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Quotes of the Day:

"Thoughts are like arrows. Once released they strike their mark. Guard them well or one day you may be your own victim. "

– Navajo Proverb

"Every decision you make is a reflection of the type of person you want to be and the kind of world you want to live in."

– Thibaut Meurisse

"You don't become cooler with age, but you do care progressively less about being cool, which is the only true way of being cool. This is called the Geezer's Paradox."

– Widdershins Smith

1. The Cornerstone: Strategic Lessons for ROK from the U.S.-Japan Summit

2. The Axis of Autocrats

3. Kim Jong Un rolls up with six new Toyota SUVs in convoy at latest appearance

4. S. Korea, Cuba agree to open diplomatic missions

5. Poland’s New South Korean-Built ATACMS-Like Ballistic Missile Seen Firing For The First Time

6. South Korea's Hanwha to supply more rocket launchers to Poland for $1.64 billion

7. Why South Korean pop culture rocks and North Korea’s does not

8. US Congress finally passes foreign aid: What are takeaways for US allies?

9. Glorifying pro-democracy activists (ROK)

10. HRNK Board Elects New Co-Chair and Co-Vice-Chair, Bids Farewell to Outgoing Directors

11. Kim Jong Un guides test of rocket developed by ‘newly-founded’ military factory

1. The Cornerstone: Strategic Lessons for ROK from the U.S.-Japan Summit

The linchpin examines the cornerstone.

A key point is in the conclusion on the ROK taking independent initiatives. I do believe it should go beyond humanitarian aid to Ukraine and provide lethal support as well.

Finally, it’s important to recognize that the recent strengthening of the US-Japan alliance stems from the Japanese government’s proactive efforts and investments. Japan has significantly increased its defense spending to 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), secured long-range striking capabilities through the acquisition of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, and established the JSDF Joint Operations Command. In parallel, as South Korea seeks enhanced security cooperation with the U.S. though participating in AUKUS, it should also take independent initiatives to boost its international stature and demonstrate its commitment. Expanding humanitarian aid in Ukraine and the Middle East could be instrumental in enhancing South Korea’s role in the global community and strengthening its position as a Global Pivotal State.

The Cornerstone: Strategic Lessons for ROK from the U.S.-Japan Summit

Commentary | April 22, 2024

https://www.globalnk.org/commentary/view?cd=COM000136

Yang Gyu Kim

Principal Researcher, EAI

Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

Editor's Note

Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at EAI, examines the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance following the recent summit and provides insights into future foreign policy directions for South Korea. Kim emphasizes that Japan's prospective participation in AUKUS Pillar 2 and its key position in numerous U.S.-led mini- and multilateral cooperation frameworks stem from the Japanese government's active endeavors and investments in aligning its China strategy with that of the U.S. In this context, Kim suggests that South Korea should enhance its cooperation with the U.S. to meet the goals of Defense Innovation 4.0, while also proactively responding to potential opposition from China and the challenges posed by North Korea's New Cold War diplomacy.

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Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio made an official visit[1] to Washington D.C. from April 9 to 14, participating in a state dinner, the US-Japan Summit, the US-Japan-Philippines Summit, and delivering an address at a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress. This visit marked the first by a Japanese Prime Minister in nine years since Shinzo Abe’s 2015 visit. It was also the fifth official or state visit during the Biden administration, preceded by visits from the leaders of India, Australia, South Korea, and France. Prior to the summit, potential agenda items including the modernization of the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) command and control structure and Japan’s participation in AUKUS Pillar 2 were spotlighted during a media interview with Prime Minister Kishida and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, drawing considerable attention.

This briefing (1) assesses the outcomes of the summit, officially summarized by both governments as “Global Partners for the Future,” (2) analyzes the implications for Japan’s position within the U.S. alliance framework in the Indo-Pacific region, and (3) investigates its implication for South Korea’s security strategy and its policies towards China and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

I. U.S.-Japan Summit Recap: Key Agendas and Importance

Kishida noted that this summit came at a “historic turning point,” necessitating a significant enhancement in Japan’s defense posture (Montgomery, Ogura, and McCarthy 4/7/2024). The summit occurs at a crucial juncture, highlighting the growing significance of the US-Japan alliance in the face of escalating global tensions. These tensions are fueled by events such as the strengthening of DPRK-Russia ties amid the ongoing Ukraine conflict, an Israeli strike on Iran’s consulate in Syria and subsequent Iranian retaliation, China’s use of a water cannon against a Philippine boat in the South China Sea, and the increasing missile threats and aggressive nuclear posture of the DPRK.

This was also a significant diplomatic event amid a critical period in Japanese domestic politics. The Liberal Democratic Party is grappling with a political crisis stemming from a funding scandal, which has caused its approval ratings to plummet to between 10-20%. For Kishida, securing a diplomatic victory became essential. Equally important was Japan’s effort to cement US-Japan relations in a way that would withstand potential shifts in the U.S. political landscape, particularly if Donald Trump were to be re-elected in November. Japan’s concerns about this scenario are encapsulated in the newly coined phrase “moshitora (もしトラ),” which translates to, “What if Trump [becomes POTUS again]?”

On April 10, the U.S. and Japan issued a Joint Leaders’ Statement announcing that their leaders had discussed strategic initiatives aimed at maintaining a free and open international order based on the rule of law and addressing 21st-century challenges (The White House 2024b). These initiatives include strengthening defense and security cooperation, exploring new frontiers in space, driving technological innovation, bolstering economic security, accelerating climate action, enhancing global diplomacy and development, and strengthening people-to-people ties. Among these, the most immediate impact on the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region could be the advancement of defense and security cooperation (The White House 2024a). Notable changes to watch for are outlined below.

First, the initiative to “upgrade alliance command and control” aims to bilaterally enhance command and control frameworks to allow for seamless integration of operations and capabilities, ensuring greater interoperability and planning between the two nations. Second, the United States and Japan plan to explore advanced capabilities under AUKUS Pillar 2, leveraging Japan’s strengths and its close defense partnerships with member countries. Third, they aim to strengthen regional networked security by collaborating with Australia on a networked air defense architecture. Fourth, the two countries are looking to deepen US-Japan defense industry cooperation by creating an alliance defense production capacity and convening a Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) to pinpoint priority areas for collaboration, including co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment. Fifth, they are committed to enhancing regional maintenance and repair capabilities, including exploring options for repairing forward-deployed U.S. Navy ships and servicing engines of U.S. Air Force aircraft stationed in Japan, such as fourth-generation fighters. Sixth, they plan to bolster Japan’s stand-off defense and counter-hypersonic capabilities through the cooperative development of the Glide Phase Interceptor to address hypersonic threats. Finally, the U.S. and Japan will improve trilateral intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) operational coordination with Australia and conduct trilateral exercises with South Korea.

II. Upgrading the U.S.-Japan Alliance: The Cornerstone of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

Given the security cooperation initiatives emphasized in the Joint Statement, what would be the most significant change to the U.S. alliance operating system in the Indo-Pacific region? While the level of actual execution of these programs would be more important than the content of the negotiation itself, just based on the summit outcome, it is evident that the U.S.-Japan alliance has become the cornerstone of U.S. military strategy as part of its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

First and foremost, Japan’s inclusion in AUKUS Pillar 2 as the first non-Western ally of the U.S. presents a significant opportunity to enhance its military capabilities and solidify its position within the alliance system. While AUKUS Pillar 1, which focuses on delivering nuclear-powered attack submarines capabilities to Australia, is more widely recognized, Pillar 2 could be more impactful in the long term. Pillar 2 deals with key future battlefield technologies, including unmanned underwater vehicles, quantum technology, artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems, cyber warfare capabilities, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic missiles, and electronic warfare.

Integrated deterrence, a core concept of the US’s new defense strategy, emphasizes a seamless integration of U.S. and allied capabilities, highlighting the importance of investments in interoperability. Furthermore, Washington’s strategy to de-risk against China hinges on countering China’s advancements in military applications of cutting-edge technology. Thus, Pillar 2 holds substantial “game-winning potential” in the US-China strategic competition (Christianson, Monaghan, and Cooke 2023). US-Japan cooperation in new weapons production, maintenance, and repair will also be strengthened by this partnership. Consequently, Japan’s entry into what was previously an exclusive Anglo-American network indicates a significant elevation of Japan’s role as the cornerstone of U.S. alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region.

