Quotes of the Day:

William J. Donovan, the Director of the OSS, believed in the power of intelligence to shape the world, stating, "In this global war, there is a global front. Every man and woman who gives us information is a soldier working on that front."

The OSS’s approach to intelligence was groundbreaking. Donovan emphasized, “The greater part of vital intelligence can be obtained not by parachuting behind enemy lines but by poring through papers, cables, reports, photographs, maps, journals, foreign newspapers, and other materials” – laying the foundation of modern intelligence research and analysis.

The OSS’s mission was succinctly described as: “Its primary one was to collect, analyze, and disseminate foreign intelligence; its secondary one was to conduct unconventional warfare” – a dual mission that has continued to define American intelligence operations.

(Above is AI generated)

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 12, 2024

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18. Key Takeaways from Biden Administration Report on Israeli Use of US Weapons

19. ‘Civil War’ sends a message that’s more dangerous than the violence it depicts onscreen

20. NATO Cannot Survive Without America

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1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 12, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov as Russian Minister of Defense on May 12, moving Shoigu to the position of Security Council Secretary in place of Nikolai Patrushev. These high-level reshuffles following the Russian presidential election strongly suggest that Putin is taking significant steps towards mobilizing the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to support a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO.
• Belousov's nearly decade-long tenure as an economic minister in the Russian federal government and his more recent involvement managing various domestic DIB innovation and drone projects, prepare him well to lead the struggling Russian MoD apparatus.
• Shoigu's replacement of Patrushev as Security Council Secretary is in line with Putin's general pattern of quietly sidelining high-level security officials by granting them peripheral roles within the Russian security sphere rather than simply firing them.
• Russian offensive efforts to seize Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) are in large part a consequence of the tacit Western policy that Ukrainian forces cannot use Western-provided systems to strike legitimate military targets within Russia.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct repeat strikes on Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure, prompting Russian milbloggers to complain about Russian forces' clear and continued inability to defend against these strikes.
• Several German politicians from different political parties expressed support for using NATO air defense systems stationed in NATO member states to shoot down Russian drones over western Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Lyptsi and Vovchansk in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin highlighted Russian forces' continued difficulty repelling Ukrainian drones on the frontline.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 12, 2024

May 12, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 12, 2024

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

May 12, 2024, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on May 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov as Russian Minister of Defense on May 12, moving Shoigu to the position of Security Council Secretary in place of Nikolai Patrushev. These high-level reshuffles following the Russian presidential election strongly suggest that Putin is taking significant steps towards mobilizing the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to support a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO. The Russian Federation Council posted a list of Putin's proposed cabinet ministers on May 12, which notably confirms that Putin has "proposed" Belousov as the new Minister of Defense (Putin's proposals are orders).[1] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Kremlin newswire TASS that Shoigu, who has served as Russian defense minister since 2012 — will assume the position of Security Council Secretary and act as Putin's deputy on the Russian Military-Industrial Commission.[2] Peskov also announced that Putin dismissed Patrushev from his former position as Security Council Secretary "due to [his] transfer to another job," which was not specified and that the Kremlin will announce his new role in the "near future."[3] Peskov also noted that Army General Valery Gerasimov will remain Chief of the Russian General Staff, and a change in this position is not foreseen at this time.[4] Gerasimov is also currently the overall theater commander for Russian forces in Ukraine.

Belousov's appointment to the position of Russian Defense Minister is a significant development in Putin's efforts to set full economic conditions for a protracted war. Belousov has no military experience and is an economist by trade — he served as Russian Minister of Economic Development from 2012–2013, following a career in economic analysis and forecasting between 1981 and 2006.[5] His lack of military experience is not anomalous — Shoigu also lacked experience in uniform before he took over the Defense Ministry.[6] Belousov then served as First Deputy Prime Minister from 2020 until his new 2024 appointment.[7] Belousov is also a known advocate for greater government involvement in the economy.[8] Peskov announced Belousov's appointment to state newswire TASS on May 12 and explained that "it is very important to fit the economy of the security bloc [domestic security power vertical] into the country's economy," suggesting that the Kremlin intends for Belousov to integrate and streamline the DIB and industries affiliated with Russia's security and defense forces with wider domestic economic policy.[9] Several Russian insider sources similarly responded to Belousov's new position and claimed that it shows that Putin has serious concerns over corruption levels and misuse of funds within the Russian military, conflicts between the military and the Russian DIB, and the perceived inefficacy of the Russian MoD as a whole.[10] An unnamed Russian federal official told Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii that Belousov will work in his new role to "competently organize work and logistics processes, ensure the necessary production and supplies, orient the economy towards the 'special military operation,' and squeeze the technological maximum out of the defense industry."[11] A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger noted that Belousov's new role "means the beginning of a large-scale audit and restructuring of all financial models" in the Russian MoD.[12]

Belousov's nearly decade-long tenure as an economic minister in the Russian federal government and his more recent involvement managing various domestic DIB innovation and drone projects, prepare him well to lead the struggling Russian MoD apparatus. The Russian MoD under Shoigu struggled with allegations of high-level corruption and bureaucratic inertia, facing constant scathing critiques from Russian military commentators.[13] Belousov has a stronger reputation for being an effective technocrat, and insider sources have claimed that he has a positive relationship with Putin.[14] Belousov met with Putin in November 2023 to discuss DIB projects and technological cooperation and has spoken to Putin about issues with Russia's domestic drone production.[15] Belousov also more recently highlighted a draft state order for 4.4 billion-rubles (roughly $48 million) for the production of drones until 2030, as well as plans to financially support drone producers and train drone developers and operators.[16] The focus on maximizing the technological innovation and output of the Russian DIB, particularly in the drone sphere, is likely to be extremely valuable to the Kremlin's war effort —the Kremlin has recently had to reckon with a gap between Russian drone production and contemporary battlefield realities.[17] Belousov personally announced in January 2023 that Russia had finalized the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" project, which provides 696 billion rubles (about $7 billion) for the production of 32,000 drones per year until 2030.[18] Putin likely intends Belousov to use his experience in a civilian government position to bridge federal economic policies with the Russian MoD agenda, thereby more fully mobilizing the Russian DIB at a larger and longer-term scale and integrating it with domestic economic policy. This effort sets conditions for a fuller economic mobilization, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine.

Shoigu's replacement of Patrushev as Security Council Secretary is in line with Putin's general pattern of quietly sidelining high-level security officials by granting them peripheral roles within the Russian security sphere rather than simply firing them. The Russian Security Council is an advisory body that also plays a role in executing security-related policies and developing Russian strategic culture, making Shoigu's appointment as Security Council Secretary and de facto demotion from the prestigious post of Russian Defense Minister less humiliating.[19] Putin has removed Shoigu from the direct MoD chain of command but granted him continued influence in the security space. Shoigu has remained an important and loyal subordinate, and sometimes a scapegoat, and Putin likely benefits from maintaining Shoigu's leadership and experience in some official capacity. Shoigu's removal also follows two high-profile incidents — the removal of his reported ally Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on corruption charges and Putin's meeting with Shoigu's political adversary and Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin to discuss DIB updates, which were likely leading indicators of the Kremlin's preparations to remove Shoigu from his long-held position.[20]

Putin has previously similarly sidelined his failed generals by appointing them to peripheral security and defense related positions outside of the direct chain of command, sometimes allowing them to redeem themselves and return to Putin’s favor as ISW has assessed.[21] Putin's removal of Patrushev from the Security Council is noteworthy, however, since several Western and Russian reports that Patrushev is a close personal ally of Putin—the Wall Street Journal alleged in December 2023 that Patrushev was the individual responsible for the assassination of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.[22] WSJ reported that Patrushev's 2008 appointment as Security Council Secretary was largely a formality and that Patrushev serves as de facto head of all Russian security services, making him the second most powerful person in Russia.[23] WSJ also reported that Patrushev acts as a "hybrid intelligence official and diplomat" and routinely pays visits to world leaders on Putin's behalf. ISW cannot yet confirm what Patrushev's new role will be but considering Patrushev's reported personal importance to Putin's regime stability and Putin's longtime tendency to balance Russian siloviki (strongmen with political influence) such as Patrushev within the power vertical, Patrushev’s next position will be an important reflection of Putin's intent. The Kremlin may establish a new role or office for Patrushev to lead, such as establishing a higher-ranking position to manage the siloviki faction.

Aside from Patrushev's dismissal, Putin largely reappointed the heads of core Russian security services, suggesting that he maintains a core cadre of loyal siloviki. Putin reappointed Vladimir Kolokoltsev as Minister of Internal Affairs, Sergei Naryshkin as Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Alexander Bortnikov as Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), and Viktor Zolotov as Director of Rosgvardia.[24] ISW previously assessed that Russian security services and affiliated siloviki, particularly Bortnikov, were key constituencies for Putin's election to his fifth term, and Putin has relied heavily on the work of the aforementioned security agencies to maintain regime stability, particularly following the failed Wagner Group rebellion.[25] Kolokolstev has been instrumental in coordinating the Kremlin's migrant policy (which has been especially relevant in the aftermath of the March 22 IS attack on Crocus City Hall); Naryshkin has been an important player in establishing information conditions and propagating justifications for the war; Putin has personally praised Bortnikov and the FSB for protecting Russian sovereignty; and Zolotov has spearheaded efforts to absorb former Wagner Group fighters into Rosgvardia.[26] These siloviki form the backbone of Putin's core cabinet, and their reappointment suggests that Putin will continue to rely on, and empower them, into his next term.

Russian offensive efforts to seize Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) are in large part a consequence of the tacit Western policy that Ukrainian forces cannot use Western-provided systems to strike legitimate military targets within Russia. Russian forces appear to be attempting to encircle Vovchansk as Russian forces approach city itself via Buhruvatka, Starytsya, and Izbytske to the west along the C-210817 road and via Vovchanskyi Khutory to the east along the O-210825 road.[27] The Russian seizure of any of these settlements would cut these Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Vovchansk and make the remaining GLOCs (T-2104 highway) increasingly crucial to the city's defense. Russian forces have also increasingly targeted bridges across nearby water features to isolate the Ukrainian defense of Vovchansk from other areas.[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed that Vovchansk is the main Russian effort in the northern Kharkiv Oblast direction and that Russian forces intend to bypass Vovchansk itself from the southwest and south.[29] Mashovets noted that Vovchansk's proximity to the international border affords Russian forces "many opportunities," including allowing Russian forces to conduct operations with limited forces and means to achieve a specific result; provides Russian forces with a "small shoulder of delivery" to allow stable control and fire support without moving their artillery; and allows for quick fuel and weapons deliveries to the frontline. 

Russian forces are reaping the benefits of the West's long-term restriction on Ukraine using Western-provided weapons to strike legitimate military targets on Russian territory — territory that Russian forces now depend on to sustain their offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Western officials have prohibited Ukraine from using Western-supplied weapons to strike targets on Russian territory, and Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated their adherence to this condition.[30] UK Foreign Minister David Cameron only recently greenlit Ukrainian forces to use UK-provided weapons to strike targets in Russian territory, but this is insufficient for Ukraine's interdiction needs in Russian territory and came too late to allow Ukrainian forces to inhibit Russia's ability to concentrate forces along the international border.[31] Ukrainian forces have previously used US-provided HIMARS to devastating effect, particularly in forcing Russian forces to withdraw from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast in November 2022 and continue to use HIMARS and other US- and Western-provided weapons to strike Russian force concentrations in rear and deep rear areas in occupied Ukraine.[32] Ukrainian forces regularly conduct drone strikes against infrastructure and airfields in Russia, but these lack the same interdiction effects that Ukrainian forces now need to generate to undermine the Russian offensive operations.[33]  Ukrainian forces would greatly benefit from being able to use advanced long-range weapons systems to disrupt Russian logistics nodes and routes that are currently supplying the Kharkiv offensive but must instead rely on their limited and depleted stock of indigenous weapons.

Kremlin information operations encouraging Western self-deterrence likely aimed to allow Russian forces to build up and launch offensive operations without the threat of Ukrainian strikes against military and logistics assets. Russian President Vladimir Putin, senior Kremlin officials, and pro-Kremlin mouthpieces have regularly threatened Western states and accused them of "provocations" for continuing to provide military assistance to Ukraine.[34] Kremlin mouthpieces have maintained this rhetorical line even after the passage of a $61 billion dollar US military assistance package to Ukraine in late April, likely in support of an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from using these weapons to degrade Russia's various ongoing offensive efforts.[35] The Kremlin will likely continue to leverage this information operation as part of its ongoing reflexive control campaign to inhibit Ukraine's ability to use all its available weapons to defend against the current Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, forcing Ukraine to allocate other resources to a less effective defense and creating opportunities for Russian forces on other sectors of the front to exploit.[36]

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct repeat strikes on Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure, prompting Russian milbloggers to complain about Russian forces' clear and continued inability to defend against these strikes. Ukrainian outlets Ukrainska Pravda and RBK Ukraine cited sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) as stating that the GUR conducted strikes with Ukrainian-made drones against the Kaluganefteprodukt oil depot in Kaluga Oblast, the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant in Lipetsk Oblast, and the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast overnight on May 11 to 12.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed two drones over Lipetsk Oblast and one drone over Volgograd Oblast.[38] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that a falling Ukrainian drone detonated and started a fire at the Volgograd oil refinery, and Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that Russian forces repelled a strike on infrastructure in the Lipetsk City industrial zone.[39] Russian opposition media published footage on May 12 of a fire at the Volgograd oil refinery.[40] ISW cannot independently verify the reported Ukrainian strikes against Kaluga and Lipetsk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Lukoil Volgograd oil refinery on the night of May 10 to 11 and on February 3, struck the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant on the night of April 23 to 24 and February 23 to 24, and struck the Kaluganefteprodukt oil depot on April 28.[41]

A Russian milblogger extensively complained about Russian forces' inability to repel Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure, claiming that the Russian military command consistently underestimates Ukrainian capabilities and that Russian forces should learn from Ukraine's ability to adapt to Russian strike methods.[42] The milblogger criticized the way Russian forces are trying to combat drone strikes with outdated Soviet-era weapons and without reconnaissance equipment. Another prominent, Kremlin-awarded milblogger agreed with the first milblogger, claiming that Russian forces lack an understanding of asymmetric warfare and that the Russian military command is slow to make changes.[43] The milblogger also blamed the issue on Russian military commanders who submit dishonest reports to the senior Russian military command — a common complaint among Russian milbloggers.[44] The milblogger claimed that Ukraine and the West are "more flexible, smarter, and more efficient" than Russian forces. The milblogger oddly and preemptively noted that this statement does not "discredit" the Russian military, which is a crime in Russia, but is instead an "adequate assessment" of the potential of the "enemy" that Russia is fighting.

Several German politicians from different political parties expressed support for using NATO air defense systems stationed in NATO member states to shoot down Russian drones over western Ukraine. German outlet Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) reported on May 11 that German Bundestag members Roderich Kiesewetter of the Christian Democrat Union Party, Agnieszka Brugger of the Green Party, and Marcus Faber of the Free Democratic Party expressed support for using NATO air defenses in countries bordering Ukraine, such as Poland and Romania, to intercept Russian drones over western Ukraine to allow Ukrainian air defenders to focus on protecting frontline areas.[45] 

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov as Russian Minister of Defense on May 12, moving Shoigu to the position of Security Council Secretary in place of Nikolai Patrushev. These high-level reshuffles following the Russian presidential election strongly suggest that Putin is taking significant steps towards mobilizing the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to support a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO.
• Belousov's nearly decade-long tenure as an economic minister in the Russian federal government and his more recent involvement managing various domestic DIB innovation and drone projects, prepare him well to lead the struggling Russian MoD apparatus.
• Shoigu's replacement of Patrushev as Security Council Secretary is in line with Putin's general pattern of quietly sidelining high-level security officials by granting them peripheral roles within the Russian security sphere rather than simply firing them.
• Russian offensive efforts to seize Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) are in large part a consequence of the tacit Western policy that Ukrainian forces cannot use Western-provided systems to strike legitimate military targets within Russia.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct repeat strikes on Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure, prompting Russian milbloggers to complain about Russian forces' clear and continued inability to defend against these strikes.
• Several German politicians from different political parties expressed support for using NATO air defense systems stationed in NATO member states to shoot down Russian drones over western Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Lyptsi and Vovchansk in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin highlighted Russian forces' continued difficulty repelling Ukrainian drones on the frontline.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

NOTE: ISW is adding a section to cover Russian offensive operations along the Belgorod-Kharkiv axis as these offensive operations comprise an operational effort separate from Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. ISW may enlarge the scope of this section should Russian forces expand offensive operations along the Russian-Ukrainian international border in northeastern Ukraine.

Russian forces recently made additional confirmed tactical advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the Vovchansk direction (northeast of Kharkiv City) and continued limited offensive operations in this area on May 12. Geolocated footage published on May 11 shows Russian forces operating in southern Ohirtseve (west of Vovchansk), suggesting that Russian forces have seized the entirety of Ohirtseve.[46] A Ukrainian officer fighting in the Vovchansk direction noted that the situation is extremely difficult because Ukrainian forces lack adequate fortifications in the area, reporting that Russian forces have surrounded Vovchansk and that meeting engagements are already occurring within the settlement.[47] Several Russian milbloggers discussed fighting within Vovchansk.[48] ISW therefore assesses that Russian forces also likely seized Hatyshche (just northwest of Vovchansk) and Tykhe (just east of Vovchansk) given the Ukrainian officer's report that Russian forces have surrounded Vovchansk and Russian milblogger claims of street fighting within Vovchansk. The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces attacked near Buhruvatka (west of Vovchansk), suggesting that Russian forces have likely consolidated positions between the international border and the Buhruvatka-Starytsya area.[49] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces have advanced 2.5 kilometers in the Vovchansk direction and noted that the Russian command has deployed at least four motorized rifle battalions of the 11th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to the Vovchansk direction.[50] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces have advanced seven kilometers deep along a 30-kilometer-wide front in the Vovchansk direction.[51]

Russian forces also recently made confirmed advances in the Lytpsi (north of Kharkiv City) direction and continued limited offensive operations in this area on May 12. Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows that Russian forces advanced up to a windbreak south of Pylna and north of Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi).[52] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Lyptsi direction near Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and Lukyantsi.[53] Mashovets noted that the Russian offensive towards Lyptsi is auxiliary to the Russian effort towards Vovchansk and stated that Russian forces have advanced between 3.2 to 3.7 kilometers towards Hlyboke and Lukyantsi.[54] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have about three motorized rifle battalions in the Lyptsi direction and that the Russian command is bringing reserves from the 11th and newly-formed 44th army corps (both LMD) to the Zhuravlevka-Ustinka-Vergilivka area in Belgorod Oblast, northeast of the Lyptsi axis.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have advanced eight kilometers deep along a 20-kilometer-wide front at the western penetration into northern Kharkiv Oblast, referring to the Lyptsi direction.[56] Ukrainian sources noted that some settlements in the northern Kharkiv direction remain contested "gray zones" despite Russian advances in these settlements, suggesting that Ukrainian forces are conducting frequent counterattacks to contest control of these areas.[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Ivanivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka and Makiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny and Novosadove; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) near Verkhnokamyanske (southwest of Siversk), Rozdolivka (south of Siversk), Spirne, and Vyimka (both southeast of Siversk).[59] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Berestove (southeast of Siversk).[60]

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Chasiv Yar on May 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Ivanviske (east of Chasiv Yar), with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces advanced up to three kilometers wide and up to 750 meters deep in the forest area near the settlement.[61] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have completely seized the Stupky-Holubovskyi-2 nature reserve (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and advanced north and northeast of the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[62]  ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces also resumed assault operations in Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[63] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; in eastern Chasiv Yar near the Novyi and Kanal microraions; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Niu York.[64] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces have intensified their assaults in the area and that Ukrainian forces are struggling to destroy Russian forces' "shed tanks" that have additional protection (referring to Russian vehicles with welded metal tanks to protect against drone strikes, also known colloquially as "turtle tanks").[65] The Ukrainian servicemember reported that Russian forces use tanks to fire on Ukrainian positions while two Russian infantry fighting vehicles loaded with infantry follow the tank to disembark infantry. The Ukrainian servicemember stated that Russian forces have increased the number of aviation, artillery, and drone strikes in the Bakhmut direction but that these strikes are less precise than Ukrainian strikes. Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar, and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating from Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) towards Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[66]

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Avdiivka on May 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces approached the outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka and west of Arkhanhelske) and advanced towards Kalynove (northwest of Avdiivka and northeast of Arkhanhelske).[67] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces also advanced west of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) along the railway.[68] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Kalynove, Sokil, Yevhenivka, Solovyove, Novopokrovske, Semenivka, Novoselivka Persha, and Berdychi; and west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, and Netaylove.[69]

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on May 12. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces advanced up to 3.72 kilometers wide and 1.15 kilometers deep.[70] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka; southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Solodke, and Paraskoviivka; and northeast of Vuhledar near Vodyane.[71] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces continue to storm Krasnohorivka with small assault groups and occasionally use armored vehicles during attacks on the settlement's eastern outskirts.[72] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces in the brick factory in central Krasnohorivka lack ammunition and armored vehicle support as Ukrainian forces cut the Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the Russian forces in the factory. A Ukrainian deputy commander reported that Russian forces are wearing civilian clothes to enter Krasnohorivka to disguise themselves as Ukrainian locals and then change into Ukrainian military uniforms upon entering the settlement.[73]  International law defines such actions as perfidy, which is a prohibited act.[74] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka; elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka; elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the direction of Kurakhove; and elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar.[75]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on May 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagement continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[76] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly operating near Blahodatne (south of Velyka Novosilka).[77]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced west of Luhivske (northeast of Robotyne) and west and southwest of Novoprokovka (northeast of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[78] Positional engagements also continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[79]

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on May 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (a district-level unit operating under the Leningrad Military District [LMD], formerly Northern Fleet) completely seized Nestryha Island in the Dnipro River Delta southwest of Kherson City, although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[81] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Krynky.[82]

Crimean occupation administration head Sergei Aksyonov claimed on May 12 that Russian air defense shot down a Ukrainian drone near occupied Simferopol.[83]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces launched at least one ballistic missile against Zaporizhia Oblast on May 12.[84] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian air defenses shot down a cruise missile over Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on May 12.[85]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) 

Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin highlighted Russian forces' continued difficulty repelling Ukrainian drones on the frontline. Rogozin claimed that Russian and Ukrainian drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems are always shifting frequencies and adapting to achieve localized superiority over each other.[86] Rogozin argued that the Russian military should consider expanding cheaper methods than EW systems to suppress Ukrainian drones. Rogozin suggested that Russian forces use smoke screens and oily aerosols to impair drone visibility, illuminate the sky to detect night drones and destroy them with small arms, and use remote-controlled rapid-fire robotic equipment and interceptor drones to down Ukrainian drones. Rogozin claimed that the Russian military has these capabilities but not in sufficient quantities.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian milbloggers are intensifying rhetoric aimed at degrading Ukrainians' trust in their government and undermining Ukrainian morale. Russian milbloggers amplified claims portraying Ukrainian government officials as inept, fleeing, and refusing to help Ukrainian civilians amid the Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[87]

A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger continued issuing rhetoric aimed at capitalizing on domestic protests in Armenia and Georgia to promote further internal destabilization and especially discredit Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[88]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarus and Iran continue to intensify bilateral cooperation. Belarusian state-owned outlet Belta reported on May 12 that Belarusian petrochemical enterprises signed cooperation agreements with Iranian petrochemical industry representatives at the Iran Oil Show.[89] Belarus and Iran have pursued increased military, economic, and technical cooperation in the past yet, which Russia is likely partially benefiting from via the Union State framework.[90]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 12, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli ground forces advanced into Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued a "precise operation" targeting Hamas in eastern Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 12, 2024

May 12, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, May 12, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on May 11 and 12, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume on Monday, May 13, 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli ground forces advanced into Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued a "precise operation" targeting Hamas in eastern Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli ground forces advanced into Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on May 11.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division launched a re-clearing operation in Jabalia after Israeli intelligence assessed that Hamas and Palestinian militias were attempting to rebuild infrastructure in the area.[2] The IDF Air Force conducted about 30 airstrikes overnight, killing several Hamas fighters.[3] Israeli forces are currently operating east of Jabalia refugee camp, but CTP-ISW cannot confirm the IDF's path to the area.[4] The IDF issued evacuation orders for civilians in Jabalia on May 11.[5]

Palestinian militias defended against Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia. Hamas fighters conducted two separate complex attacks.[6] Hamas used a drone to drop an explosive onto an Israeli tank in eastern Jabalia.[7]

Palestinian militias defended against Israeli operations in Zaytoun on May 12. The IDF launched a re-clearing operation into the Zaytoun neighborhood on May 8, marking the third time that the IDF has conducted a clearing operation there.[8] Palestinian fighters attacked Israeli forces with mortar fire and RPGs in Zaytoun and along the Netzarim corridor on May 12.[9]

Palestinian militias wounded the Israeli Defense Ministry deputy comptroller in Zaytoun on May 10.[10] The comptroller, a brigadier general, is the highest ranking IDF officer wounded in the Gaza Strip during this war.[11] Palestinian militias killed five other Nahal Brigade soldiers in Zaytoun on May 10.[12]

Israeli forces continued a "precise operation" targeting Hamas in eastern Rafah on May 12.[13] The IDF Givati Brigade located and destroyed several tunnel shafts and rockets that Palestinian fighters had prepared to fire into Israel.[14] The IDF 401st Brigade identified ten armed Hamas fighters and directed an airstrike targeting them.[15] Israeli soldiers posted photos of the IDF inside the Rafah crossing.[16]

The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) reported on May 12 that about 300,000 people have fled Rafah in the past week.[17] The estimate is consistent with the IDF’s estimation of the number of Gazans who have moved to the humanitarian zone north of Rafah.[18]

Israel opened a new border crossing in the northern Gaza Strip on May 12 to increase the flow of aid into the northern Strip.[19] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that it opened the crossing in coordination with the United States to increase aid flow into the northern Gaza Strip.[20] COGAT said that dozens of World Food Programme (WFP) trucks carrying flour left the Port of Ashdod for the Strip. The new crossing follows the WFP reporting that aid has not entered southern crossings to the Gaza Strip in several days.[21]

US Central Command commander Gen. Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi in Israel.[22] The commanders discussed unspecified operational developments and coordination between US and Israeli militaries.

