Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"It is astonishing what force, purity and wisdom it requires for a human being to keep clear of falsehoods."

– Margaret Fuller

"It was a critical task of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), to make sure that where level-headedness and tenacity were lacking (among resistance forces), these characteristics were made available by first rate organizers, so these forces could be brought into combat."

– M.R. Foot, The SOE 1940-1946

"The urge to save humanity is almost always a false front for the urge to rule."

– H.L. Mencken

1. Special Forces Within Great Power Competition | SOF News

2. Jamie Dimon, who said the $34 trillion national debt was pushing U.S. off a 'cliff,' insists it’s ’vital’ to boost military spending

3. The Black Market That Delivers Elon Musk’s Starlinks to U.S. Foes

4. German troops arrive in Lithuania, their first long-term foreign deployment since World War II

5. Military pharmacies resume regular operations after cyberattack

6. China Plays Tense Game of ‘Russian Roulette’ With U.S. Ally

7. The State of the Army 2024

8. The U.S. Army To Conduct Combat Training in the Philippines

9. America’s Next Soldiers Will Be Machines

10. Why America Needs AUKUS

11. The last surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the Korean War has died

12. Does Biden Take China’s Threat Seriously? By Walter Russell Mead

13. Opinion | Ahead of state visit, an ‘epic’ shift in Japan’s defense posture

14. Opinion | Thank China for our new three-way Pacific alliance

15. Three surprises in the US military’s wish lists

16. Army's Premier Education Benefits May Be on Chopping Block, with Tuition Assistance Cuts Being Considered, Too

17. Status of the War in Ukraine: Observations from my latest visit, Part 1 by Mick Ryan

18. Strategic Influence & the War in Ukraine: Observations from my latest visit, Part 2 by Mick Ryan

19. Putin and Xi’s Unholy Alliance

20. U.S., Japan to announce military cooperation, joint NASA lunar mission

21. The fallacy of the ‘West versus the rest’ worldview

1. Special Forces Within Great Power Competition | SOF News

As an aside, rarely do we see the Philippines mentioned in this context.

Excerpts:

A final notable aspect of special operations forces, particularly the Green Berets, is their ability to deeply intermesh or meld with the population within their area of operations. Often these soldiers are assigned to one regionally designated Special Forces group (currently there are seven such groups). Their time spent mastering one region allows them “…to develop expertise in the culture, language, traditions, geography, infrastructure, politics and environmental conditions of a particular area” (Bohle, 1997, p. 6).

Their depth of regional and local knowledge will provide for a valuable and continual flow of intelligence from a potentially contested region regarding the disposition of the local population and its societal conditions. This finely detailed intelligence (the likes of which cannot be gleaned from a satellite) can then be utilized by policymakers or combatant commanders to develop regionally sensitive and appropriate policy, thus furthering the defense and possible humanitarian goals and planning for said region.

The personnel of U.S. Special Operations Command are highly trained, intelligent and capable individuals, with the ability to have outsized effects upon their area of operations when compared to the size of their deployed unit. While great attention was placed on SOF during the Global War on Terror, renewed focus will be placed on their valuable ability to assist partners on a global scale. This assistance will provide for the primary function of maintaining and furthering of American influence to the ire of Russia and China, who seek to weaken and displace the U.S. and further their own brand of authoritarian governance. It is thus incumbent upon U.S. policymakers and military planners to maintain appropriate budget levels for the special operations community as their role overseas is just as important now (possibly more) as it was in the last 20 plus years.

Special Forces Within Great Power Competition | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · April 8, 2024

By Christian P. Martin.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) saw the U.S. military engaged in combat operations the likes of which had not been witnessed since the Vietnam War. American military personnel serving during the GWOT were deployed around the globe to seek out and destroy the terror networks (and complicit governments) that were responsible for the September 11 attacks. While conventional forces such as Army and Marine Corps infantry or armored units were a common sight on American news channels, special operations forces (SOF) were conducting surgical strikes with astounding regularity and effectiveness. However, the rise of China and Russia and their designation as near-peer competitors, would signal a return to Great Power Competition. This move will greatly shift the way in which special operations forces are utilized, from a direct-action focus to agents and custodians of American influence.

In the years following the attacks on September 11, specifically in 2003, there were “… approximately 20,000 SOF operators, representing almost half of the entire special operations force of 47,000, involved in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Horn, 2020, p. 6). Fast forward three years to 2006, and Joint Special Operations Command was conducting 300 missions per month in Iraq alone (Horn, 2020, p. 6). In the first three months of 2011, Allied special operations forces conducted 1,600 missions and captured or killed approximately 3,000 insurgents (Horn, 2020, p. 7). U.S. Special Operations Command was the vanguard of the 20-year War on Terror; its personnel, skillsets and specifically their ability to carry out lethal and destructive direct-action strikes were always in high demand.

Yet, with an eye toward a challenging future, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) made clear that the “…primacy of counterterrorism, which dominated US foreign policy for years after 9/11 is a thing of the past. Competition with authoritarian great powers—Russia and particularly China—is the order of the day” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 1). The 2018 NDS set the massive gears of the American defense establishment in motion and charted a course toward a familiar, yet hazy, past; that of competition short of all-out, high-intensity warfare, reminiscent of the Cold War days with Soviet Russia.

In line with the aforementioned NDS, by 2021 the U.S. military had completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, thus officially closing the door on its singularly focused global counterterror effort, heralding the ascent of Great Power Competition. With U.S. policymakers and the defense establishment now laser focused on competing with rival states, where does this leave U.S. special operations forces?

At first glance, one may be led to believe that Great Power Competition will solely be within the realm of the conventional armed forces. That conclusion would be incorrect. The conventional military forces of all sides will or should act as buffers against high-intensity warfare, due to the immense toll, in both human and economic terms, that would result from a conventional war. The Gray Zone between the conventional formations of the competing states is precisely where special operations forces will maneuver and be most active and impactful.

Short of a conventional war, a primary and crucial role for special operators will be advancing, consolidating and securing influence with partner or prospective partner states. The acquisition of influence then raises barriers to entry of America’s rivals, denying them the space to operate both diplomatically and militarily. To this point, former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers aptly stated, “…Great power direct conflict shouldn’t dominate the force. I want as much influence around the world as I can; the main competition is where SOF lives” (Ball, 2020, p. 7).

Special operations forces are ideally suited for influence operations as they are rapidly deployable, and they have the capability to gain entry into denied or difficult-to-access geographic locations while maintaining a low profile. Once in place, SOF operators can readily assist partner states or prospective partners who may be vulnerable to foreign-sponsored insurgent threats, coercion or overt, external military threats. Critical mission areas of these deployed operators are, but not limited to: Counterterrorism, Security Force Assistance, Foreign Internal Defense, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Military Information Support Activities (Ball, 2020, p. 7).

A prime example of U.S. special operations forces activity would be the enduring relationship with the Philippines, and the U.S. support via Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance. In this situation, U.S. special forces personnel were the architects, not only of the design, but also the execution of the Philippine counterterror effort (Robinson, 2016, p. 152). During this campaign, U.S. SOF operators assisted their Filipino counterparts in their battle with Abu Sayyaf (affiliated with the Islamic State); the Islamic militant terror group operating in the Southern Philippine islands. This effort:

“…laid the groundwork for Philippine security forces to adopt an approach that minimized civilian harm as they pursued terrorist elements . . . the U.S. ethos was transferred to Philippine forces during close partnering efforts. This process has professionalized the Philippine security forces since 2001 and has enabled continued close relations between the two nations’ militaries despite growing Chinese efforts to drive a wedge”.

(Robinson et al, 2023, p. 33)

The result of over two decades of U.S. special operations personnel working side by side with their Philippine counterparts is an enduring relationship and influence among career Philippine military personal. As these men and women have climbed to command positions within their respective military branches, this influence then aids with the retention of the U.S. as their central training partner and guide for developing military doctrine. Additional benefits would be the continued privilege of the U.S. military to operate out of Philippine military bases and retention of the U.S. as their preferred arms supplier.

This all works together to deny China its desire to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of Philippine sovereignty. Similarly, this provides confidence to other southeast Asian nations in their attempts to stand firm against the intimidation tactics of the Communist Party of China and its baseless territorial claims. In the end, the example of the Philippines is a microcosm of the global effort carried out by U.S. special operations personnel now and in the future.

A final notable aspect of special operations forces, particularly the Green Berets, is their ability to deeply intermesh or meld with the population within their area of operations. Often these soldiers are assigned to one regionally designated Special Forces group (currently there are seven such groups). Their time spent mastering one region allows them “…to develop expertise in the culture, language, traditions, geography, infrastructure, politics and environmental conditions of a particular area” (Bohle, 1997, p. 6).

Their depth of regional and local knowledge will provide for a valuable and continual flow of intelligence from a potentially contested region regarding the disposition of the local population and its societal conditions. This finely detailed intelligence (the likes of which cannot be gleaned from a satellite) can then be utilized by policymakers or combatant commanders to develop regionally sensitive and appropriate policy, thus furthering the defense and possible humanitarian goals and planning for said region.

The personnel of U.S. Special Operations Command are highly trained, intelligent and capable individuals, with the ability to have outsized effects upon their area of operations when compared to the size of their deployed unit. While great attention was placed on SOF during the Global War on Terror, renewed focus will be placed on their valuable ability to assist partners on a global scale. This assistance will provide for the primary function of maintaining and furthering of American influence to the ire of Russia and China, who seek to weaken and displace the U.S. and further their own brand of authoritarian governance. It is thus incumbent upon U.S. policymakers and military planners to maintain appropriate budget levels for the special operations community as their role overseas is just as important now (possibly more) as it was in the last 20 plus years.

**********

Author: Christian P. Martin is a defense and security researcher and writer, he spent seven years in Saigon, Vietnam as an English teacher. During that time, he earned a Master’s degree in Defense & Strategic Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso. Currently he lives in Michigan with his family. His professional areas of interest are land and naval warfare (both conventional and unconventional), with a focus on the developing world and an emergent China.

Image: Derived from CIA maps.

References:

Ball, T. (2020). Still the One: Great Power Competition and Special Operations Forces. Foreign Policy Research Institute: National Security Program.

https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/still-the-one-report-.pdf

Bohle, C. (1997). Army Special Forces: A Good Fit for Peace Operations. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA326503.pdf

Brands, H., & Nichols, T. (2020). Special Operations Forces and Great-Power Competition in the 21st Century. American Enterprise Institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25369

Horn, B. (2020). “The End of ‘The Golden Age Of SOF’? Is There a Role for Special Operations Forces in the Renewed ‘Great Power Competition?’” Journal of Future Conflict, (2), 1-33. https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/psycwww/files/uploaded_files/Graduate/ OnlineJournal/Issue_2-Horn.pdf

Robinson E, Heath, T.R., Tarini, G., Egel, D., Moesner IV, Curriden, C., Grossman, D. & Lilly S. (2023). Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces: A Concept for Proactive Campaigning Short of Traditional War.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1700/RRA1794- 1/RAND_RRA1794-1.pdf

Robinson, L. (2016). “The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defense Strategy.” PRISM, 6(3), 150–167. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26470470

sof.news · by Guest · April 8, 2024

2.Jamie Dimon, who said the $34 trillion national debt was pushing U.S. off a 'cliff,' insists it’s ’vital’ to boost military spending

When was the last time we raised taxes or issued war bonds to pay for a war? Korea I think. Perhaps Vietnam but I think it was Korea.

I think Congress should update the War Powers act and pass a law that requires the president to submit a plan to pay for any war or conflict when he notifies COngress and seeks authorization for the use of military force (or a declaration of war) from congress. He must either call for raising taxes or issue war bonds for the express purpose of funding the war. And as long as we have troops in harm's way there should be no tax cuts.

Excerpts:

Between 2001 and 2022, the U.S has paid over $1 trillion in interest on wars, according to the Brown report.

The shift in military funding started during former President George Bush’s presidency, when he slashed federal taxes just as the country invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001, according to Just Security, an online forum that analyzes security and foreign policy. Barack Obama made most of those cuts permanent while overseeing expanded U.S. military activity in Syria, and Donald Trump implemented another round of massive tax cuts in 2017 as the U.S. was doubling down on its war in Afghanistan, dropping its most powerful non-nuclear bomb in the country’s Nangarhar Province. Federal taxes dropped from about 19% of gross domestic product in 2001 to about 16% by the start of 2020.

Usually, Just Security writes, wars are funded through higher taxes and war bonds after an initial “emergency” funding period of one to two years. Yet for the entire decade between 2001 and 2011, conflicts in the Middle East were paid for from emergency budgets, which are devoid of “serious legislative or executive oversight.”

Jamie Dimon, who said the $34 trillion national debt was pushing U.S. off a 'cliff,' insists it’s ’vital’ to boost military spending

BY SUNNY NAGPAUL

April 8, 2024 at 5:34 PM EDT

Fortune

Every time he sees the American flag, he wrote to shareholders, “it reminds me of the values and virtues of this country and its founding principles conceived in liberty.” The particular values he’s emphasizing: more military spending to ensure America’s world leadership, diversity, equality and inclusion initiatives, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, more growth for banks.

After securing the helm of JPMorgan Chase as CEO 20 years ago, Dimon has been adding “national thought leader” to the list of roles he dabbles in as a financial boss. He’s had private talks on the economy with former presidential candidate Nikki Haley, although whether he actually has politician dreams is yet to be known.

In his letter, Dimon took a stance on America’s position as a global leader right off the bat. “The terrible ongoing war and violence in the Middle East and Ukraine,” and “growing geopolitical tensions, importantly in China,” he wrote, are challenging America’s global leadership role, which he said is further undermined by the U.S.’ political polarization.

While he notes the country’s economy continues to be resilient, marked by consumers still spending, the economy is being fueled by large amounts of “government deficit spending and past stimulus.” But as unwelcome as that spending is, he wrote, it will need to increase as global supply chains are restructured (as seen in the drop in oil production after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) and as the country transitions to a greener economy.

Despite his earlier criticism of government spending—he has called the debt a “cliff” and warned of a stock-market “rebellion” over government debt, Dimon identifies one key area he says needs a boost—military expenditures. The ongoing wars have “the potential to disrupt energy and food markets, migration, and military and economic relationships, in addition to their dreadful human cost,” he writes.

The fallout from these wars, he writes, “should also lay to rest the idea that America can stand alone,” adding that “global peace and order are vital to American interests.” To that effect, Dimon says America needs to lead with one of its biggest strengths: military spending.

And that spending is copious. This year, the U.S approved about $883 billion in funding for national defense, according to a Senate Armed Services Committee report, up from about $816 billion in the 2023 budget.

The U.S. is the world’s largest military spender, representing about 39% of the world’s military spending despite having just 4% of its population. It spent more on national defense than the next nine countries combined, most of which, including the U.K, Germany and France, are politically aligned with the U.S.

But the Pentagon’s budget only accounts for about one-third of the U.S.’ total war-related spending, according to a Brown University report on the costs of war. Between 2001 and 2022, U.S.-funded combat in post-9/11 war zones in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Ukraine has accumulated $2.3 trillion in costs when considering additional Homeland Security spending, interest on debt, and veterans’ health care. And to Dimon’s earlier point, the current wars have been paid for “almost entirely with borrowed money, on which interest has to be paid,” while in the past, wars were paid for by raising taxes and selling war bonds.

Between 2001 and 2022, the U.S has paid over $1 trillion in interest on wars, according to the Brown report.

The shift in military funding started during former President George Bush’s presidency, when he slashed federal taxes just as the country invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001, according to Just Security, an online forum that analyzes security and foreign policy. Barack Obama made most of those cuts permanent while overseeing expanded U.S. military activity in Syria, and Donald Trump implemented another round of massive tax cuts in 2017 as the U.S. was doubling down on its war in Afghanistan, dropping its most powerful non-nuclear bomb in the country’s Nangarhar Province. Federal taxes dropped from about 19% of gross domestic product in 2001 to about 16% by the start of 2020.

Usually, Just Security writes, wars are funded through higher taxes and war bonds after an initial “emergency” funding period of one to two years. Yet for the entire decade between 2001 and 2011, conflicts in the Middle East were paid for from emergency budgets, which are devoid of “serious legislative or executive oversight.”

Progressive politicians have long called for less military spending, urging lawmakers to reallocate some military funds to other industries that need support, like healthcare and education. And lately, they’ve been meeting a rare point of agreement with some Republicans, who were outraged over a $1.7 trillion funding bill for aid to Ukraine that Biden passed in December 2022, the Guardian reported.

Debt aside, America’s military spending does, however, help the country secure its spot as a world leader. The country’s hundreds of overseas military bases, combined with the world’s largest economy and leadership positions in various international institutions like the United Nations, makes it an “undeniable global power,” according to a report from the Council on Foreign Relations.

The downsides to high military spending include concerns that such spending is economically unsustainable, wasteful and is wreaking environmental havoc—militaries are responsible for about 5.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions, according to a Conflict and Environment Observatory report. Beyond that, the military bases allow the U.S. to hold military presences in countries, including Cuba, the Philippines, Spain, Germany, and South Korea—many of which, especially in Europe, have negative perceptions about that presence, according to a federal government study.

China is the world’s second largest military spender, allocating $293 billion for its national defense in 2022, up 4.7% from the year before–but it’s still just a fraction of the U.S budget.

In his letter, Dimon also offers his takes on other big issues in the country, including doubling down on DEI initiatives. He highlighted his company’s Advancing Black Pathways program, stating its focus on “strengthening the economic foundation of Black communities because we know that opportunity is not always created equally.”

This comes as far-right politicians continue churning out initiatives aimed at dismantling diversity programs. At least 65 bills that limit DEI programs in higher education were introduced in 25 states in 2023, and eight of them became law. The passed bills include limitations like censoring classroom instructions on racism and sexism, banning books about people of color and those who are queer, and closing DEI offices in universities.

In a world becoming increasingly more complex with these issues, Dimon reiterated that there is growing interconnectedness between foreign economic policy, national security and investment. The U.S. needs “to lead with its strengths–not only its military but also its economic, diplomatic and moral forces,” he wrote. “There is nothing more important.”

Fortune

3. The Black Market That Delivers Elon Musk’s Starlinks to U.S. Foes

Excerpts:

The Journal investigation found that a shadowy supply chain exists for Starlink hardware that has fed backroom deals in Africa, Southeast Asia and the United Arab Emirates, putting thousands of the white pizza-box-sized devices into the hands of some American adversaries and accused war criminals. Many of those end users connect to the satellites using Starlink’s roam feature after the dealers register the hardware in countries where Starlink is allowed.

In Russia, middlemen buy the hardware, sometimes on eBay, in the U.S. and elsewhere, including on the black market in Central Asia, Dubai or Southeast Asia, then smuggle it into Russia. Russian volunteers boast openly on social media about supplying the terminals to troops. They are part of an informal effort to boost Russia’s use of Starlink in Ukraine, where Russian forces are advancing.

The Kremlin didn’t respond to a request for comment.

