Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the U.S.

Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, June 06, 1962

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Restriction of free thought and free speech is the most dangerous of all subversions. It is the one un-American act that could most easily defeat us."

– William O. Douglas

"Great thoughts speak only to the thoughtful mind, but great actions speak to all mankind."

– Theodore Roosevelt

"The most shocking fact about war is that its victims and its instruments are individual human beings, and that these individual beings are condemned by the monstrous conventions of politics to murder or be murdered in quarrels not their own."

– Aldous Huxley

1. At Army’s special-ops school, the biggest changes in a generation

2. Blinken Meets With Xi as U.S. Pressures China to End Support for Russia

3. States Take On China in the Name of National Security

4. Competing agendas and cover songs: Inside Trump’s talks with foreign leaders

5. Mitch McConnell Wants Military Buildup After Big Win on Ukraine Aid

6. Army Begins Work on Floating Pier Meant to Get More Aid to Gaza, U.S. Says

7. US-led Gaza humanitarian aid pier comes under fire, UN officials say

8. Ukraine pulls US tanks from front lines over Russian drone threats

9. A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China

10. What does Taiwan get from the foreign aid bill and why is the US economy among the biggest winners?

11. U.S. to Withdraw Troops From Chad, Dealing Another Blow to Africa Policy

12. College Football Playoff Announces Decision On Army vs. Navy Game

13. How Does SOF Incorporate Technology, Evolve, and Simultaneously Compete with 5 Threats Across 5 Domains?

14. More arrests and a canceled commencement as college antiwar rallies spread

15. Network Behind Eruption of Anti-Israel College Campus Protests Revealed in New Report

16. The Campus-Left Occupation That Broke Higher Education

17. Ukrainians Increasingly Taking War Behind Russian Lines—and Moscow Is Worried

18. US Army to shift aviation force structure back to tailored brigades

19. Lidar: Another emerging technology brought to you by China

20. Forging the Force: A Joint Task Force in the Indo-Pacific

21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 25, 2024

22. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2024

1. At Army’s special-ops school, the biggest changes in a generation

Like a shark. Keep moving forward. If you stop you die. Or adapt or die.

But my caution is always never forget the fundamentals and foundational skills that define special operations and special operations forces. Beware chasing the shiny thing at the expense of the fundamental skills, particularly UW skills.

special operations — Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical

techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically

sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time

sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces,

requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 3-05)

special operations forces — Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services

designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and

equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. See also Air

Force special operations forces; Army special operations forces; Navy special

operations forces. (JP 3-05)

special forces — United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct

special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also

called SF. (JP 3-05)

At Army’s special-ops school, the biggest changes in a generation

Ukraine, robotics, and more are driving a six-year plan to improve training in irregular warfare, technology, and psyops.

BY SAM SKOVE

STAFF WRITER

APRIL 25, 2024 05:46 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

FORT LIBERTY, North Carolina—Clustered around a table in a classroom festooned with Ukrainian-language posters, six Army special operations soldiers chatted in Ukrainian with a visitor this month—not without hesitation, but seemingly ready for their upcoming exams.

“I'm very proud of them; they're doing very well,” said a Ukrainian instructor at the Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

The six-month course is among a slew of Ukraine-related changes at the school—and part of Army Special Operations Forces’ broader, six-year plan to revamp instruction in irregular warfare, technology, and psychological operations.

Students in the Ukraine class are the guinea pigs for a course that didn’t even exist until October. The course was designed from scratch over nine months, the Ukrainian instructor said, vastly condensing a process that typically takes three to five years.

Upon graduation, students will speak Ukrainian at a 1+ level on the Interagency Language Roundtable scale, a government-defined criteria that corresponds to elementary proficiency. The class aims to teach soldiers to bargain, exchange basic data on weapons, and establish rapport with Ukrainian soldiers who they might train.

The schoolhouse is also revamping basic-skills education to reflect lessons from Ukraine, according to Brig. Gen. Guillaume Beaurpere, chief of the Special Warfare Center and School.

Engineer sergeants must now learn how to both build and defeat tank ditches, a defensive feature that stymied Ukraine’s summer counter-offensive.

Drones have also been incorporated into Robin Sage, the comprehensive test that ARSOF soldiers must pass to graduate from the Special Warfare School; as well, weapons sergeants have renewed training with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, a reflection of the contested skies over Ukraine.

“You talk to any soldier in Ukraine: you don't go anywhere without a drone flying, either in support of you or against you,” said Beaurpere.

Training for ARSOF medics also now emphasizes that they can no longer depend on speedy medical evacuation. “Austere medicine is really coming back to our program,” said Beaurpere.

2030 plan

Bigger changes, not necessarily influenced by Ukraine, are also in the works to centralize instruction in the school’s core competencies — irregular warfare, psychological warfare, and civil affairs — by 2030. The changes will create distinct sub-schools, in a process akin to establishing faculty offices at a university.

By 2027, the school will host a new irregular warfare academy, which will teach the type of behind-the-lines combat that Army special operations forces have long trained in. One of the first steps, updating the Army’s irregular warfare doctrine, is already in the works with an anticipated release date for the new doctrine sometime in 2026.

“One chapter has been written and there is a logic map that's out there being circulated in terms of the rest of the content,” said Beaurpere.

In the meantime, he said, his command will issue training guidance in the next six to 12 months that will preview the doctrine changes.

“We're going to start with something that is very tactical, that can get out to the force very quickly,” he said.

Beaurpere said doctrine would focus in part on disrupting an adversary’s strategy, such as by pre-positioning troops in countries that an enemy might attack or positioning them in friendly countries near an adversary.

Other focuses for special operations forces include using them to provide access to enemy intelligence, potentially in partnership with other commands. ARSOF can provide “proximal access to areas that are of potential strategic interest to [Cyber Command] or [Space Command],” Beaurpere said.

Beaurpere also said the irregular warfare school may include new efforts to integrate electronic warfare and signals intelligence training. “We envision a pretty prolonged program of instruction that probably would run several months,” he said.

Psychological operations and civil affairs instruction will also get their own branch schools under the redesign, according to schoolhouse plans. One key change is appointing commandants for each branch school house, who can use their authority to drive modernization. The Army has designated a commandant for the psychological warfare branch from the reserve, Beaurpere said.

Beaurpere is also pushing to move the New York-based brigade that trains soldiers in psychological operations to Fort Liberty, although no decision has been made yet. “The next step to the [psychological warfare] school is a total Army school, one that looks at the reserves and the active component,” he said.

A Defense Department Inspector General report released in March said that the Army frequently had to rely on reservists due to a lack of trained active-duty psychological warfare soldiers.

In a nod to the increasing use of drones and other robotic systems in Ukraine and elsewhere, the Special Warfare School has also launched the Robotics and Unmanned Systems Integration course in October 2023. The six-week program will train 25 students four times a year on operating drones and advising partner forces on their use.

ARSOF also plans to launch a military occupational speciality focused on robotics, according to a press officer.

“We are working with the Army to create this MOS, which will fill a need in ARSOF as well as inform how the Army could approach this on a larger scale,” the press officer said.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

2. Blinken Meets With Xi as U.S. Pressures China to End Support for Russia

China is likely using north Korea as the cut out to provide lethal aid to Putin.

Excerpts:

U.S. officials say that China has provided Moscow with optics, microelectronics, drone engines and other materials that, while not lethal weaponry, have nonetheless strengthened Russia’s military industry at a critical stage in the conflict with Ukraine.

In 2023, 90% of Russia’s microelectronics imports, important for the production of missiles, tanks and aircraft, came from China, U.S. officials say. Beijing, U.S. officials add, has also helped Russia improve its satellite capabilities for use in the war in Ukraine.

Raising the stakes, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday that he is planning to go to China in May. That visit will mark Putin’s first foreign trip since his re-election in March and underscores the priority that the Kremlin places on further expanding its security and economic ties with Beijing.

China has heeded Western calls not to provide arms to Russia, but a brisk trade between the two neighbors in so-called dual-use goods, which have military and nonmilitary applications, has boosted Moscow’s efforts to rebuild its military industry, which has been constrained by Western sanctions.

Blinken Meets With Xi as U.S. Pressures China to End Support for Russia

U.S. secretary of state meets with Chinese leader as officials grapple with an array of thorny security and economic issues

https://www.wsj.com/world/blinken-meets-with-xi-as-u-s-pressures-china-to-end-support-for-russia-96e831e0?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Michael R. Gordon

and Brian Spegele

April 26, 2024 5:23 am ET

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arriving in Beijing for meetings with Chinese officials. PHOTO: CHEN YEHUA/ZUMA PRESS

BEIJING—Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Friday as the U.S. urged Beijing to cut back on his nation’s extensive support for Russia’s defense industry.

The tone of Washington’s relations with Beijing has improved markedly since a Chinese balloon drifted over the U.S. in early 2023, prompting American allegations about Chinese espionage.

A November summit meeting in California between Xi and President Biden led to the resumption of bilateral military-to-military contacts, fresh efforts to curb the role that Chinese companies play in the global trade in fentanyl and discussions on the risks of artificial intelligence.

But as Blinken engaged in hours of meetings in Beijing on Friday with Xi and other top Chinese officials, there were an array of thorny security and economic issues, including China’s help in Russia’s push to revive its arms industry, China’s military posture in the South China Sea and differences over Taiwan.

U.S. officials say that China has provided Moscow with optics, microelectronics, drone engines and other materials that, while not lethal weaponry, have nonetheless strengthened Russia’s military industry at a critical stage in the conflict with Ukraine.

In 2023, 90% of Russia’s microelectronics imports, important for the production of missiles, tanks and aircraft, came from China, U.S. officials say. Beijing, U.S. officials add, has also helped Russia improve its satellite capabilities for use in the war in Ukraine.

Raising the stakes, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday that he is planning to go to China in May. That visit will mark Putin’s first foreign trip since his re-election in March and underscores the priority that the Kremlin places on further expanding its security and economic ties with Beijing.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Friday. PHOTO: MARK SCHIEFELBEIN/REUTERS

China has heeded Western calls not to provide arms to Russia, but a brisk trade between the two neighbors in so-called dual-use goods, which have military and nonmilitary applications, has boosted Moscow’s efforts to rebuild its military industry, which has been constrained by Western sanctions.

President Biden complained about dual-use exports in a call with Xi earlier this month. U.S. officials, meanwhile, have encouraged European nations, which have extensive trade ties with China, to press Beijing on the matter as well.

The Wall Street Journal reported this week that U.S. officials were drafting sanctions that would cut off some Chinese banks from the global financial system if Beijing rebuffed its demands.

Chinese officials have repeatedly complained that the U.S. is seeking to hamper its economic development by limiting its access to advanced chips and going after some of its leading technology companies, such as TikTok owner Bytedance, while selling weapons to Taiwan.

“Overall, the China-U.S. relationship is beginning to stabilize,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the start of his meeting Friday with Blinken. “But at the same time, the negative factors in the relationship are still increasing and building…China’s legitimate development rights have been unreasonably suppressed and our core interests are facing challenges.”

Ukraine isn’t the only instance in which the U.S. has accused China of protecting Moscow’s interests. Earlier this week, the U.S. and Japan put forward a United Nations Security Council resolution to try to head off the deployment of a nuclear-armed antisatellite weapon that U.S. officials have accused Russia of developing. That measure reaffirmed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which bans putting weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

The U.S. criticized China for abstaining on the resolution, which Russia vetoed.

“Despite our multiple attempts to forge consensus, China has shown that it would rather defend Russia as its junior partner,” Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., said Wednesday.

One area in which incremental progress was expected is counternarcotics. Curbing the global trade in fentanyl, which is the leading cause of death for Americans between the ages of 18 and 49, is a high priority for Biden during this presidential election year.

In the months since Xi and Biden met in California and agreed to restart joint efforts to combat the drug trade, the two countries have convened a series of high-level meetings on the matter, including exploring ways to coordinate law enforcement activities.

“We appreciate the work that’s been done in the time since then to build that cooperation,” Blinken told China’s Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong during a separate meeting on Friday. “There is more that needs to be done to have a sustained impact.”

The biggest sticking point is the role of Chinese companies in the production of chemicals used to make fentanyl and other drugs. For years, such chemicals, known as precursors, have been openly sold over the internet, creating a marketplace for drug cartels to connect with their suppliers.

China has been slow to impose limits on such chemicals, a source of frustration for U.S. officials. In March 2022, for example, the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs added three such precursors to a list of internationally scheduled chemicals. Member states were then required to implement corresponding rules at the national level.