Secondly, if implemented, the modernization of the command and control systems of the U.S.-Japan Joint Operations Command (JOC) is poised to significantly bolster the USFJ as a military hub with the authority to conduct independent operations in the Indo-Pacific. USFJ, which includes approximately 54,000 U.S. personnel from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army, hosts the USS Ronald Reagan—the only forward-deployed U.S. Navy aircraft carrier—at its port in Yokosuka (O’Dell 2023). Historically, the limited operational authority of the three-star USFJ commander, who is under the command of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) headquartered in Hawaii, has restricted USFJ to serving merely as a platform for regional military operations (Johnstone and Schoff 2024).

USFJ is unlikely to achieve a command and control level comparable to the Combined Forces Command (CFC) of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), primarily because the roles and objectives of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are constrained by the Peace Constitution and there is public resistance to transferring operational command to U.S. forces (Takahashi 2024). Nevertheless, significant strides towards modernizing command and control were agreed upon at this summit and during the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting in January 2023. As a result, an enhanced joint command and control framework is expected to emerge soon.

Thirdly, the role of the US-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is being reinforced. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Patrick Ryder highlighted that the US’s ties with Japan “form the core of the alliance and are the cornerstone of regional peace and security in the Indo-Pacific” (U.S. Department of State 2024). Indeed, the Joint Statement from the US-Japan summit positions Japan at the forefront of various mini- and multilateral alliance cooperation, such as those involving US-Japan-Australia, US-ROK-Japan, and US-Japan-Philippines. These partnerships focus on creating regional networks for information sharing on missile defense, intelligence surveillance, and conducting joint military exercises.

Kishida’s address to the Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress epitomizes the reason for Japan’s rising status in the U.S. alliance framework. In his speech, Kishida acknowledged the “loneliness and exhaustion” the U.S. has faced in upholding the international order largely on its own, affirming that the US’s leadership is “indispensable.” He emphasized that the U.S.is “not alone,” referring to Japan as the “United States’ closest friend, tomodachi (ともだち)” (MOFA Japan 2024). This statement affirmed that Tokyo shares the same strategic objectives and directions with Washington, particularly in relation to China and Russia.

III. ROK’s Way Forward: Advancing Defense Innovation and Rethinking China & DPRK Policy

Japan’s role as a pivotal player in the U.S. alliance operating system in the Indo-Pacific region is set to grow. What steps, then, should South Korea take?

In short, for the successful execution of Defense Innovation 4.0, South Korea should also consider joining AUKUS Pillar 2. The Defense Innovation 4.0 initiative aims to build a formidable military force based on AI science and technology, with a level of commitment comparable to a “second establishment of the army” (MND 2023). Its five implementation focuses and 16 tasks range from significantly enhancing capabilities to counter North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles, to leading the development of military strategies and operational concepts, and securing AI-based core advanced combat capabilities. These endeavors, which ultimately aim to bolster the all-domain combined operational capabilities of strategic assets, align with the technology cooperation initiatives outlined in AUKUS Pillar 2 (Ryoo 2023). Although the US-ROK Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technologies Dialogue initiated in December 2023 includes cooperation on AI, quantum science, and semiconductors, its focus remains on economic security rather than military applications of advanced science technologies. Given that AUKUS is setting standard for enhancing the interoperability of the U.S. alliance network, South Korea needs to take a proactive role in discussions with the U.S. about joining Pillar 2.

However, both careful consideration and the establishment of an appropriate response to the potential costs are crucial. Unlike QUAD, AUKUS explicitly focuses on countering China as a strategic objective, which will undoubtedly elicit opposition from China if ROK pursues membership. Therefore, Seoul must primarily justify its participation in AUKUS Pillar 2 by emphasizing the need to strengthen deterrence against the escalating nuclear and missile threats from DPRK. Additionally, given that the enhanced U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamentally aligned against China, South Korea must also critically assess the direction of its China policy in the interest of long-term national security. Now is the time for South Korea to devise a tailored de-risking strategy amidst the US-China strategic rivalry, considering its broader strategic implications.

Moreover, South Korea must prepare for North Korea’s opposition and the potential increase in tensions on the Peninsula. Collaborating with the U.S. to bolster national defense with advanced technology supports the primary goal of Defense Innovation 4.0: significantly enhancing counter-DPRK capabilities. However, the development of high-yield and high-precision attack capabilities, central to the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) campaign, not only serves as a deterrent but also as a potential means for preemptive action aimed at ending the North Korean regime. This enhancement of South Korea’s retaliatory capabilities could lead to increased North Korean sense of insecurity about regime stability, potentially intensifying the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula and escalating the asymmetric arms race between South Korean conventional forces and North Korean nuclear forces. Consequently, it is critical for South Korea to establish clear doctrines and principles emphasizing that its capacity-building based on advanced technology is solely focused on enhancing defensive posture. For instance, South Korea should clarify that it will not initiate the KMPR campaign unless North Korea starts a total war or uses nuclear weapons.

This intersection of issues could create new challenges. For example, in response to South Korea joining AUKUS Pillar 2, China might ease sanctions on North Korea and bolster DPRK-China-Russia cooperation to pressure the ROK-US-Japan alliance and induce South Korea’s detachment. Concurrently, North Korea, employing its “New Cold War” diplomatic strategy, might actively seek Chinese support to pressure South Korea or aim to gain more by aligning with Chinese actions. In this context, South Korea’s efforts to advance defense innovation through the AUKUS framework must proceed in tandem with consistent messaging to China and North Korea about its defensive intentions and a pursuit of dialogue with DPRK. The recent US-Japan summit also highlighted the importance of diplomacy and engagement based on principles and advocated for dialogue with DPRK without preconditions, calling for the immediate resolution of the abduction issue.

Finally, it’s important to recognize that the recent strengthening of the US-Japan alliance stems from the Japanese government’s proactive efforts and investments. Japan has significantly increased its defense spending to 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), secured long-range striking capabilities through the acquisition of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, and established the JSDF Joint Operations Command. In parallel, as South Korea seeks enhanced security cooperation with the U.S. though participating in AUKUS, it should also take independent initiatives to boost its international stature and demonstrate its commitment. Expanding humanitarian aid in Ukraine and the Middle East could be instrumental in enhancing South Korea’s role in the global community and strengthening its position as a Global Pivotal State.

References

Christianson, John, Sean Monaghan, and Di Cooke. 2023. “AUKUS Pillar Two: Advancing the Capabilities of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.” CSIS. July 10. https://www.csis.org/analysis/aukus-pillar-two-advancing-capabilities-united-states-united-kingdom-and-australia (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

CSIS. 2024. “Previewing the Japanese Official Visit and Trilateral Leaders’ Summit.” CSIS Press Briefing. April 2. https://www.csis.org/analysis/previewing-japanese-official-visit-and-trilateral-leaders-summit (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

Johnstone, Christopher B. and Jimm Schoff. 2024. “A Vital Next Stop for U.S.-Japan Alliance: Command and Control Modernization.” CSIS. February 1. https://www.csis.org/analysis/vital-next-step-us-japan-alliance-command-and-control-modernization. (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA Japan). 2024. “Address by Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio at a Joint Meeting of the United States Congress (‘For the Future: Our Global Partnership’).” April 11. https://www.mofa.go.jp/pageite_000001_00262.html (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

Ministry of National Defense (MND). 2023. “Ministry of Defense Announces ‘Basic Plan on Defense Innovation 4.0’… Nurturing Robust Armed Forces Based on AI Science and Technology (Translated).” Briefing Room. March 7. https://www.korea.kr/multi/visualNewsView.do?newsId=148913452 (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

Montgomery, Hanako, Junko Ogura, and Simone McCarthy. 2024. “Japan’s Kishida warns world at ‘historic turning point’ as he touts U.S.alliance ahead of Biden summit.” CNN. April 7. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/07/asia/japan-kishida-us-defense-intl-hnk/index.html (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

O’Dell, Hope. 2023. “The U.S.is sending more troops to the Middle East. Where in the world are U.S.military deployed?.” Bluemarble. October 25. https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/us-sending-more-troops-middle-east-where-world-are-us-military-deployed(Accessed: April 16, 2024)

Ryoo, Moo Bong. 2023. “「Defense Innovation 4.0」 to build Robust ROK Armed Forces of AI Science and Technology. ROK Angle: Korea’s Defence Policy 261: 1-4.

Takahashi, Kosuke. “Deeper and Wider Defense Integration Tops Japan-US Summit Agenda.” The Diplomat. April 12. https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/deeper-and-wider-defense-integration-tops-japan-us-summit-agenda/ (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

The White House. 2022. “National Security Strategy.” October 12. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

The White House. 2024a. “FACT SHEET: Japan Official Visit with State Dinner to the United States.” Briefing Room. April 10. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/10/fact-sheet-japan-official-visit-with-state-dinner-to-the-united-states/ (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

The White House. 2024b. “United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement.” Briefing Room. April 10. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/10/united-states-japan-joint-leaders-statement/ (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

U.S. Department of Defense. 2024. “Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds a Press Briefing.” April 11. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3739158/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/ (Accessed: April 16, 2024)

[1]This visit was classified as “official” since the Japanese Prime Minister serves as the head of government rather than the head of state. Nevertheless, the protocol and treatment provided were equivalent to those of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s state visit last April.