The Black Market That Delivers Elon Musk’s Starlinks to U.S. Foes

The satellite-internet devices are helping Russian fighters in Ukraine and paramilitary forces in Sudan; SpaceX hasn’t shut them off

https://www.wsj.com/business/telecom/starlink-musk-ukraine-russia-sudan-satellite-communications-technology-f4fc79d9?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Thomas GroveFollow

, Nicholas BariyoFollow

, Micah MaidenbergFollow

, Emma ScottFollow

and Ian LovettFollow

April 9, 2024 12:01 am ET

A salesman at Moscow-based online retailer shopozz.ru has supplemented his usual business of peddling vacuum cleaners and dashboard phone mounts by selling dozens of Starlink internet terminals that wound up with Russians on the front lines in Ukraine.

Although Russia has banned the use of Starlink, the satellite-internet service developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, middlemen have proliferated in recent months to buy the user terminals and ship them to Russian forces. That has eroded a battlefield advantage once enjoyed by Ukrainian forces, which also rely on the cutting-edge devices.

The Moscow salesman, who in an interview identified himself only as Oleg, said that most of his orders came from “the new territories”—a reference to Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine—or were “for use by the military.” He said volunteers delivered the equipment to Russian soldiers in Ukraine.

On battlefields from Ukraine to Sudan, Starlink provides immediate and largely secure access to the internet. Besides solving the age-old problem of effective communications between troops and their commanders, Starlink provides a way to control drones and other advanced technologies that have become a critical part of modern warfare.

The proliferation of the easy-to-activate hardware has thrust SpaceX into the messy geopolitics of war. The company has the ability to limit Starlink access by “geofencing,” making the service unavailable in specific countries and locations, as well as through the power to deactivate individual devices.

Russia and China don’t allow the use of Starlink technology because it could undermine state control of information, and due to general suspicions of U.S. technology. Musk has said on X that to the best of his knowledge, no terminals had been sold directly or indirectly to Russia, and that the terminals wouldn’t work inside Russia.

The Wall Street Journal tracked Starlink sales on numerous Russian online retail platforms, including some that link to U.S. sellers on

eBay. It also interviewed Russian and Sudanese middlemen and resellers, and followed Russian volunteer groups that deliver SpaceX hardware to the front line.

The Journal investigation found that a shadowy supply chain exists for Starlink hardware that has fed backroom deals in Africa, Southeast Asia and the United Arab Emirates, putting thousands of the white pizza-box-sized devices into the hands of some American adversaries and accused war criminals. Many of those end users connect to the satellites using Starlink’s roam feature after the dealers register the hardware in countries where Starlink is allowed.

In Russia, middlemen buy the hardware, sometimes on eBay, in the U.S. and elsewhere, including on the black market in Central Asia, Dubai or Southeast Asia, then smuggle it into Russia. Russian volunteers boast openly on social media about supplying the terminals to troops. They are part of an informal effort to boost Russia’s use of Starlink in Ukraine, where Russian forces are advancing.

The Kremlin didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Ukrainian soldiers retrieved Starlink hardware from a building damaged by a Russian missile strike in Kramatorsk in 2022. PHOTO: SHANNON STAPLETON/REUTERS

Ukrainian officials said they contacted SpaceX about Russian forces using Starlink terminals in Ukraine and that they are working together on a solution. Ukraine’s telecoms regulator in March published a decree mandating that only Starlink terminals registered with authorities in Kyiv would work in occupied areas or around the front line. It isn’t clear when those new rules will take effect or how they will be enforced.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb said Friday that SpaceX is working together with Ukraine to try to end the Russians’ use of the terminals on the front. “We’re working with Ukraine and we’re working with Starlink,” he said during a briefing.

Neither SpaceX nor Musk responded to requests for comment.

A user agreement posted on Starlink’s website says customers can’t resell Starlink access without authorization, and that violators of its rules could lose access to the service. Consumer accounts generally must be started by the user in his or her own name. Customers face limits on selling or transferring terminals they bought.

In Sudan, which has declared the technology illegal, the Rapid Support Forces, a powerful paramilitary group that grew out of the infamous Janjaweed militia of the early 2000s, uses Starlink for high-speed internet access. Government forces have been fighting for a year against the group, which the U.S. has accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

Sudanese military officials and unauthorized Starlink dealers said in interviews that Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF’s deputy commander, has overseen the purchase of hundreds of Starlink terminals from dealers in the United Arab Emirates. In September, the U.S. Treasury blacklisted Abdelrahim, citing serious human-rights violations by the RSF.

Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF’s deputy commander, in a posting in November on the paramilitary group’s X account.

The terminals have boosted the rebels’ command capabilities and helped them recruit more men for the war, according to the officials, including over the past two months, when much of the country has been without internet or other telecommunications.

Sudanese authorities have contacted SpaceX and requested help in regulating the use of Starlink, including by allowing the military to turn off service areas where it was helping the RSF. Starlink never responded to the request, Sudanese officials said.

‘How am I in this war?’

SpaceX developed Starlink as a civilian technology, and Musk has sketched out big ambitions for the service. There are almost 5,700 operational Starlink satellites now orbiting Earth, and it has 2.7 million customers and a new production facility in Texas. Revenue was $1.4 billion in 2022, up from $222 million the year before.

Like other space communications systems, Starlink relies on satellites in orbit, infrastructure called ground stations and terminals to give users high-speed internet connections.

The hardware is simple enough that Starlink boasts on its website that users should be able to get online in minutes once they get a kit. The standard kit includes a flat, white antenna, a router and cables. Subscribers download an app to register and control their subscription before linking to the Starlink system.

Starlink said in its user agreement that the service isn’t designed or intended for use with military weapons. Last year, a top SpaceX executive said the company took steps to limit Ukraine from using Starlink for direct military purposes.

Musk has expressed discomfort at times about Starlink’s role in Ukraine’s war, telling his biographer, Walter Isaacson, that the service was designed for peaceful uses, not drone strikes. “How am I in this war?” Musk told Isaacson.

Elon Musk has expressed discomfort about Starlink’s role in the Ukraine war. PHOTO: SARAH SILBIGER/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Nonetheless, who can use Starlink and for what purposes hasn’t always been straightforward. The hardware has found its way into war-torn Yemen and has been smuggled into Iran, which hasn’t approved the technology.

Starlink has said that if SpaceX finds that one of its devices is being used by any sanctioned or unauthorized parties, the company investigates and could deactivate terminals.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Musk activated Starlink in the country. Ukraine’s supporters, including Poland and the U.S. Agency for International Development, bought thousands of Starlink terminals for the nation.

The terminals helped the outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainian soldiers beat back the Russians. Using the secure internet connection provided by Starlink, Ukrainian spotters using drones communicated Russian positions to artillery gunners.

Russian deficit

Moscow’s troops often lacked the necessary equipment for communicating with their commanders. Open radio transmissions sent over what were essentially walkie-talkies were jammed or picked up by Ukraine, making Russian soldiers easy targets on the battlefield.

Russia tried introducing new devices of its own, which had only entered production when the invasion began. But it had trouble rolling them out on the scale required, and there were continuing technical glitches. That kept the Russians from ever having a secure, compatible communication system for complex operations.

“As a result, they just started talking to each other less,” said Thomas Withington, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, an independent London-based security think tank. “What’s driving Starlink use is this need to have secure communications, from the tactical edge of operations to the headquarters, and to have a secure communications system which can be used to control drones,” he said.

Russia has worked for around a year to employ Starlink on the front, according to a person with knowledge of the situation. It began using the terminals widely early this year, after it figured out how to register the devices in other countries, that person said, without elaborating.

Searching for Starlink terminals on Russian search engine Yandex.ru yields numerous dealers like Oleg, who sell the hardware online to buyers in Moscow and outside the Russian capital.

One website, strlnk.ru, promised “tested performance” in the occupied areas of Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk and Kherson, with monthly fees starting at $100. The website provided contacts for a dealer, including a Russian cellphone number and a Yandex email. A representative of the firm declined to speak to a Journal reporter.

Many of the dealers in Russia advertise the hardware openly. The website Oleg works for has embedded eBay listings by people from Ohio to New Jersey selling Starlink terminals.

An eBay spokesperson said the company “abides by the laws and regulations of the countries in which it operates and complies with relevant international laws and sanctions.” EBay didn’t address the U.S. listings embedded in the website of Oleg’s employer.

Volunteers often ferry the equipment to the front line.

An image of a Starlink device from a video posted on the official Telegram account of Yekaterina and Valentina Kornienko, who describe delivering supplies to Russian soldiers at the front.

Valentina Kornienko and her sister have gained a social media following on the messaging app Telegram by posting about personally delivering supplies to the front. They posted a video in February that they said shows them delivering five Starlink terminals to Russian soldiers fighting in eastern Ukraine. They said it was the first of 30 systems meant to help Moscow’s troops overpower Ukrainian forces.

“It’s something new and very much needed, it’s Starlink,” said Kornienko in the video. “We’ll try it out and the next delivery will be bigger.”

As the war drags on, it has been unclear at times exactly where Starlink can be used, and for what.

In September 2023, Musk said he declined a request to activate Starlink in Crimea, the Ukrainian Black Sea peninsula Russia annexed in 2014, alleging that Kyiv wanted to use the service in an attack on Russian naval vessels. In a post on X, Musk said doing so would have made SpaceX complicit in a major act of war and escalated the conflict.

Russian Starlink dealers advertise on their sites that Crimea is no longer geofenced, and neither are the Russian-occupied regions of eastern and southern Ukraine, where Moscow’s troops are using the systems in their fight to grab more Ukrainian territory.

A 27-year-old major in Ukraine’s 92nd brigade who uses the call sign Angel said in an interview that he first saw Russians using Starlink earlier this year, because they hadn’t thought to camouflage the white antenna, which measures about 2 feet high and a foot wide.

“They’re mostly using the newer models,” he said, noting that the Russian dishes are high-priority targets. “It means there are drone operators somewhere nearby.”

He said he hadn’t noticed any changes in Russian behavior or strategy since they started using Starlink.

Starlink satellite technology set up last year near the front in Ukraine, in the town of Bakhmut. PHOTO: LISI NIESNER/REUTERS

Workaround in Sudan

In Sudan, Starlink hasn’t been officially authorized for use. But the RSF has figured out a workaround that allows it to use the service.

Three Dubai-based dealers told the Journal that they have shipped hundreds of Starlink devices to Sudan since July. Before sending the devices to Chad or South Sudan, the dealers said, they activate them in Dubai and buy an Africa-wide roaming package, at a cost of around $65 a month. That, they said, allows users in Sudan to bypass the lack of local Starlink authorization in the country.

Starlink has said on its official account on X that it doesn’t ship terminals to Dubai and hasn’t authorized any third-party distributors to sell Starlink there.

The dealers said they have bought a smaller number of devices in Kenya, one of the few African countries that has authorized Starlink, and Uganda, which is in the final stages of authorizing their use.

A TikTok user who identifies himself as an RSF fighter poses with Starlink equipment. The Arabic text reads: ‘Life is contradictory: it takes you riding and brings you back to the group.’

Even before then, the RSF regularly knocked out local cellphone towers, power lines and other civilian communications infrastructure before major offenses, according to experts monitoring the conflict.

Sudanese military officials said a video shared by the RSF’s official account on X in March is an example of how the group is using Starlink to show its strength and attract new recruits. The video was taken in El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, which hasn’t had internet access other than Starlink since early February.

In the video, a prominent Arab leader in Darfur, Masar Abdelrahman Aseel, tells a group of uniformed RSF fighters—some of them toting machine guns, others wooden sticks—that he is dispatching an extra 100,000 fighters to help the militia win the war. Aseel says he can send as many as one million fighters to support the RSF.

The Sudanese officials and a researcher who has been monitoring the use of social media during the war said the clip was widely shared on X as well as through WhatsApp and Telegram groups associated with the RSF.

Two of the dealers interviewed by the Journal said that they were aware that they were supplying Starlink devices to the RSF. After they ship the kits to the capitals of Chad and South Sudan, they are taken across the border to Sudan through RSF-controlled smuggling networks, the two dealers said.

How Starlink devices make their way to Sudan

Starlink kits are produced in the U.S.

UNITED

STATES

7,800 MILES

U.A.E.

Private dealers in the United Arab Emirates ship the devices to the Chadian capital

2,300 MILES

CHAD

Kits are trucked to and then smuggled across the Chad-

Sudan border

1,200 MILES

SUDAN

Sources: Dealers and Sudanese military officials

The RSF and its local allies have sold some Starlink kits within Sudan, charging as much as $2,500 each—more than five times the official retail price, said Khattab Hamad, a Sudanese Information-technology expert who works as a researcher with the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, a digital-rights group. In some parts of Darfur, the RSF is imposing taxes on owners of the devices, to the tune of $500 a year, he said.

In many Sudanese cities, the RSF and civilians who have gotten their hands on Starlink devices have set up makeshift internet cafes, charging users between $2 and $3 an hour to connect smartphones or laptops, according to aid workers and local activists.

In January, the head of Sudan’s telecommunications regulator, Gen. Al-Sadiq Jamal Al-Din Al-Sadiq, wrote a letter to SpaceX’s Global Licensing and Activation office in the U.S., complaining about the proliferation of Starlink devices in Sudan.

The agency, according to two Sudanese officials familiar with the letter, asked SpaceX to establish a joint unit with the Sudanese government that would regulate the operations of Starlink in the country, including by allowing the military to turn off service areas where it was helping the RSF.

A posting on TikTok shows an RSF truck in Sudan equipped with a Starlink device.

The two officials said there was no response from SpaceX, prompting the regulator to order a crackdown on the importation of Starlink kits. On Jan. 31, the regulator issued a statement saying that the use of Starlink wasn’t permitted and was subject to unspecified penalties.

But the military is trying to obtain its own Starlink devices to help erode the RSF’s technological advantage.

Mohamed, the Sudanese intelligence adviser, said authorities are working to find ways to get the devices to the military. “We have to get a backup plan,” he said.

Till Daldrup, Michael R. Gordon and Nikita Nikolaienko contributed to this article.

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com, Nicholas Bariyo at nicholas.bariyo@wsj.com, Micah Maidenberg at micah.maidenberg@wsj.com, Emma Scott at emma.scott@wsj.com and Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

4. German troops arrive in Lithuania, their first long-term foreign deployment since World War II

Excerpts:

About two dozen soldiers arrived in Lithuania, laying the groundwork for a further 150 to join them later this year. The deployment is expected to be up to its full strength of 5,000 by the end of 2027.

“This is the first time that we have permanently stationed such a unit outside of Germany,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said in Berlin at a farewell ceremony for the preliminary command of Germany’s Lithuanian brigade, according to German news agency dpa. Pistorius called it “an important day for the German army.”

German troops arrive in Lithuania, their first long-term foreign deployment since World War II

BY LIUDAS DAPKUS

Updated 9:30 PM EDT, April 8, 2024

AP · April 8, 2024

World News

The German government sent a combat-ready and independently capable combat unit to be deployed in Lithuania on Monday. The brigade should be operational by 2027, German news agency dpa reported. A permanent presence of around 4,800 soldiers and around 200 civilian Bundeswehr — or German army — members, who can bring their families with them, is planned. (AP video shot by Fanny Brodersen/Production: Kerstin Sopke)

VILNIUS, Lithuania (AP) — Lithuanian leaders hailed a “historic event” as Germany on Monday began deploying troops in the Baltic country — a NATO member — marking the first time since World War II that German forces will be based outside the country on a long-term basis.

About two dozen soldiers arrived in Lithuania, laying the groundwork for a further 150 to join them later this year. The deployment is expected to be up to its full strength of 5,000 by the end of 2027.

“This is the first time that we have permanently stationed such a unit outside of Germany,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said in Berlin at a farewell ceremony for the preliminary command of Germany’s Lithuanian brigade, according to German news agency dpa. Pistorius called it “an important day for the German army.”

In the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, Defense Minister Laurynas Kasciunas said that the move was “a great example” for all the countries on NATO’s eastern flank, on the border with Russia and its ally, Belarus.

“We will create such a defense and deterrence architecture that no adversary from the east will even think about testing NATO’s Article 5,” he told reporters.

Article 5 on collective defense is at the heart of the 32-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It states that an armed attack against one or more of the members shall be considered an attack against all.

Some 4,800 soldiers and around 200 civilians with the German army will be stationed permanently in Lithuania, which is increasingly worried by its aggressive neighbors.

Under an agreement, Lithuania is preparing military bases for the German brigade to be deployed in this Baltic state bordering Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the west and Belarus to the east.

The German army, the Bundeswehr, has taken part in long-term operations abroad since the 1990s, first in the Balkans and then in combat operations in Afghanistan. At the moment, the Bundeswehr says German soldiers are deployed in Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as in the Mediterranean.

However, this is the first permanent standalone German deployment, not on rotation as part of a multinational force.

Kasciunas said the German brigade is expected to reach full operational capacity by 2027.

“For us, this means more effective deterrence of the enemy and even greater security. It is an example of exceptional leadership and commitment as we actually see NATO’s collective defence and unity at work,” Lithuania Chief of Defence Valdemaras Rupsys added.

Up to one-third of troops are expected to bring their family members, according to the Lithuanian Defense Ministry.

Pistorius said Germany “will do everything we can to equip the brigade as it needs to be equipped from the outset.”

___

Associated Press writer Kirsten Grieshaber in Berlin contributed to this report.

The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business. More than half the world’s population sees AP journalism every day.

AP · April 8, 2024

5. Military pharmacies resume regular operations after cyberattack

Why military pharmacies? I was wondering why when we called in refills there was a statement about system depys for refilling prescriptions. It must have been due to this cyber attack and it must have been receiving up until last week which was the last time we heard the announcement.

The DC area refill line was issuing the warning of delays until last week.

Excerpt:

At least one military pharmacy has continued to warn of extended wait times as it recovers from the disruption.

Military pharmacies resume regular operations after cyberattack

militarytimes.com · by Karen Jowers · April 8, 2024

Military pharmacies have returned to full operations, six weeks after a cyberattack on the nation’s largest commercial prescription processor disrupted normal business at thousands of pharmacies around the world.

Following the Feb. 21 hack, Change Healthcare — which verifies whether a customer’s health insurance will help cover the cost of each medication — disconnected its system from other parts of the medical ecosystem in an attempt to limit the attack’s impact. Military pharmacies were able to manually fill prescriptions in the company’s absence, but warned customers of longer wait times.

Most retail pharmacies restarted filling and refilling patients’ prescriptions by March 8, after much of Change Healthcare’s network had regained function, according to officials from Optum, the UnitedHealth Group subsidiary that oversees Change. But on-base pharmacies lagged behind for multiple weeks as Change worked with Defense Health Agency officials to reestablish its connection to that separate network.

The connection was restored the week of April 1, a company spokesperson told Military Times April 5. Defense Health Agency officials didn’t respond to a request for information about the status of the pharmacies.

At least one military pharmacy has continued to warn of extended wait times as it recovers from the disruption.

“Pharmacy services have been fully restored and we have returned to a fully operational status, including the filling of controlled substances,” the 19th Medical Group at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, said in an April 3 Facebook post.

Earlier, Defense Health Agency officials acknowledged that some beneficiaries may have been asked to pay full price for their prescriptions at Tricare’s in-network retail pharmacies affected by the Change Healthcare outage. Those customers should file a claim for reimbursement with Tricare.

About Karen Jowers

Karen has covered military families, quality of life and consumer issues for Military Times for more than 30 years, and is co-author of a chapter on media coverage of military families in the book "A Battle Plan for Supporting Military Families." She previously worked for newspapers in Guam, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Fla., and Athens, Ga.

