the indirect control scenario China can then force the other countries (or Taiwan) to decide whether or how to challenge such a realization of the “one China” the world formally recognizes. And China could violently retaliate against any Taiwanese air or sea units that violently challenged China’s move.
Taiwan could keep governing itself, for a while. The situation would be similar, in substance, to the condition Hong Kong was in after the British relinquished control in 1997, except China would not need to raise its flag on the island itself. Taipei could file its protests and hold its demonstrations. But any Taiwanese military moves could trigger Chinese responses that Taiwan could not top. For instance, if Taiwan sought to cut off semiconductor exports to China, China could cut off all energy supplies to Taiwan, including the energy that runs its principal chip producer, TSMC. There is no plausible scenario in which Taiwan could force an outcome where it supplied the world, but not China. Eventually, China could steer Taiwan’s semiconductor trade and access to its supply chains without touching the fabrication centers themselves.
Some of the near-term danger is a byproduct of the administration’s own policy achievements. Large Western defense buildups are now in motion. They may bear significant fruit in the out years, including the buildup in Europe and Ukraine — but not right away. More reason for Russians to push as hard as they can in 2024 and 2025.
In the Middle East, Iran can provoke with proxies, continue the renewal of its nuclear program that it accelerated in 2023, and dare exhausted, isolated Israel to attack. Iran can also dare the United States to join such a war in the Middle East. We can see how that war may start. The Iranians, or at least some faction of them, may think they see better how it will end.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may be planning to stay out of such a war, as they conduct a diplomatic revolution in the Middle East. Their realignments include a detente with Iran, brokered with China. It includes understandings with China, Russia, and India that further guarantee their security. These Arab leaders think they are this era’s Henry Kissingers, cleverly navigating and dominating the space between rivals.
The United States therefore ought to deeply reexamine its strategy and strategic posture toward the whole Middle East region.
The current Gaza and Israeli-Iranian war is affecting the domestic political situation in Iraq and Turkey. The scope of operations the United States can conduct out of Incirlik and Al-Udeid may become more constrained. The United States should not assume it can readily use either of those bases in certain contingencies involving Iran or obtain easy permission for certain airspace transits.
Greatly exacerbated by the Russo-Ukrainian war, Europe’s current dependence on Middle Eastern, North African, and east Mediterranean gas and oil has become profound. European states will feel great pressure to avoid doing anything that might endanger these supplies.
The United States therefore ought to deeply reexamine its strategy and strategic posture toward the whole Middle East region. A cornerstone principle for such a reexamination might be that the future viability of Israel itself is coming into play. Its current government is on a course that will isolate and weaken it, as its enemies gather. But any future Israeli government will face terrible choices, probably involving civil strife as in 1948, but much worse. The United States, like Israel, will need to focus more on the essential requirements of Israeli survival, at least as a free and promising society.
The United States should have plans for a possible war with Iran that do not assume or rely on initiation of a preventive war, either alone or in conjunction with Israel. Those plans may need to assume Iranian access to weapons of mass destruction. Those plans will also need to have a plausible concept for how such a war might end.
Wishful Thinking and the Alternatives
Though Americans have lost limited wars in which they chose to disengage, their historical memory encourages a belief that they have always projected sufficient power for great-power contests if only they will try hard enough.
America’s adversaries have sometimes engaged in wishful thinking. The United States has certainly shown it can do this too. If it faces the burden of choosing escalation, the political, financial, and industrial base to support such a choice is weaker than it was in past episodes.
The worst case, in a major crisis, will be if the United States and its allies commit to victory, animated by their own rhetoric and dutiful but ill-considered military plans, and then are outmaneuvered and defeated. It would be the “Suez moment” for the United States, or perhaps much worse.
The United States may therefore need to prioritize action in the theaters and on the problems where its interests, allied readiness, and capabilities are at their height. Where they are more vulnerable, the United States may need to quietly rethink its current military plans. The current postures in the western Pacific and the Middle East may be especially unsound, depending on the situation.
One way to rethink the plans is to hedge the reliance on military insurance. For several reasons, the U.S. government has leaned too much on military capabilities to offset deep, chronic weaknesses in all its civilian institutions for foreign work. The United States is turning more frequently to economic sanctions. As the Ukraine case and the problem of Russian assets illustrates, this reliance has overwhelmed the capabilities, culture, and staffing of the usual bureaucracies handling these efforts, which in the U.S. case are mainly in the Treasury and Commerce departments. The overall capacity to guide these efforts strategically relies on a few overburdened civil servants.
A principal reason for the 1947 creation of a “National Security Council” was so that it would coordinate economic instruments of national power alongside the military ones, as the Americans had seen the British do so effectively in their War Cabinet system. That system in the United Kingdom had included a Ministry of Economic Warfare that recruited some of the most able people in Whitehall.
Even a relatively limited war with China would almost automatically, practically overnight, lead to freezes or seizures of trillions of dollars’ worth of Chinese and American assets of all kinds, with all sorts of counterparties caught in the whirlpools.
At the center of the American production bureaucracies was a man, now almost forgotten, named Ferdinand Eberstadt. He had been at the center of the challenging interagency and public/private economic work on both the War Production Board and the Army-Navy Munitions Board, and the later National Security Resources Board.
The United States and its allies are already very far along in creating a divided economic world to isolate Russia, Iran, and North Korea. They are not altogether isolated, of course. They just function increasingly in a separate world of trade and finance, with China as a hub. That separating world can include much of the so-called “global South.”
A key point: In my indirect control scenario, the burden of challenging offshore Chinese border controls, and therefore of causing any cut off of Taiwanese exports like semiconductors, would actually fall on the United States and its allies, not on China. This may deter the United States.
Americans usually think that “deterrence” is all about how to deter bad countries from attacking them or their friends. To America’s adversaries, this paradigm is reversed. They think they are deterring America from attacking them.
When World War II began, and in the early Cold War, the world economy was already deeply fragmented and organized imperially. Those experiences are not sufficiently suggestive about the scope of a breakage now. A little more suggestive was the experience when war broke out in 1914. On July 31, 1914, the New York and London stock markets closed. They did not reopen for the next five months.
Even a relatively limited war with China would almost automatically, practically overnight, lead to freezes or seizures of trillions of dollars’ worth of Chinese and American assets of all kinds, with all sorts of counterparties caught in the whirlpools. It could rapidly trigger the greatest disruption in the global economy since the Great Depression, and the effects could easily exceed that.
From America’s adversaries’ point of view, the economic nightmares may not be so frightful. They may think they are readier for such calamities than the United States is.
Since some of the contingencies are out of American control, the president and his chief advisers at least need to map out these risks and visibly prepare to manage them. The United States should visibly plan whether and how it and its allies might weather the extreme economic contingencies that would necessarily accompany the outbreak of even a limited war.
Such visible preparations will acquire a momentum of their own. If these plans become viable, they may even become plausible substitutes for the most vulnerable military moves.
The Big Picture
If the United States and its partners in Europe and Asia can weather the current international and domestic political crises, they will be better positioned to thrive during the rest of the 2020s than their principal adversaries. They are well positioned to influence the shape of the great technological revolutions of this age, help guide the future of the global economy, build on America’s new status as an energy superpower in managing the energy transition, and lead a deep re-conception and overhaul of the defenses that countries will build in the digital age.
So it is important to keep in mind that the broader fundamentals for the United States and the free world are promising. They are especially promising in comparison with the courses that America’s adversaries are charting.
The main challenge to the United States and to its friends may be in the short-term. They are stretched thin. A handful of key officials are functioning at the very limits of their capacity. With few exceptions, civilian leaders in the United States and the free states of Europe and Asia that are still at peace do not want to try to scare their publics into a prewar mode. They are uneasy about how their publics might respond to such alarms. And right now, the free world countries are coping. Their various enemies have problems and worries too.
My argument echoes Roosevelt’s warning to Grew in January 1941. “We cannot lay down hard-and-fast plans,” he said. Yet leaders today might be forgiven if they feel enmeshed in seemingly “hard-and-fast” commitments around the world. As enemies maneuver, and America does its own private stress tests, the United States and its friends should sharpen their focus and their strategies around allied strengths and strongpoints. “As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.”
The worst case would be to sacrifice fundamentally strong future prospects because of short-term miscalculations. Having navigated successfully through years of intense crisis, the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations had turned the corner in the Cold War by 1963–64. The momentum of Soviet and Chinese advance was ebbing. The free world was on the verge of historic advances and achievements in society and science.
The task for this period of crisis is to weather it with America’s core strengths and advantages preserved, or even enhanced.
Philip Zelikow is the Botha-Chan Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. For 25 years, he held a chaired professorship in history at the University of Virginia. For seven years before that, he was an associate professor at Harvard University. An attorney and former career diplomat, Zelikow’s federal service includes work across the government in the five administrations from President Ronald Reagan through President Barack Obama. Zelikow has also directed three successful and bipartisan national commissions: the Carter-Ford Commission on Federal Election Reform, the 9/11 Commission, and the Covid Crisis Group.
Image: ChatGPT
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2 A fine, neglected account is Lisle Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
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3 “The 1948 Yugoslav-Soviet split was total, and the ideological, political, and military hostility in the subsequent years comprehensive. Between 1948 and [1954], Yugoslavia was under a real threat of a military invasion from the Soviets and their satellite states. Border incidents and armed clashes were an everyday occurrence.” Svetozar Rajak, “The Tito-Khrushchev Correspondence, 1954,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), 315.
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4 Quotes from NIE-29, March 20, 1951, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, vol. 4 pt. 2, doc. no. 876; and Sherman Kent, “Words of Estimative Probability,” Studies in Intelligence, Fall 1964 (declassified), NARA RG 263.
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5 From notes of Stalin’s remarks in Romanian records, quoted in Mark Kramer, “Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet -East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948-1953,” in Mark Kramer and Vit Smetana, eds., Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945-1989 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), note 25.
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6 “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development” (February 4, 2022), http://www.en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.