Palestinian militias conducted four indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip into Israel on May 12. Hamas conducted three rocket attacks targeting Ashkelon and Sderot.[23] One rocket landed in Ashkelon causing damage and injuring three people.[24] The IDF reported that its air defenses intercepted two munitions launched from Rafah toward Kerem Shalom.[25] Palestinian militias have conducted near daily indirect fire attacks targeting the Kerem Shalom area since May 5.[26] The IDF has said that Palestinian fighters are attempting to harm Israeli forces.[27] The IDF stated on May 8 that the attacks aim to prevent the Kerem Shalom crossing from functioning.[28] Kerem Shalom is the main entry point for humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 11.[29] Israeli Army Radio reported that unspecified people set fire to a home in a Palestinian village and wrote “Regards from Binyamin” on the walls.[30] Palestinian media reported that Israeli settlers were responsible for the attack.[31]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 11.[32] Hezbollah conducted a drone attack on an Iron Dome platform in Beit Hillel on May 11, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[33] Hezbollah added on May 11 that it fired another drone targeting an area in Beit Hillel where Hezbollah believed Israeli officers would gather following the initial attack.[34] The IDF confirmed on May 11 that two drones fell in the Beit Hillel area without causing casualties.[35]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that a coalition aircraft intercepted a Houthi drone over the Gulf of Aden on May 10.[36] CENTCOM separately intercepted three Houthi drones over the Red Sea on May 11.[37] CENTCOM determined that the drones in both attacks presented an imminent threat to coalition forces and merchant vessels in the region.

3. Russia’s defense minister replacement suggests Kremlin preparing for protracted war in Ukraine - ISW

Russia’s defense minister replacement suggests Kremlin preparing for protracted war in Ukraine - ISW

ukrinform.net

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said this in its latest report, according to Ukrinform.

“Belousov's appointment to the position of Russian Defense Minister is a significant development in Putin's efforts to set full economic conditions for a protracted war,” the report says.

As noted, Belousov has no military experience and is an economist by trade. Several Russian insider sources similarly responded to Belousov's new position and claimed that it shows that Putin has serious concerns over corruption levels and misuse of funds within the Russian military, conflicts between the military and the Russian DIB, and the perceived inefficacy of the Russian MoD as a whole.

According to ISW, Belousov is also a known advocate for greater government involvement in the economy. His nearly decade-long tenure as an economic minister in the Russian federal government and his more recent involvement managing various domestic DIB innovation and drone projects, prepare him well to lead the struggling Russian MoD apparatus.

In January 2023, Belousov personally announced that Russia had finalized the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" project, which provides 696 billion rubles (about $7 billion) for the production of 32,000 drones per year until 2030. Belousov also more recently highlighted a draft state order for 4.4 billion-rubles (roughly $48 million) for the production of drones until 2030, as well as plans to financially support drone producers and train drone developers and operators.[

“Belousov has a stronger reputation for being an effective technocrat, and insider sources have claimed that he has a positive relationship with Putin,” the report says.

According to experts, Putin likely intends Belousov to use his experience in a civilian government position to bridge federal economic policies with the Russian MoD agenda, thereby more fully mobilizing the Russian DIB at a larger and longer-term scale and integrating it with domestic economic policy.

“These high-level reshuffles following the Russian presidential election strongly suggest that Putin is taking significant steps towards mobilizing the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to support a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO,” the report says.

As reported by Ukrinform, on May 12, Vladimir Putin proposed appointing former First Deputy Prime Minister Andriy Belousov as Defense Minister to replace Sergei Shoigu, who has headed the Russian Defense Ministry since 2012.

ukrinform.net

4. Suddenly There Aren’t Enough Babies. The Whole World Is Alarmed.

A global threat? The biggest threat to humanity?

Graphics at the link.

Suddenly There Aren’t Enough Babies. The Whole World Is Alarmed.

Birthrates are falling fast across countries, with economic, social and geopolitical consequences

https://www.wsj.com/world/birthrates-global-decline-cause-ddaf8be2?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Greg IpFollow and Janet AdamyFollow

May 13, 2024 12:01 am ET

The world is at a startling demographic milestone. Sometime soon, the global fertility rate will drop below the point needed to keep population constant. It may have already happened.

Fertility is falling almost everywhere, for women across all levels of income, education and labor-force participation. The falling birthrates come with huge implications for the way people live, how economies grow and the standings of the world’s superpowers.

In high-income nations, fertility fell below replacement in the 1970s, and took a leg down during the pandemic. It’s dropping in developing countries, too. India surpassed China as the most populous country last year, yet its fertility is now below replacement.

“The demographic winter is coming,” said Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, an economist specializing in demographics at the University of Pennsylvania. 

Many government leaders see this as a matter of national urgency. They worry about shrinking workforces, slowing economic growth and underfunded pensions; and the vitality of a society with ever-fewer children. Smaller populations come with diminished global clout, raising questions in the U.S., China and Russia about their long-term standings as superpowers.

Some demographers think the world’s population could start shrinking within four decades—one of the few times it’s happened in history.

Donald Trump, this year’s presumptive Republican presidential nominee, has called collapsing fertility a bigger threat to Western civilization than Russia. A year ago Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida declared that the collapse of the country’s birthrate left it “standing on the verge of whether we can continue to function as a society.” Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has prioritized raising the country’s “demographic GDP.”

Governments have rolled out programs to stop the decline—but so far they’ve barely made a dent.

A father held his baby in a newborn care unit in Patiala, India. PHOTO: ELKE SCHOLIERS/GETTY IMAGES

Demographic surprise

In 2017, when the global fertility rate—a snapshot of how many babies a woman is expected to have over her lifetime—was 2.5, the United Nations thought it would slip to 2.4 in the late 2020s. Yet by 2021, the U.N. concluded, it was already down to 2.3—close to what demographers consider the global replacement rate of about 2.2. The replacement rate, which keeps population stable over time, is 2.1 in rich countries, and slightly higher in developing countries, where fewer girls than boys are born and more mothers die during their childbearing years.

While the U.N. has yet to publish estimated fertility rates for 2022 and 2023, Fernández-Villaverde has produced his own estimate by supplementing U.N. projections with actual data for those years covering roughly half the world’s population. He has found that national birth registries are typically reporting births 10% to 20% below what the U.N. projected. 

Total fertility rates

U.S.

MEXICO

INDIA

CHINA

SOUTH KOREA

HUNGARY

JAPAN

5

4

3

2

1

0

1980

'90

2000

'10

'20

Sources: United Nations; U.S. Centers for Disease Control; national estimates compiled by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde

Rosie Ettenheim/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

China reported 9 million births last year, 16% less than projected in the U.N.’s central scenario. In the U.S., 3.59 million babies were born last year, 4% less than the U.N. projected. In other countries, the undershoot is even larger: Egypt reported 17% fewer births last year. In 2022, Kenya reported 18% fewer.

Fernández-Villaverde estimates global fertility fell to between 2.1 and 2.2 last year, which he said would be below global replacement for the first time in human history. Dean Spears, a population economist at the University of Texas at Austin, said while the data isn’t good enough to know precisely when or if fertility has fallen below replacement, “we have enough evidence to be quite confident about…the crossing point not being far off.”

In 2017 the U.N. projected world population, then 7.6 billion, would keep climbing to 11.2 billion in 2100. By 2022 it had lowered and brought forward the peak to 10.4 billion in the 2080s. That, too, is likely out of date. The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington now thinks it will peak around 9.5 billion in 2061 then start declining. 

U.N. estimates and projections for world population

12 billion

PROJECTION

2017

2022

9

6

3

0

1950

’60

’70

’80

’90

2000

’10

’20

’30

’40

’50

’60

’70

’80

’90

2100

Notes: 2022 data are estimates (1950-2021) and projections (2022-2100), medium variant

2017 data are estimates (1950-2015) and projections (2016-2100), medium variant

Source: United Nations

Rosie Ettenheim/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

In the U.S., a short-lived pandemic baby boomlet has reversed. The total fertility rate fell to 1.62 last year, according to provisional government figures, the lowest on record.

Had fertility stayed near 2.1, where it stood in 2007, the U.S. would have welcomed an estimated 10.6 million more babies since, according to Kenneth Johnson, senior demographer at the University of New Hampshire.

In 2017, when the fertility rate was 1.8, the Census Bureau projected it would converge over the long run to 2.0. It has since revised that down to 1.5. “It has snuck up on us,” said Melissa Kearney, an economist at the University of Maryland specializing in demographics.

A second demographic transition?

Historians refer to the decline in fertility that began in the 18th century in industrializing countries as the demographic transition. As lifespans lengthened and more children survived to adulthood, the impetus for bearing more children declined. As women became better educated and joined the workforce, they delayed marriage and childbirth, resulting in fewer children. 

Now, said Spears, “the big-picture fact is that birthrates are low or are falling in many diverse societies and economies.”

Some demographers see this as part of a “second demographic transition,” a societywide reorientation toward individualism that puts less emphasis on marriage and parenthood, and makes fewer or no children more acceptable. 

U.S. birthrates by age group

300

250

200

150

100

30-34

25-29

20-24

50

35-39

15-19

40-44

0

1940

’50

'60

'70

'80

'90

2000

'10

'20

Note: Rates are per 1,000 women in specified age group. 2023 data is provisional.

Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Rosie Ettenheim/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

In the U.S., some thought at first that women were simply delaying childbirth because of lingering economic uncertainty from the 2008 financial crisis.

In research published in 2021, the University of Maryland’s Kearney and two co-authors looked for possible explanations for the continued drop. They found that state-level differences in parental abortion notification laws, unemployment, Medicaid availability, housing costs, contraceptive usage, religiosity, child-care costs and student debt could explain almost none of the decline. “We suspect that this shift reflects broad societal changes that are hard to measure or quantify,” they conclude.

Kearney said while raising children is no more expensive than before, parents’ preferences and perceived constraints have changed: “If people have a preference for spending time building a career, on leisure, relationships outside the home, that’s more likely to come in conflict with childbearing.” 

Meanwhile, time-use data show that mothers and fathers, especially those that are highly educated, spend more time with their children than in the past. “The intensity of parenting is a constraint,” Kearney said.

Erica Pittman, a 45-year-old business banker in Raleigh, N.C., said she and her husband opted to have only one child because of demands on their time, including caring for her mother, who died last year after a long battle with multiple sclerosis. Their 8-year-old son is able to participate in theater workshops, soccer and summer camps because the couple, with a combined income of about $225,000 a year, has more time and money.

The Pittman family in Raleigh, N.C. PHOTO: ANGELA OWENS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Pittmans outside their home. PHOTO: ANGELA OWENS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“I feel like a better mom,” Pittman said. “I feel like I can go to work—because I have a fairly demanding job—but I can also make time to volunteer at his school, be the chaperone for the field trip and do those kinds of things, because I only have one to coordinate with my schedule.” 

Pittman said she only questions their decision when her son says he wishes he had a sibling to play with. In response, she and her husband, a middle-school history teacher, pick vacation destinations with a kids’ club, such as a Disney cruise, so her son can play with others his age.

‘Plugged into the global culture’

Fertility is below replacement in India even though the country is still poor and many women don’t work—factors that usually sustain fertility. 

Urbanization and the internet have given even women in traditional male-dominated villages a glimpse of societies where fewer children and a higher quality of life are the norm. “People are plugged into the global culture,” said Richard Jackson, president of the Global Aging Institute, a nonprofit research and education group. 

Mae Mariyam Thomas, 38, who lives in Mumbai and runs an audio production company, said she’s opted against having children because she never felt the tug of motherhood. She sees peers struggling to meet the right person, getting married later and, in some instances, divorcing before they have kids. At least three of her friends have frozen their eggs, she said.

“I think now we live in a really different world, so I think for anyone in the world it’s tough to find a partner,” she said. 

Sub-Saharan Africa once appeared resistant to the global slide in fertility, but that too is changing. The share of all women of reproductive age using modern contraception grew from 17% in 2012 to 23% in 2022, according to Family Planning 2030, an international organization.

Mae Mariyam Thomas, at her house in Mumbai, India, has opted to not have children. PHOTO: ATUL LOKE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Mothers held their premature babies at a hospital in Abidjan. PHOTO: ISSOUF SANOGO/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Jose Rimon, a professor of public health at Johns Hopkins University, credits that to a push by national leaders in Africa which, he predicted, would drive fertility down faster than the U.N. projects. 

Once a low fertility cycle kicks in, it effectively resets a society’s norms and is thus hard to break, said Jackson. “The fewer children you see your colleagues and peers and neighbors having, it changes the whole social climate,” he said. 

Danielle Vermeer grew up third in a family of four children on Chicago’s North Side, where her neighborhood was filled with Catholics of Italian, Irish and Polish descent and half her close friends had as many siblings as her or more. Her Italian-American father was one of four children who produced 14 grandchildren. Now her parents have five grandchildren, including Vermeer’s two children, ages 4 and 7.

The 35-year-old, who is the co-founder of a fashion thrifting app, said that before setting out to have children, she consulted dozens of other couples and her Catholic church and read at least eight books on the subject, including one by Pope Paul VI. She and her husband settled on two as the right number.

“The act of bringing a child into this world is an incredible responsibility,” she said.

U.N. 2023 projections on top 12 most-populous countries and their total fertility

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Brazil

Bangladesh

Japan

Population, millions

Indonesia

15

Nigeria

Ethiopia

U.S.

5

China

India

1

Pakistan

Russia

Mexico

Source: United Nations

Rosie Ettenheim/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

New policies

Governments have tried to reverse the fall in fertility with pronatalist policies.  

Perhaps no country has been trying longer than Japan. After fertility fell to 1.5 in the early 1990s, the government rolled out a succession of plans that included parental leave and subsidized child care. Fertility kept falling.

In 2005, Kuniko Inoguchi was appointed the country’s first minister responsible for gender equality and birthrate. The main obstacle, she declared, was money: People couldn’t afford to get married or have children. Japan made hospital maternity care free and introduced a stipend paid upon birth of the child. 

Japan’s fertility rate climbed from 1.26 in 2005 to 1.45 in 2015. But then it started declining again, and in 2022 was back to 1.26.

This year, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida rolled out yet another program to increase births that extends monthly allowances to all children under 18 regardless of income, free college for families with three children, and fully paid parental leave.

Inoguchi, now a member of parliament’s upper house, said the constraint on would-be parents is no longer money, but time. She has pressed the government and businesses to adopt a four-day workweek. She said, “If you’re a government official or manager of a big corporation, you should not worry over questions of salary now, but that in 20 years time you will have no customers, no clients, no applicants to the Self-Defense Forces.”

An event celebrating Children’s Day in Tokyo on May 5. PHOTO: GU YIPING/XINHUA/ZUMA PRESS

Doctors and nurses took care of a baby in Nyiregyhaza, Hungary. PHOTO: ATTILA BALAZS/EPA-EFE/REX/SHUTTERSTOCK

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has pushed one of Europe’s most ambitious natality agendas. Last year he expanded tax benefits for mothers so that women under the age of 30 who have a child are exempt from paying personal income tax for life. That’s on top of housing and child-care subsidies as well as generous maternity leaves. 

Hungary’s fertility rate, though still well below replacement, has risen since 2010. But the Vienna Institute of Demography attributed this primarily to women delaying childbirth because of a debt crisis that hit around 2010. Adjusted for that, fertility has risen only slightly, it concluded. 

In the U.S., while state and federal legislators have pushed to expand child-care subsidies and parental leave, they have generally not set a higher birthrate as an explicit goal. Some Republicans, though, are leaning in that direction. Last year, Trump said he backed paying out “baby bonuses” to prop up U.S. births, and GOP Arizona Senate candidate Kari Lake recently endorsed the idea. 

Republican Sen. J.D. Vance of Ohio said falling fertility matters beyond the economic pressures of a smaller labor force and unfunded Social Security. “Do you live in communities where there are smiling happy children, or where people are just aging?” he said in an interview. Lack of siblings and cousins, he said, contributes to children’s social isolation. 

He’s studied potential solutions, in particular Hungary’s approach, but hasn’t seen proof of anything that works over the long term. 

The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation found little evidence that pronatalist policies lead to sustained rebounds in fertility. A woman may get pregnant sooner to capture a baby bonus, researchers say, but likely won’t have more kids over the course of her lifetime.

Economic pressure

With no reversal in birthrates in sight, the attendant economic pressures are intensifying. Since the pandemic, labor shortages have become endemic throughout developed countries. That will only worsen in coming years as the postcrisis fall in birthrates yields an ever-shrinking inflow of young workers, placing more strain on healthcare and retirement systems. 

Neil Howe, a demographer at Hedgeye Risk Management, has pointed to a recent World Bank report suggesting that worsening demographics could make this a second consecutive “lost decade” for global economic growth.

The usual prescription in advanced countries is more immigration, but that has two problems. As more countries confront stagnant population, immigration between them is a zero-sum game. Historically, host countries have sought skilled migrants who enter through formal, legal channels, but recent inflows have been predominantly unskilled migrants often entering illegally and claiming asylum.

High levels of immigration have also historically aroused political resistance, often over concerns about cultural and demographic change. A shrinking native-born population is likely to intensify such concerns. Many of the leaders keenest to raise birthrates are most resistant to immigration.

A woman helped her mother-in-law in Hoengseong, South Korea. PHOTO: JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

As birthrates fall, more regions and communities experience depopulation, with consequences ranging from closed schools to stagnant property values. Less selective colleges will soon struggle to fill classrooms because of the plunge in birthrates that began in 2007, said Fernández-Villaverde. Vance said rural hospitals can’t stay open because of the falling local population.  

An economy with fewer children will struggle to finance pensions and healthcare for growing ranks of elderly. South Korea’s national pension fund, one of the world’s largest, is on track to be depleted by 2055. A special legislative committee recently presented several possible pension reforms, but there’s only a short window to act before the next presidential election campaign heats up.

There’s been little public pressure to act, said Sok Chul Hong, an economist at Seoul National University. “The elderly are not very interested in pension reform, and the youth are apathetic towards politics,” he said. “It is truly an ironic situation.”

Anthony DeBarros contributed to this article

5. Fighting Flares Anew in Gaza as Hamas Reconstitutes

Fighting Flares Anew in Gaza as Hamas Reconstitutes

By Liam Stack, Aaron Boxerman and Eric Nagourney

Liam Stack reported from Tel Aviv and Aaron Boxerman from Jerusalem.

Published May 12, 2024

Updated May 13, 2024, 1:16 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Eric Nagourney · May 12, 2024

The U.S. secretary of state warned that Israel’s victories over Hamas may not be “sustainable.”

A missile hitting a building in northern Gaza, seen from Israel, on Saturday.Credit...Amir Cohen/Reuters

By Aaron Boxerman and

Liam Stack reported from Tel Aviv and Aaron Boxerman from Jerusalem.

May 12, 2024, 6:19 p.m. ET

As the Israeli military stepped up pressure on what it calls Hamas’s last stronghold in Gaza, fighting elsewhere in the Palestinian enclave on Sunday led to warnings that the militants might remain a force for a long time to come.

Close-quarters ground combat between Hamas fighters and Israeli troops raged in parts of northern Gaza over the weekend, both sides said on Sunday, even as the world’s attention was largely focused on the southern city of Rafah, where Israel escalated military operations last week.

It has become a familiar scenario in the Gaza Strip over the course of the seven-month war: After pitched battles, Israel declares an area clear of Hamas, only to return after the militants reconstitute their forces.

On Sunday, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said he was concerned that Israel’s failure to lay down a template for the governance of Gaza meant that its victories might not be “sustainable” and would be followed by “chaos, by anarchy and ultimately by Hamas again.”

Mr. Blinken’s warning came as the Israeli military said its soldiers had “eliminated a number” of fighters in the Gaza City neighborhood of Zeitoun. In nearby Jabaliya, where civilians were ordered to evacuate on Saturday, troops went in overnight after fighter jets struck more than two dozen targets, the military said. The operation, it said, was “based on intelligence information regarding attempts by Hamas to reassemble.”

Hamas said on Sunday that its fighters were engaged in “fierce clashes” with Israeli soldiers near Jabaliya and that the fighters had fired heavy-caliber mortar shells at Israeli forces in Zeitoun.

Neither claim could be independently verified.

Palestine TV, a network affiliated with the Palestinian Authority, a rival to Hamas based in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, broadcast footage that it said showed civilians, many of them women and children, fleeing northern Gaza. Some were on foot, while others were on bicycles, in cars or piled onto carts drawn by donkeys.

“I am deeply distressed by the fast-deteriorating conditions in Gaza,” the United Nations’ human rights chief, Volker Türk, said in a statement about the fighting in the north.

Palestinians fleeing Rafah on Sunday, after Israeli forces launched a ground and air operation in the eastern part of the city.Credit...Hatem Khaled/Reuters

In Rafah, the southernmost city where more than a million Palestinians have fled for safety since the war began in October, Gazans were once again on the move, fearful that Israel was about to move into the city in full force.

Israel has been under intense international pressure — including from the United States, its closest ally — not to launch a full-scale invasion of Rafah. The Israelis say they are determined to eradicate the militants who led the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel.

But Hamas top leaders in the Gaza Strip, including Yahya Sinwar, are not hiding in Rafah, according to American officials, intelligence that could undercut the Israeli rationale for major military operations in the city.

U.S. officials say Israeli intelligence agencies agree with the American assessment. The two countries’ spy agencies believe that Mr. Sinwar most likely never left the tunnel network under Khan Younis, a major city to the north, according to American officials. The American officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence assessments.

Israel nevertheless has been increasing the pressure on Rafah.

The main United Nations agency aiding Palestinians in Gaza said early Sunday that about 300,000 people had fled from Rafah over the past week. Another organization, the World Food Program, warned that a full-scale invasion of the city would be “catastrophic.”

Gaza’s largest telecommunications company said on Sunday that internet service was down in parts of southern Gaza because of Israeli military operations. And Doctors Without Borders said it had started to refer the last 22 patients at one hospital, the Rafah Indonesian Field Hospital, to other facilities because it could “no longer guarantee their safety.”

An encampment for displaced Palestinians in Deir al Balah, in central Gaza, on Sunday.Credit...Ramadan Abed/Reuters

On Sunday, citizens in Israel were observing Memorial Day, a national day of mourning that has taken on added poignancy this year. At 8 p.m., a minute-long siren sounded across the country, bringing pedestrians to a standstill in the streets and traffic to a halt.

Even in a normal year, the commemoration for soldiers and victims of terrorist attacks is sacrosanct in Israel, a small country where many know someone killed or wounded as a result of the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Roughly 1,200 people were killed and 250 taken hostage on Oct. 7, the Israeli authorities say. Since Israel launched its invasion of Gaza, at least 272 soldiers have been killed, the military says. More than 34,000 Palestinians have been killed in the war, and most Gazans have been forced to flee their homes, Gaza officials say.

Liam Stackreported from Tel Aviv, Aaron Boxermanfrom Jerusalem, and Eric Nagourneyfrom New York. Reporting was contributed by Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous and Mike Ives.

Liam Stack is a Times reporter covering the Israel-Hamas war from Jerusalem. More about Liam Stack

Aaron Boxerman is a Times reporting fellow with a focus on international news. More about Aaron Boxerman

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 10 of the New York edition with the headline: As the World Watches Rafah, Battles Flare Anew in Northern Gaza

See more on: Israel-Hamas War News

The New York Times · by Eric Nagourney · May 12, 2024

6. U.S.-China talks on AI risks set to begin in Geneva

Excerpts:

“AI” — a catchall term for a range of advanced computing capabilities — has loomed large in the U.S.-China rivalry, with both governments elevating it to a priority. Sophisticated computing algorithms can give a nation an edge in areas as diverse as warfare, economic output and the creation of soft-power cultural products. Researchers say AI can also be leveraged for disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.

AI holds particular allure for militaries and intelligence agencies for its potential to help them sift through more raw data within seconds than a human could in a lifetime. Officials say the wars of the future will increasingly be fought with AI helping to make complex decisions in the heat of the moment.

The Biden administration imposed sanctions on China in October aimed at slowing its AI development by restricting its access to advanced chips, the brains of computing systems. U.S.-China tensions further flared last month after President Biden signed into law a U.S. ban on the popular short-video platform TikTok unless it sells itself to a non-Chinese buyer.

U.S.-China talks on AI risks set to begin in Geneva

The talks Tuesday are aimed at preventing disastrous accidents and unintended war amid an AI arms race.

By Eva Dou

May 13, 2024 at 5:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Eva Dou · May 13, 2024

The United States and China will hold their first high-level talks over the risks of artificial intelligence on Tuesday in Geneva, as the two governments seek to prevent disastrous accidents and unintended war amid an arms race for the emerging technology.

“We’re focused on how both sides define risk and safety here,” a senior Biden administration official told reporters last week, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss expectations for the talks.