■ Yang Gyu KIM is the Executive Director (Principal Researcher) at EAI and a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

■ Typeset by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate

For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

2. The Axis of Autocrats

Again, north Korea is mostly overlooked except for one paragraph here. north Korea does not only support Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Yemen, as well as Russia, I would bet that there are also ties between north Korea and some of the countries in the Global South.

Excerpt:

Moreover, Russia's recent move to veto the renewal of the Panel of Experts at the United Nations, which monitors and enforces sanctions against North Korea, represents a significant undermining of international efforts to control North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The Panel had been a crucial mechanism in providing universally accepted insights into North Korea’s sanctions evasion and the involvement of states like Russia and China in these activities. Russia's veto, motivated by a desire to conceal its dealings with North Korea, including arms shipments, poses a direct challenge to the transparency and efficacy of global nonproliferation regimes.

1 hour ago

7 min read

The Axis of Autocrats

The Growing Ties Between China, Russia, Iran, and the Global Southhttps://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-axis-of-autocrats?postId=dde38e64-cd47-47bf-b36d-9ae2fa175995&utm

The evolving geopolitical landscape has given rise to a complex and opportunistic alliance between China, Russia, and Iran, which could be termed an "Axis of Autocrats." This alignment, characterized by increased military, economic, political, and technological collaborations, is primarily aimed at countering the dominance of the United States and its allies in the global order. The nature of this coalition, however, reveals a mix of concerted strategic interests and significant intrinsic limitations.

China, Russia, and Iran have drawn much closer since Russia invaded Ukraine. But the relationship was burgeoning before that conflict began in 2022. Since 2019, they have conducted joint naval exercises, displaying a symbolic unity in the Arabian Sea through operations such as rescuing hijacked ships and target practice. While these exercises project an image of military synergy, they fail to foster genuine interoperability or strategic depth, underscoring the alliance's role as an "axis of convenience" rather than a tightly-knit coalition. Each country harbors distinct national interests and strategic goals, which occasionally conflict with or diverge from one another. For instance, Iran seeks more robust military collaborations, Russia remains preoccupied with its engagement in Ukraine, and China is cautious about forming deep alliances that could estrange it from Western nations.[1]

A pivotal aspect of this alliance's global impact is its support for Russia's military operations in Ukraine. China has provided critical technology and economic support, while Iran has supplied advanced drone technology. North Korea, although not a formal member of this axis, has supported these efforts by sending ammunition and missile systems to Russia. These actions not only bolster Russia's military capabilities but also complicate Western attempts to diplomatically and economically isolate Moscow.

Activities of China, Russia, and Iran Tied to Ukraine

China: Significantly aiding Russia's military efforts, particularly by transferring critical materials and technologies that support Russia's industrial and military capabilities. This support has been crucial for Russia, especially in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Russia: Has received logistical and military support from China and Iran, enhancing its capability to engage in its military operations in Ukraine. Russia, in turn, supports Iran by likely helping to strengthen its air defenses.
Iran: Actively involved in conflicts in the Middle East and supports Russia’s military actions in Ukraine by supplying drones and missiles. These activities are part of Iran's broader strategy to assert its regional influence and beyond.

The three countries - China, Russia, and Iran - have collaborated to eliminate their reliance on the US GPS system and reinforce each other's. They have also conducted naval exercises together, showing potential maritime security implications. In 2021, Iran was granted full access to China's BeiDou satellite navigation system, and integration efforts between BeiDou and Russia's GLONASS are underway. However, the scope of operational cooperation does not extend much beyond the Middle East. The Arabian Sea is the only place Russia, China, and Iran engage in trilateral exercises. Each country has different priorities. Russia sees it as an opportunity to advance its "Collective Security in the Persian Gulf" agenda and become a great maritime power. China uses the exercises to enhance the projection of its naval escort task force in the Gulf of Aden. Iran focuses on improving its naval projection capabilities. While the exercises have limited relevance in strengthening interoperability between the three navies, each participant has specific needs met through participating.[2]

The primary concern for the United States is the military implications of the Axis. However, creating a formal trilateral relationship offers opportunities for economic partnerships between the countries that could be more important. China has become an important economic lifeline with Russia and Iran under punitive global sanctions. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there has been renewed interest in Moscow and Tehran for developing the International North-South Transport Corridor. This corridor is a multi-mode route for moving freight between Russia, Central Asia, and India. Tangible steps toward greater economic integration have already been taken. After their access to the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication was suspended in February 2023, Moscow and Tehran announced that they had connected their national financial messaging services. This bilateral financial arrangement insulates both nations from Western sanctions and could be expanded to involve other countries in the future.

Additionally, this Axis plays a significant role in BRICS, an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which is an intergovernmental organization that represents some of the major emerging economies on the global stage. Initially focused on investment opportunities, BRICS has evolved into a significant geopolitical bloc since its first formal summit in 2009. The organization aims to enhance cooperation among its members and plays a pivotal role in global economic discussions. Recently, BRICS expanded to include new members such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, which broadens its influence and representation.[3]

The term "Global South" generally refers to the regions of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania that are considered in contrast to the wealthier "Global North." BRICS is often seen as a representative voice for these regions, advocating for the interests and development of emerging economies and acting as a counterbalance to the dominance of Western economic paradigms.[4]

Russia, China, and Iran play distinct roles within BRICS. Russia and China, for instance, view BRICS as a platform to enhance their global influence and as a counterforce against Western dominance. Russia leverages its position to strengthen political alliances and economic ties, particularly as it faces Western sanctions. China uses BRICS to increase its diplomatic and economic outreach, especially as its global ambitions expand. Iran’s inclusion in BRICS is seen as a strategic move to counteract its international isolation and gain support against unilateral Western policies, particularly from the United States.

China's role in BRICS offers it a strategic advantage by allowing it to forge stronger relationships with other emerging economies and to create an alternative bloc to the Western-led global order. This is particularly significant as China seeks to expand its influence in the face of challenging relations with Western countries. By leading initiatives within BRICS, such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, China strengthens its position and potentially dilutes the dominance of Western financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank.

There is a growing consensus that Iran-Russia-China is forming an axis of Authoritarians. While symbolically significant, it lacks the substance and cohesion to challenge the current international order effectively. However, when considered in conjunction with BRICS, it represents a significant shift in the global economic and political landscape, with China, Russia, and Iran playing crucial roles in shaping its direction. The organization facilitates economic cooperation among emerging markets. It serves as a strategic platform for these countries to assert their interests on the global stage, challenging the existing Western-centric order. BRICS is marked by opportunistic cooperation and limited by significant strategic and political divergences among its members. The trilateral Axis relationship underscores the complexities of international relations where states pursue alliances based on immediate strategic interests rather than enduring partnerships.

The ramifications of their activities are nuanced. While maritime exercises project an image of a unified front, they do little to enhance military interoperability or strategic depth among the three nations. Moreover, the alliance does not substantially shift the geopolitical balance, as it is more of an "axis of convenience" rather than a tightly-knit coalition. Structurally, they are not an exclusive bloc, nor is it an alliance. More pointedly, it is an assembly of discontented countries with a common goal of challenging the principles, rules, and institutions that form the basis of the current international system. When these countries work together, their actions have a much greater impact than their individual efforts. They boost each other's military capabilities, weaken the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy tools like sanctions, and impede the ability of Washington and its allies to achieve their objectives.[5]

Although weak, the ties that bind them seem enduring, and the pressures on them draw the three autocratic regimes closer together. The implications of these developments for the United States and its allies are growing more serious. The strengthening of this axis presents military, strategic, and political challenges, necessitating a multifaceted response from the U.S. The internal division within the U.S. regarding foreign engagement — with isolationist tendencies at both political poles clashing with the advocacy for robust international alliances — underscores the complexity of formulating a coherent response to the shifting global dynamics.[6]

While the China-Russia-Iran axis and its peripheral engagements with states like North Korea and multi-state organizations like BRICS symbolize a significant shift towards multipolarity and strategic competition, the alliance itself is marked by pragmatic, transactional cooperation and limited by strategic and political divergences. This situation poses a nuanced and long-term threat to the international order. It requires diligent observation, strategic patience, and proactive diplomacy by the United States and its allies to safeguard their interests and uphold global stability.

