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Quotes of the Day:
"Thoughts are like arrows. Once released they strike their mark. Guard them well or one day you may be your own victim. "
– Navajo Proverb
"Every decision you make is a reflection of the type of person you want to be and the kind of world you want to live in."
– Thibaut Meurisse
"You don't become cooler with age, but you do care progressively less about being cool, which is the only true way of being cool. This is called the Geezer's Paradox."
– Widdershins Smith
1. Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Book review)
2. Nighttime with Ukraine’s drone hunting teams
3. A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People’s Liberation Army Command and Elimination of China’s Strategic Support Force
4. How TikTok Lost the War in Washington
5. Why Turning It Off and Turning It Back On Is Gadget-Fixing Magic
6. World War II History Haunts Attempts to Seize Russian Assets
7. The Honeytrap Resistance: Women who lure Putin's soldiers to their deaths with promises of sex.
8. The Axis of Autocrats
9. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 26, 2024
10. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2024
11. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 27, 2024
12. US Pacific commander says China is pursuing ‘boiling frog’ strategy
13. Former Russian sex spy reveals how she manipulated her targets into becoming ‘obsessed’ with her
14. Myanmar: Civil war of 'many against many' tearing country up
15. Xi’s Imperial Ambitions Are Rooted in China’s History
16. Passage of Ukraine Aid Bill Could Mark a Turning Point in American Foreign Policy
17. With U.S. aid resumed, Ukraine will try to dig itself out of trouble
1. Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Book review)
An excellent short review essay that offers some important insights. This essay is very much worth reading even if you do not read the book.
The comment on Vietnam is very much worth pondering.
Excerpts:
Karlin’s research methodology is a qualitative, comparative study of four cases (Greece in the late-1940s, South Vietnam in the 1950s, Lebanon in the early-1980s, and Lebanon in the mid-2000s), in which the USG:
- Led a FID program to strengthen a fragile state’s military (vice law enforcement entity) that was up against an insurgency,
- Acted as the only friendly external power,
- Became involved due to the magnitude of implications which could have resulted from the state completely failing, and
- Constrained its involvement to a single administration in Washington, DC.
...
I do agree with Karlin’s South Vietnam case study assessment that the entire Vietnam War might have been prevented had the USG involved itself more deeply with South Vietnamese military affairs and focused on improving the military’s FID program against communist guerillas. In my opinion, such tasks would never have been possible with Lieutenant General Samuel Williams (U.S. Army) leading USG FID efforts in South Vietnam because he was an infantry officer who believed unconventional problems could be solved with conventional frameworks.A general officer with an understanding of internal defense and experience as a Ranger, Special Forces, and/or Office of Strategic Services operator would have been better suited to lead the USG FID effort in South Vietnam.
...
USG’s ability to replicate successful FID programs against antagonistic actors in and around fragile states will likely be necessary for USG to maintain advantages over its near-peer competitors for decades to come.
Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Book review) | Small Wars Journal
Small Wars Journal
BUILDING MILITARIES IN FRAGILE STATES: CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES. Mara E. Karlin. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. 283 pp. Notes. Biblio. Index. $79.95.
Reviewed by Scott Simeral
In Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, Dr. Mara Karlin presents a comparative case study of four United States Government (USG) attempts to strengthen partner militaries’ internal defense. Building Militaries opens with a summary of the Islamic State’s defeat of the Iraqi Army in 2014 after the USG trained the Iraqi Army for ten years and provided $20B in assistance. This scene-setter underscores Karlin’s assessment that the USG’s traditional approach of throwing resources and training at fragile states to shore up those states’ internal defense is not working.
Karlin attributes USG motivation for involving itself in foreign internal defense (FID) to empowering partner militaries with the ability to confront and contain security challenges before those challenges pose a national security threat to the U.S. She notes that policymakers will likely have less time and resources to work with fragile states as American foreign policy advances into an era steeped in Great Power Competition (GPC), implying the USG must learn to do more with less. Building Militaries compiles Karlin’s policy-relevant answers to when, why, and under what circumstances U.S. FID programs are likely to succeed.
Using primary and secondary sources (including archival research), interviews, and field research, Karlin tests her hypothesis that a partner military is more likely to establish internal defense if (1) the USG gets deeply involved in the partner nation’s sensitive military affairs, and (2) its antagonistic external actors (i.e., insurgents, terrorists, and their supporters) play a diminishing role.Karlin’s research methodology is a qualitative, comparative study of four cases (Greece in the late-1940s, South Vietnam in the 1950s, Lebanon in the early-1980s, and Lebanon in the mid-2000s), in which the USG:
- Led a FID program to strengthen a fragile state’s military (vice law enforcement entity) that was up against an insurgency,
- Acted as the only friendly external power,
- Became involved due to the magnitude of implications which could have resulted from the state completely failing, and
- Constrained its involvement to a single administration in Washington, DC.
Each case study provides a detailed examination of key decisions, program execution, and the nature of U.S. involvement with the partner state. Despite only one of the FID case studies (Greece) resulting in total success for the USG, Karlin extracts new and impactful findings from all four cases for policymakers to consider. Specifically, she opines a partner military is more likely to establish internal defense if the USG involves itself in sensitive partner military affairs such as determining the partner military’s organizational structure (including personnel appointments), defining the internal defense mission, and uniting military personnel appointees in the vision and initiative of that mission.
Additionally, she maintains a partner military is more likely to establish internal defense if antagonistic actors lose the capability, will, or legitimacy to use physical force (a concept Karlin refers to as monopoly on violence) for achieving their ends.Army General Richard Clarke, the twelfth Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), selected Building Militaries as one of 20 titles for his official “USSOCOM Commander’s Reading List.” Such recognition is a testament to both the quality of Karlin’s research and the strategic importance of her findings to USG foreign policy in the foreseeable future. I agree with most of Karlin’s analyses in Building Militaries and believe American foreign policymakers, Department of Defense (DoD) professionals, and scholars of Strategic Studies will find the book insightful and relevant. Should Karlin decide to publish a second edition of Building Militaries, she might consider incorporating some substantive changes.
For example, Karlin utilizes the “Variables Framework” figure
to demonstrate her hypothesis regarding the optimal internal defense of a partner state. According to her, this optimal defense can be achieved when certain independent variables align in a specific way. These variables include the “Nature of U.S. Involvement” penetrating deeply into the partner state’s sensitive military affairs, as well as an “External Threat Environment” that renders antagonistic actions by external actors ineffective. The dependent variable, titled “Monopoly on Violence is More Enforceable and Sustainable,” in the context of Karlin’s stated goal of “measur[ing] the extent to which the U.S. program results in a more enforced and sustainable monopoly on violence extended by the partner state” makes sense if the independent variables harmonize.However, what happens when these independent variables do not harmonize? The current framework fails to account for a wider range of scenarios, such as a reduction in the “Nature of U.S. Involvement” while the “External Threat Environment” intensifies. In such cases, it is likely that the dependent variable within the context of the partner state will not remain “Monopoly on Violence is More Enforceable and Sustainable.” Instead, it would more accurately reflect a situation where the monopoly on violence becomes less enforceable and sustainable.
To address this limitation and provide a more comprehensive illustration of Karlin’s stated goal for the book, the dependent variable could be reframed as “Partner State’s Ability to Enforce and Sustain Monopoly on Violence.” This reframing would allow the framework to encompass a wider range of scenarios and make it more relevant for future research.
Additionally, in the fifth chapter of Building Militaries, Karlin describes training provided to members of the Lebanese military as examples of USG efforts to improve FID against antagonistic actors’ effectiveness. Such examples help support her assessment, with one exception. Karlin’s emphasis on the Lebanese officer who graduated from the U.S. Navy SEAL course and the six officers who graduated from U.S. Army Ranger School overstates the abilities of Lebanese special operations forces (SOF) and, by association, antagonistic actors’ ability to go head-to-head with Lebanese SOF. Such emphasis is distracting to readers, particularly those who understand that training standards for foreign military personnel enrolled in U.S. SOF training are much lower than those of their American military classmates.
I do agree with Karlin’s South Vietnam case study assessment that the entire Vietnam War might have been prevented, had the USG involved itself more deeply with South Vietnamese military affairs and focused on improving the military’s FID program against communist guerillas. In my opinion, such tasks would never have been possible with Lieutenant General Samuel Williams (U.S. Army) leading USG FID efforts in South Vietnam because he was an infantry officer who believed unconventional problems could be solved with conventional frameworks.
A general officer with an understanding of internal defense and experience as a Ranger, Special Forces, and/or Office of Strategic Services operator would have been better suited to lead the USG FID effort in South Vietnam.There is room for additional books in the same genre as Building Militaries, especially those addressing the research topics Karlin proposes. Such topics include comparisons of more complex twenty-first-century campaigns, including the USG’s FID efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other research gaps include the application of Figure 2 to FID efforts not led by the USG, democratic governments, or capitalist nations. Further research might highlight successful FID case studies which were successful, despite (1) the partner state’s unwillingness to allow the USG to become deeply involved in its military affairs, (2) the training of the partner state’s law enforcement, vice military, for internal defense, and/or (3) otherwise outside the scope of Karlin’s research methodology.
As of this writing, Karlin recently stepped down from her role as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. In that role, she was charged with developing and implementing the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Previously, she was the Director of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Karlin’s research for Building Militaries was funded by SAIS and the International Studies Association, among others. As DoD strategy pivots to new priorities informed by GPC, its future is bright with Karlin at the helm. USG’s ability to replicate successful FID programs against antagonistic actors in and around fragile states will likely be necessary for USG to maintain advantages over its near-peer competitors for decades to come.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 10.
Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, 4.
Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, 11.
Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, 12.
Enforcement “assesses the extent to which antagonistic external actors are able to use violence to disrupt and manipulate the partner state” and “includes declining levels of violence and the partner military’s willingness (or lack thereof) to actively confront its opponents” (Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, 11).
Sustainability “accounts for the partner state’s long-term ability to monopolize violence within its borders, even without U.S. support” and “includes increasing partner state military control of national territory” (Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, 11).
Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, 99.
About the Author(s)
Scott Simeral
Scott Simeral is the Academic Chair, Naval Special Warfare, at the Joint Special Operations University.
Small Wars Journal
2. Nighttime with Ukraine’s drone hunting teams
High tech, new tech, old tech, and low tech.
This is one of the few articles that acknowledge an understanding by the Ukrainians of the cost differential of certain systems in attacking other systems.
Also, this is a low tech layer of air and missile defense that is perhaps overlooked by advanced nations.
Nighttime with Ukraine’s drone hunting teams
Patriot missiles are too expensive to be fired at every target. So for Iranian-made Shahed drones, mobile teams are sent out with World War II technology – machine guns, spotlights… and their ears.
https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/nighttime-with-ukraines-drone-hunting?utm=
MYROSLAVA TANSKA-VIKULOVA AND WILLIAM GLOVER WEISS
APR 28, 2024
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Sometimes, when he walks down the street and finds himself in complete silence, soldier Kostiantyn Chernyshov starts to hear a Shahed drone humming nearby.
It’s Kostiantyn’s job to be alert.
While most Ukrainians shelter inside during Russian attacks, he is part of a unit who head towards the drones. In a war with satellites, drones and lasers, his tools would be at home in World War II: he tries to shoot them down with just a machine gun.
"You only have a few seconds to shoot down the drone or damage it as much as possible," he explained.
Kostiantyn has served in the Ukrainian army on the Mobile Air Defense Fire Team’s 756th Regiment of the State Special Transport Service for over two years, shooting down Russian Shahed drones.
Kostiantyn Chernyshov, a gunner on the Mobile Air Defense Fire Team at the 756th Regiment of the State Special Transport Service.
Mobile Air Defense Fire Teams were created even before the full-scale invasion, and from the first days of the ‘great war’ started to implement their life-saving skills. They don’t use high-tech defense air systems like the PATRIOT or Iris-T. Instead, they use a simple military vehicle, equipped with a machine gun to bring the Russian drones down.
Kostiantyn's Mobile Air Defense Fire Team, which helps defend Kyiv, consists of four people.
"I am a gunner –- I load the machine gun and wait for the command to open fire. I also watch the sky," Kostiantyn said.
There are three others. One, the team leader, is responsible for the thermal camera, binoculars and laser pointer. He gives the order to fire. There is a driver, who brings the team to their designated secret locations, and lights up the sky using a spotlight. There is also an assistant gunner who helps Kostiantyn with ammunition, and also guards the group.
Kostiantyn and his Mobile Air Defense Fire Team work virtually seven days a week, 24 hours a day, and can be called to shift at any time. As soon as the order comes that they have to leave, they have only a few minutes to get ready.
"We don't know whether it's a training exercise or a combat mission. We treat each of them as a combat mission," the soldier said.
From the full-scale invasion to the end of 2023, Russia launched almost 4,000 drones into Ukraine, most of which have been shot down by Ukraine’s army. But Ukraine lacks enough air defense missiles to destroy all the enemy's equipment.
After all, shooting down missiles using modern technology is expensive. A Russian kamikaze drone, such as the Iranian-produced Shahed 136, is very cheap, costing between $20,000 and $50,000. That is the price of a new car in Ukraine. Meanwhile, PATRIOT interceptors used to shoot down the drones are estimated to cost about $4 million per missile.
So to maximize Ukraine’s defense coverage, the mobile teams have become a vital, low-tech, low-cost part of the war effort.
Kostiantyn, 26, has been in the military since the start of the war. He served in the army at the border guard service just before the full-scale invasion. On March 3rd, 2022 he came to the UAF as a volunteer.
"I was told that I would be a gunner, since I already had experience with weapons," Kostiantyn said.
He is from the Dnipro region, where he started his military career after the full scale invasion. He didn't have time to train for more than two or three days because the war was already in full swing.
Later his command relocated him to Chernihiv and now he defends Ukraine in the Kyiv region.
Kostiantyn with a Kalashnikov assault rifle.
His job is hard work. Kostiantyn's longest shift lasted up to nine hours, the shortest half an hour. Lately, the Russians have been launching drones mostly at night, so the Mobile Air Defense Fire Teams are working more often in the darkness.
"We are given a certain amount of time during the day to prepare for night work. During the day we can sleep an extra 4 hours, and sometimes an extra hour of sleep gives us a lot. The body has already adapted," Kostiantyn said.
The first thing the Mobile Air Defense Fire Group receives is an order to go out. Usually, this happens before the air raid alert starts in the Kyiv region. Each group is assigned several locations, and they roughly calculate where to go. If they arrive and this position is inconvenient, they can move.
It takes Kostiantyn's group about five to ten minutes to get to their location from the base. The vehicle is immediately turned off. There must be complete silence so that they can hear the sound of the approaching drone. It makes the sound of a motorcycle and can be heard from about 250 meters away. Everyone immediately begins to do their job.
"I set up the machine gun, and my assistant brings in the ammunition. The driver turns on the spotlight at this time to check that everything is working and nothing is out of order… Then we put it out until we hear the sound of the Shahed. The whole preparation takes one minute," Kostiantyn said.
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At night, through a thermal camera, the Shaheds are clearly visible because the engine heats up and gives off heat. By day, they peer through binoculars. The team is on high alert. They are responsible for their small sector, waiting for the enemy to fly into it.
During the day, Kostiantyn aims unaided, but at night, a spotlight illuminates the drones so he can see where to shoot.
"I don't shoot where the spotlight is. I shoot in front of it," Kostiantyn said and continued: "You have a few seconds while the drone is in your area, and you need to do as much damage as possible."
It is very difficult to shoot down a drone. It is often the case that several Mobile Air Defense Fire Teams are working to take down a single drone. They may start in one unit’s sector and finish in another. The key is to hit the engine, propeller or front end to set off the missile.
"The difficulty is that you can shoot the drone completely, for example, damage the wing, but it can continue to fly," the military said.
And such actions can even complicate the work of your colleagues. If the drone stops flying straight, but swaying left and right, up or down, it becomes more difficult to shoot it down. The group effort means Kostiantyn cannot count the number of Shaheds he has shot down. But he says he can hit a drone from a distance of a kilometer.
A lot depends on the weather. In fog, rain or clouds, it is much harder to shoot shaheds down. The fact that the Russians have started to paint their drones black has also complicated the work. It is almost possible to see them in the dark. But Ukraine’s military is overcoming this problem as well, by illuminating the sky with a laser pointer.
A cat climbs in a wreckage of Russian ‘Geran’ drone shot down on March 31, 2024 in Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine. (Photo by Zinchenko/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)
The Ukrainian military said they could not tell us how many drones were damaged or shot down by Kostiantyn, due to security concerns.
However, the Ukraine’s General Staff publishes daily statistics on how many drones or missiles and what kind of missiles were shot down by Ukrainian Air Defence every night.
Earlier this week, on the night of April 23, for example, 16 out of 17 drones were shot down. On the night of April 22, five out of seven drones were shot down. On the night of April 19, Ukrainian air defense and Mobile Air Defence Fire Teams destroyed 14 out of 14 drones.
Teams like Kostiantyn’s are constantly on the move, part of a network of air defense in Ukraine that tries to create an umbrella to protect civilians.
And on most nights they are able to shoot down most of what Russia sends their way.
Konstantin's small team works well together. Everyone knows when to help each other out when they get tired. When the drones are flying, every minute counts, because a Shahed can fly into their zone at any moment.
Kostiantyn is already addicted to his work. Although he admits that his "drone hunting" work has become routine, he feels that he is making an important contribution to Ukraine by protecting people.
One day, he may stop hearing drones wherever he goes.
After the paywall: U.S. officials predict that Ukraine will be on its back foot until 2025 — even after military aid arrives. And in reporter’s notebook, Myroslava welcomes the beginning of spring in Kyiv — with all the flowers that involves. Plus, a cat of conflict!
NEWS OF THE DAY:
U.S.: KYIV UNLIKELY TO REGAIN MOMENTUM UNTIL 2025: Despite the influx of Western support, Ukraine is ill-equipped to take back the 20% of the country currently occupied by Russian forces this year, say Western officials.
According to The Washington Post, several U.S. officials believe Kyiv has no real recourse to taking back the conquered territory without dealing with key issues first. Issues like critical manpower and supply shortages remain at the forefront of Ukraine's ability to wage more than a defensive war.
RUSSIA DETAINS JOURNALISTS WHO HELPED NAVALNY: Two Russian journalists were arrested over the weekend for allegedly helping prepare materials for Navalny's YouTube channel. The two have been detained on charges relating to participating in an "extremist organization," according to The Guardian.
The arrests come amid a crackdown on journalism in Russia, specifically in regards to the invasion of Ukraine. On Friday a journalist who worked for the Russian edition of Forbes was arrested on claims of spreading false information about the military. Russian laws have muddied the waters on what passes for treason these days.
U.S. SUPPLIED GLIDE BOMBS DID NOT WORK: Glide bombs can hit long-range targets and are being used by the Russians to great effect currently. The United States sent modified glide bombs to Ukraine back in January with a 100-mile range. The experiment was a resounding failure due to electromagnetic interference and mud, admit Pentagon officials.
"It didn't work. It didn't work for multiple reasons including the EMI environment,” one said.
REPORTER’S NOTEBOOK:
Hi there — Myroslava here!
I am writing from a rainy Kyiv, listening to Britney Spears songs on my earphones.
From time to time I look out of the window and see nothing but a gray sky, sad buildings and bits of green forest in front of me. Nothing makes me happy at the moment, except for reading after work and the rare walks to parks near my house.
Despite the cloudy weather, spring is coming. Nature is waking up, trees are blooming. Look at this beauty!
Spring in Kyiv, 2024
But at the same time, I can't forget that this is the third spring during the war. All this beauty is covered by the fear of war. And I don't even speak about us — ordinary Ukrainians who are living in peaceful Kyiv (yes, I think life in the capital is peaceful and safer than in the frontline territories because we can work and go to school and our life is much better than in other cities in Ukraine). I'm talking about soldiers who risk their lives and health every day to protect the rest of the population from the horrors of war.
No matter how beautiful it is now, I look around and almost everything reminds me of the war. I'm walking around and the air raid alert starts, which means that there may be explosions in a few minutes, so I need to get to a safe place. A few days ago, the annual book festival started in Kyiv. And while there used to be a wide variety of literature, now about half of it is filled with books about the war or modern Ukrainian classics. The war, although some say it has been forgotten, is in the air.