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7 Wang quoted in Christian Shepherd & Vic Chiang, “A year later, China blames U.S. 'hegemony' - not Russia - for war in Ukraine,” Washington Post, February 22, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/22/china-us-blame-ukraine-war/.
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8 In 2020, I analyzed and replied to Putin’s extraordinarily elaborate views on the origins of the World War II. “Lessons from the Second World War: A Reply to President Putin,” The American Interest, July 2020, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2020/07/31/a-reply-to-president-putin/. My reply was noticed in Moscow and published in Russian, in Russia in Global Affairs.
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9 The Italian-German maneuvers are concisely summarized in Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 844-55, 999.
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10 Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War (London: Pimlico Press, 1989), 536-37.
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11 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 (London: Penguin Random House, 2017), 777. Kotkin is best for the reconstruction of Stalin’s calculations.
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12 Ian Kershaw provides a good overview of Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940-1941 (London: Penguin, 2007), with the refinements noted below about the November 1941 choices. Good recent summaries of the Japanese background are Eri Hotta, Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy (London: Randon House, 2013) and Takuma Melber, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Attack and America's Entry into World War II, trans. Nick Somers (Cambridge: Polity, 2021).
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13 This judgment is based on my own research in the sources. It dovetails with the argument perceptively made in Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt & American Entry into World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) and ably elaborated recently by Richard Frank, Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937-May 1942 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2020), chapters 8 and 9.
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14 In a large literature, the close analysis of Hitler’s choices and available information that now supersedes all others is Klaus Schmider, Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation: Why Germany Declared War on the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
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15 From the Soviet records of discussions with Kim in April 1950, unearthed by Evgenii Bajanov & Natalia Bajanova and published in Kathryn Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’ Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 39, July 2002, 9. When Stalin referred to “information coming from the United States,” he was not only referring to Dean Acheson’s famous press conference in January 1950 drawing a defense line that excluded Korea and Taiwan. Stalin was probably also referring to his knowledge of the contents of the secret U.S. decision document, NSC-48, of December 1949, that had first codified this U.S. government conclusion. The contents of NSC-48 may have been passed to Soviet intelligence by Kim Philby.
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16 Stalin to Mao, October 7, 1950, included in Stalin’s letter later that day to his man in Pyongyang, Terenty Shtykov, in Alexandre Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6/7 (1995-96), 116.
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17 On the Sino-Soviet break as a spur to confrontation, see Thomas Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011). For the best studies so far of Khrushchev, Berlin, and the linked crises of 1962, see Gerhard Wettig, Chrustschows Berlin-Krise 1958 bis 1963 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006); and Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), chapters 17 and 18.
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18 Among the more famous assessment debates and misjudgments about “rational” versus actual choices were about German aims in 1938; Japanese aims in 1941; the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea in 1950 (which made no sense at the time even to Stalin’s colleague, Khrushchev); the Chinese entry into that war in 1950; the Soviet deployment of ballistic missiles to Cuba in 1962; the North Vietnamese escalation of war in South Vietnam in 1965–66; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (when the U.S. intelligence community had good evidence that the Soviet establishment opposed such an invasion).
- Dictators: The Cult of Personality in the 20th Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 206.
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20 If this summary seems surprising, see Philip Zelikow, Ernest May, and the Harvard Suez Team, Suez Deconstructed: An Interactive Study of Crisis, War, and Peacemaking (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018).
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21 Putin himself has made this point over and over again. See, e.g., Angela Stent, “Putin’s Next Term: Repression in Russia, Aggression in Ukraine,” United States Institute of Peace, March 19, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/putins-next-term-more-repression-russia-aggression-ukraine.
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22 At the time (1959) there was also a quite serious crisis still ongoing over Taiwan, where the Soviet and Chinese position was that the United States should accept the outcome of the Chinese civil war, recognize the People’s Republic of China, and grant its sovereignty over Taiwan. The Soviets had already provided the Chinese with designs for how to build nuclear weapons. But, in 1959, the Soviets refused Chinese requests to provide them with actual nuclear bombs.
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23 From the Soviet memcon, June 4, 1961, as translated by Sergey Radchenko in his forthcoming book, To Run the World. During the summer and fall of 1961 both sides began mobilizing for war. Khrushchev postponed his moves because Kennedy opened a secret backchannel that Khrushchev thought might produce a deal. But it did not. As Soviet documents now reveal, in early 1962 Khrushchev renewed his preparations to prevail and deter America from initiating a war.
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24 The correspondence was published in Joseph Grew, Ten Years in Japan (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co., 1944), 359-63.
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25 Soviet war production capability during World War II is usually exaggerated in the literature. If properly estimated to account for the vast inputs involved in making aircraft and warships, Soviet productive capacity was comparable to that of Japan. The best work on this is now Phillips Payson O’Brien, How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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26 E.g., John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger, "Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War," Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/xi-jinping-says-he-preparing-china-war; or Kawala Xie, "China's Fujian province steps up defence mobilisation reforms to improve war readiness," South China Morning Post, February 3, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3250840/chinas-fujian-province-steps-defence-mobilisation-reforms-bid-improve-war-readiness; or Mike Studeman, "China is Battening Down for the Gathering Storm Over Taiwan," War on the Rocks, April 17, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/china-is-battening-down-for-the-gathering-storm-over-taiwan/.
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27 A summary is in Burgess Laird, War Control: Chinese Writings on the Control of Escalation in Crisis and Conflict, Center for a New American Security, March 30, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/war-control. These writings tend to downplay some of the escalation risks that are highlighted in Western literature about limited war.
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28 To illustrate what is or is not a “blockade”: The 1948 Soviet cutoff of Western ground transport into West Berlin was a blockade. It was surmounted by an airlift until the blockade was lifted in 1949. The second Berlin crisis (November 1958 to November 1962) was not a threatened blockade. It was the threat to treat Allied-occupied West Berlin as now being part of communist East Germany (which the West would not recognize as a state), and thus turning over border controls that would stop the access of “outside” U.S., British, and French military forces into the middle of East Germany. It was these outsiders who would face restrictions, not ordinary commerce. In the proffered Soviet peace treaty West Berlin would become a “free city,” nominally self-governing and with U.N. oversight. This second crisis was horrifyingly difficult for the Western powers, because the threatened move would force them to initiate the moves to fight their way into preserving access. Their plans involved escalating initiations of forceful efforts, culminating in an initial “demonstration” use of nuclear weapons by the United States.
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29 For an earlier discussion of this indirect control scenario three years ago, then referred to as a “quarantine,” see Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report no. 90 (2021), 35-36, https://www.cfr.org/report/united-states-china-and-taiwan-strategy-prevent-war.
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https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/china-kinmen-intrusion-05102024034553.html. For a good recent analysis of the military problems a quarantine or indirect control move might pose, see Robert Haddick with Mark Montgomery and Elaine Luria, “Quarantines and Blockades,” in Matt Pottinger, ed., The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan (Hoover Institution, 2024), chapter 8.
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31 This Berlin context is why the United States strained to assert, in 1961 and 1962, that it enjoyed nuclear superiority, so that its threats to escalate to nuclear war, to risk American survival, might seem credible. The Soviet government therefore strained in several ways, including eventually the secret deployment of missiles to Cuba, in order to dispel such images and make such threats seem less credible.
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32 Sergei Karaganov, “An Age of Wars? Article One,” Russia in Global Affairs, January 2024, p. 8 (translated).
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33 For a three-page summary see Philip Zelikow, “The Atrophy of American Statecraft,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 103 no. 1 (January-February 2024): 56, 67-70, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/atrophy-american-statecraft-zelikow.
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Foreign Affairs, December 20, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/real-russian-nuclear-threat.
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35 Michael Brown, “A Plan to Revitalize the Arsenal of Democracy,” War on the Rocks, May 10, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/a-plan-to-revitalize-the-arsenal-of-democracy/.
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36 Few stories of potentially war-losing failure and war-winning ingenuity are more striking than that of the U.S. rubber industry, which was rescued from a very misguided start by desperate salvage work in 1942 and 1943. Alexander Field, The Economic Consequences of U.S. Mobilization for the Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022), chapter 3.
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37 See Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
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38 The recent example is the brief note by Charlie Vest, Agatha Kratz, and Reva Goujon, The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict, from the Rhodium Group in December 2022..
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39 Hugo Bromley and Eyck Freymann have drafted an illustrative study of such plans, to be published later in 2024 by the Hoover Institution Press.
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40 One of the least-known aspects of Kissinger’s relation to Vietnam were his remarkable and secret efforts, while a professor advising the government, making in-depth visits in the field during 1965 and 1966, to suggest politically practical ways for America to get out. Niall Ferguson brings this out in the first volume of his biography of Kissinger. Niall Ferguson, Kissinger 1923-1968: The Idealist (New York: Allen Lane, 2015).
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2 In March 1951, the most likely place where America’s enemies might wish to widen the war was in central Europe. Since a direct Soviet attack on West Germany would foreseeably and quickly lead to nuclear escalation, the most likely flashpoint was Yugoslavia.
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6 We can all reflect on what we misjudged back in early 2021.
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7 Wang was stressing their shared understanding that they are making choices at a momentous and fateful time.
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amour-propre and honour to the situation,” wrote Donald Cameron Watt. “The notion that Hitler was intent not on winning the diplomatic game so much as on knocking the table over, drawing his gun and shooting it out, was one they understood intellectually but not in their hearts.”10
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13 It is worth recalling today, as Russia and China confront the United States, that the proximate reason for America’s entry into World War II was its determination to save those two countries from extinction.
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14 Why then? Washington rescinded the Neutrality Acts on Nov. 13. That move would, for the first time, bring U.S. convoys into the western approaches near Britain and likely lead to clashes in 1942 unless Germany abandoned its Battle for the Atlantic.
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18 Above all, a deep historian of the topic has observed, “dictators who surround themselves with a cult of personality tend to drift off into a world of their own, confirmed in their delusions by the followers who surround them.”19
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22 It meant an end to occupation regimes. Foreign forces might withdraw from both German states. Imperialist-capitalist rule was in the process of being overthrown by revolutionary forces around the world. The world’s “have-nots” were claiming their rightful place. But that was a natural, inevitable historical process, and no occasion for international aggression or interference.