Implications for the U.S.: The strengthening of ties and coordination among these three nations poses significant challenges for the U.S. regarding military strategy and geopolitical influence. The U.S. faces the following implications:

Military and Strategic Challenges: The U.S. has to contend with a potentially more coordinated and powerful opposition in various global hotspots, including the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
Political Challenges: Inside the U.S., there is a division on how to respond to these challenges, with isolationist voices within the Republican Party calling for less engagement abroad, which contrasts sharply with those advocating for robust support for international allies and a strong stance against these adversarial alliances.

[1] Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine. “The Axis of Upheaval. How America’s Enemies are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order.” Foreign Affairs. April 23, 2024

[2] Lucas Winter, Jemima Baar, and Jason Warner. “The Axis Off-Kilter: Why An Iran-Russia-China “Axis” Is Shakier Than Meets The Eye.” War on the Rocks. April 19, 2024

[3] Kyle Hiebert “With BRICS Expansion, the Global South Takes Centre Stage. An enlarged BRICS community will expedite the rebalancing of global power away from the West.” Centre for International Governance Integration. August 31, 2023

[4] Kawashima Shin. How China Defines the ‘Global South’ Beijing tries to make the term its own.” The Diplomat. January 11, 2024

[5] Lucas Winter, Jemima Baar, and Jason Warner. “The Axis Off-Kilter: Why An Iran-Russia-China “Axis” Is Shakier Than Meets The Eye.” War on the Rocks. April 19, 2024

[6] Niall Ferguson. “The Second Cold War Is Escalating Faster Than the First . To understand what is at stake in the fight against the axis of China, Russia and Iran, just read “The Lord of the Rings.” Bloomberg. April 21, 2024

3. Kim Jong Un rolls up with six new Toyota SUVs in convoy at latest appearance

NEWS

Kim Jong Un rolls up with six new Toyota SUVs in convoy at latest appearance

https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/kim-jong-un-rolls-up-with-six-new-toyota-suvs-in-convoy-at-latest-appearance/

Acquisition of customized Japanese vehicles is another demonstration of North Korea’s ability to evade sanctions

Colin Zwirko | Joe Smith April 26, 2024

A close-up of a Toyota Land Cruiser 300 (left), with brand logo removed, ahead of Kim Jong Un’s armored vehicle | Image: KCTV (April 26, 2024)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unveiled his acquisition of a half dozen new Toyota SUVs on Thursday, traveling in an 18-vehicle convoy featuring the customized Japanese vehicles during a visit to the country’s top military university, according to NK News analysis of state media photos.

The reveal of the six Toyota Land Cruiser 300s, with the brand logos removed and flashing lights attached, represents the latest evidence that Pyongyang is circumventing U.N. sanctions that have banned the transfer of transportation vehicles to North Korea since 2017.

The Land Cruisers are part of Toyota’s J300 series, which have been produced since 2021 and have a starting price north of $80,000.

The vehicles appeared to transport Kim’s bodyguards during his visit to the Kim Il Sung Military University to celebrate the 92nd founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, according to KCTV footage on Friday.

Also seen among the luxury convoy were two Mercedes-Benz Maybach GLS 600 SUVs, two Lexus LX SUVs, two Ford Transit vans, five older Mercedes sedans and one older unidentified SUV.

These were in addition to Kim’s armored Aurus limousine, which he received from Russian leader Vladimir Putin earlier this year.

Kim has yet to show up in state media openly using a new U.S.-made Cadillac SUV that was partially visible in photos published last month.

A convoy of luxury vehicles, including six Toyota Land Cruiser 300s, surround Kim Jong Un’s limo, which was gifted to him by Russian leader Vladimir Putin earlier this year. | Image: KCTV (April 26, 2024)

The recent acquisition of luxury vehicles by the DPRK leader appears to point to an effort to modernize his collection of high-end automobiles.

It is unclear when or how North Korea imported the vehicles, but if confirmed to be genuine models, the trade would likely constitute a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 that bans the transfer of both luxury goods and most transportation vehicles to the DPRK.

The frequent appearance of new models also demonstrates Kim’s ability to evade sanctions to import large items, suggesting he could do the same with weapons and related materials or production equipment.

Peter Ward, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute and contributor to NK News, said that “obviously it’s a violation of U.N. sanctions because they’re metal machinery.”

However, Ward said he wouldn’t strictly consider these luxury purchases because they’ve been “bought for their practicality.”

He also noted that the bodyguards who used the new SUVs are highly important to the regime, meaning they’re well funded with “their own foreign currency earning units and their own trade companies, or at least trade companies which fund them,” and can thus obtain such vehicles.

Previously, Toyota vans had appeared to be the preferred choice of the DPRK leader’s entourage.

Ford and other American-made vehicles have also been spotted on the streets of Pyongyang before, including for use as a police van, while a Chevrolet Suburban and passenger van frequently joined Kim’s convoy on public activities in the past.

Kim Jong Un’s bodyguards get out of a Toyota Land Cruiser 300. | Image: KCTV (April 26, 2024)

Edited by Bryan Betts

4. S. Korea, Cuba agree to open diplomatic missions

S. Korea, Cuba agree to open diplomatic missions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 28, 2024

SEOUL, April 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Cuba have agreed to open diplomatic missions in each other's countries, Seoul's foreign ministry said Sunday, as a follow-up step to the establishment of their diplomatic relations earlier this year.

A South Korean delegation, led by Song Si-jin, director general for planning and management at the foreign ministry, visited Havana from Wednesday through Saturday and discussed efforts to open the missions with Cuban officials, the ministry said in a release.

"The two countries agreed to establish permanent embassies in Seoul and Havana, respectively, and exchanged diplomatic letters confirming this," the ministry said.

Based on the agreement, the government plans to set up a temporary mission in Havana and dispatch diplomats as an interim step before establishing a permanent embassy, the ministry said.

On Feb. 14 (Seoul time), South Korea and Cuba made the surprise announcement on the establishment of diplomatic relations, in an apparent heavy blow to North Korea that has touted "brotherly" ties with Havana.

This file photo shows the then South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se (L) holding talks with his Cuban counterpart, Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, in Havana on June 5, 2016, during Yun's visit to the Caribbean nation, the first such trip by a top South Korean diplomat. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 28, 2024

5. Poland’s New South Korean-Built ATACMS-Like Ballistic Missile Seen Firing For The First Time

Poland’s New South Korean-Built ATACMS-Like Ballistic Missile Seen Firing For The First Time

As part of its spending spree in South Korea, the Polish Armed Forces is receiving a long-range missile comparable to the U.S.-made ATACMS.

THOMAS NEWDICK

PUBLISHED APR 25, 2024 1:13 PM EDT

twz.com · by Thomas Newdick · April 25, 2024

A new video shows, apparently for the first time, Poland’s new short-range ballistic missile in action. The CTM-290 missile is made in South Korea and offers broadly similar capabilities to the U.S.-made MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which has become one of the pre-eminent weapons in the war in Ukraine. The CTM-290 is launched from the Homar-K multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), based on a Polish-built truck chassis, and is indicative of a widening military relationship between Poland and South Korea. In recent years, this has also seen the Eastern European country buy light combat aircraft, tanks, and self-propelled artillery from Seoul.

The footage showing the CTM-290 missile being launched from the Homar-K was reportedly taken during a presentation for Polish government officials. This is said to have taken place yesterday at a range belonging to South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD) located in Anheung, around 60 miles southwest of Seoul.

The missile’s outward similarity to the ATACMS is obvious, down to the single-round missile pod that slots into the wheeled MLRS launcher vehicle, which can also fire a range of other projectiles. The CTM-290 shares very similar dimensions with the ATACMS, including a diameter of 600 milimeters for the South Korean missile, compared to 610 milimeters for the MGM-140, although the weapons are not compatible with each other’s respective launchers.

The type of warhead, or warheads supplied to Poland for its CTM-290 missiles is unclear, although South Korea is known to use a penetrator type for its equivalent KTSSM-I, to defeat hardened bunkers and other buried structures, a target set that is less relevant for the intended Polish missions.

Today, the manufacturer of the system, Hanwha Aerospace, confirmed that it had signed a $1.64-billion deal with Poland to supply it with 72 Homar-K MLRS units, part of a wider agreement dating from October 2022 that is worth around $22 billion, and which includes 288 examples of the MLRS, plus various other weapons.

Hanwha Aerospace said that the latest deal would take effect only after a separate financial contract, with government support, is signed by the end of November, Reuters reports. An initial batch of 18 of the MLRS plus ammunition were reportedly delivered to the Polish Armed Forces last year.