Seth Center, the State Department deputy envoy for critical and emerging technology, and Tarun Chhabra, senior director for technology and national security at the National Security Council, will lead the U.S. delegation, the administration official said. China will be represented by officials from the Foreign Ministry and the National Development and Reform Commission, the nation’s central economic planning agency.

“AI” — a catchall term for a range of advanced computing capabilities — has loomed large in the U.S.-China rivalry, with both governments elevating it to a priority. Sophisticated computing algorithms can give a nation an edge in areas as diverse as warfare, economic output and the creation of soft-power cultural products. Researchers say AI can also be leveraged for disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.

AI holds particular allure for militaries and intelligence agencies for its potential to help them sift through more raw data within seconds than a human could in a lifetime. Officials say the wars of the future will increasingly be fought with AI helping to make complex decisions in the heat of the moment.

The Biden administration imposed sanctions on China in October aimed at slowing its AI development by restricting its access to advanced chips, the brains of computing systems. U.S.-China tensions further flared last month after President Biden signed into law a U.S. ban on the popular short-video platform TikTok unless it sells itself to a non-Chinese buyer.

Chinese Embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu said in a statement that the dialogue between the United States and China on AI would have effects for the future of not only the two countries, but other nations as well.

“The two sides have the responsibility to engage in candid dialogue,” he said.

Follow Technology

Biden administration officials tempered expectations for concrete outcomes of this week’s talks, saying they are not seeking to release a joint statement or cooperate with China on AI research. An official dismissed the idea that the U.S. chips sanctions might be revisited, saying that Washington will not negotiate “national security measures.”

China’s AI development continues to lag behind the United States, but its high-tech companies like Huawei Technologies, Alibaba and Baidu have made significant strides. China may have an edge in certain aspects, such as the manual data-labeling process that is used to train AI models, due to the country’s lower labor costs.

In a commentary for the Brookings Institution think tank, scholars Graham Webster and Ryan Hass suggested these talks could produce a better shared understanding of what constitutes permissible military use of AI, and agreements on what kinds of data can be shared across borders for training AI models.

Administration officials did not say if the talks will touch on TikTok or Huawei, the China-based telecommunications giant that has faced U.S. sanctions. Both companies have made forays into AI algorithms in recent years.

Simply keeping an open line of communication may be enough of a result from the talks for now. With intensified distrust and hostility, officials on both sides say preventing the de facto cold war from accidentally turning hot — whether from an AI mishap or human bungling — should be a policy priority.

The term “artificial intelligence” dates to the 1950s, with research on intelligent computers going back further. These algorithms reached a new level of sophistication by 2015, when Google’s DeepMind division unveiled an AI program that could beat the world’s top players of Go, a classic Chinese board game considered one of the most complex games to strategize.

Under the Obama administration, the National Science and Technology Council produced a report in 2016 identifying AI as a strategic focus, recommending that federal agencies intensify their investment in the technology and keep tabs on rival nations. China set out its own national blueprint in 2017, aiming to be a world leader in AI by 2030.

The launch of ChatGPT in 2022 brought this AI development race into the public view, with the chatbot making it clear to lay consumers just how advanced and broadly useful this technology had become. Biden issued an AI executive order in October, launching a whole-of-government push to ensure the United States remains the world leader in the technology.

Even as AI holds enormous innovative promise, one risk that government officials find troubling is the potential for the vast data troves hooked up to the back ends of the AI algorithms to be hacked by adversaries. Another risk is of military accidents due to malfunction of automated systems.

There also are all sorts of thorny ethical questions as governments decide exactly what they program AI systems to do, and what margins of error they will allow. The Israeli army’s use of AI algorithms to identify individuals as bombing targets in Gaza, as reported by +972 magazine, has generated controversy in recent weeks.

The Washington Post · by Eva Dou · May 13, 2024

7. Russia’s Bombardment of Ukraine Is More Lethal Than Ever

A number of maps and graphics at the link.

Did our Congressional delay in support to Ukraine contribute to this?

Excerpts:

The increased bombardment is destroying infrastructure and cities while sapping Ukraine’s already sparse supply of missiles, which the country needs to keep Russia’s air force out of its skies. 

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday on CBS News’s “Face the Nation” that the monthslong delay getting congressional approval for Ukraine aid has come at a cost.

“We are doing everything we can to rush this assistance out there. Europeans are doing the same,” Blinken said.

The next two or so months will be crucial for whether Russia’s air force can be held at bay before new Western air-defense supplies arrive in Ukraine, according to a European military intelligence official. 

Russia’s Bombardment of Ukraine Is More Lethal Than Ever

Ukraine has intercepted fewer missiles as Russia increases attacks, fires more harder-to-hit weapons

https://www.wsj.com/world/russias-bombardment-of-ukraine-is-more-lethal-than-ever-afd733c4?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Alistair MacDonaldFollow, Jemal R. BrinsonFollow, Emma BrownFollow and Ievgeniia Sivorka

Updated May 13, 2024 12:04 am ET

Ukraine is shooting down a far smaller proportion of Russian missile attacks than it was earlier in the war.

The worsening performance of Ukraine’s air defenses comes as Russia increases drone and missile attacks, and fires more harder-to-hit weapons, such as ballistic missiles. Kyiv is also running low on ammunition for the Western-supplied Patriot systems that have been its best defense against such attacks.

In the past six months, Ukraine intercepted around 46% of Russian missiles, compared with 73% in the preceding six-month period, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of daily data from the Ukrainian Air Force Command. Last month the interception rate fell to 30% of missiles. The interception rate for long-range Shahed drones, which are easier to shoot down, fell just 1 percentage point to 82% in the past six months.

While the attack and interception data for several days was incomplete, and Ukraine uses such statistics for propaganda purposes, a UAF spokesman and an independent defense analyst said the data gave an overall accurate picture.

The increased bombardment is destroying infrastructure and cities while sapping Ukraine’s already sparse supply of missiles, which the country needs to keep Russia’s air force out of its skies. 

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday on CBS News’s “Face the Nation” that the monthslong delay getting congressional approval for Ukraine aid has come at a cost.

“We are doing everything we can to rush this assistance out there. Europeans are doing the same,” Blinken said.

The next two or so months will be crucial for whether Russia’s air force can be held at bay before new Western air-defense supplies arrive in Ukraine, according to a European military intelligence official. 

Russian attacks in Ukraine since the beginning of the war

Air/drone strike

Missile

BELARUS

RUSSIA

POLAND

Kyiv

RUSSIAN FORCES

Kharkiv

Lviv

Dnipro

UKRAINE

Zaporizhzhia

Donetsk

Kryviy Rih

MOL.

Mariupol

Odesa

Kherson

Port of

Mykolaiv

Sea of Azov

ROMANIA

Port of Izmail

Black Sea

Note: Strikes and Russian forces as of April 30

Sources: ACLED (strikes); Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project (Russian forces)

“The less of a threat Ukrainian defenses pose to Russian air power the greater the threat to Ukrainian forces on the ground and critical infrastructure,” said Douglas Barrie, a specialist in military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank.

Over the past six months, Russia fired around 45% more drones and missiles than in the proceeding six-month period, according to the data. 

Intercepting the greater volume of attacks runs down ammunition stocks while large barrages can also overwhelm Ukrainian defenses, with air-defense systems sometimes unable to reload quickly enough, a UAF spokesman said.

Russia fired almost double the number of Shahed drones, at 2,628, in the past six months compared with the previous period, the data shows. The drones are partly used to test air defenses before missiles are sent in, analysts said.

Munitions fired by Russia into Ukraine

An average of 608.5 munitions were fired each month over the past six months compared to 423.8 during the previous six months

900

800

Shot down

700

Drones

Missiles

600

Not shot down

500

400

300

200

100

0

Oct. 2022

'23

'24

Note: As of April 30

Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command

It also fired 114 ballistic and 46 hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles, compared with 33 and 27, respectively, for the previous six months. Moscow has also repurposed air-defense systems to attack Ukraine, firing 175 missiles from its S-300 or S-400 air-defense system into unoccupied Ukraine this year alone. 

In the past six months, Ukraine has shot down just 10% of the ballistic missiles Russia has fired. It hasn’t intercepted any of the S-300 and S-400 missiles fired into Ukraine so far this year, according to the data.

The data show higher interception rates for cruise missiles, such as the Kh-555. The UAF says they can be intercepted with a wider range of air defense because they are typically slower and smaller. Ukraine uses midrange defense systems, such as the Western-supplied Nasams, to shoot down these missiles.

Russian munitions shot down by Ukraine

Kh-55 (Diagram below)

Shahed-136

Max speed: 115 mph

Max flying range: Up to

1,553 miles

Weight: 441 lbs.

In service: 2021

Origin: Iran

Max speed: 591 mph

Range: Up to 1,553 miles

Weight: 1.3 tons

In service: 1984

Origin: Russia

1,304

4,400

shot down

Data for Kh-555/101/55 missiles

Shahed-136

Kh-55

6-foot man

Kalibr:

407

shot

down

Iskander-K: 66

Iskander-M

and KN-23: 38

Onyx: 12

Air defense

(S-300/400): 19

Kh-35: 1

Guided aviation missiles: 206

(generally all types without categories)

Tochka U: 6

Zircon: 2

Note: 3D models are not to scale. Munitions data is from start of the war until early April.

Sources: Military Today (Shahed-136); Missile Threat (Kh-55); Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (Kh-55 speed); Ukrainian Air Force Command (munitions data)

The Patriot is Ukraine’s only reliable way to shoot down ballistic, S-300 and hypersonic missiles. But Kyiv has few Patriot systems and has had to conserve missiles, not least as fresh U.S. supplies were held up in Washington. 

Now those supplies have been unlocked, the Defense Department has said it would send more Patriot interceptors. While some of these missiles will likely come from stockpiles, others will be ordered, taking several years to be manufactured.

The UAF declined to give the exact number of Patriot systems currently operating in Ukraine but said they could be counted on one hand. President Volodymyr Zelensky has told reporters that Ukraine needs a minimum of seven additional Patriots but has also separately said 25 of the missile systems would be needed to cover all of Ukraine’s territory.

Ukraine has an array of other missile-defense systems, including Nasams and the Iris/T, though these aren’t as effective against ballistic or hypersonic missiles and anti-air missiles repurposed from defense to attack.

How a Patriot battery tracks and intercepts targets

RADAR

Radar detects and tracks missiles and other targets.

Radar sends data to remote Engagement Control

Station.

ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION

1

2

ECS receives the data and sends it to the Patriot Launching Station.

Interceptor missile canister

Antenna

LAUNCHING STATION

Launching Station houses remote operating module, launcher and up to 16 interceptor missiles.

Launching Station receives targets’ location from ECS through the station’s antenna.

3

INTERCEPTOR

Interceptors are fired either manually or remotely from the ECS.

4

Note: Diagram is not to scale

Source: Army Recognition

Jemal R. Brinson and Peter Champelli/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The air war may now come down to which side can outlast the other on missile supplies. Ukraine is dependent on its Western allies, which are struggling to make missiles fast enough. 

Russia still has its own stockpiles and is capable of producing 170 missiles every month, according to a Ukrainian official. Moscow has also received supplies of drones and missiles from its allies, including Iran and North Korea.

For now, Russia continues to attack Ukraine with missiles and drones from locations to the country’s north, east and south.

The origin of missile and drone attacks on Ukraine

Number of times mentioned*

Drone

LITHUANIA

Missile

Ryazan

100

60

20

BELARUS

Bryansk

RUSSIA

Engels

Voronezh

Kursk

Belgorod

KAZAKHSTAN

RUSSIAN FORCES

UKRAINE

Rostov

Astrakhan

Volgodonsk

Yeysk

MOL.

Sea of Azov

Primorsko-Akhtarsk

Air Base

Caspian Sea

ROMANIA

Cape Tarkhankut

Cape

Chauda

Balaklava

Black Sea

BULGARIA

GEORGIA

AZERBAIJAN

ARMENIA

TURKEY

*Chart shows the number of times Ukrainian Air Force Command data mentioned certain locations as the origin of an attack, not the number of missiles or drones launched.

Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command

Roque Ruiz, Oksana Pyrozhok, Max Colchester and Lindsay Wise contributed to this article.

Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com, Jemal R. Brinson at jemal.brinson@wsj.com and Emma Brown at Emma.Brown@wsj.com

8. New strategic military sites in Philippines exercised in Balikatan

Who would have thought the Philippines would again be so strategically important. But geography always matters.

New strategic military sites in Philippines exercised in Balikatan

Defense News · by Jen Judson · May 12, 2024

MANILA – New military sites designated under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the U.S. and the Philippines allowed forces during the bilateral Balikatan exercise to test their strategic effectiveness and to work on improvement projects there.

EDCA allows the U.S. to fund improvement and construction of infrastructure at existing Philippine military bases and other locations as well as to rotationally deploy U.S. troops. The agreement was signed in 2014 and established six sites originally. In 2023, it four more sites weee added to the list.

The mutual defense treaty between the U.S. and Philippines established the EDCA sites in order to support combined training, exercises and interoperability between the two militaries.

“The Philippines retains sovereignty and control over EDCA sites,” U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Oscar Franquez, spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Manila, told Defense News. “EDCA sites are not U.S. bases, and the U.S. does not maintain permanent forces or footprints in the Philippines.”

The U.S. government has funded over $100 million in improvement projects to advance the modernization of the Philippines Armed Forces.

Three out of the four new EDCA sites were used for major events within the Balikatan exercise series, which began in late April and wrapped up on May 9.

Those three sites are locations strategic to the Philippines’ territorial defense. One is located on Balabac Island, south of Palawan Island. The island borders the southeast portion of the South China Sea, where the Philippines continues to defend its territory from Chinese aggression at places like the Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines marines operate aboard a shipwrecked World War II-era tank landing ship, the Sierra Madre.

The other site is at La-Lo airport in north central Luzon, a commercial airport being used during Balikatan for operations to project air assault missions into the northern islands within close proximity to Taiwan.

“The use of new and existing enhanced defense cooperation agreement sites during Balikatan 24 enhanced combined training and interoperability between the U.S. and Armed Forces of the Philippines, allowing us to operate together more efficiently,” U.S. Marine Capt. Colin Kennard, a spokesperson for the Combined Joint Information Bureau at Balikatan, told Defense News.

At La-Lo, U.S. Air Force C-130s delivered vital assets like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).

CH-47F Chinooks and UH-60M Black Hawks could be seen regularly taking off and landing, conducting air assaults into the northern islands, such as Basco, where part of the U.S. Army’s 1st Multidomain Task Force was situated for operations.

La-Lo also hosted a medical command post during the exercise.

“Because of its proximity,” La-lo “allows us to more efficiently support training events that focus on coastal defense and maritime key terrain in the Batanes Islands,” Kennard said. Basco is part of that island chain.

The final new site used during Balikatan was the Naval Base Camilo Osias in Northern Luzon.

The fourth new EDCA site, Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela – located in the central western portion of Luzon — was not used during Balikatan.

Of the original six EDCA designated sites, Fort Magsaysay served as a central basing location for Balikatan as it has in the past, particularly hosting the exercise’s jungle training.

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Justin Farcassi, an engineer equipment mechanic with Marine Wing Support Squadron 174, Marine Aircraft Group 24, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, guides a Millennium Military Vehicle during a fly-away forward arming and refueling point operation in support of Exercise Balikatan 24 at Lal-lo Airport, Lal-lo, Cayayan, Philippines, April 27, 2024. (Photo by Cpl. Trent A. Henry/U.S. Marine Corps)

Training enhancements

Directly following Balikatan, during a second phase of the Salaknib exercise that kicked off in the weeks prior to Balikatan, the U.S. Army is bringing its Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Exportable, or JPMRC X, to Fort Magsaysay, which marks the the first time the most extensive iteration of the exportable version of the major training center is deployed west of the international date line.

The deployment of the JPMRC X to the Philippines will “help enable, assist and allow the Philippine army to begin to establish their own training center in the vicinity of Fort Magsaysay,” Gen. Charles Flynn, U.S. Army Pacific Command commander, said during a May 8 media roundtable.

“We’re helping them create that capability,” he said, “Where they choose to put it and how to build it is their own decision, but they turned to us for the expertise that we have and the JPMRC is a really concrete example of assistance that we’re giving them in and around their EDCA sites.”

In Hawaii, the JPMRC is a combat training center rotation that validates an infantry brigade combat team and brings in multinational and joint partners in an immersive training environment to conduct fully instrumented, live, virtual, constructive support to achieve specific training objectives to validate the BCT. Each brigade spends about 12 months prior preparing and training with JPMRC being the culminating training exercise.

The Army’s 25th Infantry Division is bringing the instrumentation systems, an exercise control group and an opposition force to the Philippines to conduct the JPMRC training during the second phase of Salaknib and will team up with the Philippines’ 7th Infantry Division for the event, Brig. Gen. David Zinn, 25th ID deputy commanding general, told Defense News in an interview at Fort Magsaysay.

“We’re very excited about it,” Zinn said. “Number one, it’s a proof of principle that we can do this. Number two, it’s a demonstration of the value of this to our partners who I hope, in the future, that they run this capability internally to understand the value of a brigade level training exercise with a dedicated opposition force.”

The Army is also now engaged in improving range facilities at Fort Magsaysay, Flynn noted. “That helps the Philippine army because now they have an improved range, but also helps us because when we’re over there for Balikatan and Salaknib, we have better range facilities to be able to operate on,” Flynn said.

The Army will continue to help improve the EDCA sites over time, Flynn said. “I think what has become more focused is that the Philippine military is now focused on territorial defense operations and that shift from counterinsurgency is in support of our allies and in support of our treaty allies. That defense matters,” he added. “We help defend terrain, we help defend people and ... we help them protect and defend their territorial integrity and national sovereignty.”

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

9. Mighty dollar pushes Asian governments to boost currency protection

Graphic at the link.

Mighty dollar pushes Asian governments to boost currency protection

Asian monetary officials seek to buy time until the U.S. economy slows down

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Market-Spotlight/Mighty-dollar-pushes-Asian-governments-to-boost-currency-protection?utm

LISA KIM, Nikkei staff writer

MAY 13, 2024 06:00 JST

TOKYO -- Asian governments are increasingly taking action to stop the fall of their currencies that have been battered this year by the mighty U.S. dollar. 

The strength of the American economy and its higher-for-longer rates have translated to weaker Asian currencies. Asian policymakers are responding to the dollar's strength in varying degrees, from issuing verbal warnings to raising interest rates. Some are even believed to have intervened by buying their local currency -- a tricky move that could dent a central bank's credibility. 

Currency analysts are focused on the U.S. consumer price index for April due Wednesday after the previous month's data caused the yen to tumble. 

The most recent piece of significant U.S. economic data, nonfarm payrolls, was weaker than expected, meaning Asian currencies could take a breather. But that alone won't push the dollar lower, according to Fiona Lim, senior currency strategist at Maybank in Singapore.

The upcoming U.S. inflation data "would actually determine the next move for dollar-Asian currencies," she said. "Before it comes out, we'll probably see some kind of consolidation." 

Traders are predicting an 8.5% chance of a U.S. rate cut after the next Federal Open Market Committee meeting in June and around 33% for the following meeting in July, according to federal funds rate futures tracker CME FedWatch tool. 

The Japanese yen is one of the Asian currencies most affected by the stronger-than-expected U.S. economy. 

The Japanese government appears to have intervened twice recently -- on April 29 and May 1 -- to shore up its currency, though official data is yet to be released, analysts said. Before the first suspected intervention, the yen had plummeted past 160 to the dollar, marking its lowest in 34 years. 

The yen's decline boils down to the roughly 5 percentage point gap in yields between the U.S. and Japan. The Japanese yen is hovering at the 155 range to the dollar on a 9.4% drop this year, according to Refinitiv.  

More dollar selling and yen buying intervention could prove difficult for Tokyo without backing from Washington, according to Shoki Omori, chief desk strategist at Mizuho Securities. 

U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen reportedly said earlier this month that "we would expect these interventions to be rare and consultation to take place," though she did not comment on whether Tokyo had intervened. 

A summary of opinions from the Bank of Japan's April monetary policy meeting released last week showed a hawkish tone compared to Gov. Kazuo Ueda's previous public remarks. Some board members saw the possibility of an accelerated rate rise and many said the BOJ should reduce its bond purchases. 

But Mizuho Securities' Omori expects that short bets against the yen will continue until the fundamentals change as "there is no silver bullet" to reverse the yen's weakness. 

"Carry trade using yen will remain attractive unless the BOJ increases the policy rate quickly and significantly, say 50 basis points in one go, and reduces purchases of short term bonds," he said. 

Investors are pricing in a 17.5% chance of a BOJ rate increase by July and 25% by October, according to Mizuho Securities. 

In South Korea, forex reserves shrank by nearly $6 billion last month from March, according to Bank of Korea data, partially due to the country's efforts to stop the fall of the won. 

The country's central bank said in a statement that the decline in its forex reserves is linked to several factors, including "market stabilization measures such as foreign exchange swap with the National Pension Service," which was put in place in September 2022. 

Markets are speculating that the South Korean government helped defend the won's rapid decline, as the currency strengthened against the dollar after a verbal warning last month, according to Moon Da Woon, economist at Korea Investment & Securities in Seoul. 

South Korea's Finance Ministry and central bank made the verbal intervention in April, warning of rapid currency movements, just as the won touched 1,400 against the U.S. dollar for the first time in about a year and half.  

The won has strengthened since then, recently trading at 1366.50 to the dollar, according to Refinitiv. Korea Investment & Securities' Moon said she expects the won to strengthen to high 1,200 levels by year end. 

Over in Indonesia, the central bank unexpectedly raised the benchmark interest rate last month by 25 basis points to 6.25% to beef up its currency. 

Bank Indonesia Gov. Perry Warjiyo said at a press conference last week that data suggest no more rate rises are in store for now. He vowed to work on strengthening the currency to below 16,000 to the dollar. 

The rupiah has strengthened to around 16,000 to the dollar from almost 16,300 before the surprise rate increase but it has yet to rebound after falling to a four-year low last month. 

One of the most stable Asian currencies is the Indian rupee, though it slid to its lowest ever rate to the dollar -- 83.739 -- last month. 

The currency has been "heavily managed" by the Reserve Bank of India since about October, trading at a narrow range of about 83, according to Rob Carnell, chief economist for Asia Pacific at ING in Singapore. 

Carnell said all central and regional banks in Asia except Malaysia have forex reserves to cover more than six months of imports, which is the threshold of a sufficient reserve. 

The Malaysian ringgit is trading at 4.737 to the dollar after dropping to its 26-year low of 4.7965 in February. 

The ringgit's weakness is caused by the dollar's strength, a decline in Malaysia's current account surplus, and the currency's strong correlation with the Chinese yuan, which is also weakening. 

10. The New Propaganda War

Partisan appearance aside, this is a long and important read about what the autocrats are doing.

Excerpts:

In the aftermath of these events, the Chinese concluded that the physical elimination of dissenters was insufficient. To prevent the democratic wave then sweeping across Central Europe from reaching East Asia, the Chinese Communist Party eventually set out to eliminate not just the people but the ideas that had motivated the protests. In the years to come, this would require policing what the Chinese people could see online.

Nobody believed that this would work. In 2000, President Bill Clinton told an audience at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies that it was impossible. “In the knowledge economy,” he said, “economic innovation and political empowerment, whether anyone likes it or not, will inevitably go hand in hand.” The transcript records the audience reactions:

“Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the internet.” (Chuckles.) “Good luck!” (Laughter.) “That’s sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.” (Laughter.)

While we were still rhapsodizing about the many ways in which the internet could spread democracy, the Chinese were designing what’s become known as the Great Firewall of China. That method of internet management—which is in effect conversation management—contains many different elements, beginning with an elaborate system of blocks and filters that prevent internet users from seeing particular words and phrases. Among them, famously, are Tiananmen, 1989, and June 4, but there are many more. In 2000, a directive called “Measures for Managing Internet Information Services” prohibited an extraordinarily wide range of content, including anything that “endangers national security, divulges state secrets, subverts the government, undermines national unification,” and “is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state”—anything, in other words, that the authorities didn’t like.

...

These stories are symptomatic of a larger problem: Because the American extreme right and (more rarely) the extreme left benefit from the spread of antidemocratic narratives, they have an interest in silencing or hobbling any group that wants to stop, or even identify, foreign campaigns. Senator Mark Warner, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told me that “we are actually less prepared today than we were four years ago” for foreign attempts to influence the 2024 election. This is not only because authoritarian propaganda campaigns have become more sophisticated as they begin to use AI, or because “you obviously have a political environment here where there’s a lot more Americans who are more distrustful of all institutions.” It’s also because the lawsuits, threats, and smear tactics have chilled government, academic, and tech-company responses.

One could call this a secret authoritarian “plot” to preserve the ability to spread antidemocratic conspiracy theories, except that it’s not a secret. It’s all visible, right on the surface. Russia, China, and sometimes other state actors—Venezuela, Iran, Hungary—work with Americans to discredit democracy, to undermine the credibility of democratic leaders, to mock the rule of law. They do so with the goal of electing Trump, whose second presidency would damage the image of democracy around the world, as well as the stability of democracy in America, even further.

The New Propaganda War

Autocrats in China, Russia, and elsewhere are now making common cause with MAGA Republicans to discredit liberalism and freedom around the world.

By Anne Applebaum

Illustrations by Tyler Comrie

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · May 6, 2024

This article was featured in the One Story to Read Today newsletter. Sign up for it here.