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25 And they never had a meaningful capability to attack the American homeland. In 1937–41 and in 1948–62, Americans felt that, if they mobilized, their war production would be overwhelming and that their eventual striking power was limitless.
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Indirect control. China implements air and sea border controls to make Taiwan a self-governing administrative region of China. There is no need for a direct attack on Taiwan or any blockade of usual commerce. Without initiating violent action, the Chinese can assert sovereign control over the air and sea borders to Taiwan, establishing customs and immigration controls. This is not the same thing as a blockade. A blockade would instead become one of the possible consequences if the other side violently challenged China’s assertion of indirect control.28
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29 It is doable now, with little warning. In every way, this is the easiest option for China to execute and defend publicly. In every way, it is the hardest option for the United States to counter. China is already rehearsing this option on a limited scale in controlling the waters around Taiwan’s offshore island of Kinmen. This option might effectively accomplish China’s objectives with the least danger of massive disruption and the best posture for escalation dominance, since the other options still remain.30
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31 That threat was thinly credible then, in a situation of U.S. nuclear advantages. Such a threat is inconceivable now. Yet, for good political as well as strategic reasons, the United States also can’t and won’t preemptively and visibly abandon Taiwan. As a practical matter, the dilemma is acute.
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33 It will be a close call to see if military aid can shore up Ukraine’s defenses. It may be an even closer call to see if the West can sustain the level of financial assistance vital to Ukraine, especially in 2025, as Europeans still wring their hands over whether and how to use the Russian financial assets frozen in their jurisdictions. The period of maximum danger may come if Ukraine’s supporters are successful and Ukraine’s position becomes sustainable and promising. Because then Russia will have to decide whether to escalate.34
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35 Even if funded, plans for large expansions of naval or air power have a long lead time, looking at least into the 2030s. Even then the results may not provide the kind of capabilities that will solve the particular escalation choices that America faces. Depending on the scenario, the United States may also encounter severe practical issues in its internal decision processes, the preparedness of key allies, or the requirements of the military operations.
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tnsr.org · by Philip Zelikow · May 16, 2024
14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin framed Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russian efforts to create a "buffer zone" to protect Russian border areas from Ukrainian strikes, confirming ISW's previous assessments.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have stabilized the front in northern Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian forces have not reached Ukraine's "concrete" and "most powerful" line of defense in the area.
- Russian forces will likely be able to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wide front and fix Ukrainian troops in the international border area even as the tempo of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast slows.
- Russian forces reportedly leveraged notable electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to support tactically significant gains during the first days of their limited offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Senior NATO military commanders confirmed ISW's prior assessments that Russian forces do not have sufficient forces to achieve a "strategic breakthrough" in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of large-scale aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian energy and port infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea on the night of May 16 to 17.
- US officials reiterated the White House's unwillingness to support Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons in strikes against military targets in Russia.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to further known Russian information operations intended to directly undermine Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the annual Russian-Chinese Expo and forum on interregional cooperation and visited Harbin Polytechnic University during the second and last day of his trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on May 17.
- Ukrainian and Western sources continue to report that Russian forces are committing war crimes in newly occupied areas of Kharkiv Oblast.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 17, 2024
May 17, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2024
Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 17, 2024, 6:35pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on May 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin framed Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russian efforts to create a "buffer zone" to protect Russian border areas from Ukrainian strikes, confirming ISW's previous assessments. Putin responded to a journalist's question about Russian forces' objectives in the Kharkiv direction, stating that Russian forces are achieving success "according to plan" and that Russian forces have no immediate plans to seize Kharkiv City.[1] Putin stated that Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction are aimed at creating a "buffer zone" to protect Russian border areas, including Belgorod City, from Ukrainian strikes. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces appear to be prioritizing the establishment of a "buffer zone" along the international border over setting conditions for deeper penetrations into northern Kharkiv Oblast.[2]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have stabilized the front in northern Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian forces have not reached Ukraine's "concrete" and "most powerful" line of defense in the area.[3] Zelensky stated that Russian forces have currently reached the "first line" that Ukrainian forces built further from the border and that Ukrainian forces have also built a second and third line of defense. Zelensky described the third line of defense as the "most powerful" as it is further from the border and was not under threat of Russian shelling during its construction. Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces have stabilized the situation in the area and that the deepest Russian forces have advanced is 10 kilometers, which is consistent with ISW's assessment of Russian advances near Lyptsi. Western and Ukrainian media reported on May 10 that Ukrainian military sources stated that Russian forces intend to establish a 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone along the northern border of Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian forces will likely prioritize leveling the front in northern Kharkiv Oblast at this depth over deeper penetrations.[4]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that elements of the Russian military command strengthened the Northern Grouping of Forces with elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army and 11th and 44th Army Corps (all of the Leningrad Military District [LMD]), echoing previous statements from Ukrainian military observers about the Northern Grouping of Forces' composition.[5] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces launched offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast "well ahead of schedule" when Ukrainian forces were "turning over," possibly referring to a Ukrainian troop rotation.[6] Russian forces made their narrow penetration towards Ocheretyne in late April by attacking during a Ukrainian brigade-level rotation on the frontline, and Russian forces may have sought to take advantage of similar situations to penetrate Ukrainian positions.[7]
Russian forces will likely be able to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wide front and fix Ukrainian troops in the international border area even as the tempo of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast slows. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces have expanded the area of active hostilities by about 70 kilometers since starting offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and are trying to force Ukrainian forces to commit brigades from reserves to the frontline.[8] ISW continues to assess that Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv international border likely have the strategic objective of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces to this axis to enable Russian advances in other areas of eastern Ukraine.[9] Geolocated footage published on May 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian tanks moving towards the international border near Sumy Oblast.[10] Even limited Russian activity in other areas of the international border below the threshold of Russian offensive operations could have the effect of stretching Ukrainian forces along a wider front. Russian forces will be able to draw and fix Ukrainian forces to the border area as long as Russia sustains a presence in northern Kharkiv Oblast and threatens penetrations of other border areas. Russian forces have shown a propensity for conducting offensive operations along different sectors of the front in "pulses" with one sector decreasing in intensity as another increases, and Russian forces may slow offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast for a time but resume the tempo at a later time of their choosing.[11]
Russian forces reportedly leveraged notable electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to support tactically significant gains during the first days of their limited offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Washington Post reported on May 17 that elements of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast lost connection to drone and communications systems due to intense Russian EW jamming when Russian forces began their incursion into Kharkiv Oblast on May 10.[12] The Washington Post reported that the Ukrainian soldiers stated that the Russian EW jamming completely disrupted Ukrainian forces' satellite internet connection via Starlink devices, reportedly the first time that Russian EW has completely knocked out Ukrainian Starlink connection since the start of the full-scale invasion.[13] A Ukrainian soldier told the Washington Post that these disruptions forced Ukrainian forces to communicate only through radio and phones and prevented Ukrainian forces from conducting basic reconnaissance.[14] Russian and Ukrainian forces have been in an offense-defense race involving EW systems and counter-EW adaptations, and it is notable that Russian forces were able to achieve such a widespread effect with their EW capabilities in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[15] Russian forces may have waited to deploy a new EW adaptation to achieve widespread disruptions during the beginning of their limited offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have previously adapted quickly to changes in each other's EW capabilities, and Russian forces may have decided that leveraging a new capability to make tactically significant gains at the outset of a new offensive operation would be the most worthwhile use of the capability's novelty.[16]
Senior NATO military commanders confirmed ISW's prior assessments that Russian forces do not have sufficient forces to achieve a "strategic breakthrough" in Ukraine. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe and US European Command Commander General Christopher Cavoli stated on May 16 that Russian forces do not have the necessary number of troops or the skill to conduct operations at the scale necessary to achieve and exploit a strategic-level breakthrough in Ukraine, and expressed confidence that Ukrainian forces will "hold the line" near Kharkiv City.[17] Cavoli noted that NATO member states have not observed Russian forces accumulate the resources required for such a breakthrough, further supporting ISW's recent assessments that Russian forces are unlikely to make operationally significant gains against more well-provisioned Ukrainian forces during the Russian summer offensive effort.[18] NATO commanders also indicated that Russian forces are preparing for a longer-term war effort, however. Cavoli stated that Russian forces have improved in some unspecified areas but failed to improve in others, but that the Russian military has proven that it is a learning organization.[19] NATO Military Committee Chairperson Lieutenant Admiral Rob Bauer stated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is more efficient than the Western DIB but that Russian forces still struggle with troop quality and training, all consistent with ISW's longstanding assessments about Russia's attempts to sustain its long-term war effort amid short to medium-term struggles with manpower and materiel.[20]
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of large-scale aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian energy and port infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea on the night of May 16 to 17. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on May 17 that its sources in Ukrainian intelligence stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Security Service (SBU) struck Russian military facilities in Novorossiysk and Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai and in occupied Sevastopol on the night of May 16 to 17.[21] The Ukrainian intelligence sources reportedly stated that the GUR and SBU targeted Black Sea Fleet (BSF) ships in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 17 that Russian forces destroyed 123 drones over Crimea and Krasnodar Krai and 25 unmanned boats in the Black Sea in the past day.[22] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched over 140 drones and 20 unmanned boats in the overnight strikes on Sevastopol and Krasnodar Krai.[23] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Ukrainian forces struck a port and fuel terminal in Novorossiysk.[24] The Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters stated that falling drone debris caused a fire at an oil refinery in Tuapse on the morning of May 17, and Russian milbloggers and opposition media posted footage of the Ukrainian strike on the Tuapse oil refinery.[25] Reuters reported that two unspecified sources stated that Russian authorities conducted an emergency shutdown of the Tuapse oil refinery after the drones hit the facility's liquified petroleum gas production unit but that the refinery will likely restart "relatively soon."[26] The SBU reportedly struck the Rosneft oil refinery in Tuapse in late January 2024, and Reuters reported that the oil refinery resumed operations in late April 2024.[27] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev stated that drone debris damaged a power substation near Sevastopol and caused partial blackouts in the city.[28]
US officials reiterated the White House's unwillingness to support Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons in strikes against military targets in Russia. US Defense Department Spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated on May 16 that the Biden Administration has not changed its position against Ukrainian forces using US weapons to strike targets within Russia and that the administration believes that the equipment should be used to liberate occupied Ukrainian territory.[29] ISW continues to assess that US and other Western limitations on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia have created a sanctuary in Russia's border areas from which Russian aircraft can conduct glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions and settlements and where Russian forces and equipment can freely assemble before entering combat.[30] This US policy is severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[31]
Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to further known Russian information operations intended to directly undermine Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president. Putin claimed during his press conference in Harbin on May 17 that the current Ukrainian government "has its origins" in a Western-facilitated coup d'état, referring to the Kremlin's information operation falsely asserting that Ukraine's Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 was an externally organized and funded coup against pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych that installed a series of pro-Western governments in Ukraine.[32] Putin additionally claimed that Ukraine's political and legal systems must determine if Zelensky will still be considered Ukraine's legitimate president when his first term technically expires on May 20. Ukraine would have held its presidential election on March 31 and would have begun a new presidential term on May 20 if Russia had not illegally invaded Ukraine.[33] Ukraine's constitution permits postponing elections and allows a sitting president to continue to serve after the designated end of his term under martial law, and Zelensky's decision not to hold elections given Ukraine's ongoing existential defensive war is fully in accord with the Ukrainian constitution.[34] Ukrainian officials have repeatedly warned that the Kremlin is currently running a series of information operations aimed at undermining and questioning Zelensky's legitimacy.[35]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin framed Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russian efforts to create a "buffer zone" to protect Russian border areas from Ukrainian strikes, confirming ISW's previous assessments.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have stabilized the front in northern Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian forces have not reached Ukraine's "concrete" and "most powerful" line of defense in the area.