A prototype of the Polish Homar-K launcher on a Jelcz P883.57 chassis at the International Defence Industry Exhibition 2023 in Kielce, Poland. Michał Derela/Wikimedia Commons

The Homar-K MLRS is the Polish version of the South Korean K239 Chunmoo. In its Polish configuration, the MLRS is integrated with a Polish-made Jelcz 8×8 truck chassis. The Homar-K also has various other Polish components and subsystems, including fire control, communication, and battlefield management systems, with local defense industry playing a major role in the overall integration effort.

In both the original Chunmoo and the Homar-K, the launch vehicle carries two missile containers. In the Polish version, these can contain a single CTM-290, as demonstrated at Anheung, with a range of approximately 290 kilometers (180 miles), or six 239mm CGR-080 precision-guided artillery rockets with a range of approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles), according to the manufacturer. Examples of the CGR-080 rocket are seen being launched in the video below.

The stated range of the CTM-290 puts it in the same category as the longest-range versions of ATACMS, which can find their mark out to 300 kilometers (186 miles), compared with 140 kilometers (87 miles) for the shortest-range ATACMS variants. In the case of Ukraine, only the shorter-range missiles were provided at first, although the United States yesterday committed also to the supply of longer-range variants to Ukraine “as soon as practicable” — additional reporting from multiple outlets suggests that those munitions have already been secretly sent to Ukraine.

Full-scale models of some of the different rockets and tactical ballistic missiles available for the South Korean MLRS. At the bottom is the CTM-290 SRBM. Immediately above it is the CGR-080 precision-guided artillery rocket. dooyeol Choi Music travel/Wikimedia Commons

For its part, the CGR-080 is broadly equivalent to the M30A1 and M31A1 227mm precision-guided rockets fired by the U.S.-made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Both these types have a stated maximum range of at least 70 kilometers (43 miles) and have been used to considerable effect in the war in Ukraine.

“Chunmoo is a key asset of South Korea’s self-reliant defense capability, and the advanced artillery system will be taking the roles of defending the Polish border, and the Polish Chunmoo MRLS will be supplied as fast as possible to contribute to the military buildup of Poland,” Son Jaeil, the President and CEO of Hanwha Defense said back in October 2022, when the original contract agreement was announced.

The K239 Chunmoo in South Korean service. Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea

It’s notable that a lot of the requirements for the defense of Poland align with those of South Korea.

Both countries share a border with an unpredictable neighbor that has a vastly numerically superior military, especially in terms of mechanized infantry and armored formations.

South Korea originally developed the Chunmoo as part of its ‘kill chain’ concept, in which the MLRS would contribute to efforts to blunt any land invasion by the North, including SRBMs to strike areas in the enemy’s rear.

With broadly similar concerns about a potential Russian thrust across its border, or elsewhere in the region, Poland looked to South Korea as it set about modernizing and expanding its armed forces after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

While Poland requested almost 500 examples of the U.S.-supplied HIMARS, it was unhappy about the long delivery time and instead looked to South Korea for an alternative in the shape of the Chunmoo.

“We’re aware that we will not receive all 500 HIMARS launchers, for which we have sent a letter of request, within a timeline that would be satisfactory to us,” Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Mariusz Błaszczak said at the time. “We decided to split the HIMARS order into stages. We will have both the HIMARS and the Chunmoo.”

In the meantime, the first examples of the HIMARS were also delivered to Poland in 2023.

HIMARS launchers at a military base in Warsaw, where an event took place to mark the delivery to Poland of the first of these systems on May 15, 2023. Photo by Attila Husejnow/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

With its ability to hit targets at almost 300 kilometers, the CTM-290 is a particularly notable addition to the Polish Land Forces and is part of a growing focus the country is placing on its long-range strike capabilities.

These capabilities received another major boost with the announcement last month that the U.S. Department of State had approved a possible sale to Poland of up to 821 examples of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), worth $1.77 billion.

A close up of an AGM-158B JASSM-ER under a F-15E Strike Eagle during a test. U.S. Air Force

This follows on from a Polish previous order for 70 JASSM-ER weapons in 2016, to arm its F-16C/D Block 52+ fighters. Since then, Poland has also committed to buying 32 F-35A stealth fighters which will also be armed with JASSM-ER, albeit carried externally. Furthermore, Poland has been suggested as a possible future customer for the F-15EX fighter, which would likely be prioritized for standoff strikes against surface targets, as we have discussed previously.

Only this week it was announced that Poland had received approval for a purchase of up to 360 examples of the AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range (AARGM-ER). Allied with the F-35, these will provide a very significant boost to Poland’s ability to attack hostile air defenses at standoff range.

Beyond this, Poland has expressed interest in buying Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles for its planned new fleet of conventionally powered submarines, which are being procured under the Orka program. At the same time, the Polish Navy is planning to acquire new surface combatants that will be equipped with the Mk 41 vertical launch system that’s also compatible with the Tomahawk.

A U.K. Royal Navy attack submarine fires a Tomahawk cruise missile during a test off the U.S. coast. Crown Copyright

However, expanding the long-range conventional strike capabilities of the Polish Navy is very much a long-term project, meaning that the CTM-290 and the JASSM-ER are also being acquired as very important gap-fillers.

Such projects — and others, including advanced new U.S.-supplied tanks and attack helicopters — have been aided by a significant hike in defense spending. Poland now invests 4.23 percent of its GDP in its armed forces, more than double the NATO target of 2 percent.

While Russian aggression against Ukraine provides a reminder to Poland of the importance of robust defenses, there are already some questions being raised about how sustainable this spending is. In particular, there have been concerns over the financial terms of Poland’s purchases of South Korean arms.

Polish Army soldiers stand in front of South Korea-made military equipment in the port of Gdynia, after the arrival of the first K2 tanks and K9 howitzers for Poland on December 6, 2022. Photo by MATEUSZ SLODKOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images

There is also the fact that South Korean equipment generally doesn’t conform to NATO standards, making its integration with Western systems harder. In the case of the Homar-K especially, Poland seems to have decided it was more important to get its hands on these weapons faster, and in greater numbers, for which South Korea’s impressive industrial capacity was determined to be the answer.

For now, at least, sales of equipment such as the Homar-K MLRS ensure that Poland is South Korea’s most important military export customer. The acquisition of these weapons represents an important factor in Poland’s expanding long-range strike capability.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

twz.com · by Thomas Newdick · April 25, 2024

6. South Korea's Hanwha to supply more rocket launchers to Poland for $1.64 billion

South Korea's Hanwha to supply more rocket launchers to Poland for $1.64 billion

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/south-koreas-hanwha-supply-more-rocket-launchers-poland-164-billion-4291141?utm

FILE PHOTO: A K-239 Chunmoo rocket artillery system is seen during its demonstration at Hanwha Aerospace factory in Changwon, South Korea, March 16, 2023. REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji/File Photo

25 Apr 2024 01:27PM

(Updated: 25 Apr 2024 01:55PM)

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SEOUL :South Korea's Hanwha Aerospace said on Thursday it signed a $1.64 billion deal to supply 72 Chunmoo rocket artillery units to Poland, part of an estimated $22 billion agreement Seoul reached with Poland in 2022.

Poland had already agreed on terms to acquire 218 Chunmoos as part of the 2022 deal, which was South Korea's largest-ever arms sale.

Hanwha Aerospace said in a statement that the latest deal would take effect only after a separate financial contract, with government support, is signed by the end of November.

A delegation headed by Poland's deputy defence minister, Pawel Bejda, visited South Korea this week, as South Korean media reports said Polish officials are visiting state-backed export credit agencies (ECAs), including the Export-Import Bank of Korea, to negotiate over financing.

Korea Eximbank declined to comment.

7. Why South Korean pop culture rocks and North Korea’s does not

The subtitle tells the story.

Culture | Gangnam style v gulag style

Why South Korean pop culture rocks and North Korea’s does not

Dictatorship stifles creativity and joy

illustration: the economist/alamy/getty images

Apr 22nd 2024|seoul

Listen to this story. Enjoy more audio and podcasts on iOS or Android.

orth korea’s rulers have always had strong views on art. Kim Il Sung, the regime’s founding despot, said artists should “arouse burning hatred for the enemy through their works”. His son and successor, Kim Jong Il, was such a cinema enthusiast that he kidnapped a South Korean director and his actress ex-wife and forced them to make propaganda films, including a (surprisingly good) revolutionary Godzilla-style monster flick. Kim Jong Un, the current ruler, demands “masterpieces pulsating with the sentiment of the times”, by which he means praise for himself.