6. China Plays Tense Game of ‘Russian Roulette’ With U.S. Ally

I recall a decade or so ago when we were saying that our Mutual Defense Treaty did not necessarily commit us to defend disputed territory. Did that contribute to the current situation? Had we committed to its defense in the last decade, would that have deterred China from its current action? Probably not given Chinese malign intentions.

China Plays Tense Game of ‘Russian Roulette’ With U.S. Ally

Chinese coast guard ships have slammed Philippine boats with water cannons, shattering a windshield and injuring Filipino crew

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/china-plays-tense-game-of-russian-roulette-with-u-s-ally-580473a1?mod=hp_lead_pos4

By Niharika Mandhana

Updated April 9, 2024 12:03 am ET

A Chinese Coast Guard vessel blocked the way of a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea in March. PHOTO: ADRIAN PORTUGAL/REUTERS

SINGAPORE—China is intensifying a dangerous game in the South China Sea, in ways that risk drawing the U.S. into its fight with the Philippines.

In early March, two Chinese coast guard ships slammed a Philippine boat with high-pressure blasts of water cannon, smashing its windshield and preventing it from delivering supplies to a military outpost. A few weeks later, during another Philippine resupply run, Chinese water cannons hit the boat again, leaving its interior in shambles and injuring three Filipino navy personnel.

The tactics—which include Chinese coast guard and maritime militia ships bumping straight into Philippine vessels—are designed to make it more difficult for Manila to maintain the outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. China claims the reef as its own along with much of the strategic waterway.

Chinese-occupied islands/reefs

Other islands/reefs

TAIWAN

CHINA

Paracel Islands

SOUTH CHINA SEA

PHILIPPINES

Second Thomas Shoal

Spratly

Islands

BRUNEI

200 miles

MALAYSIA

INDO.

200 km

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Policymakers worry the increasingly tense encounters could result in a grave incident, push Manila to invoke its mutual-defense treaty with the U.S. and spiral into a broader conflict. That is why the South China Sea will be high on the agenda when President Biden huddles in Washington this week with his counterparts from the Philippines and Japan for their first-ever three-way summit.

“It’s a really critical hot spot right now that could end up in a bad place,” Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told a congressional committee last month, calling Chinese actions aggressive and dangerous.

The mutual-defense treaty between Washington and Manila can be triggered by an armed Chinese attack on Philippine armed forces or public vessels, including its coast guard, in the South China Sea. Adm. Aquilino said that if a Filipino sailor or soldier were killed, Manila could invoke the treaty.

“That would put our policy decision makers in a place that would require really tough choices,” he said.

Late last month, after the two most recent encounters with Chinese ships, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.signaled that China had crossed a line. He said in a statement that he had approved “a response and countermeasure package” that he said was “proportionate, deliberate, and reasonable in the face of the open, unabating, and illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous attacks” by China’s coast guard and maritime militia.

He didn’t elaborate on the new measures, but said: “Filipinos do not yield.”

On Board a Philippine Coast Guard Ship During a Confrontation With China

The State of the Army 2024

The cancellation of a scout helicopter might signal a new era of agility.

BY SAM SKOVE

STAFF WRITER

APRIL 8, 2024 05:26 PM ET

ARMY

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

Six months into his tenure, the newest Army chief of staff canceled plans for a sleek, futuristic helicopter, a decision that reflects new priorities for the service—and just might epitomize a new era of agility.

Unlike earlier multibillion-dollar programs scuttled for bad program design or cost overruns, Gen. Randy George axed the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft, or FARA, to accommodate major changes in warfare—in particular, those seen in Ukraine—that demand new tech such as loitering munitions and drones.

“We are learning from the battlefield—especially in Ukraine—that aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed,” George said in a press release. “Sensors and weapons mounted on a variety of unmanned systems and in space are more ubiquitous, further reaching, and more inexpensive than ever before.”

It’s a shift that in many ways reflects the Army’s broader shift away from the policies of the global war on terror.

With an eye on Ukraine and the Red Sea, the Army is pushing harder than ever to exploit cutting-edge, often commercially-derived technologies that have brought clarity to the fog of war. But it’s also taking an old-school approach to munitions: working hard to buy more of them, from 155mm artillery shells to advanced missiles.

Training day

The easiest place to see the Army’s transformation is in its most advanced training centers: the National Training Center in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana.

In both locations, the Army fields an opposing force, or OPFOR, to go up against Army units rotating in for training. Both OPFORs are rapidly absorbing lessons from Ukraine and seeking advantage through a wide variety of cheap, commercially-available ;tools.

An Army soldier arriving at either center might be tracked before she knows it, her cell phone acting as a lone digital light amid desert or forest. OPFOR’s cheap quadcopters might then pick up the signal and drop a fake grenade on them.

Should OPFOR choose to hold their fire, they could use the drone to track the soldier to their base, then use commercial satellite footage or an AI-powered analysis of signal patterns to map out the command post and its connections to others.

They could then choose to isolate the base with powerful jammers or level it with a simulated missile.

It isn’t all high-tech though —the near-constant artillery barrages faced by Ukrainian forces also highlight the continued importance of low-tech explosives. So both centers greet trainees with a renewed emphasis on artillery, forcing them to re-learn the importance of digging fighting positions deep into the earth.

Commercial tech

George sees the work of OPFOR and other units experimenting with tech as a path for the Army as whole: greater use of commercial technology, combined with the flexibility to adopt or ditch new gear as needed.

Conversations with OPFOR and soldiers at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center has convinced the chief of staff to “double down on some of the things that we're doing like on [drones],” he said in an interview with Defense One in January.

Key to that strategy is something George calls “transforming in contact”: pushing out new, often commercial tech to units to have them test it out in realistic training.

The January exercises, for example, saw the Army’s first use of ATAK— cheap, Android-based mapping and communications software—across all echelons of command. It’s also increasingly common to see Army units deploy Starlink communications devices, a commercial satellite technology used on both sides of the Ukrainian front.

George’s plan is a departure from how the Army normally fields the equipment, in which major contractors duke it out for years before a single platform is rolled out to hundreds of thousands of soldiers. That system, though, is also what led to the service fielding drones that struggled to fly in the rain.

As one example of the new equipment strategy, the Army has requested $25 million this year to buy commercial drones for troops. Rather than routing the drones through the lengthy procurement process, the money for the drones will instead be classified as “operation and maintenance” funds.

This designation makes acquisition of the drones simpler, theoretically allowing unit commanders to acquire the drones directly.

Major acquisitions

The Army’s transformation isn’t all cheap fixes from the commercial world.

Alongside Starlink terminals and Android software, the service is also planning a raft of investments in robotics, loitering munitions, counter-drone weapons, far-seeing spy tech, and far-reaching missiles to match.

Although many programs are only just started, the Army is moving quickly by fielding systems in a year or two rather than the nearly decade-long process it often takes.

The Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance program is slated to field loitering munitions to infantry units in 2024 in an iterative process, the Army Futures Command’s chief, Gen. James Rainey, said late last year.

Various types of launched effects—what the Army calls drones launched from helicopters—will enter production by next fiscal year, officials said at last week’s AUSA Global Force conference.

Medium-range drones, which could include loitering munitions, are also being tested this year and will be produced in fiscal year 2025. Short-range drones will be tested in fiscal year 2025 and produced in fiscal year 2026, and longer-range drones will be tested in fiscal year 2026 and fielded in fiscal year 2027.

Other efforts include packing business jets with spyware, a new organization focusing on long-range intelligence-gathering, and developing long-range cannon shells.

With Ukraine and Russia using tens of thousands of shells per day and wargames of a Taiwan-China fight showing a high need for missiles, the Army is also re-focusing on munitions to pair with its high-tech sensors.

Army efforts include a rapid increase in production of 155mm shells to aid Ukraine, with 100,000 a month promised—as long as Congress passes a Ukraine aid supplemental bill. The Army is also boosting missile production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) and Patriot anti-air missiles through multi-year buys, a mechanism that incentivizes manufacturers to invest in production.

Newer missiles are also coming online. In December, the Army received its first batch of Precision Strike Missiles, which will replace the older GMLRS missiles.

In an increasingly tense globe, many of these munitions are playing an active role as soon as they leave the factory floor. The Army has upped purchase of Coyote drone interceptors, which are already knocking down enemy drones in the Middle East, while 155mm shells are heading to Ukraine.

Force structure

Thanks in part to lessons from Ukraine and elsewhere, the Army is also changing the design of its forces, including by planning to add multiple new anti-air units in a nod to both the threat of drones and the belief that the U.S. is not guaranteed air dominance in future wars.

The redesign of its force structure also reflects a less comfortable reality: fewer and fewer Americans are choosing to become soldiers. The force redesign announced in February is in part to rationalize a force designed to field an Army of 494,000 soldiers, but which in reality only has 445,000.

At the same time, the Army is hoping to push recruiting up through an intensive recruiting campaign, which includes new ads, launching a trial program to make recruiting a separate career path, and targeting older recruits.

The Army is seeing an uptick so far over the same time last year, George told Stars and Stripes in February. Still, it hit just 74% percent of its goal in the first fiscal quarter of 2024, from Oct. 1 and Dec. 31.

Those soldiers aren’t just important for staffing out the Army’s formations—they’re also key to the soldier-centric Army innovation George wants to see. The more qualified, tech-centric soldiers the Army can attract, the more feedback the Army will get for their “transforming in contact mission.”

“We are going to get our best innovation from our soldiers, working with [product] developers,” George said in Defense One’s State of the Army interview. “Our soldiers are really innovative, they will figure out how to make things work.”

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

8. The U.S. Army To Conduct Combat Training in the Philippines

Will the Philippines be contested in a conflict with CHina? It will surely be key terrain for the US to support operations in the INDOPACIFIC.

The U.S. Army To Conduct Combat Training in the Philippines

By Jim Gomez

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/04/09/the_us_army_to_conduct_combat_training_in_the_philippines_1023783.html

U.S. Army MG Marcus Evans, Commanding General of the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division, gestures during an interview with The Associated Press on Feb. 8, 2024, in Manila, Philippines. The U.S. Army is introducing a new joint battlefield training in the Philippines aimed at boosting combat readiness and efficiency, including the adequate provision of ammunition and other supplies in difficult tropical jungle and archipelagic conditions, Evans said Sunday, April 7, 2024. (AP Photo/Aaron Favila, File)

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — The U.S. Army is introducing a joint battlefield training in the Philippines to improve combat readiness including by ensuring adequate supply of ammunition and other needs in difficult conditions in tropical jungles and on scattered islands, a U.S. general said.

The Biden administration has been strengthening an arc of military alliances in the Indo-Pacific to better counter China, including in any future confrontation over Taiwan. The U.S. moves dovetail with Philippine efforts to shore up its territorial defenses amid disputes with China in the South China Sea and ability to respond to frequent natural disasters.

About 2,000 U.S. and Philippine army forces will join the dayslong combat drills backed by helicopters and artillery fire against armed adversaries in a jungle setting in the northern Philippines in June, Maj. Gen. Marcus Evans, commanding general of the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division, said Sunday.

The combat training will be held in the Philippines for the first time at Manila’s request. It’s not clear whether the longtime treaty allies would decide to turn the maneuvers into an annual exercise, Evans said.

The drills from June 1 to 10 come at the conclusion of two larger back-to-back exercises between the allied forces — the Salaknib army-to-army exercises, which opened Monday, and the Balikatan, which will start later in April and involve about 16,000 U.S. and Philippine forces. Several countries including Japan will send observers.

“We have to be prepared to respond to humanitarian crisis, natural disaster crisis, and that is what this training affords us the opportunity to do,” Evans told The Associated Press in a telephone interview. “While we feel confident in our overall readiness and training path, it’s something that we can never be complacent in.”

The combat-readiness drill in June “provides an excellent venue for us to get better in terms of our warfighting readiness, to enhance our partnership and then strengthen both our army profession by working together in a very challenging environment,” Evans said.

The training was designed to be monitored live to show, for example, how much ammunition, batteries for two-way radios and food would be carried by U.S. and Philippine forces and how they planned for resupplies in a remote battlefield.

“It really is a way for soldiers, leaders and units to be able to see themselves during a simulated combat environment scenario,” Evans said.

Such past combat training in Hawaii has led to better information-sharing by smaller and more agile combat units and improved combat endurance, he said. It bolstered “the ability to sustain ourselves in a jungle and archipelago environment because there are not ground lines of communications, so we have to rely heavily on air or maritime assets to be able to move supplies.”

China has vehemently opposed increased deployments of American forces in Asia, including the Philippines, saying such military presence was endangering regional harmony and stability.

Last year, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. defended his decision to allow U.S. military presence in more Philippine military camps under a 2014 defense pact, saying it was vital to his country’s territorial defense.

China had warned the increased U.S. military presence would “drag the Philippines into the abyss of geopolitical strife.”

9. America’s Next Soldiers Will Be Machines

Move out and draw fire. I am all for having robots walk point.

Excerpts:

In the United States’ next major war, the Army’s brass is hoping that robots will be the ones taking the first punch, doing the dirty, dull, and dangerous jobs that killed hundreds—likely thousands—of the more than 7,000 U.S. service members who died during two decades of wars in the Middle East. The goal is to put a robot in the most dangerous spot on the battlefield instead of a 19-year-old private fresh out of basic training.

Not all of these machines are ready for prime time, though. During the Fort Irwin exercise, dubbed “Project Convergence”—which was designed to test robots in realistic combat scenarios—they didn’t face live bullets. The robots don’t have peripheral vision; they can’t look left or look right like a human soldier can by simply turning their head. And the Army’s outdated network can’t always keep hundreds of drones aloft at the same time, or even tell U.S. troops which of the unpiloted aircraft are friend or foe.

But they’ve come a long way. George and other Army leaders believe that almost every U.S. Army unit, down to the smallest foot patrols, will soon have drones in the sky to sense, protect, and attack. And it won’t be long before the United States is deploying ground robots into battle in human-machine teams.

“It’s not just one robot [that] replaces one human,” said Alex Miller, George’s chief technology officer. The question, he said, is how the Army can put robots on the front line “without taking a single rifleman, or multiple riflemen, off the line to control a robot.”

America’s Next Soldiers Will Be Machines

In future wars, U.S. generals want to send robots to face the enemy’s first bullets.

APRIL 6, 2024, 7:00 AM

By Jack Detsch, a Pentagon and national security reporter at Foreign Policy.

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch

Science and Technology
United States
Jack Detsch

FORT IRWIN, California—For as long as the United States has had an army, U.S. infantry soldiers have stuck by one motto: “Don’t shoot until you see the whites of their eyes.”

But fighting on the U.S. Army’s largest training ground last month, Lt. Isaac McCurdy and his platoon of infantry troops, playing a fictional enemy of the United States, found themselves up against a very different kind of foe: one with camera lenses for eyes and sheet metal for skin.

These weren’t your average flesh-and-blood men that they were fighting. They were machines.

Driving on eight screeching wheels and carrying enough firepower on their truck beds to fill a small arms depot, a handful of U.S. Army robots stormed through the battlefield of the fictional city of Ujen.

The robots shot up houses where the opposition force hid. Drones that had been loitering over the battlefield for hours hovered above McCurdy and his team and dropped “bombs”—foam footballs, in this case—right on top of them, a perfectly placed artillery shot. Robot dogs, with sensors for heads, searched houses to make sure they were clear.

“If you see the whites of someone’s eyes or their sunglasses, [and] you shoot back at that, they’re going to have a human response,” McCurdy said. “If it’s a robot pulling up, shooting something that’s bigger than you can carry yourself, and it’s not going to just die when you shoot a center mass, it’s a very different feeling.”

A robotic dog moves across a sandy desert landscape through the purple smoke of a flare. Solders holding guns crouch behind the four-legged robot, taking shelter against a wall.

A Ghost Robotic Dog moves forward with U.S. soldiers behind it during an exercise at Fort Irwin on March 17Spc. Samarion Hicks/U.S. Army

The Army’s top officer, Gen. Randy George, made the trip from the Pentagon to watch the fictitious battle. Standing on the rooftop of a makeshift stucco building that swayed from the tank rounds thudding against the desert sand, he was flanked by a half-dozen top generals and about as many colonels. Many of them wore metal wristbands engraved with the names of the soldiers who died under their commands in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the United States’ next major war, the Army’s brass is hoping that robots will be the ones taking the first punch, doing the dirty, dull, and dangerous jobs that killed hundreds—likely thousands—of the more than 7,000 U.S. service members who died during two decades of wars in the Middle East. The goal is to put a robot in the most dangerous spot on the battlefield instead of a 19-year-old private fresh out of basic training.

Not all of these machines are ready for prime time, though. During the Fort Irwin exercise, dubbed “Project Convergence”—which was designed to test robots in realistic combat scenarios—they didn’t face live bullets. The robots don’t have peripheral vision; they can’t look left or look right like a human soldier can by simply turning their head. And the Army’s outdated network can’t always keep hundreds of drones aloft at the same time, or even tell U.S. troops which of the unpiloted aircraft are friend or foe.

But they’ve come a long way. George and other Army leaders believe that almost every U.S. Army unit, down to the smallest foot patrols, will soon have drones in the sky to sense, protect, and attack. And it won’t be long before the United States is deploying ground robots into battle in human-machine teams.

“It’s not just one robot [that] replaces one human,” said Alex Miller, George’s chief technology officer. The question, he said, is how the Army can put robots on the front line “without taking a single rifleman, or multiple riflemen, off the line to control a robot.”

A pile of boulders in a desert landscape are painted all over with U.S. Army logos in various colors. A blue sky and a few small white clouds are visible overhead.

U.S. Army Futures Command and Project Convergence logos are painted alongside various insignias on rocks outside the gates of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, seen on March 20.Spc. Marquis McCants/U.S. Army

You could be forgiven if you didn’t know there was a U.S. Army training base nearly the size of Rhode Island in the middle of the California desert. After all, Fort Irwin isn’t easy to get to.

Pull off Interstate 15, go through the city of Barstow, and drive another 23 or so miles. You’ll see a big pile of rocks—boulders of basalt formed millions of years ago when an ancient volcano erupted—painted with Army insignias. You’ll see the red and blue shield of the 197th Infantry Brigade and the black and yellow Norman shield and horse silhouette of the 1st Cavalry Division. Every logo symbolizes a different Army unit that has trained here—about 10 every year. That’s how you know you’re at Fort Irwin.

The isolation is the point. Soldiers call the massive training range “the box.” That’s because it’s basically a sandbox for military exercises, one of the only places in the continental United States where you can jam the electromagnetic spectrum, fly drones at 30,000 feet, and fire large munitions without bothering anybody. Fort Irwin contains 14 fictional cities and 1,200 buildings. Once troops arrive, they’re here for 21 days—with no showers.

Life in the desert is hard. In a January exercise, U.S. Army troops had to brave wind, rain, sleet, snow, and oppressive heat, sometimes all in one day. There are about 1,200 fake casualties for every three-week rotation. Service members in one of the brigades that deployed here for that mock battle with the 1st Armored Division had to carry their artillery with them 40 miles into battle.

Soldiers in combat gear run across a dusty street with their guns drawn in front of the simple concrete buildings of a fake city used for training. Telephone wires and clouds are visible overhead.