Two years later, China still hasn’t scheduled the chemicals. China said last year it was “in the process” of scheduling three new precursors, but hasn’t said when it would be finished.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Brian Spegele at Brian.Spegele@wsj.com

3. States Take On China in the Name of National Security

A question is whether these state actions influence the American people to be wary of China and its malign activities? How will Americans feel when the shelves at Walmart are empty (perhaps an extreme example). What will be the overall effect on the China-US relationship and will these actions contribute effectively to defending against Chinese malign activities?

States Take On China in the Name of National Security

Local politicians impatient with Washington’s actions against Beijing block Chinese land purchases, factory plans and research

https://www.wsj.com/politics/states-take-on-china-in-the-name-of-national-security-7ed05257?mod=hp_lead_pos11

By James T. Areddy

Updated April 26, 2024 12:05 am ET

Montana Gov. Greg Gianforte signed a law last year banning TikTok in the state. A judge later blocked the measure. PHOTO: GARRETT TURNER/MONTANA GOVERNOR’S OFFICE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

States have a new adversary: China.

From Florida to Indiana and Montana, an expanding array of local proposals, bills, laws and regulations aim to block Chinese individuals and companies from acquiring land, winning contracts, working on research, setting up factories and otherwise participating in the U.S. economy.

State officials, overriding traditional local interests such as drawing investment and creating jobs, say they are acting where Congress hasn’t to address grassroots American distrust of the Chinese Communist Party.

The states have generally been moving faster on China legislation than Congress. By the time a bill that could force a sale of TikTok by its Chinese owner ByteDance reached President Biden’s desk Wednesday, over 30 state governments had passed regulations targeting the short-video app.

In their efforts to challenge perceived China threats, states are often claiming authority to define national-security risks.

“There is a real responsibility on behalf of governors and state legislatures to look out for the safety and protection of our citizens,” said Virginia Gov. Glenn Youngkin, who last year blocked Ford Motor from setting up a battery venture in his state with China-based Contemporary Amperex Technology, or CATL. He has also signed bills to curb Chinese land purchases and use of TikTok on state devices.

Youngkin says he opposed the plant for electric-vehicle batteries because he didn’t want to allocate Virginia taxpayer money to support Chinese technology. Ford is now building a scaled-down version of the project in Michigan, where it has also faced localized resistance.

Virginia Gov. Glenn Youngkin says states have a role in protecting Americans from China. PHOTO: STEVE HELBER/ASSOCIATED PRESS

When Iowa’s state Senate passed a bill this month to shield some of the world’s biggest chemical makers from certain pesticide lawsuits, its legislation specified that one type of company would be ineligible for the protection: Chinese.

State assemblies are sometimes known as America’s laboratories of democracy for pathbreaking laws. Nebraska in 1980 became the first state to legislate divestiture from apartheid South Africa—six years before Congress acted.

Since early 2023, states and the District of Columbia have introduced 624 pieces of legislation related to China, rivaling Congress’s 663, according to information service BillTrack50.com.

Security before investment

The anti-China action has stirred most aggressively in Republican-controlled states, where Beijing faces blame for problems from fentanyl deaths and factory closures to last year’s balloon overflight and the Covid-19 pandemic. State legislators say that whether similar policies will gain traction at the federal level is likely to depend on the extent of Republican success in November’s elections.

“China has a very clearly stated objective: and that is to dominate the world, and do that at the U.S.’s expense,” Youngkin said.

Municipality and state lawmakers have repeatedly promoted anti-China measures that threaten jobs and investment in the communities they serve.

The Grand Forks City Council blocked Fufeng Group from building a mill at this North Dakota site. PHOTO: BEN BREWER/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Opponents of the Fufeng plant said it could be used to spy on the nearby Grand Forks Air Force Base. PHOTO: BEN BREWER/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Grand Forks, N.D., last year stopped a Chinese food ingredient maker, Fufeng Group, from building a corn-processing plant that promised to create 1,000 jobs. State and local authorities had initially welcomed Fufeng’s expected $700 million investment, pitched as the city’s largest private investment ever, but support collapsed when claims were made—with little substantiation—that the facility could be a conduit to spy on nearby Grand Forks Air Force Base.

Grand Forks had a duty to act because the federal government was “slow and contradictory” in addressing the possible national-security implications of Fufeng’s plant, Mayor Brandon Bochenski argued in a policy statement shortly before the City Council suspended the project’s permitting process. The City Council faced heat from residents who were angry that a Chinese company might be welcomed into their community, with one resident at a public hearing calling the plant a “goofy thing with the Chinese communist government.”

The Fufeng effect has since dominoed through state capitals, including South Dakota’s, where Gov. Kristi Noem in 2023 cited North Dakota’s experience in signing an executive order that forbade many activities in her state by companies linked to governments the U.S. has designated as “foreign adversaries”—namely China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela and North Korea.

Fufeng later identified a site for its plant in Indiana, only to get tripped up by a new state law that forbids Chinese and other designated adversaries from entering deals for agricultural land.

One of the bill’s proponents, Indiana State Sen. Jean Leising, acknowledged the proposed plant was popular among corn farmers and that she was warned that between Fufeng and 10 other Chinese investors, the legislation would cost Indiana $14 billion in lost income. She reasoned that sacrifices are necessary. “Safety or revenue, you sometimes have to make a decision,” she said.

Fufeng said that it is “well into the process of exploring alternative sites for our plant which will produce great animal nutrition products and meet the needs of the community that welcomes it.” The company told legislators in Indiana it is also looking at locations in Minnesota and Illinois.

“States are continuing to blur the lines between state power and federal power,” said Christopher Daley, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana, who criticizes his state’s land-use restrictions as “far too broad.”

Virginia Gov. Youngkin said issues such as land use are state-level decisions, in Virginia’s case sometimes affecting national-security assets such as the Pentagon.

Patchwork legislation

When the Iowa state Senate this month passed a bill designed to make it difficult to sue pesticide makers if their product labels follow federal requirements to warn of health risks, people involved in the process said a clause was included specifically to build support for the legislation: “The bill does not apply to a product made by a Chinese state-owned enterprise,” the text said.

Before legislation died on Saturday, when the Iowa House recessed before voting on it, that caveat seemed aimed at a product from Syngenta, a Switzerland-based maker of seeds and pesticides that since 2017 has been owned by China National Chemical, one of China’s largest government-controlled companies.

Chinese-owned Syngenta has been ordered to sell its land in Arkansas but allowed to remain in Indiana. PHOTO: CFOTO/ZUMA PRESS

Syngenta is also under fire in Arkansas, where authorities fined the company $280,000 and ordered it to sell 160 acres it has owned for 36 years for violating a new law barring land holdings by a “prohibited foreign-party-controlled business.” A spokeswoman for Gov. Sarah Huckabee Sanders said, “Gov. Sanders has promised Arkansans she’ll step up where the federal government has failed.”

Syngenta spokesman Saswato Das said the company’s Arkansas employees are Americans serving local farmers, and the land decision “was a shortsighted action that fails to account for the effects of such an action, intended or not, on the U.S. agricultural market.”

In a sign of inconsistencies between states pursuing similar goals, the same Indiana land-use bill that stopped Fufeng from building a plant there grandfathered Syngenta, which has around 100 employees and 115 acres in the state.

Leising and a state representative, Kendell Culp, said Indiana lawmakers decided to make the legislation forward-looking. Culp said no company was singled out.

Smithfield Foods was purchased by China’s WH Group over a decade ago. PHOTO: SHANNON STAPLETON/REUTERS

The land issue is particularly knotty. The federal government says Chinese entities are the registered owners of under 1% of the foreign-held agricultural land in the U.S., with 87% of that owned by five companies, including one of America’s biggest meatpackers, Smithfield Foods, which was bought by China’s WH Group in 2013.

New land-use restrictions have “required us to do a lot more explaining about our ownership structure,” said Smithfield spokesman Jim Monroe, who noted that Americans run Smithfield and American institutional investors are among WH Group’s biggest shareholders.

Challenges to anti-China measures

Florida has legislated some of the most far-reaching China decoupling. While campaigning for president last year, Gov. Ron DeSantis signed a law to stop land purchases, block state contracting and university partnerships involving Chinese nationals. His office termed the package “a blueprint for other states.”

To detractors, the anti-China measures can be unnecessary, poorly conceived and ineffective political grandstanding, sometimes even racist or unconstitutional.

Several efforts have faced legal challenges.

After Montana imposed an outright ban on TikTok in the state, a judge blocked the measure, citing the First Amendment—an avenue the company is expected to explore in challenging the federal legislation. Asian-Americans in Texas took credit last year for killing a state legislative effort to ban Chinese land ownership.

And in Florida, three Chinese nationals from large public universities argued in a suit against state agencies such as the state Education Department that new hurdles to their participation in academic research are unconstitutionally race-based.

“Florida has succumbed to the temptation to target ‘disfavored’ foreigners—this time at the state level—including most prominently, once again, individuals from China,” last month’s suit said. Florida’s Education Department declined to comment.

Write to James T. Areddy at James.Areddy@wsj.com

4. Competing agendas and cover songs: Inside Trump’s talks with foreign leaders

The only question that matters to these foreign emissaries is how can you help Trump win (not the election per se but if he is the president)? The only way Trump will be influenced is if they can show value in helping Trump win on whatever agenda item is important to him.

Oh and as noted, our diplomats routinely engage with opposition political parties in other countries to include candidats on both sides when running for office.

Competing agendas and cover songs: Inside Trump’s talks with foreign leaders

It’s unclear whether the conversations will have an effect on a former president who is impulsive with his decision-making

By Josh Dawsey, Marianne LeVine and Michael Birnbaum

April 26, 2024 at 5:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Josh Dawsey · April 26, 2024

In March, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban went to Mar-a-Lago, arguing to Donald Trump that Russia would grind Ukraine down and eventually win their war — and that the United States should accept that reality. Then the two spent hours in a ballroom listening to a cover band play Rolling Stones hits.

Several weeks later, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron made a very different pitch to Trump. Over steaks at Mar-a-Lago, he warned Trump that he needed to continue providing military aid to Ukraine since Russia would not stop until it had taken over the entire country.

And at dinner inside Trump Tower last week, Polish President Andrzej Duda brought up the war in Ukraine and encouraged Trump to keep funding the Ukrainians if elected president. Trump told him Europe needed to do more to help Ukraine, a message the former president shared on social media the next day.

As he pursues a return to the White House, Trump is speaking regularly with foreign officials looking to influence his thinking on a range of issues. Central to many of the discussions is the future of the war in Ukraine — an area where Trump and President Biden hold different views — according to people with knowledge of the talks, who like some others spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe private conversations. The meetings have also touched on other topics, from the future of NATO to tariffs.

After the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol by a pro-Trump mob and mounting criminal charges against him, many foreign emissaries and leaders doubted Trump would be the Republican nominee again, according to seven European ambassadors involved in the discussions. But as he has secured his position as GOP standard-bearer again, they have angled to be in his ear to shape his considerations and learn more about his thinking. Some have shared notes about who has influence with Trump and what arguments might work, and ambassadors have reached out to Trump advisers, friends and Mar-a-Lago Club members.

But it’s unclear whether the conversations will have an effect on a former president who is impulsive with his decision-making. As president, Trump often blindsided allies with decisions and didn’t have a nuanced understanding of foreign affairs, according to one of the European ambassadors who interacted with him, and many leaders believed he governed out of narcissism and revenge. But it was easier to reach Trump’s inner circle compared with the Biden administration, decisions were sometimes made faster, and Trump wasn’t wedded to every long-standing U.S. government policy, which could be refreshing, this person said.

“People are looking at President Trump throughout the world as the Republican nominee — it’s about Ukraine, but it’s about keeping the relationship with a guy who has a 50-50 chance of being president,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a former Trump critic who has become a close ally in recent years.

The world leaders Trump has spoken with include right-wing heads of state and other officials who have drawn international criticism for oppressive governing tactics. Trump has long-standing relationships with some, such as Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who the CIA concluded ordered the killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

The talks are unfolding amid wars in Ukraine and Gaza and dueling military strikes from Israel and Iran. Lawmakers and foreign policy experts said the meetings were not unusual but distinguished between Cameron, a former U.K. prime minister and previous leader of the Conservative Party, and Orban, who has pro-Russian and autocratic leanings, has clashed with some other European leaders, and has voiced support for Trump’s campaign.

“We need leaders in the world who are respected and can bring peace. He is one of them! Come back and bring us peace, Mr. President!” Orban wrote on the social media website X after his meeting with Trump.

“Viktor Orbán and the Hungarian government are not making decisions in the interests of Russia or Ukraine, but solely in the interests of Hungary and the Hungarian people,” Orban’s office said in a statement when asked about the Trump meeting.