- Russian forces will likely be able to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wide front and fix Ukrainian troops in the international border area even as the tempo of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast slows.
- Russian forces reportedly leveraged notable electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to support tactically significant gains during the first days of their limited offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Senior NATO military commanders confirmed ISW's prior assessments that Russian forces do not have sufficient forces to achieve a "strategic breakthrough" in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of large-scale aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian energy and port infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea on the night of May 16 to 17.
- US officials reiterated the White House's unwillingness to support Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons in strikes against military targets in Russia.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to further known Russian information operations intended to directly undermine Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the annual Russian-Chinese Expo and forum on interregional cooperation and visited Harbin Polytechnic University during the second and last day of his trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on May 17.
- Ukrainian and Western sources continue to report that Russian forces are committing war crimes in newly occupied areas of Kharkiv Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Lyptsi on May 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Lyptsi and Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hlyboke and are fighting on the outskirts of Lyptsi, with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces advanced 300 to 600 meters towards Lyptsi.[37] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are expanding their zone of control near Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi).[38] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian minefields are complicating and slowing Russian advances near Lyptsi and Zelene (east of Lyptsi).[39] Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov stated that Russian infantry is probing Ukrainian positions and attacking near Lyptsi in roughly squad to reduced company-sized groups and are taking advantage of dense forest areas that allow small groups to conduct concealed maneuvers.[40] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces are mostly conducting attacks with infantry but are also trying to use armored vehicles.[41] The Ukrainian commander stated that Ukrainian forces have destroyed up to half of the Russian vehicles involved in offensive operations.[42] Pasi Paroinen, an OSINT analyst with the Finnish Black Bird Group, stated that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements are participating in Russian offensive operations in an unspecified area of northern Kharkiv Oblast.[43] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 5 that an unspecified VDV battalion is part of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast, and a Russian milblogger, who has an avowed bias against the VDV and "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces Commander General Mikhail Teplinsky, claimed on May 5 that the Russian 104th VDV Regiment's (76th VDV Division) 3rd VDV battalion is in Kursk Oblast.[44] ISW has yet to observe confirmation that any VDV elements are participating in the limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Russian forces reportedly advanced near Vovchansk on May 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Tykhe (northeast of Vovchansk) and seized Zybyne (east of Vovchansk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[45] A Ukrainian sergeant operating near Vovchansk told the Wall Street Journal that Russian forces control the northern half of Vovchansk, although it is unclear if he means the entire section of Vovchansk north of the Vovcha River.[46] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russian forces have seized all of Vochansk north of the Vovcha River, however. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Vovchansk, near the Aggregate Plant and the Vovchansk Central District Hospital in central Vovchansk, and west of Vovchansk near Starytsa and Buhruvatka.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations near Starytsa and Vovchansk.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian serviceman who was recently operating near Vovchansk stated that Russian forces are trying to make up for insufficient counterbattery fire with guided glide bomb strikes but that Russian forces lack sufficient quantities of guided glide bombs.[49] The Russian servicemen allegedly claimed that some Russian artillery pieces are suffering from barrel wear and that Ukrainian drones are not allowing Russian forces to move to new firing positions.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces reportedly advanced northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna on May 17, although there were no confirmed changes to the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna front. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along a front 4.97 kilometers wide and 1.71 kilometers deep west and south of Krokhmalne (northwest of Svatove) and three kilometers towards Pishchane (northwest of Svatove).[50] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within northeastern Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna).[51] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Vilshana; northwest of Svatove near Ivanivka, Berestove, Kyslivka, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova.[52]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) near Spirne (east of Siversk), Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), and Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) on May 17.[53]
Russian forces continued assaults near Chasiv Yar on May 17 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted ground attacks near the Novyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka and Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Niu York.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kalynivka and that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in basements in western Bohdanivka.[55] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction, and elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) reportedly operate near Klishchiivka.[56]
Russian forces recently advanced northwest and west of Avdiivka amid continued offensive operations in the area on May 17. Geolocated footage published on May 15 and 16 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced along a windbreak southwest of Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) and along Neberezhna Street in western Netaylove (west of Avdiivka), respectively.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced east of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the Russian claim.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a tactical regrouping in an unspecified area of the Avdiivka direction due to Russian offensive operations.[59] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Arkhanhelske and Ocheretyne and west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka.[60]
Russian forces reportedly recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued attacks west and southwest of the city on May 17. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced up to the western outskirts of Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[61] Russian forces also continued ground assaults west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka; southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Novomykhailivka, and Pivdenne Mine No. 1; northeast of Vuhledar near Vodyane; and southeast of Vuhledar near Mykilske.[62] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar.[63]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on May 17 near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka).[64] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) continue to operate near Urozhaine.[65]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to clear Robotyne as of May 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on May 17 that Russian forces have not seized Robotyne.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that positional fighting continued near Verbove (east of Robotyne).[68] Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD) and the 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole (northeast of Robotyne).[69]
Russian forces intensified assaults against Ukrainian positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on May 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the front. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces intensified their assaults near the limited Ukrainian tactical bridgehead in Krynky over the past day but that Ukrainian forces have not lost any positions in the area.[70] Pletenchuk added that Russian forces have not tried to assault Nestryha island in the Dnipro River Delta in recent days.[71] Positional fighting continued between Oleshky Sands National Park and Krynky and Kozachi Laheri and Krynky.[72] Elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[73]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 16 to 17 and individual missile strikes on May 17. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 20 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces destroyed all 20 Shaheds over Kharkiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts on the night of May 16 to 17.[74] Odesa Oblast Military Administration head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian forces struck Odesa City with an unspecified number and type of missiles on May 17.[75]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the annual Russian-Chinese Expo and forum on interregional cooperation and visited Harbin Polytechnic University during the second and last day of his trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on May 17. Putin focused his remarks at both events on increased Russian-Chinese economic cooperation and cultural exchange.[76] Putin also met with PRC Vice Chairman Han Zheng.[77] ISW continues to assess that Putin likely views Russia's relationship with the PRC as decisive in his effort to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry to support a protracted war in Ukraine.[78] US State Department Spokesperson Dev Patel stated on May 16 that the US believes that the PRC's "reconstruction" of Russia's defense industry is deeply problematic and that the US continues to monitor the situation.[79]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues its effort to formalize its control over Russian irregular and volunteer forces. The Russian MoD published footage on May 17 showing Russian officials issuing vehicles and electronic warfare (EW) equipment to an unspecified BARS detachment (Combat Army Reserve) from Rostov Oblast.[80]
Regional Russian officials are reportedly recruiting lower-level Russian officials to join volunteer units and fight in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 17 that Kamchatka Krai Governor Vladimir Solodov recently called on other Kamchatka Krai regional and municipal officials and civil servants to join a volunteer unit and serve on the frontline in Ukraine.[81] Verstka's sources claimed that there is very little support for Solodov's initiative, and one source told Verstka that it is unlikely Solodov is pushing the initiative without a "command from above."