On June 4, 1989, the Polish Communist Party held partially free elections, setting in motion a series of events that ultimately removed the Communists from power. Not long afterward, street protests calling for free speech, due process, accountability, and democracy brought about the end of the Communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Within a few years, the Soviet Union itself would no longer exist.

Also on June 4, 1989, the Chinese Communist Party ordered the military to remove thousands of students from Tiananmen Square. The students were calling for free speech, due process, accountability, and democracy. Soldiers arrested and killed demonstrators in Beijing and around the country. Later, they systematically tracked down the leaders of the protest movement and forced them to confess and recant. Some spent years in jail. Others managed to elude their pursuers and flee the country forever.

In the aftermath of these events, the Chinese concluded that the physical elimination of dissenters was insufficient. To prevent the democratic wave then sweeping across Central Europe from reaching East Asia, the Chinese Communist Party eventually set out to eliminate not just the people but the ideas that had motivated the protests. In the years to come, this would require policing what the Chinese people could see online.

Nobody believed that this would work. In 2000, President Bill Clinton told an audience at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies that it was impossible. “In the knowledge economy,” he said, “economic innovation and political empowerment, whether anyone likes it or not, will inevitably go hand in hand.” The transcript records the audience reactions:

“Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the internet.” (Chuckles.) “Good luck!” (Laughter.) “That’s sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.” (Laughter.)

While we were still rhapsodizing about the many ways in which the internet could spread democracy, the Chinese were designing what’s become known as the Great Firewall of China. That method of internet management—which is in effect conversation management—contains many different elements, beginning with an elaborate system of blocks and filters that prevent internet users from seeing particular words and phrases. Among them, famously, are Tiananmen, 1989, and June 4, but there are many more. In 2000, a directive called “Measures for Managing Internet Information Services” prohibited an extraordinarily wide range of content, including anything that “endangers national security, divulges state secrets, subverts the government, undermines national unification,” and “is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state”—anything, in other words, that the authorities didn’t like.

From the May 2022 issue: There is no liberal world order

The Chinese regime also combined online tracking methods with other tools of repression, including security cameras, police inspections, and arrests. In Xinjiang province, where China’s Uyghur Muslim population is concentrated, the state has forced people to install “nanny apps” that can scan phones for forbidden phrases and pick up unusual behavior: Anyone who downloads a virtual private network, anyone who stays offline altogether, and anyone whose home uses too much electricity (which could be evidence of a secret houseguest) can arouse suspicion. Voice-recognition technology and even DNA swabs are used to monitor where Uyghurs walk, drive, and shop. With every new breakthrough, with every AI advance, China has gotten closer to its holy grail: a system that can eliminate not just the words democracy and Tiananmen from the internet, but the thinking that leads people to become democracy activists or attend public protests in real life.

If people are naturally drawn to human rights, democracy, and freedom, then those concepts have to be poisoned.

But along the way, the Chinese regime discovered a deeper problem: Surveillance, regardless of sophistication, provides no guarantees. During the coronavirus pandemic, the Chinese government imposed controls more severe than most of its citizens had ever experienced. Millions of people were locked into their homes. Untold numbers entered government quarantine camps. Yet the lockdown also produced the angriest and most energetic Chinese protests in many years. Young people who had never attended a demonstration and had no memory of Tiananmen gathered in the streets of Beijing and Shanghai in the autumn of 2022 to talk about freedom. In Xinjiang, where lockdowns were the longest and harshest, and where repression is most complete, people came out in public and sang the Chinese national anthem, emphasizing one line: “Rise up, those who refuse to be slaves!” Clips of their performance circulated widely, presumably because the spyware and filters didn’t identify the national anthem as dissent.

Even in a state where surveillance is almost total, the experience of tyranny and injustice can radicalize people. Anger at arbitrary power will always lead someone to start thinking about another system, a better way to run society. The strength of these demonstrations, and the broader anger they reflected, was enough to spook the Chinese Communist Party into lifting the quarantine and allowing the virus to spread. The deaths that resulted were preferable to public anger and protest.

Like the demonstrations against President Vladimir Putin in Russia that began in 2011, the 2014 street protests in Venezuela, and the 2019 Hong Kong protests, the 2022 protests in China help explain something else: why autocratic regimes have slowly turned their repressive mechanisms outward, into the democratic world. If people are naturally drawn to the image of human rights, to the language of democracy, to the dream of freedom, then those concepts have to be poisoned. That requires more than surveillance, more than close observation of the population, more than a political system that defends against liberal ideas. It also requires an offensive plan: a narrative that damages both the idea of democracy everywhere in the world and the tools to deliver it.

On February 24, 2022, as Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, fantastical tales of biological warfare began surging across the internet. Russian officials solemnly declared that secret U.S.-funded biolabs in Ukraine had been conducting experiments with bat viruses and claimed that U.S. officials had confessed to manipulating “dangerous pathogens.” The story was unfounded, not to say ridiculous, and was repeatedly debunked.

Nevertheless, an American Twitter account with links to the QAnon conspiracy network—@WarClandestine—began tweeting about the nonexistent biolabs, racking up thousands of retweets and views. The hashtag #biolab started trending on Twitter and reached more than 9 million views. Even after the account—later revealed to belong to a veteran of the Army National Guard—was suspended, people continued to post screenshots. A version of the story appeared on the Infowars website created by Alex Jones, best known for promoting conspiracy theories about the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School and harassing families of the victims. Tucker Carlson, then still hosting a show on Fox News, played clips of a Russian general and a Chinese spokesperson repeating the biolab fantasy and demanded that the Biden administration “stop lying and [tell] us what’s going on here.”

Chinese state media also leaned hard into the story. A foreign-ministry spokesperson declared that the U.S. controlled 26 biolabs in Ukraine: “Russia has found during its military operations that the U.S. uses these facilities to conduct bio-military plans.” Xinhua, a Chinese state news agency, ran multiple headlines: “U.S.-Led Biolabs Pose Potential Threats to People of Ukraine and Beyond,” “Russia Urges U.S. to Explain Purpose of Biological Labs in Ukraine,” and so on. U.S. diplomats publicly refuted these fabrications. Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to spread them. So did the scores of Asian, African, and Latin American media outlets that have content-sharing agreements with Chinese state media. So did Telesur, the Venezuelan network; Press TV, the Iranian network; and Russia Today, in Spanish and Arabic, as well as on many Russia Today–linked websites around the world.

This joint propaganda effort worked. Globally, it helped undermine the U.S.-led effort to create solidarity with Ukraine and enforce sanctions against Russia. Inside the U.S., it helped undermine the Biden administration’s effort to consolidate American public opinion in support of providing aid to Ukraine. According to one poll, a quarter of Americans believed the biolabs conspiracy theory to be true. After the invasion, Russia and China—with, again, help from Venezuela, Iran, and far-right Europeans and Americans—successfully created an international echo chamber. Anyone inside this echo chamber heard the biolab conspiracy theory many times, from different sources, each one repeating and building on the others to create the impression of veracity. They also heard false descriptions of Ukrainians as Nazis, along with claims that Ukraine is a puppet state run by the CIA, and that NATO started the war.

Outside this echo chamber, few even know it exists. At a dinner in Munich in February 2023, I found myself seated across from a European diplomat who had just returned from Africa. He had met with some students there and had been shocked to discover how little they knew about the war in Ukraine, and how much of what they did know was wrong. They had repeated the Russian claims that the Ukrainians are Nazis, blamed NATO for the invasion, and generally used the same kind of language that can be heard every night on the Russian evening news. The diplomat was mystified. He grasped for explanations: Maybe the legacy of colonialism explained the spread of these conspiracy theories, or Western neglect of the global South, or the long shadow of the Cold War.

Tyler Comrie

But the story of how Africans—as well as Latin Americans, Asians, and indeed many Europeans and Americans—have come to spout Russian propaganda about Ukraine is not primarily a story of European colonial history, Western policy, or the Cold War. Rather, it involves China’s systematic efforts to buy or influence both popular and elite audiences around the world; carefully curated Russian propaganda campaigns, some open, some clandestine, some amplified by the American and European far right; and other autocracies using their own networks to promote the same language.

To be fair to the European diplomat, the convergence of what had been disparate authoritarian influence projects is still new. Russian information-laundering and Chinese propaganda have long had different goals. Chinese propagandists mostly stayed out of the democratic world’s politics, except to promote Chinese achievements, Chinese economic success, and Chinese narratives about Tibet or Hong Kong. Their efforts in Africa and Latin America tended to feature dull, unwatchable announcements of investments and state visits. Russian efforts were more aggressive—sometimes in conjunction with the far right or the far left in the democratic world—and aimed to distort debates and elections in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Still, they often seemed unfocused, as if computer hackers were throwing spaghetti at the wall, just to see which crazy story might stick. Venezuela and Iran were fringe players, not real sources of influence.

Slowly, though, these autocracies have come together, not around particular stories, but around a set of ideas, or rather in opposition to a set of ideas. Transparency, for example. And rule of law. And democracy. They have heard language about those ideas—which originate in the democratic world—coming from their own dissidents, and have concluded that they are dangerous to their regimes. Their own rhetoric makes this clear. In 2013, as Chinese President Xi Jinping was beginning his rise to power, an internal Chinese memo, known enigmatically as Document No. 9—or, more formally, as the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere—listed “seven perils” faced by the Chinese Communist Party. “Western constitutional democracy” led the list, followed by “universal human rights,” “media independence,” “judicial independence,” and “civic participation.” The document concluded that “Western forces hostile to China,” together with dissidents inside the country, “are still constantly infiltrating the ideological sphere,” and instructed party leaders to push back against these ideas wherever they found them, especially online, inside China and around the world.

From the December 2021 issue: The bad guys are winning

Since at least 2004, the Russians have been focused on the same convergence of internal and external ideological threats. That was the year Ukrainians staged a popular revolt, known as the Orange Revolution—the name came from the orange T-shirts and flags of the protesters—against a clumsy attempt to steal a presidential election. The angry intervention of the Ukrainian public into what was meant to have been a carefully orchestrated victory for Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian candidate directly supported by Putin himself, profoundly unnerved the Russians. This was especially the case because a similarly unruly protest movement in Georgia had brought a pro-European politician, Mikheil Saakashvili, to power the year before.

Shaken by those two events, Putin put the bogeyman of “color revolution” at the center of Russian propaganda. Civic protest movements are now always described as color revolutions in Russia, and as the work of outsiders. Popular opposition leaders are always said to be puppets of foreign governments. Anti-corruption and prodemocracy slogans are linked to chaos and instability wherever they are used, whether in Tunisia, Syria, or the United States. In 2011, a year of mass protest against a manipulated election in Russia itself, Putin bitterly described the Orange Revolution as a “well-tested scheme for destabilizing society,” and he accused the Russian opposition of “transferring this practice to Russian soil,” where he feared a similar popular uprising intended to remove him from power.

Putin was wrong—no “scheme” had been “transferred.” Public discontent in Russia simply had no way to express itself except through street protest, and Putin’s opponents had no legal means to remove him from power. Like so many other people around the world, they talked about democracy and human rights because they recognized that these concepts represented their best hope for achieving justice, and freedom from autocratic power. The protests that led to democratic transitions in the Philippines, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, and Mexico; the “people’s revolutions” that washed across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989; the Arab Spring in 2011; and, yes, the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia—all were begun by those who had suffered injustice at the hands of the state, and who seized on the language of freedom and democracy to propose an alternative.

This is the core problem for autocracies: The Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, and others all know that the language of transparency, accountability, justice, and democracy appeals to some of their citizens, as it does to many people who live in dictatorships. Even the most sophisticated surveillance can’t wholly suppress it. The very ideas of democracy and freedom must be discredited—especially in the places where they have historically flourished.

In the 20th century, Communist Party propaganda was overwhelming and inspiring, or at least it was meant to be. The future it portrayed was shiny and idealized, a vision of clean factories, abundant produce, and healthy tractor drivers with large muscles and square jaws. The architecture was designed to overpower, the music to intimidate, the public spectacles to awe. In theory, citizens were meant to feel enthusiasm, inspiration, and hope. In practice, this kind of propaganda backfired, because people could compare what they saw on posters and in movies with a far more impoverished reality.

A few autocracies still portray themselves to their citizens as model states. The North Koreans continue to hold colossal military parades with elaborate gymnastics displays and huge portraits of their leader, very much in the Stalinist style. But most modern authoritarians have learned from the mistakes of the previous century. Freedom House, a nonprofit that advocates for democracy around the world, lists 56 countries as “not free.” Most don’t offer their fellow citizens a vision of utopia, and don’t inspire them to build a better world. Instead, they teach people to be cynical and passive, apathetic and afraid, because there is no better world to build. Their goal is to persuade their own people to stay out of politics, and above all to convince them that there is no democratic alternative: Our state may be corrupt, but everyone else is corrupt too. You may not like our leader, but the others are worse. You may not like our society, but at least we are strong. The democratic world is weak, degenerate, divided, dying.

Instead of portraying China as the perfect society, modern Chinese propaganda seeks to inculcate nationalist pride, based on China’s real experience of economic development, and to promote a Beijing model of progress through dictatorship and “order” that’s superior to the chaos and violence of democracy. Chinese media mocked the laxity of the American response to the pandemic with an animated film that ended with the Statue of Liberty on an intravenous drip. China’s Global Times wrote that Chinese people were mocking the January 6 insurrection as “karma” and “retribution”: “Seeing such scenarios,” the publication’s then-editor wrote in an op-ed, “many Chinese will naturally recall that Nancy Pelosi once praised the violence of Hong Kong protesters as ‘a beautiful sight to behold.’ ” (Pelosi, of course, had praised peaceful demonstrators, not violence.) The Chinese are told that these forces of chaos are out to disrupt their own lives, and they are encouraged to fight against them in a “people’s war” against foreign influence.

Read: I watched Russian TV so you don’t have to

Russians, although they hear very little about what happens in their own towns and cities, receive similar messages about the decline of places they don’t know and have mostly never visited: America, France, Britain, Sweden, Poland—countries apparently filled with degeneracy, hypocrisy, and Russophobia. A study of Russian television from 2014 to 2017 found that negative news about Europe appeared on the three main Russian channels, all state-controlled, an average of 18 times a day. Some of the stories were obviously invented (European governments are stealing children from straight families and giving them to gay couples! ), but even the true ones were cherry-picked to support the idea that daily life in Europe is frightening and chaotic, that Europeans are weak and immoral, and that the European Union is aggressive and interventionist. If anything, the portrayal of America has been more dramatic. Putin himself has displayed a surprisingly intimate acquaintance with American culture wars about transgender rights, and mockingly sympathized with people who he says have been “canceled.”

Fear, cynicism, nihilism, and apathy, coupled with disgust and disdain for democracy: This is what modern autocrats sell to their citizens and to foreigners, all with the aim of destroying what they call “American hegemony.”

The goal is clear: to prevent Russians from identifying with Europe the way they once did, and to build alliances between Putin’s domestic audience and his supporters in Europe and North America, where some naive conservatives (or perhaps cynical, well-paid conservatives) seek to convince their followers that Russia is a “white Christian state.” In reality, Russia has very low church attendance, legal abortion, and a multiethnic population containing millions of Muslim citizens and migrants. The autonomous region of Chechnya, which is part of the Russian Federation, is governed, in practice, by elements of Sharia law. The Russian state harasses and represses many forms of religion outside the state-sanctioned Russian Orthodox Church, including evangelical Protestantism. Nevertheless, among the slogans shouted by white nationalists marching in the infamous Charlottesville, Virginia, demonstration in 2017 was “Russia is our friend.” Putin sends periodic messages to this constituency: “I uphold the traditional approach that a woman is a woman, a man is a man, a mother is a mother, and a father is a father,” he told a press conference in December 2021, almost as if this “traditional approach” would be justification for invading Ukraine.

Michael Carpenter: Russia is co-opting angry young men

This manipulation of the strong emotions around gay rights and feminism has been widely copied throughout the autocratic world, often as a means of defending against criticism of the regime. Yoweri Museveni, who has been the president of Uganda for more than three decades, passed an “anti-homosexuality” bill in 2014, instituting a life sentence for gay people who have sex or marry and criminalizing the “promotion” of a homosexual lifestyle. By picking a fight over gay rights, he was able to consolidate his supporters at home while neutralizing foreign criticisms of his regime, describing them as “social imperialism”: “Outsiders cannot dictate to us; this is our country,” he declared. Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, also ducks discussion of Hungarian corruption by hiding behind a culture war. He pretends that ongoing tension between his government and the U.S. ambassador to Hungary concerns religion and gender: During Tucker Carlson’s recent visit to Hungary, Carlson declared that the Biden administration “hates” Hungary because “it’s a Christian country,” when in fact it is Orbán’s deep financial and political ties to Russia and China that have badly damaged American-Hungarian relations.

The new authoritarians also have a different attitude toward reality. When Soviet leaders lied, they tried to make their falsehoods seem real. They became angry when anyone accused them of lying. But in Putin’s Russia, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, and Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela, politicians and television personalities play a different game. They lie constantly, blatantly, obviously. But they don’t bother to offer counterarguments when their lies are exposed. After Russian-controlled forces shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government reacted not only with a denial, but with multiple stories, plausible and implausible: It blamed the Ukrainian army, and the CIA, and a nefarious plot in which dead people were placed on a plane in order to fake a crash and discredit Russia. This tactic—the so-called fire hose of falsehoods—ultimately produces not outrage but nihilism. Given so many explanations, how can you know what actually happened? What if you just can’t know? If you don’t know what happened, you’re not likely to join a great movement for democracy, or to listen when anyone speaks about positive political change. Instead, you are not going to participate in any politics at all.

Anne Applebaum: The American face of authoritarian propaganda

Fear, cynicism, nihilism, and apathy, coupled with disgust and disdain for democracy: This is the formula that modern autocrats, with some variations, sell to their citizens and to foreigners, all with the aim of destroying what they call “American hegemony.” In service of this idea, Russia, a colonial power, paints itself as a leader of the non-Western civilizations in what the analyst Ivan Klyszcz calls their struggle for “messianic multipolarity,” a battle against “the West’s imposition of ‘decadent,’ ‘globalist’ values.” In September 2022, when Putin held a ceremony to mark his illegal annexation of southern and eastern Ukraine, he claimed that he was protecting Russia from the “satanic” West and “perversions that lead to degradation and extinction.” He did not speak of the people he had tortured or the Ukrainian children he had kidnapped. A year later, Putin told a gathering in Sochi: “We are now fighting not just for Russia’s freedom but for the freedom of the whole world. We can frankly say that the dictatorship of one hegemon is becoming decrepit. We see it, and everyone sees it now. It is getting out of control and is simply dangerous for others.” The language of “hegemony” and “multipolarity” is now part of Chinese, Iranian, and Venezuelan narratives too.

In truth, Russia is a genuine danger to its neighbors, which is why most of them are re-arming and preparing to fight against a new colonial occupation. The irony is even greater in African countries like Mali, where Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group have helped keep a military dictatorship in power, reportedly by conducting summary executions, committing atrocities against civilians, and looting property. In Mali, as in Ukraine, the battle against Western decadence means that white Russian thugs brutally terrorize people with impunity.

And yet Mali Actu, a pro-Russian website in Mali, solemnly explains to its readers that “in a world that is more and more multipolar, Africa will play a more and more important role.” Mali Actu is not alone; it’s just a small part of a propaganda network, created by the autocracies, that is now visible all over the world.

The infrastructure of antidemocratic propaganda takes many forms, some overt and some covert, some aimed at the public and some aimed at elites. The United Front, the fulcrum of the Chinese Communist Party’s most important influence strategy, seeks to shape perceptions of China around the world by creating educational and exchange programs, controlling Chinese exile communities, building Chinese chambers of commerce, and courting anyone willing to be a de facto spokesperson for China. The Confucius Institutes are probably the best-known elite Chinese influence project. Originally perceived as benign cultural bodies not unlike the Goethe-Institut, run by the German government, and the Alliance Française, they were welcomed by many universities because they provided cheap or even free Chinese-language classes and professors. Over time, the institutes aroused suspicion, policing Chinese students at American universities by restricting open discussions of Tibet and Taiwan, and in some cases altering the teaching of Chinese history and politics to suit Chinese narratives. They have now been mostly disbanded in the United States. But they are flourishing in many other places, including Africa, where there are several dozen.

These subtler operations are augmented by China’s enormous investment in international media. The Xinhua wire service, the China Global Television Network, China Radio International, and China Daily all receive significant state financing, have social-media accounts in multiple languages and regions, and sell, share, or otherwise promote their content. These Chinese outlets cover the entire world, and provide feeds of slickly produced news and video segments to their partners at low prices, sometimes for free, which makes them more than competitive with reputable Western newswires, such as Reuters and the Associated Press. Scores of news organizations in Europe and Asia use Chinese content, as do many in Africa, from Kenya and Nigeria to Egypt and Zambia. Chinese media maintain a regional hub in Nairobi, where they hire prominent local journalists and produce content in African languages. Building this media empire has been estimated to cost billions of dollars a year.

Tyler Comrie

For the moment, viewership of many of these Chinese-owned channels remains low; their output can be predictable, even boring. But more popular forms of Chinese television are gradually becoming available. StarTimes, a satellite-television company that is tightly linked to the Chinese government, launched in Africa in 2008 and now has 13 million television subscribers in more than 30 African countries. StarTimes is cheap for consumers, costing just a few dollars a month. It prioritizes Chinese content—not just news but kung-fu movies, soap operas, and Chinese Super League football, with the dialogue and commentary all translated into Hausa, Swahili, and other African languages. In this way, even entertainment can carry China-positive messages.

This subtler shift is the real goal: to have the Chinese point of view appear in the local press, with local bylines. Chinese propagandists call this strategy “borrowing boats to reach the sea,” and it can be achieved in many ways. Unlike Western governments, China doesn’t think of propaganda, censorship, diplomacy, and media as separate activities. Legal pressure on news organizations, online trolling operations aimed at journalists, cyberattacks—all of these can be deployed as part of a single operation designed to promulgate or undermine a given narrative. China also offers training courses or stipends for local journalists across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, sometimes providing phones and laptops in exchange for what the regime hopes will be favorable coverage.

The Chinese also cooperate, both openly and discreetly, with the media outlets of other autocracies. Telesur, a Hugo Chávez project launched in 2005, is headquartered in Caracas and led by Venezuela in partnership with Cuba and Nicaragua. Selectively culled bits of foreign news make it onto Telesur from its partners, including headlines that presumably have limited appeal in Latin America: “US-Armenia Joint Military Drills Undermine Regional Stability,” for example, and “Russia Has No Expansionist Plans in Europe.” Both of these stories, from 2023, were lifted directly from the Xinhua wire.

Iran, for its part, offers HispanTV, the Spanish-language version of Press TV, the Iranian international service. HispanTV leans heavily into open anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial: One March 2020 headline declared that the “New Coronavirus Is the Result of a Zionist Plot.” Spain banned HispanTV and Google blocked it from its YouTube and Gmail accounts, but the service is easily available across Latin America, just as Al-Alam, the Arabic version of Press TV, is widely available in the Middle East. After the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, an international group dedicated to fighting disinformation, found that Iran was creating additional hacking groups to target digital, physical, and electoral infrastructure in Israel (where it went after electoral rolls) and the United States. In the future, these hacking operations may be combined with propaganda campaigns.

RT—Russia Today—has a bigger profile than either Telesur or Press TV; in Africa, it has close links to China. Following the invasion of Ukraine, some satellite networks dropped RT. But China’s StarTimes satellite picked it up, and RT immediately began building offices and relationships across Africa, especially in countries run by autocrats who echo its anti-Western, anti-LGBTQ messages, and who appreciate its lack of critical or investigative reporting.

RT—like Press TV, Telesur, and even CGTN—also functions as a production facility, a source of video clips that can be spread online, repurposed and reused in targeted campaigns. Americans got a firsthand view of how the clandestine versions work in 2016, when the Internet Research Agency—now disbanded but based then in St. Petersburg and led by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, more famous as the mercenary boss of the Wagner Group who staged an aborted march on Moscow—pumped out fake material via fake Facebook and Twitter accounts, designed to confuse American voters. Examples ranged from virulently anti-immigration accounts aimed at benefiting Donald Trump to fake Black Lives Matter accounts that attacked Hillary Clinton from the left.

Since 2016, these tactics have been applied across the globe. The Xinhua and RT offices in Africa and around the world—along with Telesur and HispanTV—create stories, slogans, memes, and narratives promoting the worldview of the autocracies; these, in turn, are repeated and amplified in many countries, translated into many languages, and reshaped for many local markets. The material produced is mostly unsophisticated, but it is inexpensive and can change quickly, according to the needs of the moment. After the October 7 Hamas attack, for example, official and unofficial Russian sources immediately began putting out both anti-Israel and anti-Semitic material, and messages calling American and Western support for Ukraine hypocritical in light of the Gaza conflict. The data-analytics company Alto Intelligence found posts smearing both Ukrainians and Israelis as “Nazis,” part of what appears to be a campaign to bring far-left and far-right communities closer together in opposition to U.S.-allied democracies. Anti-Semitic and pro-Hamas messages also increased inside China, as well as on Chinese-linked accounts around the world. Joshua Eisenman, a professor at Notre Dame and the author of a new book on China’s relations with Africa, told me that during a recent trip to Beijing, he was astonished by how quickly the previous Chinese line on the Middle East—“China-Israel relations are stronger than ever”—changed. “It was a complete 180 in just a few days.”