Book festival in Kyiv. Books by Ukrainian poets
Despite everything, people try to live normal lives, especially in spring. When the massive flowering of trees in the Kyiv Botanical Garden began recently, it was very difficult to get there — because everyone came to take photos. There were also photoshoots for dogs and even cats.
The most beautiful are the sakura (cherry blossoms in Japanese) and the magnolia blossoms. These trees are quite rare in Ukraine and are often planted in alleys. The largest, and most famous, such alley of sakura is in Uzhhorod (Western Ukraine).
Magnolias blooming, Kyiv
This is how Ukrainians try to calm down and relax during war. Even men who have become cold to such things during wartime go and enjoy Ukrainian beauty. Although it can be different than it used to be... In February a missile fragment hit my neighbor's yard, and part of the house burned down. Now it is empty, but beautiful trees still stand in front of it.
A burned house behind the trees.
For me, this spring of 2024 is very contradictory. On the one hand, you constantly read pessimistic pieces in the Western media about how Ukraine will fight on. On the other hand, you understand that it is crucial not to give up, but at the same time not to have any illusions about a quick victory. The most important thing is to work for victory.
Want to go above and beyond your subscription? Hit the tip jar, here!
Tip jar!
And although I have forgotten what a peaceful life is, I believe that one day I will definitely remember. After all, light always conquers darkness.
Today’s cat of war is Nyasha with the soldier Kostiantyn, which lives at the 756th Regiment of the State Special Transport Service:
Stay safe out there.
Best,
Myroslava
3. A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People’s Liberation Army Command and Elimination of China’s Strategic Support Force
The graphic is at the link: https://jamestown.org/program/a-disturbance-in-the-force-the-reorganization-of-peoples-liberation-army-command-and-elimination-of-chinas-strategic-support-force/
A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People’s Liberation Army Command and Elimination of China’s Strategic Support Force
Publication: China Brief Volume: 24 Issue: 9
April 26, 2024 05:39 PM Age: 2 days
jamestown.org · by J. Michael Dahm · April 26, 2024
Executive Summary:
- Consolidation and refinement of military information power capabilities within the new Information Support Force (ISF) continues to reflect the PLA’s outsized emphasis on battlespace information control in multi-domain integrated joint operations.
- The April 2024 reorganization eliminated the Strategic Support Force and subordinated the Space Systems Department and Network Systems Department—now designated the Military Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force, respectively—to the Central Military Commission.
- Additional changes to PLA organization and a clarification of roles and responsibilities in the new structure may be forthcoming.
- The ISF could be the PLA’s answer to information network competition as the US military advances network capabilities associated with Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).
Editor’s note: This article is one of two that cover the disbanding of the Strategic Support Force, announced on April 19. You can read the complementary piece here.
On April 19, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) eliminated its Strategic Support Force (SSF; 战略支援部队) and created a new military force, the Information Support Force (ISF; 信息支援部队). The ISF did not replace the SSF, which had overarching responsibility for all PLA space- and information-related capabilities. The mid-April reorganization elevated the SSF’s former communications organization, the Information Communication Base (ICB), to a higher grade, making it equivalent to the other two SSF departments. The three SSF functional components, what are now called the Military Aerospace Force (ASF; 军事航天部队), the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队), and the Information Support Force (ISF), have been organized under the Central Military Commission (CMC). They join the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF; 联勤保障部队) as four “arms” (兵种) that are directly subordinate to the CMC.
The implications and impacts of this development are not entirely clear in the wake of the SSF’s demise. The move by CMC Chairman Xi Jinping may be related to factors ranging from ongoing corruption scandals within PLA ranks to bureaucratic infighting to organizational efforts to increase operational effectiveness. In the final analysis, the SSF may have fallen victim to a combination of all those factors. The ISF, for its part, may be the PLA’s answer to information network competition as the US military advances network capabilities associated with Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).
Evolution of the Strategic Support Force
The Strategic Support Force was created in 2015 as part of so called “above-the-neck” reforms that reorganized the upper echelons of the PLA (see China Brief, February 8, 2016). These reforms created operationally focused military theater commands and scoped military service responsibilities to “man, train, and equip” similar to command relationships in the US military between combatant commands and military services. The newly created SSF was a military service unique to the PLA that focused on space, counter-space, and information warfare capabilities.
Prior to the SSF’s dissolution, the SSF may have totaled between 200,000 and 250,000 personnel. Given the two million PLA troops on active duty, the SSF only represented between 10-12 percent of the force. Still, if those numbers are accurate, the SSF alone was larger than almost every NATO military and had almost as many personnel as the entire Japan Self Defense Force (Dahm, 2024, p.12). In the PLA organizational hierarchy, every command organization has a “grade,” akin to a unit rank. The SSF was a theater grade organization, commanded by a full general, organizationally on par with the other military services and the PLA’s five operational theater commands.
In 2015, the newly created SSF brought together information-related organizations from the PLA’s former General Staff Department (GSD). The GSD 3rd Department (3PLA), responsible for electronic intelligence and cyber reconnaissance, GSD 4th Department (4PLA), responsible for electronic warfare and cyber-attack, and some intelligence elements from the GSD 2nd Department (2PLA) were grouped under the Network Systems Department (NSD) (网络系统部). The NSD was a deputy theater grade organization under the SSF commanded by a lieutenant general. The NSD also reportedly inherited the PLA’s 311 Base, which has a mission narrowly focused on psychological operations against Taiwan, generating propaganda, and influencing public opinion on the island to support PLA objectives. [1]
The reforms also consolidated space-related organizations from the PLA’s former General Armaments Department (GAD) in the SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD; 航天系统部). The SSD was also a deputy theater grade organization under the SSF. It was responsible for virtually all PLA space operations including space launches; telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) of satellites and other space vehicles; management and control of PLA space-based communications and reconnaissance; and select counter-space capabilities, especially on-orbit counter-space capabilities.
A second round of PLA reforms, the 2017–2019 “below-the-neck” reforms, made significant changes within the military services and theaters. One move in these reforms shifted the PLA organization with overall responsibility for national and joint military communication networks to SSF control. In 2015, the CMC Joint Staff Department controlled what was known as the Information Assurance Base (IAB; 信息保障基地) also called the Information Support Base (信息支援基地). [2] As part of the below-the-neck reforms, the IAB, designated the 61001 Unit (61001部队), was moved to the SSF and renamed the “Information Communication Base (ICB; 信息通信基地).” The ICB commanded a number of geographically distributed information communication brigades (信息通信旅) assigned to support PLA theater commands. [3]
The “base” in “Information Communication Base” refers to a high-level military organization and not necessarily a basing facility (e.g., a naval base). According to PLA organizational convention, a “base (基地),” is normally a corps grade or deputy corps grade command, one or two steps down from a deputy theater grade. Therefore, within the SSF, the ICB was likely an independent corps grade organization directly under SSF command alongside the two deputy theater grade departments, the NSD and SSD. Figure 1 depicts PLA organization with detail of SSF elements prior to the April 2024 reforms (Dahm, 2024, p.15).
Figure 1: Pre-April 2024 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Organization.
The New Reforms and Expectations for the Information Support Force
Eight years after its creation, the April 2024 reorganization eliminated the Strategic Support Force and subordinated the SSD and NSD—now designated the Military Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF), respectively—to the CMC. The Information Communication Base (ICB) was elevated from a corps grade organization to a deputy theater grade organization and renamed the Information Support Force (ISF). A former deputy commander of the SSF, Lieutenant General Bi Yi, assumed command of the new ISF. PLA spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian stated, “With the latest reform, the PLA now has a new system of services and arms under the leadership and command of the CMC. There are four services, namely the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Rocket Force; and four arms, including the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, the Information Support Force, and the Joint Logistic Support Force” (Xinhua Daily Telegraph, April 20). Figure 2 depicts PLA organization with detail of former SSF elements following the April 2024 reforms.
The ISF will likely retain all the ICB’s responsibilities and capabilities. Whether theater information communication brigades are elevated to theater information communication bases remains to be seen. The new ISF probably has overarching responsibility for the PLA’s enterprise-level computer architecture, the integrated command platform (一体化指挥平台). The ISF may also coordinate cyber defense and information security of PLA networks through the Network Security and Defense Center (NSDC; 网络安防中心). [4] Former ICB units that are likely now part of the ISF also appear to be responsible for maintaining and repairing the National Defense Communication Network (NDCN; 国防通讯网) built on the PRC’s defense fiber-optic cable (国防光缆) backbone network (MOD, December 3, 2018).
Figure 2: Post-April 2024 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Organization
Rationale Unclear, Further Restructuring Possible
It is not entirely clear why the PLA decided to eliminate the Strategic Support Force. With the benefit of hindsight, the US Department of Defense (DoD) may have anticipated the reorganization for some time. DoD first included the new terms for the SSF’s Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force in its 2023 “China Military Power Report” (DoD, 2023, p.70). In January 2024, Chinese language media began to speculate about an imminent breakup of the SSF into its component elements (Ming Pao Canada, January 11). Palace intrigue surrounded the potential elimination of the SSF since its commander, General Ju Qiansheng, had been missing from public appearances since summer 2023. Ju was rumored to be caught up in ongoing corruption scandals involving the PLA Rocket Force and Equipment Development Department. As of this writing, Ju’s future is unclear.
Despite the corruption speculation, the PLA may have eliminated the SSF simply because it had become irrelevant. Reports indicated that the aerospace, cyberspace, and communications network elements pursued their disparate functions relatively independent of the SSF staff (Ming Pao Canada, January 11). The elimination of the SSF should not necessarily be viewed as a failed PLA experiment. The consolidation and refinement of military information power capabilities continues to reflect the PLA’s outsized emphasis on battlespace information control in multi-domain integrated joint operations.
Official coverage of the ISF creation ceremony observed, “Xi Jinping emphasized that the Information Support Force is a newly created strategic force and a key element for coordinating the construction and application of network information systems” (MOD, April 19). A subsequent PLA Daily newspaper commentary connected the creation of the ISF to Xi’s 2022 report to the 20th Party Congress that emphasized network information systems as the “largest variable (最大变量)” for improving the combat effectiveness of the military (MOD, April 20). At the core of the PLA’s informationized warfare concept is the idea that modern warfare is a confrontation between systems-of-systems. Empowering the new deputy theater grade Information Support Force to strengthen and harden information network capabilities may be the PLA’s response to similar US DoD efforts to consolidate and align US military information networks under the umbrella of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).
Additional changes to PLA organization and clarification of roles and responsibilities in the new structure may be forthcoming. In the April 19, 2024, ISF rollout, the PLA spokesperson foreshadowed, “As circumstances and tasks evolve, we will continue to refine the modern military force structure with Chinese characteristics” (Chinamil, April 22). Monitoring future development related to PLA information organizations will provide much needed insights into the PRC’s military capabilities, strategy, and intent.
Notes
[1] Western assessments probably overstate the SSF’s leading role in PLA psychological operations. As part of the 2015 reforms, the SSF reportedly inherited the 311 Base (61716部队) from the former General Political Department (GPD). Limited open-source intelligence indicates the 311 Base is focused exclusively on psychological warfare and propaganda that targets public opinion on Taiwan. Very little evidence has emerged that the SSF has control over psychological or propaganda operations against other targets such as the US and its allies, regionally or globally. Broader SSF cyber capabilities may certainly play a role in collecting intelligence and spreading disinformation as part of a broader malign influence campaign, but there is scant evidence that the SSF has overall responsibility for political warfare in the PLA or PRC government. See, Mark Stokes and Russel Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department (Washington, DC: 2049 Institute, 2013), 29, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/P2049_Stokes_Hsiao_PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_101413.pdf, also, John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2018), p. 17, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf.
[2] Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, “Seizing the Commanding Heights: The PLA Strategic Support Force in Chinese Military Power,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 44, no. 2 (2021): p. 253, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1747444. The Information Communication Base (ICB) should not be confused with the CMC Joint Staff Department Information and Communications Bureau (信息通信局) (JSD ICB).
[3] Zhang Xiaohan, “学思践悟, 重点突破备战保通” [Study, Think and Practice, Focus on Breakthroughs & Prepare for Success], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], April 2, 2023, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/yw_214068/16213872.html. There is conflicting information about the organization and subordination of PLA information communication forces. On the one hand, it seems clear that the top-level Information Communication Base (61001 Unit), headquartered in southwest Beijing, commands several SSF ICB brigades throughout China. However, PLA media makes numerous references to apparently remote “information communication bases.” This may be an informal term that simply describes where IC brigades and other ICB units are physically located. See, for example, “情注一缆通滇藏 – 记某信息通信基地四营五连连长翁春芳” [A Cable Connects Yunan and Tibet – A Record of Weng Chunfang, Commander of the Fourth Battalion Fifth Company of an Information Communications Base], 新华网 [XinhuaNet], December 3, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-12/03/c_1123801663.htm. Attempts to sort out inconsistencies in terminology are further exacerbated by the fact that other PLA services maintain their own information communication brigades and information communication units. See, “正赛 (通信兵专业比武邀请赛)” [Main Match (The Signal Corps Professional Competition Invitational Tournament)], 永不消逝的电波 [The Eternal Wave], June 27, 2023, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_23645590.
[4] Kania and Costello, 253, see also, Zhang Dapeng, Kang Zizhan, Wang Lingshuo, and Zhang Shaobo, “淬炼新域新质‘新锋刃’” [Tempering the New Domain, New Quality, ‘New Forward Edge’], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], December 21, 2022, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/yw_214068/4928766.html.
jamestown.org · by J. Michael Dahm · April 26, 2024
4. How TikTok Lost the War in Washington
Excerpts:
They say TikTok Chief Executive Shou Zi Chew missed opportunities early in his tenure to try to build support on Capitol Hill—and instead depended on negotiations with U.S. security officials over a complex restructuring that never panned out.
In recent months, TikTok was outflanked by opponents and repeatedly surprised by the surging momentum against it in Washington, leading to last-ditch steps to rally support that reinforced many lawmakers’ concerns about the Chinese app’s ability to influence public opinion.
“I don’t think they ever understood how concerned we were with the national security implications of so much American data being put at risk,” House Majority Leader Steve Scalise (R., La.) said of TikTok.
It is unknowable whether different strategies could have changed TikTok’s fate, given Washington’s deepening, bipartisan distrust of China, especially on tech matters.
...
Behind the scenes, the bill’s supporters in the House were searching for a must-pass bill to attach it to. They found it in a Senate-backed $95 billion package of foreign aid to Ukraine and Israel. The package passed the House last weekend, followed by the Senate late Tuesday.
Ultimately, the bill passed through Congress—which hasn’t been able to agree on other tech legislation—because TikTok couldn’t dissuade lawmakers that its ownership is a threat to the U.S.
“The divestiture bill is a national security bill,” said Sen. Brian Schatz (D., Hawaii), a member of the Commerce Committee. “Whatever we think about social-media companies—that’s for another day.”
Chew once again sought support from users in a defiant message on TikTok. “It’s obviously a disappointing moment, but it does not need to be a defining one,” he said. “Rest assured, we aren’t going anywhere.
How TikTok Lost the War in Washington
Combination of coordinated efforts by its critics and missteps by the company led to the law forcing a sale or ban of the popular app
https://www.wsj.com/tech/how-tiktok-lost-the-war-in-washington-bbc419cc?mod=hp_lead_pos11
By Georgia Wells
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and Kristina Peterson
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April 28, 2024 5:30 am ET
TikTok spent the past four years trying to fend off a U.S. ban, but it never figured out Washington.
The law signed by President Biden on Wednesday requiring a sale or ban of the popular app was in part the product of tectonic shifts in U.S.-China relations and coordinated, stealthy efforts by its critics on Capitol Hill.
Those factors were compounded by a series of miscalculations that, in the end, left the Chinese-backed company scrambling for support among its users in ways that were ineffective or even backfired.
TikTok now faces a battle for survival in the U.S. courts. Its other alternative is to find a deal that could extract some value out of its U.S. operation—but faces opposition from Beijing and uncertain interest from U.S. buyers. Failure on those fronts likely would mean the end of a U.S. business that forms the core of TikTok’s global operations, a grievous wound for the most internationally successful internet app to have come out of China.
This account is based on interviews with current and former employees of TikTok as well as lawmakers, and others involved in the battle over the app.
Missed opportunities
They say TikTok Chief Executive Shou Zi Chew missed opportunities early in his tenure to try to build support on Capitol Hill—and instead depended on negotiations with U.S. security officials over a complex restructuring that never panned out.
Shou Zi Chew, chief executive officer of TikTok, missed opportunities to build support in Washington. PHOTO: TIERNEY L. CROSS/BLOOMBERG NEWS
In recent months, TikTok was outflanked by opponents and repeatedly surprised by the surging momentum against it in Washington, leading to last-ditch steps to rally support that reinforced many lawmakers’ concerns about the Chinese app’s ability to influence public opinion.
“I don’t think they ever understood how concerned we were with the national security implications of so much American data being put at risk,” House Majority Leader Steve Scalise (R., La.) said of TikTok.
It is unknowable whether different strategies could have changed TikTok’s fate, given Washington’s deepening, bipartisan distrust of China, especially on tech matters.
“The government was not negotiating in good faith, and they intentionally misled Congress about the facts,” said Michael Beckerman, TikTok’s vice president of government relations. “There is not a CEO in the world that could have done a better job than Shou.”
During its 2020 battle against a ban effort by President Donald Trump, TikTok had been led by a U.S. executive and an Australian. In mid-2021, parent company ByteDance tapped Chew, in part because of his extensive bicultural experience. Born and raised in Singapore, the 41-year-old is fluent in Mandarin, attended Harvard Business School and worked for Goldman Sachs.
Need to build trust
He lacked, however, extensive experience with U.S. politics. People close to Chew urged him to get to know Washington’s power players. While Chew spoke about the need for TikTok to build trust, he didn’t give priority to such meetings, instead focusing on revenue, product features and a potential IPO.
Chew left government relations to his general counsel, Erich Andersen, a longtime Microsoft executive who had served as head of the U.S. tech giant’s intellectual property group.
Andersen spent much of 2022 negotiating with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a federal panel known as Cfius, over TikTok’s proposal to wall off U.S. user data. Called Project Texas, the proposal was designed to assuage concerns that Beijing could pressure TikTok to provide data or influence Americans’ views—demands TikTok has said it would never comply with.
General counsel Erich Andersen negotiated with a federal panel over TikTok’s proposal to wall off U.S. user data. PHOTO: NOAH BERGER/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Chew was getting conflicting advice. Some TikTok executives argued that he shouldn’t meet with lawmakers because the Cfius talks were confidential. Others said TikTok’s problems were fundamentally political and he could engage without detailing the negotiations.
In early 2022, Chew told employees in multiple calls that a deal with the U.S. government was nearly done. But within a couple months, it was clear that something was off. By August, Cfius wasn’t returning TikTok’s calls.
Visits to lawmakers’ offices
That December, TikTok learned House lawmakers wanted Chew to testify. Twenty months into his tenure, he made his first big Washington tour, spending much of January through March visiting the offices of more than two-thirds of the approximately 50 members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
A TikTok spokeswoman said Chew had previously met with some lawmakers, and attended a congressional sporting event, in 2022.
Chew faced a barrage of harsh questioning over more than five hours in the March hearing. Chew’s team felt much of the grilling was unfair, with lawmakers suggesting incorrectly that he is a Chinese citizen and his boss is China’s Communist Party leader.
But executives felt they had gained ground with users. One measure: Chew’s TikTok account soared from fewer than 15,000 followers before the hearing to more than three million soon after.
TikTok was getting help from Club for Growth, a powerful conservative group backed by financier Jeff Yass, whose Susquehanna International Group is a major shareholder of TikTok’s parent company. And President Biden joined TikTok on Super Bowl Sunday to reach younger voters.
The situation lulled some inside TikTok into thinking it was safe. But the ground was already shifting against it.
Drafting bipartisan legislation
After Chew’s testimony, Scalise began discussions with lawmakers, tasking a new select committee on China with drafting bipartisan legislation.
That small team worked during the fall of 2023, fueled by a steady stream of pizzas, and the bones of the agreement were in place by late 2023. The team quietly worked with the Justice Department to make sure the bill was drafted with the best shot of staving off a legal challenge.
CEO Shou Zi Chew speaking with Michael Beckerman, TikTok’s vice president of government relations, at a hearing in Washington last year. PHOTO: CHIP SOMODEVILLA/GETTY IMAGES
Keeping the drafting under wraps helped delay the deluge of TikTok lobbying, which previously had some success deterring legislative efforts.