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian Strela Research and Production Association told Kremlin newswire TASS on MAY 17 that the company developed a new Strela drone variant that can strike Ukrainian targets as far as 35 kilometers from the frontline.[82] Strela claimed that the new drone has a number of unspecified developments that help overcome electronic warfare (EW) interference and that the drone is compact and easy to carry. Strela reported that the drone can operate for one and a half hours in reconnaissance mode or as a strike drone with a three-kilogram payload.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Ukrainian and Western sources continue to report that Russian forces are committing war crimes in newly occupied areas of Kharkiv Oblast. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal case on May 17 into the execution of a disabled civilian by advancing Russian forces in Vovchansk.[83] Ukrainian forces discovered the body of a deceased civilian in a wheelchair while conducting aerial reconnaissance over Vovchansk, and Ukrainian officials believe that Russian forces likely killed the civilian as the civilian attempted to flee from a nearby medical facility. Kharkiv Oblast Investigative Department Head Serhii Blovinov reported that Russian forces are holding 35 to 40 civilians hostage in a basement in Vovchansk next to a Russian command post and are essentially using the civilians as human shields, in apparent violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs and protected civilians.[84] Blovinov reported that Russian forces and self-identified Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) employees are interrogating the civilians.[85] A Ukrainian police officer in Vovchansk told the Wall Street Journal that Russian snipers fired on Ukrainian police officers attempting to protect and evacuate civilians from the settlement.[86] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported on May 16 that Russian forces are preventing residents from evacuating and are holding civilians captive in basements in northern Vovchansk and that Russian forces have begun to execute civilians.[87] The detention and summary execution of civilians is a war crime and is emblematic of Russian forces' behavior throughout occupied Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration reported on May 15 that Ukrainian officials returned an orphaned Ukrainian child from Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to their aunt in Ukrainian-controlled territory.[88]
Occupation officials continue efforts to settle Russian families in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Mariupol City Council reported on May 16 that over 7,800 more Russians have likely settled in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast in the past six months and that this number is based on the increased number of Russian school children in occupied Mariupol.[89] The Ukrainian Mariupol City Council reported that at least 2,600 more Russian children have enrolled in schools in occupied Mariupol since September 2023 and noted that occupation officials are attempting to Russify Mariupol.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Putin continued to use his visit to China on May 17 to promote longstanding boilerplate information operations about Russia's feigned interest in negotiations.[90] Putin repeatedly referenced a Russian information operation alleging that Western officials previously coerced Ukraine to reject an agreement favorable to Russia during a press conference with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping.[91] Putin claimed that the PRC is sincerely trying to solve the war in Ukraine, attempting to depict the PRC as a neutral mediator in the hopes that Chinese involvement in envisioned negotiation processes may lead to negotiations that are more favorable to Russia.[92] The Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations in hopes of undermining Western support for Ukraine and prompting the West to offer concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers continue to allege that Romania and the Moldovan government are threatening Moldovan language and culture as part of Kremlin information operations that aim to justify future Russian aggression in all of Moldova.[93] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently accused the Moldovan government of engaging in a Nazi-like "genocide" in Moldova — a notable inflection in Kremlin rhetoric about Moldova that is likely meant to set conditions for a Russian effort to secure control over Moldova and not just Moldova's two pro-Russian regions.[94]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
15. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 17, 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-17-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Post-War Governance: Hamas is continuing to discuss its desired political end state in which a Hamas-influenced government governs the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu separately suggested he would be open to a post-war Gaza that excludes the Palestinian Authority. Several senior Israeli officials have recently criticized Netanyahu for his unwillingness to define a post-war plan.
- Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces described the fighting in Jabalia as some of the most intense of the war.
- Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in several areas of eastern Rafah.
- Humanitarian Aid: Aid trucks began transporting supplies from the US-constructed offshore pier into the Gaza Strip.
- West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank.
- Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel.
- Iran: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed that Iran launched 162 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 100 ballistic missiles during its April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel.
- Yemen: Houthi Spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea claimed that Houthi air defenses shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over a Houthi-controlled area of Ma’rib Governorate, Yemen.
- Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting Israel.
IRAN UPDATE, MAY 17, 2024
May 17, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, May 17, 2024
Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Thomas Bergeron, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Hamas is continuing to discuss its desired political end state in which a Hamas-influenced government governs the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh gave a speech on May 15 that outlined this end state, which will include an “administration” for the post-war Gaza Strip that Hamas will build alongside “all [Palestinian] factions.”[1] Hamas has had a vision for the post-war Gaza Strip since at least late December 2023, when Haniyeh said Hamas was open to a national unity government including Hamas that would rule both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[2] Both Russia and China have supported this effort since at least February 2024. Russia facilitated Hamas-Fatah talks in February 2024 that sought to achieve "Palestinian unity,” and China hosted senior Hamas and Fatah officials in Beijing on April 26 to "strive for the early realization of Palestinian unity and reunification.”[3] Fatah is the party that controls the Palestinian Authority and would be the main Hamas governing partner in a unity government.
Hamas probably sees an opportunity to exploit this war and Hamas’ relative popularity in the West Bank to expand its political control in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Fatah leader and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 88 years old and has not identified a successor.[4] Hamas almost certainly views the lack of a successor and Abbas’ age as a weakness it will be able to exploit once Abbas dies. The war has also increased Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank, according to a Palestinian polling organization. Thirty-five percent of West Bankers support Hamas as of March 2024 compared to 12% of West Bankers in September 2023.[5] Only 12% of West Bankers support Fatah as of March 2024, and 47% of West Bankers support no party.[6] Hamas likely assesses it can leverage these trends to improve its political position vis-a-vis Fatah and Israel by expanding Hamas’ political control to the West Bank.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggested that he would be open to a post-war Gazan authority that excludes the Palestinian Authority.[7] Netanyahu made unspecified comments that suggested his openness to a local authority in the Gaza Strip during a cabinet meeting. This follows criticism from several senior Israeli officials, including the defense minister, who oppose establishing a military government in the Gaza Strip and demand a clear post-war plan.[8] Netanyahu suggested that a "non-Hamas civilian administration with overall Israeli military responsibility" could govern the Strip during an interview with CNBC in April 2024.[9] Israel has reportedly engaged with Palestinians unaffiliated with Hamas during the war to discuss governance issues, including managing the Rafah crossing and distributing and securing aid.[10]
Key Takeaways:
- Post-War Governance: Hamas is continuing to discuss its desired political end state in which a Hamas-influenced government governs the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu separately suggested he would be open to a post-war Gaza that excludes the Palestinian Authority. Several senior Israeli officials have recently criticized Netanyahu for his unwillingness to define a post-war plan.
- Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces described the fighting in Jabalia as some of the most intense of the war.
- Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in several areas of eastern Rafah.
- Humanitarian Aid: Aid trucks began transporting supplies from the US-constructed offshore pier into the Gaza Strip.
- West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank.
- Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel.
- Iran: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed that Iran launched 162 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 100 ballistic missiles during its April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel.
- Yemen: Houthi Spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea claimed that Houthi air defenses shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over a Houthi-controlled area of Ma’rib Governorate, Yemen.
- Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting Israel.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
Israeli forces described the fighting in Jabalia as some of the most intense of the war. The IDF began clearing operations in Jabalia on May 11 and reached the city center by May 17.[11] Palestinian militias have maintained the highest daily attack rate of the war in Jabalia. Israeli officers told Israeli media that the engagements with Palestinian fighters, both above and below ground, have been the "most violent" of the war, highlighting the challenges of maneuvering through the narrow alleys of Jabalia refugee camp.[12] Palestinian militias have been using explosive devices and firing rocket-propelled grenades.[13] Israeli forces have killed about 200 Palestinian fighters and detained 40 for questioning during the operation so far.[14]
Palestinian militias sustained a high rate of attacks in Jabalia on May 17. The militias claimed 22 attacks.[15] Hamas claimed that it disrupted Israeli ground lines of communication east of the Jabalia refugee camp by attacking Israeli armored personnel carriers and infantry.[16] Hamas said that these attacks forced the IDF to change its supply lines multiple times.[17] The IDF has not commented on the Hamas attacks. Commercially available satellite imagery captured in May 2024 shows a newly cleared track along the Shaashaa Road east of Jabalia, indicating Israeli efforts to build and protect a road to support operations in Jabalia. Israeli forces originally cleared terrain along the Shaashaa Road in late 2023, according to commercially available satellite imagery.
The IDF published a summary of its activity in Zaytoun neighborhood, southern Gaza City, after completing a re-clearing operation there on May 16.[18] Israeli forces initially launched the operation in Zaytoun on May 8, marking the third time that the IDF has conducted a clearing operation there.[19] The IDF reported that its forces destroyed rocket launchers, a Hamas headquarters, tunnels, and a lathe for producing weapons.[20] The IDF Air Force struck more than 100 targets in the area. Israeli forces also engaged Palestinian fighters and destroyed infrastructure along the Netzarim corridor south of Gaza City. The IDF has not confirmed whether Israeli forces have withdrawn from Zaytoun following the operation.
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in several areas of eastern Rafah on May 17. The IDF 401st Brigade destroyed rocket launch sites east of Rafah and found launchers for long-range rockets.[21] Israeli forces have located and destroyed several tunnel shafts in the area but have not confirmed whether these tunnels cross into Egypt.[22] The Israeli representative to the Hague said on May 17 that Israel has identified nearly 700 tunnel shafts in Rafah and approximately 50 of the 700 tunnels cross into Egyptian territory.[23] The Israeli representative said that Hamas uses the tunnels to smuggle itself weapons and that Hamas could be using the tunnels to smuggle hostages or Hamas senior operatives out of the Gaza Strip.[24] Palestinians developed tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt to smuggle goods under the border several decades ago.[25] Several Palestinian militias targeted Israeli command positions and forces in eastern Rafah—including at the Rafah crossing—with rocket and mortar fire.[26]
Israeli forces recovered the bodies of three hostages in a tunnel in the Gaza Strip.[27] The IDF spokesperson made the announcement on May 17.[28] Palestinian fighters killed the three hostages during Hamas’ October 7 attack at the Nova music festival and took the bodies into the Gaza Strip.[29] Israeli forces located the bodies using information from detained Palestinian fighters.[30]
Aid trucks began transporting supplies from the US-constructed offshore pier into the Gaza Strip on May 17.[31] The United Kingdom supplied the aid and has been coordinating logistics in Cyprus, where the aid is inspected.[32] The World Food Programme will deliver the aid to other agencies or distribute it directly.[33] The aid is destined for both the northern and southern Gaza Strip. The UN anticipates minimal delays at Israeli checkpoints because the aid has been pre-inspected in Cyprus.[34]
The Washington Post published several satellite images on May 17 that show the development and size of Israeli forward operating bases along the Netzarim Corridor south of Gaza City[35] Israeli forces have established forward operating bases along the corridor, which runs east-west across the Gaza Strip, to facilitate future raids into the northern Gaza Strip.[36] The corridor meets with the US-constructed offshore pier to facilitate humanitarian aid shipments. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the IDF has enhanced radar and observation capabilities at some military positions.