The president of South Korea probably has views on the arts, too. But because it is a democracy, its artists do not have to care what he thinks. Which helps explain why South Korean pop culture has spread joy across the world, whereas North Korean “people’s culture” has not.

chart: the economist

On YouTube “Gangnam Style”, a South Korean rap video, has been viewed 5bn times—nearly 60 times as often as “Kiss”, a popular children’s song from the North. On imdb, an online film database, the top South Korean films have hundreds of thousands of ratings; the top northern ones, hardly any. The gulf is so vast that only a logarithmic scale can illustrate it (see charts).

Cultural success translates into cash. Half of the top ten bestselling albums in the world last year were South Korean, according to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, a trade group. The country’s pop-culture exports were a whopping $13bn in 2022, up from just under $5bn in 2013. This sum dwarfs North Korea’s official exports of all goods and services combined.

The two Koreas share 5,000 years of history and were separated only after the second world war. So a comparison of their modern pop culture offers a useful insight into the effect of politics on creativity.

The first difference is freedom. In the South, artists are allowed to criticise, satirise and expose uncomfortable truths. “Parasite”, the first foreign film to win Best Picture at the Oscars in 2020, presents a bleak picture of inequality in South Korea (which is not especially bad by rich-country standards). “Squid Game”, a television series, offers a gory and original take on the same theme: cash-strapped contestants in an imaginary game show compete for a huge jackpot—and face death if they lose.

chart: the economist

North Koreans are free only to criticise the South. One northern newspaper called “Parasite” a “masterpiece” for its examination of working-class woes in Seoul. But any art about North Korea must glorify the regime and vilify its enemies. This makes for dreary, predictable fare.

The sole feature film North Korea has released in the past five years is “A Day and a Night”, a tiresome yarn about a humble nurse exposing counter-revolutionaries. Whereas South Korean shows depict complex protagonists facing difficult moral choices, characters in North Korean ones must simply be good (heroic workers) or bad (traitors, spies). Foreign characters are either evil (Americans, Japanese) or implausibly devoted to the Kim family.

Furthermore, all parts must be played by actors who have never displeased the regime. This applies retroactively, which can be awkward. The lead role in “The Taehongdang Party Secretary”, a television drama about a land-reclamation project to grow potatoes, was originally played by Choe Ung Chol, who later fell from grace for unclear reasons. (Rumour has it that he was associated with Kim Jong Un’s uncle, who was executed for treason in 2013 and more or less airbrushed out of history.) When the show was recently rebroadcast, Mr Choe’s face and voice had been digitally removed from every scene and replaced with those of a new actor.

Ideological conformity extends to music, too. “Leader, Just Give Us Your Order!” is a typically bombastic anthem, with a video of soldiers goose-stepping and charging into battle through sheets of fire. Few foreigners enjoy such tracks, and many North Koreans only pretend to. Choi Il-hwa, who escaped from North Korea when she was 14, recalls that she and her friends would “twist the lyrics” of state-approved songs, substituting “love” and “friends” for “glory” and the Kim dynasty, thus risking horrific punishment for a few moments of artistic freedom.

When imitation is and isn’t flattery

The second big difference concerns foreign influence. South Korean artists borrow widely. Film directors such as Park Chan-wook and Bong Joon-ho draw inspiration from Hong Kong gangster movies, Taiwanese neo-realist flicks and American classics. Blackpink, the first female k -pop group to top America’s Billboard Top 200, reimagine American hip-hop and pop in a style that is uniquely their own. On their debut song, “Whistle”, they rap in a mix of English and Korean over skittering trap-style hi-hats. South Korean music firms make 80-95% of their profit from new releases, estimates Suh Bo-kyung of Bernstein Research, so they are always after new sounds to plunder.

North Korean artists, by contrast, must pretend that good ideas come only from North Korea, and especially from the Kim family. The state ideology is juche (self-reliance). Citizens can be sent to the gulag merely for possessing foreign films or music. Kim Jong Il warned that the “corrupt pop music” of foreigners would “stimulate vulgar and unhealthy hedonism”.

Just a few trusted artists are allowed access to foreign material, and typically disguise their borrowing. Thus, many North Korean mobile games are uncredited rip-offs of Western titles like “Angry Birds” and “Bejewelled”, which are unavailable on North Korea’s walled-off internet. Its most famous original game, “Pyongyang Racer”, is an uninspired driving simulation. Its main virtue is verisimilitude: the streets are as empty as those of the capital, where only the rich own cars.

The third difference is capitalism. Pop culture in South Korea is produced by a variety of private companies. These firms are scandal-prone and notorious for micromanaging stars’ lives. But they never forget that fans have choices.

Mindful that their country has just 52m people, they have strived to please a global audience, just as South Korean industrial firms have aimed to export cars and mobile phones. k-pop groups often feature members with different styles, who speak different languages and sometimes come from different countries. Lyrics and videos tend to be less raunchy than their Western equivalents, making them palatable to censors and parents in more of the world. South Korean artists have been swift to embrace new technology. For example, the country is a pioneer of webtoons, a form of comic designed to be scrolled downwards on a phone screen. Koreans now dominate the Japanese webtoon market.

Most important, South Korean artists have grappled with universal themes. The way that television series such as “Squid Game” and “The Glory” (which deals with bullying) explore economic and social injustice resonates with global audiences, who “share similar agonies”, says Jin Dal-yong of Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada.

North Korean pop culture, by contrast, is state-directed and aims to please one man. Since Kim Jong Un’s life experiences are a trifle unusual—he was brought up to be a god-king and can have anyone who annoys or ridicules him put to death—this does not always yield content to which normal people can relate.

On “Grandfather’s Old Tales”, a children’s show on North Korean television, an “imperialist” wolf rips apart a rabbit. (“Baby Shark”, a South Korean children’s song, is less bloody and far more popular.) In “A Sick and Twisted World”, a comic book series, readers are invited to look down on depraved foreign customs, such as eating contests in America.

To be fair, Mr Kim has tried to modernise some of his country’s cultural output. He personally launched Moranbong, a girl band in short skirts, in 2012, around the time when the whole world was dancing to “Gangnam Style”. Moranbong signalled a flirtation with openness: members played covers of Western songs such as “My Way” and the theme from “Rocky”. But since then the group has grown more conservative, ditching their risqué outfits for military garb, belting out songs such as “Fly High, Our Party Flag” and offering videos of nuclear missiles destroying America.

Occasionally, despite the obstacles, North Korean artists produce art that speaks to people. “Comrade Kim Goes Flying”, a film from 2012 about a coalminer who wants to be a trapeze artist, was well-received by foreign film-festival-goers, as was “A Schoolgirl’s Diary”, a coming-of-age tale about a girl struggling to accept her father’s commitment to his work.

Years after she escaped, Ms Choi and her parents were driving, and she put on some North Korean pop, including “Whistle”. Not the Blackpink song, but one with a similar love theme and an unmistakably North Korean lyric: “Today I smiled and told you I’d exceeded production goals three-fold.” Ms Choi’s father grew nostalgic. Ignore the oppressive words; the tunes helped him realise it was ok to miss the place where he was born, even if he has absolutely no desire to return.

North Korea has talent: cartoonists who can draw, composers who can create a tune. It is only their rulers who hold them back. When it comes to hard power, the two Koreas are in the same weight class, thanks to the North’s nuclear weapons. But culturally, the South is a colossus, whereas the North’s soft power is as weak as the rationale for making a communist dictatorship hereditary. ■

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This article appeared in the Culture section of the print edition under the headline "Gangnam style v gulag style"

8. US Congress finally passes foreign aid: What are takeaways for US allies?

US Congress finally passes foreign aid: What are takeaways for US allies?

The Korea Times · April 28, 2024

By Lee Jong-eun

Lee Jong-eun

On April 20, the U.S. House of Representatives ended months of legislative gridlock and passed four individual legislative bills. These bills respectively provided foreign aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan and required TikTok’s China-based parent company to sell the social media platform to a non-Chinese company. Shortly afterward, the U.S. Senate passed the omnibus legislation combining the four House-passed bills. On April 24, Biden signed the $95.3 billion foreign aid bills into law, declaring, “It’s a good day for world peace.”

The passage of the foreign aid bills appeared uncertain for months, entangled by domestic U.S. politics. Congressional Republicans demanded, in particular, that the aid for Ukraine’s war be tied to the legislation strengthening regulations of the U.S.-Mexico border and the asylum process. Eventually, Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson relied on the support from Congressional Democrats to pass a series of stalled foreign aid bills, overcoming the opposition from some members of his party.