Sentiment against China in Congress was continuing to sour, and criticism of TikTok gained new momentum because of anger over TikTok videos about the Israel-Hamas conflict, which many critics claimed were disproportionately anti-Israel. TikTok says it doesn’t promote either side of an issue.
Concerns about social media
TikTok also was among the companies in the crosshairs over broad concerns about social media.
“TikTok is facing resistance from all the critics of big tech, all the criticism of social media, they’re facing all the criticism of Chinese apps, of China-based tech companies,” said Daniel Castro, vice president at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a Washington-based research group funded by U.S. tech giants and other companies.
When plans for a vote on the proposed House bill emerged in early March, TikTok executives were blindsided.
In response, the app served users a notification urging them to call lawmakers to protest a possible ban. The stunt backfired, showing TikTok’s powerful ability to mobilize users for a political goal, lawmakers and congressional aides said.
Meanwhile, Kellyanne Conway, a former senior White House official, made calls on behalf of the Yass-backed Club for Growth, urging lawmakers to reject the legislation as a violation of free speech and an unfair boost to Facebook, according to people familiar with the discussions.
Pressure on Republican lawmakers
Republican lawmakers also received calls from Doug Stafford, one of the people said. Stafford is an adviser to Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.), who according to federal records has received more than $24 million in political donations from Yass and Yass’s wife since 2015.
TikTok’s offices in Los Angeles. PHOTO: JESSICA PONS FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The people familiar with the calls said they understood the message from Conway and Stafford to be that politicians wouldn’t get funding from Yass-backed groups in the future if they voted for the bill.
A spokesman for Yass, a longtime supporter of libertarian causes, said opposing a TikTok ban was “libertarianism 101.” In a statement, Club for Growth President David McIntosh said Yass has never directed the organization to take a position on any issue, and that how lawmakers voted on the TikTok bill wouldn’t affect whether Club for Growth supports them.
The pressure stoked some anxiety among lawmakers but also some resentment. One lawmaker, in response, helped assemble a 278-page packet to other Congress members that made the case for the bill. It laid out arguments about national security concerns with TikTok.
The House Energy and Commerce Committee approved the bill unanimously, and it sailed through the House in a 352-65 vote. Scalise said he hosted a celebration just off the House floor right after the vote. Some House staffers played “TiK ToK,” the 2009 hit song by Kesha.
Trying to leverage support
The company stuck with its strategy of trying to leverage support among U.S. users and creators—though that again demonstrated the ability to influence opinion that critics had feared.
The company decided to post a video to its main account that featured Chew encouraging users to lobby their senators. The video went viral almost instantly, indicating that the company had used a tactic called “heating” to promote the video widely on the platform, according to people familiar with the process. The video ultimately received more than 37 million views.
The spokeswoman said TikTok didn’t heat the video.
The TikTok bill looked like it had stalled after arriving in the Senate. Executives again took solace, assessing that it might drag out until after the presidential election.
Once again, TikTok’s assessment proved too optimistic.
Behind the scenes, the bill’s supporters in the House were searching for a must-pass bill to attach it to. They found it in a Senate-backed $95 billion package of foreign aid to Ukraine and Israel. The package passed the House last weekend, followed by the Senate late Tuesday.
Ultimately, the bill passed through Congress—which hasn’t been able to agree on other tech legislation—because TikTok couldn’t dissuade lawmakers that its ownership is a threat to the U.S.
“The divestiture bill is a national security bill,” said Sen. Brian Schatz (D., Hawaii), a member of the Commerce Committee. “Whatever we think about social-media companies—that’s for another day.”
Chew once again sought support from users in a defiant message on TikTok. “It’s obviously a disappointing moment, but it does not need to be a defining one,” he said. “Rest assured, we aren’t going anywhere.
Write to Georgia Wells at georgia.wells@wsj.com and Kristina Peterson at kristina.peterson@wsj.com
5. Why Turning It Off and Turning It Back On Is Gadget-Fixing Magic
I am sure many of us appreciate this mystery being solved for us.
Excerpt:
A reboot is a no-duh solution, which is why your IT helpers almost always recommend doing that first. It turns out that flipping a device off and on can resolve software issues and bugs. This has been true for decades. Computers have advanced, but they still largely work the same as the earliest models did. Now that computers come in so many nontraditional tech products like cars and refrigerators, rebooting is even more useful and universal, IT experts say.
Why Turning It Off and Turning It Back On Is Gadget-Fixing Magic
There’s a reason it’s the first question IT asks
https://www.wsj.com/tech/personal-tech/why-turning-it-off-and-turning-it-back-on-is-gadget-fixing-magic-8a25ba91?mod=latest_headlines
By Cordilia James
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April 28, 2024 9:00 am ET
Whether it’s your computer or a mile-long train, the No. 1 way to fix tech problems hasn’t changed in years: Try turning it off and on again.
A reboot is a no-duh solution, which is why your IT helpers almost always recommend doing that first. It turns out that flipping a device off and on can resolve software issues and bugs. This has been true for decades. Computers have advanced, but they still largely work the same as the earliest models did. Now that computers come in so many nontraditional tech products like cars and refrigerators, rebooting is even more useful and universal, IT experts say.
Unlike a factory reset, rebooting maintains your preferences and data instead of returning your device to its original settings. It’s also not as risky as invasive troubleshooting techniques that have you dissembling devices or sticking things where they don’t belong.
Kenny Chan, a senior technology manager at Archetype, a San Francisco-based communications and marketing agency, says he gets about two to four tickets a week about issues that could’ve been resolved by doing a reboot.
“Some users come to me and say ‘I just did the reboot and it didn’t work, but let me do it with you while you’re on the call with me,’” Chan said. “It works when I’m there.”
It isn’t just computers and smartphones that work better after a reboot. Sometimes, planes, trains and automobiles also need to be turned off and on to get back to normal. Flight crews often restart the in-flight Wi-Fi and entertainment system to make them work, while a train might need to reboot if it’s having technology issues caused by extreme weather, communications losses or power failure on the tracks, said an Amtrak spokesman.
Jason Cerezo took a flight that required the crew to reboot the plane so it could leave the gate. PHOTO: VERONICA MULLEN
Jason Cerezo, 52 years old, had just settled into his seat on a flight from Portland, Ore., to Dallas for a business trip when the pilot notified everyone that the plane was having trouble disconnecting from the gate and required a restart. Cerezo, the owner of a graphic-design and web-development agency in Champaign, Ill., laughed to himself despite having to leave the plane and reboard.
“Everything is computer-based, so turning a plane off and turning it back on again makes perfect sense,” Cerezo said. “That’d be the first thing I would do if I were troubleshooting an airplane.”
Quick fix
One common issue that might require a restart is memory leaks, which happen when applications have coding errors that cause them to overload the system. The leaks can cause sluggish performance, crashes and freezes. Similar issues can arise when you keep a device on for too long without closing any programs.
Turning off a device pauses those apps, stopping the leak. It clears the device’s RAM, which is the short-term memory storage for a computer’s operating system, says Aaron Grady, Windows’ partner group project manager at Microsoft.
When a user turns the device back on, applications open with a clean slate, free from bugs that might have caused hiccups earlier.
“This process is similar to taking a short nap when you’re feeling overwhelmed,” Grady said. “When you wake up, you feel refreshed and can tackle problems more effectively.”
This applies to any product that has software running on it, including cars. They have onboard computers that control various systems such as Bluetooth connections and GPS navigation.
Under the hood
Gurpiar Gill, a 27-year-old teacher in Saskatchewan, Canada, drives a truck for a construction company in the summer. Two years ago, his boss bought a 2021 Ford F-150 for him to use, but just two weeks after getting the truck, he turned it on and noticed that the digital dashboard’s screen was blank.
Gill started to panic, skimming through the vehicle’s manual and scrolling through car forums online to find possible solutions. When nothing useful came up, he turned off the vehicle and waited a few minutes before turning it on again. It worked.
“I was just surprised,” Gill said. “Our technology has increased so much and has gotten so advanced, but this very simple thing that I’ve been using since the early 2000s to fix our very first Wi-Fi router is still working.”
Resets can even work for some hardware-related issues, Grady said, such as connectivity problems from a malfunctioning port or a nonresponsive screen.
Not all issues can be resolved with a reboot. For example, corrupted files on a computer’s hard drive would need to be deleted manually, Chan says, which is why in some cases you might have to clear your computer’s cache that houses those files.
Still, the next time you have a tech problem, channel your inner IT person and think to yourself: “Have you tried turning it off and back on?”
—For more WSJ Technology analysis, reviews, advice and headlines, sign up for our weekly newsletter.
Write to Cordilia James at cordilia.james@wsj.com
6. World War II History Haunts Attempts to Seize Russian Assets
Excerpts:
The Group of Seven is divided on whether to confiscate Russia’s assets, with Japan, which faces reparation claims of its own from South Korea and other neighbors, opposing the move. The Japanese Foreign Ministry said it would continue to discuss the issue with its G-7 partners.
Demands for further WWII reparations have dogged Germany for decades, at times souring relations with its neighbors. After WWII, Berlin paid the Allied powers and the then Soviet Union compensation for Germany’s war of aggression. Since 1952, Germany has also given more than $90 billion to Holocaust survivors and their families, according to Jewish organizations.
Recently, calls for further reparations have re-emerged. Poland, which Nazi Germany invaded and occupied throughout the war, has sought $1.3 trillion in compensation from Berlin since 2022, while Greece since 2019 has asked for more than $300 billion.
World War II History Haunts Attempts to Seize Russian Assets
Berlin has emerged as an opponent of plans to seize frozen Kremlin funds for reconstruction and military support of Ukraine
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/world-war-ii-history-haunts-attempts-to-seize-russian-assets-eb066910?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1
By Bojan PancevskiFollow
and Laurence NormanFollow
Updated April 28, 2024 12:04 am ET
BERLIN—The specter of World War II is haunting Western attempts to seize Russian assets and funnel them to Ukraine’s defense against Moscow.
Berlin has emerged as one of the fiercest opponents of the U.S.-led push to commandeer some of the nearly $300 billion of Russian central-bank assets that were frozen at the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Germany fears that seizing, rather than freezing, the funds could create a precedent and inspire new claims against them for WWII-era crimes.
The misgivings risk the fate of the initiative. The U.S. and U.K. say its success is crucial for a Ukrainian victory, but there is little chance of progress without wider European support. The funds, several times the size of the recently approved $61 billion U.S. aid package for Ukraine, would bolster Ukraine’s ailing armed forces and help rebuild the country.
Two-thirds of the Russian money at play sits in Europe’s clearinghouses and, two years into the war, Germany has only just backed using the windfall profits to fund Ukrainian arms. Paris, Rome and the European Central Bank also are hesitant, in case taking hold of the reserves hits international confidence in the euro and single-currency assets.
The Group of Seven is divided on whether to confiscate Russia’s assets, with Japan, which faces reparation claims of its own from South Korea and other neighbors, opposing the move. The Japanese Foreign Ministry said it would continue to discuss the issue with its G-7 partners.
Demands for further WWII reparations have dogged Germany for decades, at times souring relations with its neighbors. After WWII, Berlin paid the Allied powers and the then Soviet Union compensation for Germany’s war of aggression. Since 1952, Germany has also given more than $90 billion to Holocaust survivors and their families, according to Jewish organizations.
Recently, calls for further reparations have re-emerged. Poland, which Nazi Germany invaded and occupied throughout the war, has sought $1.3 trillion in compensation from Berlin since 2022, while Greece since 2019 has asked for more than $300 billion.
Destruction from the war in Ukraine is widespread. PHOTO: SERHII KOROVAYNY FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
A Ukrainian volunteer rescuer walks among damaged buildings in Chasiv Yar, Ukraine. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Germany says its initial postwar payments, and a 1990 treaty that anchored the country’s borders following its reunification, settled the issue. The then Soviet Union and the U.S. were signatories to the treaty; Poland, Greece and Italy weren’t involved.
In 2004, when Poland joined the European Union, Berlin agreed not to support claims against Warsaw from millions of Germans expelled and expropriated. Poland in turn dropped its compensation claims. But the issue has remained an irritant.
“When we talk about executioners, victims, punishment, suffering…we demand not only memory, not only the truth. We demand compensation,” then Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said in September, on the 84th anniversary of Germany’s invasion.
Courts in Italy—which the Nazis invaded after the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini collapsed in 1943—have in recent years awarded restitution payments to families of victims of the occupation. Some Italian courts then attempted to seize German state assets, including real estate in Italy belonging to German schools and cultural, historical and archaeological institutions.
Germany took Italy to the International Court of Justice, or ICJ, where a ruling on the matter is pending. Italian authorities have refused to stop the cases, saying that would infringe on the independence of the courts.
Berlin argues international law prohibits individuals from making claims against states in foreign courts and that state assets are immune from seizure. Violating this principle in Russia’s case would undermine Germany’s longstanding legal position, Berlin officials said.
Russia’s Foreign Ministry has said that confiscating Russian assets would be “21st-century piracy.” Some Russian officials have warned they would retaliate.
The Polish state received little compensation after WWII. During the Cold War, its then Soviet rulers transferred looted German machinery and ships in lieu of compensation. Germany later paid $270 million to individual claimants in Poland, after causing the country’s widespread destruction and leaving between five million and six million people dead, roughly three million of whom were Jewish.
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, seated right, with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in November 1990. PHOTO: PICTURE-ALLIANCE/DPA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Communist Polish government dropped its compensation claims against its East German Warsaw Pact ally in 1953. But the issue returned to prominence after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Helmut Kohl, Germany’s then-chancellor, sought to link a denial of Poland’s reparations claims to the recognition of Poland’s postwar borders, which included swaths of prewar Germany. Kohl eventually backed down under international and domestic pressure.
Andreas Rödder, professor of contemporary history at the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz in Germany, said the Italian and Polish claims against Germany are valid—as is Berlin’s refusal to honor them in full. Yet successive German governments made a mistake by taking a legalistic approach and refusing to consider a compromise, he added, leading the problem to fester.
“Germany was comfortable in its erroneous assumption that the problem had been resolved and deliberately avoided the issue for decades, so it shouldn’t be surprised that Poland and Greece now say they have unfinished business,” Rödder said.
Germany also argues that Russian assets should be left intact to use as leverage in any talks to end the war and induce Russia to cede some of the Ukrainian territory it occupies.
Slawomir Debski, head of Pism, a think tank, said another motivation for Berlin’s refusal to seize Russian assets could be that it shields German companies still operating there from retaliation. The Leave Russia group, which campaigns for Western companies to exit from the Russian market, says 272 German companies still operate there.
Within the G-7, a complicated compromise may be starting to emerge. The U.S. has proposed that the group front-load 10 years of profits—essentially interest payments on matured assets—from the frozen funds. That money would act as collateral for a bond issued by a special-purpose vehicle set up by the G-7 to raise money for Ukraine. G-7 countries would guarantee the debt.
Europeans have their own plan to use the interest generated by frozen Russian assets to pay for weapons and reconstruction for Ukraine. That is likely to go ahead soon, although EU officials say Europe could join the U.S. plan in 2025. Discussions are still at an early stage.
President Biden this week signed into law legislation that authorizes his administration to seize Russian sovereign assets under U.S. jurisdiction. The U.S. holds $5 billion-to-$6 billion of Russian assets, congressional officials say.
Nazi soldiers question Jewish people in Warsaw in 1943. PHOTO: AFP/GETTY IMAGES
A young man sitting atop the Berlin Wall in November 1989. PHOTO: RAYMOND DEPARDON/MAGNUM PHOTOS
“We’re looking at a series of possibilities ranging from actually seizing the assets to using them as collateral,” Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said last week.
The U.S. argues that under international law, countries can take otherwise unlawful countermeasures against a country violating its international obligations. While lawyers and policymakers say Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears to fit the principle, there are disagreements over whether any country other than Ukraine is entitled to apply countermeasures.
Initially, U.S. officials also worried that confiscating Russian assets could backfire against Washington and allies such as Israel. The U.S. has since argued that only directly affected countries, such as Ukraine’s main backers, whose security is threatened and who are paying for some of Kyiv’s defense, would be entitled to confiscate assets.
Bart Szewczyk, an associate at U.S. law firm Covington who previously advised the European Commission and worked at the ICJ, said that Berlin’s concerns about setting a precedent for reparations cases were unwarranted.
“The logic behind countermeasures clearly applies only to current and ongoing violations of international law, rather than those that occurred 80 years ago,” he said.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a jurist who once managed his own legal firm, is unwilling to take the risk, according to German officials. One of the officials said the move could open other European capitals to claims over slavery and colonialism.
Andrew Duehren contributed to this article.
Write to Bojan Pancevski at bojan.pancevski@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com
7. The Honeytrap Resistance: Women who lure Putin's soldiers to their deaths with promises of sex.
The Honeytrap Resistance: Women who lure Putin's soldiers to their deaths with promises of sex. Locals handing out poison cakes... There's nothing Ukrainians behind enemy lines won't do to defeat their Russian occupiers
PUBLISHED: 17:05 EDT, 27 April 2024 | UPDATED: 17:22 EDT, 27 April 2024
Daily Mail · by Lord Ashcroft For The Mail On Sunday · April 27, 2024
At first glance, Andrii is a typical university student. Aged 21, he has a mop of fair hair, blue eyes and a gentle smile. Unlike most students, however, he has been risking torture and death behind enemy lines, smuggling out secret intelligence to the Ukrainian resistance.
Andrii was born and brought up in Mariupol, the port city that was besieged and then invaded by Russia in the first two months of the war in early 2022.
The brave Ukrainian soldiers who remained in the city's steelworks for weeks under terrifying bombardment came to embody the nation's defiance against overwhelming firepower.
A true patriot, Andrii couldn't sit by while his country collapsed. So, unarmed and with just a smartphone, he began photographing documents, buildings and locations that he felt would be useful for the Ukrainian armed forces.
From August 2022 he became aware of a secure social media channel on which he could send his information to the Ukrainian army, barely 100 miles away with rocket launchers trained on his home city.
Pictured: Russian soldiers at the Mariupol drama theatre which was hit by an airstrike on March 26. Brave citizens such as Andrii are sending photos of documents and buildings to the Ukrainian army
Ukrainian soldier Artem Kariakin. Ukrainians are engaging in various forms of resistance to Russian occupation, from raising Ukrainian flags overnight to sabotaging key infrastructure
Ukrainian soldiers on the front line in the town of Kreminna in the Donetsk region
A crater left by a damaged hospital ward in Kharkiv after being hit by two Russian missiles
He then began locating and photographing enemy barracks and troop movements, along with weapon and ammunition stores.
This vital information was used to kill Russian troops and wipe out enemy equipment using missiles, drones and artillery shells.
Andrii is just one of tens of thousands of brave men and women who have risked their lives in what many abroad call the 'Occupied Territories' – but which Ukrainians prefer to call the 'Temporary Occupied Territories'.
About 20 per cent of Ukraine's land, mostly in the far east of the country, is under Russian control.
Millions of people are forced to live under the iron rule of their occupiers, who keep order through the threat of imprisonment, torture and even execution.
Aged 19 at the time of the invasion and living with his family, Andrii says: 'I wanted to do something, however small, to help the country I love. I did not consider my life was important compared to the bigger picture – I was prepared to die.'
Eventually, however, Russian police and security agencies cottoned on to his spying. Andrii knew he had to flee his home city when he heard Russian security officers were interrogating shoppers over his whereabouts, armed with a picture of him.
Andrii's escape from Mariupol in March last year was just as dangerous.
With all roads to the rest of Ukraine blocked, he had to cross into Russia.
In a nerve-shredding encounter at the border, Andrii was taken to a room where he was strip-searched by Russian guards.
They were looking for tattoos linking him to Ukrainian military units or evidence that he had been using a weapon.
They then questioned him for two hours before eventually releasing him, satisfied with his story that he was a student who needed to visit Russia. He travelled onwards through enemy territory by bus, praying each time it pulled over that no more gun-toting guards would board, asking for an 'Andrii'.
After what felt like an age, he crossed the Russian border into Belarus, and from there to Kyiv.
He was sad to leave his family but relieved to leave behind a city starved of electricity and drinking water, with little food in the shops and few medical supplies.