Soldiers conduct an urban assault drill in the training grounds at Fort Irwin on March 18. Sgt. Maxwell Bass/U.S. Army

It’s like a giant game of laser tag, with the intensity turned up. Almost everyone who fights in the simulation dies in the simulation at one point—sometimes with pools of fake blood and prosthetic gore that looks real enough to fool an untrained eye. Even George has died in the simulation more times than he’d like to admit.

The scenarios are written to fit wherever U.S. troops are deploying, which for the past two decades has mostly been Iraq and Afghanistan. But since 2014, around the time of the Kremlin’s first invasion of Ukraine, the Army has used Fort Irwin to practice large-scale combat operations against enemy forces modeled after China’s People’s Liberation Army and the Russian military.

The idea is for the Army to do most of its bleeding in training, not on the battlefield. So organizers try to make the simulated enemy tougher than the real one—not like the Russians, who stumbled into Ukraine with maps from the 1980s looking for towns that didn’t exist. The fighting that Ukrainian troops have experienced on the battlefield—inside Mariupol’s Azovstal steel plant, around the city of Kharkiv, and during the liberation of Kherson—has forced the Army to adapt even further.

“Originally, we had units actually knocking on doors because that’s what they learned in Iraq and Afghanistan,” said Maj. Gen. Curt Taylor, the commander of the national training center. “That’s going to get you killed.” And more often than not, soldiers have to hold their (simulated) fire. There are paid actors roaming around Irwin playing civilians caught in the crossfire.

An 8-wheeled unmanned vehicle with a gun on the front moves across a sandy street as soldiers in combat gear watch.

An unmanned transport vehicle with a remote weapon system provides support to soldiers in an urban environment as part of a training exercise at Fort Irwin on March 12. Spc. Samarion Hicks/U.S. Army

The scenarios are also starting to include robots. Today, the Army might have three platoons deployed in a basic attack, McCurdy said: one to fix the enemy in place, another to maneuver on them, and then one more in reserve. Put robots into that group of soldiers, and they suddenly have much more room to maneuver.

“Then you have basically three platoons entirely freed up,” McCurdy said. “And it also draws far more enemy attention to those harder targets of the robots. It protects you, frees you up, gives you more flexibility, and weakens up all other fronts of the enemy’s defenses.”

“I’m not 100 percent sure how they would work against it,” said Sgt. Philip Webb, the weapons squad leader for the opposing force in the exercise.

That might not be true on every battlefield. Like everything here, Project Convergence is an experiment. It’s hard to stop a robot from rolling along Fort Irwin’s sand and volcanic rock, which has plenty of traction for the Army’s Small Multipurpose Equipment Transports to move freely across. And soldiers haven’t shot any real live ammunition at the robots—yet. A well-placed shot to the sensor might render a ground robot functionally useless. And robots might turn into expensive icicles at the British military’s largest training ground in the hostile winters of the Canadian province of Alberta.

The alliance has transformed its once sleepy headquarters into a war command focused on Russia.

Drones are already ubiquitous—you can buy a quadcopter off the shelf for about $50 at most big-box stores—but building ground robots that can see and sense their way through modern battlefields is much harder.

But the entire field of military robotics is speeding up. Ukraine has already pledged to create a separate service branch for drones and unmanned vehicles. The U.S. Army might not be too far off: It’s considering a proposal to add a platoon of robots, the equivalent of 20 to 50 human soldiers, to its armored brigade combat teams, which are the service’s bread-and-butter, tank-backed infantry units.

Army officials don’t think that robots will replace humans—or that they will do much to solve the problem of recruiting shortfalls—but they’re working on the math to get the ratio of humans to robots to about 2-to-1 or 3-to-1.

The point is to get the advantage before China or Russia do.

“We don’t want it to be even,” said Lt. Gen. John Morrison, the principal advisor to the Army’s chief of staff for network and cybersecurity. “We want it to be a technical overmatch.”

A soldier in combat gear looks up as a small drone flies above him in front of a pile of rocks in a desert landscape. Another soldiers kneels in front of a massive pile of boulders a few yards away.

Soldiers use experimental drone technology in a training assault as a part of Project Convergence at Fort Irwin on Oct. 27, 2022. Spc. Jaaron Tolley/U.S. Army

If the Russia-Ukraine war has taught the Army anything about the future of warfare, it’s to look up. Soldiers are listening for drones and coming up with battle drills to defend against them. If something can be seen or sensed, it can be killed.

To survive on the modern battlefield, soldiers are having to make themselves smaller and smaller—almost invisible. Loitering munitions can wait over the battlefield for hours, ready to dive if an operator senses the faintest twitch. Fort Irwin’s mock enemy troops have 105 drone swarms and can attack with dozens to hundreds of the small unmanned planes at a time.

Unwieldy server stacks and satellite dishes sticking out of U.S. vehicles and outposts could get soldiers killed. And U.S. troops will probably have to turn off their iPhones and Androids, which are rippling through the electromagnetic spectrum.

“The cell phone is the new cigarette in the foxhole,” said Taylor, the training center commander. “We’ve shown soldiers, ‘hey, your cell phone can get you killed.’” Taylor and his team recently spotted an otherwise undetectable Apache helicopter weaving through their air defenses when they clocked the pilot’s iPhone doing 120 miles per hour across the desert.

War is moving at the speed of technology—light-years. But the U.S. Army moves at the speed of budget—fiscal years. That’s not going to work when a home-built quadcopter can drop a grenade and destroy a fighter jet parked on the ground. And the Defense Department is on the wrong side of the cost equation.

“What keeps me up is the cost imposition factor that robotics systems bring,” said Miller, the chief technology officer. “A $1,500 drone can take out a multimillion-dollar aircraft.”

A U.S. Army general in camouflage wears an augmented reality headset over his eyes and holds a controller. Standing around him are reporters and other soldiers.

Gen. Randy George tests new augmented reality technology during an event at Fort Irwin on March 18.Sgt. Maxwell Bass/U.S. Army

George has only been on the job for six months, but he has already taken a scalpel to the Army’s weapons programs. The Army canceled the RQ-11 Raven and RQ-7 Shadow drone programs, which took nearly a decade to produce and earned the nickname “flying lawnmower” from troops miffed by their slow speed. Crash just one and it might cost the Army a million dollars—enough to pay about a platoon’s worth of Army privates their full year’s wages.

But building up is difficult, and China is poised at virtually every part of the drone and robotics supply chain. And Project Convergence is still just an experiment; the Army hasn’t been able to get most of this new technology into the budget—it’s mostly on the list of unfunded priorities that George is asking Congress to add to its almost $186 billion budget request. That’s too slow. In the next war, the Army is going to need to reprogram things instantly.

With drones becoming all the rage, the Army has also canceled the big-ticket Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft program—which was developing a next-generation scout helicopter—and service leaders want to end production of one variant of Blackhawk helicopters. It’s still an open question whether the Army has the authority to buy and build cheap off-the-shelf drones like the Ukrainians, though. George is seeking the acquisition authority to do so, but the defense industry doesn’t love the idea of the Army being a less predictable weapons buyer; many companies want the stability of multiyear contracts.

The next target for belt-tightening is the ponderous Distributed Common Ground System, the Army’s most widely used intelligence sharing platform: stacks of servers that resemble discarded record players with messes of wires extending from them, many of which have had to be updated by hand.

Members of the brass say that they’re listening to the rank and file’s demands to throw out the old junk. “When someone says something is a piece of crap, that bothers me,” George said.

Instead, troops want to be running their missions from tablets and iPhones. Maj. Gen. Jim Isenhower, who leads the Army’s 1st Armored Division, told George during a demonstration that he believes putting command-and-control systems onto screens, tablets, and mixed reality applications can help him reduce the size of a combat outpost by 95 percent, from 326 troops to about eight—so small that the Army’s opposition force didn’t even spot it during practice drills.

Calling out orders from a tablet can make the Army move faster, too. Before, U.S. Army intelligence analysts were looking at radar and signals intercepts through a soda straw, trying to find the right line of data to see what weapons the enemy had and where they were. Now, with one radar pass, U.S. troops can start to map out a Russian and Chinese unit and what kinds of guns that unit has in its arsenal, with artificial intelligence helping to find the signal in the noise.

The goal is to reduce the speed of targeting decisions to minutes and seconds in order to compete with enemies who are equally fast, if not faster.

“You defend against the first wave, great,” said Col. Scott Shaw, the director of the Army’s maneuver capabilities development and integration directorate. “What about the 12th wave? And what if the 12th wave comes in the 12th minute?”

Two soldiers stand and one lays on the ground, all in combat gear, with guns drawn, as they navigate a street corner on a simulated streetscape during a training drill in the desert.

U.S. Army paratroopers observe their surroundings during an urban terrain drill at Fort Irwin on March 11.Sgt. Maxwell Bass/U.S. Army

Plumes of smoke drifted off the desert sand and the robot’s gun barrels. The SMET vehicles that had stormed through Ujen had wheeled into position and fired Javelin shots into the caldera, the valley’s cauldron-like floor.

In their wake, mine-clearing robots rushed out and fired a 350-foot rope line full of explosive charge, more than 1,500 pounds of C-4 explosives spooled in a tube.

“Five. Four. Three. Two. One,” Shaw said, counting down as he waited for the charge to detonate.

It didn’t go off. So Shaw counted down from five again. Again, there was no explosion.

The faulty line charge was one of the few things that went visibly wrong during the exercise. In another instance, Army officials jammed themselves, and a swarm of drones dropped out of the sky. If soldiers were to make these kinds of mistakes on a real battlefield today, actual human beings could get killed.

“I would not want to put a human into that,” said Taylor, Fort Irwin’s commander, who has watched videos of Ukrainian troops trying to clear Russian minefields with the same U.S.-made explosives, working under a hail of gunfire.

Robots may be harder to kill, but you can’t fix stupid, either. “They don’t have curiosity—they don’t have instincts,” said Gen. Jim Rainey, the head of U.S. Army Futures Command.

An unmanned vehicle assisted by soldiers in combat gear is loaded with human-sized dolls used to represent fake casualties during a drill. Another vehicle is at right with low buildings behind.

An unmanned military transport vehicle deploys for a simulated casualty evacuation during an exercise at Fort Irwin on March 16. Spc. Marquis McCants/U.S. Army

But the idea of creating robots that do have curiosity and instincts is also terrifying. Are military officials worried about creating terminators?

George, the Army chief, said that he’s not. “You’re talking about completely autonomous vehicles,” he said. “Everything out there was controlled by a soldier.”

Experts acknowledge that the robots of the future may need two sets of rules: one for peacetime, and another for war. With Russian troops invading their country, the Ukrainian military doesn’t care very much about safety features such as kill switches, which would force a robot to cease all operations if it gets a command that’s not signed with the encryption codes of the right controller.

The United Nations, on the other hand, cares a lot about such things. The U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee approved a draft resolution on autonomous weapons in November, declaring that a human should always be in the loop.

“The law of warfare is how we’re going to apply robotic systems,” said Miller, George’s chief technology officer.

But scientists are still at the ground level of building out the field of robotics, just like the Stanford University professors who built the network protocols that led to the internet. “They didn’t envision the internet, so they didn’t envision all the ways that people could abuse the internet,” said Miller.

“The scariest circumstance is not Skynet,” Miller added, referring to the super-intelligent network of killer robots from the Terminator movies as he held a cellphone with an app tracking the positions of soldiers and robots at Fort Irwin. “The scariest circumstance is that it comes under the enemy’s control.”

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Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch

10. Why America Needs AUKUS

Why America Needs AUKUS

AUKUS deepens the United States’ relationships, strengthens collaboration, and primes it strategically for an increasingly volatile world.

The National Interest · by Eric Lies · April 8, 2024

America has long seen the value of collaborating with other nations to ensure a peaceful, prosperous, and free world. The AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to share critical technology represents a revitalization and reimagining of this American tradition and is vital to the country’s continued security. Given the increasingly Chinese government’s aggressive nature in the Indo-Pacific, the free passage of goods and regional states’ ability to maintain their sovereignty are under threat. While China benefits from free trade, if it were to set the terms on which trade occurred, this would severely impact the freedom of Indo-Pacific states. The very fabric of the U.S.-ordered system is straining.

AUKUS gives the United States another tool to strengthen and maintain the system it has led since World War II and to minimize the costs and risks of doing so. Improving the three countries’ material readiness increases the cost of aggressive action within the Indo-Pacific, lowering the risk of such action being attempted in the first place. The American-led deterrence regime has allowed more than $2 million of trade between the region and the United States, with one-third of global trade passing through the region. These numbers don’t capture the fact that the highest quality technologies, from computer chips to automobiles, are manufactured by countries most at risk of China’s aggressive revanchism. A failure to reinforce the capacity to deter and respond to violent activities in the Indo-Pacific will lead to massive disruptions in supply lines, disruptions that would make the impact of COVID-19 pale in comparison. Without these trade routes, average Americans face the prospect of skyrocketing prices and inflation, a hit to the wallet they simply can’t afford, and potentially difficult choices between saving for their futures and putting food on the table.

Some policymakers in the United States question the value of American security commitments, arguing that money should be redirected toward domestic priorities, such as homeland defense or lowering overall government spending. Mira Rapp-Hooper argues this is a fundamental misunderstanding of the United States’ strategic position. Since World War II, the United States has relied on the alliance structure to practice “forward defense,” shifting potential conflicts as far from U.S. territory as possible. NATO, for example, has allowed for close coordination between allied countries that minimized strategic ambiguity and responded to potential conflicts at the source, allowing them to spread and potentially impact the United States closer to home. While the strategic circumstances have shifted since the Cold War, increased cooperation is still the best means to counter rising threats. Given the global nature of the United States’ interests and China’s rise to be a peer competitor in the Indo-Pacific, leveraging alliances within the region offsets the difference in attention the region receives from the United States and China.

Increasingly integrating the three AUKUS countries’ military-industrial complexes and collaborating on research and development will improve the economic opportunities available to the United States. Demand for U.S. expertise in submarine construction will exist for decades due to AUKUS Pillar One, but the opportunities to share and develop critical technology under Pillar Two can’t be ignored. The eight lines of effort contained in Pillar Two are wide-ranging and include, for example, artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles, electronic warfare, and hypersonic missiles. Lowering trade barriers allows companies to access three separate military customers and their domestic markets. This subsequent market expansion has the potential to deliver even more growth than Pillar One, given the wide scope for cooperation. This says nothing of the increased ability for joint research and investigations that universities across the three countries can conduct and what economic developments that may lead to.

Ultimately, the strategic rationale for AUKUS is to build and maintain effective deterrence of Chinese revanchism through collaboration, which creates an environment conducive to trade, development, and prosperity. As China modernizes and increases the size of its forces, the United States’ position in the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. The U.S.-backed system has facilitated growth and improved quality of life throughout the region many times over since the end of World War II, but with the rise of strategic competition between the United States and China, these benefits have become obscured.

AUKUS demonstrates that the United States will stay involved in the region and bolster its allies’ capabilities through cooperation. This does not mean the United States is getting nothing in return. The U.S.-led system has provided Americans access to high-quality and reasonably priced goods and services. It has given American businesses opportunities to expand overseas and support American jobs that otherwise would never have existed. It has kept the United States safe for seventy years and has cost far less than going alone would have. AUKUS deepens these relationships, strengthens collaboration, and primes the United States strategically for an increasingly volatile world. AUKUS helps the region. AUKUS helps Australia and the UK. AUKUS helps the United States. That’s why the United States needs AUKUS.

Eric Lies is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Washington, DC office, specializing in security strategy and military affairs. He previously served in the U.S. Navy as a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer and holds a bachelor of science with a major in international affairs from the U.S. Naval Academy and a master’s in international service from American University.

Image: U.S. Navy Flickr.

The National Interest · by Eric Lies · April 8, 2024

11. The last surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the Korean War has died

May Colonel Puckett rest in peace. I am glad they were finally able to honor him with the MOH in 2021 before he passed.

The last surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the Korean War has died

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · April 8, 2024

Ralph Puckett Jr., an Army veteran who was the last living Medal of Honor recipient from the Korean War, died on Monday at the age of 97.

Puckett was awarded the military’s highest honor by President Joe Biden in 2021, more than 70 years after his heroism overseas. In a statement, officials from the National Medal of Honor Museum Foundation hailed him and the 146 other Medal of Honor recipients from that war as models for heroism and service.

“Col. Ralph Puckett was the last of a generation of extraordinary heroes,” said Chris Cassidy, president and CEO of the foundation. “His actions [on the battlefield] reverberated far beyond the Korean peninsula as his courage, sacrifice, commitment and patriotism have inspired Americans for over 70 years.”

WRBL reported that Puckett died at his home in Columbus, Georgia, in his sleep early Monday morning.

Retired Ranger Col. Ralph Puckett, 94, to receive Medal of Honor for Korean War battle

The battle for Hill 205 was part of a counteroffensive that marked the Chinese entrance into the Korean War, destroyed the Eighth Army’s right flank and triggered a massive U.S. retreat.

Puckett, who retired as a colonel, was a young lieutenant in 1950 when he led 51 Army Rangers and nine Korean soldiers across frozen rice paddies to seize a key hill overlooking the Ch’ongch’on River.

Army officials said Puckett repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire over nearly a day of fighting, first to commandeer a tank to provide cover for his men, then several more times to draw fire away from the positions they were trying to defend.

“Over the course of the counterattack, the Rangers were inspired and motivated by the extraordinary leadership and courageous example exhibited by [1st Lt.] Puckett,” the official Army citation of his actions stated. “As a result, five human wave attacks by a battalion strength enemy element were repulsed.”

Puckett was wounded several times by shrapnel and small arms fire. At one point, he ordered his men to leave him behind and retreat to a safer area. They managed to evacuate him before American artillery fire destroyed their overrun positions on the hill.

For his actions, Puckett was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Several of his men and colleagues lobbied for years to have that honor upgraded, a move which came in 2021.

Puckett earned a second Distinguished Service Cross for actions during the Vietnam War, as well as two Silver Stars during his 22-year military career.

Puckett’s death leaves 62 living recipients of the Medal of Honor, according to the foundation.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

12. Does Biden Take China’s Threat Seriously? By Walter Russell Mead

Excerpts:

Yet close American cooperation with Japan comes at a cost. Chinese nationalists see Japan as China’s greatest historical enemy and the U.S. as China’s most powerful contemporary opponent. Photos of Mr. Kishida clinking champagne flutes with Mr. Biden will inflame Chinese public opinion and allow regime propagandists to whip up support for Xi Jinping at a time of economic stress.

Most Westerners yawn when they read official Chinese documents, but as Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung write in their concise and important new book, “The Political Thought of Xi Jinping,” there is much to be learned from them. A vision of zero-sum competition with the U.S. is at the heart of China’s approach to international politics, and hostility toward Japan is central to the Communist Party’s goal of uniting the Chinese people behind Mr. Xi and the party elite.

In 2014 Mr. Xi added three memorial days to the Chinese calendar, celebrated with marches and events throughout the country. Two of the three are explicitly anti-Japan. One commemorates the victims of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, and the other celebrates Japan’s defeat in World War II. Chinese textbooks and curricula have been revised to highlight the evil intentions and relentless ambition of Japan and the U.S. The idea that national unity under communist leadership is the way to frustrate China’s foreign enemies is central to regime propaganda.