Trump has privately said he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine by pressuring Ukraine to give up some territory, according to people familiar with the plan. The proposal would depart dramatically from Biden’s pro-Ukraine posture.

Cameron offered up the European perspective that Russian President Vladimir Putin would seize on any backing away from Ukraine as a show of weakness, a move seen by some as an attempt to change Trump’s view. Trump suggested in the meeting that Russia might settle for part of the country, an idea Cameron argued against.

“They’re trying to use any perceived general political affiliation with Republicans, with the American right, to try to steer Trump away from his worst instincts and toward a conservative version of defense of the free world,” said Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland and fellow at the Atlantic Council, when asked about Cameron’s meeting with Trump.

While a range of countries have sought to curry favor, Trump advisers said, few have worked harder than British officials. A British diplomat has repeatedly visited Mar-a-Lago, attended Trump’s Super Tuesday victory party, dined with Trump privately, met with senior Republicans, texted with his advisers and attended Trump’s campaign events, according to five people familiar with the meetings. The embassy declined to comment on its meetings. The British ambassador has also met with Trump, along with former British politician Nigel Farage, a proponent of the Brexit movement, and former U.K. prime minister Liz Truss.

Trump’s campaign didn’t comment on the details of the meetings and suggested they are a sign of his strength among world leaders. “America’s allies are anxiously hoping that President Trump will be re-elected to end the war and chaos created by Joe Biden’s weakness,” campaign spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said in a statement.

Trump appears to enjoy the meetings with foreign dignitaries, especially if they are at Mar-a-Lago, and his team is often happy to meet with leaders who are also speaking to the White House and lawmakers on Capitol Hill, according to advisers. Trump’s team likes the tableau of him meeting with world leaders as his criminal trial unfolds in New York, as it shows the image of a leading political figure instead of a criminal defendant, a person close to him said.

He met Tuesday at Trump Tower with former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso. The Japanese opposition party has also asked for a meeting with the former president. Taiwanese officials, concerned about China, have orchestrated meetings with people close to Trump. During the annual Conservative Political Action Conference in February, Trump spoke backstage with Spanish members of the far-right party Vox.

“He’s meeting with people he’s comfortable with,” said Aaron David Miller, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former diplomat.

Top Trump adviser Susie Wiles and speechwriter Vince Haley typically accompany Trump in the conversations, according to people with knowledge of the meetings. One adviser predicted the meetings with foreign leaders will only pick up, as his team fields more requests.

Trump’s advisers have also studied the Logan Act, a law that aims to keep private citizens out of foreign affairs, and have declined some meetings, they said, but would not specify which ones.

In the conversations, Trump often gravitates to domestic politics, talking about abortion politics with some of the leaders and raising how to secure borders with Duda and Orban, who have also campaigned on anti-migration platforms, according to people briefed on the meetings. The conversations are often discursive and sometimes focus on golf, the people said.

Foreign diplomats posted to Washington said they aren’t sure whether Trump can be swayed by their conversations. But one senior European diplomat noted that although Trump’s public message after his Duda meeting generally appeared skeptical of European efforts to support Ukraine, he said that the country’s survival “is also important to us” — which the diplomat said might be a sign that Duda moved Trump slightly. (Duda, who met with Biden last month, once proposed naming a military base in Poland “Fort Trump.”)

Duda told a Polish television channel that he told Trump it was better to send money and equipment to Ukraine now, so that Ukrainians could bear the brunt of the fight against Russia, rather than in the future if Russia continues unchecked in Europe, when American soldiers might be pulled into fighting in Europe as they were in both world wars.

“President Donald Trump asked me how I assess the situation, how I see the possibilities of further development of this situation, so I described it,” Duda told the channel, Telewizja Republika. “I think that later he analyzed these aspects of our conversation.”

European ambassadors were pleased that Trump did not blow up a recent deal to send more U.S. aid to Ukraine, closely watching his comments in fear, people familiar with the matter said.

Some Democrats predicted Trump’s meetings would not yield a shift in his positions. “My sense is he’s not going to offer anything more orthodox on foreign relations. I don’t think this is some effort to try and suggest he’s going to be a more normal president,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), who sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Although senior leaders and diplomats around the world are generally mindful not to appear as though they are meddling in the political processes of other countries, many of them also typically try to meet with the main opposition leaders ahead of elections — especially once the leading candidates have been picked. They do so to try to impress their own national priorities and understand how their own countries might be affected by a switch in governments.

Back in 2016, some embassies in Washington were so dismissive of a Trump victory that they didn’t bother with the standard outreach to representatives of his campaign — a decision that their bosses in their home capitals were later frustrated with, according to diplomats from multiple countries.

John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, said he’s heard from ambassadors asking him about what a second Trump term would look like. He recalled that meetings with Trump vary depending on the foreign leader, adding that the former president has a tendency to ramble, which leaders can find “frustrating.”

“Different leaders approach him in different ways: Some try to flatter him, some try to grit their teeth and be patient,” said Bolton, who has become critical of Trump. “You never can tell what Trump is going to do in a meeting.”

Trump in 2019 had a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in which Trump attempted to withhold aid to Ukraine unless Zelensky said he would investigate Biden. The decision led to Trump’s first impeachment in Congress.

Foreign governments have responded to Trump’s standing as the presumptive Republican nominee as the signal that it was legitimate to start meeting him directly, diplomats said. Since late last year, as the likelihood Trump could make a comeback became clearer, they have been meeting with representatives who have been involved in thinking through Trump’s possible second-term foreign policy.

One Middle Eastern country has put together a list of 50 people it believes are close to Trump — and the 10 it thinks will be in his “innermost circle,” according to a person familiar with the list. It is closely studying the work of conservative think tanks — particularly the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 — to understand who might make power in a new Trump administration, and to learn how to get to those people, the person said. And the country has courted lobbying firms that have Trump allies.

Meanwhile, Biden’s top diplomat, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, has made a habit of meeting with opposition leaders from other countries — including those engulfed in war, such as Israel. Trump has not talked with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he remains annoyed with because he called Biden the winner in late 2020 and pulled Israel from a joint military mission with the United States at the last minute, Trump has told others privately.

And Cameron — standing alongside Blinken at the State Department — noted with equanimity that the top U.S. diplomat had met British Labour leader Keir Starmer in February ahead of likely U.K. elections later this year that are poised to launch Starmer to No. 10 Downing Street.

In Washington, embassy parties still are overwhelmingly populated by Biden administration and Democratic officials. And the European ambassador involved in discussions about Trump said that there can be some “blowback” from engaging with Trump because so many Democrats and Washington foreign policy experts are “allergic” to them doing it.

“It makes normal behavior a bit trickier,” the ambassador said. “Trump is the nominee or the candidate, there’s nothing that we can do. We have to engage with them.”

The Washington Post · by Josh Dawsey · April 26, 2024

5. Mitch McConnell Wants Military Buildup After Big Win on Ukraine Aid

My bias is showing again. The headline editor omitted north Korea. But at least the Senator did not.

Excerpt:

McConnell has long argued that the conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East and Asia are interconnected, and that the abandonment of Kyiv would be a gift to America’s adversaries. He calls Russia, Iran, China and North Korea “the axis of aggressors.” Any effort to boost military spending would run into opposition from progressive Democrats among others.

Mitch McConnell Wants Military Buildup After Big Win on Ukraine Aid

Senate minority leader is pushing to boost military spending to confront China, Iran and Russia as he prepares to leave post

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/mcconnell-interview-ukraine-trump-eaa627f4?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

By Siobhan Hughes

and Lindsay Wise

Updated April 25, 2024 11:22 am ET

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell. PHOTO: JULIA NIKHINSON/REUTERS

WASHINGTON—Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.), fresh off a big bipartisan victory on overseas aid that reasserted America’s muscular role in the world, said he wants to pump up military spending to guard against new challenges from China, Russia and Iran.

“This is a skirmish in a larger war,” McConnell, who this week helped deliver a majority of Republican votes for a long-delayed $95.3 billion package of aid to Ukraine, Israel and other countries, said in an interview. “And so I think that requires ongoing attention, which is what is going to be my major interest here,” he said, pointing to the 1980s buildup under President Ronald Reagan.

Military spending will be central in the last major legislative fight before the November elections—and likely the last for McConnell as minority leader—with Congress facing a Sept. 30 deadline for funding the government in the new fiscal year. President Biden has called for $895.2 billion in base defense spending, the most on record but also an amount constrained by the 1% cap that was agreed to in last year’s Fiscal Responsibility Act, the debt-ceiling deal reached between Biden and former House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.).

“Where we go from here is to try to impress upon the administration as well to increase defense spending,” said McConnell, 82 years old. “I mean that’s what Reagan taught us—you get peace through strength. And our current budget doesn’t reflect that.”

Army Begins Work on Floating Pier Meant to Get More Aid to Gaza, U.S. Says

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/04/26/world/israel-gaza-war-hamas

Image

A U.S. Army vessel deployed to assist in the construction of a floating pier off Gaza’s coast.Credit...Kristen Zeis for The New York Times

Here’s what we know:

Defense Department officials said the structure, which is expected to be completed in early May, could help relief workers deliver as many as two million meals a day.

A floating pier would move aid from ships into Gaza.

Image

A U.S. Army vessel assisting in the construction of the floating pier.Credit...Kristen Zeis for The New York Times

Army engineers on Thursday began construction of a floating pier and causeway for humanitarian aid off the coast of Gaza, which, when completed, could help relief workers deliver as many as two million meals a day for the enclave’s residents, Defense Department officials said.

The construction on the “initial stages of the temporary pier and causeway at sea” means that the project’s timing is in line with what Pentagon officials had predicted, Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Defense Department’s press secretary, said. The construction is meant to allow humanitarian aid to bypass Israeli restrictions on land convoys into the besieged strip.

General Ryder said that defense officials expected the project, ordered up by President Biden early last month, to be completed early next month. The facility is meant to include an offshore platform to transfer aid from ships, and a floating pier to bring the aid to shore.

Aid organizations have welcomed the plan, which will be an addition to the airdrops of humanitarian supplies that the U.S. military has been conducting over Gaza. But aid workers say, and defense officials have acknowledged, that the maritime project is not an adequate substitute for land convoys. Such aid convoys fell sharply when the war began more than six months ago and have only partly recovered.

Some U.S. military officials have also privately expressed security concerns about the project, and General Ryder said that the military was looking into a mortar attack on Wednesday that caused minimal damage in the area where some pier work is supposed to be done. However, he said, U.S. forces had not started moving anything into the area at the time of the mortar attacks.

The floating pier is being built alongside an Army ship off the Gaza coast. Army ships are large, lumbering vessels, so they have armed escorts, particularly as they get within range of Gaza’s coast, defense officials have said.

The United Nations says famine is likely to set in within Gaza by the end of May.

Aid workers have described bottlenecks for aid at border crossings because of lengthy inspections of trucks, limited crossing hours and protests by Israelis, and they have highlighted the difficulty of distributing aid inside Gaza. Israeli officials have denied that they are hampering the flow of aid, saying the United Nations and aid groups are responsible for any backlogs.

Senior Biden administration and military officials detailed a complex plan in a Pentagon call with reporters on Thursday afternoon, explaining how the pier and causeway are being put together, and how it is supposed to work. Army engineers are constructing the facility aboard Navy ships in the eastern Mediterranean. One official said that the “at-sea assembly of key pieces” of the pier began on Thursday.

Biden officials are insistent that the Pentagon can carry out aid deliveries through the floating pier without putting American boots on the ground in Gaza. Officials described a complicated shuttle system, through which aid would be loaded onto Navy ships in Cyprus and transported to a causeway — a floating platform — at sea.

The Pentagon’s military acronym for the project is J-Lots, for Joint Logistics Over the Shore.

The causeway at sea is different from the floating pier where the aid will be offloaded into Gaza. An engineering unit with the Israeli military will anchor the floating pier to the Gaza shore, a senior military official told reporters in the Pentagon call.

Shuttle boats run by aid organizations, the United Nations or other countries are then expected to transport the aid to the floating pier, where it is to be loaded onto trucks driven by “a third party,” the official said. He declined to identify the third party.

The official said that Israel was dedicating a brigade to provide security for the American troops and aid workers working on the pier.

The operation is expected to bring in enough aid for around 90 trucks a day, a number that will increase to 150 trucks a day when the system reaches full operating capacity, the official said.

— Helene Cooper reporting from Washington

7. US-led Gaza humanitarian aid pier comes under fire, UN officials say

US-led Gaza humanitarian aid pier comes under fire, UN officials say

militarytimes.com · by Lolita C. Baldor, Julia Frankel and Jon Gambrell, The Associated Press · April 25, 2024

JERUSALEM — An under-construction pier for a U.S.-led project to bring aid into the Gaza Strip came under fire Wednesday, forcing U.N. officials to take shelter there, Israeli and U.N. officials said.