The passage of the foreign aid package is a relief for the governments of Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, which have lobbied for the aid as critical to their geopolitical security. The political dynamics leading up to the passage of the legislation, however, provide three takeaways that merit prudent considerations for U.S. allies.

First, Johnson justified sending military aid to Ukraine by using the analogy that “sending bullets” to Ukraine is better than “sending American boys” instead. Such calculations signal foreign policy preferences for U.S. indirect involvement in geopolitical conflicts abroad. Sometimes described as an “offshore balancing,” the strategic justification behind the latest U.S. foreign aid appears to arm the regional allies to bear the burden of deterring their regional security threats.

The U.S. has not always successfully maintained an indirect involvement in foreign conflicts. During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt advocated for providing aid to Great Britain, promising, "We will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands.” During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson promised not to send U.S. troops “10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.” The two presidents eventually deployed U.S. troops to fight in these wars. Subsequently, contemporary U.S. policymakers could face domestic politics wary of the risks that foreign aid could eventually result in U.S. direct intervention in the conflicts of Europe and the Middle East.

For U.S. allies, retaining U.S. support could then require signaling reassurance that the former could sufficiently deter regional security threats even without U.S. direct intervention. Should security situations deteriorate beyond the capacity of the individual allies, the U.S. might intervene directly, but there are risks that contemporary U.S. politics could instead suspend foreign aid for the “lost causes.”

Second, former U.S. President Donald Trump’s support provided political cover for Johnson to risk opposition from his party members in passing the foreign aid bills. Previously, Trump’s opposition to funding the aid for Ukraine without a complementary border control legislation contributed to months of partisan gridlock in Congress. Trump’s reasons for changing his stance are not wholly clear, but there are two indicators. First, Johnson incorporated Trump’s demand to designate some amount of aid to Ukraine as a loan. Trump endorsed the change, declaring that the U.S. should provide foreign assistance with expectations for a “paycheck.” Second, Trump acknowledged on a social media post the importance of Ukraine's survival to U.S. security interests, then chided Europe for not providing sufficient assistance to Ukraine.

Trump’s motives appear to reaffirm what has sometimes been described as his “transactional diplomacy.” As Trump campaigns to regain his presidency in the upcoming presidential election, he appears to be concerned with the negative future consequences the international security crisis could have on the United States. Trump, however, also seems to be motivated to use U.S. assistance as explicit leverage to extract substantive concessions from other countries. For U.S. allies, there might be relief that Trump’s second-term presidency would not be isolationist, and there could be prospects for cooperation based on mutual interests. On the flipside, U.S. allies should remain wary about the terms of cooperation that a future Trump presidency or Republican Congress could impose.

Third, U.S. foreign policy’s recent trend toward restraint and skepticism toward involvement in foreign conflicts does not apply to its growing assertiveness in confronting China. Among the four bills passed by the House, the foreign aid bill for Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region received the most votes in support. In the increasingly divided U.S. politics, assertive foreign policy toward China remains one of the few issues with bipartisan support. With the U.S. Congress also approving a measure forcing TikTok to sever ties with China, the areas of bilateral conflict will likely expand. It might be a relief for U.S. allies in Asia that U.S. commitment to regional security remains higher than toward world regions. On the other hand, having experienced the economic uncertainties from the U.S.-China “trade war,” the allies should be attentive toward the impact of the future bilateral “legal war” over technological regulations.

After the passage of the U.S. foreign aid legislation, several media outlets posted the quote often attributed to Winston Churchill, “Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing…after they have exhausted all other possibilities.” Churchill is also attributed to have said in the fall of 1942, “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.” If U.S. foreign policy continues to trend toward “direct, assertive confrontation” toward China and “indirect, transactional assistance” elsewhere, U.S. allies should prepare for appropriate strategic responses.

Lee Jong-eun is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.

The Korea Times · April 28, 2024

9. Glorifying pro-democracy activists (ROK)

Glorifying pro-democracy activists

The Korea Times · April 28, 2024

Rep. Back Hye-ryun of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), chairwoman of the National Assembly's National Policy Committee, bangs the gavel during a committee meeting, April 23. The DPK members of the committee approved the bill to honor pro-democracy activists and sent it directly for a vote in a National Assembly plenary session. The DPK has vowed to pass the bill in May. Yonhap

DPK should drop self-serving bill to honor activists

People who perished or sacrificed themselves for the sake of the country or fellow citizens facing life-threatening circumstances deserve recognition.

And Korea does honor its war heroes, independence fighters who risked their lives both at home and abroad to achieve Korea’s independence from Japan’s brutal colonial rule, and the numerous soldiers who lost their lives in defense of the country.

Patriots and their heroic deeds should be remembered, and their legacies should be inherited by the generations that follow them. Certainly, there is a role the government can play to make this happen. Honoring them and chronicling their works to help future generations remember their sacrifices is one such effort.

There is one precondition that must be met to be recognized as a national hero: an individual's contributions must be indisputable. Suspicions grow into distrust when those who are proposed to be decorated are controversial or public opinion about them is divided. The initiative to honor certain people will be caught in controversy when the initiators and the beneficiaries are the very same people.

The main opposition Democratic Party of Korea's (DPK) endeavor to pass a bill designed to glorify pro-democracy activists has caused a stir due to its potential conflict of interest and the lack of consensus built about the role of some potential beneficiaries.

The DPK’s flip-flopping about the bill has also fueled public distrust.

Rep. Woo Won-shik of the DPK initially proposed an identical bill in 2020 when President Moon Jae-in was in office. It drew a lot of criticism at the time. Many viewed the measure as self-serving legislation, partly because the DPK was and still is led by Generation 586 politicians, who took to the streets and led the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s.

The potential beneficiaries of the bill are pro-democracy activists of the same generation as those politicians. The DPK scrapped the bill as they became wary of the possible negative fallout on the general elections held earlier this month.

The DPK picked up the measure again, after the elections.

The main opposition party pushed through the same bill to decorate pro-democracy activists and allow them to enjoy various perks, including medical insurance and financial support. This time, the DPK lawmakers moved quickly and without hesitation despite the worsening public opinion. The DPK, by taking advantage of its majority status, deliberated and passed the bill quickly at the National Assembly's National Policy Committee on April 23 and sent it directly to a plenary session for voting, bypassing the Legislation and Judiciary Committee which is chaired by Rep. Kim Do-eup of the ruling People Power Party (PPP).

This is something unusual, if not outright illegal.

Once approved in standing committees, bills are sent to the Legislation and Judiciary Committee for final review before they are sent to a plenary session for a vote.

The DPK justified its move, claiming the bill has been stuck in the judiciary committee for over 80 days and in a case like this, committee members can vote again and once approved, it can be sent directly to a plenary session.

The PPP accused the DPK of taking advantage of its “tyranny of the majority,” declaring that democracy is in peril.

Despite the criticism, the DPK vowed to approve the bill in May. Given its majority status in the Assembly, the DPK will be able to pass the bill on its own. However, it remains uncertain whether President Yoon Suk Yeol will eventually sign it into law or not. Yoon has the last call as he can veto passed bills.

Problems will occur if the bill is signed into law and takes effect. The bill will allow those who were convicted of having violated the National Security Law to receive the same benefits.

Activists who were convicted of arson in 1989, in which seven police officers died after entering the Dong-Eui University in the southeastern port city of Busan to save five kidnapped auxiliary police officers, can be designated as contributors to the democracy movement. And those who were involved in the torture and beating of innocent victims who were falsely accused of having spied on the activists, better known as the "double spy scandal" at Seoul National University in 1984, will also be eligible for such benefits.

The passage of the bill will serve only the interests of those who will be designated as contributors to the nation's democracy. It will surely backfire and hurt the DPK.

If the president refuses to sign the bill into law, which is highly likely considering his frequent exercising of his veto power, another round of partisan conflicts will be inevitable. The DPK will gain nothing, because criticism against it will be unavoidable if the bill is passed.

The best-case scenario will be that the DPK voluntarily scraps the bill to prevent a possible parliamentary deadlock. Doing so will also serve its own interests, as the suspension of the bill will help the party save face.

The Korea Times · April 28, 2024

10. HRNK Board Elects New Co-Chair and Co-Vice-Chair, Bids Farewell to Outgoing Directors

HRNK Board Elects New Co-Chair and Co-Vice-Chair,

Bids Farewell to Outgoing Directors

April 25, 2024

Dear Friends of HRNK,

At its 55th meeting on April 24th, HRNK's Board of Directors unanimously elected The Honorable Jack David as its new Co-Chair and The Honorable Robert Joseph as its new Co-Vice-Chair.