'Life under Russian control was horrible,' he says. 'There was an information vacuum. The internet was blocked along with Ukrainian and US TV and radio channels.
'We were cut off from the outside world and all we heard was Russian propaganda.'
Today he still works with the resistance but as an administrator in the Dnipro area in the east of the country.
He marshals spies still in Mariupol, feeding their vital intelligence to the armed forces.
'I am still trying to do my bit,' said Andrii, who has also resumed his studies. 'At the time of the invasion I was a quiet home boy, but I am proud of what I have been able to do.'
Tens of thousands of brave men and women in what Ukrainians call 'Temporary Occupied Territories' risk their lives to resist Putin's forces
Millions of people are forced to live under the iron rule of their occupiers, who keep order through the threat of imprisonment, torture and even execution
Behind enemy lines, resistance takes many forms.
Some take part in civil disobedience, a kind of non-violent protest against the occupiers.
Their actions, designed to boost morale, include secretly painting anti-Russian graffiti in public places and tying yellow ribbons – a resistance symbol – far and wide.
Others ensure that blue and yellow Ukrainian flags are regularly hoisted in public places overnight.
Open protests, however, are non-existent because those who took part in them in the early days were arrested and sometimes tortured and killed.
Under the cover of darkness, however, Ukrainians sabotage infrastructure including railways, communications and factories, and some will kill the enemy if the opportunity arises.
The direct action of those doughty fighters, armed with a secretly amassed arsenal of guns, car bombs and other explosives, has seen hundreds of Russians soldiers and collaborators shot or blown up. I have learned that women are also playing a key role in the resistance, including acting as honeytraps to lure Russian soldiers to their deaths.
However, many soldiers are so hungry that poisoned food – rather than the suggestion of sexual favours – is the preferred method of assassination.
In the north-east city of Izium, during the first days of the occupation, two Russian soldiers were killed and 28 hospitalised when locals gave them poisoned cakes –a grim irony given that the Kremlin is no stranger to poisoning its enemies.
However, the most valuable weapon that fighters have is intelligence: information that, shared on phones, enables the Ukrainian army to strike from hundreds of miles away.
It should not be forgotten that for some, notably in Crimea and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk, the resistance has been smouldering for a full decade, since Vladimir Putin ordered their illegal annex-ation in 2014.
In Kharkiv in north-east Ukraine, a soldier told me that, as war loomed, several civilians were trained in how to co-ordinate attacks on enemy troops, similar to methods used by the French Resistance in the Second World War.
Small, isolated cells were created so that if an underground member was caught and tortured then he or she could not betray the identities or whereabouts of the wider group.
While the city of Kharkiv was never occupied, the soldier poured his efforts into operating a 50-strong network of spies on WhatsApp, many of them living behind Russian lines. These men and women fed the army crucial intelligence using 'burner phones' – devices that are destroyed after the message is sent so the source cannot be traced – which they had been given in the weeks before the invasion when Russian tanks were massing on the border.
The military in Kharkiv used the intelligence to pound Russian targets, one of which was a huge depot of armoured vehicles 50 miles south of the city.
On one occasion, the social media group was infiltrated by a spy feeding information to the invaders, but the traitor was quickly identified and shot, the soldier told me.
The occupation, according to intelligence sources, has been far more brutal than anyone expected. Torture centres exist openly in many high streets, intended to give a clear and chilling message that anyone discovered helping or even showing sympathy towards Ukraine will be treated viciously.
One source said: 'The Russians are using medieval torture techniques in a modern war – dismemberment and castration – along with more modern techniques including applying electric shocks to men's genitals – they are monsters.'
He added: 'No one expected the occupation to be so harsh.'
Under the yoke of Russian rule, local populations have to tolerate rigged elections, forced mobilisation, repression and intimidation.
Pre-construction mine clearance works underway in Russian-controlled Mariupol
In occupied territories, locals are forced to put up with rigged elections and forced mobilisation and intimidation
Construction workers lay bricks while rebuilding a destroyed district in the city of Mariupol
Those who refuse to apply for Russian passports are deprived of the best homes, healthcare and education for their children, yet still thousands defiantly keep their Ukrainian nationality.
Russia tries to control the internet, communications and all TV and radio channels, having set up at least one station aimed solely at their new Ukrainian civilians.
The channel continually broadcasts sinister warnings about the repercussions for those who collaborate with 'the enemy'.
Intelligence sources in Kyiv have learned that, after the atrocities at Bucha in early 2022, when hundreds of dead bodies of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians were found strewn in the streets, the Kremlin told army and security services that evidence of their barbarity must never again be left for the world to see.
Today its brutality is as common as ever, just more discreet.
One 33-year-old member of the partisan group Atesh (meaning 'Fire' in Ukrainian) told me that she could have left Crimea several times but chose to stay to carry out her valuable work.
'We cannot simply watch from the sidelines as Russia commits terrible crimes on Ukraine: kills, tortures, rapes, destroys entire cities and brings its terrible 'Russian world' to free people,' she said.
Intelligence from Atesh has proved invaluable, not least in inflicting heavy damage on Russia's Black Sea fleet. As a champion of bravery, a collector of gallantry medals and the author of seven books on courage, I have no doubt that once this brutal war is over, more incredible stories of valour will emerge from the rubble.
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Lord Ashcroft KCMG PC is an international businessman, philanthropist, author and pollster. For more information on his work, visit lordashcroft.com. Follow him on X/Facebook @LordAshcroft.
Daily Mail · by Lord Ashcroft For The Mail On Sunday · April 27, 2024
8. The Axis of Autocrats
Again, north Korea is mostly overlooked except for one paragraph here. north Korea does not only support Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Yemen, as well as Russia, I would bet that there are also ties between north Korea and some of the countries in the Global South.
Excerpt:
Moreover, Russia's recent move to veto the renewal of the Panel of Experts at the United Nations, which monitors and enforces sanctions against North Korea, represents a significant undermining of international efforts to control North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The Panel had been a crucial mechanism in providing universally accepted insights into North Korea’s sanctions evasion and the involvement of states like Russia and China in these activities. Russia's veto, motivated by a desire to conceal its dealings with North Korea, including arms shipments, poses a direct challenge to the transparency and efficacy of global nonproliferation regimes.
1 hour ago
7 min read
The Axis of Autocrats
The Growing Ties Between China, Russia, Iran, and the Global South
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-axis-of-autocrats?postId=dde38e64-cd47-47bf-b36d-9ae2fa175995&utm
The evolving geopolitical landscape has given rise to a complex and opportunistic alliance between China, Russia, and Iran, which could be termed an "Axis of Autocrats." This alignment, characterized by increased military, economic, political, and technological collaborations, is primarily aimed at countering the dominance of the United States and its allies in the global order. The nature of this coalition, however, reveals a mix of concerted strategic interests and significant intrinsic limitations.
China, Russia, and Iran have drawn much closer since Russia invaded Ukraine. But the relationship was burgeoning before that conflict began in 2022. Since 2019, they have conducted joint naval exercises, displaying a symbolic unity in the Arabian Sea through operations such as rescuing hijacked ships and target practice. While these exercises project an image of military synergy, they fail to foster genuine interoperability or strategic depth, underscoring the alliance's role as an "axis of convenience" rather than a tightly-knit coalition. Each country harbors distinct national interests and strategic goals, which occasionally conflict with or diverge from one another. For instance, Iran seeks more robust military collaborations, Russia remains preoccupied with its engagement in Ukraine, and China is cautious about forming deep alliances that could estrange it from Western nations.[1]
A pivotal aspect of this alliance's global impact is its support for Russia's military operations in Ukraine. China has provided critical technology and economic support, while Iran has supplied advanced drone technology. North Korea, although not a formal member of this axis, has supported these efforts by sending ammunition and missile systems to Russia. These actions not only bolster Russia's military capabilities but also complicate Western attempts to diplomatically and economically isolate Moscow.
Activities of China, Russia, and Iran Tied to Ukraine
- China: Significantly aiding Russia's military efforts, particularly by transferring critical materials and technologies that support Russia's industrial and military capabilities. This support has been crucial for Russia, especially in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
- Russia: Has received logistical and military support from China and Iran, enhancing its capability to engage in its military operations in Ukraine. Russia, in turn, supports Iran by likely helping to strengthen its air defenses.
- Iran: Actively involved in conflicts in the Middle East and supports Russia’s military actions in Ukraine by supplying drones and missiles. These activities are part of Iran's broader strategy to assert its regional influence and beyond.
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The three countries - China, Russia, and Iran - have collaborated to eliminate their reliance on the US GPS system and reinforce each other's. They have also conducted naval exercises together, showing potential maritime security implications. In 2021, Iran was granted full access to China's BeiDou satellite navigation system, and integration efforts between BeiDou and Russia's GLONASS are underway. However, the scope of operational cooperation does not extend much beyond the Middle East. The Arabian Sea is the only place Russia, China, and Iran engage in trilateral exercises. Each country has different priorities. Russia sees it as an opportunity to advance its "Collective Security in the Persian Gulf" agenda and become a great maritime power. China uses the exercises to enhance the projection of its naval escort task force in the Gulf of Aden. Iran focuses on improving its naval projection capabilities. While the exercises have limited relevance in strengthening interoperability between the three navies, each participant has specific needs met through participating.[2]
The primary concern for the United States is the military implications of the Axis. However, creating a formal trilateral relationship offers opportunities for economic partnerships between the countries that could be more important. China has become an important economic lifeline with Russia and Iran under punitive global sanctions. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there has been renewed interest in Moscow and Tehran for developing the International North-South Transport Corridor. This corridor is a multi-mode route for moving freight between Russia, Central Asia, and India. Tangible steps toward greater economic integration have already been taken. After their access to the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication was suspended in February 2023, Moscow and Tehran announced that they had connected their national financial messaging services. This bilateral financial arrangement insulates both nations from Western sanctions and could be expanded to involve other countries in the future.
Moreover, Russia's recent move to veto the renewal of the Panel of Experts at the United Nations, which monitors and enforces sanctions against North Korea, represents a significant undermining of international efforts to control North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The Panel had been a crucial mechanism in providing universally accepted insights into North Korea’s sanctions evasion and the involvement of states like Russia and China in these activities. Russia's veto, motivated by a desire to conceal its dealings with North Korea, including arms shipments, poses a direct challenge to the transparency and efficacy of global nonproliferation regimes.
Additionally, this Axis plays a significant role in BRICS, an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which is an intergovernmental organization that represents some of the major emerging economies on the global stage. Initially focused on investment opportunities, BRICS has evolved into a significant geopolitical bloc since its first formal summit in 2009. The organization aims to enhance cooperation among its members and plays a pivotal role in global economic discussions. Recently, BRICS expanded to include new members such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, which broadens its influence and representation.[3]
The term "Global South" generally refers to the regions of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania that are considered in contrast to the wealthier "Global North." BRICS is often seen as a representative voice for these regions, advocating for the interests and development of emerging economies and acting as a counterbalance to the dominance of Western economic paradigms.[4]
Russia, China, and Iran play distinct roles within BRICS. Russia and China, for instance, view BRICS as a platform to enhance their global influence and as a counterforce against Western dominance. Russia leverages its position to strengthen political alliances and economic ties, particularly as it faces Western sanctions. China uses BRICS to increase its diplomatic and economic outreach, especially as its global ambitions expand. Iran’s inclusion in BRICS is seen as a strategic move to counteract its international isolation and gain support against unilateral Western policies, particularly from the United States.
China's role in BRICS offers it a strategic advantage by allowing it to forge stronger relationships with other emerging economies and to create an alternative bloc to the Western-led global order. This is particularly significant as China seeks to expand its influence in the face of challenging relations with Western countries. By leading initiatives within BRICS, such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, China strengthens its position and potentially dilutes the dominance of Western financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank.
There is a growing consensus that Iran-Russia-China is forming an axis of Authoritarians. While symbolically significant, it lacks the substance and cohesion to challenge the current international order effectively. However, when considered in conjunction with BRICS, it represents a significant shift in the global economic and political landscape, with China, Russia, and Iran playing crucial roles in shaping its direction. The organization facilitates economic cooperation among emerging markets. It serves as a strategic platform for these countries to assert their interests on the global stage, challenging the existing Western-centric order. BRICS is marked by opportunistic cooperation and limited by significant strategic and political divergences among its members. The trilateral Axis relationship underscores the complexities of international relations where states pursue alliances based on immediate strategic interests rather than enduring partnerships.
The ramifications of their activities are nuanced. While maritime exercises project an image of a unified front, they do little to enhance military interoperability or strategic depth among the three nations. Moreover, the alliance does not substantially shift the geopolitical balance, as it is more of an "axis of convenience" rather than a tightly-knit coalition. Structurally, they are not an exclusive bloc, nor is it an alliance. More pointedly, it is an assembly of discontented countries with a common goal of challenging the principles, rules, and institutions that form the basis of the current international system. When these countries work together, their actions have a much greater impact than their individual efforts. They boost each other's military capabilities, weaken the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy tools like sanctions, and impede the ability of Washington and its allies to achieve their objectives.[5]
Although weak, the ties that bind them seem enduring, and the pressures on them draw the three autocratic regimes closer together. The implications of these developments for the United States and its allies are growing more serious. The strengthening of this axis presents military, strategic, and political challenges, necessitating a multifaceted response from the U.S. The internal division within the U.S. regarding foreign engagement — with isolationist tendencies at both political poles clashing with the advocacy for robust international alliances — underscores the complexity of formulating a coherent response to the shifting global dynamics.[6]
While the China-Russia-Iran axis and its peripheral engagements with states like North Korea and multi-state organizations like BRICS symbolize a significant shift towards multipolarity and strategic competition, the alliance itself is marked by pragmatic, transactional cooperation and limited by strategic and political divergences. This situation poses a nuanced and long-term threat to the international order. It requires diligent observation, strategic patience, and proactive diplomacy by the United States and its allies to safeguard their interests and uphold global stability.
Implications for the U.S.: The strengthening of ties and coordination among these three nations poses significant challenges for the U.S. regarding military strategy and geopolitical influence. The U.S. faces the following implications:
- Military and Strategic Challenges: The U.S. has to contend with a potentially more coordinated and powerful opposition in various global hotspots, including the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
- Political Challenges: Inside the U.S., there is a division on how to respond to these challenges, with isolationist voices within the Republican Party calling for less engagement abroad, which contrasts sharply with those advocating for robust support for international allies and a strong stance against these adversarial alliances.
[1] Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine. “The Axis of Upheaval. How America’s Enemies are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order.” Foreign Affairs. April 23, 2024
[2] Lucas Winter, Jemima Baar, and Jason Warner. “The Axis Off-Kilter: Why An Iran-Russia-China “Axis” Is Shakier Than Meets The Eye.” War on the Rocks. April 19, 2024
[3] Kyle Hiebert “With BRICS Expansion, the Global South Takes Centre Stage. An enlarged BRICS community will expedite the rebalancing of global power away from the West.” Centre for International Governance Integration. August 31, 2023
[4] Kawashima Shin. How China Defines the ‘Global South’ Beijing tries to make the term its own.” The Diplomat. January 11, 2024
[5] Lucas Winter, Jemima Baar, and Jason Warner. “The Axis Off-Kilter: Why An Iran-Russia-China “Axis” Is Shakier Than Meets The Eye.” War on the Rocks. April 19, 2024
[6] Niall Ferguson. “The Second Cold War Is Escalating Faster Than the First . To understand what is at stake in the fight against the axis of China, Russia and Iran, just read “The Lord of the Rings.” Bloomberg. April 21, 2024
9. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 26, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-april-26-2024
Key Takeaways
- The PRC unilaterally opened two eastbound connecting flight routes near Taiwanese airspace over the Kinmen and Matsu islands. The move is likely part of a CCP effort to strain Taiwan’s situational awareness around its airspace and put pressure on Taiwan’s incoming Lai Ching-te administration.
- PRC tariffs on Taiwan’s polycarbonate exports may be part of a pressure campaign ahead of Lai Ching-te’s presidential inauguration on May 20.
- Former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou met with Kuomintang Chairman Eric Chu on April 16 and discussed amending a law that counters PRC interference in Tawan’s politics.
- The People’s Liberation Army dissolved the Strategic Support Force into three distinct arms to achieve “information dominance” and operational superiority through force integration.
- The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the importance of addressing United States sanctions on PRC companies during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the PRC. The PRC framing of the visit indicates that the CCP aims to alleviate economic tension with the United States while maintaining commercial and defense industrial base assistance to Russia.
- The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Lin Jian framed the United States Army deploying the Typhon ground-based cruise missile and air-defense missile launcher to the Philippine island of Luzon as part of the US-Philippine Salaknib 2024 military exercise as “provoking conflict.”
CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, APRIL 26, 2024
Apr 26, 2024 - ISW Press
China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 26, 2024
Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Nils Peterson, and Mathilde Lemerle of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: April 25 at Noon ET
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- The PRC unilaterally opened two eastbound connecting flight routes near Taiwanese airspace over the Kinmen and Matsu islands. The move is likely part of a CCP effort to strain Taiwan’s situational awareness around its airspace and put pressure on Taiwan’s incoming Lai Ching-te administration.
- PRC tariffs on Taiwan’s polycarbonate exports may be part of a pressure campaign ahead of Lai Ching-te’s presidential inauguration on May 20.
- Former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou met with Kuomintang Chairman Eric Chu on April 16 and discussed amending a law that counters PRC interference in Tawan’s politics.
- The People’s Liberation Army dissolved the Strategic Support Force into three distinct arms to achieve “information dominance” and operational superiority through force integration.
- The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the importance of addressing United States sanctions on PRC companies during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the PRC. The PRC framing of the visit indicates that the CCP aims to alleviate economic tension with the United States while maintaining commercial and defense industrial base assistance to Russia.
- The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Lin Jian framed the United States Army deploying the Typhon ground-based cruise missile and air-defense missile launcher to the Philippine island of Luzon as part of the US-Philippine Salaknib 2024 military exercise as “provoking conflict.”
Cross-Strait Relations
The PRC unilaterally opened two eastbound connecting flight routes near Taiwanese airspace over the Kinmen and Matsu islands. The move is likely part of a CCP effort to strain Taiwan’s situational awareness around its airspace and put pressure on Taiwan’s incoming Lai Ching-te administration. The flight routes, W122 and W123, have been operational in the westbound direction since 2018 and connect the PRC cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen to the M503 north-south flight route, which goes down the middle of the Taiwan Strait. The W122 route flies close to the Matsu islands and the W123 route flies near the Kinmen Islands, two island groups near the PRC that Taiwan controls. The PRC Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) unilaterally canceled a 6 nautical mile “offset” of the M503 route in January 2024, which moved the route to within 4.2 nautical miles (5 miles or 7.8 kilometers) of the median line of the Taiwan Strait. It announced on the same day that it would permit eastbound flights along the W122 and W123 routes.[1] The CAAC finally launched the new eastbound flight routes on April 19. It claimed the new airspace “optimization” and the adjustment of the M503 route were needed to meet the “development needs” of air transportation between the Yangtze River Delta and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Bay Area and to ensure flight safety.[2]
Taiwan’s Civil Aviation Administration said both the establishment of the new flight routes and the “unilateral” adjustment of the M503 were a danger to air traffic in the area. It said it will request that aircraft turn around if they approach Taiwanese airspace without permission.[3] ROC Premier Chen Chien-jen condemned the new routes, called for them to be retracted, and directed the CAA to study possible response measures.[4] The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) denied that there were any security concerns about the new flight routes and also denied the existence of a median line in the Taiwan Strait.[5]
An unnamed “senior Taiwan official” told Reuters the PRC’s flight adjustments were part of a pattern of pressure on Taiwan ahead of ROC Vice President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration as President on May 20. The official said the CCP wants Taiwan to “cave in, make compromises, and change [its] behavior.”[6] The CCP considers Lai and his political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to be separatists. The timing of the air route changes is consistent with political motives. The CAAC originally announced the routes and the shifting of the M503 route on January 30, not long after Taiwan’s January 13 election. It activated the new routes on April 19, almost one month before Lai’s inauguration. Increasing the volume of flights in the sensitive airspace near Kinmen, Matsu, and the Taiwan Strait median line serves to strain Taiwanese resources as Taiwan must monitor, assess, and prepare to respond to each flight as a potential airspace incursion.