Not that everyone hearing these messages will necessarily know where they come from, because they often appear in forums that conceal their origins. Most people probably did not hear the American-biolabs conspiracy theory on a television news program, for example. Instead, they heard it thanks to organizations like Pressenza and Yala News. Pressenza, a website founded in Milan and relocated to Ecuador in 2014, publishes in eight languages, describes itself as “an international news agency dedicated to news about peace and nonviolence,” and featured an article on biolabs in Ukraine. According to the U.S. State Department, Pressenza is part of a project, run by three Russian companies, that planned to create articles in Moscow and then translate them for these “native” sites, following Chinese practice, to make them seem “local.” Pressenza denied the allegations; one of its journalists, Oleg Yasinsky, who says he is of Ukrainian origin, responded by denouncing America’s “planetary propaganda machine” and quoting Che Guevara.

Like Pressenza, Yala News also markets itself as independent. This U.K.-registered, Arabic-language news operation provides slickly produced videos, including celebrity interviews, to its 3 million followers every day. In March 2022, as the biolabs allegation was being promoted by other outlets, the site posted a video that echoed one of the most sensational versions: Ukraine was planning to use migratory birds as a delivery vehicle for bioweapons, infecting the birds and then sending them into Russia to spread disease.

Yala did not invent this ludicrous tale: Russian state media, such as the Sputnik news agency, published it in Russian first, followed by Sputnik’s Arabic website and RT Arabic. Russia’s United Nations ambassador addressed the UN Security Council about the biobird scandal, warning of the “real biological danger to the people in European countries, which can result from an uncontrolled spread of bioagents from Ukraine.” In an April 2022 interview in Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told The Atlantic’s editor in chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, and me that the biobirds story reminded him of a Monty Python sketch. If Yala were truly an “independent” publication, as it describes itself, it would have fact-checked this story, which, like the other biolab conspiracies, was widely debunked.

Read: Anne Applebaum and Jeffrey Goldberg interview Volodymyr Zelensky

But Yala News is not a news organization at all. As the BBC has reported, it’s an information laundromat, a site that exists to spread and propagate material produced by RT and other Russian facilities. Yala News has posted claims that the Russian massacre of Ukrainian civilians at Bucha was staged, that Zelensky appeared drunk on television, and that Ukrainian soldiers were running away from the front lines. Although the company is registered to an address in London—a mail drop shared by 65,000 other companies—its “news team” is based in a suburb of Damascus. The company’s CEO is a Syrian businessman based in Dubai who, when asked by the BBC, insisted on the organization’s “impartiality.”

Another strange actor in this field is RRN—the company’s name is an acronym, originally for Reliable Russian News, later changed to Reliable Recent News. Created in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, RRN, part of a bigger information-laundering operation known to investigators as Doppelganger, is primarily a “typosquatter”: a company that registers domain names that look similar to real media domain names—Reuters.cfd instead of Reuters.com, for example—as well as websites with names that sound authentic (like Notre Pays, or “Our Country”) but are created to deceive. RRN is prolific. During its short existence, it has created more than 300 sites targeting Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. Links to these sites are then used to make Facebook, Twitter, and other social-media posts appear credible. When someone is quickly scrolling, they might not notice that a headline links to a fake Spiegel.pro website, say, rather than to the authentic German-magazine website Spiegel.de.

Doppelganger’s efforts, run by a clutch of companies in Russia, have varied widely, and seem to have included fake NATO press releases, with the same fonts and design as the genuine releases, “revealing” that NATO leaders were planning to deploy Ukrainian paramilitary troops to France to quell pension protests. In November, operatives who the French government believes are linked to Doppelganger spray-painted Stars of David around Paris and posted them on social media, hoping to amplify French divisions over the Gaza war. Russian operatives built a social-media network to spread the false stories and the photographs of anti-Semitic graffiti. The goal is to make sure that the people encountering this content have little clue as to who created it, or where or why.

Russia and China are not the only parties in this space. Both real and automated social-media accounts geolocated to Venezuela played a small role in the 2018 Mexican presidential election, for example, boosting the campaign of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Notable were two kinds of messages: those that promoted images of Mexican violence and chaos—images that might make people feel they need an autocrat to restore order—and those that were angrily opposed to NAFTA and the U.S. more broadly. This tiny social-media investment must have been deemed successful. After he became president, López Obrador engaged in the same kinds of smear campaigns as unelected politicians in autocracies, empowered and corrupted the military, undermined the independence of the judiciary, and otherwise degraded Mexican democracy. In office, he has promoted Russian narratives about the war in Ukraine along with Chinese narratives about the repression of the Uyghurs. Mexico’s relationship with the United States has become more difficult—and that, surely, was part of the point.

None of these efforts would succeed without local actors who share the autocratic world’s goals. Russia, China, and Venezuela did not invent anti-Americanism in Mexico. They did not invent Catalan separatism, to name another movement that both Russian and Venezuelan social-media accounts supported, or the German far right, or France’s Marine Le Pen. All they do is amplify existing people and movements—whether anti-LGBTQ, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, anti-Ukrainian, or, above all, antidemocratic. Sometimes they provide a social-media echo. Sometimes they employ reporters and spokespeople. Sometimes they use the media networks they built for this purpose. And sometimes, they just rely on Americans to do it for them.

Here is a difficult truth: A part of the American political spectrum is not merely a passive recipient of the combined authoritarian narratives that come from Russia, China, and their ilk, but an active participant in creating and spreading them. Like the leaders of those countries, the American MAGA right also wants Americans to believe that their democracy is degenerate, their elections illegitimate, their civilization dying. The MAGA movement’s leaders also have an interest in pumping nihilism and cynicism into the brains of their fellow citizens, and in convincing them that nothing they see is true. Their goals are so similar that it is hard to distinguish between the online American alt-right and its foreign amplifiers, who have multiplied since the days when this was solely a Russian project. Tucker Carlson has even promoted the fear of a color revolution in America, lifting the phrase directly from Russian propaganda. The Chinese have joined in too: Earlier this year, a group of Chinese accounts that had previously been posting pro-Chinese material in Mandarin began posting in English, using MAGA symbols and attacking President Joe Biden. They showed fake images of Biden in prison garb, made fun of his age, and called him a satanist pedophile. One Chinese-linked account reposted an RT video repeating the lie that Biden had sent a neo-Nazi criminal to fight in Ukraine. Alex Jones’s reposting of the lie on social media reached some 400,000 people.

Given that both Russian and Chinese actors now blend in so easily with the MAGA messaging operation, it is hardly surprising that the American government has difficulty responding to the newly interlinked autocratic propaganda network. American-government-backed foreign broadcasters—Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Farda, Radio Martí—still exist, but neither their mandate nor their funding has changed much in recent years. The intelligence agencies continue to observe what happens—there is a Foreign Malign Influence Center under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—but they are by definition not part of the public debate. The only relatively new government institution fighting antidemocratic propaganda is the Global Engagement Center, but it is in the State Department, and its mandate is to focus on authoritarian propaganda outside the United States. Established in 2016, it replaced the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which sought to foil the Islamic State and other jihadist groups that were recruiting young people online. In 2014–15, as the scale of Russian disinformation campaigns in Europe were becoming better known, Congress designated the GEC to deal with Russian as well as Chinese, Iranian, and other propaganda campaigns around the world—although not, again, inside the United States. Throughout the Trump administration, the organization languished under the direction of a president who himself repeated Russian propaganda lines during the 2016 campaign—“Obama founded ISIS,” for example, and “Hillary will start World War III.”

Today the GEC is run by James Rubin, a former State Department spokesperson from the Bill Clinton era. It employs 125 people and has a budget of $61 million—hardly a match for the many billions that China and Russia spend building their media networks. But it is beginning to find its footing, handing out small grants to international groups that track and reveal foreign disinformation operations. It’s now specializing in identifying covert propaganda campaigns before they begin, with the help of U.S. intelligence agencies. Rubin calls this “prebunking” and describes it as a kind of “inoculation”: “If journalists and governments know that this is coming, then when it comes, they will recognize it.”

“Lo and behold, the entity that becomes the most persistent in alleging that American elections are fraudulent, fake, rigged, and everything else turns out to be the president of the United States.”

The revelation in November of the Russian ties to seemingly native left-wing websites in Latin America, including Pressenza, was one such effort. More recently, the GEC published a report on the African Initiative, an agency that had planned a huge campaign to discredit Western health philanthropy, starting with rumors about a new virus supposedly spread by mosquitoes. The idea was to smear Western doctors, clinics, and philanthropists, and to build a climate of distrust around Western medicine, much as Russian efforts helped build a climate of distrust around Western vaccines during the pandemic. The GEC identified the Russian leader of the project, Artem Sergeyevich Kureyev; noted that several employees had come to the African Initiative from the Wagner Group; and located two of its offices, in Mali and Burkina Faso. Rubin and others subsequently spent a lot of time talking with regional reporters about the African Initiative’s plans so that “people will recognize them” when they launch. Dozens of articles in English, Spanish, and other languages have described these operations, as have thousands of social-media posts. Eventually, the goal is to create an alliance of other nations who also want to share information about planned and ongoing information operations so that everyone knows they are coming.

It’s a great idea, but no equivalent agency functions inside the United States. Some social-media companies have made purely voluntary efforts to remove foreign-government propaganda, sometimes after being tipped off by the U.S. government but mostly on their own. In the U.S., Facebook created a security-policy unit that still regularly announces when it discovers “coordinated inauthentic behavior”—meaning accounts that are automated and/or evidently part of a planned operation from (usually) Russian, Iranian, or Chinese sources—and then takes down the posts. It is difficult for outsiders to monitor this activity, because the company restricts access to its data, and even controls the tools that can be used to examine the data. In March, Meta announced that by August, it would phase out CrowdTangle, a tool used to analyze Facebook data, and replace it with a tool that analysts fear will be harder to use.

X (formerly Twitter) also used to look for foreign propaganda activity, but under the ownership of Elon Musk, that voluntary effort has been badly weakened. The new blue-check “verification” process allows users—including anonymous, pro-Russian users—to pay to have their posts amplified; the old “safety team” no longer exists. The result: After the collapse of the Kakhovka dam in Ukraine last summer, a major environmental and humanitarian disaster caused by Russian bombing over many weeks, the false narrative that Ukraine had destroyed it appeared hundreds of thousands of times on X. After the ISIS terrorist attack on a concert hall in Moscow in March, David Sacks, the former PayPal entrepreneur and a close associate of Musk’s, posted on X, with no evidence, that “if the Ukrainian government was behind the terrorist attack, as looks increasingly likely, the U.S. must renounce it.” His completely unfounded post was viewed 2.5 million times. This spring, some Republican congressional leaders finally began speaking about the Russian propaganda that had “infected” their base and their colleagues. Most of that “Russian propaganda” is not coming from inside Russia.

Over the past several years, universities and think tanks have used their own data analytics to try to identify inauthentic networks on the largest websites—but they are also now meeting resistance from MAGA-affiliated Republican politicians. In 2020, teams at Stanford University and the University of Washington, together with the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council and Graphika, a company that specializes in social-media analytics, decided to join forces to monitor false election information. Renée DiResta, one of the leaders of what became the Election Integrity Partnership, told me that an early concern was Russian and Chinese campaigns. DiResta assumed that these foreign interventions wouldn’t matter much, but she thought it would be useful and academically interesting to understand their scope. “Lo and behold,” she said, “the entity that becomes the most persistent in alleging that American elections are fraudulent, fake, rigged, and everything else turns out to be the president of the United States.” The Election Integrity Partnership tracked election rumors coming from across the political spectrum, but observed that the MAGA right was far more prolific and significant than any other source.

The Election Integrity Partnership was not organized or directed by the U.S. government. It occasionally reached out to platforms, but had no power to compel them to act, DiResta told me. Nevertheless, the project became the focus of a complicated MAGA-world conspiracy theory about alleged government suppression of free speech, and it led to legal and personal attacks on many of those involved. The project has been smeared and mischaracterized by some of the journalists attached to Musk’s “Twitter Files” investigation, and by Representative Jim Jordan’s Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government. A series of lawsuits alleging that the U.S. government sought to suppress conservative speech, including one launched by Missouri and Louisiana that has now reached the Supreme Court, has effectively tried to silence organizations that investigate both domestic and foreign disinformation campaigns, overt and covert. To state baldly what is happening: The Republican Party’s right wing is actively harassing legitimate, good-faith efforts to track the production and dissemination of autocratic disinformation here in the United States.

Over time, the attack on the Election Integrity Partnership has itself acquired some of the characteristics of a classic information-laundering operation. The most notorious example concerns a reference, on page 183 of the project’s final post-2020-election report, to the 21,897,364 tweets gathered after the election, in an effort to catalog the most viral false rumors. That simple statement of the size of the database has been twisted into another false and yet constantly repeated rumor: the spurious claim that the Department of Homeland Security somehow conspired with the Election Integrity Partnership to censor 22 million tweets. This never happened, and yet DiResta said that “this nonsense about the 22 million tweets pops up constantly as evidence of the sheer volume of our duplicity”; it has even appeared in the Congressional Record.

The same tactics have been used against the Global Engagement Center. In 2021, the GEC gave a grant to another organization, the Global Disinformation Index, which helped develop a technical tool to track online campaigns in East Asia and Europe. For a completely unrelated, separately funded project, the Global Disinformation Index also conducted a study, aimed at advertisers, that identified websites at risk for publishing false stories. Two conservative organizations, finding their names on that latter list, sued the GEC, although it had nothing to do with creating the list. Musk posted, again without any evidence, “The worst offender in US government censorship & media manipulation is an obscure agency called GEC,” and that organization also became caught up in the endless whirlwind of conspiracy and congressional investigations.

As it happens, I was caught up in it too, because I was listed online as an “adviser” to the Global Disinformation Index, even though I had not spoken with anyone at the organization for several years and was not aware that it even had a website. A predictable, and wearisome, pattern followed: false accusations (no, I was not advising anyone to censor anyone) and the obligatory death threats. Of course, my experience was mild compared with the experience of DiResta, who has been accused of being, as she put it, “the head of a censorship-industrial complex that does not exist.”

These stories are symptomatic of a larger problem: Because the American extreme right and (more rarely) the extreme left benefit from the spread of antidemocratic narratives, they have an interest in silencing or hobbling any group that wants to stop, or even identify, foreign campaigns. Senator Mark Warner, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told me that “we are actually less prepared today than we were four years ago” for foreign attempts to influence the 2024 election. This is not only because authoritarian propaganda campaigns have become more sophisticated as they begin to use AI, or because “you obviously have a political environment here where there’s a lot more Americans who are more distrustful of all institutions.” It’s also because the lawsuits, threats, and smear tactics have chilled government, academic, and tech-company responses.

One could call this a secret authoritarian “plot” to preserve the ability to spread antidemocratic conspiracy theories, except that it’s not a secret. It’s all visible, right on the surface. Russia, China, and sometimes other state actors—Venezuela, Iran, Hungary—work with Americans to discredit democracy, to undermine the credibility of democratic leaders, to mock the rule of law. They do so with the goal of electing Trump, whose second presidency would damage the image of democracy around the world, as well as the stability of democracy in America, even further.

This article appears in the June 2024 print edition with the headline “Democracy Is Losing the Propaganda War.” Anne Applebaum’s new book, Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World, will be published in July.

Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want To Run The World

By Anne Applebaum

When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · May 6, 2024

11. The US Army says it wants to recruit more psychological warfare 'nerds'

As an aside:

Psychological warfare is PSYWAR

Psychological operations is PSYOP (versus PSYOPS or PsyOps).

The US Army says it wants to recruit more psychological warfare 'nerds'

Business Insider · by Cameron Manley

Military & Defense

Cameron Manley

2024-05-12T13:50:33Z

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This image from video released by the U.S. Army, shows a frame from a haunting new video, released in May 2024, in the latest effort by the Army to lure soldiers to some of its more secretive units. US Army via AP

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• Psychological warfare, or PsyOps, aims to influence public opinion and wage the war of words.
• PsyOps missions range from leaflet drops to deceiving the enemy and shaping opinion on foreign soil.
• The US Army, struggling to fill the ranks of its PsyOps units, released a haunting recruitment video.

In late 2021, the Army Special Operations Command leaders and special forces recruiters had a problem: they needed more enlistees for their Psychological Operations groups.

Experts in persuasion and influence, psychological warfare, or PsyOp, soldiers don't often fit the stereotypical mold of an Army recruit. These individuals tend to live and think outside the norm, and recruitment must meet them via non-traditional means.

This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now.

In May 2022, recruiters released their first eerie recruitment video: "Ghost in the machine: Psywar." Last week, they released their second: "Ghost in the machine 2."

"Ghosts in the Machine 2" takes the viewer on a journey of introspection. Quotes, both spoken and on screen, music, images and ideas are layered on top of one another to create tension and draw the viewer in.

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While the first video focuses on psychological warfare and the shadows, "Ghosts in the Machine 2" emphasizes that words and ideas can be powerful weapons.

The final scene in the second video displays the text "See you at Selection" and provides viewers with the web address of the US Army Special Operations Recruiting website (GoArmySOF.com).

"We're all nerds for sure"

The videos are designed to garner curiosity from the specific type of recruit that they're looking for.

"We're all nerds for sure," the Army major who created the ad and a member of the 8th Psychological Operations Group based at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, told the Associated Press. "But we're all nerds in different ways."

Usually, those who are drawn to the job are "planners," he said. "They're writers, they're great thinkers. They're idea people."

He said they are often creative — artists and illustrators — but others are tech experts who can bring ideas to life in online messaging.

Trying to make PsyOps understood by potential enlistees

In March, a report found that due to "burnout" issues among psyop soldiers, units were unable to fight both China and Russia in the information war.

But part of the recruitment issue is that people who could be good candidates don't fully understand what PsyOps is or what it involves.

This image from video released by the US Army, shows a frame from a haunting new video, released i May 2024, in the latest effort by the Army to lure soldiers to some of its more secretive units. US Army via Getty

The video aims to recruit future PsyOps soldiers and show applicants what their jobs will entail.

" 'Ghost in the Machine' tells you what psychological operations is, and shows you it, without telling you in words," Lt. Col. Steve Crowe, commander of the Special Forces Recruiting Battalion, told AP.

"You watch the video, and you're like, OK, this is how I'll influence and change behavior."

Recruiters told AP that about six months after the first video was released, 51% of soldiers who applied for the PsyOps mission and got into the assessment and selection course said the video had a medium to high influence on their decision to try out for the job.

The US has been using PsyOps for years

One of the most renowned psychological operations occurred during World War II. The US Ghost Army deceived the Germans using inflatable tanks, radio deception, disguises, and impersonations.

This photo provided by the Ghost Army Legacy Project shows inflatable tanks in March, 1945. National Archives/Ghost Army Legacy Project via AP

In what was known as Operation Viersen, they deployed inflatables, sound trucks, and fake headquarters to divert German forces from the actual crossing point of the Rhine River.

PsyOps soldiers have more recently advised Ukrainian troops in their attempts to counter Russian disinformation campaigns since the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

After the Russian invasion in 2022, Ukrainian forces used a variety of tactics to convince Russian soldiers to surrender. Leaflets and social media posts told Russian troops how and where they could give themselves up.

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Business Insider · by Cameron Manley

12. Inside Israel, It’s a Very Different War

Inside Israel, It’s a Very Different War

There are few to no images of Gaza casualties on Israeli TV, widening the gulf in perspective between Israel and the outside world

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/inside-israel-its-a-very-different-war-628097b2?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By David LuhnowFollow and Anat Peled | Photographs by Tanya Habjouqa | NOOR for The Wall Street Journal

May 12, 2024 9:00 pm ET

TEL AVIV—Every evening on TV news, Israelis get the latest on the Gaza war—cease-fire and hostage talks, Israeli military casualties, battlefield analysis and coverage of the Oct. 7 attacks by Islamist militant group Hamas that sparked the conflict. 

One thing that is almost always missing: the people of Gaza. 

Israel is watching one war unfold in Gaza, while much of the rest of the world is seeing a different one, with footage of the destruction caused by Israeli airstrikes in the densely populated enclave and sometimes gruesome images of Palestinians killed in the fighting. 

That split screen helps explain the widening gulf between an Israel that feels isolated and misunderstood and outsiders who have shifted their attention from the horrors of Oct. 7 to the damage inflicted by Israel’s campaign to destroy Hamas. That gap in perspective could grow in coming weeks if Israel’s military expands its effort to destroy the remaining Hamas battalions in the crowded southern Gaza city of Rafah. 

On Israeli television, there is virtually no footage of dead Palestinians and only some scenes of the destruction, according to media executives, journalists, media analysts and ordinary Israelis. Many Israeli Jews, who usually consume news in Hebrew, also say they rarely come across explicit footage of Gaza on their smartphones, though they are aware there has been widespread destruction and a high death toll. 

Television plays an outsize role as a news source in Israel—unlike the U.S. and Europe, where most people’s primary source is social media.

Nearly two-thirds of Israeli Jews said they had seen a few or no images of the damage, according to an April survey by the Israel Democracy Institute, a nonpartisan research center. Just over a third said they had seen a lot, either through Israeli media or social media.  

“You see everything about the war on Israeli television except for the people of Gaza,” said Shuki Tausig, editor of the Seventh Eye, an Israeli publication that focuses on the country’s media. “Right now, Israeli media can’t cope with a complex reality. They know that their viewers don’t really want to see images of their enemy dying, so they just don’t show it.” 

Spokespeople for Israel’s leading television channels—Kan 11 as well as channels 12, 13, and 14—declined to comment or didn’t respond to a request. Channel 12 provided The Wall Street Journal with several examples of recent newscasts that included scenes of bombed out buildings and ruins in Gaza and civilians talking about their plight, including the lack of food. There were no images of dead civilians. 

Ayala Panievsky, an Israeli academic who lives in London, said there is a big split between what she sees on television in London and what friends and family see back in Israel. “I’ve never seen such a big difference in perspective before,” she said.  

Residents Flee Rafah as Israeli Military Operation Intensifies

Residents Flee Rafah as Israeli Military Operation Intensifies

Play video: Residents Flee Rafah as Israeli Military Operation Intensifies

Israel’s leaders have said the military needs to move into Rafah to dismantle the remaining battalions of Hamas. Photo: Hatem Khaled/Reuters

One recent night in Israel, an anchor on Kan 11, Israel’s public broadcaster, interviewed Stav Sela, whose 32-year-old brother Ram was killed along with hundreds more at the Nova music festival by Hamas militants during the Oct. 7 attacks that Israeli authorities say left 1,200 dead and more than 240 hostages. Stav described Ram as ״a meter ninety-five of curls” who loved music. She and her musician friend, Ligal, sang a song written in his memory. 

Several time zones away in the U.S., CNN viewers watched a dispatch from Gaza about an alleged Israeli airstrike that killed 10 children, including a 9-year-old girl playing foosball with her friends on a crowded street, some of the more than 34,000 dead in Gaza since the war began, according to Palestinian authorities. A group of men placed the body of another girl, aged 10 and clad in pink pants, into a body bag, as relatives wailed in grief.

The divide in perspective is most stark between Israel and the neighboring Arab world. The region’s leading broadcaster, Qatar-headquartered Al Jazeera, offers nearly nonstop coverage of the Gaza campaign, often with explicit images of destruction and civilian deaths. It has shown very little footage from the initial attacks on Oct. 7 that sparked the war and has regularly featured analysts who cast doubt on Israeli accounts of the atrocities. 

Still images from Israeli news channels 12 to 14, on May 2 showing hostage-family protests and the Israeli military.

A March survey found that more than 80% of Palestinians don’t believe Hamas committed any atrocities on Oct. 7 despite widespread evidence, said Khalil Shikaki, director of the West Bank-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Those who had seen online videos of the attacks were 10 times as likely to believe Hamas had committed atrocities as those who hadn’t seen videos, Shikaki said. 

“And that tells you the importance of sources of information,” he said. “If you do not watch, you don’t believe.” 

Israel’s government on May 5 shut down the local offices of Al Jazeera under a new law that gives Israel the power to ban foreign news organizations deemed to be a threat to national security. Israel seized Al Jazeera’s equipment and blocked its broadcasts and website. Al Jazeera and Israeli rights groups criticized the move as undemocratic.

Daniel Levy, an economics professor at Bar-Ilan University, said he and his wife think they are not getting the whole story from Israel’s media, and occasionally watch Al Jazeera in English to see the other side. He said he could still access the network on his Smart TV and through YouTube despite the Israeli ban. 

Levy said Al Jazeera is very biased against Israel, and he mistrusts the official death toll from the conflict given by the Palestinian authorities. “But, given our trauma of October 7th, I worry that many Israelis have difficulty seeing faces behind the numbers of Palestinians that have died, which makes Al Jazeera’s reporting with the images, which are often hard to watch and heartbreaking, particularly important,” he said.

Inside Israel, the Oct. 7 attack is still an open wound, a 9/11 moment on a bigger scale that shattered the feeling of relative safety many Israelis enjoyed in recent years. It wasn’t just an attack; it was an armed invasion, where people were killed in their homes or taken from their villages. 

In such a small country, many Israelis feel a personal connection with the victims or hostages, partly because it could just as easily have been them.

Israeli journalists, who are a tightknit community, not only covered the attack, but some were victims themselves, including a news photographer of a major Israeli news site killed by militants. 

President Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Images of the hostages are everywhere—rows of pictures in Tel Aviv’s airport, billboards along highways and cities, yellow ribbons tied to trees, cars and lapels of politicians and newscasters, empty tables in restaurants reserved for missing hostages, graffiti scrawled on the street that reads “Bring Them Home Now.” At “Hostage Square,” where family members of the hostages hold vigil, a clock counts the days, hours and minutes they have been held against their will. The hostages are almost always featured on the nightly news broadcasts.