Upon their decision to leave the Board after long years of service, HRNK's Board of Directors expressed its deep gratitude to outgoing Co-Chair Gordon Flake and Co-Vice-Chair Suzanne Scholte, and unanimously adopted resolutions honoring their remarkable contributions to the North Korean human rights cause and HRNK's mission.

Please find the biographies of Co-Chair Jack David and Co-Vice-Chair Robert Joseph enclosed, together with the resolutions honoring former Co-Chair Gordon Flake and former Co-Vice-Chair Suzanne Scholte.

Greg Scarlatoiu

Executive DirectorThe Honorable Jack David is a Senior Fellow and Member of the Board of Trustees at Hudson Institute, as well as a manager of his own investments. Additionally, he is an independent consultant on national security matters, especially combating weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. David has had long involvement with international human rights issues, serving several years as a delegate to a working group of the UN Human Rights Commission. For many years, he was a director of the International League for Human Rights. He was one of the founders of the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, on the board of directors of which he served in its initial years.

His publications include numerous articles on issues of federal or U.S. constitutional law, which he authored or edited. His articles relating to U.S. foreign and U.S. national security policy have appeared in The Wall Street Journal, The Asian Wall Street Journal, The Forward, and The New York Sun, National Review Online, and other media outlets. He has written many privately distributed analyses of foreign and security affairs. He is also the editor of The Blessings of Liberty (Random House, 1989).

Ambassador Robert Joseph is a Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. Until March 2007, Ambassador Joseph was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. In this capacity, he reported directly to the Secretary of State as the principal State Department officer for non- and counterproliferation matters, arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defense relations, and security assistance. His management responsibilities included oversight of three major bureaus headed by Assistant Secretaries of State: International Security and Nonproliferation; Political and Military Affairs; and Verification, Compliance and Implementation.

Previously, from January 2001 through November 2004, Dr. Joseph served on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense. In this capacity, he was responsible, under the supervision of the National Security Advisor, for developing and coordinating U.S. policies and strategies for preventing, deterring and defending against threats to the United States from weapons of mass destruction. Earlier, he was Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control.

Dr. Joseph was also the founder and Director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. His awards include the National Defense University President’s Award for Individual Achievement and the National Nuclear Security Administration Gold Medal for Distinguished Service. He also received the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service (and Bronze Palm), and multiple Senior Executive Service Meritorious Achievements citations. In 2006, he was the recipient of the annual Ronald Reagan award for his contributions to U.S. missile defense.

A RESOLUTION HONORING GORDON FLAKE,

FORMER CO-CHAIR OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE

COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA (HRNK)

WHEREAS, GORDON FLAKE provided critical initiative and support throughout most of HRNK’s development;

WHEREAS, GORDON FLAKE served as Co-Chair of the Board of Directors for eight years;

WHEREAS, GORDON FLAKE displayed admirable leadership and dedication;

WHEREAS, GORDON FLAKE made extraordinary contributions to HRNK’s mission;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea on this 24th day of April 2024 that GORDON FLAKE be honored and thanked for his long service to the organization.

A RESOLUTION HONORING SUZANNE SCHOLTE,

FOUNDING MEMBER AND FORMER CO-VICE-CHAIR OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA (HRNK)

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE provided critical initiative, vision, and support during HRNK’s development as a founding member and Co-Vice-Chair of the Board of Directors for twenty-three years;

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE led the vanguard of the North Korean human rights movement with faith, passion, compassion, and resilience;

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE pioneered the introduction and advancement of North Korean human rights before the U.S. Congress and the American people;

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE was the first to give North Korean escapees a voice before the U.S. Congress;

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE made critical contributions to the adoption of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 and subsequent reauthorizations;

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE has saved North Korean lives and given hope to many in the North Korean escapee community;

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE has kept the flame of North Korean human rights and freedom burning, against all odds;

WHEREAS, SUZANNE SCHOLTE is a freedom fighter who imparts mentorship, leadership, and inspiration to human rights defenders in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and beyond;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea on this 24th day of April 2024 that SUZANNE SCHOLTE be honored and thanked for her long service to the organization and for her lifelong commitment to bringing freedom, human rights, prosperity, and democracy to all Koreans.

11. Kim Jong Un guides test of rocket developed by ‘newly-founded’ military factory

NEWS

Kim Jong Un guides test of rocket developed by ‘newly-founded’ military factory

https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/kim-jong-un-visits-military-university-on-key-army-holiday/

Test comes as North Korea celebrates 92nd founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army

Colin Zwirko April 26, 2024

Kim watched the 240mm MLRS test from the northern runway of Pyongyang International Airport | Image: KCTV (April 26, 2024)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw a rocket test Thursday and demanded a “newly-established national defense industrial enterprise” fulfill annual production plans, according to state media.

The cryptic introduction of the new munitions company, likely referring to a factory, comes as Kim has increased public inspections of such plants in the last year, while emphasizing that the DPRK has short-range weapons aimed at South Korea.

The new enterprise is notably under the North Korean organization responsible for foreign arms sales, suggesting its establishment could be linked to Pyongyang’s efforts to send rockets and missiles to Russia to support its invasion of Ukraine.

Kim visited the Kim Il Sung Military University on Thursday as well to mark the 92nd founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, the Rodong Sinmun reported Friday.

Thursday’s weapons test involved a 240mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), which state media said was fitted with “new technology that will bring about a strategic shift to strengthen artillery capabilities,” without elaborating on the technology.

Kim watches a 240mm MLRS test | Image: Rodong Sinmun (April 26, 2024)

The 240mm rocket fitted with “new technology” was launched from a decades-old mobile launch vehicle | Image: KCTV (April 26, 2024)

The “successful” test was meant to assess the conduct of the newly established and “modernized” new factory under the Second Economic Commission, it added.

The Second Economic Commission (SEC) is the main DPRK organization in charge of managing all of the country’s weapons production and foreign sales.

State media reported in February on a similar 240mm MLRS test but said at the time it included a new “ballistic control system,” while photos showed it involved a newer launch vehicle model.

A photo published with Friday’s report shows that at least the launch vehicle used for the latest test was a decades-old model.

NK News analysis suggests the launch was conducted from the northern runway of Pyongyang International Airport.

The new enterprise “must properly fulfill this year’s military production plan without fail,” Kim reportedly said at the launch site.

A 240mm MLRS test in February used a newer launch vehicle model | Image: KCNA (Feb. 12, 2024)

The main focus of the report was on the new apparent factory, but it did not include any further details about its location or size.

The latest rocket launch comes after North Korea started sending rockets and ballistic missiles to Russia last year for use against Ukraine, suggesting the new enterprise could be related to the SEC’s foreign exports side.

New SEC Chairman Ko Pyong Hyon and other top military officials were present at the test, according to the Rodong Sinmun. Ko was formerly a manager at the Kanggye Tractor Factory, which Kim visited last year to inspect production of various caliber rockets, some fitted with new warhead designs.

In addition to the Kanggye plant, 240mm rockets also appear to be under production at the Tonghungsan Machine Factory in Hamhung on the east coast.

The SEC is headquartered in Kangdong northeast of Pyongyang, where a new large greenhouse farm was built recently and where Kim has spent time overseeing large-scale military drills this year.

Kim also oversaw salvo launches of larger caliber 600mm MLRS weapons earlier this week and in March and the inaugural launch of the new Hwasong-16B intermediate-range hypersonic missile in early April. State media reported on tests of new cruise and anti-aircraft missiles last weekend as well.

MILITARY UNIVERSITY VISIT

In a speech delivered at Kim Il Sung Military University (KISMU) on Thursday, Kim appealed for better student recruitment and education quality in line with “a farsighted plan to have the strongest military in the world,” according to the Rodong Sinmun.

The more the school improves on these fronts, “the more our enemies’ fear and anxiety will increase,” he said.

Kim Jong Un at Kim Il Sung Military University | Image: Rodong Sinmun (April 26, 2024)

Kim reportedly toured facilities around the campus, also watching a soccer game and attending a banquet to celebrate the army holiday.

The report did not show or mention the DPRK leader reviewing attack plans against South Korea or the U.S. as it did during a similar visit to the Kim Jong Il University of Military and Politics across the road in southwest Pyongyang earlier this month.

Kim last publicly visited KISMU in Oct. 2012 to celebrate the school’s 60th founding anniversary. Construction on a new indoor stadium took place on campus in late 2022 ahead of the 70th anniversary.

North Korea held a large-scale military parade on the army founding anniversary in 2022.

Edited by Arius Derr

Last updated on April 26 at 12:38 p.m. KST with additional background, and at 12:06 p.m. with corrections clarifying that the new enterprise is a factory rather than a defense office.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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