PRC tariffs on Taiwan’s polycarbonate exports may be part of a pressure campaign ahead of Lai Ching-te’s presidential inauguration on May 20. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced on April 19 that it would levy tariffs of up to 22.4% on Taiwan’s polycarbonate exports to the PRC. Polycarbonate is a material used in many fields such as electronic appliances, sheets and films, automobiles, optics, packaging, medical devices, and safety equipment.[7] The tariffs resulted from MOFCOM concluding an anti-dumping investigation into Taiwanese polycarbonate products. MOFCOM first announced the investigation in November 2022 and released preliminary findings announced in August 2023 which claimed Taiwanese “dumping” of polycarbonate products had “substantially” damaged the PRC’s polycarbonate industry. The findings released on April 19 confirmed the conclusions from August.
ROC Executive Yuan spokesperson Lin Tze-luen accused the PRC of using “political manipulation” to interfere with normal cross-strait trade relations.[8] The TAO spokesperson claimed on April 24 that the anti-dumping investigation reached its conclusion “fairly and impartially” and fully complied with relevant laws and World Trade Organization regulations. The spokesperson threatened further economic measures against Taiwan “if the DPP authorities continue to stubbornly adhere to the ‘Taiwan independence’ stance,” however.[9]
The TAO statement and the timing of the tariff announcement are consistent with a politically motivated pressure campaign against Taiwan and the incoming administration of Lai Ching-te. The tariffs took effect on April 20, exactly one month before Lai’s presidential inauguration. MOFCOM’s announcement of the tariffs on April 19 also coincided with the CAAC announcing its new flight routes near Kinmen and Matsu. The PRC previously imposed punitive economic measures against Taiwanese chemical and fishery products before Taiwan’s January 13 election. It also claimed Taiwan’s trade restrictions on the PRC violated the 2011 Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). ISW has assessed that these punitive economic measures may have been meant to influence Taiwan’s election.[10]
Taiwan
Former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou met with Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu on April 16 and discussed amending a law that counters PRC interference in Tawan’s political system. Ma, who is a member of the KMT, and the KMT leadership advocated amending some provisions of the law to prevent it from becoming a tool for DPP “manipulation” and to avoid “stifling the rights of Taiwanese people to exchange with the mainland.” They did not publicly specify what amendments they sought to make.[11] The Anti-Infiltration Act is a 2020 law that the DPP government passed to counter PRC interference in Taiwan’s elections and political system. It imposes criminal penalties for accepting funds from “hostile foreign forces” to make political donations and lobby the government. It also increases penalties for other election law violations if those violations are committed with funding from foreign forces.[12]
Ma and the KMT’s plans to propose amendments are consistent with their opposition to the law when originally passed. Ma at the time compared the law’s passage to a return to “martial law” in Taiwan, referring to the period of KMT authoritarian rule from 1949-1987 known as the “White Terror.”[13] The KMT boycotted the final vote on the law and criticized it as a ploy for the DPP to win votes shortly before the 2020 election. Some of the law’s critics said it was too broad and could be used to repress legitimate political activity and cross-strait exchanges.[14]
The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson on April 24 claimed the Anti-Infiltration Act is an “evil law” meant to suppress dissidents, create “Green Terror,” and seek the “selfish interests” of one party.[15] “Green Terror” is a term the CCP and other opponents of the DPP use to compare DPP policies with the repressive policies of the “White Terror.” Green is the DPP’s official color. The CCP’s rhetoric about the Anti-Infiltration Law is similar to that of Ma and some hardline KMT officials. The CCP prefers for the law to be abolished rather than amended, however.
The DPP said it would oppose former president Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang’s proposed amendments to Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act. ROC Vice President and President-elect Lai Ching-te said on April 17 that the KMT’s proposal appears to be harmful to Taiwan and regional stability. He said the Anti-Infiltration Act is designed to prevent malicious infiltration by foreign forces and does not hinder cross-strait exchanges.[16] DPP spokesperson Justin Wu said on April 23 that the DPP would oppose any loosening of the law. He raised suspicions about the timing of Ma and the KMT’s announcement, noting that it came shortly after Ma returned from his trip to the PRC on April 1-11. Wu also warned KMT legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi not to discuss domestic Taiwanese legislation during his planned trip to the PRC.[17] Fu will lead a KMT delegation to the PRC on April 25.[18]
The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs is investigating the leak of government documents and whether the documents were altered overseas before their public disclosure. The leaked documents dating from March 15 included reportedly official communications between the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Keelung Customs Service, and the ROC National Treasury Administration approving a Hsiao Bi-khim request for the wine she imported for her personal consumption to be exempted from inspection. The documents were part of 4GB of data acquired by hackers.[19] The ROC MOFA did not confirm the authenticity of the leaked documents. It suspected the documents involved may have undergone “malicious overseas alteration” after being “sold on the dark web.”[20] The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance stated that the transfer of Hsiao Bi Khim’s personal belongings back to Taiwan occurred legally. [21] ROC Premier Chen Chien-jen stated that the accusations against Hsiao Bi-khim were an act of cognitive warfare and called on the public to maintain vigilance. [22]
China
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) dissolved the Strategic Support Force (SSF) into three distinct arms to pursue “information dominance” and operational superiority through force integration. Xi created the SSF in 2015 during comprehensive military reforms, tasking it with integrating military operations across the cyber, electronic, and aerospace domains.[23] Former PLA Navy Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo stated in 2016 that SSF responsibilities included target detection and reconnaissance, relaying target information, management of BeiDou [navigation] satellites and space reconnaissance means, and conducting operations in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.[24] CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping announced the dissolution of the SSF and the inauguration of the Information Support Force (ISF) on April 19.[25] Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Wu Qian stated that an Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force also came into existence alongside the ISF as a part of the restructuring.[26]
The three new arms are organized in the same support capacity as the preexisting Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), whose task is to unify logistics to support the five theater commands. The four auxiliary arms are distinct from the PLA’s four armed services, which are the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.
Xi described the new ISF as a key support for coordinating the development and application of “network information systems,” referring to mechanisms to facilitate information sharing and strengthen information infrastructure across the military.[27] Xi’s introduction indicates that the ISF will assume one of the SSF’s primary responsibilities, which includes what former SSF Commander Gao Jin referred to as acting as an “information umbrella” for the military to integrate operational capabilities.[28] This entails forming a data link to enable information transmission, processing, and distribution that is critical to the cohesion of joint operations.[29] This is consistent with PRC military doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of network-centric “informatized” warfare that exploits information sharing to achieve synergy across warfighting domains.[30] The PLA defines information dominance as gaining “superiority over an adversary in terms of information acquisition, transmission, processing, utilization, and confrontation capabilities.”[31] Information offense and defense are inherent to information dominance in the PLA’s view, requiring a blend of kinetic and non-kinetic means to influence, interfere with, degrade, and destroy the enemy’s information systems.[32]
The Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force will likely take on the responsibilities of the SSF’s two functional units, the Aerospace and Network Systems Departments.[33] PRC officials have not indicated where responsibilities under the SSF’s broad remit would be reallocated, such as collecting intelligence, technical reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and psychological warfare.
The SSF’s division into three distinct organizations demonstrates the CCP leadership’s aim to streamline its various missions into separate individual arms to improve efficacy. The creation of a standalone ISF suggests that the SSF was inadequate to meet Xi’s standards for centralizing informatization in PLA operations. Xi appointed SSF Deputy Commander Bi Yi as ISF Commander and SSF Political Commissar Li Wei ISF Political Commissar.[34] Retaining top leadership roles such as Bi and Li suggests that the reason for the SSF’s dissolution was primarily functional and not due to endemic performance or trust issues throughout the command. The ISF’s placement under the direct command of the Central Military Commission affirms the centrality of information in military operations and maintains CCP leadership’s close supervision over the information chain.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the importance of addressing United States sanctions on PRC companies during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the PRC. The PRC framing of the visit indicates that the CCP aims to alleviate economic tension with the United States while maintaining commercial and defense industrial base assistance to Russia. Blinken met with party officials in Shanghai on April 24 before traveling to Beijing to meet with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 26.[35] The head of the MFA’s North America and Oceania Division Yang Tao announced the PRC’s main goals for Blinken’s visit during a briefing on April 23 are: 1) establishing the right perception; 2) strengthening dialogue; 3) effectively managing disagreements; 4) promoting mutually beneficial cooperation; and 5) jointly assume responsibilities as major countries. The establishment of right perception refers to making the United States not contest fundamental economic and political disagreements with the PRC over sensitive issues like CCP regime stability and Taiwan. Yang claimed that the United States has intensified measures to suppress the PRC’s economy, trade, science, and technology with sanctions. Yang denied the PRC’s responsibility for the crisis in Ukraine and urged the United States to immediately stop “indiscriminately imposing unilateral sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals.” Yang also noted “negative developments” regarding the United States’ security cooperation with the Philippines, Australia, and Japan. [36]
A senior unnamed State Department official outlined the issues that Blinken will focus on during a briefing on April 19, which included US concerns about PRC businesses’ transfers of dual-use materials and weapons components to Russia that Russia is using to advance its military production. The State Department official stated the United States’ concern that through Chinese support, Russia has reconstituted its defense industrial base and is therefore reinforcing the threat to Ukraine on the battlefield and European security writ large. Blinken called the PRC the primary contributor to Russia’s defense industrial base on April 19 during the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Italy.[37]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Lin Jian framed the United States Army deploying the Typhon ground-based cruise missile and air-defense missile launcher to the Philippine island of Luzon as part of the US-Philippine Salaknib 2024 military exercise as “provoking conflict.” The United States Army stated this is the first time it deployed the Typhoon to the Philippines.[38] Lin claimed that the deployment “aggravated regional tensions” and urged the Philippines to be aware of the unspecified “serious consequences of catering to the US.”[39]
Russia
The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) began implementing expanded cooperation with the Border Guard Bureau Service of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). The CCG held working-level talks with the FSB in Vladivostok from April 16 to 18 for the first time since the signing of the April 2023 memorandum of understanding between the two services. The meetings involved tabletop exercises and seminars.[40] The April 2023 memorandum stated that the CCG and FSB would strengthen maritime law enforcement.[41]
10. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces will likely make significant tactical gains in the coming weeks as Ukraine waits for US security assistance to arrive at the front but remains unlikely to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses.
- Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces will likely be able to prevent operationally significant Russian advances during Russia’s expected summer offensive effort, although Russian forces will nevertheless leverage select advantages and adaptations to pose a significant threat to Ukraine this summer.
- The tempo of Russian offensive operations is currently higher in the Avdiivka direction than near Chasiv Yar, as Russian forces focus on exploiting a tactical situation that is unfavorable to Ukrainian troops northwest of Avdiivka. Russian forces are likely to intensify offensive operations near Chasiv Yar in the coming weeks, however, as Chasiv Yar provides Russian forces with the opportunity for more operationally significant advances.
- Russian forces conducted large-scale cruise and ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 26 to 27 and have likely resumed sea based Kalibr cruise missile strikes after a long pause.
- Ukrainian forces successfully conducted drone strikes against a Russian airfield and oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai on the night of April 26 to 27.
- The Russian federal government continues efforts to codify increased control over migrant communities living in Russia.
- The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to intensify its hybrid operations against Moldova.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances north of Avdiivka and west of Donetsk City.
- Russian federal subjects continue to sponsor Russian military formations.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 27, 2024
Apr 27, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2024
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 27, 2024, 8:10pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on April 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces will likely make significant tactical gains in the coming weeks as Ukraine waits for US security assistance to arrive at the front but remain unlikely to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Politico reported on April 26 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told US Speaker of the House Mike Johnson in December 2023 that Ukrainian forces would be able to “hold out” until March or April 2024 without additional US security assistance, a period through which Ukrainian forces are now passing without the arrival of US military aid.[1] The arrival of US aid at the front in the coming weeks will allow the Ukrainian forces to address their current materiel constraints and blunt ongoing Russian offensive operations, and Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to destabilize Ukrainian defenses and gain ground ahead of the arrival of the American security assistance.[2] Two Ukrainian intelligence officers reportedly told the Financial Times that Russian forces aim to use ongoing offensive operations and missile strikes against Ukraine to prepare the battlefield for an expected large-scale Russian offensive operation in late May or in June.[3] The Financial Times reported that a Western official stated that Russian forces may make further “tactical breakthroughs” in the coming weeks but will not “overrun” Ukraine.[4] Russian forces have opportunities to make significant tactical gains in the Avdiivka area and pursue an operationally significant objective with the seizure of Chasiv Yar; but, neither of these efforts is likely to develop into an operationally significant penetration in the near term, let alone cause the collapse of the Ukrainian defensive line in Donetsk Oblast.[5]
Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces will likely be able to prevent operationally significant Russian advances during Russia’s expected summer offensive effort, although Russian forces will nevertheless leverage select advantages and adaptations to pose a significant threat to Ukraine this summer. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have previously prevented Russian forces from making even tactical gains during previous large-scale offensive efforts in Ukraine, and it is unlikely that Russian forces will conduct an offensive operation this summer that is significantly larger and more intense than their previous offensive efforts.[6] The Financial Times reported that a Western official stated that the Russian military is still an ineffective army characterized by old equipment and poorly trained soldiers and asserted that Russian forces have not improved since starting the invasion in February 2022.[7] Judging Russian military effectiveness on the absolute quality of Russian forces ignores how Russian forces are leveraging their temporary relative advantages over Ukraine to place Ukrainian forces under increasing stress. The Russian military is facing constraints on the amount of modern and effective equipment that it can and will be able to deploy in Ukraine, and the overall combat effectiveness of Russian formations and units continues to decline as they suffer degradation in Ukraine.[8] Russian forces are in part relying on their quantitative advantages in equipment and manpower to place consistent and increasing pressure on Ukrainian forces, however, and the Russian military is accepting losses that Ukrainian forces could not sustain.[9] The Russian focus on mass, regardless of quality, has supported tactical Russian gains, especially as delays in Western security assistance have degraded Ukraine’s qualitative advantages over Russian forces, and Russian forces will likely use mass to achieve tactical advances against even well-provisioned Ukrainian forces this summer.[10]
Russian reliance on mass is not the only adaptation that Russian forces have made in Ukraine, however, as the Russian military has demonstrated an uneven propensity for operational, tactical, and technological innovation and learning.[11] The Russian military command appears to be learning from past operational planning mistakes in Ukraine and will likely conduct a summer offensive operation that aims to stretch and overwhelm Ukrainian forces across a larger frontline in eastern Ukraine.[12] Russian forces have also significantly changed tactical aviation operations in Ukraine with their mass use of glide bombs, allowing fixed-wing aircraft to more safely conduct strikes from further in the rear.[13] These glide bomb strikes will continue to play a critically important role in supporting Russian ground operations this summer despite the likely improved air defense capabilities that Ukrainian forces will be able to leverage against Russian aircraft as additional Western air defense materiel arrives.[14] Russian forces continue to deploy technological innovations throughout the front at scale to support offensive pushes and appear to be timing the deployment of these innovations to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities and make gains before Ukrainian forces subsequently adapt to the Russian innovations.[15] Russian forces may intend to leverage new technological or tactical innovations precisely at the beginning of their summer offensive effort to offset the stronger capabilities that Ukrainian forces will possess following the arrival of US security assistance. Russian forces still suffer from widespread tactical failures, however, and Ukrainian forces will still be able to exploit those failures as long as the Russian military command continues to struggle with internalizing and disseminating adaptations at the tactical level.[16] Ukraine will be able to neutralize many of the materiel constraints it currently faces in the coming weeks and is taking steps to alleviate its manpower challenges in the coming months, but Russia will continue to pursue its own advantages as Ukrainian capabilities improve. Ukraine is very likely to stabilize the frontlines in the coming months and may be able to begin limited counteroffensive operations in late 2024 or early 2025.
Russian forces are continuing to exploit a tactical penetration north and northwest of Avdiivka and recently made additional confirmed advances in the area. Geolocated footage published on April 27 shows that Russian forces advanced to northern Novokalynove (north of Avdiivka), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces completely seized the settlement on April 27.[17] Some milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced into Keramik (directly northwest of Novokalynove), although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces in Keramik.[18] Geolocated footage published on April 27 also shows that Russian forces advanced in western Ocheretyne, in southwestern Solovyove, and to a treeline south of Novobakhmutivka (all northwest of Avdiivka).[19] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured the entirety of Solovyove, which is consistent with available geolocated footage of Russian forces in the southwestern part of the settlement.[20] Several Russian sources also claimed that fierce fighting continued in western Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and that Russian forces were pushing Ukrainian forces further west of the settlement.[21]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reiterated reports on April 27 that Russian forces introduced additional reserves from the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) to the Novobakhmutivka-Ocheretyne line to break through Ukrainian defenses, and that Ukrainian forces are responding by committing additional reserve forces and resources to the area.[22] The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies similarly noted on April 26 that Russian forces have committed two motorized rifle brigades and one motorized rifle regiment directly to the tactical penetration in the Ocheretyne area, which has created a threefold advantage in Russian forces and assets over Ukrainian forces and assets.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting north of Avdiivka near Arkhanhelske and Keramik; northwest of Avdiivka near Semenivka and Ocheretyne; west of Avdiivka near Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove.[24] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly seized Novokalynove and are now operating near Keramik; elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are operating near Arkhanhelske; elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are operating in and near Berdychi; elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are operating near Semenivka; and elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are operating in the Pervomaiske-Netyalove area southwest of Avdiivka.[25]
The tempo of Russian offensive operations is currently higher in the Avdiivka direction than near Chasiv Yar, as Russian forces focus on exploiting a tactical situation that is unfavorable to Ukrainian troops northwest of Avdiivka. Russian forces are likely to intensify offensive operations near Chasiv Yar in the coming weeks, however, as Chasiv Yar provides Russian forces with the opportunity for more operationally significant advances. Russian forces have recently committed roughly a division’s worth of combat power northwest of Avdiivka, which has lent them a roughly threefold advantage over Ukraine’s available combat power in the same area, by unofficial Ukrainian estimates.[26] Russian forces have committed roughly doctrinal end strength and relatively doctrinally-consistent formations to an area where Ukrainian forces have struggled with under-resourcing, which has allowed Russian forces to achieve tactical gains in areas north and northwest of Avdiivka over the course of recent weeks. Russian offensives in the Chasiv Yar direction, by contrast, have significantly slowed over the past week — a Russian milblogger noted on April 27 that the frontline has remained without significant changes and that the tempo of Russian operations has decreased.[27] ISW has frequently assessed that Russian forces have struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations throughout the war but have more recently been able to conduct shorter alternating offensive operations in offensive “pulses,” as has been the case in the Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka directions for most of 2024 thus far.[28] Russian forces are likely leaning into attacks northwest of Avdiivka in order to build on the recent tactical success they have achieved, while Russian forces committed in the Chasiv Yar direction are likely temporarily pulling back from offensives to rest and reconstitute. Russian forces will likely soon increase the pace of offensives near Chasiv Yar once again, and this offensive pressure has the potential to become significant.[29] If Russian forces are able to intensify attacks and seize Chasiv Yar, they would be able to use Chasiv Yar as a staging point for subsequent offensive operations against Ukraine’s critical fortress belt cities of Kostyantynivka, and Druzhkivka.[30] Russian forces will need to replenish and reinforce the units that are currently attacking around Avdiivka, and the process of replenishment and reinforcement is likely to blunt the overall intensity of their attacks and inhibit their ability to reach their wider operational objective — Pokrovsk and the Donetsk Oblast administrative border — rapidly as long as Ukrainian forces receive necessary reinforcements and supplies.