We should make no mistake. Both elite and mass Chinese public opinion will read this week’s U.S.-Japan summit as a serious escalation of Washington’s direct challenge to Mr. Xi and his goal of unification with Taiwan. The question is whether the Biden administration and the country it leads are prepared for the blowback.

Does Biden Take China’s Threat Seriously?

His diplomacy is provocative, but his defense strategy isn’t preventive enough.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-biden-take-chinas-threat-seriously-japan-state-dinner-defense-pacific-e7859c50?mod=MorningEditorialReport&mod=djemMER_h

By Walter Russell Mead

April 8, 2024 4:56 pm ET

President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at Camp David, Aug. 18, 2023. PHOTO: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/REUTERS

After six months in which the Middle East seemed to suck all the oxygen out of the Oval Office, the White House is pivoting to the Indo-Pacific this week as Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrives for consultations and a state dinner. President Biden and Mr. Kishida will be joined Thursday by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for talks on China’s growing military threat to the Philippines.

The deepening security relationship with an increasingly activist Japan is the heart of America’s strategy, which illustrates both the potential and possible pitfalls in Team Biden’s approach. As China’s power has grown and it has cast off the “peaceful rise” policy of Deng Xiaoping’s era, Tokyo sees Beijing’s ambitions as a direct and increasingly urgent threat to its security and independence. If China compels Taiwan to unite with the mainland and makes good on its sweeping claims in the South China Sea, Beijing will be able to restrict Japan’s trade with the world. Tokyo is responding to this threat, made more powerful by China’s growing alliance with Russia, by increasing defense spending, strengthening its security relationship with the U.S., and enhancing military cooperation and engagement with neighbors like the Philippines.

Yet close American cooperation with Japan comes at a cost. Chinese nationalists see Japan as China’s greatest historical enemy and the U.S. as China’s most powerful contemporary opponent. Photos of Mr. Kishida clinking champagne flutes with Mr. Biden will inflame Chinese public opinion and allow regime propagandists to whip up support for Xi Jinping at a time of economic stress.

Most Westerners yawn when they read official Chinese documents, but as Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung write in their concise and important new book, “The Political Thought of Xi Jinping,” there is much to be learned from them. A vision of zero-sum competition with the U.S. is at the heart of China’s approach to international politics, and hostility toward Japan is central to the Communist Party’s goal of uniting the Chinese people behind Mr. Xi and the party elite.

In 2014 Mr. Xi added three memorial days to the Chinese calendar, celebrated with marches and events throughout the country. Two of the three are explicitly anti-Japan. One commemorates the victims of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, and the other celebrates Japan’s defeat in World War II. Chinese textbooks and curricula have been revised to highlight the evil intentions and relentless ambition of Japan and the U.S. The idea that national unity under communist leadership is the way to frustrate China’s foreign enemies is central to regime propaganda.

We should make no mistake. Both elite and mass Chinese public opinion will read this week’s U.S.-Japan summit as a serious escalation of Washington’s direct challenge to Mr. Xi and his goal of unification with Taiwan. The question is whether the Biden administration and the country it leads are prepared for the blowback.

With widely respected Asia hand Kurt Campbell at the No. 2 spot in the State Department after his February Senate confirmation, a chief architect of America’s Asian diplomatic strategy is well-placed to keep strengthening and integrating America’s vital alliances and partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. Yet old questions linger. Does Mr. Biden understand how serious the challenge from China is? Does he have a plan for American and allied success? Is he willing and able to give his military and diplomatic teams the resources and political support they need?

Not everybody in Asia is convinced that the answer is yes. An annual survey of business, political and civil-society actors by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute found for the first time this year that a slim majority of Southeast Asian leaders would, if forced to choose, opt for China over the U.S. as their “preferred alignment choice in the region.” Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia were among the countries where majorities would choose China in a pinch.

Those skeptical Southeast Asians are onto something. America’s failure to match China’s epochal military buildup—not a lack of diplomatic activism—is the root cause of the region’s geopolitical insecurity. Better security cooperation with Japan, a goal of this week’s talks, can help at the margins, but a serious policy for the Indo-Pacific requires larger investments from the U.S. than Team Biden is currently ready to provide.

As a result, American policy in Asia is to speak loudly while brandishing a small stick. If we persist, it won’t matter how many toasts American and Japanese leaders drink together or how many memos of understanding they sign. Unless we get the basics right, Mr. Xi’s China will one day call our bluff.

WSJ Opinion: Nuclear Submarines, Aukus and Rebalancing the Indo-Pacific

Opinion | Ahead of state visit, an ‘epic’ shift in Japan’s defense posture

By Takeo Akiba

April 7, 2024 at 8:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Takeo Akiba · April 7, 2024

Takeo Akiba is the Japanese national security adviser.

The Meiji Restoration in the second half of the 19th century is regarded by the Japanese people as an epic period in which our nation transformed itself from a feudal society into a modern democratic state. As Western countries expanded their influence in East Asia, the government of Japan sought to catch up through industrial development and enhancement of military power, while accepting new values from the West.

Now, more than 150 years later, another epic change is underway, in which Japan sees its role in the world as one of maintaining universal values and protecting the international order based on the rule of law.

War in Ukraine has undermined the international order. The security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is inseparable, and now, other developments in the Indo-Pacific have threatened the international order. Military buildups, including nuclear weapons and missiles, cross-border cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructures, attempts to unilaterally change the status quo at sea and in the air, and information warfare have all placed Japan in its most severe security environment since World War II.

Against this challenging backdrop, Japan formulated a new national security strategy in December 2022 and decided to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who is visiting the United States this week, government ministries and agencies in Japan, sometimes noted for operating in self-contained silos, are now coordinating closely and remaking themselves for a new era.

Though it has long been true that the Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s security policy, Japan is at the same time fully committed to defending itself. Japan will take necessary measures to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense initiatives, up from 1.2 percent two years ago. In fact, Japan’s defense budget in fiscal 2024, which passed at the end of March after intense discussions at the Diet, increased by about 50 percent from fiscal 2022.

We are reshaping not only the size of the defense budget, but how the budget is spent. Japan decided to acquire counterstrike capabilities to deter armed attacks, a historic step for our country. Japan will acquire the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile system, or TLAMs, with the cooperation of the United States. By leveraging standoff defense capabilities including TLAMs, Japan will be able to conduct effective counterstrikes to prevent further attacks, while bolstering our missile defenses.

We are updating our domestic rules related to security policy as well. Japan has refrained from promoting arms exports, regardless of the destination, since the 1970s. However, this policy has proved increasingly unsuitable as security challenges have intensified.

Japan has opened a way to enable the transfer of a wider variety of defense equipment, including fighter jets co-developed with other countries. In December, Japan opted to transfer Patriot missiles to the United States to replenish the U.S. inventory. This policy change will help create a desirable security environment for Japan, while maintaining our firm and consistent position as a peace-loving nation. Now that production lines are severely stretched in various countries, Japan will seek the possibility of supporting its ally and like-minded countries in this field.

We have expanded the scope of our national security efforts into the economic field as well, to bolster our supply chain resilience, strengthen control of critical technologies and more effectively prevent unintended transfer of advanced technologies to other countries. And we intend to beef up our internal security protocols related to economic security by introducing security clearance legislation, which also will enable us to further deepen cooperation with other countries.

The threat of cyberattacks is growing rapidly. The Kishida administration is also preparing necessary legislation to strengthen defenses against cyberattacks and establish a new cybersecurity organization with strong resources and solid authority.

Our efforts should not be misinterpreted. Our goal is to strengthen deterrence and make room for genuine dialogues with countries and regions, including authoritarian regimes. Kishida’s visit to the United States this week will be a historic opportunity to underscore Japan’s commitment to improving the security environment and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law.

The Washington Post · by Takeo Akiba · April 7, 2024

14. Opinion | Thank China for our new three-way Pacific alliance

Map/graphics at the link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/09/china-united-states-japan-philippines-alliance-summit/

Excerpts:

For the Biden team, this summit is the culmination of years of work building new alliance groups in Asia. They have already held meetings with the leaders of the Quad (United States, Japan, Australia and India), AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom and United States), and Japan and South Korea last year at Camp David. This latest arrangement is sometimes internally called JAROPUS (Japan, Republic of Philippines and United States), an acronym coined by U.S. ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel that has not yet completely caught on.

“The Indo-Pacific comes down to two strategic visions,” Emanuel told me in an interview. “One is that this is China’s neighborhood and China makes the rules. The other is that the United States is a permanent Pacific power that you can bet long. The U.S. version is gaining ground.”

...

Washington has a tendency to focus on the urgent over the important. But with China’s power growing, the United States must demonstrate that despite two ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza and domestic political dysfunction, America can still play the geopolitical long game in Asia. Hopefully, this week’s trilateral summit will mark the beginning, not the end, of that effort.

Opinion | Thank China for our new three-way Pacific alliance

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · April 9, 2024

Israel and Ukraine might be sucking up all the foreign policy oxygen, but this week in Washington, one of the most significant international developments is something else entirely. The leaders of two important Asian allies will meet with the U.S. president, together, for the first time — highlighting a new three-way alliance. And the man who deserves the most credit for making this happen is, ironically, Chinese President Xi Jinping.

When President Biden meets with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. at the White House Wednesday, these leaders will present this new trilateral alliance as focused on common interests and principles such as freedom of navigation and rule of law, rather than as directed at any one country. But the subtext is clear: as China’s appetite for power and territory grows, Indo-Pacific allies are teaming up and asking for U.S. help.

For the Biden team, this summit is the culmination of years of work building new alliance groups in Asia. They have already held meetings with the leaders of the Quad (United States, Japan, Australia and India), AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom and United States), and Japan and South Korea last year at Camp David. This latest arrangement is sometimes internally called JAROPUS (Japan, Republic of Philippines and United States), an acronym coined by U.S. ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel that has not yet completely caught on.

“The Indo-Pacific comes down to two strategic visions,” Emanuel told me in an interview. “One is that this is China’s neighborhood and China makes the rules. The other is that the United States is a permanent Pacific power that you can bet long. The U.S. version is gaining ground.”

In the long run, just the countries’ common urge to oppose China’s aggression won’t be sufficient to sustain the momentum. Unless the United States improves the investment and trade elements of its Indo-Pacific strategy, Asian allies will eventually turn back to China out of economic necessity. But for now, Xi’s bullying is driving his neighbors to call for more U.S. engagement and cooperation.

“My message to Xi Jinping is, ‘Don’t change,’” Emanuel said, a bit facetiously. “Keep it up at home and in the neighborhood. He deserves recognition for all his assistance.”

The meeting’s backdrop is a tense, medium-boil crisis playing out now in the South China Sea. Beijing claims ownership of about 90 percent of this crucial waterway, which one-third of global shipping traverses each year. For years, Beijing has been harassing and threatening ships near disputed islands and geographical features it claims as its own. Lately, China’s tactics are increasingly dangerous.

Chinese Coast Guard ships have taken to shooting water cannons and even ramming Philippine ships trying to bring supplies to a reef called the Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands. Philippine troops occupy the reef, living on a decrepit ship that the country deliberately marooned there in 1999. This issue is so prominent in the Philippines that it has pushed Marcos, who came to power in 2022 with Beijing’s support, toward the Western camp.

Japan, which has its own territorial disputes with China, is already providing the Philippines with ships, radar and other technology to help it patrol its waters. Now, in advance of the summit, the three allies plus Australia have begun joint naval patrols in the South China Sea. Tokyo and Manila are also finalizing an agreement to permit Japanese troops to temporarily be based in the Philippines, alongside U.S. troops there.

China’s state media calls these moves provocative and destabilizing. Marcos’s break with China has also earned him the ire of domestic critics — including his own sister. But he says his country can only stand up to Beijing with the help of allies such as the United States and Japan, and that the best way to convince Xi to curb his aggression is by showing strength. He is right on both counts.

“The deterrence game is escalating in the South China Sea, with the Philippines on the front lines,” Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute, told me. “And all of this has huge implications for a Taiwan scenario.”

In my conversations with officials from both countries, their first question is always: What will Donald Trump do if he gets reelected? Nobody really knows, but based on Trump’s actions during his last term, Asian allies have reason for concern. Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Japan and South Korea if they didn’t pay more to host them. He “fell in love” with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un.

Trump had a good relationship with then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and then-Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, but both of those leaders are gone. Many officials in Trump’s administration who worked to bolster alliances in Asia won’t be back. In a second Trump term, the only sure bet is on unpredictability.

Washington has a tendency to focus on the urgent over the important. But with China’s power growing, the United States must demonstrate that despite two ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza and domestic political dysfunction, America can still play the geopolitical long game in Asia. Hopefully, this week’s trilateral summit will mark the beginning, not the end, of that effort.

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · April 9, 2024

15. Three surprises in the US military’s wish lists

The three:

The first surprise is that, though China is the stated strategic pacing threat, the UPLs are filled with shortfalls in capabilities related to this challenge. In fact, the commander of Indo-Pacific Command monopolizes the list in asking for $11 billion, which is 38% of the entire UPL requests, and tops its own previous-year needs by more than $7.5 billion.

...

The second surprise is that within the investment accounts, there is a very notable shift in the UPLs away from procurement and into military construction as well as research and development. In FY23, procurement made up 53% of the UPLs. In FY25, that is down to 30%, with well over half (54%) not even submitted by the military departments but instead coming from INDOPACOM and the National Guard Bureau.

...

The third surprise is in the readiness category, which includes appropriations for operations and maintenance as well as military personnel, along with targeted partner efforts funded through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Despite the FY25 budget request’s stated focus on readiness, the Air Force puts forth a single $1.5 billion request for spares, noting a one-time need for aircraft readiness that it could not fully fund in the budget due to fiscal constraints.

Three surprises in the US military’s wish lists

Defense News · by Elaine McCusker and Maj. Gen. John G. Ferrari (ret.) · April 9, 2024

The White House recently submitted a budget request for defense totaling $850 billion for the fiscal year that begins this coming Oct. 1. The president’s budget, while important, is only the start of the legislative process that determines the final level of funding for the military. Under the Constitution, Congress has the responsibility to “raise and support Armies” and to provide funding for that military. To do this job, Congress has public hearings with key defense leaders, private meetings with experts and internal deliberations among staff.

It also requires submission of the often-misunderstood unfunded priorities lists, or UPL.

As detailed in our newly published analysis, the 12 unfunded priorities lists that have been made public to date this year total $28.7 billion in funding shortfalls and represent the best professional military judgement of our nation’s most senior uniformed leaders.

These unfunded priorities equate to about 3.4% of the $850 billion budget request. Given that inflation remains at about 3.2% and the pay raise for military members is 4.5%, the 1% topline increase in the budget request, when combined with the 3.4% in additional funding within the UPLs, would keep the Pentagon at a roughly zero real growth rate.

As there are two major wars ongoing, several shadow wars and the potential for a major conflict with China, we can expect the Pentagon may also have a fiscal 2025 emergency supplemental in the works. Even with this context, the UPLs contained several interesting surprises.

The first surprise is that, though China is the stated strategic pacing threat, the UPLs are filled with shortfalls in capabilities related to this challenge. In fact, the commander of Indo-Pacific Command monopolizes the list in asking for $11 billion, which is 38% of the entire UPL requests, and tops its own previous-year needs by more than $7.5 billion.

Research and development UPLs related to the Pacific and space make up 83% of shortfalls. Similarly, military construction gaps are up $4 billion over last year, an increase that is almost entirely for INDOPACOM needs. High-dollar requirements listed include facilities in Guam; harbor improvements in Palau; runways, wharfs and harbor projects in Micronesia; and water treatment and hangar projects in Hawaii.

Large shortfalls to counter China signal what we already know: The defense budget is too small. But it also may indicate priority disagreements during program and budget decisions, or that INDOPACOM has a more unrestrained view of the process than the service chiefs, or that Congress tends to support INDOPACOM UPLs in how it rescues the Pentagon budget. It likely means all of these things.

The second surprise is that within the investment accounts, there is a very notable shift in the UPLs away from procurement and into military construction as well as research and development. In FY23, procurement made up 53% of the UPLs. In FY25, that is down to 30%, with well over half (54%) not even submitted by the military departments but instead coming from INDOPACOM and the National Guard Bureau.

With procurement the known bill-payer for this year’s stated budget focus on readiness and the near-term fight, the UPLs were expected to make up for the lack of funding to actually buy the ships, planes, ground vehicles and space systems we know we need to remain competitive and to sustain our industrial base and supply chains struggling under uncertain and insufficient budgets.

The third surprise is in the readiness category, which includes appropriations for operations and maintenance as well as military personnel, along with targeted partner efforts funded through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Despite the FY25 budget request’s stated focus on readiness, the Air Force puts forth a single $1.5 billion request for spares, noting a one-time need for aircraft readiness that it could not fully fund in the budget due to fiscal constraints.

In addition, INDOPACOM lists a $581 million gap, which essentially means that the day-to-day operating forces and contracted logistics support functions of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps components in the Pacific are underfunded, at least in the view of the INDOPACOM commander.

In conclusion, three key points stand out. The FY25 defense budget request is too low to meet even those readiness requirements it says it prioritizes, and it loses ground on crucial strategic innovation, posture and procurement efforts necessary for U.S. national security and military competitiveness.

UPLs are important tools in determining where to apply missing resources, but they also signal consequences to budget uncertainty and the resulting disjointed approach to supporting strategic priorities.

And third, as Congress examines the unfunded priorities and the capability gaps they represent to increase the defense budget to minimally required levels, it should also prioritize on-time enactment of annual appropriations as equally important to promoting our national security.

Elaine McCusker is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. She previously served as the Pentagon’s acting undersecretary of defense (comptroller). Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John G. Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at AEI. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the service.

16. Army's Premier Education Benefits May Be on Chopping Block, with Tuition Assistance Cuts Being Considered, Too

Excerpts:

Last week, Military.com reported the Army was eyeing cuts to its Credentialing Assistance program. But the potential upcoming cuts also include its tuition assistance program, the service confirmed to the publication. This is the first time tuition assistance being on the chopping block has been publicly acknowledged.

The education benefits, which are currently under review and cost the Army about $278 million last year, are broadly popular among the rank and file, and are among the service's premier recruiting and retention tools. The Army has historically seen furthering the education of its troops as key to a well-rounded force.

...

The cuts would not impact the GI Bill, which is controlled by the Department of Veterans Affairs, or scholarships through the National Guard, which are controlled by the states.

Army's Premier Education Benefits May Be on Chopping Block, with Tuition Assistance Cuts Being Considered, Too

military.com · by Steve Beynon · April 8, 2024

The Army is seeking cuts to two major education benefits -- a move that expands previously reported potential cutbacks to credentialing assistance for soldiers and that could affect more than 100,000 troops who tap the benefits each year.

Last week, Military.com reported the Army was eyeing cuts to its Credentialing Assistance program. But the potential upcoming cuts also include its tuition assistance program, the service confirmed to the publication. This is the first time tuition assistance being on the chopping block has been publicly acknowledged.

The education benefits, which are currently under review and cost the Army about $278 million last year, are broadly popular among the rank and file, and are among the service's premier recruiting and retention tools. The Army has historically seen furthering the education of its troops as key to a well-rounded force.

"The Army recognizes the value of both to support our soldiers' professional development and readiness levels," Maj. Andrea Kelly, a service spokesperson, said in a statement to Military.com. "However, in order to ensure their long-term sustainability, the Army is conducting a thorough review of both programs."