No militant group immediately claimed responsibility for the assault, which the Israelis described as a mortar shell attack.

Authorities said that no one was wounded.

The attack marks a shaky start to the construction of the pier, a project that the U.S. is spearheading to surge humanitarian aid into Gaza. A Hamas official told The Associated Press on Wednesday that the militant group will resist any foreign military presence involved with the port project.

While satellite photos show major port construction along the shore near Gaza City, aid groups are making it clear that they have broad concerns about their safety and reservations about how Israeli forces will handle security.

Sonali Korde, an official with the U.S. Agency for International Development, said key agreements for security and handling the aid deliveries are still being negotiated. Those include how Israeli forces will operate in Gaza to ensure that aid workers are not harmed.

“We need to see steps implemented. And the humanitarian community and IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) continue to talk and engage and iterate and improve the system so that everyone feels safe and secure in this very difficult operating environment,” Korde said.

Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, Pentagon spokesman, said Thursday that U.S. military vessels stationed offshore have begun to construct the temporary pier and causeway at sea. He said the attack at the port “in no way delays” the ongoing mission and said aid deliveries could be up and running by early May.

Navy ship underway for Gaza pier mission suffers fire, returns to US

The cargo ship 2nd Lt. John P. Bobo suffered a fire in its engine room Thursday, forcing it to return to Florida, the Navy said.

Aid groups have been shaken by the deaths of seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in an Israeli airstrike on April 1 as they traveled in clearly marked vehicles on a delivery mission authorized by Israel. The killings have hardened sentiment among some aid groups that the international community should focus instead on pushing Israel to ease obstacles to the delivery of aid on land routes by truck.

The World Central Kitchen staff, who were honored at a memorial service Thursday in Washington, are among more than 200 humanitarian workers killed in Gaza, a toll the U.N. says is three times higher than any previous number for aid workers in a single year of any war.

Development of the port and pier comes as Israel faces widespread international criticism over the slow trickle of aid into the Palestinian territory, where the United Nations says at least a quarter of the population sits on the brink of starvation.

The construction of the new port in the Gaza Strip appears to have been moving quickly over the last two weeks, according to satellite images analyzed Thursday by The Associated Press. The port sits just southwest of Gaza City, a bit north of a road bisecting Gaza that the Israeli military built during the fighting.

The area once was the territory’s most-populous region, before the Israeli ground offensive rolled through, pushing over 1 million people south toward the town of Rafah on the Egyptian border.

A U.N. official said the port will likely have three zones — one controlled by the Israelis where aid from the pier is dropped off, another where the aid will be transferred, and a third where Palestinian drivers contracted by the U.N. will wait to pick up the aid before bringing it to distribution points.

Offshore, U.S. Navy and Army vessels have started the construction of the large pier or floating platform that will sit a couple miles out. And they will also build the wide causeway that will eventually be anchored to the shoreline, where workers will unload and distribute the aid.

But it reflected ongoing threats from Hamas, which has said it would reject the presence of any non-Palestinians in Gaza. High-ranking Hamas political official Khalil al-Hayya said the group would consider Israeli forces — or forces from any other country — stationed by the pier to guard it as “an occupying force and aggression,” and that they would resist it.

First Army vessel leaves US to build temporary pier for Gaza aid

U.S. Central Command said the General Frank S. Besson left Virginia on Saturday with equipment to build a temporary pier for Gazans to receive aid.

The U.N.’s World Food Program has agreed to lead the aid delivery effort.

Carl Skau, WFP’s deputy executive director, said Thursday that it’s “necessary for us to be able to operate, reach communities, have access to needs, and to do so in a safe and secure way.” Speaking at the U.N., he also said the port mission must be just one part of a broader Israeli effort to improve sustainable, land-based deliveries of aid to avert a famine.

But, he noted, “let’s be honest, when you’re operating a humanitarian operation in a combat zone, security is pretty high on the list.”

The U.N. official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss behind-the-scenes deliberations, said several sticking points remain around how the Israelis would handle the port’s security. The military is reportedly seeking to install remote-controlled gun positions, which the U.N. opposes, said the official, although it was not clear what weapons were being described.

In a statement Thursday, the IDF said it “will act to provide security and logistical support for the initiative,” including the construction of the dock and the transfer of aid from the sea to the Gaza Strip.

A top Cyprus government official, who spoke to the AP on the customary condition of anonymity, said the pier “will be ready by (end of) next week and we will begin (aid shipments) again.” The official didn’t specify when exactly shipments will begin.

The port will provide critical extra aid as getting more supplies into Gaza through land crossings has proven challenging, with long backups of trucks awaiting Israeli inspections. Past efforts to get land in by sea faltered after the World Central Kitchen attack.

Countries have even tried airdropping aid from the sky — a tactic that aid groups say is a last-ditch resort because it can’t deliver aid in large quantities and also has led to deaths.

Baldor reported from Washington. Associated Press writers Menelaos Hadjicostis in Nicosia, Cyprus; Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations; Josef Federman in Jerusalem; and Ellen Knickmeyer in Washington contributed to this report.

8. Ukraine pulls US tanks from front lines over Russian drone threats

Ukraine pulls US tanks from front lines over Russian drone threats

militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp · April 26, 2024

Ukraine has sidelined U.S.-provided Abrams M1A1 battle tanks for now in its fight against Russia, in part because Russian drone warfare has made it too difficult for them to operate without detection or coming under attack, two U.S. military officials told The Associated Press.

The U.S. agreed to send 31 Abrams to Ukraine in January 2023 after an aggressive monthslong campaign by Kyiv arguing that the tanks, which cost about $10 million apiece, were vital to its ability to breach Russian lines.

But the battlefield has changed substantially since then, notably by the ubiquitous use of Russian surveillance drones and hunter-killer drones. Those weapons have made it more difficult for Ukraine to protect the tanks when they are quickly detected and hunted by Russian drones or rounds.

Five of the 31 tanks have already been lost to Russian attacks.

US Abrams tanks for training Ukrainian forces arrive in Germany early

Abrams tanks needed for training Ukrainian forces have arrived in Germany slightly ahead of schedule, already on their way to the Grafenwoehr Army base.

The proliferation of drones on the Ukrainian battlefield means “there isn’t open ground that you can just drive across without fear of detection,” a senior defense official told reporters Thursday.

The official spoke on the condition of anonymity to provide an update on U.S. weapons support for Ukraine before Friday’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting.

For now, the tanks have been moved from the front lines, and the U.S. will work with the Ukrainians to reset tactics, said Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Adm. Christopher Grady and a third defense official who confirmed the move on the condition of anonymity.

“When you think about the way the fight has evolved, massed armor in an environment where unmanned aerial systems are ubiquitous can be at risk,” Grady told the AP in an interview this week, adding that tanks are still important.

“Now, there is a way to do it,” he said. “We’ll work with our Ukrainian partners, and other partners on the ground, to help them think through how they might use that, in that kind of changed environment now, where everything is seen immediately.”

News of the sidelined tanks comes as the U.S. marks the two-year anniversary of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a coalition of about 50 countries that meets monthly to assess Ukraine’s battlefield needs and identify where to find needed ammunition, weapons or maintenance to keep Ukraine’s troops equipped.

‘We need to move fast’: Pentagon sends Ukraine $1 billion in new aid

The Pentagon has been out of money to refill stocks sent to Ukraine since the start of this year, threatening a crisis on the front lines.

Recent aid packages, including the $1 billion military assistance package signed by President Joe Biden on Wednesday, also reflect a wider reset for Ukrainian forces in the evolving fight.

This week’s assistance emphasized counter-drone capabilities, including .50-caliber rounds specifically modified to counter drone systems; additional air defenses and ammunition; and a host of alternative, and cheaper, vehicles, including Humvees, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles.

The U.S. also confirmed for the first time that it is providing long-range ballistic missiles known as ATACMs, which allow Ukraine to strike deep into Russian-occupied areas without having to advance and be further exposed to either drone detection or fortified Russian defenses.

While drones are a significant threat, the Ukrainians also have not adopted tactics that could have made the tanks more effective, one of the U.S. defense officials said.

After announcing it would provide Ukraine the Abrams tanks in January 2023, the U.S. began training Ukrainians at Grafenwoehr Army base in Germany that spring on how to maintain and operate them. They also taught the Ukrainians how to use them in combined arms warfare — where the tanks operate as part of a system of advancing armored forces, coordinating movements with overhead offensive fires, infantry troops and air assets.

As the spring progressed and Ukraine’s highly anticipated counteroffensive stalled, shifting from tank training in Germany to getting Abrams on the battlefield was seen as an imperative to breach fortified Russian lines. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on his Telegram channel in September that the Abrams had arrived in Ukraine.

Since then, however, Ukraine has only employed them in a limited fashion and has not made combined arms warfare part of its operations, the defense official said.

During its recent withdrawal from Avdiivka, a city in eastern Ukraine that was the focus of intense fighting for months, several tanks were lost to Russian attacks, the official said.

A long delay by Congress in passing new funding for Ukraine meant its forces had to ration ammunition, and in some cases they were only able to shoot back once for every five or more times they were targeted by Russian forces.

In Avdiivka, Ukrainian forces were badly outgunned and fighting back against Russian glide bombs and hunter-killer drones with whatever ammunition they had left.

About Tara Copp, AP

Tara Copp is a Pentagon correspondent for the Associated Press. She was previously Pentagon bureau chief for Sightline Media Group.

9. A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China

Please go to the link to see the full effects of the interactive website as well as the maps and graphics: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/04/26/us/politics/us-china-military-bases-weapons.html?searchResultPosition=4

The article asks an important question: What deters China?

Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, said in an interview in Taipei that the strengthened alliances and evolving military force postures were critical to deterring China.

“We are very happy to see that many countries in this region are coming to the realization that they also have to be prepared for further expansions of the P.R.C.,” he said, referring to the People’s Republic of China.

To some Chinese military strategists, the U.S. efforts are aimed at keeping China’s naval forces behind the “first island chain” — islands close to mainland Asia that run from Okinawa in Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines.

U.S. military assets along these islands could prevent Chinese warships from getting into the open Pacific waters farther east if conflict were to break out.

Leaders in China’s People’s Liberation Army also talk of establishing military dominance of the “second island chain” — which is farther out in the Pacific and includes Guam, Palau and West Papua.

But several conservative critics of the administration’s policies argue that the United States should be keeping major arms for its own use and that it is not producing new ships and major weapons systems quickly enough to deter China, which is rapidly growing its military.

Some American commanders acknowledge the United States needs to speed up ship production but say the Pentagon’s warfighting abilities in the region still outmatch China’s — and can improve quickly with the right political and budget commitments in Washington.

“We have actually grown our combat capability here in the Pacific over the last years,” said Adm. Samuel J. Paparo Jr., the incoming commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. “But our trajectory is still not a trajectory that matches our adversary. Our adversaries are building more capability and they’re building more warships — per year — than we are.”

Mr. Paparo said new American warships were still more capable than the ones China is building, and the U.S. military’s “total weight of fires” continued to outmatch that of the People’s Liberation Army, for now.

A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China

With missiles, submarines and alliances, the Biden administration has built a presence in the region to rein in Beijing’s expansionist goals.

By John Ismay, Edward Wong and Pablo Robles

April 26, 2024

Since the start of his administration, President Biden has undertaken a strategy to expand American military access to bases in allied nations across the Asia-Pacific region and to deploy a range of new weapons systems there. He has also said the U.S. military would defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion.

On Wednesday, Mr. Biden signed a $95-billion supplemental military aid and spending bill that Congress had just passed and that includes $8.1 billion to counter China in the region. And Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken traveled to Shanghai and Beijing this week for meetings in which he planned to raise China’s aggressive actions around Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Earlier in April, the leaders of the Philippines and Japan met with Mr. Biden at the White House for the first such summit among the three countries. They announced enhanced defense cooperation, including naval training and exercises, planned jointly and with other partners. Last year, the Biden administration forged a new three-way defense pact with Japan and South Korea.

President Biden held a trilateral meeting earlier this month with the leaders of Japan and the Philippines at the White House. Yuri Gripas for The New York Times

“In 2023, we drove the most transformative year for U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region in a generation,” Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, said in a statement following an interview.

The main change, he said, is having American forces distributed in smaller, more mobile units across a wide arc of the region rather than being concentrated at large bases in northeast Asia. That is largely intended to counter China’s efforts to build up forces that can target aircraft carriers or U.S. military outposts on Okinawa or Guam.