Russian forces conducted large-scale cruise and ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 26 to 27 and have likely resumed sea based Kalibr cruise missile strikes after a long pause. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported on April 27 that Russian forces launched 34 missiles: nine Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; nine Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast and the Sea of Azov; two S-300 missiles from Belgorod Oblast; two Iskander-K ballistic missiles, four Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles from Ryazan and Tambov oblasts; and eight Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.[31] Oleshchuk stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 21 total missiles: six Kh-101/555s, eight Kh59/69s, one Iskander-K, and six Kalibrs. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukraine’s largest private energy operator DTEK reported that unspecified Russian missiles struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and “seriously” damaged four unspecified thermal power plants (TPPs).[32]
This is notably the first large-scale Russian strike package since late December 2023 that did not include Shahed drones. Russian forces also notably launched Kalibr missiles as part of the strike package after conducting only a handful of individual Kalibr strikes in recent months. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that this strike series was only the third confirmed use of Kalibr missiles in over six months and that Russian forces launched them from two Kilo-class submarines for fear of losing surface ships to Ukrainian strikes.[33] Pletenchuk stated that the two submarines are based in Novorossiysk, indicating that the Russian military has sufficiently improved the infrastructure at the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) port in Novorossiysk to load Kalibrs.[34] Ukrainian and United Kingdom (UK) military officials reported in February and March 2024 that the BSF naval base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea was the only BSF base with the infrastructure to load these missiles onto Kalibr carriers.[35] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 18 that Russian forces had likely improved the infrastructure at the Novorossiysk port to accommodate the redeployment of the majority of BSF assets away from its main base in occupied Sevastopol and reported that Russian forces had loaded an unspecified Russian Grigorovich-class guided missile frigate with cruise missiles at the Novorossiysk port.[36] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported in April 2024 that Russia had accumulated at least 260 Kalibr missiles and aimed to produce an additional 30 in April.[37] Russian forces will likely continue conducting Kalibr strikes from submarines based in Novorossiysk by leveraging the stockpile and the new missile-loading infrastructure in Novorossiysk. However, increased BSF surface vessel sorties will make them more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes.
Ukrainian forces successfully conducted drone strikes against a Russian airfield and oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai on the night of April 26 to 27. Unspecified sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and the Ukrainian military successfully conducted drone strikes against the Kushchyovskaya airfield while “dozens” of Russian military aircraft, radar systems, and electronic warfare (EW) systems were stationed there, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of damaged equipment at the airfield.[38] Geolocated footage published on April 27 shows the aftermath of the Ukrainian strike at the Kushchyovskaya airfield and purportedly shows damaged glide bomb kits.[39] Russian milbloggers widely criticized the Russian military for failing to protect the airfield after multiple successful Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian airfields in occupied Ukraine and Russia.[40] Suspilne’s sources stated that Ukranian drones struck the Ilskiy and Slavyansk oil refineries, damaging their distillation columns and causing fires.[41] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratev stated that Ukrainian drones attempted to strike oil refineries and infrastructure facilities in Slavyanskiy, Siverskiy, and Kushchyuvskiy raions but that the strikes did not cause “serious” damage.[42] Slavyansk Oil Refinery Security Director Eduard Trudnev stated that 10 drones struck the refinery, causing it to partially stop functioning, and noted that there could be additional unseen damage.[43] The Ukrainian SBU, Special Forces (SSO), and Unmanned Systems Forces previously struck the Slavyansk Oil Refinery on the night of March 16 to 17.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 66 Ukrainian drones over Krasnodar Krai on the night of April 26 to 27.[45]
The Russian federal government continues efforts to codify increased control over migrant communities living in Russia. The Russian State Duma introduced a bill on April 27 that “proposes a number of innovations that will help modernize Russian legislation and resolve certain issues of ensuring national security in the field of migration.”[46] The proposed bill also includes provisions to introduce a deportation regime for migrants who “have no grounds” to be in Russia, including those who commit certain crimes.[47] The proposed bill will also prevent foreigners who are subject to the deportation regime from purchasing real estate, opening bank accounts, or getting married.[48] The deportation bill will allow the Russian federal government to define whichever foreign individuals or communities it chooses as subject to deportation—a move that will likely allow the government to extend more oppressive control over migrant communities and cater to Russian ultranationalists who have frequently called for such harsh policies.[49] The Russian Ministry of Education and Science similarly announced on April 27 that the 12 Russian universities that are authorized to conduct Russian-language certification exams have terminated their contracts with commercial partners, meaning that only the universities and state and municipal organizations can administer Russian language certification testing.[50] This development will significantly complicate the process of obtaining Russian language certification for migrants, which will likely limit their access to certain jobs or even social services and provide the Russian government with greater control over migrant communities. The Russian government appears to be selectively empowering some migrant communities as it further disenfranchises others, however. A joint project run by Russian state media source RT and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) called “Not One on One” sends requests to the MVD to help foreigners obtain Russian citizenship in certain limited cases.[51] The RT project reported that it sent a request to the MVD regarding the citizenship of a migrant from Kyrgyzstan who fled Kyrgyzstan for Russia after being convicted for fighting for Russian forces in Ukraine.[52] Russian authorities have increased crackdowns against Central Asian migrants living in Russia, particularly after the wake of the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack, and the RT project emphasizes the fact that the Russian government is interested in selectively protecting some migrants from Central Asian communities as long as they are ideologically useful in the context of the Russian war effort.
The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to intensify its hybrid operations against Moldova. Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia Yevgenia Gutsul told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 26 that Moldovan law enforcement officials detained her and three of her advisors for several hours when the group arrived at the Chisinau airport after a series of recent meetings in Russia and Turkey.[53] Gutsul claimed that Moldovan law enforcement inspected her luggage and detained her for an hour before releasing her, and one of Gutsul’s advisors told TASS that Moldovan authorities interrogated the three advisors for an additional two hours.[54] It is unclear if Moldovan authorities formally detained Gutsul and her advisors. TASS reported that a group of 100 people gathered outside the airport to welcome Gutsul and chanted “Victory” when Gutsul exited the airport, likely referring to Gutsul’s position as the newly formed pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc’s executive secretary.[55] Gutsul claimed that Moldovan authorities are making every effort to humiliate her and other pro-Russian Moldovans and framed Moldovan authorities’ recent confiscation of over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians as a “biased” effort to humiliate innocent Moldovans.[56] Gutsul and other pro-Kremlin actors will likely continue to seize on short-term detentions and legitimate efforts by the Moldovan government to defend itself against Russian hybrid operations to justify further Russian aggression towards Moldova.
The Moldovan government is also taking steps to address known Russian information operations aimed at Gagauzia. The Moldovan Audiovisual Council announced on April 26 that it fined two regional and local television (TV) stations in Gagauzia, “TV-Gagauzia” and “ATV,” 100,000 Moldovan lei ($5,627) for spreading disinformation, hate speech, and not ensuring “information security” with their broadcasts.[57] The Audiovisual Council determined that the TV stations provided a platform for public figures to spread symbols and messages intended to “fortify a divergence” between Gagauzia's connection to Moldova and its alleged proximity to the Russkyi Mir (Russian World). The Audiovisual Council reported that the TV stations amplified narratives justifying Gagauzia’s theoretical future secession from Moldova, accusing Moldova of losing its sovereignty and traditional family values, and equating Moldova’s future accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO with “war.” ISW has extensively reported on the Kremlin’s use of its Russian World framework — an intentionally vague ideological and geographic idea that includes any former territory of the Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation and the inhabitants of those territories - to justify Russian aggression under the guise of ”protecting” Russian “compatriots abroad” in Russia’s “historical territories.”[58] Russian President Vladimir Putin noted during his annual New Year’s address on December 31, 2023, and has since reiterated that 2024 is the “Year of the Family” for Russia and has since pursued domestic policies aimed at strengthening Russia’s “traditional family values.”[59] The Gagauzian TV stations’ efforts to equate the EU and NATO with “war” are also in line with the Kremlin’s informational efforts to justify Russia’s ongoing military reforms and invasion of Ukraine as a response to inherently escalatory actions by NATO and the EU and in preparation for the Kremlin’s envisioned long-term existential conflict with the West.[60] The Kremlin will likely continue to disseminate known narratives in Moldovan society through a variety of means and may intend to use the newly-formed Victory electoral bloc to amplify its narratives.
Russian peacekeeping forces conducted another undisclosed training exercise in the Russian-backed Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria, likely aimed at creating unease in Moldovan society and increased tension in the already fraught relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The Moldovan Bureau of Reintegration reported on April 23 that Russian peacekeeping forces violated the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Joint Control Commission (JCC) protocols by conducting training exercises to “repel attacks on the positions of peacekeeping forces” near four settlements in Transnistria on April 23 without coordinating with Moldovan authorities.[61] Moldovan authorities called the incident a “provocation” and a violation of the founding acts of the peacekeeping mission and stated that the incident would be discussed at the next JCC meeting. Transnistrian Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev claimed on April 25 that the peacekeeping exercises were “justified” and “necessary” to ensure the combat readiness of Russian peacekeeping units.[62] Moldovan authorities previously urged the JCC to conduct an investigation into Russian peacekeepers’ use of undisclosed drones and weapons during a December 2023 training exercise, another violation of JCC protocols.[63] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely engaged in hybrid operations in Moldova and intends to use pro-Russian actors in Gagauzia and Transnistria to destabilize and degrade Moldovan democracy and ultimately prevent Moldova’s accession to the EU.[64]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces will likely make significant tactical gains in the coming weeks as Ukraine waits for US security assistance to arrive at the front but remains unlikely to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses.
- Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces will likely be able to prevent operationally significant Russian advances during Russia’s expected summer offensive effort, although Russian forces will nevertheless leverage select advantages and adaptations to pose a significant threat to Ukraine this summer.
- The tempo of Russian offensive operations is currently higher in the Avdiivka direction than near Chasiv Yar, as Russian forces focus on exploiting a tactical situation that is unfavorable to Ukrainian troops northwest of Avdiivka. Russian forces are likely to intensify offensive operations near Chasiv Yar in the coming weeks, however, as Chasiv Yar provides Russian forces with the opportunity for more operationally significant advances.
- Russian forces conducted large-scale cruise and ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 26 to 27 and have likely resumed sea based Kalibr cruise missile strikes after a long pause.
- Ukrainian forces successfully conducted drone strikes against a Russian airfield and oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai on the night of April 26 to 27.
- The Russian federal government continues efforts to codify increased control over migrant communities living in Russia.
- The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to intensify its hybrid operations against Moldova.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances north of Avdiivka and west of Donetsk City.
- Russian federal subjects continue to sponsor Russian military formations.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces intensified operations northwest of Svatove and reportedly captured Kyslivka as of April 27. Russian milbloggers claimed on the evening of April 26 that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) broke through Ukrainian defenses in Kyslivka, and several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the entire settlement as of April 27.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.85 kilometers in depth along the railway line that runs through Kyslivka.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have semi-encircled neighboring Ukrainian forces in Kotlyarivka (northwest of Svatove and immediately southwest of Kyslivka).[67] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Fighting continued northwest of Svatove near Berestove, Kyslivka, and Stelmakhivka.[68]
Fighting continued southwest of Svatove and in the Kreminna area on April 27 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka, Novoyehorivka, and Hrekivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny and Zarichne; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[69] A Ukrainian sergeant operating near the Serebryanske forest area told the Guardian in an interview published on April 27 that Russian forces have a five-to-one artillery advantage over Ukrainian forces in the area, which the sergeant described as “more or less stable” as compared to other intense areas of the front where Russian forces have up to a ten-to-one artillery advantage.[70]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Limited positional engagements continued in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) near Spirne and Vyimka (both southeast of Siversk) on April 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[71] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) posted footage showing elements of the 6th Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) operating near Spirne.[72]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar area on April 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting continued on Chasiv Yar’s eastern outskirts and that Russian forces were trying to clear positions in the forest area east of Chasiv Yar.[73] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also advancing south of the Stupky-Holubovskyi 2 nature reserve area (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and moving parallel to the T0504 Bakhmut-Ivanivske-Kostyantynivka highway.[74] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka.[75] Elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division and the Ossetian “Sarmat” volunteer battalion are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[76]
See topline text for updates on the situation in the Avdiivka direction.
Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage posted on April 27 shows that Russian forces recently advanced in central Krasnohorivka towards the traffic circle.[77] Some Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are beginning to clear the brick factory in western Krasnohorivka, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces maintaining positions within the brick factory area.[78] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka and Pobieda.[79] Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces completely controlled Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[80] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] 1st AC) are reportedly operating in Krasnohorivka, and elements 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 68th Army Corps (EMD) are reportedly operating in Novomykhailivka.[81]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 27. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters in depth near Urozhaine and 100 meters in depth near Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of these Russian claims.[82] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked east of Velyka Novosilka in the Vuhledar area near Vodyane, southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Prechystivka, and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[83] Elements of the Russian 43rd Spetsnaz Company are operating near Vuhledar; elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces and EMD) are striking Ukrainian targets near Urozhaine; and elements of the 165th Artillery Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are operating west of Velyka Novosilka near Hulyaipole.[84]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional engagements continued in western Donetsk Oblast on April 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[85] Elements of the Russian 50th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[86]
Ukrainian forces recently conducted a missile strike against a railway bridge in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a railway bridge west of Chernihivka (northwest of Melitopol).[87]
Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on April 27.[88] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a small presence near the Antonivsky roadway bridge.[89] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction, and elements of the Russian “Margelov” Volunteer Battalion are operating near occupied Kakhovka.[90]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian federal subjects continue to sponsor Russian military formations. Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin met with elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division in Tula City on April 26 and reportedly provided the formation with new uniforms and equipment.[91] A Russian political insider source claimed on January 13 that Dyumin is the patron of the 106th VDV Division.[92]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Kalashnikov Concern, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, announced on April 27 that Russian forces in Ukraine are receiving Russian BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) equipped with a 4S24 dynamic protection system, which reportedly protects IFVs from grenades or anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) strikes.[93] Kalashnikov Concern announced the new protection system in 2023 and stated that it has been supplying the newly equipped IFVs since the beginning of 2024.[94]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Belarusian officials aided ongoing Russian efforts to intimidate and demoralize Ukrainian citizens. Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) Head Ivan Tertel alleged during the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly on April 25 that Belarusian volunteers fighting alongside Ukrainian forces, who Tertel claimed are terrorists aiming to invade Belarus, are currently receiving treatment at two hospitals in Kyiv City.[95] Tertel named the addresses of the two hospitals, one of which is a children’s hospital, and stated that Belarus will respond decisively and without hesitation in the fight against “terrorism.”[96] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that Tertel’s comments support ongoing Russian information operations that aim to demoralize Ukrainians but that Ukrainian officials had to consider the comments as a real threat.[97] The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported that Ukrainian officials evacuated the two hospitals due to the safety concerns.[98] Russian forces have targeted hospitals, children’s hospitals, and areas where it was clearly marked that children were sheltering since the start of the full-scale invasion, and Ukrainian officials are understandably attentive to any possible threats against these targets.[99] Targeting medical infrastructure or combatants who have been rendered hors de combat due to injury is a violation of international law.[100]
Russian officials continue to portray Ukrainian strikes against legitimate military targets in occupied Ukraine and in Russia as “terrorist attacks” in order to threaten Ukraine and the West with escalation. United Kingdom (UK) Defense Chief of Staff Admiral Tony Radakin stated on April 25 that Ukrainian operations targeting the Russian deep rear will become a feature of the war as Ukraine gains more long-range strike capabilities.[101] The Russian Embassy to the UK characterized Radakin’s statements as justification for “terrorism” on April 27, part of routine Russian efforts to label legitimate Ukrainian strikes as “terrorist” attacks.[102] Ukraine, as a country defending against an existential war of aggression, has every right to target both Russian military infrastructure and key elements of Russia’s war fighting capabilities within occupied Ukraine and within Russia. Russian efforts to label legitimate Ukrainian military operations as “terrorism” aim to prompt the West into self-deterrence over fears of escalation while generating further Russian domestic support for the war in Ukraine.[103]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
11. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 27, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-27-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to target Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure across the Gaza Strip.
- West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 26.
- Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 26.
- Yemen: The Houthis launched three ballistic missiles targeting two commercial vessels in the Red Sea on April 26.
- Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched one drone targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa on April 26.
IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 27, 2024
Apr 27, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, April 27, 2024
Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on April 27 and 28, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume on Monday, April 29, 2024.
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to target Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure across the Gaza Strip.
- West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 26.
- Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 26.
- Yemen: The Houthis launched three ballistic missiles targeting two commercial vessels in the Red Sea on April 26.
- Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched one drone targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa on April 26.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
Israeli forces continued to target Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure across the Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force struck over 25 militia targets across the Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last information cut off on April 26.[1] The 679th Armored Brigade directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who the IDF said were preparing to fire at Israeli forces from a building in an unspecified area of the Central Gaza Strip.[2] The IDF Air Force targeted a vehicle transporting eight Hamas fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[3] The IDF Air Force also struck a rocket or mortar launch position in Khan Younis as Palestinian fighters prepared to fire from the position.[4]
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine targeted Israeli forces east of Khan Younis.[5]
The IDF reported on April 27 that the Israeli Defense Ministry began construction of a humanitarian aid distribution area on the coast of the central Gaza Strip.[6] This aid distribution point will service the US-constructed pier off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 26.[7]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
- Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
- Expel the United States from Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 26.[8]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
The Houthis launched three ballistic missiles targeting two commercial vessels in the Red Sea on April 26.[9] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the Houthis launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Barbados-flagged, Liberia-operated Maisha and United Kingdom-owned, Panama-flagged Andromeda Star.[10] CENTCOM and British maritime security firm Ambrey reported minor damage to the Andromeda Star.[11] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed the attack targeted the Andromeda Star, adding that Houthi forces also shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Saada Governorate, northern Yemen.[12]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched one drone targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa on April 26.[13] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the claimed attack at the time of this writing.
12. US Pacific commander says China is pursuing ‘boiling frog’ strategy
Excerpts:
He added that the PLA pressuring the Philippines even as it reduced assertive activity towards the US demonstrated a “might equals right” bullying strategy. “They believe they can get away with it.”
Aquilino said he was concerned about other threats, including North Korea, which launched more missiles in 2023 than its previous cumulative total. He said he was paying close attention to the co-operation between North Korea and Russia and deepening ties between China and Russia which he stressed was “incredibly concerning”.
As he prepares to hand over command in Hawaii to Paparo, Aquilino said one of his top messages was the need to focus on speed and urgency in terms of operating and delivering capabilities, including with allies. He said these included the sophisticated networks that link sensors and weapons.
“The ability to prevent this conflict will require a sense of urgency and speed in the delivery of our new modernisation capabilities [and] our posture initiatives,” Aquilino said
US Pacific commander says China is pursuing ‘boiling frog’ strategy
Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · April 28, 2024
The commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific region has accused China of pursuing a “boiling frog” strategy, raising tensions in the region with increasingly dangerous military activity.
Admiral John “Lung” Aquilino said that during his three years as US Indo-Pacific commander, China has increased its pace of military development and matched its growing capabilities with more destabilising behaviour.
“It’s getting more aggressive, they’re getting more bold and it’s getting more dangerous,” Aquilino told the Financial Times in an interview before he hands over command to Admiral Samuel “Pappy” Paparo next week.
Aquilino said China was stepping up its aggressive conduct through a “boiling frog” strategy, in which it gradually raised the temperature so that the ultimate danger was under-appreciated until it was too late.
“There needs to be a continual description of China’s bad behaviour that is outside legal international norms. And that story has to be told by all the nations in the region,” said Aquilino. He added that Beijing was engaged in a “might equals right” strategy throughout the region.
The former Top Gun fighter pilot headed US Indo-Pacific command during a period of strained US-China relations. He was in charge when China responded to then-US Speaker Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan in August 2022 with unprecedented military drills. He was also in command when a suspected Chinese spy balloon flew over the US last year.
Asked what was the most nerve-racking incident during his command, Aquilino said it was around the time of Pelosi’s visit, partly because China misinterpreted the trip as an escalatory change in US policy. At the time, there were calls on Chinese social media for the People’s Liberation Army to shoot down Pelosi’s plane.
“The misinterpretation by the Chinese gave me a concern that they might actually take actions that could be detrimental,” said Aquilino.
Chinese warplanes now routinely fly over the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which previously acted as a buffer between the sides. More recently, China’s coast guard has also become more assertive around the Taiwanese islands of Kinmen and Matsu.
“This is the pressure campaign in action. I’ve watched it increase in scope and scale, it is not slowing down,” said Aquilino. “It is only getting more aggressive.”
Aquilino said China had not flown any spy balloons over Hawaii, Guam or the continental US since the February 2023 incident. Asked if any had flown near the US, he replied: “Let me just say we haven’t had any overfly the United States.”
He said the “best example” of China’s coercive activity was around the Second Thomas Shoal, a reef inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China claims the feature despite a 2016 international arbitration tribunal ruling that it has no sovereign claim over the submerged reef.
Chinese coast guard vessels have in recent months taken aggressive actions — including firing water cannons — to stop the Philippines from resupplying marines on the Sierra Madre, a rusty ship that Manila grounded on the reef in 1999 to reinforce its claims.