The news comes as college degrees and civilian training are becoming more relevant in the service, especially among noncommissioned officers for whom civilian education is quickly becoming expected. The Army is also in the midst of a historic recruiting shortage, and education benefits have long been a critical incentive to fill the ranks.

It's unclear what prompted the benefits review, or whether those funds are even able to be siphoned to other priorities, as law sometimes dictates the services spend money in specific ways. The Army declined interview requests with officials for this story, including with Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Weimer, whose office is traditionally the center of gravity for issues pertaining to the enlisted force, which most often uses the benefits.

Tuition assistance was introduced in 1999, but it was broadly implemented in the Army in 2002 in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks when the service needed to quickly beef up its ranks. At the time, college was also becoming a greater priority both in the service and in the civilian workforce.

Since 2020, about 101,000 soldiers across all Army components use the benefit each year -- averaging about $218 million in cost. But it's unclear what specific cuts or changes to tuition assistance the Army is mulling.

The Army's Credentialing Assistance Program, or Army CA, was introduced forcewide in 2020 in its current form, after evolving from a smaller version of the benefit. It was broadly seen by senior leadership as key during a time in which the service wanted troops to have diverse skill sets outside of their military occupation.

At the same time, the Army CA benefit could set soldiers up for success in the civilian world when they transition out of the service.

In the last four years, 64,500 soldiers have used the benefit, with licensing and qualifications in project management, personal training and piloting being among the most frequently chosen fields. The use of the benefit has ballooned since 2020, costing $8 million then and growing to $60.2 million last year, according to data provided by the Army.

Right now, the service is looking to cut its credentialing benefit in 2025 from $4,000 per year without a cap on use to just $1,000 per year and never to exceed $4,000 in a soldier's career, sources with direct knowledge of the deliberations explained to Military.com. The publication also reviewed an internal brief and emails confirming the plans, though it was unclear whether those plans had been finalized.

The cuts would not impact the GI Bill, which is controlled by the Department of Veterans Affairs, or scholarships through the National Guard, which are controlled by the states.

Service-specific education benefits are built for soldiers to use while in service and can be employed piecemeal -- whereas the GI Bill is generally built to be used in semesters, which is often impractical for active-duty troops. The GI Bill is also a benefit that can be transferred to a spouse or child.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · April 8, 2024

17. Status of the War in Ukraine: Observations from my latest visit, Part 1 by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

Summary: Avoiding a Strategy for Defeat

The topic of war strategy was one of several significant takeaways from my latest visit to Ukraine. I would summarise this strategic issue as follows:

War Strategy: Shifting Focus from ‘Defending Ukraine’ to ‘Defeating Russia’. The strategy of Ukraine, and its western supporters, must change. Russia has proved to be more resilient and adaptive than anticipated in the early days of the war. In the third year of the war, Russia has momentum and also has the strategic initiative. The Ukrainian pathway to victory is unclear without a change in direction in NATO and US policy for the war, from helping Ukraine defend itself to helping Ukraine defeat Russia in Ukraine. This must be accompanied by increased resourcing and a Ukrainian ‘theory of victory’.

That concludes my first short article about my insights into the status of the war in Ukraine after 770 days. I will publish more insights from my recent Ukraine visit over the coming days. In my next post, I will examine how strategy and progress in the war is being communicated.

Status of the War in Ukraine

Observations from my latest visit, Part 1

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/status-of-the-war-in-ukraine

MICK RYAN

APR 08, 2024

∙ PAID

Image: President of Ukraine website

In the past week, I conducted another visit to Ukraine. I travelled with a small team of colleagues from the Washington DC-based Centre for Strategic and international Studies (CSIS) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Our visit included meetings with government and non-government organisations, including the following:

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence.
Ukrainian Military Intelligence.
The Ukrainian Committee for National Security and Defence.
The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries.
Non-government agencies. This included organisations that are developing advanced technologies including drones and digitised command and control capabilities such as the Rapid Capabilities Group and Come Back Alive, as well as the Centre for Defence Strategies (with a focus on the impact of current and next generation drones), and the Centre for Strategic Communications and Information Security.

Over the next week, I will publish a series of short articles here for subscribers that describe the insights I gained from this visit. There were many. But perhaps the most important was related to the strategy for the war.

War Strategy

A compelling theme of this visit was that the strategy of Ukraine, and its western supporters, needs to change in the short term. The current approach, particularly that of the United States, which provides just enough support to keep Ukraine afloat and wrings its hands over even the smallest chances of ‘escalation’ is not tenable. If sustained, it will be a strategy for defeat.

Russia has proved to be more resilient and adaptive than anticipated in the early days of the war. In the third year of the war, Russia has momentum and also has the strategic initiative. It’s global misinformation campaign to convince Ukraine’s supporters that Russian victory is inevitable has been amplified in public discourse, including by Western politicians.

Russia’s defence production is surging forward. With a combination of early industrial mobilisation in 2022, increased domestic production, import of dual use goods from China, subverting of sanctions on western high technology components and leveraging Cold War stockpiles and mothballed factories, Russia is now in a position to resource its strategy to subjugate Ukraine in a way that it was not when it began its large-scale invasion in February 2022.

Mobilisation is popular in Russia. Because of the pay offered, it has seen many Russians change their economic status with an influx of money that would otherwise have been unimaginable for many poorer Russian citizens.

Russia has also recovered psychologically from the shock of its early failures in the war. Like all strategic surprises, the Russian losses in 2022 sent shockwaves through the Russian system. However, the Russian government has now recovered and has a sense of optimism and even over-confidence about its prospects in the war that was not obvious even a year ago.

In this environment, western governments have a choice to make. They might decide that Russia is too powerful and that an accommodation is necessary. Or, they might decide that a Russian victory is not assured and is not desirable because of the follow-on impacts for European and Asian security.

The later is the only realistic, and moral, option for Western nations.

Russia has vulnerabilities which, because of the shortfalls in western assistance, Ukraine has not been able to exploit. And, if Russia succeeds in Ukraine, there is a realistic expectation among European strategists and analysts that Russia will seek to then takeover Baltic states and confront NATO in other ways.

A Russian success in Ukraine is also certain to embolden Iran in the Middle East, North Korea on the Korean Peninsula and most dangerously, China in the western Pacific. Russian failure in Ukraine, on the other hand, buys time for Europe to rearm and redevelop its defences, and will give pause to other predatory authoritarians.

There are three key implications of this.

First, we need to adopt a broader view of the threat posed by authoritarian states. Collectively, Iran, Russia, North Korea and China are fighting an ideological conflict against the collective ‘west’. This was a key element of Putin’s most recent speeches about the war and has also been a constant them in President Xi’s speeches. This axis of authoritarians are fighting a single entity – the West – and we will need to adopt a similar approach.

This will have military, industrial, financial, informational and diplomatic dimensions, and all of these require additional investment. And it demands a reduction in our redlines and the current political terror over escalation that has been seen in Western capitals since the start of the war. Russia exploits our fear of redlines, and uses to its advantage the western propensity to ‘kick the can down the road’ with difficult strategic problems. Some strategic risk taking on the part of Western nations is necessary.

Second, there is an urgent need for a strategic policy change from ‘defend Ukraine’ to ‘defeat Russia in Ukraine’ in NATO countries and beyond. While resourcing this changed strategy will mean higher defence budgets, greater investment in defence industry and significantly increased aid to Ukraine, the cost of not doing so will be an order of magnitude greater in long run than cost of adopting this policy, and resourcing it, in the short term. European nations are beginning to step up to this challenge but this needs to accelerate. Countries such as Canada, Japan, Australia and others can do much more than they currently are.

Third, Indo-Pacific nations have a direct interest in Ukrainian security and the defeat of Russia. Countries such as Japan, with their massive financial assistance packages for Ukraine and visits by Japanese officials to the nation appear to understand this. Australia, with its relatively small aid so far and lack of diplomatic presence in Ukraine, appears to yet develop such an appreciation. European and Asian nations face a common, joined-up threat from authoritarian regimes which now dominate the Eurasian landmass. There is a common interest among all democracies to challenge, and push back, this threat.

A common topic in much of our discourse in Ukraine, which is related to this shift in strategic policy, is the current lack of a clear Ukrainian theory of victory. One of Ukraine’s biggest challenges at presence is the definition of ‘what victory is’. This is something that Ukraine will need to develop. At the same time, it will need to discuss its theory of victory with its supporters.

The theory of victory will need to include how Russia might be defeated in Ukraine, as well as the conditions that such a defeat seeks to impose: NATO membership for Ukraine, a reduced threat from Russia, reconstruction, justice and other subjects are all part of the desired conditions. Possessing a compelling theory of victory will also provide the foundation for a transformed strategic narrative, which is explored in the next article.

I have previously discussed what some elements of a Ukrainian theory of victory might look like here.

Overall, it is difficult to envision a Ukrainian pathway to victory without a change in direction with NATO and US policy in this war, including a significant increase in resources for Ukraine from its supporters.

Summary: Avoiding a Strategy for Defeat

The topic of war strategy was one of several significant takeaways from my latest visit to Ukraine. I would summarise this strategic issue as follows:

War Strategy: Shifting Focus from ‘Defending Ukraine’ to ‘Defeating Russia’. The strategy of Ukraine, and its western supporters, must change. Russia has proved to be more resilient and adaptive than anticipated in the early days of the war. In the third year of the war, Russia has momentum and also has the strategic initiative. The Ukrainian pathway to victory is unclear without a change in direction in NATO and US policy for the war, from helping Ukraine defend itself to helping Ukraine defeat Russia in Ukraine. This must be accompanied by increased resourcing and a Ukrainian ‘theory of victory’.

That concludes my first short article about my insights into the status of the war in Ukraine after 770 days. I will publish more insights from my recent Ukraine visit over the coming days. In my next post, I will examine how strategy and progress in the war is being communicated.

18. Strategic Influence & the War in Ukraine: Observations from my latest visit, Part 2 by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

Summary: Adapting Ukraine’s Strategic Influence Activities

The challenge with strategic communications was a significant observation during my latest visit to Ukraine. I would summarise this strategic issue as follows:

Ukrainian Strategic Communications: Failing to Cut Through. Ukraine is failing to gain the kind of strategic communications cut through that it was able to achieve in the first year after the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. The recent speech by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church also appears to have provided clarified purpose for Russia’s attempt to subjugate Ukraine. Ukraine needs to discover a ‘new voice’ that explains the importance of defending Ukraine, why Western support is vital, and that Russian narratives about an inevitable Russian victory are wrong.

That concludes the second in this series of insights into the status of the war in Ukraine after 770 days. I will publish more insights from my latest Ukraine visit over the coming days.

Strategic Influence & the War in Ukraine

Observations from my latest visit, Part 2

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/strategic-influence-and-the-war-in

MICK RYAN

APR 09, 2024

∙ PAID

Image: President of Ukraine website

Last week, I conducted my fourth visit to Ukraine.

This week, I am publishing a series of short articles for subscribers that describe the insights I gained from this visit. The first piece, published yesterday, examined strategy for the war from the perspective of Ukraine and Western nations. As I wrote in that article, we must shift from a strategy of ‘defending Ukraine’ to one of ‘defeating Russia in Ukraine’. This evolved strategy must be resourced appropriately and rapidly.

In this second article describing my observations on the status of the war in Ukraine, I will explore strategic communications and the narratives employed by Ukraine to build national unity and gain international support.

Ukrainian Strategic Communications and Influence

It is clear to many of the Ukrainians we spoke with during the visit, as well as external observers, that Ukraine is failing to gain the kind of strategic communications cut through that it was able to achieve in the first year after the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. President Zelensky was extraordinarily successful in using social media and appearances at national and multi-national events in gaining diplomatic, military, financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

This Zelensky Effect and the power of Ukraine’s strategic influence activities now appears to be waning. There are a multiple of possible explanations for this, and the current challenges are probably a combination of all of the below:

The lack of a clear Ukrainian theory of victory. As discussed in my previous post, without a clear vision of what a Ukrainian victory looks like, which can be understood by Western politicians and publics, Ukrainian strategic influence activities will continue to struggle against Russian misinformation efforts. Not only does a theory of victory drive strategy, such a theory also drives how the war is portrayed in strategic narratives.
The failure of the 2023 Ukrainian counter offensive. This promised a lot (although much of the build up was also by western press, others in Ukraine must also bear some of the blame). This ‘over promise and under deliver’ approach must not be repeated.
The 2023-2024 mobilisation debate. This has been problematic in Ukraine and the current bill that is being finalised apparently has thousands of amendments. While domestically decisive, internationally it has resulted in questions about the commitment of some elements of Ukrainian society to winning the war.
The Zelensky-Zaluzhny civil-military crisis. This was a political rather than personal issue, with the Ukrainian president with close advisors seeing the popular Zaluzhny as a potential rival. Zaluzhny’s public comment in publications such as Time only fanned the flamed the issue. But the failure of the counter offensive was also a key determinant. This was a significant tactical and strategic failure, and someone had to be held accountable.
Several corruption scandals. The procurement scandals under Defence Minister Reznikov and with military recruiting have hurt Ukraine, despite the Ukrainian government’s significant efforts to counter institutional corruption.
The US congressional debate over assistance. This has resulted in Ukraine now being a partisan issue in the US and has seen some politicians reaching for any excuse not to support Ukraine.

There are several other challenges in Ukraine’s strategic influence activities which need to be addressed.

Part of the challenge for Ukraine in the construction of its strategic narratives is that there is no overarching state agency responsible for coordinating strategic messaging. The office of President does presidential messaging, but the strategic influence activities of all other government departments is done informally through horizontal coordination. Improved strategic messaging from Ukraine will probably require improved internal coordination of those strategic influence activities.

The challenge of countering Russian messaging and global misinformation operations is profound. Russia has continued to evolve its strategic messaging through multiple means in the past two years. It’s messaging has two key audiences:

A global audience to improve support for Russia and decrease western support for Ukraine.
A Ukraine audience, with the aim of fracturing Ukrainian unity but also message about a corrupt Ukrainian military to reduce the desire of Ukrainians to serve in the military.

The recent document issued by the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church also appears to have provided clarified purpose for Russia’s attempt to subjugate Ukraine. It includes statements such as the following:

The borders of the Russian World as a spiritual and cultural-civilizational phenomenon are significantly wider than the state borders of both the present Russian Federation and the greater historical Russia…Russia should become one of the leading centers of the multipolar world, leading integration processes and ensuring security and stable development throughout the post-Soviet space.

This was a call to arms and provides an ideological foundation for the words and deeds of the Russian state henceforth. As one of our interlocutors noted, Russia has now confirmed the ideological basis for their place in the world and the rationale for their war in Ukraine. This sees them possess a new sense of confidence and arrogance which is extraordinarily dangerous and sets the conditions for strategic miscalculation on the part of Putin.

A couple of other external factors are also having an impact.

The war in Gaza has seen a significant amount of media effort being reallocated from Ukraine to Israel’s operations in Gaza. This has included the physical relocation of media teams from different agencies. As a consequence, there is less visibility of the war with Western publics. This decrease in attention from western citizens has provided a cue for some Western politicians to ‘move on’ from the war, and this makes it more difficult for Ukrainian strategic messaging to ‘cut through’.

A second factor is ‘war weariness’. While it is difficult to understand how citizens of western nations, who are not asked to fight or even pay new taxes for the war, can be ‘weary’ it is unfortunately a phenomenon that has appeared in the last year. Useful articles on this topic have been published by The Economist and Foreign Affairs (among others). This has exacerbated by Russian misinformation operations and as a result, there has been multiple polls showing decline support among Western citizens for supporting Ukraine. As a side issue, this ‘war weariness’ in western nations is also an indication of declining national resilience.

Finally, the inability of contemporary politicians to explain the war to their citizens, and to enunciate a clear rationale for supporting Ukraine, is a significant issue. It is a challenge that is relevant not only to supporting Ukraine but building the political resolve in democracies to resist the coercion and other activities of authoritarian countries.

There are some notable exceptions to this, with Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas being a superb strategic communicator with a clear message about why supporting Ukraine and resisting Russia is a vital national interest for all Western nations. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has also done a commendable job in communicating with western publics about the war.

As a consequence of all these elements, Ukraine needs to discover a ‘new voice’ that explains the importance of defending Ukraine, why Western support is vital, how Russian brutality must be stopped, and that Russian narratives about an inevitable Russian victory are wrong. It is a difficult task.

It is however an essential undertaking for 2024. The development of new messages and approaches to messaging must be primarily undertaken by Ukraine but can be supported by NATO and its individual members. I would propose that this new strategic narrative will need to encompass the following macro-ideas:

Russia is dangerous, brutal towards civilians but beatable; Ukraine is hurt but can win with our support.

And, importantly, the new narrative needs to focus on an approach that incorporates under-promising but over-delivering with regards to military operations.

Summary: Adapting Ukraine’s Strategic Influence Activities

The challenge with strategic communications was a significant observation during my latest visit to Ukraine. I would summarise this strategic issue as follows:

Ukrainian Strategic Communications: Failing to Cut Through. Ukraine is failing to gain the kind of strategic communications cut through that it was able to achieve in the first year after the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. The recent speech by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church also appears to have provided clarified purpose for Russia’s attempt to subjugate Ukraine. Ukraine needs to discover a ‘new voice’ that explains the importance of defending Ukraine, why Western support is vital, and that Russian narratives about an inevitable Russian victory are wrong.

That concludes the second in this series of insights into the status of the war in Ukraine after 770 days. I will publish more insights from my latest Ukraine visit over the coming days.

19. Putin and Xi’s Unholy Alliance

Excerpts;

Indeed, the deepening of this partnership is one of the most consequential results of the Ukrainian tragedy. Moscow and Beijing may never sign a formal alliance, but the evolution of their relationship in the years ahead will increasingly affect the world and challenge the West.

To come to terms with this development, Western policymakers should abandon the idea that they can drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. Under Trump, the National Security Council entertained the idea of a “reverse Kissinger” approach of engaging Russia, the weaker partner, but to no avail. Whereas former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger courted communist China during the Cold War by offering Beijing a normalization of ties with the United States, U.S. officials cannot extend a deal of that sort to either Moscow or Beijing at this point. Any hopes of peeling them away from each other are nothing more than wishful thinking. Certainly, the Sino-Russian relationship is not without its strains, and existing tensions may be exacerbated as China grows more confident and is tempted to start bossing around the Russians in a more heavy-handed way—something that no ruler in Moscow would take lightly. For now, however, Beijing and Moscow have demonstrated a remarkable ability to manage their differences.

If the China-Russia tandem is here to stay, Western leaders must build a long-term strategy that will help maintain peace by accounting for all the ramifications of having to compete with China and Russia simultaneously. For a start, the West will need to find the right balance between deterrence and reassurance with Moscow and Beijing to avoid dangerous escalatory situations that could arise from accidents, misperceptions, and miscommunication. Western governments should consider the second-order effects of the coercive economic measures they have applied to Russia and China and how retaliatory countermeasures further erode the fabric of globalization. And while they should not tolerate Russian and Chinese disinformation and attempts to subvert the functioning of international institutions, Western countries should seek to make some of these institutions, such as the United Nations and its related agencies, functional again even with Beijing and Moscow on board. When considering how to protect European and Asian security, rein in climate change, govern new disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, and address the challenges facing global financial architecture, Western policymakers must now reckon with the reality of an increasingly resolute Sino-Russian axis.