“The hostages are everything to us,” said Dorit Eldar, a retired physician standing on a Tel Aviv beach in a miles-long line of people who came out on a recent Saturday to press for the return of the hostages. “We have a covenant in Israel. You don’t leave people behind.”  

Many Israelis feel the rest of the world is largely ignoring the plight of the hostages, the brutality of the Oct. 7 attack, and the tens of thousands of evacuees from the north and south of the country. Discussions of a long-term cease-fire or the reconstruction of Gaza are incomprehensible to many until the hostages come home, according to Dahlia Scheindlin, an Israeli public opinion expert.

“So in a way, everything is hostage to the hostages,” she said. 

On Israeli television, there is almost no footage showing Palestinian casualties in Gaza, and little of the widespread destruction. When airstrikes are shown, it is often from a distance.

While the hostages are still being held, many Israelis may not want to see footage of civilian casualties—or care much, said Tamar Hermann, a senior research fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute. A March survey found that 80% of Israeli Jews said the country should have little to no consideration of suffering by the civilian population in Gaza in deciding whether to continue fighting. Hermann says that would likely change if the hostages were released. 

A poll in early May by the Israel Democracy Institute found that more than half of Israelis said winning the release of the hostages was more important than invading Rafah to root out Hamas. 

Some feel the media is too afraid to tackle public opinion by showing some of the innocent victims or by pressing Israel’s government on claims that Israel has impeded humanitarian aid. 

Unlike the U.S. and Europe, where most people now get their information primarily from social media, television still plays an outsize role in Israel, with three-quarters of Israelis saying it is a key source of information, said Tausig, the Seventh Eye editor. 

Israel’s media is reflecting Israel’s broader shift to the right over the past two decades that followed the wave of suicide bombings during the major Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005 known as the Second Intifada, and a growing perception that prospects for peace with Palestinians are dim.

Some 60% of the Jewish Israeli population now self-identifies as right wing, with a quarter centrist and 11-14% as left, according to Scheindlin. Support for a two-state solution has declined over time to about a quarter of Jewish Israelis. 

Aryeh Vanderhoof, an American-Israeli who lives in Jerusalem, has seen footage of dead civilians in Gaza online but doubts the death toll. He said he is saddened to think of civilian deaths, but also thinks the U.S. and many in the West are hypocritical. 

“It feels like the rest of the world doesn’t understand what we’re up against,” he said. “You can’t make peace with someone whose way of life is to kill you.”

Israeli media has also shifted to the right, especially amid a long-running effort by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to portray the media as left-wing and unpatriotic, according to Panievsky, a fellow at City University in London who specializes in populism and the media. During the 2019 election, his campaign erected giant billboards with the faces of four prominent Israeli journalists, saying: “They Won’t Decide.” 

Panievsky says many of the 45 Israeli journalists she interviewed in recent years said they had intentionally shifted their coverage to the right or censored themselves, including being more wary of using the word “occupation” when alluding to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Six said they hired bodyguards after receiving death threats for their coverage.  

Some feel Israel's media is afraid to tackle public opinion by showing footage of Palestinian suffering or pressing the government on humanitarian aid.

The Prime Minister’s office declined to comment.

Israeli television rarely shows Arabs on its screens—not even the Arab Israelis who make up about 20% of the population. Over the past seven years of monitoring, the Seventh Eye found that interviews or screen-time featuring Arab Israelis climbed from 2% to 4%, before falling back in the past year, especially since Oct. 7. 

Mohammad Magadli, an Arab-Israeli journalist, is one of the few Arab journalists reporting on mainstream Hebrew language news channels. He lives the split screen daily running back and forth from the Arabic language radio station Nas in Nazareth to the studios of Channel 12 near Jerusalem. 

“It’s moving between two worlds,” he said. 

Yonit Levi, a news anchor at Channel 12, said Western countries struggle to understand the scale of what Israel suffered on Oct. 7.

Since Oct. 7, he says he has faced a public backlash to his media appearances on Israeli television including death threats and calls for his firing. One Likud party member said on X that Magadli isn’t loyal and should be fired after he spoke on air about the lack of humanitarian aid in Gaza. After he said on air that he had spoken to a family member in Gaza to discuss food prices, hundreds of posts on social media called for firing him for having ties to the enemy.

Magadli says he is just trying to do his job. “The basic things that we need to do is to deliver to our people what’s going on, you know?” he said. “And the Israeli people really don’t know what is going on in Gaza.”

Yonit Levi, an anchor also at Channel 12 and co-host of the “Unholy” podcast, said Western countries struggle to understand the scale of what Israel suffered on Oct. 7. She said television executives had debated how much of the Oct. 7 atrocities to show and whether they should show more of Gaza. 

“We are trying the best we can,” she said. “Know that we are having these conversations every day.”

Write to David Luhnow at david.luhnow@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the May 13, 2024, print edition as 'Israeli Television Depicts a Different War'.

13. German Automakers VW, Traton Help to Supply Myanmar Junta With Trucks: Report

German Automakers VW, Traton Help to Supply Myanmar Junta With Trucks: Report

irrawaddy.com · by The Irrawaddy · May 10, 2024

Rights group Justice for Myanmar (JFM) and data analysis organization C4ADS have called on well-known German truck manufacturer Traton and its parent company Volkswagen to cut ties with Chinese state-owned firm Sinotruk, which supplies military trucks to the Myanmar junta.

The organizations said in a joint statement released on Thursday that the military junta relies on a fleet of military trucks to transport troops and weapons across the country as it continues its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.

The groups said there was substantial evidence showing the regime’s military is obtaining and assembling military trucks with the support of Sinotruk. In turn, the Chinese company is benefiting from Traton’s investment and collaboration, their report says.

Sinotruk claims it has never conducted business with the military junta or sold trucks to its armed forces.

According to the findings by JFM and C4ADS, however, recent reporting and publicly available information show that Sinotruk’s vehicles are widely used by the junta in its military operations, and that the company has directly engaged with the junta through sales and manufacturing support.

The groups urged Sinotruk to “adhere to its responsibilities under international law and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”. They also called on the Chinese truck company “to cease all ongoing business with the military regime and its partners”, and to “block the regime’s access to Sinotruk vehicles, parts, technology and support”.

Two Sinotruck vehicles-turned-military trucks are seen after being seized by Karenni resistance forces during an ambush of a military convoy transporting troop reinforcements in Karenni State in June 2022. / KNDF

“Not doing so exposes the company to the risk of liability for aiding and abetting the junta’s war crimes and crimes against humanity,” the report said.

The groups also urged Traton and Volkswagen to conduct a thorough investigation into Sinotruk’s business links to the military regime, and demanded that Traton take “immediate action to ensure it cuts all business ties to the junta military”.

“Failing that, Traton should divest from and end business relations with Sinotruk to avoid further complicity,” JFM and C4ADs said.

The groups called on the German government and European Commission to exercise their authority over Traton and Volkswagen to ensure their products do not fall into the hands of the junta and their investment does not support war crimes and crimes against humanity.

They also urged foreign governments to impose coordinated, targeted sanctions to block the junta’s sources of funds, arms, military equipment, technology and jet fuel, and called on the United Nations Security Council to impose a global arms embargo on the military junta and targeted sanctions on the junta’s business interests.

Your Thoughts …

irrawaddy.com · by The Irrawaddy · May 10, 2024

14. Assessing the Integration of Artificial Intelligence into National Security Assessments

An interesting experiment. I have been playing with ChatGPT, MIcrosoft Copilot ,and Perplexity to test AI capabilities.

Assessing the Integration of Artificial Intelligence into National Security Assessments

divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · May 13, 2024

Editor’s Note: This article was written by an Artificial Intelligence based on a prompt that it received from a human. As such, we recommend you do your own research to confirm or refute the content of this article before using it to inform your actions or inactions. We also ask that you tolerate any deviations from our traditional formats or writing style that are present in this article. This article is part of an experiment of sorts that we did as for our 2024 Call for Papers Team-Up with Blogs of War: An Artificial Intelligence Wrote This Article. For more information click here.

Mike White is a Senior Customs Officer with the New Zealand Customs Service. He holds a MIntSy (Master’s Degree) in Intelligence and an MA in Defence and Security Studies, both from Massey University. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Summary: Integrating AI into national security assessments presents both significant advantages, such as enhanced data processing capabilities, and serious risks, including vulnerability to manipulation and loss of human oversight. A balanced approach that combines AI’s strengths with human judgment is essential for maintaining national security integrity.

Text: The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into national security assessments represents a watershed moment in the evolution of defense and intelligence strategies. This development promises to revolutionize the way national security threats are identified, analyzed, and countered. However, this technological leap also introduces complex risks that could potentially compromise the very security it aims to enhance. The dual-edged nature of AI’s application in this domain necessitates a thorough analysis of its implications for national security.

Advantages of AI in National Security Assessments

The primary advantage of incorporating AI into national security operations lies in its unparalleled data processing capabilities. AI can analyze vast amounts of data—from satellite imagery to communications intercepts—far more rapidly and accurately than human analysts. This efficiency can significantly enhance threat identification and situational awareness, allowing for more timely and informed decision-making.

Moreover, AI algorithms can detect patterns and anomalies that may elude human observers, potentially uncovering subtle signals of emerging threats. By integrating machine learning, these systems can continuously improve their analytical accuracy and adapt to new, evolving challenges without explicit reprogramming. This dynamic learning capability ensures that national security assessments remain relevant in the face of rapidly changing global threats.

AI can also automate routine analytical tasks, freeing human analysts to focus on more complex and nuanced aspects of national security. This division of labor can increase the overall effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence operations, ensuring that human expertise is applied where it is most needed.

Risks and Challenges

Despite these advantages, the integration of AI into national security assessments is not without significant risks. One of the foremost concerns is the vulnerability of AI systems to manipulation. Adversaries could potentially exploit weaknesses in AI algorithms, feeding them misleading information to skew analyses and decision-making processes. This vulnerability underscores the critical need for robust cybersecurity measures and continuous monitoring of AI systems to detect and mitigate such threats.

Another significant risk is the potential for over-reliance on AI, which could lead to a diminishment of human oversight and critical thinking in the assessment process. AI algorithms, for all their sophistication, lack the contextual understanding, ethical judgment, and flexibility that human analysts bring to national security assessments. This limitation can result in oversights or misinterpretations of complex situations, which could have grave consequences for national security.

Additionally, the use of AI in national security raises ethical and legal concerns, particularly regarding accountability and transparency. Decisions based on AI analyses might be difficult to explain or justify, given the often-opaque nature of machine learning algorithms. This “black box” problem complicates efforts to maintain accountability in national security decision-making processes.

Balancing AI and Human Judgement

Given these advantages and risks, a balanced approach that leverages the strengths of AI while mitigating its vulnerabilities is essential. This approach should involve a synergistic partnership between AI and human analysts, where AI handles the bulk of data processing and initial analysis, while humans provide oversight, ethical judgment, and contextual understanding. Such a partnership could enhance the accuracy and effectiveness of national security assessments while safeguarding against the risks associated with over-reliance on AI.

Moreover, establishing clear guidelines and ethical standards for the use of AI in national security is crucial. These guidelines should address concerns related to accountability, transparency, and the protection of civil liberties, ensuring that AI-enhanced assessments are conducted responsibly and ethically.

Conclusion

The use of AI in national security assessments offers substantial benefits, including improved efficiency, accuracy, and adaptability in threat analysis. However, these advantages come with significant risks, such as vulnerability to manipulation, loss of human oversight, and ethical concerns. A balanced approach that combines the strengths of AI with human judgment and ethical considerations is vital for harnessing the potential of AI in national security without compromising the integrity and effectiveness of assessments. As such, AI should augment rather than replace human-created assessments, ensuring that national security decisions are informed by both technological capabilities and human insight.

Endnotes:

The following prompt was given to ChatGPT-4 by Mike White:

—–BEGIN—–

In 1000 words, assess the risk to national security of using AI to make or assist in the making of national security assessments. Address the advantages and disadvantages. Can/should AI created assessment replace human created ones.

Use the following format:

Title: Note: Titles will always begin with “Assessment of”

Date Originally Written: Month, Day, Year.

Date Originally Published: Month, Day, Year.

Article Point of View: short description of the central thesis of the assessment.

Summary: Note: “Summary” will be five lines of text maximum.

Text: Note: This part of the article, called “Text,” is what will be counted against the 1,000-word limit.

—–END—–

divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · May 13, 2024

15. The sights of SOF Week 2024 [Photos]

Photos at the link: https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/the-sights-of-sof-week-2024-photos/?utm

​I did not observe any unconventional warfare specific equipment or technology. (note sarcasm)

The sights of SOF Week 2024 [Photos] - Breaking Defense

A look at some of what this year's SOF Week conference in Tampa had to offer.

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · May 10, 2024

Kraken Technology Group’s K4 Manta was on display with BlueHalo markings, following a recent announcement of a new partnership between the two companies. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

SOF WEEK 2024 — Special operators may be a relatively small community in the world of military affairs, but there was no shortage of attendees at this year’s SOF Week conference in Tampa. According to the conference’s organizers, over 15,000 people hailing from more than 60 nations were expected at the conference, with thousands packing the streets to see the event’s annual capabilities demonstration on the water just outside of the Tampa Convention Center.

Amid a rise of global tensions and increasing demand for special operators that US Special Operations Command boss Gen. Bryan Fenton described as a “renaissance,” there was a plethora of equipment on display by vendors this week. Below are just a few photos of what the show looked like on the ground.

Polaris debuted a new concept demonstrator of its tactical MRZR Alpha vehicle, which is aimed at missions like precision fires and logistics. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

Hascall-Denke’s equipment-carrying display dog may not have been real, but he was still a good boy. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. CQ Brown during a keynote address on Thursday. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

Attendees mill about Thursday morning before addresses from top officials delivered at the JW Marriott in downtown Tampa. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

Special operators during the conference’s marquee event, a capability demonstration held on the water just outside the convention center. This year’s featured drone swarms, F-35 flyovers, Black Hawk and Little Bird helos, fast attack boats and more. The organizers stressed the demonstration did not use actual special ops techniques, since that would be silly to allow the public to catch on camera. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

Israel Aerospace Industries’s booth included multiple uncrewed systems. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

L3Harris displayed multiple communications devices, which are critical for special operators constantly on the move who need to closely coordinate their missions. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

Stidd sought to make waves with this submersible boat that operators can use to more quickly swim to their target. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

BlueSky innovations had a host of communications equipment on display. (Michael Marrow/Breaking Defense)

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · May 10, 2024

16. American Aid Ship Heads to Gaza, but the System for Unloading It Still Isn’t in Place

What if we needed to employ this capability in a large scale combat operation somewhere. Is this an effective logistics support capability? Or does it just brief well?

American Aid Ship Heads to Gaza, but the System for Unloading It Still Isn’t in Place

The New York Times · by Gaya Gupta · May 13, 2024

A Pentagon spokesman said bad weather had made it impossible to install a new floating pier and causeway.

The container ship Sagamore, right, docked in Cyprus on Wednesday.Credit...Petros Karadjias/Associated Press

By

• May 9, 2024

An American vessel carrying aid intended for Gaza has departed from Cyprus, the Pentagon said on Thursday, but a temporary floating pier constructed by the U.S. military is not in place to unload the food and supplies meant for the enclave.

Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Pentagon spokesman, said in a news briefing on Thursday afternoon that while the construction of the floating pier and the causeway has been completed, weather conditions have made it unsafe to actually place them off the coast of Gaza.

General Ryder said that the aid on the vessel, called Sagamore, eventually would be loaded onto another American motor vessel docked at Ashdod, the Roy P. Benavidez. That second vessel would take the aid to the floating pier system as soon as it is installed off the coast in northern Gaza, he said, allowing it to be delivered to the enclave.

Sagamore appeared to be anchored at the Israeli port of Ashdod by late Thursday evening, according to VesselFinder, a ship tracking website. For now, the aid for Palestinians, desperately needed, is roughly 20 miles from the nearest Gazan border crossing.

“While I’m not going to provide a specific date, we expect these temporary piers to be put into position in the very near future, pending suitable security and weather conditions,” General Ryder said.

Israel has prevented the construction of Gaza’s own international seaport, prompting the United States and another aid group, the World Central Kitchen, to create their own systems for getting aid into the enclave by sea.

But aid groups and experts have frequently criticized the maritime efforts as costly and complicated ways to deliver aid, citing trucking as a more efficient way to get food inside Gaza. After Israeli strikes killed seven World Central Kitchen workers, the group paused its maritime operations there. The food charity has since said it would restart operations in Gaza with the help of Palestinian aid workers.

More food is needed in Gaza. The director of the World Food Program, Cindy McCain, said recently that some areas are already experiencing a famine.

Gaya Gupta is a reporter covering breaking news and a member of the 2023-24 Times Fellowship class, a program for journalists early in their careers. More about Gaya Gupta

The New York Times · by Gaya Gupta · May 13, 2024

​17.  Why Israel’s ‘clear and leave’ strategy against Hamas isn’t working by Max Boot

Excerpts:

Netanyahu refuses to countenance any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza or to accept any road map for the creation of a Palestinian state. That makes it unlikely that moderate Arab states would send peacekeepers or make a major contribution to rebuilding efforts. In the short term, the only way to avoid complete chaos — Mogadishu on the Mediterranean — is for Israeli troops to take over the responsibility of security and governance themselves. But the IDF, scarred by memories of Israel’s costly two-decade occupation of southern Lebanon, has zero desire to become an occupying force.

That’s understandable, but the consequence is that Israel is waging a war in which tactical success is likely to result in strategic failure. Researchers for Rand found that, while “clear, hold and build” strategies require lengthy commitments and don’t always work, an “iron fist” approach of the kind that Israel is employing — focused almost exclusively on killing insurgents — was far less successful historically. (The “iron fist” strategy worked only 32 percent of the time in the cases studied by Rand, compared with a 73 percent success rate for population-centric counterinsurgency.)

That is what the Biden administration has been trying to tell Netanyahu and his war cabinet. The essential U.S. message is that Israel has every right to defend itself, but it needs to be smarter about how it does so. Netanyahu thinks he knows better. Hence the impasse between U.S. and Israeli officials over the Rafah operation. However this disagreement gets resolved, Israel will eventually need to figure out who will govern Gaza, because otherwise Hamas or some other radical group will simply emerge out of the rubble and Israel will find itself right back where it started.

Opinion 

 Why Israel’s ‘clear and leave’ strategy against Hamas isn’t working

U.S. military planners behind the “surge” in Iraq explain how to execute a successful counterinsurgency.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/05/13/israel-gaza-hamas-counterinsurgency/?utm

By Max Boot

Columnist|

Author followed

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May 13, 2024 at 7:15 a.m. EDT

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Palestinians look at the destruction after an Israeli airstrike in Deir al Balah, Gaza Strip, on April 30. (Abdel Kareem Hana/AP)

From the start of Israel’s war in Gaza, President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been divided by a clash of counterinsurgency visions. Israel has been determined to destroy Hamas at all costs, while U.S. officials have worried that Israel was inflicting too many civilian casualties, was not doing enough to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and lacked a “day after” plan to stabilize Gaza after Hamas’s defeat. As one U.S. official told me, “The Israelis are showing how not to do counterinsurgency.”

Netanyahu has been loath to listen. That led Biden last week to threaten to cut off the delivery of offensive weapons if the Israel Defense Forces proceed with a major assault on Rafah, the city where Hamas’s four remaining battalions are hiding among more than 1 million civilians.

In his dismissal of U.S. counsel, Netanyahu has been influenced not only by his own right-wing coalition allies but also by senior IDF officers, many of whom, to be candid, don’t have much respect for U.S. military advice. IDF officers privately argue that the U.S. military, after suffering defeats from Vietnam to Afghanistan, does not have the standing to lecture them on how to fight a guerrilla foe. Moreover, they point out, neither U.S. troops nor any other counterinsurgents have ever faced an enemy hiding in such a formidable subterranean fortress: Hamas has built 350 to 450 miles of tunnels beneath Gaza.

The Israeli criticisms are well taken — the U.S. list of counterinsurgency failures over the decades is long and galling — but there is at least one U.S. military force that has enjoyed impressive counterinsurgency success. That would be the U.S. troops, led by Gen. David H. Petraeus (now retired), who implemented “the surge” in Iraq in 2007 and 2008.

When the surge began, Anbar province appeared to be lost to al-Qaeda in Iraq (at the time, one of the most bloodthirsty terrorist groups on the planet), and Iraq seemed to be heading for an all-out civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. By the time the surge ended, sectarian violence had fallen by more than 90 percent and al-Qaeda in Iraq had largely been defeated. (After the outbreak of the Syrian civil in 2011 and the ill-advised pullout of U.S. troops from Iraq the same year, this terrorist organization would be reborn as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.)

There are many reasons the surge worked so well, from an increase of 30,000 U.S. troops to the decision of prominent Anbar sheikhs to abandon al-Qaeda, but underlying the U.S. success was a change in strategy. Previously, U.S. troops had been focused on killing and capturing as many insurgents as possible, only to discover that the military’s heavy-handed use of firepower and large-scale roundups of military-age males created more enemies than they eliminated. Petraeus and his brain trust went back to counterinsurgency 101 by implementing a “clear, hold and build” strategy modeled on past counterinsurgency victories such as Britain’s mid-century war in Malaya and the U.S. war in the Philippines at the turn of the previous century.

They abandoned the previous model of having U.S. troops “commute” to the fight and return every night to sprawling, heavily fortified bases. In the new approach, after clearing neighborhoods of insurgents in heavy fighting, U.S. troops would stay in the area 24/7 to provide security and prevent insurgents from reinfiltrating. They also helped locals rebuild from the ravages of war. This was not a humanitarian impulse but a hardheaded military calculation that the only way to win a guerrilla war is to secure the population.

In recent days, I reached out to Petraeus and a couple members of his brain trust to ask, in light of their own experience in Iraq, what they thought of the Israeli way of war in Gaza. They are all staunch supporters of Israel, but they are highly critical of the IDF strategy — or lack thereof.

Petraeus acknowledged in an email that Gaza is “vastly more challenging than Fallujah, Ramadi, Baqubah and Mosul combined,” referring to cities in Iraq where U.S. forces fought under his command. But, he argued, “the correct approach is a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign that features the traditional tasks of Clear (areas of Hamas terrorists), Hold (keep the civilians secure from Hamas reinfiltration), and Build (provide ample humanitarian assistance, restore the basic services to the people, and then rebuild the many damaged and destroyed areas so that the population can return).”

The problem, in Petraeus’s view, is that “the Israelis are not performing the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ elements” of a counterinsurgency campaign. “They are just clearing and leaving to fight in other areas. And that inevitably means that they will have to go back and reclear endlessly.” Recent experience confirms his warning: On Nov. 15, Israeli troops stormed al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, which they described as a Hamas stronghold. Then they left. After reports that the complex was once again being used a terrorist base, the IDF returned on March 18 for another two-week operation.

A couple of Petraeus’s former officers, both noted students of counterinsurgency, focused (as he also did) on the lack of a viable political end-state for Israel’s military campaign. “The United States failed to properly consider what sort of peace it wanted to build in Iraq and Afghanistan before it invaded those countries,” said retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, now a professor of warfighting studies at the Army War College. “Without knowing what you’re trying to accomplish, operations tend to be disjointed and counterproductive. It’s past time for Israel to learn from our mistakes and think hard about a two-state solution with capable Palestinian security forces policing both Gaza and the West Bank.”

In a similar vein, retired Col. Peter Mansoor, author of the definitive history of the surge and a professor of military history at Ohio State University, told me, “The Israelis in Gaza are committing the same primary mistake as the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq: Seeking a military solution to what is fundamentally a political issue. By pursuing the destruction of Hamas and ignoring the root causes of the conflict, the Israelis by their actions are creating more future combatants than they are eliminating in the near term. Inevitably, Hamas 2.0 will rise from the ashes of the current fighting.”

The concerns raised by Petraeus, Nagl and Mansoor about Israel’s perverse “clear and leave” strategy are valid and compelling. The implication is that, even if the IDF goes into Rafah, doing so won’t result in a lasting victory against Hamas. Truly winning this war would require creating some sort of government in Gaza that could gain the support of the people and prevent Hamas from returning after Israeli soldiers pull out. But no such solution appears to be in the works.

Netanyahu refuses to countenance any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza or to accept any road map for the creation of a Palestinian state. That makes it unlikely that moderate Arab states would send peacekeepers or make a major contribution to rebuilding efforts. In the short term, the only way to avoid complete chaos — Mogadishu on the Mediterranean — is for Israeli troops to take over the responsibility of security and governance themselves. But the IDF, scarred by memories of Israel’s costly two-decade occupation of southern Lebanon, has zero desire to become an occupying force.

That’s understandable, but the consequence is that Israel is waging a war in which tactical success is likely to result in strategic failure. Researchers for Rand found that, while “clear, hold and build” strategies require lengthy commitments and don’t always work, an “iron fist” approach of the kind that Israel is employing — focused almost exclusively on killing insurgents — was far less successful historically. (The “iron fist” strategy worked only 32 percent of the time in the cases studied by Rand, compared with a 73 percent success rate for population-centric counterinsurgency.)

That is what the Biden administration has been trying to tell Netanyahu and his war cabinet. The essential U.S. message is that Israel has every right to defend itself, but it needs to be smarter about how it does so. Netanyahu thinks he knows better. Hence the impasse between U.S. and Israeli officials over the Rafah operation. However this disagreement gets resolved, Israel will eventually need to figure out who will govern Gaza, because otherwise Hamas or some other radical group will simply emerge out of the rubble and Israel will find itself right back where it started.