Israeli media obtained an Israeli government document that describes the cost of an Israeli military occupation of the Gaza Strip.[37] The document claimed that occupation would cost 20 billion NIS (roughly 5 billion USD) per year and require five permanent IDF divisions in the Strip. The IDF would be required to dramatically increase the number of reserve soldiers and reduce its forces in IDF Northern and Central Command.
The Arab League called on May 16 for a United Nations peacekeeping force to deploy into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank until a two-state solution can be negotiated.[38] UN spokesperson Farhan Haq said this is the first time that the Arab League has made the request in a written document. US State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel said that bringing in “additional security forces” could potentially compromise Israel’s campaign to dismantle Hamas when asked about whether the United States would support deploying peacekeepers.[39]
Palestinian militias conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on May 17.[40] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Resistance Committees fired rockets from Jabalia refugee camp in a combined attack targeting Sderot.[41] An Israeli war correspondent noted that Palestinian militias have been increasingly firing rockets at Sderot as Israeli forces advance in Jabalia.[42] Palestinian militias have repeatedly fired rockets into Israel as Israeli ground forces approached launch sites during the war.[43]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 16.[44] Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces during operations in Tubas.[45]
Dozens of Israeli settlers attacked an Israeli truck driver and set fire to his truck in Kochav Hashachar, northeast of Ramallah, on May 16.[46] Israeli media reported that the settlers believed the truck was transporting humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.[47] The IDF said that two officers and one soldier were injured as the IDF intervened.[48] The IDF added that it would act ”to the fullest extent of the law” against anyone who attacks IDF soldiers or Israeli security forces.
Israeli settlers and organizations have repeatedly disrupted the delivery of aid to the Gaza Strip from the West Bank since the Israel-Hamas War began.[49] The Times of Israel reported that two unspecified US officials said on May 16 that the Biden administration was looking into sanctioning Israeli settlers involved in the attacks against aid convoys.[50] White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on May 13 called the recent attacks a “total outrage“ and said that the United States is looking into tools it could use to respond.[51]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
- Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
- Expel the United States from Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 16.[52] The IDF said that unspecified fighters fired 75 "munitions” from Lebanon targeting Israeli territory.[53] The IDF added that it intercepted dozens of these munitions. Hezbollah said that it fired 50 rockets targeting an Israeli logistics base in the Golan Heights and that it fired another rocket salvo targeting Israeli forces in al Zaoura in northern Israel shortly after.[54] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the attacks injured two Israeli civilians.[55]
Hezbollah has claimed firing salvos with dozens of rockets into Israel several times per month since February 2023.[56] Hezbollah said it fired more than 100 rockets targeting Israeli forces in northern Israel on March 12, marking one of its largest attacks since the Israel-Hamas War began.[57]
The IDF killed a Hamas commander in a strike in Lebanon on May 17. An IDF drone strike killed a Hamas commander in Majdal Anjar in the Bekaa Governorate in Lebanon on May 17.[58] An unspecified source close to Hamas told Agence France-Presse that the commander was responsible for Hamas activity in the Bekaa region.[59] Hamas mourned the death of the commander on May 17.[60]
The IDF also killed a Hezbollah commander in a second strike on May 17. An IDF airstrike killed a senior Hezbollah air force commander in Najariyah, southern Lebanon, according to Israeli sources.[61] The IDF confirmed that it conducted strikes targeting Hezbollah compounds in the same area on May 17.[62] Israeli sources reported that the commander was responsible for firing one-way attack drones at Israel.[63] Hezbollah mourned the death of the commander on May 17.[64]
IDF Northern Command Maj. Gen. Uri Gordin and Home Front Command Maj. Gen. Rafi Milo met at Northern Command headquarters on May 16.[65] Gordin and Milo discussed the continued defense of northern Israel in various conflict scenarios and creating conditions for displaced civilians to return to northern Israel.
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed on May 16 that Iran launched 162 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 100 ballistic missiles during its April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel.[66] The IDF previously stated on April 14 that Iran launched approximately 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles.[67] Senior Iranian leaders have previously claimed that Iran’s April 13 attack was a ”success.”[68] Iranian officials have separately stated that Iran has adopted a new “equation” for confronting Israel under which Iran will retaliate by launching attacks targeting Israel directly from Iranian territory should Israel attack Iran or Iranian targets abroad.[69]
The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) arrested over 230 individuals on charges of performing “acts of satanism” in Shahriar city, 30 km west of Tehran, on May 16.[70] The arrest included three European citizens.[71] The arrested individuals were accused of wearing satanic symbols on their clothes and bodies, drinking alcohol, and consuming psychedelic substances.
Houthi Spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea claimed that Houthi air defenses shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over a Houthi-controlled area of Ma’rib Governorate, Yemen, on May 16.[72] Sarea claimed the Houthis used a surface-to-air missile to shoot down the drone.[73] CENTCOM has not acknowledged the incident. CTP-ISW cannot verify that the Houthis shot down an MQ-9.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed one drone attack targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on May 16.[74] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed to strike an unspecified “vital” target in Eilat, southern Israel.[75] CTP-ISW cannot verify that the claimed attack occurred.
The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-aligned Shia political parties—held an “emergency meeting” on May 16 to discuss the selection of the next speaker of the Council of Representatives.[76] The Shia Coordination Framework called for all members of parliament to attend the May 18 election of a new parliament speaker. Iraqi parliament must reach a two-thirds quorum on May 18 to hold the vote.[77]
16. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 17, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2024
Key Takeaways:
- The Fujian provincial government in the PRC launched a series of economic initiatives that aim to build political support in Taiwan for cross-strait integration. Promoting economic ties between Fujian and Taiwan’s outer islands furthers the PRC’s efforts to establish greater political influence over ROC municipalities.
- The United States and PRC held their first bilateral government negotiations on artificial intelligence risks and governance in Geneva, Switzerland on May 14.
- The PRC may make an upcoming PRC-South Korea summit conditional on South Korea not sending a delegation to Taiwan President-elect Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20.
- The PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in three areas of the South China Sea to signal its resolve amid heightened tensions with the Philippines.
- CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held a series of meetings with European and Russian leaders in April and May, after which he likely concluded that the PRC could maintain and deepen economic ties with Europe while continuing to support Russia’s war against Ukraine.
CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 17, 2024
May 17, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 17, 2024
Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: May 16 at Noon ET
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways:
- The Fujian provincial government in the PRC launched a series of economic initiatives that aim to build political support in Taiwan for cross-strait integration. Promoting economic ties between Fujian and Taiwan’s outer islands furthers the PRC’s efforts to establish greater political influence over ROC municipalities.
- The United States and PRC held their first bilateral government negotiations on artificial intelligence risks and governance in Geneva, Switzerland on May 14.
- The PRC may make an upcoming PRC-South Korea summit conditional on South Korea not sending a delegation to Taiwan President-elect Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20.
- The PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in three areas of the South China Sea to signal its resolve amid heightened tensions with the Philippines.
- CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held a series of meetings with European and Russian leaders in April and May, after which he likely concluded that the PRC could maintain and deepen economic ties with Europe while continuing to support Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The Fujian provincial government in the PRC launched a series of initiatives aimed at building political support in Taiwan for cross-strait integration.[1] Among the services that the Fujan provincial government announced on April 28 is the “Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass,” a 300 RMB benefits card that facilitates the travel and settlement of Matsu residents in Fuzhou. The card offers Matsu residents discounted rides on transportation and hotels in Fuzhou, free tours of Fuzhou's major cultural attractions, housing benefits, and dedicated hotline consultation for children's education, employment, and entrepreneurship.[2] The Fujian government also announced that it will promote the construction of transportation and industrial infrastructure, such as airports, high-speed rails, highways, and ports, to increase connectivity between Fuzhou and Matsu.
The Fujian government announced the new programs on the same day that Kuomintang (KMT) Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi met with Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao. The PRC’s announcement during Fu’s visit follows a pattern of showcasing cooperative policies to portray the KMT as a good faith partner that produces favorable outcomes for cross-strait relations.
Municipal offices in the Matsu Islands facilitated residents’ participation in the PRC initiatives. Municipal offices in Matsu (officially Lienchiang County) began assisting in the collection of the card applicants’ information in March after county Magistrate Wang Chung-ming met with Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee Secretary Lin Baojin.[3] The county Transportation and Tourism Bureau processed the information and forwarded it to the PRC for card printing.[4] Deputy Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chan Chih-hung stated at a press conference on May 9 that the MAC initially warned the Lienchiang County government about the possible illegality of cooperating with the PRC in processing applications and highlighted the danger of transferring citizens’ personal information.[5]
Promoting economic ties between Fujian and Taiwan’s outer islands furthers the PRC’s efforts to establish greater political influence over ROC municipalities. The purpose of intertwining the local economies and increased cross-strait interaction is to positively affect the livelihoods of residents in Taiwan’s outer islands and make decoupling a politically unpopular policy. Targeting Taiwan’s economically vulnerable and isolated outer islands enables the PRC to establish its influence at a local level without having to engage with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) central government, with which the PRC severed official communication in 2016.