These land forces, including a retrained and refitted U.S. Marine littoral regiment in Okinawa, will now have the ability to attack warships at sea.

For the first time, Japan’s military will receive up to 400 of their own Tomahawk missiles — the newest versions of which can attack ships at sea as well as targets on land from over 1,150 miles away.

The Pentagon has also gained access rights for its troops at four additional bases in the Philippines that could eventually host U.S. warplanes and advanced mobile missile launchers, if Washington and Manila agree that offensive weaponry can be placed there.

The United States has bilateral mutual defense agreements with several allied nations in the region so that an attack on the assets of one nation could trigger a response from the other. Bolstering the U.S. troop presence on the soil of allied countries strengthens that notion of mutual defense.

In addition, the United States continues to send weapons and Green Beret trainers to Taiwan, a de facto independent island and the biggest flashpoint between the United States and China. Mr. Xi has said his nation must eventually take control of Taiwan, by force if necessary.

“We’ve deepened our alliances and partnerships abroad in ways that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago,” Kurt Campbell, the new deputy secretary of state, told reporters last year, when he was the top Asia policy official in the White House.

What Deters China?

Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, said in an interview in Taipei that the strengthened alliances and evolving military force postures were critical to deterring China.

“We are very happy to see that many countries in this region are coming to the realization that they also have to be prepared for further expansions of the P.R.C.,” he said, referring to the People’s Republic of China.

To some Chinese military strategists, the U.S. efforts are aimed at keeping China’s naval forces behind the “first island chain” — islands close to mainland Asia that run from Okinawa in Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines.

U.S. military assets along these islands could prevent Chinese warships from getting into the open Pacific waters farther east if conflict were to break out.

Leaders in China’s People’s Liberation Army also talk of establishing military dominance of the “second island chain” — which is farther out in the Pacific and includes Guam, Palau and West Papua.

Seoul

SOUTH

KOREA

Tokyo

JAPAN

CHINA

Taipei

TAIWAN

Hong Kong

First Island Chain

Pacific

Ocean

Second Island Chain

Manila

South

China Sea

GUAM

PHILIPPINES

MALAYSIA

INDONESIA

But several conservative critics of the administration’s policies argue that the United States should be keeping major arms for its own use and that it is not producing new ships and major weapons systems quickly enough to deter China, which is rapidly growing its military.

Some American commanders acknowledge the United States needs to speed up ship production but say the Pentagon’s warfighting abilities in the region still outmatch China’s — and can improve quickly with the right political and budget commitments in Washington.

“We have actually grown our combat capability here in the Pacific over the last years,” said Adm. Samuel J. Paparo Jr., the incoming commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. “But our trajectory is still not a trajectory that matches our adversary. Our adversaries are building more capability and they’re building more warships — per year — than we are.”

Mr. Paparo said new American warships were still more capable than the ones China is building, and the U.S. military’s “total weight of fires” continued to outmatch that of the People’s Liberation Army, for now.

Warplanes on the flight deck of U.S.S. Carl Vinson, an aircraft carrier, during a joint U.S. and Japanese military exercise in the Philippine Sea in January. Richard A. Brooks/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a Cold War-era arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow, prohibited land-based cruise or ballistic missiles with ranges between 311 miles and 3,420 miles. But after the Trump administration withdrew from the pact, the United States was able to develop and field a large number of small, mobile launchers for previously banned missiles around Asia.

Even with the deployment of new systems, the United States would still rely on its legacy assets in the region in the event of war: its bases in Guam, Japan and South Korea, and the troops and arms there.

All of the senior U.S. officials interviewed for this story say war with China is neither desirable nor inevitable — a view expressed publicly by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III. But they also insist that a military buildup and bolstering alliances, along with diplomatic talks with China, are important elements of deterring potential future aggression by Beijing.

Chen Jining, the Communist Party chief in Shanghai, told Mr. Blinken on Thursday that “whether China and the U.S. choose cooperation or confrontation, it affects the well-being of both peoples, of both nations, and also the future of humanity.”

Japan

U.S. military or

partner bases

Tokyo

Okinawa

The new deterrent effort is twofold for American forces: increasing patrolling activities at sea and the capabilities of its troop levels ashore.

To the former, the Pentagon has announced that U.S. Navy warships will participate in more drills with their Japanese counterparts in the western Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan and with Filipino ships in the South China Sea, where the Chinese coast guard has harassed ships and installations controlled by the Philippines.

A swarm of Chinese militia and Coast Guard vessels chased a Philippine Coast Guard ship in the South China Sea last year. Jes Aznar for The New York Times

To the latter, Marine Corps and Army units already in the Pacific have recently fielded medium- and long-range missiles mated to small, mobile trucks that would have been prohibited under the former treaty.

These trucks can be quickly lifted by Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft or larger cargo planes to new locations, or they can simply drive away to evade a Chinese counterattack. A new flotilla of U.S. Army watercraft being sent to the region could also be used to reposition troops and launchers from island to island.

In an interview last year with The New York Times, Gen. David H. Berger, then the Marine Corps’ top general, said the service had begun analyzing strategic choke points between islands where Chinese forces were likely to transit throughout the Pacific. He said the service had identified sites where Marine assault forces like the new Okinawa-based littoral regiment could launch attacks on Beijing’s warships using these new weapons.

Philippines

Luzon

Partner bases

Manila

The Pentagon announced in February last year a new military base-sharing agreement with Manila, giving U.S. forces access to four sites in the Philippines for use in humanitarian missions, adding to the five sites previously opened to the Pentagon in 2014. Most of them are air bases with runways long enough to host heavy cargo planes.

Plotting their locations on a map shows the sites’ strategic value should the United States be called upon to defend their oldest treaty ally in the region, if the Philippines eventually agrees to allow the U.S. military to put combat troops and mobile missile systems there.

One, on the northern tip of Luzon Island, would give missile-launching trucks the ability to attack Chinese ships across the strait separating Philippines from Taiwan, while another site about 700 miles to the southwest would allow the U.S. to strike bases that China has built in the Spratly Islands nearby.

In 2023, the United States committed $100 million for “infrastructure investments” at the nine bases, with more funds expected this year.

Australia

Darwin

Potential

submarine

bases

Canberra

The Pentagon has forged closer military ties with Australia and Papua New Guinea, extending America’s bulwark against potential attempts by the Chinese military at establishing dominance along the “second island chain.”

The Obama administration moved a number of littoral combat ships to Singapore and deployed a rotating force of Marines to Darwin, on Australia’s north coast, giving the Pentagon more assets that could respond as needed in the region.

Last year, the Biden administration greatly elevated its commitment to Australia, which is one of America’s most important non-NATO allies.

The U.S.S. North Carolina, a Virginia-class submarine, docking in Perth, Australia last year. Tony Mcdonough/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

A new multibillion dollar agreement called AUKUS — for Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — will permanently transfer some of the U.S. Navy’s newest Virginia-class attack subs to Canberra. The location of the new bases for those subs has not been announced, but the first group of Australian sailors who will crew them graduated from nuclear power training in America in January.

These stealthy submarines, which can fire torpedoes and Tomahawk missiles, will potentially add to the number of threats Beijing faces in case of a regional war.

Just north of Australia, an agreement in August gave U.S. forces more access to Papua New Guinea for humanitarian missions and committed American tax dollars to update military facilities there.

To Admiral Paparo, this growing network of partnerships and security agreements across thousands of miles of the Pacific is a direct result of what he calls China’s “revanchist, revisionist and expansionist agenda” in the region that has directly threatened its neighbors.

“I do believe that the U.S. and our allies and partners are playing a stronger hand and that we would prevail in any fight that arose in the Western Pacific,” the admiral said in an interview.

“It’s a hand that I would not trade with our would-be adversaries, and yet we’re also never satisfied with the strength of that hand and always looking to improve it.”

Sources: Congressional Research Service; United States Department of Defense

Additional work by Scott Reinhard, Martín González Gómez and Agnes Chang.

10. What does Taiwan get from the foreign aid bill and why is the US economy among the biggest winners?

What does Taiwan get from the foreign aid bill and why is the US economy among the biggest winners?

The sweeping foreign aid package passed by congress has drawn the ire of China, but billions of dollars will actually stay in the US

The Guardian · by Jonathan Yerushalmy · April 26, 2024

Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen has praised the US Congress for passing a sweeping foreign aid package this week which included arms support for the island, and has drawn the ire of China.

After months of delays and contentious debate, the bill was signed into law by Joe Biden on Wednesday. Described as $95bn in aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, the legislation actually contains provisions that broadly affect many parts of the Asia-Pacific, while also spending billions of dollars at home in America.

House Republicans billed the $8.1bn for the Indo-Pacific as an effort to “counter communist China and ensure a strong deterrence in the region,” however the largest provision of funding is for projects in the US itself.

In the face of delayed shipbuilding projects, $3.3bn of the bill will go towards the US domestic submarine-building industry.

US military aid: what’s in the $95bn bill and why has it taken so long for Congress to pass?

$1.9bn is designated for a Columbia-class submarine – America’s newest class of nuclear-powered submarine – the first of which is due to be delivered in 2027. Another $200m is designated for a Virginia-class submarine.

The vast majority of this money will be spent in the United States, with more than 16,000 suppliers across all 50 states set to benefit, according to Connor Fiddler at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

“Nearly half of the Indo-Pacific appropriations directly reinforce the submarine industrial base,” Fiddler wrote in his analysis of the package. “While this investment will enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the immediate impact will be supporting the American economy.”

The submarine funding was a condition of congressional endorsement of the Aukus deal between the US, UK and Australia, and is aimed at ensuring the US can produce Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines for Australia without undermining its own capability requirements.

Another $2bn of funding in the aid package will go towards the foreign military financing program for Taiwan and other security partners in the Indo-Pacific, who the US says are “confronting Chinese aggression.”

According to US officials, the foreign financing program allows eligible partner nations to “purchase US defense articles, services, and training”.

A further $1.9bn will go towards defence related expenses provided to Taiwan and other regional partners, while $542m will specifically strengthen US military capabilities in the region.

On Wednesday, China criticised the package, saying that such funding was pushing Taiwan into a “dangerous situation.”

Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office said the aid “seriously violates” US commitments to China and “sends a wrong signal to the Taiwan independence separatist forces.”

Separately, Taiwan has signed billions in contracts with the US for latest-generation F-16V fighter jets, M1 Abrams main battle tanks and the HIMARS rocket system, which the US has also supplied to Ukraine.

The United States is Taiwan’s most important international backer and arms supplier even in the absence of formal diplomatic ties. China, which views Taiwan as its own territory, has repeatedly demanded arms sales stop.

The Associated Press contributed to this report

The Guardian · by Jonathan Yerushalmy · April 26, 2024

11. U.S. to Withdraw Troops From Chad, Dealing Another Blow to Africa Policy

We appear to be getting beat in strategic competition in Africa. Is that accurate? Do we know why? What can we learn about Russian new generation or non-linear warfare in Africa?

Russian New Generation Warfare and the Future of War:

As a result, it follows that the main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020 are:

i. From direct destruction to direct influence;

ii. from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;

iii. from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;

iv. from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;

v. from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;

vi. from direct clash to contactless war;

vii. from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy’s internal side and base;

viii. from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace;

ix. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;

x. From war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx

•Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country. It is interesting to note the notion of permanent war, since it denotes a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical structure, the clear enemy is Western civilization, its values, culture, political system, and ideology.

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx

U.S. to Withdraw Troops From Chad, Dealing Another Blow to Africa Policy

The departure of U.S. military personnel in Chad and Niger comes as both countries are turning away from years of cooperation with the United States and forming partnerships with Russia.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/25/us/politics/chad-us-troop-withdrawal.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

A U.S. Special Forces trainer leading Chadian soldiers during an exercise in Ndjamena, Chad, in 2017.Credit...Bryan Denton for The New York Times

By Eric Schmitt

Reporting from Washington

April 25, 2024

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Chad and Niger? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The Pentagon will withdraw dozens of Special Operations forces from Chad in the next few days, the second major blow in a week to American security and counterterrorism policy in a volatile swath of West and Central Africa, U.S. officials said on Thursday.

The decision to pull out about 75 Army Special Forces personnel working in Ndjamena, Chad’s capital, comes days after the Biden administration said it would withdraw more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel from Niger in the coming months.

The Pentagon is being forced to draw down troops in response to the African governments’ demands to renegotiate the rules and conditions under which U.S. military personnel can operate. Both countries want terms that better favor their interests, analysts say. The decision to withdraw from Niger is final, but U.S. officials said they hoped to resume talks on security cooperation after elections in Chad on May 6.