Putin and Xi’s Unholy Alliance

Why the West Won’t Be Able to Drive a Wedge Between Russia and China

By Alexander Gabuev

April 9, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Alexander Gabuev · April 9, 2024

Just a decade ago, most U.S. and European officials were dismissive about the durability of the emerging partnership between China and Russia. The thinking in Western capitals was that the Kremlin’s ostentatious rapprochement with China since 2014 was doomed to fail because ties between the two Eurasian giants would always be undercut by the growing power asymmetry in China’s favor, the lingering mistrust between the two neighbors over a number of historical disputes, and the cultural distance between the two societies and between their elites. No matter how hard Russian President Vladimir Putin might try to woo the Chinese leadership, the argument went, China would always value its ties to the United States and to U.S. allies over its symbolic relations with Russia, while Moscow would fear a rising Beijing and seek a counterbalance in the West.

Even as China and Russia have grown significantly closer, officials in Washington have remained dismissive. “They have a marriage of convenience,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told U.S. senators in March 2023 during Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s state visit to Moscow. “I am not sure if it is conviction. Russia is very much the junior partner in this relationship.” And yet that skepticism fails to reckon with an important and grim reality: China and Russia are more firmly aligned now than at any time since the 1950s.

The tightening of this alignment between Russia and China is one of the most important geopolitical outcomes of Putin’s war against Ukraine. The conscious efforts of Xi and Putin drive much of this reorientation, but it is also the byproduct of the deepening schism between the West and both countries. Western officials cannot wish this axis away, hoping in vain that the Kremlin bridles at its vassalage to Zhongnanhai or making futile attempts to drive a wedge between the two powers. Instead, the West should be prepared for an extended period of simultaneous confrontation with two immense nuclear-armed powers.

A Partnership with Limits

In a joint statement issued on February 4, 2022, Putin and Xi described ties between their two countries as a “partnership without limits.” That phrase won a lot of attention in the West, especially after Putin invaded Ukraine just 20 days later. Yet the deepening partnership was not born in February 2022. Following the bitter estrangement of the Sino-Soviet split that spanned the 1960s to the 1980s, China and Russia have become closer for several pragmatic reasons. Both sides wanted to make the territorial conflict between them a thing of the past, and by 2006, their 2,615-mile border had finally been fully delimited. Economic complementarity also drove them together: Russia had an abundance of natural resources but needed technology and money, while China needed natural resources and had money to spare and technology to share. And as Russia grew increasingly authoritarian with Putin in charge since 2000, Beijing and Moscow teamed up at the UN Security Council, using their power as permanent members to push back against many of the positions and norms advocated by Western countries, including the use of sanctions against authoritarian regimes and U.S.-led pressure campaigns in regional hot spots such as Syria.

China and Russia have also long shared a distrust of the United States, seeing Washington as an ideology-driven global hegemon that wants to prevent Beijing and Moscow from taking their rightful places in leading the world order and, even worse, that aims to topple their regimes. The ideological and political compatibility between China’s party-state and an increasingly authoritarian Russia has also grown. Leaders in Beijing and Moscow also refrained from criticizing the other’s record of repression at home and treatment of national minorities—subjects routinely brought up by Western counterparts.

Russia and China’s growing closeness is one of the most important outcomes of the war in Ukraine.

After the breakdown of Russian relations with the United States following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin pivoted to the East to offset the effect of Western economic sanctions and make the Russian economy more resilient to Western pressure. Russia, whose defense industry survived the lean 1990s largely by selling arms to China, stepped up its exports of more sophisticated weaponry to its southern neighbor, such as S-400 surface-to-air missiles and Su-35 fighter jets, and invested in expanding pipelines, railroads, ports, and cross-border bridges that bring Russian natural resources to the Chinese market and Chinese imports to Russia.

As a result, the share of bilateral trade between the countries in Russia’s overall trade jumped from ten percent before the annexation of Crimea to 18 percent before Putin’s full-scale onslaught against Ukraine in 2022. The EU remained a more important partner for Russia, however, accounting for 38 percent of the country’s trade, as well as being the country’s largest investor and technology provider and a key destination for oil and gas exports. As for China, Russia accounted for only 2.5 percent of its trade in 2022, barely scraping into the ranks of its top 10 trading partners. China has counted its commercial, financial, and technological ties to the United States and Europe as far more important for the dynamism of the Chinese economy than its equivalent ties to Russia.

This helps to explain why, after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine—which by many accounts Beijing had not expected—China tried to sit on the fence. It maintained ties with Russia, seized the opportunity to buy cheap Russian oil (as did other fence sitters, including India), and did not directly criticize Russian aggression. At the same time, it refrained from supplying Moscow lethal aid except for occasional small shipments of gunpowder and other war-related materials, formally supported Ukrainian territorial integrity, and did not engage in gross violations of Western sanctions—although several Chinese companies were put under U.S. and EU sanctions in early 2024 for shipping banned goods to Russia.

The Great Quantitative Leap

Despite Beijing’s initially cautious approach, most available data points to a much more robust relationship between China and Russia developing in the two years since the invasion. In 2022, bilateral trade grew by 36 percent to $190 billion. In 2023, it grew to $240 billion, surpassing the $200 billion mark in November, a goal that Xi and Putin initially intended to reach in 2025. China has imported energy commodities worth $129 billion—mostly oil, pipeline gas, liquefied natural gas, and coal—that account for 73 percent of Russian exports to China, as well as metals, agricultural products, and wood. At the same time, China has exported to Russia goods worth $111 billion, dominated by industrial equipment (around 23 percent of exports), cars (20 percent), and consumer electronics (15 percent).

Western export controls and the increased focus of Western capitals on the enforcement of sanctions have meant that Russia has no other long-term option than to shift to importing Chinese-manufactured industrial and consumer goods. As a result, sales of Chinese industrial equipment jumped by 54 percent in 2023 compared with the previous year, and sales of Chinese cars nearly quadrupled, making Russia the largest overseas market for Chinese automobiles with combustion engines. Hidden in these figures are Chinese-made items that directly boost the Russian military machine, including growing exports of chips, optics, drones, and sophisticated manufacturing tools.

China and Russia have grown notably closer in the critical area of security and military cooperation. Even amid Russia’s war of aggression, China’s People’s Liberation Army has increased the number of joint activities it performs with the Russian military. In September 2022, despite significant problems on the frontlines in Ukraine, Russia conducted a strategic exercise in its Far East to which China sent 2,000 troops. A few months later, in December, the Chinese and Russian navies held their annual exercise, this time in the East China Sea. In 2023, Beijing and Moscow held three rounds of naval exercises, and in 2022 and 2023, they conducted four joint patrols in Asia with nuclear-armed bombers. These activities still clearly lack the breadth and depth of the joint drills between the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia, but the Chinese and Russian militaries are undoubtedly deepening their interoperability.

Warships during a joint naval exercise held by China, Iran, and Russia in the Gulf of Oman, March 2024

Iranian Army / West Asia News Agency / Reuters

That closeness is reflected in diplomacy as well. Since the war in Ukraine, in-person meetings between Russian and Chinese elites have increased markedly. The Kremlin and Zhongnanhai have worked together before, but personal bonds were rare, with the exception of that between Putin and Xi. Now the two presidents have made a point of encouraging their top officials to work together and to get to know each other. Since Xi’s state visit to Russia in March 2023, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and senior members of his team have traveled to China twice, in addition to Putin’s own trip to Beijing in October. Throughout 2023, many senior Russian officials and CEOs of the largest state-owned and private companies shuttled to and from China. Senior Chinese leaders—especially those from the military and security sectors—have also made trips to Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is currently in Beijing for talks with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. It is notable that this traffic is mostly one-sided—senior Russian officials and business leaders are going to China much more frequently than their Chinese counterparts go the other way, a clear indication of Russia’s desperate need for China. The one exception is the military-security domain, where the visits of high-ranking officials have tended to be symmetrical and reciprocal.

Beyond professional ties, connections to China are becoming increasingly important for Russian elites in crafting futures for themselves and their offspring. Most of these figures are now under Western sanctions, with the possibility of keeping their wealth in the West or sending their children to the United States or Europe for education foreclosed. The top Chinese and Hong Kong universities, meanwhile, are ranked much higher than similar institutions in Russia. There is growing anecdotal evidence that for the first time in Russian history, members of the Russian elite and their children have started to learn Mandarin.

The overall warming of attitudes to China is reflected in opinion polls, too, including recent data produced by the joint efforts of the Carnegie Endowment and the Levada Center, the independent Russian polling organization. At the end of 2023, 85 percent of Russians viewed China positively, whereas only six percent had a negative opinion of the country. Nearly three-quarters of Russians do not believe China is a threat to them—against around a fifth of Russians who think China is a threat. Over half of Russians now want their children to learn Chinese, a stunning development. More than 80 percent of people still want their kids to learn English, but the number of people interested in Mandarin is rising rapidly. The most China-friendly attitudes are recorded in the Russian Far East, a region that shares a border with China and is most exposed to the country in day-to-day life. This generally positive public disposition to China has allowed the Kremlin to enter a closer economic, technological, and political embrace with Beijing than ever before.

A Friend in Need

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, war has become the organizing principle of Russian domestic, economic, and foreign policy. The Kremlin now assesses every relationship with a foreign power through a lens of three essential considerations: whether this relationship can help Russia directly on the battlefield in Ukraine, whether it can help to sustain the Russian economy and circumvent sanctions, and whether it can help Moscow push back against the West and punish the United States and its allies for supporting Kyiv.

Russia’s relationship with China emphatically checks all three boxes. Russia’s cooperation with China has to a large extent enabled Putin to continue his aggression against Ukraine. Beijing is not providing direct lethal aid to Moscow, but China’s indirect support for the Russian war effort is indispensable. It includes the supply of commercial surveillance drones, Chinese-made computer chips, and other critical components used by the Russian defense industry. On the economic front, Putin’s war chest relies heavily on revenue from Chinese purchases of Russian exports. The clearance of payments in the Chinese yuan keeps the Russian financial system afloat, and imports of cars, electronics, and other consumer goods keep shops well stocked and ordinary Russians quiet.

More telling, however, is Russia’s decision to firmly align with China in its geopolitical contest with the United States. Before the war, some voices in the Kremlin privately urged caution and advised against blindly rushing into China’s arms. The fragmentation of global order, skeptics warned, could lead to China’s emergence as a hegemon in its neighborhood and the most potent power in Eurasia—with Russia playing the role of a subservient vassal for many years to come. Accordingly, before February 24, Russia tried to guard its own autonomy by maintaining at least some balance in its relationships with the U.S.-led West and China, although the anti-Western tilt in Moscow’s policy became increasingly pronounced after Putin formally returned to the presidency in 2012.

War has become the organizing principle of Russian economic and foreign policy.

The full-blown invasion of Ukraine has destroyed that precarious balance once and for all. With the West helping to kill Russian soldiers and waging an economic war against Russia, it is no longer possible for the Kremlin to maintain ties with the United States and its partners in Europe and Asia. Throughout the war, Putin has reiterated that Moscow’s true enemy is not Ukraine but the West, which he claims seeks to weaken and dismember Russia. Helping China undermine U.S. global dominance is thus an important Russian goal because it can hasten victory in the war against the West that the Kremlin believes it is fighting. This change in attitude explains Moscow’s desire to step up military and technological cooperation with Beijing, as does China’s growing leverage in the bilateral relationship—Russia is having a hard time resisting China’s requests to share sensitive technology. Integrating Russia’s economy, brainpower, and military technology into a Pax Sinica, a Chinese-led order with Eurasia at its geographic heart, is the only way Russia can sustain its confrontation with the West.

Unsurprisingly, this shift has only exacerbated the asymmetry that characterizes Sino-Russian relations. As a larger and more technologically advanced economy that maintains pragmatic ties with the West, China has stronger bargaining power and many more options than does Russia, and its leverage over its northern neighbor is growing all the time. Russia is now locking itself into vassalage to China. A couple of years down the road, Beijing will be more able to dictate the terms of economic, technological, and regional cooperation with Moscow. The Kremlin is not blind to that prospect, but it does not have much choice as long as Putin needs Chinese support to fight his war in Ukraine, which has become an obsession.

To be sure, vassalage to China will not necessarily constitute full and unconditional subordination. North Korea, which depends on Beijing for nearly every aspect of its security and economy, has some maneuvering space when it comes to its giant neighbor, and Pyongyang can sometimes make moves that upset Beijing—for example, when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered the assassination in 2017 of his half-brother Kim Jong Nam, who was living under de facto Chinese protection. Russia is much more powerful than North Korea. No matter how much it needs Chinese support, it will not simply become China’s quiescent and obedient servant.

New Chinese-made cars arriving at a commercial port in Vladivostok, Russia, August 2023

Tatiana Meel / Reuters

Putin likes to rationalize his fateful choices by looking to historical analogies. Late last year, he referred to the thirteenth-century prince Alexander Nevsky, who ruled multiple principalities in what is now modern Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine as a vassal of the Mongol empire that at the time, ironically, also included China. Nevsky is lionized in Russian history as the leader who repulsed several attacks from the west, notably his defeat in 1242 of the Livonian Order that sought to spread Western Catholicism into regions where Eastern Orthodoxy was predominant. Putin sees himself following in Nevsky’s footsteps, defying the West even as he defers to the East. “Prince Alexander Nevsky traveled to the Horde, bowed to the Khan and obtained a Khan’s edict for his reign, primarily to be able to effectively resist the invasion of the West,” Putin remarked in November 2023. “Why? Because the Horde, arrogant and cruel as it was, never threatened our greatest treasure—our language, traditions, and culture, something the Western conquerors were eager to suppress.” The parallels are clear: the Russian ruler today is ready to tolerate vassalage to a power that does not threaten Russian identity and does not interfere too much in domestic affairs in order to push back against the West, which Putin and his ideologues portray as decadent and a mortal threat to traditional Russian values.

For its part, China has also come to see Russia as part of a fundamental geopolitical realignment. Going into 2021, Beijing had reasons to hope that its relations with the United States—the most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century—would be back on a predictable trajectory after the disruptive presidency of Donald Trump. Although China could not expect a comprehensive détente, it hoped for a healthier mix of competition and cooperation between the two most powerful countries in the world. Not only did Chinese decision-makers know the team of experienced foreign policy operators in the new White House, but Xi’s personal relationship with Biden dated back to the then vice president’s visit to China in 2011. But Beijing’s hopes were dashed when Biden retained much of Trump’s hawkish China policy, which involved strengthening military partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and limiting China’s access to cutting-edge U.S. technology as much as possible. Unforeseen developments, such as U.S. House of Representative’s Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, have also convinced Beijing that China’s confrontation with the United States is bound to deepen, regardless of who occupies the White House.

This realization shapes how China thinks about its relationship with Russia. Following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing made sure to ascertain the United States’ red lines and largely tried to adhere to them. However, as Xi discovered in October 2022 after Biden authorized far-reaching U.S. export controls targeting China, such a cautious approach will not stop Washington from trying to constrain Beijing. Throwing Putin under the bus was never an option for Zhongnanhai, since China is afraid of potential instability in Russia and the prospect of a pro-Western regime installed in the Kremlin should Putin abruptly leave the political scene. And if a protracted confrontation between China and the United States is inevitable, Beijing needs all the partners it can get, since the United States enjoys a huge advantage in its large network of resourceful allies.

Back-to-Back in Eurasia

No other power can bring as much to China’s table as Russia, particularly right now. Russia’s abundance of natural resources—not just oil and gas but also metals, uranium, fertilizers, wood, agricultural goods, and water—can help feed the Chinese economy. The problem for Russia, of course, is that this trade with China will increasingly occur with prices dictated by Beijing and payable in yuan. In the meantime, this flow of Russian resources boosts China’s energy and food security while decreasing its dependency on vulnerable maritime routes such as the Malaka Strait, which is patrolled by the U.S. Navy. It also increases the competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing by lowering energy costs. Although the Russian market is much smaller than the U.S. or EU markets, it is still sizable and increasingly hungry for Chinese products. Russian sales are becoming ever more important for Chinese manufacturers, given unstable domestic demand in China and decreasing exports to traditional markets in the West. Moreover, since 70 percent of Chinese trade with Russia is settled in yuan, Beijing can treat the trade relationship as a flagship project for its currency’s internationalization. Indeed, in November 2023, the yuan’s share of global trade reached 4.61 percent, according to SWIFT data, its highest level ever.

Russia also has some advanced military technologies that China still needs, despite the overall superior sophistication of Chinese defense manufacturing. These include S-500 surface-to-air missiles, engines for modern fighter jets, tools for nuclear deterrence such as early-warning systems, stealthier submarines, and technologies for underwater warfare. Despite an exodus of talent following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia still has some brainpower, particularly in information technology, that China is interested in tapping.

Military-to-military cooperation with Russia is an important asset for China. There is still potential for the two countries to step up their intelligence sharing, conduct joint cyber-operations to steal sensitive Western government or commercial data, and coordinate their influence operations, including disinformation campaigns. So far, Russia and China have not really worked in tandem on the disinformation front, instead spreading similar narratives in parallel—but a combined approach could well take shape as the governments grow ever closer.

Russia is replacing its near total reliance on the West with reliance on China.

Moscow and Beijing do not want to sign a formal military alliance, as senior officials on both sides have reiterated multiple times. Neither wants to have a legal obligation to fight for the other and be dragged into an unnecessary conflict. Still, two large nuclear powers that are on friendly terms standing back-to-back on the giant Eurasian landmass is a major headache for Washington. With the collapse of global nuclear arms control regimes and China’s rapid nuclear buildup, U.S. strategists will face tough choices about resource allocation: the United States will need to develop a strategic nuclear force that can at the same time deter two partnered rivals with vast nuclear arsenals. A de facto nonaggression pact between China and Russia, and the countries’ shared perception of the United States as an enemy, could lead to increased coordination between the European and Asian theaters, further stretching U.S. resources and attention. If, for example, China decides to make a move in the Taiwan Strait, Russia could simultaneously stage a provocative large-scale military drill in Europe, helping China by straining U.S. capacities to respond.

“There are changes happening, the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years. Let’s drive those changes together,” Xi told Putin in parting at the end of his state visit in March 2023. The Russian leader eagerly agreed. Beijing’s and Moscow’s actions are indeed driving some profound changes to the global order, but these are not necessarily informed by careful strategic plans and well-articulated visions. Putin’s anti-Western rhetoric that defines his invasion of Ukraine both as a rebellion against U.S. hegemony and “neocolonial practices” and as a bid to build a “more just multipolar world order” fails to convince the countries of the diverse global South (a group Putin grandiosely claims to represent), many of which look askance at Russia’s blatant disregard for Ukraine’s sovereignty and international law. The problem for the West is that many countries perceive its leader, the United States, to be just as cynical as Russia, thanks to Washington’s checkered legacy of interventionism and selective respect for international law. Recent U.S. and European support for Israel in its war in Gaza, which is seen to flout some international norms, has only reinforced that perception.