“I’m certainly very concerned at Second Thomas Shoal,” Aquilino said. “Philippine coastguardsmen and service members have been injured. That’s a step up the ladder beyond a pressure campaign.”
Since Joe Biden and Xi Jinping held a summit in San Francisco in November, Chinese fighter jets have stopped the “risky and coercive” aerial intercepts of US spy planes that were common over the previous two years.
Aquilino has welcomed that development, but he said it was clear that China used the intercepts as a “dedicated tool in their toolbox” to deploy as wanted.
He added that the PLA pressuring the Philippines even as it reduced assertive activity towards the US demonstrated a “might equals right” bullying strategy. “They believe they can get away with it.”
Aquilino said he was concerned about other threats, including North Korea, which launched more missiles in 2023 than its previous cumulative total. He said he was paying close attention to the co-operation between North Korea and Russia and deepening ties between China and Russia which he stressed was “incredibly concerning”.
As he prepares to hand over command in Hawaii to Paparo, Aquilino said one of his top messages was the need to focus on speed and urgency in terms of operating and delivering capabilities, including with allies. He said these included the sophisticated networks that link sensors and weapons.
“The ability to prevent this conflict will require a sense of urgency and speed in the delivery of our new modernisation capabilities [and] our posture initiatives,” Aquilino said
Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · April 28, 2024
13. Former Russian sex spy reveals how she manipulated her targets into becoming ‘obsessed’ with her
Conclusion:
“I can tell you from researching Aliia’s story … it doesn’t go well for anyone,” he added. “The agents are as exploited as the targets. I think there are no winners here when you’re using sex and love as weapons of war.”
Former Russian sex spy reveals how she manipulated her targets into becoming ‘obsessed’ with her
New York Post · by Stephanie Nolasco , Fox News · April 27, 2024
Originally Published by:
After charming her targets as a “master manipulator,” Aliia Roza is breaking her silence.
The former Russian citizen who claims to be an ex-spy is revealing her tales of sexpionage in a new podcast from Tenderfoot TV and iHeartPodcasts, “To Die For.”
The podcast claims to be the first time an alleged Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)-trained “seduction agent” is speaking out about her “training, techniques, targets and missions,” Deadline.com reported.
It was launched by Neil Strauss, author of “The Game” who also wrote “The Dirt” about rock band Mötley Crüe.
“It’s been over two decades that I’ve stayed silent,” Roza told Fox News Digital. “But for a few reasons, I couldn’t keep my silence. I couldn’t live with this pain anymore, even though I’ve been through all this trauma. … If it was not me [speaking out], then who would speak out?”
In the podcast, listeners will discover how Roza managed to flee Moscow with her young son. Roza said she wanted to give her child a better life.
“The biggest achievement of my life is becoming a parent,” Roza explained. “I wanted to experience that. I wanted to create a family. I wanted to have kids. And I was not allowed to do that. And then I realized, ‘Wait a minute. I live only one life. I don’t want to spend my life sacrificing for something I don’t believe in anymore.’ That was the moment when I looked for possibilities to escape.”
Aliia Roza said she was trained to be a “master manipulator.” FOX News
Roza was born into a Kazakh-Tatar family of a high-ranking military officer in the Soviet Union. Her grandfather fought the Nazis during World War II, and her father is a high-ranking officer of over 45 years. As a child, Roza said, she was involved in a special government program for children of high-ranking officers.
Roza described how she once had big dreams to pursue fashion design. But it was her father, she said, who warned her, “There’s no other option.”
“I was trained from a very early age to do different things like martial arts, physical activities,” Roza claimed. “I learned you cannot give up, you cannot be vulnerable, you cannot be weak, you cannot cry. Nobody can enter this program. If you don’t have a family member who is a high-ranking officer, it’s impossible.
Aliia Roza said that, at first, she felt “patriotic” as a spy. FOX News
“I never thought I would [later] enter a sex program.”
At age 18, Roza said, she was chosen out of 350 students to participate in a top-secret program developed by former KGB psychologists and high-ranking officers. There, Roza said, she studied how to use seduction and persuasion to get information from enemy targets.
“It’s not just sex – it’s very far from sex actually,” Roza explained. “It’s all about the art of communication. We’re taught how to dress up, how to put on makeup, how to present yourself, how to speak with your targets, how to make your targets believe in you and trust you. … It’s about the psychology of people, of criminals, of men. … It’s about understanding the perspective of men and what exactly they want.”
Aliia Roza is the granddaughter of a national hero who fought the Nazis during World War II. Her father is a high-ranking officer of over 45 years. FOX News
“When you seduce, it’s … as simple as starting with good compliments,” she continued. “It’s not just, ‘I like your jacket.’ It has to be something really specific and appropriate from that moment. This will make people really attracted to you. They’ll start to like you. And when you know how to lead a conversation, people will become very open to you. They will become very friendly. … You learn how to be polite, friendly, respectful in society.
“And there are the sex techniques,” she teased. “This is really hardcore. But it’s making your target become obsessed with you. That’s a completely different game.”
Roza said it took “many years” for her to later realize she was “brainwashed” as a “master manipulator.”
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“I was made to believe that I was a hero fighting against human and drug trafficking, saving all of these underage kids that were … kidnapped from their families,” she said. “I would see all the parents coming to our department crying, begging us to help.
“We as agents had this very low salary. … We had like $100 a month working six days a week. … But I felt patriotic. I felt like a hero saving someone’s life. And I felt very powerful. I felt that nobody could do anything to me. I was sacrificing my body doing all these missions. So, I just detached my emotions from my body.
“At the end of the day, when I saved someone’s life, I felt good about it,” Roza shared. “But I never asked myself how I felt being in a body that was constantly abused and raped by random men. … One former FBI agent said I was a broken toy, that I was sex trafficked myself. … But all my classmates, we didn’t feel this way. We felt patriotic. We were ready to sacrifice and do anything for our government. That’s how I felt.”
In the podcast, Aliia Roza described how she grew up in a strict household. FOX News
Strauss told Fox News Digital that, at first, it was difficult to believe Roza’s story. But after doing research and speaking to sources, it was difficult to ignore her claims.
“I only covered the story of Aliia’s time in Russia,” he explained. “But there’s a whole other world, a whole other story. There are very intense experiences, trauma, PTSD. … It goes in a place no one expects.
“I remember the first time I was introduced to Aliia over dinner,” Strauss recalled. “When she started speaking, everyone stopped what they were doing. They only listened to her. She held the floor for the rest of the meal. That’s all I could think about afterward. … There was a story here that needed to be told. And it was also the way she told her story. I never heard anything like it before.”
Aliia Roza Aliia Roza was born in the USSR into a Kazakh-Tatar family of a high-ranking military officer in the Soviet Union. FOX News
In 2004, Roza fell in love with a man she was meant to gather intelligence on, the New York Post reported. According to the outlet, the man’s associates discovered she was a spy. With the help of her lover, Roza fled Moscow and eventually laid down roots in Los Angeles.
Roza has not returned to Russia for more than a decade, she said. She assumed a new name, one she still uses today.
Roza said despite working to stop human and drug trafficking as a spy, she also felt “used” by the Russian government.
“I saw all these other female agents who reached a certain age, like 56,” she said. “They were so miserable, so lonely. They were not allowed to have private lives. They couldn’t have families. … I couldn’t allow that to happen to me.”
As a secret agent, Aliia Roza worked to stop human and drug trafficking. It’s something she’s still passionate about today. FOX News
Today, Roza teaches her tips on seduction not to agents-in-training, but to women eager to boost their self-esteem. She has over a million followers on Instagram.
She described being “disappointed” by the Russia-Ukraine war.
“Putin started the war,” she said. “All of these innocent people have died for no reason. … It’s awful. We need to speak out about it because it’s not over. … Who will speak out against this evil? What is happening in the world? I do hope my story will encourage women to be inspired, support each other and share their stories. I hope we can unite.”
Strauss is hopeful the podcast will encourage other former female spies to come forward.
“What stood out to me? Most people are afraid to talk,” he explained. “And if the Russian intelligence program is so widespread, why are so few people willing to come forward? And I think a lot of people don’t understand what it’s like for a woman growing up in the Russian military intelligence community, the lack of rights, the lack of agency, the abuse and horror that goes on there.
“I can tell you from researching Aliia’s story … it doesn’t go well for anyone,” he added. “The agents are as exploited as the targets. I think there are no winners here when you’re using sex and love as weapons of war.”
New York Post · by Stephanie Nolasco , Fox News · April 27, 2024
14. Myanmar: Civil war of 'many against many' tearing country up
Excerpts:
The question of whether the country could definitively fall apart is being taken more seriously, including at the United Nations and among diplomats, Charles Petrie, former UN coordinator for Myanmar, told DW.
...
In the meantime, neighboring countries fear the effects of Myanmar's continued disintegration. India is building a fence on the border. Thailand is preparing for another influx of refugees. China held military maneuvers on the border with Myanmar in April. And Bangladesh will have to provide for the persecuted Rohingya people for the foreseeable future.
Among neighboring countries, there is a "self-serving and cynical" foreign policy approach that keeps all options open, Criss Group's Horsey said. "They understand the coup was bad. They understand very bad things are happening in Myanmar. But for their own interest, they've maintained close relations with the regime."
Myanmar: Civil war of 'many against many' tearing country up – DW – 04/27/2024
Rodion Ebbighausen
19 hours ago19 hours ago
Four years ago, a coup plunged Myanmar into civil war, proliferating armed groups in a place already rife with ethnic divisions. With the country disintegrating, neighbors are alarmed.
DW · by In focus
Myanmar is now four years into a civil war that shows no sign of abating. Following an October 2023 offensive in the north-eastern state Shan, the military junta, known as the State Administrative Council (SAC), lost control over swathes of territory on the border with China.
In early April the border town Myawaddy, an important transit point for the flow of goods between Thailand and Myanmar, fell under the control of the Karen people, an ethnic minority group that has been battling the central government for decades. As of late April, Myawaddy was back under SAC control. The situation remains volatile.
On the other side of Myanmar, on the western border with Bangladesh, an armed ethnic group named the Arakan Army is giving the SAC military a hard time.
The governing junta is on the backfoot and under immense pressure in Myanmar's border regions, only able to launch retaliatory attacks from the air or with long-range artillery.
"The Civil War is going on and it won't stop any time soon," an expert from Yangon, who cannot be named for security reasons, told DW. The military isn't on the brink of defeat either, the source stressed.
History repeating itself
The current situation, while dramatic, isn't totally new. Today's Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, has never been a fully functioning nation state since gaining independence in 1948.
No central government has ever succeeded in ruling the entire country. And certainly no common national identity has ever emerged in this land of many ethnicities. The intensity of the conflict between them all has ebbed and flowed over the course of the past 76 years as has the extent of central government control.
Nonetheless the military coup against the government of Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021 ushered in a whole new phase of fragmentation.
The main difference now is that these divisions are more obvious, according to the anonymous Yangon source. "The country used to be fragmented but it wasn't as visible. Today people can see it with their own eyes because of social media and interconnectedness," they said. Talk of the country's possible disintegration is on the rise, they added.
A patchwork of armed groups
The already complicated landscape of Myanmar's conflict has only become more complex. Before the military coup in 2021, there were around 24 armed ethnic groups in Myanmar and hundreds of militias. The number of troops in each group varied from several hundred up to an estimated 30,000 fighters in, for example, the United Wa State Army (USWA) and the Arakan Army.
Since the coup, another 250 to 300 of the so-called People's Defense Forces (PDF) have been added to this list. These are thought to total around 65,000 fighters. Some of the PDFs are under the control of the opposition National Unity Government, some act independently, and others are in close coordination with larger ethnic armed groups.
In addition there are many criminal cartels that have gained influence during the last four years. These also overlap with the military as well as some ethnic groups.
Conflicts between ethnic groups persist, although the focus is currently on fighting the military junta. "The conflict is not simply one against many, but many against many. It's not just the military against the rest," the Yangon expert explains.
Could Myanmar fall apart?
The question of whether the country could definitively fall apart is being taken more seriously, including at the United Nations and among diplomats, Charles Petrie, former UN coordinator for Myanmar, told DW.
Myanmar's military junta under increasing pressure, expert says
Richard Horsey, an analyst from the think tank Crisis Group International and a long-time Myanmar observer, told DW that there was no doubt fragmentation was on the rise. Nonetheless, Horsey doesn't believe Myanmar would collapse entirely and end up in violent chaos like Libya or Somalia.
"Because Myanmar isn't a well-functioning, centralized state that has suddenly fallen into atomization. It's a country that was pretty fragmented. It's always been fragmented to some extent or another," he said.
Federalism in the future
In the past, discussions on Myanmar's long-term future have repeatedly focused on how to build a political structure in which all ethnic groups are represented. The buzzword has always been federalism. Even today, there are efforts to build a federal democratic constitution, but the process is difficult. Some groups keep breaking off negotiations, others decline to take part.
For Myanmar's neighbors, border zones are increasingly of concernImage: Sakchai Lalit/AP/picture alliance
In the meantime, neighboring countries fear the effects of Myanmar's continued disintegration. India is building a fence on the border. Thailand is preparing for another influx of refugees. China held military maneuvers on the border with Myanmar in April. And Bangladesh will have to provide for the persecuted Rohingya people for the foreseeable future.
Among neighboring countries, there is a "self-serving and cynical" foreign policy approach that keeps all options open, Criss Group's Horsey said. "They understand the coup was bad. They understand very bad things are happening in Myanmar. But for their own interest, they've maintained close relations with the regime."
This article was translated from the original German.
DW · by In focusIsrael-Hamas warRussia's war in Ukraine
15. Xi’s Imperial Ambitions Are Rooted in China’s History
My thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.
Excerpts:
Beijing is approaching the world not to embrace it, but to rule it. The Western world has no excuse for missing this reality, and American politicians have badly misjudged Beijing for decades. Washington’s China policy will continue to be a “two steps forward, one step back” affair until it reckons with the Middle Kingdom’s penchant for imperialism.
This reality calls into question the unspoken objective of American policymakers: seeking a democratic China. For all their differences, both hawks and doves in the United States have framed the “China problem” as an ideological challenge. Proponents of engagement believed that economic contacts would necessarily lead to political reform, a belief rooted in liberal internationalism. Advocates of confrontation couch the CCP regime as the problem, which implies an ideological solution.
The one unchanging constant in America’s China policy since Nixon’s meeting with Mao in 1972 is the steady commitment to regime change, either by commerce or competition. The underlying belief in the universal power of democracy has proved intoxicating. “If we can just make them like us,” the thinking goes, “we can turn an enemy into a friend.”
Perhaps this self-delusion is inevitable. America’s national identity is steeped in beliefs about liberty, equality, and opportunity. But the CCP’s heritage raises an uncomfortable question for the United States: Even if modern China were to become a democracy, would it cease to be the Middle Kingdom?
If the CCP collapsed and China followed Taiwan’s path of economic and political liberalization, would it suddenly lose its appetite for hegemony? Maybe. Then again, perhaps simplifying Beijing’s behavior to its current Communist Party overlords ignores thousands of years of China’s own history, as well as the strategic culture that informs those decisions.
Xi’s Imperial Ambitions Are Rooted in China’s History
Myths of peacefulness belie a record as expansionist as any other power.
APRIL 27, 2024, 1:48 PM
By Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
Foreign Policy · by Michael Sobolik
When Richard Nixon defied expectations and went to China in 1972, Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, packed the president’s briefcase. Among Nixon’s reading materials was The Chinese Looking Glass, a book by British journalist Dennis Bloodworth about understanding China on its own terms. In his opening pages, Bloodworth sets the stage by going back to the beginning: “The gaudy catalogue of China’s disasters and dynastic glories, whose monumental scale has given the Chinese much of their character … brings us to our true beginning.”
When Richard Nixon defied expectations and went to China in 1972, Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, packed the president’s briefcase. Among Nixon’s reading materials was The Chinese Looking Glass, a book by British journalist Dennis Bloodworth about understanding China on its own terms. In his opening pages, Bloodworth sets the stage by going back to the beginning: “The gaudy catalogue of China’s disasters and dynastic glories, whose monumental scale has given the Chinese much of their character … brings us to our true beginning.”
Countering China's Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance," Michael Sobolik, 192 pp, .95, Naval Institute Press, April 2024.
Countering China’s Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance, Michael Sobolik, 240 pp., $21.95, Naval Institute Press, April 2024.
Kissinger, one of America’s most consequential foreign-policy leaders in recent memory, clearly internalized the centrality of China’s “true beginning.” In his 2011 tome On China, Kissinger marveled at China’s “singularity” and staying power. Indeed, even the hardest of hearts cannot help but be moved by the continuity of a civilization that predates the birth of Christ by hundreds, even thousands, of years.
Awe, however, is no substitute for knowledge. In the opening pages of On China, Kissinger writes of China’s “splendid isolation” that cultivated “a satisfied empire with limited territorial ambition.” The historical record, however, contradicts him. From the Qin dynasty’s founding in 221 B.C. to the Qing’s collapse in 1912 A.D., China’s sovereign territory expanded by a factor of four. What began as a small nation bound in the fertile crescent of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers morphed into an imperial wrecking ball. In the words of Bloodworth, the very author Kissinger recommended to Nixon in 1972, “It would be absurd to pretend that the Chinese had never been greedy for ground—they started life in the valley of the Yellow River and ended by possessing a gigantic empire.”
Rows of ancient terracotta warriors.
Ancient terra cotta warriors from the Qin Dynasty stand in a pit at the Emperor Qin’s Terracotta Warriors and Horses Museum in Shaanxi province, China, on July 7, 2006.China Photos/Getty Images
To be sure, China was not the aggressor in every war it fought. In antiquity, nomadic tribes regularly raided China’s proto-dynasties. During the infamous Opium Wars of the 19th century, Western imperialist powers victimized and preyed upon China at gunpoint. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regularly refers to China’s “Century of Humiliation,” when European empires brutalized China and killed or wounded tens of thousands of Chinese men, women, and children. Indeed, the party has memorialized these grievances in a permanent exhibit of the National Museum of China, just steps away from Tiananmen Square.
For all of Beijing’s legitimate and long-standing security concerns, however, the sheer scope of China’s expansion is undeniable. Western leaders often deny or ignore it, usually at the behest and prodding of Chinese leaders. When Nixon finally gained an audience with Mao Zedong, he reassured the chairman, “We know China doesn’t threaten the territory of the United States.” Mao quickly corrected him: “Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.” To which Nixon added, “Nor any country.” Within the decade, Beijing invaded Vietnam.
At the time, Nixon’s gambit was to split the Soviet bloc and drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nixon and Kissinger saw the Sino-Soviet split and took stock of the PRC’s trajectory: a growing population that, once harnessed, was poised to dominate the global economy. It was textbook realpolitik: cold, dispassionate tactics divorced from moralism. If Washington could turn the Soviet Union’s junior partner, the West could significantly hamper Moscow’s ability to project power into Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.
During the final years of Nixon’s life, his presidential speechwriter William Safire asked him about that fateful trip to Beijing in 1972. Had opening up to the PRC made Americans safer and China freer? According to Safire, “That old realist, who had played the China card to exploit the split in the Communist world, replied with some sadness that he was not as hopeful as he had once been: ‘We may have created a Frankenstein.’” Over time, many in the United States have come to realize this predicament. Unfortunately, articulating that problem well has proved difficult.
A historic photograph of President Nixon at the Great Wall of China.
Then-U.S. President Richard Nixon with Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian, looking out over the Great Wall, circa 1972. Bettmann Archives/Getty Images
During her brief stint as director of policy planning at the State Department in 2019, Kiron Skinner previewed the shop’s keystone intellectual project: a strategy to counter China, in the spirit of George Kennan’s “containment” strategy. At a public event in April 2019, Skinner tipped her hand and revealed her philosophy of U.S.-China competition: “This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology, and the United States hasn’t had that before.” She went on to add, incorrectly: “It’s the first time that we will have a great-power competitor that is not Caucasian.” Skinner received widespread criticism for these remarks and was soon after dismissed for unrelated issues.