The departure of U.S. military advisers in both countries comes as Niger, as well as Mali and Burkina Faso, is turning away from years of cooperation with the United States and forming partnerships with Russia — or at least exploring closer security ties with Moscow.

The Kremlin uses persuasion — and other times, coercion — to achieve its aims. The United States warned Chad’s president last year that Russian mercenaries were plotting to kill him and three senior aides and that Moscow was backing Chadian rebels massing in the Central African Republic, to the south. At the same time, the Kremlin was courting sympathizers within Chad’s ruling elite, including cabinet ministers and a half brother of the president.

More on U.S. Armed Forces

Abuse at Abu Ghraib: Three men who were detained at the notorious prison in Iraq are suing a defense contractor, saying its interrogators told U.S. soldiers to “soften up” prisoners.
Troops in Niger: More than 1,000 American military personnel will leave Niger in the coming months, Biden administration officials said, upending U.S. counterterrorism and security policy in the tumultuous Sahel region of Africa.
A Belated Funeral: Pvt. Albert King, a Black soldier killed by a white military police officer in 1941, was blamed for his own death and buried in an unmarked grave. Eight decades later, the Army gave him a full military funeral.
At Long Last: Three members of America’s World War II “Ghost Army,” the precursor to the Army’s current psychological warfare units, were awarded the Congressional Gold Medal on Capitol Hill.

The impending departure of the U.S. military advisers from Chad, a sprawling desert nation at the crossroads of the continent, was prompted by a letter from the Chadian government this month that the United States saw as threatening to end an important security agreement with Washington.

The letter was sent to the American defense attaché and did not directly order the U.S. military to leave Chad, but it did single out a Special Operations task force that operates from a Chadian military base in the capital and serves as an important hub for coordinating U.S. military training and advising missions in the region.

About 75 Green Berets from the 20th Special Forces Group, a National Guard unit from Alabama, serve in the task force. A handful of other U.S. military personnel work in the embassy or in different advisory jobs and are not affected by the decision to withdraw, officials said.

The letter blindsided and puzzled American diplomats and military officers. It was sent from Chad’s chief of air staff, Idriss Amine; typed in French, one of Chad’s official languages; and written on General Amine’s official letterhead, two American officials said. It was not sent through official diplomatic channels, they said, which would be the typical method of handling such issues.

Current and former U.S. officials said the letter, which was reported earlier by CNN, could be a negotiating tactic by some members of the military and the government to pressure Washington into a more favorable deal before the elections in May.

American officials said that unlike the U.S. troop departure from Niger, the withdrawal from Chad could be only temporary while diplomats determined whether a new so-called status of forces agreement could be reached, and if so, whether U.S. military advisers would return to Chad. Barring last-minute diplomatic developments, the U.S. troops are scheduled to begin leaving this weekend and complete their departure to Germany by May 1, two American officials said.

“As talks continue with Chadian officials, U.S. Africa Command is currently planning to reposition some U.S. military forces from Chad, a portion of which was already scheduled to depart,” Maj. Pete Nguyen, a Pentagon spokesman, said on Thursday.

“This temporary step is part of an ongoing review of our security cooperation, which will resume after the May 6 presidential election,” Major Nguyen said.

While France, a former colonial power in the region, has a much larger military presence in Chad, the United States has also relied on the country as a trusted security partner.

Chad’s presidential guard is one of the best trained and equipped in the semiarid belt of Africa known as the Sahel. The country has played host to military exercises conducted by the United States. Officials at the Pentagon’s Africa Command say Chad has been a major partner in an effort involving several countries in the Lake Chad basin to fight Boko Haram.

“U.S. Africa Command remains dedicated to building enduring partnerships with Chad and other African nations in the Sahel to address mutual security concerns and to help promote a peaceful and prosperous future in the region,” Gen. Michael E. Langley, the head of the command, said during a visit to Chad in January, according to a statement from the command.

During the trip, the statement said, General Langley met with Gen. Abakar Abdelkerim Daoud, Chad’s military chief of staff, and other leaders. Discussions focused on regional security challenges and Chadian efforts to counter violent extremism in the Sahel.

Mahamat Adamou contributed reporting from Ndjamena, Chad.

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

A version of this article appears in print on April 26, 2024, Section A, Page 10 of the New York edition with the headline: U.S. to Pull Troops From Chad, in a Blow to Its Africa Policy. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

12. College Football Playoff Announces Decision On Army vs. Navy Game

A national security issue.

College Football Playoff Announces Decision On Army vs. Navy Game

https://thespun.com/more/top-stories/college-football-playoff-announces-decision-on-army-vs-navy-game

TZVI MACHLINAPR 24, 2024

EAST RUTHERFORD, NJ - DECEMBER 11: Army Cadets on the field after the march on prior to the 122nd Army/Navy college football game between the Army Black Knights and the Navy Midshipmen on December 11, 2021 at MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, NJ. (Photo by Rich Graessle/Icon Sportswire via Getty Images)

Getty Images.

While it may not have the vitriol of The Game or The Iron Bowl, the Army-Navy Game is as big a part of college football culture as any traditional rivalry. But with the game so often falling outside of the College Football Playoff selection process, how will the Selection Committee account for that game under the new format?

The short answer appears to be that they won't. According to Chris Vannini of The Athletic, College Football Playoff executive director Bill Hancock has said that the Army-Navy Game will not be a part of the selection process.

Hancock asserted that the final rankings will be on Selection Day - the day after Conference Championship Weekend - while the Army-Navy Game will continue to be played on the Saturday after. He added that the two programs did not want to move their historic rivalry game to before Selection Day.

"Army-Navy Game will not be part of the selection committee process, Bill Hancock says. Final rankings are on selection day. The game is six days later. Army and Navy both did not want to move the game to before selection Sunday," Vannini wrote.

However, as many have pointed out, that could lead to an interesting scenario involving the two historic football programs.

In theory, either one of those schools could go 11-0, win the AAC Championship Game, get selected as the Group of Five at-large team, and then lose to the other in the Army-Navy game the following week.

It wouldn't be the most realistic scenario, but it could happen. And the College Football Playoff is basically admitting that they're okay with that possibility.

13. How Does SOF Incorporate Technology, Evolve, and Simultaneously Compete with 5 Threats Across 5 Domains?

Anytime I hear academics talk about legacy doctrine I cringe. There is so much legacy doctrine that remains relevant, timely, and timeless. But I agree with the comment about policy by CONOP. Note that that is not legacy SOF doctrine. That is a corruption of sound SOF doctrine that evolved during the GWOT.

Excerpt:

The conference's central point is the critical need for SOF to evolve beyond traditional counterterrorism roles and adapt to the broader strategic challenges posed by great power rivals and technological advancements. SOF will remain the tool of choice for CT, but it must evolve beyond legacy doctrine to more effectively and economically contain this threat. This requires a fundamental transformation in how SOF is integrated into national and global security strategies, ensuring it remains a pivotal element in addressing contemporary and emerging threats.

...

Similarly, relying solely on policy by CONOP is no longer viable in an age of competition. Ambiguous or absent policies in complex situations, such as Ukraine, Taiwan, or Israel, leave our best asymmetric assets with no way to offer solutions or take actions that could deter, degrade, or contain threats. If the Special Operations Forces (SOF) are only left to keep proposing CONOPs to higher headquarters, it will be impossible to execute an effective campaign, as called for in the National Defense Strategy. On the other hand, a policy analyst offered an optimistic view on U.S.-China relations, emphasizing the need for strategic non-confrontational competition and the benefits of high-level diplomacy and international partnerships.

...

CONCLUSION

SOFCON 2024 outlined the need for SOF to evolve rapidly in response to the complex challenges of great power competition that demands confronting five separate threats operating across five separate domains. This evolution involves technological adaptation, a significant organizational culture, and a transformation of strategic operations. SOF must address existing bureaucratic and legacy challenges to fully leverage its unique capabilities. SOF must ensure it remains a critical asset in U.S. national security strategy to both contain terrorism while significantly contributing to strategic competition with global powers. Utilizing the resources of our finest academic institutions is a means of rapidly improving the understanding of the complex geo-political environment and concentrating on technical and theoretical solutions SOF may not be able to develop on its own. Competing successfully in great power competition while containing non-state actors is a massive undertaking, especially when the enemy prefers asymmetric approaches, and you are the asymmetric solution.

How Does SOF Incorporate Technology, Evolve, and Simultaneously Compete with 5 Threats Across 5 Domains?

Dispatch From Yale SOFCON 2024

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/how-does-sof-incorporate-technology-evolve-and-simultaneous-compete-with-5-threats-across-5-domain?utm

INTRODUCTION

The Special Operations Forces Conference (SOFCON) is an annual event organized by the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University. The conference brings together academic and government civilians, military representatives, and industry professionals to explore and address the evolving challenges and opportunities facing the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. The conference aims to promote dialogue on the strategic role of SOF in countering major power rivals like China and Russia and delves into the optimal functions of SOF within national security strategies.

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Three panels, each consisting of three members, responded to a series of questions. Their comments varied as each panelist came from different backgrounds, but some themes developed. The best technology-focused comments came from a senior operator who emphasized the integration of AI and technology to enhance decision-making and operational efficiency in Special Operations Forces (SOF). He advocated for a computing-human interface that accelerates the pace of joint warfighting functions. Another panelist, who came from outside the Department of Defense (DoD), challenged the SOF community to succinctly articulate their value in the Great Power Competition (Elevator pitch). They highlighted the importance of inter-agency collaboration and transparency for effective global engagement.

There was a common agreement that there is an absence of a clear 'sales pitch' for SOF in modern conflict and competition. This highlighted the need for clearer roles and risk management strategies to integrate SOF effectively with conventional forces. While SOF struggles with an identity in the Great Power Competition, the DoD struggles with it from a strategic and budgetary standpoint. A budget analyst discussed the focus of budget negotiations on conflict preparedness at the expense of broader competition strategies. This meant that more conflict-oriented budgets within the Department of Defense would come at the expense of competition.

The idea of Great Power Competition was a significant point of focus. There was a repeated call for a comprehensive solution involving all government agencies, but no clear solution was proposed on how to achieve it. More importantly, there was an emphasis on developing an advanced risk management system for the interagency, allies, and partners. While details were lacking, recognizing changes in red lines in Great Power Competition is essential to overcome outdated mindsets that hinder action and impede the development of more effective ways to address challenges.

Similarly, relying solely on policy by CONOP is no longer viable in an age of competition. Ambiguous or absent policies in complex situations, such as Ukraine, Taiwan, or Israel, leave our best asymmetric assets with no way to offer solutions or take actions that could deter, degrade, or contain threats. If the Special Operations Forces (SOF) are only left to keep proposing CONOPs to higher headquarters, it will be impossible to execute an effective campaign, as called for in the National Defense Strategy. On the other hand, a policy analyst offered an optimistic view on U.S.-China relations, emphasizing the need for strategic non-confrontational competition and the benefits of high-level diplomacy and international partnerships.

SOFCON highlighted the need for the SOF enterprise to keep pace with technological advancements, particularly in AI and drone technologies, to maintain operational superiority. Additionally, new authorities for Great Power Competition are needed within the SOF domain, as are strategies for minimizing the digital footprint of SOF operatives. The conference effectively brought together experts who provided valuable insights into overcoming technological, political, and bureaucratic hurdles. Notably, Yale students offered fresh perspectives on the strategic employment of SOF and the challenges posed by the global increase in "denied terrain."

However, the conference also revealed a few missed opportunities. The absence of the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) underscored a potential loss in forging stronger academic-military partnerships. Additionally, themes such as the importance of integrating new technologies, enhancing inter-agency cooperation, and refining operational strategies to confront global adversaries effectively are frequently discussed across the SOF enterprise, with limited success in advancing these issues.

Seemingly beyond SOF’s direct influence, the challenge posed by declining trust in national institutions and the importance of maintaining a unified national identity to address global security and economic challenges effectively were discussed. While it is a domestic issue, it is also an enduring national security interest. SOF can be part of the solution in protecting the values that underpin our democracy and the systems that maintain our democratic system through IO, civil affairs, abiding by ROE based on the rule of law, influence, and capability development of democratic partners.

The conference's central point is the critical need for SOF to evolve beyond traditional counterterrorism roles and adapt to the broader strategic challenges posed by great power rivals and technological advancements. SOF will remain the tool of choice for CT, but it must evolve beyond legacy doctrine to more effectively and economically contain this threat. This requires a fundamental transformation in how SOF is integrated into national and global security strategies, ensuring it remains a pivotal element in addressing contemporary and emerging threats.