Beijing’s hypocrisy and the distance between its rhetoric and deeds are also plain to see. China’s muscular assertion of its maritime claims in the South China Sea against the Philippines, for example, flies in the face of Beijing’s claims that it respects international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, and wants to solve territorial disputes with its neighbors through peaceful means. Xi and Putin are fond of invoking “the indivisibility of security,” as they did in their joint statement on February 4, 2022, as a call to the United States to take the security concerns of others seriously, but that seemingly principled insistence is belied by Russia’s total disregard for Ukraine’s security concerns and China’s bullying of its neighbors.

Hollow words do not change how the real world operates. Nor does the much-touted expansion of organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the multilateral grouping BRICS alter the international order by itself. What has had a real and durable impact on the order is the fact that in the last two years, Beijing’s and Moscow’s dealings have clearly demonstrated the limits of Western coercive power and provided a viable alternative to countries seeking to hedge against dependence on Western technology and the U.S.-dominated financial system. Russia is on its way to replace near total reliance on the West with reliance on China; it stayed afloat and has been able to wage an expansive war against a large country backed by NATO. Other countries wary of dependence on the West now see how Beijing can be a ready source of technology and payment settlement mechanisms, as well as a giant market for commodities producers. This is the most significant contribution of the Chinese-Russian alignment to the remaking of the global order.

No Reverse Kissinger

Indeed, the deepening of this partnership is one of the most consequential results of the Ukrainian tragedy. Moscow and Beijing may never sign a formal alliance, but the evolution of their relationship in the years ahead will increasingly affect the world and challenge the West.

To come to terms with this development, Western policymakers should abandon the idea that they can drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. Under Trump, the National Security Council entertained the idea of a “reverse Kissinger” approach of engaging Russia, the weaker partner, but to no avail. Whereas former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger courted communist China during the Cold War by offering Beijing a normalization of ties with the United States, U.S. officials cannot extend a deal of that sort to either Moscow or Beijing at this point. Any hopes of peeling them away from each other are nothing more than wishful thinking. Certainly, the Sino-Russian relationship is not without its strains, and existing tensions may be exacerbated as China grows more confident and is tempted to start bossing around the Russians in a more heavy-handed way—something that no ruler in Moscow would take lightly. For now, however, Beijing and Moscow have demonstrated a remarkable ability to manage their differences.

If the China-Russia tandem is here to stay, Western leaders must build a long-term strategy that will help maintain peace by accounting for all the ramifications of having to compete with China and Russia simultaneously. For a start, the West will need to find the right balance between deterrence and reassurance with Moscow and Beijing to avoid dangerous escalatory situations that could arise from accidents, misperceptions, and miscommunication. Western governments should consider the second-order effects of the coercive economic measures they have applied to Russia and China and how retaliatory countermeasures further erode the fabric of globalization. And while they should not tolerate Russian and Chinese disinformation and attempts to subvert the functioning of international institutions, Western countries should seek to make some of these institutions, such as the United Nations and its related agencies, functional again even with Beijing and Moscow on board. When considering how to protect European and Asian security, rein in climate change, govern new disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, and address the challenges facing global financial architecture, Western policymakers must now reckon with the reality of an increasingly resolute Sino-Russian axis.

ALEXANDER GABUEV is Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

Foreign Affairs · by Alexander Gabuev · April 9, 2024

20. U.S., Japan to announce military cooperation, joint NASA lunar mission

A lot of questions to be answered on the efficacy of a Japan-US combined command.

But this really calls into question Japan's confidence in INDOPACOM. Should there be a new command structure for the entire Asia Pacific region? Perhaps a maritime Geographic Command to defend the maritime spaces (which is the comparative advantage of INDOPACOM as a traditional naval dominant command). Then we might want to establish a Northeast Asia Command closer to the Asia land mass. (My recommendations are here: Revitalizing America's North Korea Policy

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/revitalizing-americas-north-korea-policy-207642

Excerpts from my paper with my recommendations for a Northeast Asia Command:

Restructure the U.S. National Security Apparatus in Northeast Asia

It is time to rethink how the United States employs its instruments of national power in Asia and, specifically, in Northeast Asia. For more than a decade, the United States has paid lip service to an “Asian pivot,” only to find that the Middle East has a stranglehold on its strategic attention. A major restructuring should be considered.

Establishing a Northeast Asia Combatant Command is not a new idea It has been studied for more than three decades. However, it is likely that INDOPACOM is too large and faced with multiple, complex challenges that are largely maritime. Of course, wherever military boundaries are established, there will always be resource gaps and competition for military resources. However, given the importance of Northeast Asia, a Combatant Command in Korea is necessary to ensure sufficient priority and resources are provided to protect U.S. interests. But a new military command alone is insufficient.

The State Department should set up a new office in Japan—a regional or “super” ambassador whose mission would be to synchronize regional diplomacy efforts, engage with multilateral diplomatic groups, and coordinate regional information activities. This ambassador would be very useful in sustaining and growing trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. This would help to reduce the adverse effects of stovepipe or bilateral diplomacy at the expense of regional efforts. Yes, this would supplant some of the activities and authorities of the regional desks in the State Department. Still, it would allow for more rapid responses and engagement in the region.

An Economic Engagement Center should be established in Taiwan to support the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) . Again, this would supplant some of the activities of State, Treasury, and Commerce Departments in Washington, but it would improve responsiveness to economic activities in the region.

Although this may seem like a relatively logical change in military and diplomatic posture, it is a radical change for the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of national power. However, the radical nature of these combined actions would demonstrate a substantive U.S. commitment to the region and improve the application of all the tools available in a more synchronized, well-orchestrated, and effective manner.

Excerpts from the article below:

Though Biden will express intent to enhance the U.S. joint military command structure in Japan, he will not unveil a specific plan, said a senior administration official. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has yet to approve a plan, in consultation with the president and the incoming commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel Paparo, the official said.

Meanwhile, Tokyo has announced plans to establish a Joint Operations Command by 2025 to direct all Japanese military operations, a move the United States has long sought. In return, Tokyo would like Washington to set up an operational command in Japan. Joint operations of U.S. personnel in Japan are currently directed by Indo-Pacom, which is headquartered in Hawaii.

“Today, if China attacked Taiwan, the United States and Japan would struggle to forge a combined response,” said Christopher Johnstone, a former senior Biden White House aide on East Asia who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “With truly operational commands in Japan, we would have a much better ability to coordinate military operations in real time.”

U.S., Japan to announce military cooperation, joint NASA lunar mission

President Biden is hosting Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for a state visit this week, deepening ties between close allies

By Ellen Nakashima and Jeanne Whalen

April 8, 2024 at 9:02 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · April 9, 2024

The leaders of the United States and Japan this week will commit to modernizing their military alliance, with the aim of eventually creating a truly operational hub for the most consequential defense partnership in the Pacific.

They will also outline a vision for an integrated air defense network that links Japanese, Australian and U.S. sensors, so each country can have a full picture of airborne threats in the region.

And they will announce that a Japanese astronaut will become the first non-American on a NASA mission to the moon.

These are among the raft of announcements expected this week when President Biden welcomes Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for a state visit on Wednesday, to be followed a day later by a first-ever summit among the leaders of Japan, the United States and the Philippines.

The summits are the latest display of the Biden administration’s efforts to deepen what it calls a “latticework” of alliances and partnerships in the region — a clear signal to China. Underscoring the point, Japan and the United States on Sunday joined Australia and the Philippines in military drills in the South China Sea, an area that China claims as part of its maritime dominion.

The relationship with Japan in particular has significantly deepened, with Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell recently calling it “the cornerstone of our engagement in the Indo-Pacific.”

The gains, however, have not been without some economic strains. Most recently, Japanese officials were frustrated by Biden’s public opposition to Nippon Steel’s $14.9 billion bid to acquire U.S. Steel, with the president saying it was “vital” that the faded industrial giant remained in American hands.

But Tokyo, officials there say, understands the election-year necessity of Biden’s opposition to the takeover and has remained outwardly placid. The two governments, stressing that the matter is for the companies to work out, are determined that it not mar this week’s visit.

China’s growing aggressiveness in the region has brought Japan and the Philippines closer to the United States as their security interests converge. In the past year and a half, Japan has made significant reforms to its national security and defense strategies and has committed to buying U.S. Tomahawk missiles and building its own counterstrike capability. The Philippines has granted the U.S. military access to more bases on its islands.

Biden administration officials say the U.S.-Japan relationship is in the strongest shape it has ever been. “There should be a permanent level of mutual trust,” said one Japanese official, who like other senior officials in both capitals spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss planning for the summit.

Kishida, who will deliver a speech Thursday to a joint meeting of Congress, will also highlight Japan’s aspirations to be a global leader. At last year’s Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima, Japan, Kishida rallied support for Ukraine, expanded Global South participation in the meeting of advanced democracies, and he called for collective action against economic coercion — a veiled swipe at China.

Japan, said one senior Biden administration official, is aligning with the United States “in many ways like a NATO ally.”

Though Biden will express intent to enhance the U.S. joint military command structure in Japan, he will not unveil a specific plan, said a senior administration official. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has yet to approve a plan, in consultation with the president and the incoming commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel Paparo, the official said.

Meanwhile, Tokyo has announced plans to establish a Joint Operations Command by 2025 to direct all Japanese military operations, a move the United States has long sought. In return, Tokyo would like Washington to set up an operational command in Japan. Joint operations of U.S. personnel in Japan are currently directed by Indo-Pacom, which is headquartered in Hawaii.

“Today, if China attacked Taiwan, the United States and Japan would struggle to forge a combined response,” said Christopher Johnstone, a former senior Biden White House aide on East Asia who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “With truly operational commands in Japan, we would have a much better ability to coordinate military operations in real time.”

Kishida and Biden will also discuss expanding co-production of defense equipment. The Japanese already produce Patriot missiles under license from Raytheon and have committed to exporting several dozen to the United States to refill depleted stocks sent to Ukraine and other allies. Though Biden and Kishida will not name specific weapon systems in their joint statement, an expansion of Patriot production could be discussed privately, along with the possibility of establishing other new manufacturing lines in coming years, U.S. officials said.

The two countries will also highlight economic investments, notably in electric-vehicle battery manufacturing, where Washington needs Tokyo’s assistance to jump-start production and fend off Beijing’s dominance.

“The preference is to rely on countries or governments that have values that are more in line with ours,” said Willy Shih, a Harvard Business School professor.

Japanese battery companies have announced more than $20 billion of investments in the United States in recent years. Toyota has said it will spend nearly $14 billion on a giant battery plant in Liberty, N.C., which Kishida will visit this week. Panasonic, which already operates a battery factory with Tesla in Nevada, is investing up to $4 billion in another plant in Kansas. Honda and joint-venture partner LG Energy Solution of South Korea are spending more than $4 billion on a battery factory in Ohio.

There remain tensions over what are seen as the Biden administration’s protectionist tax breaks on U.S.-made electric vehicles, but that “seems less significant,” said the Japanese official, than the “the issue of over-dependency on China” for key goods such as solar panels and critical minerals.

But, the official added, there is a deeper geostrategic issue that remains, in Tokyo’s view, unresolved: Washington’s resistance to joining a trans-Pacific trade pact whose 11 members include Canada, Australia Japan, Mexico and Chile. Though the Obama administration supported the trade agreement and led the negotiations, negative voter sentiment in the lead-up to the 2016 election made it clear that congressional approval would be extremely difficult.

Given protectionist impulses in both parties, the Biden administration has not seriously considered seeking to join. China and Taiwan, meanwhile, have asked to do so.

“The presence of the United States in the most advanced free trade agreement in the world would be significant,” the official said, referring to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, better known as the CP-TPP.

“We will continue to raise the strategic importance,” the official said.

The United States has its frustrations with Japan, too, particularly in the area of cybersecurity. Japan’s national security systems have been breached by Chinese government hackers, and Washington has told Tokyo that it needs to continue to strengthen its network security, including in the intelligence realm.

U.S. officials have encouraged Tokyo to “hold government officials accountable for the secrets they’re trusted with,” Campbell said last week at the Center for a New American Security. “It’s fair to say that Japan has taken some of those steps, but not all of them.”

Though the administration’s foreign policy focus has been on wars in Europe and the Middle East, it has lavished diplomatic attention on Asian and Pacific allies and partners. With the Kishida visit on Wednesday, four of Biden’s five state dinners will have been held for leaders of Indo-Pacific countries, including India, South Korea and Australia. French President Emmanuel Macron also was accorded the honor.

Christian Davenport contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · April 9, 2024

21. The fallacy of the ‘West versus the rest’ worldview

Some very interesting food for thought.

Excerpts:

Spektor, a professor at the School of International Relations at the Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Brazil, argued this framing was contingent on the belief that “the future of international law hinges upon the changing balance of power between liberals in the West and their enemies both within the West itself and beyond it.” And that a “multitude of nonaligned developing countries that, apparently devoid of any strong moral commitments, seek to take advantage of the current situation, hedging their bets rather than siding either with the rising autocrats or the West.”

Spektor then set about dismantling this worldview. I attended his lecture and moderated a panel of respected American international law experts who reacted to Spektor’s remarks. In today’s newsletter, I’m laying out the argument he put forward. (You can also watch the whole Brookings event online.)

He offered an interesting tweak to the conventional understanding of the “rules-based order” — the set of norms, institutions and laws that underpin global politics. To some in the West, including top U.S. officials, the “rules-based order” is the bedrock of a classically liberal status quo, allowing for peace and prosperity to bloom. To others, it is a polite euphemism for a near-century of U.S. hegemony.

But Spektor insisted that the “rules-based order” and its liberal elements “were not created by Western fiat.” Rather, they are the product of decades of contestation and diplomatic battles that ran through an era of decolonization and through the emergence and consolidation of principles of human rights in international law and the global public debate.

For example, “resistance to Western dominance from Angola to Vietnam, Algeria to Afghanistan, paved the way for many of the rules constraining the use of force today,” he argued. “The trade law that we now know was deeply shaped by former colonies asserting permanent jurisdiction over their natural resources, and by coalitions of countries from the postcolonial world who pushed against Western protectionism.”

Today's WorldView: ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ The fallacy of the ‘West versus the rest’ worldview

By Ishaan Tharoor

with Sammy Westfall

https://s2.washingtonpost.com/camp-rw/?trackId=596b6713ae7e8a44e7d6f778&s=6614bd60d639aa0cc1b73f6e&linknum=2&linktot=53

s2.washingtonpost.com · by Ishaan Tharoor

British Ambassador to the United Nations Barbara Woodward and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield vote in favor of a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Israel-Gaza war last month. (Mike Segar/Reuters)

In the shadow of the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, a certain shorthand emerged. The battles that raged in war-ravaged cities, trench-lined marshlands and the corridors of the United Nations had sharpened a burgeoning global divide. Countries outside the West did not seem to share the same outrage over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as their U.S. and European counterparts, nor locate in the war the same fears of the collapse of international norms voiced by many in the West. In Washington and Brussels, commentators and foreign policy elites began pointing to a geopolitical gap between the “West and the rest,” lamenting the capacity for nations elsewhere to shrug at the autocratic predations of Russian President Vladimir Putin and be cowed by the growing coercive influences of Beijing.

“If the postcolonial world is unwilling to punish such a glaring violation of the principle of nonintervention, the argument goes, it must be because they don’t care for international rules, because they resent the West and its values, or because they are somehow beholden to Putin,” explained Brazilian political scientist Matias Spektor, in a substantive lecture delivered at the Brookings Institution, a leading Washington think tank, on Friday.

Spektor, a professor at the School of International Relations at the Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Brazil, argued this framing was contingent on the belief that “the future of international law hinges upon the changing balance of power between liberals in the West and their enemies both within the West itself and beyond it.” And that a “multitude of nonaligned developing countries that, apparently devoid of any strong moral commitments, seek to take advantage of the current situation, hedging their bets rather than siding either with the rising autocrats or the West.”

Spektor then set about dismantling this worldview. I attended his lecture and moderated a panel of respected American international law experts who reacted to Spektor’s remarks. In today’s newsletter, I’m laying out the argument he put forward. (You can also watch the whole Brookings event online.)

He offered an interesting tweak to the conventional understanding of the “rules-based order” — the set of norms, institutions and laws that underpin global politics. To some in the West, including top U.S. officials, the “rules-based order” is the bedrock of a classically liberal status quo, allowing for peace and prosperity to bloom. To others, it is a polite euphemism for a near-century of U.S. hegemony.

But Spektor insisted that the “rules-based order” and its liberal elements “were not created by Western fiat.” Rather, they are the product of decades of contestation and diplomatic battles that ran through an era of decolonization and through the emergence and consolidation of principles of human rights in international law and the global public debate.

For example, “resistance to Western dominance from Angola to Vietnam, Algeria to Afghanistan, paved the way for many of the rules constraining the use of force today,” he argued. “The trade law that we now know was deeply shaped by former colonies asserting permanent jurisdiction over their natural resources, and by coalitions of countries from the postcolonial world who pushed against Western protectionism.”

In Spektor’s view, great “liberal” powers are as likely to undermine the rules-based order as revisionist autocracy. He points to the United States at the arguable peak of its “unipolar” moment: A decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, and at the start of a new harrowing age of conflict in the Middle East.

“The decisions that followed 9/11 marked a major departure from the decades-long consolidation of the rules-based order,” Spektor argued, noting the debates over the legality of various U.S. campaigns, as well as the use of torture. “Powerful constraints on the use of force were upended first in Iraq and then in Libya.”

To many onlookers around the world, it laid bare certain hypocrisies and pretensions that surrounded Western talk about a “rules-based order.” But that doesn’t necessarily mean the “rules-based order” doesn’t have value for nations elsewhere. For all the autocratic threat Russia and China pose in the minds of Western strategists, they are, in their own way, custodians of the same institutions and norms, and have both benefited from them and broken them.

“China and Russia, like all great powers, including the United States, will break the rules they don’t like, try as much as possible to push for the rules they like, and be hypocritical when justifying their ways,” Spektor said.

That’s why many in the “Global South” aren’t convinced by the “democracy versus autocracy” agenda driven by the Biden administration. They see, Spektor explained, the tensions “not so much between a world safe for democracy versus a world safe for autocracy, but a world where the strong are unconstrained by the global legal order versus a world where the strong have to go through the motions of international law because there are checks on their power.”

Spektor proposed that, in an era of global competition, Western governments and policymakers need to reckon more positively with accusations of hypocrisy, rather than simply shrugging them off. This would boost their international legitimacy and standing far greater than other acts of coercion or pressure.

He also wanted to pull the conversation about the “rules-based order” away from the cruder contexts where it sometimes goes. Spektor rejects the “civilizational” standard applied to discussions about liberalism and international law — the afterlife of a legacy of Western imperial domination that assumes certain cultural characteristics or national traits are more hospitable to liberal, democratic values than others.

This ignores, in his view, the ways in which such paternalistic thinking laid the foundations for the many abuses and injustices of colonialism. It also elides the extent to which illiberalism is on the march within Western societies, as well.

“Rather than fictionalize the differences between an Enlightened West and a backwards rest around a ‘standard of civilization,’ should we not be pushing for a universal ‘standard of truth’ instead?” Spektor asked.

This would force politicians and wonks to develop “some ability to see the world through the eyes of others,” he said. That may seem now a perhaps uncomfortable and unattainable level of empathy to expect of elites in power in Western capitals.

But, Spektor added, “if we succeed, we might conclude that if we condemn the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians by our enemies, we should be able to hold our allies, our partners, and indeed ourselves, to the same standard.”

1,000 Words

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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