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Opinion by Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author of the forthcoming “Reagan: His Life and Legend.” Twitter

18. Key Takeaways from Biden Administration Report on Israeli Use of US Weapons

Key Takeaways from Biden Administration Report on Israeli Use of US Weapons 

https://www.justsecurity.org/95583/israel-weapons-hamas-us-report-takeaways/

by John Ramming Chappell

May 11, 2024

On Friday, May 10, the Biden administration released its overdue first report required by National Security Memorandum 20 (NSM-20) assessing the conduct of Israel and other foreign governments that receive weapons from the United States. Journalists and lawmakers have especially anticipated the administration’s findings on Israel, but the report also includes assessments of conduct by the governments of Colombia, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine. 

The United States provides more weapons than any other country in the world to Israel. Germany is Israel’s second largest supplier. Since the October 7 Hamas attack, the United States has reportedly transferred bombs, artillery shells, precision guidance kits (which are attached to bombs for targeting purposes), tank ammunition, guided missiles, firearms, drones, various types of ammunition, and other weapons to the Israeli government. Journalists and human rights investigators have documented the use of U.S. bombs, artillery shells, tank shells, precision guidance kits, and aircraft in attacks that have killed civilians, apparently violated international humanitarian law, and may amount to war crimes. 

The NSM-20 report finds “it is reasonable to assess” that Israeli security forces have used U.S. weapons to violate international humanitarian law or best practices for reducing harm to civilians. However, as noted by former State Department officials, the report conspicuously avoids making specific legal determinations and concludes that Israel’s assurances regarding humanitarian aid and international law compliance are “credible and reliable,” meaning that the United States can continue to supply its partner with weapons covered under NSM-20.

The most important response to the report will come from Congress, and specifically Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), who authored the proposed amendment that served as the precursor to NSM-20. In reaction to the report, Van Hollen said it “fails to do the hard work of making an assessment and ducks the ultimate questions that the report was designed to determine.” 

Notably, the day before the report’s release, Axios’ Barak Ravid reported, that the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and USAID “recommended” that Secretary of State Antony Blinken “conclude that Israel has violated the terms of the national security memorandum, but other parts of the department pressed Blinken to certify that it didn’t.” 

In a full statement reflecting on the report, Van Hollen remarked, “Today’s report also indicates a continuation of a disturbing pattern where the expertise and analyses of those working most closely on these issues at the State Department and at USAID have been swept aside to facilitate a predetermined policy outcome based on political convenience.” On the other hand, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Ben Cardin (D-MD) expressed agreement with the report’s “assessment that Israel has not violated International Humanitarian Law and that military assistance to support Israel’s security remains in the U.S. interest and should continue.”

 Below are highlights from the report, followed by deeper context, analysis, and implications. 

• The report did not conclude that the United States is required to suspend arms transfers as a matter of law or policy. 
• The NSM-20 report concludes that “given Israel’s significant reliance on U.S.-made defense articles, it is reasonable to assess that defense articles covered under NSM-20 have been used by Israeli security forces since October 7 in instances inconsistent with its IHL [international humanitarian law] obligations or with established best practices for mitigating civilian harm.” (Emphasis added.) 
• The U.S. government did not find any violations of Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act, which bars military aid to any government that “prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.” However, the United States “will continue to monitor and respond.” 
• Beyond Section 620I, the report notes that the Israeli government has taken actions that “delayed or had a negative effect on the delivery of aid to Gaza” and that “the overall level reaching Palestinian civilians – while improved – remains insufficient.” However, it further finds that in some instances, Israel may have restricted the delivery of humanitarian aid, but did not do so arbitrarily. 
• The Israeli government “has not shared complete information to verify whether U.S. defense articles covered under NSM-20 were specifically used in actions that have been alleged as violations of [international human rights or humanitarian law] in Gaza, or in the West Bank and East Jerusalem during the period of the report.” Israel did share “some information on specific incidents,” which implicate international humanitarian law, “some details of its targeting choices, and some battle damage assessments.” 
• The Intelligence Community “assesses that Israel could do more to avoid civilian harm.” Customary international humanitarian law stipulates: “All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”

What NSM-20 Requires 

In terms of global weapons exports, the United States sends more weapons abroad than any other country in the world and more than the next six countries combined. Last year, the United States exported more than $80 billion in arms. While U.S. weapons transfers can contribute to a range of legitimate foreign policy priorities, they can also contribute to human rights abuses, harm to civilians, corruption, armed violence, crime, and other risks. NSM-20 is the latest policy that seeks to address the most serious downside risks and review how U.S. weapons are used.

NSM-20 is a presidential policy requiring that all countries receiving weapons from the United States that are funded with U.S. taxpayer dollars provide credible and reliable written assurances to the U.S. government. Those assurances commit the recipient to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and use such weapons in a manner that complies with international law. Countries that do not provide those assurances are not eligible to receive U.S.-funded weapons, but the policy provides a narrow waiver, which allows that in “rare and extraordinary circumstances,” a country that does not provide assurances may remain eligible. 

NSM-20 does not extend to weapons purchased with another government’s national funds or to air defense systems, weapons “intended to be used for strictly defensive purposes,” or “non-lethal” weapons. The precise scope of this carve-out remains unclear but surely covers support for the Israeli Iron Dome missile defense system.

For countries that the United States considers to be currently engaged in armed conflict (Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine), those assurances were due 45 days after the release of the policy. All other countries receiving U.S.-funded weapons must provide such assurances within 180 days of the policy’s release (Aug. 6TK, 2024). Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant submitted written assurances to the Biden administration on March 14. Blinken reportedly accepted them as credible and reliable on March 25.

NSM-20 also requires reporting to congressional committees assessing U.S. weapons recipients’ violations of international law, failures to implement best practices for civilian harm mitigation, and restrictions on humanitarian aid. Friday’s report – filed two days past the May 8 deadline – is the first annual report provided, covering the period between January 2023 and the report’s submission.

In addition to the annual reports, NSM-20 establishes a rolling process for the Biden administration to assess the credibility and reliability of assurances provided by foreign governments whenever the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense assesses that the assurances have been “called into question and should be revisited.” 

No New Suspension of Arms Transfers

As a bottom line, Friday’s report does not conclude that the United States is required to suspend arms transfers. When Secretary Blinken initially accepted Israel’s assurances regarding international law and humanitarian aid as credible and reliable on March 25, he faced significant opposition on that finding from within the U.S. government, from legislators, and from leading human rights and humanitarian organizations. Blinken also faced criticism from other directions, including a joint letter from Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senator Jim Risch (R-ID), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calling for the repeal of NSM-20. They argued that NSM-20 is duplicative of already existing U.S. law and “leave[s] open the possibility of overly broad or inconsistent interpretations.”

With that backdrop, the report concluded that Israel’s assurances are “credible and reliable so as to allow the provision of defense articles covered under NSM-20 to continue.” 

This finding follows the Biden administration’s imposition of a condition on aid to Israel and its first announced pause of a weapons delivery to Israel. These decisions come as Biden faces considerable pressure on his Gaza policy and aid to Israel, particularly after Israeli forces entered Rafah, the 25-square-mile governorate in Gaza where more than a million displaced Palestinians are sheltering.

On May 8, the Biden administration reportedly paused the delivery of a shipment of 3500 500- and 2000-pound bombs to Israel. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin cited concerns with the Israeli military’s Gaza offensive. Although this marks the first time that Biden has publicly announced the suspension of an arms transfer to Israel, Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY), Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, previously placed an informal hold on a sale of F-15 war planes that the Biden administration has proposed.

In an interview on CNN on May 8, Biden confirmed the recent suspension of a shipment of weapons and committed that, if the Israeli military enters population centers in Rafah, he will not supply “the weapons that have been used historically to deal with Rafah, to deal with the cities.” Much remains unclear about this condition, including what categories of weapons would be covered beyond 2000-pound bombs and artillery shells, both of which Biden mentioned. Aid groups report that Israeli forces are already present in Rafah, but Biden administration officials claim that the president’s red line has not been crossed.

Although the NSM-20 report does not expand upon Biden’s recent decisions to restrict and condition certain arms transfers to Israel, several pre-existing laws and policy frameworks impose conditions on arms transfers and security assistance. Those laws and policies – including the Leahy Laws, Sections 502B and 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act, and the Conventional Arms Transfer policy – may independently require the suspension of certain arms transfers or security assistance. 

U.S. Arms Likely Used to Violate International Law, But No Legal Determinations

The report notes “numerous credible UN, NGO, and media reports of Israeli airstrikes impacting civilians and civilian objects… that have raised questions about Israel’s compliance with its legal obligations under IHL and with best practices for mitigating civilian harm.” The State Department specifically points to several incidents, including multiple strikes on Jabaliya refugee camp and an Amnesty International-documented strike on the home of the al-Mu’eileq family in Deir al-Balah, which killed 43 civilians according to the group.

The NSM-20 report concludes that:

given Israel’s significant reliance on U.S.-made defense articles, it is reasonable to assess that defense articles covered under NSM-20 have been used by Israeli security forces since October 7 in instances inconsistent with its IHL obligations or with established best practices for mitigating civilian harm. 

Similarly, the report found that “certain Israeli-operated systems are entirely U.S.-origin (e.g., crewed attack aircraft) and are likely to have been involved in incidents that raise concerns about Israel’s IHL compliance.” 

Part of the U.S. government’s analysis regarding international humanitarian law focuses on Israel’s “institutions and processes” rather than legality of specific actions. It also states that the United States does “not have complete information on how these processes are implemented.” As discussed below, this fits into a broader issue raised in the report: the Israeli government has apparently not fully cooperated with U.S. efforts to assess how Israeli forces use U.S. weapons. 

Although the NSM-20 report readily concluded that “Hamas does not follow any portion of and consistently violates IHL” – a conclusion that exceeds the scope of the reporting requirement – it generally avoids drawing specific legal conclusions about any such violations by the Israeli military despite “significant concerns.” 

Regarding accountability for possible violations, the report cites ongoing Israeli investigations of incidents but notes: “Recognizing such investigations and legal processes take time, to date” the U.S. government “is unaware of any Israeli prosecutions for violations of IHL or civilian harm since October.”

The Israeli Military Is Not Doing Enough to Protect Civilians

As a threshold matter it is important to note that international humanitarian law requires States to take “all feasible precautions” to minimize civilian injury and deaths. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and customary international law could not be more clear. Failure to comply with this obligation is a violation of international law. In U.S. policy, Defense Secretary Austin has called the protection of civilians in conflict a “significant strategic and moral imperative.”

According to the NSM-20 report, the State Department reviewed reports of civilian harm that “raised serious questions” about Israel’s implementation of civilian harm mitigation best practices. The report discusses the Israeli military’s use of no-strike lists (which are lists of locations and entities that should not be targeted), “tactical pauses,” and humanitarian deconfliction measures. In each case, the report cites humanitarian organizations’ concerns that these practices have been insufficient and inconsistent. 

The report does not specifically engage with best practices like understanding the civilian environment, cognitive bias, red-teaming, civilian harm tracking and assessments, and amends for civilian harm, which have featured prominently in U.S. reviews of civilian harm policies and practices. Nor does it engage with the Israeli military’s use of explosive weapons in densely populated areas of Gaza. The United States has endorsed the 2022 Political Declaration on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, which commits, among other provisions, that its own armed forces will: 

adopt and implement a range of policies and practices to help avoid civilian harm, including by restricting or refraining as appropriate from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, when their use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects.

“The IC [Intelligence Community] assesses that Israel could do more to avoid civilian harm,” the report states. No effort is made in the report to reconcile such assessments with the international humanitarian law obligation to take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm. 

The report also concludes: “While Israel has the knowledge, experience, and tools to implement best practices for mitigating civilian harm in its military operations, the results on the ground, including high levels of civilian casualties, raise substantial questions as to whether the IDF is using them effectively in all cases.” 

The report briefly discusses the implementation of the Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance, a set of guidelines announced in September to create a process for tracking the use of U.S. weapons in civilian harm incidents. The report notes: “85 alleged incidents of civilian harm involving Israeli military operations in Gaza have been submitted to the CHIRG for evaluation, and approximately 40 percent of those cases have been closed.” Although the State Department is engaging with the Israeli military to create a “dedicated channel” focused on reviewing civilian harm incidents and making civilian harm mitigation recommendations, the report implies that no such channel currently exists.

Concerns About Humanitarian Aid Restrictions – But U.S. Law Not Triggered

NSM-20 requires reporting on covered countries’ compliance with the requirements of Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits U.S. military aid to any government that “prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.” The Van Hollen amendment, and subsequently NSM-20, have significantly raised the profile of Section 620I. Since the release of the Van Hollen amendment, dozens of members of Congress and non-governmental organizations have claimed that continued military aid to Israel violates Section 620I. (See Brian Finucane’s analysis in Just Security.)

In addition to Section 620I, NSM-20’s reporting requirement requires assurances that a covered country will “facilitate and not arbitrarily deny, restrict, or otherwise impede, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance and United States Government-supported international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance.” 

The State Department acknowledges in its report that several Israeli government actions have impeded the delivery of humanitarian aid. According to public reporting, humanitarian organizations have documented restrictions on items that the Israeli government considers “dual-use,” with military and civilian applications, including anesthetics, maternity kits, and water filters. The presence of a “dual-use” item on a truck entering Gaza can result in Israeli authorities’ denying the entry of the entire truckload of aid. For its part, the NSM-20 report acknowledges that the Israeli government “has, on occasion, stretched dual-use issues to a concerning degree.” The report also notes “denials or delays of specific movements of humanitarian actors.” Similarly, the U.N. Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs has regularly documented instances in which Israeli authorities have not approved humanitarian aid delivery missions in various parts of Gaza. 

In addition to restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid, the report discusses Israel’s attacks on humanitarian aid workers and facilities. The report lists several strikes on humanitarians, including the killing of seven World Central Kitchen aid workers, a strike on an International Rescue Committee and Medical Aid for Palestinians housing compound, and the reported killing of 118 civilians awaiting the delivery of food aid. 

However, the State Department does not find that the continued provision of military aid to Israel violates Section 620I. Nor does the report elaborate on the State Department’s interpretation of Section 620I, which it has not disclosed publicly. The report finds that several Israeli military practices impede the delivery of humanitarian aid “but not necessarily in an arbitrary manner,” as is required in NSM-20’s language independent of Section 620I. Nevertheless, the State Department concludes that the “overall level reaching Palestinian civilians – while improved – remains insufficient.” The report commits that the United States “will continue to monitor and respond.” 

Israeli Military Has Not Fully Cooperated With U.S. Authorities to Examine Weapons Use

Determining whether a violation of international humanitarian law has occurred is typically a fact-intensive process, and NSM-20’s scope (i.e., it only covers U.S. weapons paid for using U.S. taxpayer dollars) make that process all the more difficult. The report acknowledges “it is often difficult to make swift, definitive assessments or determinations on whether specific U.S. defense articles or services have been used in a manner not consistent with international law.” However, the NSM-20 report repeatedly notes difficulties securing the Israeli government’s cooperation in assessments of how it uses U.S. weapons. 

The Israeli government “has not shared complete information to verify whether U.S. defense articles covered under NSM-20 were specifically used in actions that have been alleged as violations of [international human rights or humanitarian law] in Gaza, or in the West Bank and East Jerusalem during the period of the report.” Nor has the Israeli government provided “full visibility into Israel’s application of [international humanitarian law] principles and procedures.” Israel did share “some information on specific incidents implicating IHL [international humanitarian law], “some details of its targeting choices, and some battle damage assessments.” That’s it: some.

Since the United States has provided nearly $20 billion in military aid to Israel in the past year and carried out more than 100 arms transfers since October, the U.S. government’s lack of visibility into the Israeli government’s compliance with its legal obligations gives significant cause for concern.

The Ball is in Congress’ Court 

The continued provision of weapons to the Israeli government amid extensive harm to civilians and a famine has become a matter of national and international concern. Members of Congress have sought to understand how Israel is using U.S. weapons, prompting the Biden administration to issue its own assessment and assurances that Israel, and other partners, are complying with international law.

Legislators will undoubtedly compare Biden administration’s report to other accounts of Israel’s compliance with the assurances related to international humanitarian law and humanitarian access, including reports from Refugees International, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, several humanitarian organizations, and an independent panel of legal experts and former State Department officials. Many of those reports draw fairly definitive conclusions that the Israeli military has violated international humanitarian law in specific instances. It is also expected that the International Criminal Court may soon issue arrest warrants for senior Israeli officials and Hamas leaders on the body of evidence of war crimes in the conflict.

NSM-20 itself and Friday’s report originated in congressional pressure. The key question now is: what will Congress do next? Proponents of continued unconditional arms transfers to Israel have rebuked Biden for pausing the delivery of some bombs and outlining a condition on certain weapons transfers. But critics from opposing perspectives may now seek to convert their dissatisfaction with the NSM-20 report into legislative action to restrict arms transfers to Israel. How these conflicts play out – both within Congress and between legislators and the president – at this critical juncture could shape the future of the war in Gaza, U.S. arms transfers policy, and the U.S.-Israel relationship.

John Ramming Chappell

John Ramming Chappell (@jwrchappell) is an Advocacy & Legal Fellow at Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), where he engages with U.S. policymakers and advocates to enhance the protection of civilians in conflict.

Editor’s note: Readers may also be interested in Larry Lewis, Israeli Civilian Harm Mitigation in Gaza: Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold?, Just Security (March 12, 2024)

19. ‘Civil War’ sends a message that’s more dangerous than the violence it depicts onscreen

I still have not seen this but I will soon.

‘Civil War’ sends a message that’s more dangerous than the violence it depicts onscreen | CNN

CNN · by John Blake · May 12, 2024

CNN —

A month after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the historian Yuval Noah Harari made a bold claim that seemed delusional.

Harari made his claim in an essay on the heroism of the Ukrainian people. He praised embattled Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, who refused to flee his country when death seemed certain, telling his would-be rescuers that he needed ammunition, not a ride. He marveled at the outnumbered Ukrainian soldiers on Snake Island who told a Russian warship to “go f**k yourself,” and the civilians blocking Russian tanks with their bodies.

“Nations are ultimately built on stories,” said Harari, author of “Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind.” “Each passing day adds more stories that Ukrainians will not only tell in the dark days ahead, but in the decades and generations to come … This is the stuff nations are built from. In the long run, these stories count for more than tanks.”

But there’s another type of story that’s gained traction in the US — the kind that can cause a nation to unravel. The new hit movie, “Civil War,” which has earned more than $100 million worldwide at the box office, is the latest example of a disturbing trend: We no longer seem to know how to tell well-crafted stories that counter those that depict American democracy as doomed.

In “Civil War,” tanks trample democracy. The film depicts a near-future America that has been torn apart by seceding regions and militia violence. It features a fascist leader in the White House, an attempted coup and Americans casually killing one another in the streets. One critic called it writer-director Alex Garland’s “very in-your-face attempt to imagine the unimaginable in America.”

It’s hard to imagine any other future for the United States when you consider the popularity of movies like “Civil War.” Most of the stories about the state of America that gain traction in popular culture are the ones that end in its failure. They’re the opposite of the hopeful, unifying stories any country needs to overcome tough times.

“Civil War” is part of a growing entertainment genre that, to borrow a phrase from former President Donald Trump, could be called “American carnage.” Dystopian movies and TV shows like “The Walking Dead,” “The Purge,” “The Hunger Games,” “The Handmaid’s Tale” and “The Last of Us” all imagine a hellish future in America triggered by an environmental, political or civic collapse.

There’s nothing wrong with dystopian thrillers. They serve as cautionary tales and are as old as the book of Revelation. But the messages they send may be more dangerous than the violence depicted onscreen: The collapse of democracy is inevitable. Americans can never transcend their tribalism. Resistance is futile.

There’s something wrong when we churn out stories about superheroes in spandex banding together from different galaxies to save the universe, but we can’t tell a popular story that shows Americans coming together to save our country.

‘Casablanca’ offers a lesson for today’s Americans

It didn’t used to be this way. There was another time when democracy in America was under threat, and filmmakers responded by making stirring movies aimed at lifting Americans’ spirit and equipping them for the battles ahead.

Consider “Casablanca,” the classic 1942 film. It proves that you can tell a gripping story about patriotism without being sappy or boring. In the film, Humphrey Bogart plays Rick, the cynical owner of a Moroccan nightclub at the onset of World War II. The movie is remembered today for its classic lines (“Here’s looking at you kid”; “We’ll always have Paris”; “Round up the usual suspects”).

Dooley Wilson, Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman in "Casablanca."

Everett Collection

Yet there’s another classic line uttered by Rick — “I stick my neck out for nobody” — that hints at deeper reasons why “Casablanca” was made. The film is set before Pearl Harbor, when many Americans didn’t want to get involved in a European conflict. Adolf Hitler’s Nazi war machine seemed unstoppable. Fascism was on a global march. Democracy’s future seemed grim.

Rick responds to the impending crisis with apathy and cynicism. But when his old flame, played by actress Ingrid Bergman, walks into his club one night, she not only rekindles their romance but his idealism.

“The movie was a patriotic rallying cry that affirmed a sense of national purpose,” wrote Cristóbal S. Berry-Cabán in an essay. “The film emphasized group effort and the value of individual sacrifices for a larger cause. It portrayed World War II as a peoples’ war, typically featuring a diverse group of people and ethnic backgrounds who are thrown together, tested, and molded into a dedicated (force) fighting fascism.”

Other films of that era made similar storytelling choices. Legendary Hollywood director TeFrank Capra made a series of seven patriotic films during World War II called “Why We Fight” that rallied Americans in the fight against fascism.

The entertainer Frank Sinatra, a paragon of mid-20th century American masculinity, starred in a short film called “The House We Live In.” It would be labeled “woke” today. In the film, Sinatra intervenes when he sees a group of youths chasing a Jewish boy. He tells them that “religion makes no difference, except to a Nazi or someone who’s stupid.” The film was eventually selected by the Library of Congress as being “culturally and historically” significant.

Sinatra would later record a song with the same title as the film, which he would perform throughout his career. It included lines like, “The faces that I see. All races and religions. That’s America to me.”

Frank Sinatra in a still from "The House I Live In," 1945).

John Springer Collection/Corbis Historical/Getty Images

Other World War II-era films like “Don’t be a Sucker,” which emphasized racial and religious tolerance in America, emphasized the same message. It went viral after the 2017 neo-Nazi rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.

Those black-and-white films may seem dated and idealistic in an America that has been through the Vietnam War, Watergate, 9/11 and January 6. But a country needs a unifying story like a human being needs oxygen.

“Stories are essential to holding a nation together,” says Kermit Roosevelt III, a historian and author of “The Nation That Never Was: Reconstructing America’s Story.” “You have to have something that motivates people to make sacrifices for the nation. If you’re going to fight a war, you have to have people who are willing to lay down their lives. But we more often call on people to make sacrifices for others, to bear burdens, promote justice and help out the less fortunate.”

That doesn’t mean we return to the days of making clumsy propaganda films. But Roosevelt says we should keep in mind that most stories contain some elements of propaganda.

“We have this idea that propaganda is bad or ideology is bad,” Roosevelt says. “But I think that history and education are inherently ideological, and there’s a perspective there and you’re trying to impart lessons.”

What united Reagan and Obama

Some of America’s most gifted political leaders knew that lesson well. Two of the most consequential presidents in recent memory — Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama — were master storytellers. They told stories that made Americans believe in democracy, in one another and in their country’s future.

President Ronald Reagan reading his last speech to the nation at the end of his second term in 1989.

Diana Walker/The Chronicle Collection/Getty Images

Reagan’s skills were on display when he told a story about American vitality in his farewell speech that echoed Sinatra’s “The House We Live In.” He said the source of America’s greatness was immigrants.

“While other countries cling to the stale past, here in America we breathe life into dreams,” Reagan said. “Thanks to each wave of new arrivals to this land of opportunity, we’re a nation forever young, forever bursting with energy and new ideas, and always on the cutting edge, always leading the world to the world to the next frontier. This quality is vital to our future as a nation.”

Former President Obama cited his personal story as a reason to believe in America, despite the country’s history of not living up to its ideals. The son of a White mother from Kansas and a Black father from Kenya, Obama said his journey to national prominence was proof that the American dream was possible.

“I stand here knowing that my story is part of the larger American story, that I owe a debt to all of those who came before me, and that, in no other country on Earth is my story even possible,” he during his speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, which would eventually catapult him to the White House.

It’s easy to dismiss Reagan’s and Obama’s storytelling as the product of clever speechwriters. What candidate doesn’t call America great, or vow that anything is possible in the land of the free and home of the brave?

Barack Obama greets delegates before he accepts the Democratic presidential nomination at the 2008 Democratic National Convention on August 28, 2008, in Denver, Colorado.

Chuck Kennedy/Pool/Getty Images

But the dominant American political figure of recent years does not typically tell such unifying stories about his country. Former President Trump coined the term “American carnage” during his 2017 inaugural address. He routinely describes an America that more resembles the failed state depicted in the “Civil War” movie, with his declaration in January that “We are a nation in decline, we are a failing nation.”

Telling that kind of story hasn’t appeared to hurt Trump any more than it hurt the makers of “Civil War.” And, truth be told, stories of American greatness can ring hollow to the descendants of enslaved Americans, the Japanese Americans interned during World War II and those dismayed today by politicians and judges who disregard democratic norms.

How can we tell a story today that doesn’t ignore the brutality of American history but still inspires hope for the future?

There’s another figure from the past who may help us.

Making the ‘emotional case for democracy’

Walt Whitman, the 19th century writer dubbed “the poet of democracy,” said that America was his greatest poem. Through poetry, Whitman did what so many seem incapable of today — he made a multiracial, multireligious democracy in America visceral and exciting, not a civics lesson.