The PRC has already made political inroads by promoting cross-strait travel links. The PRC and ROC islands of Kinmen and Matsu expanded links in transportation, trade, and postal services in 2008 after decades of lobbying by the PRC. The PRC refers to these services between the PRC and Taiwan's outer islands as the "Three Little Links."[6] The PRC’s promotion of cross-strait travel has resonated with Kinmen residents, especially with whom political support for a bridge to connect the island to the mainland is strong.[7] The PRC has capitalized on that political support to promote the development of the Fujian “demonstration zone for integrated cross-strait development.”[8]
The measures are part of a broader PRC program unveiled in September 2023 that seeks to cultivate Fujian province as a “demonstration zone” for cross-strait integration by promoting infrastructure linkages and economic incentives with Taiwan.[9] The sweeping initiative aims to make Fujian, a region that shares a cultural and linguistic heritage with Taiwan, into a hub for “merged development” by attracting Taiwanese people and businesses.[10] Other measures include establishing a service center to accommodate Taiwanese firms transitioning to Fujian, offering preferential loans to Taiwanese businesses, and providing professional training programs to increase employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for Taiwanese people in Fujian.[11] The initiative entails creating a “joint living circle” between Fuzhou and Matsu, which the PRC is promoting by popularizing programs such as the Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass. The Fuzhou city government announced an additional ten policies on May 16 at the Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Fair that aim to draw in Matsu residents and enterprises.[12]
The dominant parties in Taiwan—the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT)—voiced opposing stances on the PRC initiatives. Democratic Progressive Party Secretary-General Rosalia Wu labeled the program a tool of the PRC’s United Front political strategy to assimilate Taiwan and called on the Lienchiang County government to stop acting as an agent of the PRC’s political influence.[13] DPP legislator Lin Chu-yin questioned National Security Bureau (NSB) Deputy Director Hsu Hsi-hsiang on May 13 whether the Matsu government’s cooperation in submitting the applications constituted a violation of the Cross-Strait Act and enabled the PRC to spread its influence.[14] Hsu replied that the NSB would work with the MAC to determine whether the Matsu government’s cooperation with the program broke the law. Hsu mentioned that the program received approximately 3,000 applicants, almost a quarter of Lienchiang County’s population of 13,000. The Lienchiang County government suspended assistance in applying for the card in April.
Kuomintang (KMT) Secretary-General Hung Mong-kai stated at the same press conference that cross-strait tourism was an “olive branch” that could bring the two sides of the strait closer together. Fu announced that the KMT will propose a resolution in the Legislative Yuan to lift restrictions on cross-strait tourism and prioritize facilitating mainland tourists’ travel to Taiwan’s outer islands.[15]
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the United States for participating in joint naval exercises with Taiwan in the Pacific in April. Reuters reported on May 14 that Taiwan and the United States conducted unpublicized drills in the Western Pacific, according to unnamed sources. ROC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Sun Li-fang responded to the claim on May 14, stating that the Taiwanese navy carried out routine exercises with the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, referring to a non-binding code that aims to prevent confrontations between different navies at sea.[16] The United States is a signatory to the agreement. Taiwan abides by the code even though it is not a signatory. MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin criticized the United States in a press conference the same day, urging the US to “earnestly abide by the one-China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, and stop the erroneous act of military collusion.”[17]
China
The United States and PRC held their first bilateral government negotiations on artificial intelligence (AI) risks and governance in Geneva, Switzerland on May 14. The meeting was the first under an intragovernmental dialogue on AI that US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed to launch during their meeting in San Francisco in November 2023.[18] The US delegation included officials from the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Commerce. The PRC delegation included officials from the MFA, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the CCP Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission. An unnamed US official told the South China Morning Post that the first round of talks was not intended to focus on deliverables but instead was an initial exchange of views about the technical risks of AI.[19]
A US readout said that the two sides “exchanged perspectives on their respective approaches to AI safety and risk management” in a “candid and constructive” discussion. The United States also raised concerns over the misuse of AI, including by the PRC.[20] The United States has made a declaration that only humans, and never AI, would make decisions about deploying nuclear weapons. It has urged the PRC to make a similar commitment.[21] The PRC has not responded to this US demand, however, and readouts from both sides of the May 14 talks did not mention military applications of AI.
A PRC readout said that the PRC supports strengthening the global governance of artificial intelligence with the United Nations as the main channel. It said it is willing to strengthen communication and coordination with the international community, including the United States, to form a global AI governance framework and standards with broad consensus. The PRC also expressed its “solemn stance” on the US restrictions and “suppression of China” in the field of AI.[22] An MFA spokesperson objected to a proposed US AI export control bill on May 10. He urged the United States not to “politicize” trade, science, and technology. He also called on the United States to stop protectionist practices, restrictions on PRC science and technology, and disruptions to the international economic order.[23]
The PRC condemned the US imposition of new tariffs on PRC goods. The US government announced on May 14 that it would further increase tariffs on PRC goods including electric vehicles, batteries, solar cells, minerals, semiconductors, steel and aluminum, cranes, and medical equipment.[24] A PRC Ministry of Commerce spokesperson claimed the United States was abusing the Section 301 tariff review process out of “domestic political considerations.” It said the tariffs violate WTO rules and US President Joe Biden’s commitment to not “seek to suppress and contain China’s development” and not to decouple from the PRC.[25] An MFA spokesperson said the United States was “compounding” its mistakes and that the tariffs would primarily hurt US consumers. Both spokespeople said the PRC would take unspecified measures to protect its interests.[26]
The PLA claimed it “expelled” the USS Halsey after the ship “illegally broke into” waters around the Paracel Islands. PLA Southern Theater Command spokesperson Colonel Tian Junli claimed PLA air and naval forces “monitored, warned, and expelled” the Halsey destroyer ship on May 10 after it “illegally” entered the “territorial waters” around the Paracel Islands without PRC permission. Tian claimed the US transit violated PRC sovereignty and security. He also claimed it was “ironclad evidence” that the United States is pursuing “navigational hegemony,” is militarizing the South China Sea, and is a “security risk creator.”[27] The US 7th Fleet said that the Halsey carried out a Freedom of Navigation Operation to challenge restrictions on innocent passage around the Paracel Islands by the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and to challenge the PRC’s claim to straight baselines around the islands. It did not mention any confrontation with PLA forces.[28] The PRC administers the Paracel Islands and calls them the “Xisha Islands.” Taiwan and Vietnam also claim the islands.
The PRC claims straight archipelagic baselines around the Paracel Islands, which means it considers all the water between the islands as its territorial waters. The PRC also requires foreign ships to get permission or provide advance notification when they sail through its territorial waters. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not permit countries to restrict “innocent passage” through their territorial waters. “Innocent passage” is uninterrupted transit through the waters without other activities such as fishing, research, intelligence collection, or military activities. UNCLOS also only permits designated archipelagic states to draw straight-baseline claims around their islands. Non-archipelagic states, such as the PRC, can only claim waters up to 12 nautical miles from their shores as their territorial sea.[29]
The PRC framed US-UK-Australia nuclear submarine cooperation as a threat to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime at a seminar in Vienna. The PRC permanent mission in Vienna hosted a seminar on May 10 entitled “AUKUS: A Case Study about the Development of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards.” An MFA spokesperson claimed over 100 attendees from the missions of nearly 50 countries, think tanks, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in “heated discussions” about IAEA supervision of AUKUS, the US-UK-Australia security partnership. The spokesperson claimed that the nuclear submarine cooperation within AUKUS undermines regional security, provokes arms races and “confrontation between camps,” and has triggered “widespread concerns” about nuclear proliferation. He further claimed the trilateral cooperation undermines the effectiveness of the IAEA and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because existing institutional safeguards and oversight mechanisms cannot effectively supervise the transfer of nuclear reactors and large amounts of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium involved in the AUKUS submarine deal. He urged the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia to stop promoting nuclear submarine cooperation.[30]
The PRC reference to “nuclear submarine cooperation” refers to the AUKUS plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia, which includes at least three submarines from the United States and nuclear reactors constructed in the United Kingdom.[31] The NPT bans the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states, such as Australia, but permits the transfer of fissile material to non-nuclear states without IAEA inspection if the material is not for use in explosive devices.[32] The PRC has accused the United States and the United Kingdom of violating the “object and purpose” of the NPT by transferring fissile material to Australia, however.[33] The PRC seminar in Vienna came less than two weeks before an upcoming IAEA conference in Vienna from May 20-24.[34] The PRC may raise the issue of the AUKUS nuclear submarine deals at the conference or seek to include language about the issue in a joint ministerial declaration produced by ministers attending the conference.
Northeast Asia
South Korea
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi acknowledged “difficulties and challenges” in the PRC-ROK relationship during talks with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul. The talks in Beijing on May 13 were the first bilateral foreign minister talks between the two countries since 2022. The two countries’ relations have been strained over South Korea’s increasingly close security and economic relationship with the United States.[35] The PRC readout of the meeting said Wang acknowledged the PRC-ROK relationship has faced “difficulties and challenges” lately but hoped the two countries could enhance mutual trust and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation on trade and development. Wang also urged South Korea to “abide by the one-China principle [and] properly and prudently handle Taiwan-related issues.”[36] The readout did not elaborate on the “difficulties and challenges” Wang referred to. The ROK readout of the meeting said Cho also agreed the two countries should enhance mutual trust and strengthen economic cooperation. Cho also raised concerns about North Korea’s recent “provocations” and illicit military cooperation with Russia. He called on the PRC to strengthen its constructive role for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the denuclearization of North Korea and urged the PRC not to repatriate North Korean defectors against their will.[37] The PRC readout did not mention these issues.
The PRC may condition the holding of a future PRC-ROK summit on whether South Korea sends a delegation to Taiwan President-elect Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20. President of the Seoul-based Korea-China Global Association Woo Su-yuen, whom Korean media described as a “longtime adviser to Chinese policymakers,” said PRC Premier Li Qiang would attend a PRC-South Korea-Japan trilateral summit at the end of May. The three countries have not announced an exact date for the summit, but media reports say it will likely take place on May 26-27. Woo also claimed top PRC State Council and CCP officials privately said during his visit to the PRC in April that Beijing would only agree to a separate bilateral PRC-ROK summit if South Korea honors its commitment not to send a delegation to the presidential inauguration of Lai Ching-te in Taiwan on May 20.[38]
Making bilateral talks contingent on South Korea's decision not to send a delegation to Lai’s inauguration is consistent with the PRC’s willingness to suspend dialogue to punish other countries for engaging with Taiwan. The PRC suspended military dialogue with the United States after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022 and did not resume the dialogue until after the Biden-Xi meeting in November 2023.[39]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in three areas of the South China Sea to signal its resolve amid heightened tensions with the Philippines. The PRC is deploying research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal, potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from last month when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to reclaim Sabina Shoal. The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough in an attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying fishermen near Scarborough Shoal. The PRC asserts that the United States and the Philippines are driving tensions in the region, however, through joint exercises and by forming a coalition against the PRC.