Skinner’s mistake was twofold. First, she simply got the history wrong and ignored imperial Japan in World War II. Of deeper consequence was her failure to explain what strategic culture actually is, why it matters, and how China’s past shapes the CCP’s behavior today. In fairness, these errors aren’t unique to Skinner. Understanding Chinese history can be difficult for most Westerners. In some ways, it’s difficult to think of two more different nations. The United States is less than three hundred years old. China was unified more th
Donald Trump during and Xi Jinping walk in front of a row of Chinesse soldiers dressed in white.
Then-U.S. President Donald Trump during a welcoming ceremony with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, on Nov. 9, 2017.Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images
an two hundred years before Christ was born. Immigrants founded America. Denizens established China. The United States was born out of revolution against a colonial power. China came into being from a regional conflict of gigantic proportions. Favorable geography allowed America to grow economically and territorially on its own terms and at its own pace. China came into being surrounded by rival kingdoms and tribes on every side.
Americans turn to one source more than any other to make sense of these differences: The Art of War, by Sun Tzu. One of his more recognizable dictums, “All warfare is based on deception,” has captured the imagination of many Western thinkers. Instead of investigating the history that informed Sun Tzu’s counsel, however, many policymakers take the easier path of Orientalizing China. “China thinks in centuries, and America thinks in decades” is a well-worn trope. Another well-meaning but vapid cliché is, “America plays chess, but China plays Go.”
Read More
China’s silver medalists, Xu Jiayu, Yan Zibei, Zhang Yufei, and Yang Junxuan, stand on the podium next to the British gold medalists after the final of the mixed 4x100m medley relay swimming event during the Olympic Games in Tokyo.
China’s silver medalists, Xu Jiayu, Yan Zibei, Zhang Yufei, and Yang Junxuan, stand on the podium next to the British gold medalists after the final of the mixed 4x100m medley relay swimming event during the Olympic Games in Tokyo.
New reporting implicates Beijing and anti-doping officials in covering up Chinese Olympic swimmers’ positive tests in 2021.
These statements are often left untethered from history and offered as self-evident axioms. What’s left are useless clichés that offer no actual understanding of why Chinese strategists advised cunning and deception, or how China’s unique historical experiences informed military tactics. In the absence of curiosity, an impression easily forms of China as “the other,” a mysterious, inscrutable competitor. A shallow understanding of Beijing’s past leads to incomplete conclusions about its present behavior.
More often than not, policymakers find it easier to avoid China’s history entirely. In late 2020, the policy planning office finished the 72-page report. It was a commendable attempt to reprise Kennan’s strategic clarity, but China’s dynastic strategic culture received a single page of attention.
Reducing strategic culture to vague racial differences helps no one except Chinese President Xi Jinping and his party henchmen. The CCP works to enmesh itself with the Chinese people and regularly uses them as a rhetorical human shield. To criticize the CCP, according to the well-worn rhetorical trope of Beijing’s diplomats, is to “hurt the feelings of 1.4 billion people.” As a matter of course, Beijing uses this specious logic to construe anti-CCP policies as evidence of racism. Years before former U.S. President Donald Trump fell headlong into this trap with his careless rhetoric about the “Chinese virus” and “kung-flu,” a young generation of China hawks had vowed to evade this pitfall.
Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin wrote about this resolve in his 2021 bestseller, Chaos Under Heaven, which documented the collective decision of Washington, D.C.-based China hands to blunt Beijing’s attempts “to divide Americans by party or ethnicity, to divert attention from its actions.” I was a regular member of those meetings and still believe America’s leaders must differentiate the party from the Chinese people—not only out of respect for those who daily live under the CCP’s jackboot, but also for the safety of Chinese Americans, who faced a rise of race-based crime in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. But, in doing so, America must avoid a separate trap: equating the party with China.
A historic photograph shows residents walking past a poster showing the Chairman Mao Zedong.
Residents walk past a poster showing Chairman Mao Zedong, during the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” in downtown Beijing circa 1967. Jean Vincent/AFP via Getty Images
China’s history did not begin in 1949 when Mao and the CCP established the PRC. Nor did it start with China’s “Century of Humiliation,” when European imperialist powers forcibly opened China in the mid-19th century. Chinese civilization predates America and the West by orders of millennia. That context gives meaning to the party’s contemporary behavior. The themes of greatness, fall, and restoration hidden in Xi’s remarks in 2013 constitute the essence of Chinese history.
They are the four-act play of China’s story, or “strategic culture”—without which it is impossible to understand the CCP’s strategy today. Strategic culture explains how a country’s unique experiences shape distinct national identities that translate into foreign policy. These three elements—story, identity, and policy—reinforce and shape one another. To be sure, the CCP has its own story, identity, and policies, but the party is one tributary in a long river. American leaders cannot prevail against the CCP without understanding the story and identity that belong to China.
From the start, China has been a civilizational juggernaut striving for political hegemony. China has often attempted to conceal this ambition with conciliatory diplomacy, but its neighbors know from experience the struggle to live—and survive—in the dragon’s shadow. CCP diplomats often bully China’s neighbors by claiming sovereignty over part or all of their territory “from time immemorial”—an inadvertent admission that the party is the latest crusader in a long line of imperialists. This struggle that was once relegated to the nations of East Asia is now a challenge for every country in the world.
Beijing is approaching the world not to embrace it, but to rule it. The Western world has no excuse for missing this reality, and American politicians have badly misjudged Beijing for decades. Washington’s China policy will continue to be a “two steps forward, one step back” affair until it reckons with the Middle Kingdom’s penchant for imperialism.
This reality calls into question the unspoken objective of American policymakers: seeking a democratic China. For all their differences, both hawks and doves in the United States have framed the “China problem” as an ideological challenge. Proponents of engagement believed that economic contacts would necessarily lead to political reform, a belief rooted in liberal internationalism. Advocates of confrontation couch the CCP regime as the problem, which implies an ideological solution.
The one unchanging constant in America’s China policy since Nixon’s meeting with Mao in 1972 is the steady commitment to regime change, either by commerce or competition. The underlying belief in the universal power of democracy has proved intoxicating. “If we can just make them like us,” the thinking goes, “we can turn an enemy into a friend.”
Perhaps this self-delusion is inevitable. America’s national identity is steeped in beliefs about liberty, equality, and opportunity. But the CCP’s heritage raises an uncomfortable question for the United States: Even if modern China were to become a democracy, would it cease to be the Middle Kingdom?
If the CCP collapsed and China followed Taiwan’s path of economic and political liberalization, would it suddenly lose its appetite for hegemony? Maybe. Then again, perhaps simplifying Beijing’s behavior to its current Communist Party overlords ignores thousands of years of China’s own history, as well as the strategic culture that informs those decisions.
Foreign Policy · by Michael Sobolik
16. Passage of Ukraine Aid Bill Could Mark a Turning Point in American Foreign Policy
Excerpts:
In the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact, which gave those two totalitarian allies control of most of the Eurasian landmass by the summer of 1940, President Roosevelt persuaded Congress to vastly increase military spending, allow aid to Prime Minister Churchill’s Britain, and institute a military draft — at a time when more than 80 percent of Americans opposed going to war.
As hard as it may be to imagine Mr. Biden or Mr. Trump carrying out such an enterprise, there’s a strong case that some significant military buildup and some demonstrated determination to resist aggression is necessary to deter this Cold War’s axis of evil from plunging into war with damage — destruction of lives, of economies, of human rights — far greater than the horrors inflicted on Ukraine and Israel.
Passage of Ukraine Aid Bill Could Mark a Turning Point in American Foreign Policy
America increasingly seems to be in a new Cold War, only this time with China united with Russia and in possession of an advanced economy intertangled with ours.
MICHAEL BARONE
Sunday, April 28, 2024
06:16:00 am
nysun.com
Was the passage by the House last Saturday and the Senate on Tuesday of the foreign aid package with money for Ukraine, Israel, and Free China a turning point in American foreign policy?
It certainly was a turnabout in rhetoric and in partisan behavior. Speaker Johnson led the narrowly Republican House to pass by resounding margins bills to aid Ukraine (311-112), Israel (366-58), and Taiwan (385-34), and to sanction Iran and force the sale of TikTok (360-58). The narrowly Democratic Senate passed the whole kit and caboodle by a similarly lopsided margin (79-18).
These results are broadly in sync with public opinion. Republican members who voted against aiding Ukraine seem to represent only a minority of Republican voters. And, thanks to Mr. Johnson’s adopting President Trump’s suggestion of calling the aid a loan rather than a grant, they’re more skeptical of helping Ukraine than the former president.
The vocal and, on campuses, violent left-wingers who oppose aid to Israel have got President Biden worried enough that he felt obliged, after condemning the “antisemitic protests,” to also condemn “those who don’t understand what’s going on with the Palestinians.”
It’s a comment that deserves the treatment that Mr. Trump got for talking, without specifying exactly whom he meant, about “very fine people on both sides” at Charlottesville, Virginia.
As Walter Russell Mead wrote in the Wall Street Journal, “Friends and foes who thought America was paralyzed by internal dissension are taking another look.”
Yet that is no reason for complacency. Bipartisan agreement on an aid package does not make a dysfunctional foreign policy functional. As Mr. Mead writes, the Biden administration’s “failures to deter Russia in Ukraine and Iran in the Middle East, and fears of what a similar failure of deterrence could mean in the Indo-Pacific, have created bipartisan majorities for a more activist, better-armed American presence on the world scene.”
The failures go back a ways. Presidents George W. Bush and Obama not gauging President Putin’s potential for evil, the collapse during President Xi’s incumbency of the plausible hopes that trade ties would make Communist China a “responsible stakeholder” in world trade and politics, the Obama administration’s inexplicable cozying up to the mullahs of Iran — these initial failures have only now become clear.
Just as Nazi Germany made a pact with Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1939 and formed the Axis with Japan and Italy in 1940, America is faced now with a working alliance of revanchist dictatorial powers determined to alter the balance of power in their favor.
The historian Niall Ferguson has no compunction about comparing aid opponents’ complaints about Ukraine with Prime Minister Chamberlain’s 1938 description of Adolf Hitler’s demands on Czechoslovakia as “a quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing.”
Republican aid opponents have their own history to cite. Senator Vance argues that the establishment is presenting “the same exact talking points 20 years later” as those for the invasion of Iraq in 2002-03. Only aid is not invasion, Ukraine is not Iraq, and Mr. Vance’s arguments are no more compelling than the arguments made in 1990-91 that the Gulf War would be another Vietnam.
Mr. Ferguson seems more persuasive in saying we are now in Cold War II, only this time with China united with Russia and in possession of an advanced economy intertangled with ours.
The Biden administration, in its latest move to cut off Chinese bank financing of the Russian war effort, seems to recognize this, as does Secretary Yellen, who complained last month that China is building “overcapacity” in solar energy and lithium ion batteries.
Yet just saying “don’t,” as Mr. Biden said to Israel before it launched its retaliatory strikes against Iran last week, is not enough.
In the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact, which gave those two totalitarian allies control of most of the Eurasian landmass by the summer of 1940, President Roosevelt persuaded Congress to vastly increase military spending, allow aid to Prime Minister Churchill’s Britain, and institute a military draft — at a time when more than 80 percent of Americans opposed going to war.
As hard as it may be to imagine Mr. Biden or Mr. Trump carrying out such an enterprise, there’s a strong case that some significant military buildup and some demonstrated determination to resist aggression is necessary to deter this Cold War’s axis of evil from plunging into war with damage — destruction of lives, of economies, of human rights — far greater than the horrors inflicted on Ukraine and Israel.
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17. With U.S. aid resumed, Ukraine will try to dig itself out of trouble
With U.S. aid resumed, Ukraine will try to dig itself out of trouble
Washington says Kyiv must address critical manpower shortages and shore up its defenses to enable major offensives in the future
By Missy Ryan and Siobhán O'Grady
April 27, 2024 at 6:42 p.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Missy Ryan · April 27, 2024
A long-awaited influx of U.S. weapons will help Ukraine to blunt Russia’s advance in the coming months, Biden administration officials said after Congress passed a major aid package, but an acute troop shortage and Moscow’s firepower advantage mean that Kyiv won’t likely regain major offensive momentum until 2025 at the earliest.
Lawmakers’ approval of the foreign aid bill following months of partisan gridlock was a victory for President Biden. The sprawling legislation includes $61 billion to fuel Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invading forces.
As initial shipments of arms, including artillery shells, air defense missiles, and armored vehicles, begin to reach Ukraine, U.S. officials said they expect the new weapons will buy time for Kyiv to replenish its military ranks and strengthen battlefield defenses — including trenches and minefields — ahead of an expected Russian offensive.
A U.S. defense official, who like some others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss Western projections, said the aid would give Ukraine the chance to better cope with continued Russian attacks “whether on the front lines or in the skies” and more effectively defend troops and civilians alike.
“But time is precious,” the official said. “And time shouldn’t be wasted.”
The foreign aid package’s approval, over objections from a cohort of House Republicans, was a desperately needed injection of hope for Ukraine, where exhausted combat units have been outgunned 5 to 1 as they have been forced to ration ammunition in the face of Russian glide bombs and increasingly bold aircraft assaults. As the legislation languished in Congress, Ukrainian officials made urgent pleas for air defense systems, blaming the shortage for Russia’s string of successful attacks on cities and power plants.
President Volodymyr Zelensky characterized the long-delayed American aid as a lifeline, but stressed that the promised resupply must arrive quickly. “We will have a chance for victory if Ukraine really gets the weapon system which we need so much,” he told NBC News last weekend. Zelensky’s office did not immediately respond to a request seeking comment for this report, but has acknowledged the challenges Ukraine’s military faces.
More than two years after President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian forces have lost their early battlefield momentum and most U.S. officials interviewed for this report believe Zelensky faces no clear military course to regaining the 20 percent of his country that Russia now occupies. While Russia has lost more than 300,000 troops to injury or death, according to U.S. estimates, it retains advantages in manpower and hardware, as Moscow continues to outproduce the West in artillery and other arms while having turned to Iran and North Korea for help supplementing its domestic industrial capacity.
White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Wednesday that Ukraine would need time to “dig out of the hole” caused by Congress’s six-month delay.
Biden administration officials cite what they believe Ukraine has done well despite the disappointment of its unsuccessful counteroffensive last year: defending vulnerable areas in Ukraine’s north and east, where Kyiv has permitted only limited Russian gains in the past year; keeping crucial commercial shipping lanes open in the Black Sea while putting Russia’s naval fleet on the defensive; and threatening the Kremlin’s stronghold in the occupied Crimea peninsula.
They frame 2024 as primarily a defensive year for Ukraine, but also cite the promise of new capabilities the West is supplying, including long-range ATACMS missiles provided by the United States in recent weeks, that will allow Ukraine to strike more effectively into Crimea, an important Russian staging ground. Western nations are also expected to begin delivering a limited number of F-16 fighter jets later this year.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Friday announced the administration’s intent to contract $6 billion in arms for Ukraine, including Patriot air-defense missiles and counter-drone systems — a tranche of vitally needed arms, he said, but one that could take months if not years to produce. The administration has employed a two-tiered approach to helping Ukraine: one entails the immediate drawdown and transfer of existing U.S. military stockpiles; the other is aimed at long-term sustainment through purchase orders for weapons and ammunition.
Austin, speaking to reporters Friday, said Ukraine’s path would be “dependent upon whether or not Ukraine can effectively employ these systems and sustain those systems, and whether or not Ukraine can mobilize an adequate number of troops to replenish its ranks.”
Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the newly approved funding package would “help shape the future.”
With the battle in Congress now over, U.S. officials say they will turn their focus to Ukraine’s other urgent challenges, including the country’s struggle to mobilize more troops.
In recent weeks, Ukrainian lawmakers have passed steps to streamline conscription and lower the age for men to be eligible to be drafted for military service from 27 to 25. Zelensky’s government, hoping to reclaim fighting power from a population far smaller than Russia’s, also has asked European nations to help encourage the return of some of the millions of military-age men who fled Ukraine following Putin’s invasion.
“The manpower situation is the growing problem,” said Rob Lee, a former U.S. Marine now at the Foreign Policy Research Institute who has closely followed the Ukraine conflict. “And if that’s not fixed, then this aid package is not going to solve all Ukraine’s issues.”
Kyiv has not said how many troops will be needed in 2024 and 2025. Ukraine’s previous top commander, whom Zelensky replaced in February, said that number could be as high as a half-million. While the current commander has said the number is smaller, even marshaling a fraction of that is a risky proposition for Zelensky.
Ukraine’s personnel shortfalls also underscore the political challenges that Zelenksy’s government will likely face as the war grinds on. The ongoing debate over mobilization is a delicate one for Zelensky, who must marshal enough combat power to keep Russia at bay but also avoid shattering the national unity already under strain after more than two years of bloodshed and deprivation.
A U.S. official said the Biden administration is cognizant of the delicacy of its conversations with counterparts in Kyiv about the country’s personnel gap.
“Who are we to say, ‘You just need to draft more men to fight.’ But at the same time, it is a real concern,” the official said. “The laws they have passed in the past couple of weeks will help them, but they’ve got to mobilize more forces and find a way to inspire more Ukrainian men to come to the front lines.”
A Ukrainian lawmaker who spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid said they believed Zelensky’s announcement in February that 31,000 soldiers had been killed since 2022 vastly downplayed the war’s true toll.
The military death count, which Ukraine had long refused to disclose, likely had to be presented as lower to avoid disrupting an already-struggling recruitment and mobilization drive, the lawmaker said.
The lawmaker acknowledged that there is a manpower shortage, especially as Russia ramps up its recruitment — but that the situation has not reached a “red line.”
“I don’t think it’s an emergency right now,” the lawmaker said. “We do need more people, but we need to balance.”
The mobilization effort has been hampered in part by concerns over the open-ended timeline of a combat tour, frustrations with low pay and concerns that Ukraine’s government will not properly care for the families of those killed or wounded, the lawmaker said.
“We see so many deaths and so many wounded,” the lawmaker said. “If they go, [troops] want to know how long they will be there.”
Crucial to regaining momentum, Lee said, is for Ukraine to get more recruits in uniform soon, because they must be trained individually and in groups if Kyiv hopes to avoid the problems it encountered during last year’s failed offensive.
“All that requires time, and that’s why the longer it goes without fixing the manpower and mobilization situation, the less likely a large-scale 2025 offensive becomes,” Lee said.
The U.S. military’s training program for Ukrainian troops, an effort concentrated in Europe, has slowed, officials say, suggesting a depletion of the personnel pipeline. The last brigade trained in Germany was in January or February, the officials said.
Ukraine’s strongest European backers are equally troubled by its manpower situation. Poland, which like other countries from NATO’s eastern flank is investing heavily in its own defenses, is the primary transit point for the vast majority of U.S. aid flowing into Ukraine.
Maj. Gen. Krzysztof Nolbert, Poland’s defense attaché in Washington, said renewing Ukrainian forces and acquiring promised arms would likely lead to success “given the exhausted and poorly trained state” of Russian forces.
“It’s definitely the time to reconstitute the troops,” he said. “It is perhaps the most critical factor that will determine whether they will be successful or not.”
Although Russia has relied on poorly trained troops, it has in recent months ramped up weapons production and now significantly outguns Ukraine’s forces. Washington recently acknowledged that Russia’s forces are not as depleted as was once understood and that Russian troops have adapted on the battlefield.
U.S. officials also cite a need to build out Ukraine’s physical defenses ahead of Russia’s expected offensive. Ukrainian forces have spent the last year digging trenches, putting in place barriers and laying mines, but U.S. officials believe more must be done. They hope the antitank and anti-personnel mines included in the arms package announced in recent days will help.
They also hold out hope that Ukraine can find opportunities to reclaim smaller pockets of Russian-controlled areas in 2024, even if it can’t mount a major offensive.
“The good news is that Russia, years in this war, has not found a way to substantially take advantage of Ukrainian weaknesses,” the U.S. official said.
The Biden administration’s attempt to steer Ukraine toward a more sustainable course against Russia occurs as it prepares to host a major summit in July marking the NATO alliance’s 75th anniversary.
While the Biden administration has already ruled out issuing an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO during the summit, two of Ukraine’s leading advocates in Congress are urging the president to approach the event with the idea that “Ukraine should be offered a realistic path to NATO membership” once it has met the alliance’s conditions and requirements.
“We must send an unmistakable message to Putin that Ukraine’s future lies firmly with Europe,” Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) wrote in a letter to Biden on Friday.
O’Grady reported from Kyiv. Abigail Hauslohner and Dan Lamothe contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Missy Ryan · April 27, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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