Key Issues Discussed

Technological Advancements and Integration: The discussions emphasized the importance of harnessing technological advancements such as AI and drones to maintain SOF's operational edge. The capability to integrate these technologies into daily operations and strategic decision-making processes is crucial.
Process and Bureaucratic Challenges: Several speakers highlighted the bureaucratic inertia that hinders rapid adaptation and integration of new technologies. This includes slow procurement processes and the rigidity of budget allocations focused predominantly on large platforms and conventional warfare capabilities.
Adaptation to Great Power Competition (GPC): SOF's need to articulate its role and value in the GPC context was clearly stressed. SOF must move beyond a counterterrorism-centric approach and develop capabilities that address broader strategic challenges posed by major powers like China and Russia while innovating to contain terrorism in ways not yet conceived.
Addressing Legacy Problems: The recurrent theme was overcoming outdated conceptions and practices that limit SOF’s flexibility and responsiveness. This includes transforming the bureaucratic structures that impede inter-agency collaboration and strategic planning.

Recommendations for SOF Adjustments in GPC

Embracing New Technologies: SOF should aggressively pursue the adoption and integration of emerging technologies, especially AI and drone technologies, into their operational frameworks. This will enhance decision-making speed and operational effectiveness.
Strategic and Organizational Innovation: SOF must reform internal processes to allow quicker adaptation to changing global security dynamics. This includes establishing structured frameworks for innovation and leveraging unique authorities for strategic planning and resource allocation.
Enhanced Inter-agency Collaboration: SOF should strengthen ties with other government agencies and international partners to compete with major powers effectively. This enhances the collective ability to address complex global threats and ensures a unified approach in strategic regions.
Focusing on Strategic Deterrence and Influence: Beyond kinetic operations, SOF should prioritize roles in influence and deterrence operations, engaging in activities that shape adversary behavior and strategic calculations in favor of U.S. interests.

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Yale SOFCON 2024 effectively showcased the complex landscape in which Special Operations Forces operate, emphasizing the need for strategic innovation and technological integration. Key takeaways include the necessity for new authorities, the impact of technologies, and the importance of evolving SOF capabilities to address broader geopolitical challenges.

Enhancing partnerships between academic institutions and SOF entities to improve future conferences could foster innovation and address the bureaucratic challenges that currently hinder SOF effectiveness. Such collaboration would not only leverage academic insights but also facilitate the development of cutting-edge solutions to complex problems facing the SOF community. Additionally, to foster a more integrated approach to problem-solving, greater participation from all sectors of the SOF community, including academic institutions like JSOU, is recommended. Lastly, focusing on actionable outcomes and implementing achievable SOF strategies are the best basis for providing clear directives for future SOF operations that support national security policies.

CONCLUSION

SOFCON 2024 outlined the need for SOF to evolve rapidly in response to the complex challenges of great power competition that demands confronting five separate threats operating across five separate domains. This evolution involves technological adaptation, a significant organizational culture, and a transformation of strategic operations. SOF must address existing bureaucratic and legacy challenges to fully leverage its unique capabilities. SOF must ensure it remains a critical asset in U.S. national security strategy to both contain terrorism while significantly contributing to strategic competition with global powers. Utilizing the resources of our finest academic institutions is a means of rapidly improving the understanding of the complex geo-political environment and concentrating on technical and theoretical solutions SOF may not be able to develop on its own. Competing successfully in great power competition while containing non-state actors is a massive undertaking, especially when the enemy prefers asymmetric approaches, and you are the asymmetric solution.

14. More arrests and a canceled commencement as college antiwar rallies spread

Anti-war rallies. Do these students think they are emulating the antiwar protests of the 1960s? If so, how can they justify their anti-semitism? They have so undermined their legitimacy by their anti-semitc activities and statements.

Read the enitre article at the link below. The entire article could not be pasted in this message.

More arrests and a canceled commencement as college antiwar rallies spread

By Dan Rosenzweig-Ziff, Jennifer Hassan, Richard Morgan and Karin Brulliard

Updated April 26, 2024 at 1:21 a.m. EDT|Published April 25, 2024 at 8:19 a.m. EDT

https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2024/04/25/university-protests-gaza-arrests-emerson-usc/

15. Network Behind Eruption of Anti-Israel College Campus Protests Revealed in New Report

Subversion? Active Measures? Political warfare? Dau Tranh?

Is this a deliberate campaign to sow division in the US by our adversaries?

Where is the counter propaganda campaign against these networks?

Why aren't the universities using this type of information such as this to counter these campus actions and organizations?

Recognize the strategy. understand it. EXPOSE it. And attack the strategy with a superior political warfare campaign.

Excerpts:

NGO Monitor noted that all of the groups in question supported and justified the Hamas atrocities of Oct. 7 and that many are linked to designated Palestinian terror organizations.

...

“A common feature of all these NGOs is non-transparent funding and structure,” added the report, which was released amid an explosion of anti-Israel demonstrations on college campuses amid surging antisemitism since Oct. 7.

...

He added, “A central focus must be the secret funding that enables these NGOs and the question as to whether foreign states and terrorist entities are involved in bringing incitement to Ivy League schools and beyond.”

Beyond focusing on Israel and Gaza, the campus demonstrations have been theaters for the airing of antisemitic demagoguery not heard with such apparent mainstream acceptance in the Western world since the rise of the Nazis in Weimar Germany, a series of events which saw students emerge to express solidarity with Adolf Hitler’s vision of a world without Jews. The current students — drawn from organizations such as Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), Within Our Lifetime (WOL), and others — have been filmed calling for not only the killing of Israelis and Jews but also the dissolution of the US government and acts of terror on American soil.

...

“Saturation of anti-Israel, pro-BDS sentiment on college campuses is a long term danger to US support for Israel by its simple normalization of demonizing the Jewish state,” NAS said at the time. “Beyond the problem of antsemitism, the importance of academia to the BDS movement’s growth and viability demonstrates the steady erosion of its political neutrality that has taken place over the past two decades.”

Network Behind Eruption of Anti-Israel College Campus Protests Revealed in New Report - Algemeiner.com

algemeiner.com · by The Algemeiner · April 25, 2024

The “Gaza Solidarity Encampment” at Columbia University, located in the Manhattan borough of New York City. Photo: Reuters Connect

Anti-Zionist protests striking US colleges and universities across the country have been the result of “tightly coordinated” efforts backed by the financial power and logistical support of groups linked to terrorist organizations and some of America’s most prestigious philanthropic foundations, according to a new report.

In the wake of the Hamas terror group’s Oct. 7 invasion of southern Israel, the “exponential rise in antisemitic violence, incitement, intimidation, and harassment on and around campuses in the United States is not the product of spontaneous protests of individuals. Rather, they are tightly coordinated and well-funded by a network of radical and often antisemitic nongovernmental organizations,” stated the report by NGO Monitor, a Jerusalem-based research institute. “Under the guise of human rights and justice, these NGOs work to undermine the economic, military, and other ties between the US and Israel, and to besiege and divide the US Jewish community.”

NGO Monitor noted that all of the groups in question supported and justified the Hamas atrocities of Oct. 7 and that many are linked to designated Palestinian terror organizations.

“A common feature of all these NGOs is non-transparent funding and structure,” added the report, which was released amid an explosion of anti-Israel demonstrations on college campuses amid surging antisemitism since Oct. 7.

Since last week, college students have been amassing in the hundreds at a growing number of schools, taking over sections of campuses by setting up “encampments” and refusing to leave unless administrators condemn Israel and adopt the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement, which seeks to isolate the Jewish state from the international community as a step toward its eventual elimination. Endorsing the BDS movement would entail universities shuttering academic programs linked to Israel, banning Israeli academics from campus, and divesting endowments of any holdings connected to Israel.

Footage of the protests has shown demonstrators chanting in support of Hamas, calling for the destruction of Israel, and even threatening to harm members of the Jewish community on campus.

“The extremely troubling attacks at some of the most esteemed academic institutions, with protesters openly intimidating Jews on campus and endorsing murder and rape, are deeply concerning,” NGO Monitor president Gerald Steinberg said in a statement accompanying the new report. “Given the gravity of the situation, US authorities must initiate a public and transparent investigation into the groups responsible for antisemitism on university campuses.”

He added, “A central focus must be the secret funding that enables these NGOs and the question as to whether foreign states and terrorist entities are involved in bringing incitement to Ivy League schools and beyond.”

Beyond focusing on Israel and Gaza, the campus demonstrations have been theaters for the airing of antisemitic demagoguery not heard with such apparent mainstream acceptance in the Western world since the rise of the Nazis in Weimar Germany, a series of events which saw students emerge to express solidarity with Adolf Hitler’s vision of a world without Jews. The current students — drawn from organizations such as Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), Within Our Lifetime (WOL), and others — have been filmed calling for not only the killing of Israelis and Jews but also the dissolution of the US government and acts of terror on American soil.

These organizations have maintained both influential and radical friends, NGO Monitor explained in its new report released on Thursday, noting that JVP — a fringe anti-Israel group that has often joined forces to coordinate events with SJP — has received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Other donors to JVP include the Open Society Policy Center and the Kaphan Foundation, among others.

As for SJP, one of its founders, Hatem Bazian, is also a co-founder of American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), an advocacy group that, according to a landmark report last year by the National Association of Scholars (NAS), “retains ties to terrorist groups operating in the Palestinian Territories.” AMP is a growing power player in the US Democratic Party and has led several legislative initiatives aimed at eroding Democratic support for Israel.

NGO Monitor also named in its report Within Our Lifetime, a New York City-based group headed by a former City University of New York (CUNY) student who once threatened to set a Jewish student’s Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sweater on fire while he wore it. Since Oct. 7, WOL has openly cheered Hamas’ atrocities as the “right to resist zionist [sic] settle violence” and “Resistance in all its forms. By any means necessary” — an apparent endorsement of Hamas’ abductions and sexual violence against Israeli women. The group’s funding is a source of mystery; the public cannot freely donate to it because a link to its donation platform, “Donorbox,” is broken, but it is widely believed that the Westchester Peace Action Committee (WESPAC), a nonprofit based in New York, is WOL’s principal funder.

Another group named in the new report, US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR), supports a network of allied groups, including AMP, JVP, and WESPAC. USCPR has received immense financial support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, which has awarded it at least $355,000 since 2018.

Many of the same groups backing the ongoing protests have also been integral in the growth of the BDS movement. Indeed, a growing alignment of large philanthropic organizations with BDS has been fueling the movement’s growth on American college campuses, as was revealed in the NAS report from last year.

According to NAS’s findings, JVP as of last year had received $480,000 from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, whose endowment was valued at $1.27 billion, since 2017, and the Tides Research Fund, a sponsor of Black Lives Matter, has given the group at least $75,000 since 2019. Between 2014 and 2015 alone, JVP brought in over half a million dollars in grants. Additionally, Palestine Legal, a lawfare group founded in 2012 to support campus BDS groups like SJP, is the beneficiary of generous funding from Tides Foundation, a pioneer of activist investment that has given over $1.5 million to anti-Israel initiatives, according to figures included in the report.

“Saturation of anti-Israel, pro-BDS sentiment on college campuses is a long term danger to US support for Israel by its simple normalization of demonizing the Jewish state,” NAS said at the time. “Beyond the problem of antsemitism, the importance of academia to the BDS movement’s growth and viability demonstrates the steady erosion of its political neutrality that has taken place over the past two decades.”

Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.

algemeiner.com · by The Algemeiner · April 25, 2024

16. The Campus-Left Occupation That Broke Higher Education

Excerpts:

The muscle of independent thinking and open debate, the ability to earn authority that Daniel Bell described as essential to a university’s survival, has long since atrophied. So when, after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Jewish students found themselves subjected to the kind of hostile atmosphere that, if directed at any other minority group, would have brought down high-level rebukes, online cancellations, and maybe administrative punishments, they fell back on the obvious defense available under the new orthodoxy. They said that they felt “unsafe.” They accused pro-Palestinian students of anti-Semitism—sometimes fairly, sometimes not. They asked for protections that other groups already enjoyed. Who could blame them? They were doing what their leaders and teachers had instructed them was the right, the only, way to respond to a hurt.

...

Elite universities are caught in a trap of their own making, one that has been a long time coming. They’ve trained pro-Palestinian students to believe that, on the oppressor-oppressed axis, Jews are white and therefore dominant, not “marginalized,” while Israel is a settler-colonialist state and therefore illegitimate. They’ve trained pro-Israel students to believe that unwelcome and even offensive speech makes them so unsafe that they should stay away from campus. What the universities haven’t done is train their students to talk with one another.

The Campus-Left Occupation That Broke Higher Education

Elite colleges are now reaping the consequences of promoting a pedagogy that trashed the postwar ideal of the liberal university.