The PRC deployed research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal, which may be part of a campaign to reclaim the island and prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to Second Thomas Shoal. Sabina Shoal is roughly 37 miles east of the Second Thomas Shoal and is the staging point for Philippine resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal. The resupply missions enabled the Philippines to maintain the Sierra Madre, a dilapidated World War II-era naval ship that the Philippines ran aground at Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 to serve as a military detachment.[40]
The PRC has sent an unspecified number of research vessels and divers to Sabina Shoal since early May, which prompted the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to deploy a ship near Sabina Shoal on May 11 in response.[41] PCG Spokesman Jay Tarriela expressed concern on May 11 about the PRC dumping crushed corals at Sabina Shoal, which he warned was a preparatory step to allow the PRC the option to build structures upon the shoal as part of a reclamation effort.[42] He also stated on May 13 that the PCG’s mission is to prevent the PRC from “carrying out a successful reclamation in Sabina Shoal.”[43] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin denied Tarriela’s assertion and accused the Philippines of misleading the international community.[44]
A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would extend the PRC’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal. A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would also provide the PRC with the opportunity to build a military facility to the east of the Second Thomas Shoal. This would surround the Second Thomas Shoal with PRC military facilities, which would enhance the difficulty of Philippine resupply missions. The Filipino troops stationed on the Sierra Madre as well as the ship’s structural integrity depend on Philippine resupply missions.
The malign PRC activities at the Sabina Shoal come as the PRC alleges that the Philippines has violated a series of secret and informal agreements about the Second Thomas Shoal since 2016. The PRC claims are part of a malign influence campaign to secure PRC control over the Second Thomas Shoal and frame the Philippines as the belligerent in the South China Sea. The PRC Embassy to the Philippines claimed on May 2, 2024, that Xi Jinping and then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte reached an unwritten “temporary special arrangement” in 2016 about the Philippines’ access to the waters near Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC alleged that they concluded the arrangement as a gentleman's agreement with two stipulations. First, Philippine fishing vessels would have access to the waters near Second Thomas Shoal. Philippine military and police ships needed to stay at least twelve nautical miles away from the shoal, however.[45] Second, the Philippines would not transport construction materials to repair the Sierra Madre, a dilapidated World War II-era naval ship on Second Thomas Shoal that the Philippines deliberately ran aground in 1999 to serve as a military detachment.[46] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning clarified that if the Philippines needed to replenish the Sierra Madre with necessities for the personnel there, it must notify the PRC in advance, which will approve and supervise the process.[47]
PRC MFA Spokesman Lin Jian claimed on May 6, 2024, that the PRC reached another unspecified “gentleman’s agreement” in 2021 with the Philippine government under then-President Rodrigo Duterte. Lin claimed the Philippines violated this agreement in February 2023 without specifying the contents of the agreement or how the Philippines had failed to comply with it. Lin also claimed that the PRC negotiated a “new model” at “the beginning of this year [2024]” that received the approval of “all key officials in the Philippine chain of command, including the Secretary of National Defense and the National Security Advisor.”[48] Lin then stated that the Philippines carried out a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on February 2 before abandoning this “new model.” [49]
Philippine political leadership denies the existence of these alleged agreements. Duterte denied ever making a “gentleman’s agreement” with Xi, however, and claimed that the 2016 meeting helped keep the status quo of peace in the South China Sea. Duterte also claimed that Xi threatened to go to war if the Philippines exercised its economic rights in the South China Sea.[50] Current Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. deems the alleged agreement illegitimate since it was a “secret agreement” hidden from the public.[51] Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and National Security Advisor Eduardo Año denied agreeing to the PRC-alleged “new model” on May 5.[52] The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs also stated on May 5 that “no cabinet-level official of the administration has agreed to any Chinese proposal pertaining to Ayungin Shoal [Second Thomas Shoal].”[53]
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels surrounding Scarborough Shoal failed to prevent a successful resupply mission to Filipino fishermen by the civilian group Atin Ito. At least 4 CCG and 26 CMM vessels are at Scarborough Shoal awaiting the Atin Ito convoy as of May 14.[54] 1 PLA Navy, 8 CCG, and 34 CMM vessels sailed to the east of Scarborough Shoal to prevent the Atin Ito convoy from reaching the shoal on May 15.[55] SeaLight Director Ray Powell noted this is the largest-ever blockade at Scarborough.[56] The Atin Ito convoy comprises 5 commercial fishing vessels and 100 small fishing boats that aim to deliver supplies such as food and fuel to the fisherman.[57] The Atin Ito convoy is independent of the Philippine government even though the BRP Bacagay is escorting the convoy.[58] An advance party of the Atin Ito convoy delivered 1,000 liters of fuel and 200 food packs near Scarborough Shoal on May 16.[59] The convoy leaders declared the mission accomplished on May 16 in light of this news and decided to not sail closer to Scarborough Shoal.[60]
The CCP English language propaganda outlet Global Times released articles and a video maligning the Philippines to portray the Philippines as irresponsible to the Atin Ito convoy. It claimed on May 13 that Atin Ito is using the fishermen as “human shields” and that the organization is a “hired gun” of the United States that has “continuously stirred up troubles” in the South China Sea.[61] Global Times also released an edited video showing Philippine fishermen polluting the environment by spitting, urinating, and dumping garbage at sea.[62]
A PLA Navy (PLAN) destroyer division carried out anti-missile and anti-submarine drills in the South China Sea. The PLA Southern Theater Command (STC) posted a video of the drill on May 10, the day the US-Philippine annual Balikatan military exercise in the South China Sea concluded.[63] The drill included the powerful Type 055 guided-missile destroyer Zunyi and other ships including the destroyer Haikou, destroyer Kunming, and frigate Xianning. The STC said the ships were deployed in “sea-strike tactical formation” for training that focused on sea warfare, air defense and anti-missile warfare, and submarine warfare. The drill also included simulated nighttime strikes on onshore targets and exercises involving buoys.[64] PRC state-owned media Global Times reported that PLAN task forces led by Type 055 destroyers conducted multiple exercises around the South China Sea over the past month, including four PLAN ships that traversed the Sibutu Strait near the southern Philippines on May 2.[65]
Europe
Xi held a series of meetings with European and Russian leaders in April and May, after which he likely concluded that the PRC could maintain and deepen economic ties with Europe while continuing to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Xi emphasized the benefits of cooperation between Europe and the PRC and rejected concerns about Sino-Russian ties and support that the PRC is providing to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Xi said during his April meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on April 16 that PRC and German industrial and supply chains are “deeply embedded” in one another and claimed this is not a “risk” but a guarantee of future relations – a possible reference to the European Union’s “de-risking” policies toward the PRC. He stressed that the two countries have “huge potential” for “win-win cooperation,” including in green development, and said both sides should be wary of protectionism. He said that the PRC hopes for a “fair, open, and non-discriminatory German market.”[66] Xi also stressed cooperation during his May 5 meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. He said he hopes that “EU institutions… [will] formulate a positive policy towards China” and build “an industrial and supply chain partnership that is stable and mutually trustworthy.”[67] Xi’s statements aligned with a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on April 27 in the leadup to Xi’s trip that emphasized the necessity of avoiding “confrontation between camps” and the desire for France to push the EU to “pursue a positive and pragmatic policy towards China.”[68]
Xi’s approach during these meetings aimed to dissuade the European Union from implementing more hawkish economic policies against the PRC’s interests. The European Commission and its president Ursula von der Leyen have called EU-PRC trade “critically unbalanced,” criticized the PRC’s preferential treatment of its domestic companies and overcapacity in its production, and called for “de-risking” policies to reduce Europe’s economic dependence on the PRC.[69] The European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy released in 2023 said “de-risking” policies are meant to mitigate risks to supply chain resilience, risks to critical infrastructure, risks related to leakage of sensitive technology, and risks of economic coercion by diversifying supply chains and restricting European companies’ ability to produce sensitive technologies overseas.[70] Scholz, Macron, and von der Leyen all urged Xi to pressure Russia to end its war against Ukraine.[71]
Xi focused on shared Sino-Russian geopolitical goals during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 16, however. Putin framed Russia and the PRC as both not willing to “accept Western attempts to impose an order based on lies, hypocrisy, and invented rules” in a written interview with CCP media outlet Xinhua on May 15.[72] Xi’s view in the aftermath of this meeting that the PRC and Russia should deepen their cooperation to produce a multi-polar world aligns with Putin’s view in the Xinhua interview.[73] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin’s May 16 statements further demonstrate Xi’s view that the PRC can continue supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine with minimal consequences. He framed the US accusations of PRC support for Russia as an attempt to shift blame for the Russia-Ukraine War onto the PRC. Wang then reiterated the PRC claim that US accusations “against China’s normal trade with Russia” are unjustified. [74]
The PRC strongly denied and condemned the United Kingdom’s espionage charges against alleged agents from Hong Kong. UK police charged three men under the National Security Act for allegedly assisting Hong Kong’s intelligence service in spying on UK-based dissidents. The charges include aiding a hostile state and forcing entry into a UK address. One of the men is the office manager at the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) in London and an alleged former classmate of Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee. The other two are a UK Border Force official and a former Royal Marines commando.[75] The UK summoned PRC ambassador Zheng Zeguang to lodge complaints about the spying.[76] Lee, the PRC Embassy in the UK, and the MFA all strongly denied the charges. An MFA spokesperson called the allegations “malicious slander” and “political manipulation” and expressed “serious concern” about the prosecution of PRC citizens.[77] PRC Ambassador Zheng also claimed the case was a fabrication to “smear and attack” the Hong Kong government. He accused the UK of wantonly harassing and detaining PRC citizens in the UK and warned it not to meddle in Hong Kong affairs. He said the PRC is “firmly resolved in fighting anti-China elements seeking to disrupt Hong Kong” and accused the UK of “harboring wanted criminals.”[78] The UK government previously charged two British nationals with spying for the PRC in April.[79]
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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