In “Songs of Myself,” Whitman vividly described America as “the Nation of many nations,” and said of himself and his country,” “Of every hue and caste am I, of every rank and religion.”

Read Whitman today and one is struck by his expansive definition of what it means to be an American. No one is excluded — he treats the “boatman and clam-diggers, the farmer, the deacon, the runaway slave, the prostitute and the president with equal reverence, “For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.”

Walt Whitman (1819-1891), American poet and author.

Three Lions/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

The historian Ian Beacock said Whitman offers an answer for those who wonder how they can defend democracy against stories that predict its demise. He suggests they take Whitman’s approach: “State an emotional case for democracy that appeals as much to those who already possess power as to those yet without it.”

It starts with being honest about the appeal of other modes of government, like fascism, he says.

“It’s obvious that being free and equal is better than being dominated,” Beacock wrote.” But is it better than dominating? Exerting power over others is a seductive feeling, too, if a dark and dangerous one.”

Many democracies simply “unravel” because their citizens get complacent, Beacock says. Democracy is hard to sustain because of its constant demands for compromise. People often go shopping for alternatives that seem like less work, he says.

Whitman told stories about democracy that engaged people’s feelings, not just their intellect, Beacock says.

“This is perhaps Whitman’s core contribution to democratic thought and practice: the reminder that democracy’s defenders mustn’t neglect political feelings (“Logic and sermons never convince”) and that self-government must appeal to the human heart if it is to last long. “

We need a new way to tell the American story

The Austrian philosopher Ivan Illich was once asked about the most revolutionary way to change a society. He said:

“Neither revolution nor reformation can ultimately change a society, rather you must tell a new powerful tale, one so persuasive that it sweeps away the old myths and becomes the preferred story, one so inclusive that it gathers all the bits of our past and our present into a coherent whole, one that even shines some light into our future so that we can take the next step…”

Kirsten Dunst in "Civil War." The film can be viewed as a cautionary tale about a fractious America.

Courtesy of A24

How Americans in 2024 decide to tell their national story is up for debate. What shouldn’t be up for discussion, though, is the need for such stories. Isn’t it time we tell a new story of a future America where the White House isn’t going up in flames and citizens aren’t murdering one another?

The box office success of “Civil War” ensures, though, that more “American carnage” stories are likely headed our way. Though the film doesn’t take any political sides, it amplifies the same message that autocrats in Russia and China are making through their propaganda: America is hopelessly divided and degenerate, and democracy is doomed.

Maybe it’s time to rediscover what Americans of another era knew. Those old black-and-white films about what makes America special may seem corny now. But they understood that you must defend democracy not only with tanks, but with stirring tales that reverberate for generations to come.

If you believe democracy is under threat in America, find a “new powerful tale” that inspires us to believe it has a future.

But don’t dispense platitudes or give us a civics lesson.

Tell us a story.

John Blake is a Senior Writer at CNN and the author of “More Than I Imagined: What a Black Man Discovered About the White Mother He Never Knew.”

CNN · by John Blake · May 12, 2024

20. NATO Cannot Survive Without America

A BFO (blinding flash of the obvious)?

Conclusion:

The United States has been here before. Prior to both world wars, Washington sought neutrality. Neither effort at isolationism worked and only prevented the United States from being able to help deter the aggressors in those wars. Eventually, the United States was pulled into both conflicts. After World War II, having learned the dangers of isolationism, the United States remained engaged and paved the way for the founding of NATO and 75 years of relative peace in Europe. The United States must not forget the painful lessons of the last century. To do so would risk undercutting U.S. global leadership, undermining the Washington-built international order, and making the world safer for authoritarian rule.

NATO Cannot Survive Without America

If Trump Pulls Out, the Alliance Would Likely Fall Apart

By Hans Binnendijk, R. D. Hooker, Jr., and Alexander Vershbow

May 13, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Hans Binnendijk, R.D. Hooker Jr., and Alexander Vershbow · May 13, 2024

Last month, NATO, the world’s most successful military alliance, celebrated its 75th anniversary. Some fear that it may have been its last anniversary with the United States playing a leading role. Former U.S. President Donald Trump still views the alliance as obsolete. If reelected, he says he would encourage Russian leaders to do “whatever the hell they want” to member states that do not pay what he considers to be enough for defense. A second Trump presidency could have dire implications for European security.

Trump’s defenders argue that he is bluffing to pressure Europe into spending more on defense. But former U.S. officials who worked closely with Trump on NATO during his tenure, including one of us (R.D. Hooker Jr.), are convinced he will withdraw from the alliance if reelected. Trump hugely resents the more moderate advisers who kept him in check during his first term. If he reaches the White House in 2025, the guardrails will be off.

The U.S. Congress is concerned, too. It recently enacted legislation to prohibit a president from withdrawing from NATO unless Congress approves, either by a two-thirds vote in the Senate or an act of both houses of Congress. But Trump could circumvent this prohibition. He has already raised doubts about his willingness to honor NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause. By withholding funding, recalling U.S. troops and commanders from Europe, and blocking important decisions in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s top deliberative body), Trump can dramatically weaken the alliance without formally leaving it. Even if he does not withdraw American support completely, Trump’s current position on NATO and his disinterest in supporting Ukraine, if adopted as national policy, would shatter European confidence in American leadership and military resolve.

EUROPE, ABANDONED

If Trump is reelected and follows through on his anti-NATO instincts, the first casualty would be Ukraine. Trump has opposed additional military aid to Kyiv and continues to fawn over Russian President Vladimir Putin. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg is already trying to Trump-proof aid to Ukraine by coordinating it under the aegis of the alliance rather than the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Should the United States weaken or terminate its defense commitment to Europe under Trump, European countries would feel more vulnerable and may become increasingly reluctant to send Ukraine their own vital military supplies. With dramatic aid cuts, Kyiv could be forced to negotiate an unfavorable agreement with Moscow that would leave Ukraine a rump state militarily and economically vulnerable to Russia. Should Ukraine’s defenses collapse altogether, brutal repression and forced Russification await some 38 million people.

The disastrous consequences would only start there. A deflated NATO would struggle to mount an effective conventional deterrent against further Russian aggression. Russia is now on a war footing, spending six percent of its GDP on defense, and its authoritarian leader is committed to an ultra-nationalistic mission to consolidate his rule over what he calls the “Russian world,” an unspecified geographic space that extends well beyond his country’s internationally recognized borders. Moscow could reconstitute its armed forces relatively quickly. After subjugating all of Ukraine, Putin would probably focus on the Baltic states—NATO members covered by the alliance’s security umbrella but claimed as historic Russian lands by Putin. Should NATO’s conventional deterrence be weakened by the withdrawal of U.S. support, Russia would only be tempted to act more brazenly.

NATO countries collectively now spend two percent of GDP on defense, but, in the absence U.S. support, European armies are still not sufficiently prepared, equipped, and able to fight against a major-power adversary. Europe remains heavily reliant on the United States in several important areas. On its own, it lacks many of the key tools necessary for successful defense, including airlift capabilities, air-to-air refueling, high-altitude air defense, space assets, and operational intelligence—these are all supplied primarily by the United States. Without American help, NATO would lose much of its military edge over Russia. Europe’s defense industry remains badly fragmented, and developing the needed defense capacities to compensate for the loss of American backing could take the remainder of this decade.

A deflated NATO would struggle to mount an effective conventional deterrent against further Russian aggression.

Should the United States abandon NATO, the erosion of nuclear deterrence would severely compound Europe’s conventional deterrence problem. Nuclear weapons underpin the United States’ commitment to defend its allies and its nuclear capabilities form the bedrock of NATO’s capacity for deterrence. Should Trump close the American nuclear umbrella, Europe would have to rely on less than 600 British and French strategic nuclear warheads, a fraction of Russia’s total force of over 5,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. Since Europe has no tactical nuclear weapons, it can hope to deter a Russian tactical nuclear attack only by threatening escalation to the strategic level, a move that Moscow may not find credible. In an attempt to scare Europeans away from backing Ukraine, Russia has on many occasions hinted it might use tactical nuclear weapons. Unlike the United States, France and the United Kingdom have not extended their nuclear deterrent to protect their allies. Should Washington leave Europe to fend for itself, Moscow might calculate that it could successfully resort to nuclear blackmail to capture the territory of NATO member states.

Without U.S. leadership in NATO, cohesion and unity among members would be difficult to maintain. It often requires a strong American voice to bring disparate member states to a consensus. Since NATO’s founding, a U.S. general officer has led the organization’s command structure, overseeing the military activities of all NATO member states. It is doubtful that any other country in the alliance could play this role.

NATO without the United States might limp along, but it is more likely that the alliance would collapse altogether. The European Union is not in a position to take NATO’s place any time soon, as its military capabilities are limited and more capable of managing regional crises than fighting major wars. Even if a rump NATO survives without strong American involvement, the challenges of divided leadership, inadequate deterrence capabilities, and an assertive adversary would heighten the risk of war with Russia, a major power bent on overturning the liberal international order.

THE FALLOUT

The damage would not be limited to Europe. If Trump wants to withdraw from NATO to punish allies for their inadequate defense spending, why would the United States maintain its commitments to its Asian allies, many of whom currently spend even less than NATO countries? For now, the defense ties between the United States and its allies in Asia, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, are growing stronger in the face of Chinese provocations. But a lack of confidence in U.S. commitments may well lead some of these countries to pursue nuclear weapons to offset China’s and North Korea’s nuclear advantages, undercutting the fragile stability that has prevailed in the region for decades. The withering of U.S. global leadership would also have profoundly negative consequences in the Middle East, where U.S. forces and U.S.-led coalitions are needed to deal with terrorist threats.

The United States’ economy might also suffer. Should a breakdown of deterrence trigger a general war with Russia or China, the economic costs would be staggering. Just a few Houthi fighters in Yemen have been able to disrupt global shipping through their attacks in the Red Sea. Imagine the consequences of a war among major powers. Moreover, trade ties often follow security ties. Last year, two-way transatlantic trade in goods topped $1.2 trillion. The United States has about $4 trillion invested in European industry. Some five million Americans work in European-owned industries. The United States has a huge economic stake in maintaining a peaceful Europe.

The United States has been here before. Prior to both world wars, Washington sought neutrality. Neither effort at isolationism worked and only prevented the United States from being able to help deter the aggressors in those wars. Eventually, the United States was pulled into both conflicts. After World War II, having learned the dangers of isolationism, the United States remained engaged and paved the way for the founding of NATO and 75 years of relative peace in Europe. The United States must not forget the painful lessons of the last century. To do so would risk undercutting U.S. global leadership, undermining the Washington-built international order, and making the world safer for authoritarian rule.

• HANS BINNENDIJK is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was Senior Director for Defense Policy at the National Security Council, Vice President of the National Defense University, and Legislative Director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
• R. D. HOOKER, JR., is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was Dean of the NATO Defense College and Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council.
• ALEXANDER VERSHBOW is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a Senior Adviser at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. He was U.S. Ambassador to NATO and Russia, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and NATO Deputy Secretary-General.

Foreign Affairs · by Hans Binnendijk, R.D. Hooker Jr., and Alexander Vershbow · May 13, 2024

21. America, China, and the Trap of Fatalism

I wondered if we can get any retired US military colonels published in a major Chinese foreign affairs publication (without being censored)

ZHOU BO is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a Senior Colonel (retired) in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

​Excerpts:

The narrowing power gap between China and the United States may intensify their competition, but it also means they have more reason to confront shared challenges. For example, in the Middle East, Beijing and Washington now have a similar stance on two major issues: finding a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. As the Israeli war in Gaza continues, the two-state solution may look like a fanciful dream. But the war has led more people to realize that the status quo is unsustainable. No war will last forever. Beijing and Washington should work together in making the two-state solution the paramount principle guiding any future road maps that sketch the way to peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.

Beijing and Washington must also work together to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. On this issue, China has a major role to play: it enjoys Iran’s trust. China has given Iran an economic lifeline in the face of U.S. sanctions by buying the country’s oil. Beijing should make it clear to Tehran that although it is entitled to develop nuclear power for peaceful uses, it must not develop nuclear weapons. Doing so would very likely spur a preemptive strike by Israel or even a joint strike by Israel and the United States. Going nuclear will also surely invite severe UN sanctions on Iran—and China, despite being Iran’s largest trading partner, would have to abide by them.

As great powers, China and the United States may never become great friends. But they can resist becoming enemies. Level heads and cautious optimism will help maintain the stability of the world’s most important relationship. Fatalism and recklessness will only drive the countries toward a conflict that neither wants.

America, China, and the Trap of Fatalism

How to Manage the World’s Most Important Relationship

By Zhou Bo

May 13, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Zhou Bo · May 13, 2024

According to the National Security Strategy that the Biden administration issued in 2022, the United States faces a “decisive decade” in its rivalry with China. Chinese officials have come to believe the same thing. As Washington has grown ever more voluble in its desire to compete with Beijing, the Chinese government has turned from surprise to protest to an avowed determination to fight back. In Beijing’s view, the United States fears losing its primacy and forces this struggle on China. In turn, China has no choice but must “dare to fight,” as the report of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party insisted.

Such intensifying confrontation is lamentable but not inevitable. Beltway analysts have greatly exaggerated China’s supposed threat to Western democratic systems and international order. In recent years, U.S. leaders have cast China as a revisionist power and invoked the specter of a global clash between democracy and autocracy. But democracy’s troubles in the twenty-first century have little to do with China. According toa 2023 report from Freedom House, liberaldemocracy around the world has been in steady decline for17years. That is not China’s doing. China has not promoted its socialist values abroad. It has not been directly involved in any war since 1979. Despite its partnership with Russia, it has not supplied lethal aid to the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Indeed, far from being a revisionist power seeking to upend the world, China upholds the status quo. It has joined almost all the international regimes and institutions established by the U.S.-led West after World War II. As the world’s top trader and the largest beneficiary of globalization, China is deeply embedded in the existing international order and wishes to safeguard that system. Despite disagreements, tensions, and even disputes, China maintains robust ties with the West; neither side could countenance the kind of severing of relations that has occurred between the West and Russia since the invasion of Ukraine.

China has advanced new institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the multilateral BRICS grouping, and the Belt and Road Initiative to build global infrastructure, all of which could change the international political and economic landscape. But these shifts would serve to reform, rather than replace, the international order, making it more equitable and elevating the interests of many less prosperous countries.

And yet if one listens to the policymaking establishments in the West, one can hear the sound of lines being drawn. A refrain one hears often today suggests that the world has entered a new cold war. It is still too early to judge whether the rivalry between China and the United States really resembles the one between the Soviet Union and the United States—and, indeed, if it will continue to remain cold. But the analogy fails to capture a critical distinction: unlike the Cold War, this rivalry is between two individual titans rather than two confrontational camps. Washington cannot rally an implacably anti-China alliance, just as Beijing cannot lead a bloc that is uniformly hostile to the United States. Most U.S. allies have China as their largest trading partner. Like all other countries in an increasingly multipolar world, they will pick and choose positions on specific issues, not blindly take the United States’ side. Washington has enjoyed modest success in rallying allies and partners in arrangements meant to contain China, such as the Indo-Pacific security partnership known as the Quad and the military partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States known as AUKUS. But these groupings do not amount to much: they look like a few tiny islands in a vast ocean. In many parts of the world, especially in Africa, the United States has already lost to China, which helps local economies without delivering moralizing bromides about governance and values.

But those ties do not represent the formation of an anti-Western, pro-Chinese camp. Relations between China and the United States cannot simply be defined by “extreme competition,” as U.S. President Joe Biden once declared. Instead, they combine competition and cooperation in an ever-shifting balance. At a time when Washington is focused on competition with Beijing, it is useless for Beijing to insist on cooperation when such calls fall on deaf ears. What both sides can agree on is a fundamental redline—not letting their competition slide into outright confrontation. To that end, China and the United States must remain willing to talk to help avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations—and to reassure an anxious world.

TRUST BUT TALK

Unfortunately, Beijing and Washington have talked to each other much less in recent years than the two superpowers did during the latter half of the Cold War. Back then, both sides remained committed to dialogue even if they were wary of each other. When U.S. President Ronald Reagan used a famous Russian proverb—“trust but verify”—after signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, he was politely suggesting that he did not, in fact, trust the Soviets, but that that would not stop him from entering into negotiations and agreements with them. The same logic still applies: trust is not necessarily a precondition for dialogue or interaction. In the absence of trust, the Soviet Union and the United States still managed to cooperate in a number of areas, including arms control, the eradication of smallpox, and the joint exploration of space for peaceful purposes.

If “trust but verify” characterized the later years of the Cold War, a modified version of the proverb is the right paradigm for China and the United States today: “trust but talk.” The relative bonhomie of the Obama administration, when the countries held wide-ranging talks on bilateral, regional, and global issues, is unlikely to return any time soon. The hard-line policies of the Trump administration, the COVID-19 pandemic, and U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 put a definitive end to that era. Biden has retained many of Trump’s positions on China, and a bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington that the United States must get tougher on its closest geopolitical peer.

Talks, however, have now haltingly resumed, notably including the military-to-military communications that were severed after Pelosi’s Taiwan visit. They have included phone calls between high-level officials, the U.S.-Chinese Defense Policy Coordination Talks between defense officials, discussions around the U.S.-Chinese Military Maritime Consultative Agreement about maritime and aviation disputes, and a new channel of communication between Chinese and American theater commanders. Such talks represent a good start, but they are only a start. Senior military officers should visit with one another more regularly, both sides should use the hotline that was established in 2008 for crisis management more often, and they should encourage direct communications between pilots and sailors to help avoid dangerous close encounters in the air and at sea.

ACCIDENTS AND GUARDRAILS

Few in Beijing and Washington disagree about the need to establish guardrails or confidence-building measures to make conflict less likely. One area that produces considerable friction and tension are the waters and airspace in the South China Sea, where China’s territorial claims are seldom respected. U.S. aircraft regularly conduct close surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s exclusive economic zones. U.S. naval vessels sail through waters off the islands and rocks in the South China Sea over which China claims sovereignty. In the Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military, the United States documented over 180 instances of Chinese aircraft conducting “coercive and risky” intercepts of U.S. aircraft in the region between fall 2021 and fall 2023, a measure of growing tensions.

This dynamic will likely persist, as neither side is willing to back down. The Americans want to have technical discussions in the hope of making accidents and potential skirmishes less likely. The Chinese, for their part, find such conversations a bit odd. They are focused more broadly on their security, interpreting the U.S. Navy’s operations in China’s exclusive economic zones and maneuvers in the South China Sea as reckless provocations. Put another way, the Americans may want to ask Chinese ships that are monitoring U.S. ships to maintain a particular distance; the Chinese would respond by saying that the Americans would be safest if they weren’t there at all.

China in principle agrees to guardrails proposed by the United States, but Beijing fears that such guardrails are meant to freeze in place a status quo that favors Washington. Obviously, the overall military strength of the PLA lags behind that of the U.S. military. But in China’s vicinity, the gap between the PLA and the U.S. military is closing, as Chinese military capacities have grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades. The United States fears that China wants to drive it out of the western Pacific. As a result, Washington is investing more militarily in the region and calling on its allies and partners to gang up on China. This in turn irks Beijing and makes the situation more volatile.

Neither Beijing nor Washington wants an accident, let alone a confrontation. In 2020, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense convened the first Crisis Communication Working Group, meeting by video teleconference to discuss how to prevent a crisis. Such a working group represents a step in the right direction. Were an accident in the South China Sea to occur, it might spur nationalist outrage in both countries, but it is hard to believe that it would trigger a full-blown war. The deadly collision between a Chinese fighter and an American spy plane in 2001 didn’t prove to be the end of the world; the crisis produced by the fatal incident was resolved in 11 days. Skillful diplomacy prevailed and both sides saved face.

DIRE STRAIT

The only issue that could drag China and the United States into a full-blown conflict is the dispute over Taiwan. Currently, a dangerous cycle is unfolding. The United States fears a potential attack from the mainland and is speeding up arms sales and expanding training and personnel exchanges to boost Taiwan’s defense and turn the island into a “porcupine.” An angry but increasingly confident China has responded by sending more warplanes to routinely fly over the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which previously acted as a buffer between the sides.

Many Western observers suggest that Taiwan will be the next Ukraine. And yet U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2023 that a conflict with China was neither imminent nor inevitable. A war over Taiwan will not come to pass as long as Beijing believes peaceful reunification with the island is still possible. If it suspects that the prospect of peaceful reunification is exhausted forever, then its calculus will change. But there is no indication that Beijing has drawn such a conclusion even after Taiwan elected William Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the Taiwanese leader in January. (Lai has in the past described himself as a “political worker for Taiwanese independence.”) In a meeting with former Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou in April, Xi said it was imperative to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, adhering to the one-China principle, the notion that China and Taiwan remain formally one country.

Taiwan is the only issue that could drag China and America into a full-blown conflict.

China has never announced a timetable for reunification. As a proportion of GDP, China’s defense budget remains low—below two percent, as it has been for decades. That figure speaks volumes about China’s confidence and about Beijing’s assessment of its relationship with Washington. China is exercising restraint. Pelosi’s visit to the island triggered Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that involved firing live ammunition and missiles. But Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen met with Pelosi’s successor, Kevin McCarthy, in California in April 2023, and China’s subsequent exercises were much more subdued.

Beijing is also trying its best to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, around 1.5 million Taiwanese worked and lived on the mainland—a figure that equals around six percent of the Taiwanese population. It seems that they did not mind living in a totally different political system so long as it provided them with better economic opportunities than they had in Taiwan. In September 2023, China unveiled a plan in which Beijing would make it easier for Taiwanese people to live and work in Fujian Province (across the strait from the island), including by allowing them to buy property, promising equal treatment for Taiwanese students enrolled in public schools, and linking the Chinese port city of Xiamen with the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, which are just a few miles apart, via a bridge and gas and electricity connections.

Taiwan’s status remains a very sensitive issue for Beijing, something that Washington should never take lightly. For peace to prevail in the Taiwan Strait, the United States should reassure China that it has no intention of straying from its professed commitment to the “one China” policy. U.S. leaders have refused to enter into direct conflict with Russia over Ukraine despite the gravity of the Russian transgression. Equally, they should consider war with China a redline that cannot be crossed.

NOT FRIENDS, BUT NOT ENEMIES

Beyond these areas of friction, there remains plenty of room for collaboration. Three areas are particularly noteworthy: cyber, outer space, and artificial intelligence. As the strongest countries on earth, China and the United States should take the lead in crafting rules and regulations in these domains. In cyberwarfare, countries should refrain from striking critical information networks, such as military command-and-control systems. Beijing and Washington should exchange a list of sensitive targets that should be considered out of bounds and should not be attacked in any circumstance. To avoid an arms race in outer space, they should agree to negotiate a binding treaty that would commit countries to not placing weapons in outer space and encourage deliberations on rules and responsible behavior. At their meeting in California in November 2023, Biden and Xi agreed to establish an intergovernmental dialogue on AI. Even if it is not possible to prevent AI from being used for military purposes, China and the United States should at least lead in reducing risks related to AI-enabled military systems. In this regard, nothing is more important than ensuring absolute human control over nuclear command-and-control systems.

Another important area for cooperation, much as it was during the Cold War, is in limiting the risks posed by nuclear weapons. But discussions about nuclear disarmament between China and the United States won’t happen in the foreseeable future. China’s nuclear inferiority to the United States makes Beijing reluctant to join bilateral or multilateral talks on nuclear disarmament. Currently, there are no high-level talks in the nuclear field planned between the two sides.

But China and the United States have cooperated in this field in the past. After India and Pakistan successfully tested nuclear bombs in 1998, China and the United States jointly condemned the tests and reached an agreement on “non-targeting” of nuclear weapons; that is, they pledged not to target nuclear weapons at each other. In 2000, the five major nuclear powers (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) all agreed to do so. The logical next step would be to issue mutual “no first use” pledges, promising never to initiate a nuclear attack. China already maintains such a policy, but the United States does not, although the current policy, as described by the Biden administration, comes awfully close: the United States will only “consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” Committing to no first use does not exclude nuclear retaliation, so it would not neutralize the deterrent power of nuclear weapons.

Both sides can agree on a fundamental redline—not letting their competition slide into outright confrontation.

The narrowing power gap between China and the United States may intensify their competition, but it also means they have more reason to confront shared challenges. For example, in the Middle East, Beijing and Washington now have a similar stance on two major issues: finding a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. As the Israeli war in Gaza continues, the two-state solution may look like a fanciful dream. But the war has led more people to realize that the status quo is unsustainable. No war will last forever. Beijing and Washington should work together in making the two-state solution the paramount principle guiding any future road maps that sketch the way to peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.

Beijing and Washington must also work together to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. On this issue, China has a major role to play: it enjoys Iran’s trust. China has given Iran an economic lifeline in the face of U.S. sanctions by buying the country’s oil. Beijing should make it clear to Tehran that although it is entitled to develop nuclear power for peaceful uses, it must not develop nuclear weapons. Doing so would very likely spur a preemptive strike by Israel or even a joint strike by Israel and the United States. Going nuclear will also surely invite severe UN sanctions on Iran—and China, despite being Iran’s largest trading partner, would have to abide by them.

As great powers, China and the United States may never become great friends. But they can resist becoming enemies. Level heads and cautious optimism will help maintain the stability of the world’s most important relationship. Fatalism and recklessness will only drive the countries toward a conflict that neither wants.

• ZHOU BO is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a Senior Colonel (retired) in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Foreign Affairs · by Zhou Bo · May 13, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com