By George Packer

The Atlantic · by George Packer · April 25, 2024

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Fifty-six years ago this week, at the height of the Vietnam War, Columbia University students occupied half a dozen campus buildings and made two principal demands of the university: stop funding military research, and cancel plans to build a gym in a nearby Black neighborhood. After a week of futile negotiations, Columbia called in New York City police to clear the occupation.

The physical details of that crisis were much rougher than anything happening today. The students barricaded doors and ransacked President Grayson Kirk’s office. “Up against the wall, motherfucker, this is a stick-up,” Mark Rudd, the student leader and future member of the terrorist organization Weather Underground, wrote in an open letter to Kirk, who resigned a few months later. The cops arrested more than 700 students and injured at least 100, while one of their own was permanently disabled by a student.

In other ways, the current crisis brings a strong sense of déjà vu: the chants, the teach-ins, the nonnegotiable demands, the self-conscious building of separate communities, the revolutionary costumes, the embrace of oppressed identities by elite students, the tactic of escalating to incite a reaction that mobilizes a critical mass of students. It’s as if campus-protest politics has been stuck in an era of prolonged stagnation since the late 1960s. Why can’t students imagine doing it some other way?

Perhaps because the structure of protest reflects the nature of universities. They make good targets because of their abiding vulnerability: They can’t deal with coercion, including nonviolent disobedience. Either they overreact, giving the protesters a new cause and more allies (this happened in 1968, and again last week at Columbia), or they yield, giving the protesters a victory and inviting the next round of disruption. This is why Columbia’s president, Minouche Shafik, no matter what she does, finds herself hammered from the right by Republican politicians and from the left by her own faculty and students, unable to move without losing more ground. Her detractors know that they have her trapped by their willingness to make coercive demands: Do what we say or else we’ll destroy you and your university. They aren’t interested in a debate.

Michael Powell: The unreality of Columbia’s ‘liberated zone’

A university isn’t a state—it can’t simply impose its rules with force. It’s a special kind of community whose legitimacy depends on mutual recognition in a spirit of reason, openness, and tolerance. At the heart of this spirit is free speech, which means more than just chanting, but free speech can’t thrive in an atmosphere of constant harassment. When one faction or another violates this spirit, the whole university is weakened as if stricken with an illness. The sociologist Daniel Bell, who tried and failed to mediate a peaceful end to the Columbia occupation, wrote afterward:

In a community one cannot regain authority simply by asserting it, or by using force to suppress dissidents. Authority in this case is like respect. One can only earn the authority—the loyalty of one’s students—by going in and arguing with them, by engaging in full debate and, when the merits of proposed change are recognized, taking the necessary steps quickly enough to be convincing.

The crackdown at Columbia in 1968 was so harsh that a backlash on the part of faculty and the public obliged the university to accept the students’ demands: a loss, then a win. The war in Vietnam ground on for years before it ended and history vindicated the protesters: another loss, another win. But the really important consequence of the 1968 revolt took decades to emerge. We’re seeing it now on Columbia’s quad and the campuses of elite universities around the country. The most lasting victory of the ’68ers was an intellectual one. The idea underlying their protests wasn’t just to stop the war or end injustice in America. Its aim was the university itself—the liberal university of the postwar years, which no longer exists.

That university claimed a special role in democratic society. A few weeks after the 1968 takeover, the Columbia historian Richard Hofstadter gave the commencement address to a wounded institution. “A university is a community, but it is a community of a special kind,” Hofstadter said—“a community devoted to inquiry. It exists so that its members may inquire into truths of all sorts. Its presence marks our commitment to the idea that somewhere in society there must be an organization in which anything can be studied or questioned—not merely safe and established things but difficult and inflammatory things, the most troublesome questions of politics and war, of sex and morals, of property and national loyalty.” This mission rendered the community fragile, dependent on the self-restraint of its members.

The lofty claims of the liberal university exposed it to charges of all kinds of hypocrisy, not least its entanglement with the American war machine. The Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse, who became a guru to the New Left, coined the phrase repressive tolerance for the veil that hid liberal society’s mechanisms of violence and injustice. In this scheme, no institution, including the university, remained neutral, and radical students embraced their status as an oppressed group.

Charles Sykes: The new rules of political journalism

At Stanford (where my father was an administrator in the late ’60s, and where students took over a campus building the week after the Columbia revolt), white students compared themselves to Black American slaves. To them, the university was not a community dedicated to independent inquiry but a nexus of competing interest groups where power, not ideas, ruled. They rejected the very possibility of a disinterested pursuit of truth. In an imaginary dialogue between a student and a professor, a member of the Stanford chapter of Students for a Democratic Society wrote: “Rights and privacy and these kinds of freedom are irrelevant—you old guys got to get it through your heads that to fight the whole corrupt System POWER is the only answer.”

A long, intricate, but essentially unbroken line connects that rejection of the liberal university in 1968 to the orthodoxy on elite campuses today. The students of the ’68 revolt became professors—the German activist Rudi Dutschke called this strategy the “long march through the institutions”—bringing their revisionist thinking back to the universities they’d tried to upend. One leader of the Columbia takeover returned to chair the School of the Arts film program. “The ideas of one generation become the instincts of the next,” D. H. Lawrence wrote. Ideas born in the ’60s, subsequently refined and complicated by critical theory, postcolonial studies, and identity politics, are now so pervasive and unquestioned that they’ve become the instincts of students who are occupying their campuses today. Group identity assigns your place in a hierarchy of oppression. Between oppressor and oppressed, no room exists for complexity or ambiguity. Universal values such as free speech and individual equality only privilege the powerful. Words are violence. There’s nothing to debate.

The post-liberal university is defined by a combination of moneymaking and activism. Perhaps the biggest difference between 1968 and 2024 is that the ideas of a radical vanguard are now the instincts of entire universities—administrators, faculty, students. They’re enshrined in reading lists and codes of conduct and ubiquitous clichés. Last week an editorial in the Daily Spectator, the Columbia student newspaper, highlighted the irony of a university frantically trying to extricate itself from the implications of its own dogmas: “Why is the same university that capitalizes on the legacy of Edward Said and enshrines The Wretched of the Earth into its Core Curriculum so scared to speak about decolonization in practice?”

A Columbia student, writing to one of his professors in a letter that the student shared with me, explained the dynamic so sharply that it’s worth quoting him at length:

I think [the protests] do speak to a certain failing on Columbia’s part, but it’s a failing that’s much more widespread and further upstream. That is, I think universities have essentially stopped minding the store, stopped engaging in any kind of debate or even conversation with the ideologies which have slowly crept in to every bit of university life, without enough people of good conscience brave enough to question all the orthodoxies. So if you come to Columbia believing in “decolonization” or what have you, it’s genuinely not clear to me that you will ever have to reflect on this belief. And after all this, one day the university wakes up to these protests, panics under scrutiny, and calls the cops on students who are practicing exactly what they’ve been taught to do from the second they walked through those gates as freshmen.

The muscle of independent thinking and open debate, the ability to earn authority that Daniel Bell described as essential to a university’s survival, has long since atrophied. So when, after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Jewish students found themselves subjected to the kind of hostile atmosphere that, if directed at any other minority group, would have brought down high-level rebukes, online cancellations, and maybe administrative punishments, they fell back on the obvious defense available under the new orthodoxy. They said that they felt “unsafe.” They accused pro-Palestinian students of anti-Semitism—sometimes fairly, sometimes not. They asked for protections that other groups already enjoyed. Who could blame them? They were doing what their leaders and teachers had instructed them was the right, the only, way to respond to a hurt.

Adam Serwer: The Republicans who want American carnage

And when the shrewd and unscrupulous Representative Elise Stefanik demanded of the presidents of Harvard and Penn whether calls for genocide violated their universities’ code of conduct, they had no good way to answer. If they said yes, they would have faced the obvious comeback: “Why has no one been punished?” So they said that it depended on the “context,” which was technically correct but sounded so hopelessly legalistic that it led to the loss of their jobs. The response also made nonsense of their careers as censors of unpopular speech. Shafik, of Columbia, having watched her colleagues’ debacle, told the congresswoman what she wanted to hear, then backed it up by calling the cops onto campus—only to find herself denounced on all sides, including by Senator Tom Cotton, who demanded that President Joe Biden deploy the United States military to Columbia, and by her own faculty senate, which threatened a vote of censure.

The right always knows how to exploit the excesses of the left. It happened in 1968, when the campus takeovers and the street battles between anti-war activists and cops at the Democratic convention in Chicago helped elect Richard Nixon. Republican politicians are already exploiting the chaos on campuses. This summer, the Democrats will gather again in Chicago, and the activists are promising a big show. Donald Trump will be watching.

Elite universities are caught in a trap of their own making, one that has been a long time coming. They’ve trained pro-Palestinian students to believe that, on the oppressor-oppressed axis, Jews are white and therefore dominant, not “marginalized,” while Israel is a settler-colonialist state and therefore illegitimate. They’ve trained pro-Israel students to believe that unwelcome and even offensive speech makes them so unsafe that they should stay away from campus. What the universities haven’t done is train their students to talk with one another.

The Atlantic · by George Packer · April 25, 2024

17. Ukrainians Increasingly Taking War Behind Russian Lines—and Moscow Is Worried

As it should be.

Key point here. You need an entire campaign to win, not just one line of effort.

Excerpt:

Ukrainian partisans, despite all the success against Russian forces, will not win the war for Kyiv on their own (Al Jazeera, September 6, 2022). Their actions inside Ukraine, however, suggest that they are playing a far more important role there and inside Russia. (For a useful discussion of these possibilities and how they are shaping Moscow’s thinking, see Irregular Warfare Center, September 21, 2023.) At the very least, the successes of Ukraine’s partisans and Moscow’s decision to counter by setting up its own partisan detachments deserve far more attention and the Ukrainian effort far more support from those who want to see Putin’s aggression stopped.

Ukrainians Increasingly Taking War Behind Russian Lines—and Moscow Is Worried

jamestown.org · by Paul Goble · April 25, 2024

Executive Summary:

Neither Russia nor Ukraine will win or lose the war solely based on what happens at the front, rather, both Moscow and Kyiv seek to bring the war home to the other to gain an advantage.
Each has attacked the other with bombs and drones, but Ukraine is also taking the war behind the Russian lines by organizing partisan groups in the occupied territories and within Russia.
Ukrainian partisan groups are disrupting Russian operations, and their actions raise the specter that Moscow will have to contend with an angry and armed population that will resist the Kremlin long into the future.

Since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine, it has been commonplace to predict the outcome depending on shifts in the frontlines. Many predict a Russian victory when Russian forces advance and a Ukrainian triumph when Ukrainian units press forward. Neither Russia nor Ukraine, however, will win or lose the war based solely on what happens at the front. Instead, both have sought to come out on top by bringing the war home to the other through attacks on population centers far beyond the lines. Frequent Russian bombing raids on Ukrainian cities and increased Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia’s border regions and large city centers, including St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kazan, have attracted more attention in recent months (see EDM, December 21, 2023, April 11, 18, 24). Far less attention, however, has been paid to another development that may prove fateful: Kyiv’s impressive organization of a partisan movement in the Russian-occupied portions of Ukraine and its support of ethnic and regional movements within the Russian Federation (see EDM, May 16, July 25, 2023, January 25, February 1). Moscow had largely failed to respond to these efforts until very recently, and these actions are increasingly raising the specter of disintegration in Russia.

The successes of Ukraine’s partisan movement over the past year have led some in Moscow to recall that it took the Soviet government more than a decade after World War II to suppress Ukrainian partisans. They have also raised fears that, if Russian forces were able to occupy large swaths of Ukraine, Moscow would face a similar and perhaps even greater challenge not only in Ukraine but among non-Russians and regional groups within an expanded Russian Empire. The organization of sleeper cells in Ukrainian areas that Russian troops appear to be on the verge of occupying has further enflamed these concerns (Lenta.ru, April 17). In such circumstances, Putin’s war in Ukraine would not lead to the restoration of some version of the Soviet Union. Instead, it would likely set the stage for a far more violent collapse of that new entity into a plethora of states—possibly becoming what many in the West feared 30 years ago, “a Yugoslavia with nukes.” (For a thoughtful and early warning of such possibilities, see senior Moscow commentator Aleksandr Tsipko’s article on the eve of Putin’s invasion, Mk.ru, May 1, 2022; compare with Window on Eurasia, March 27, 2022, February 28.)

The Ukrainian partisan movement has largely flown under the radar of most because it is impossible to say exactly how large it is—estimates range up to 100,000. It is perhaps even more difficult to specify what actions the movement, rather than regular Ukrainian army units, are independently carrying out. It is clear that Kyiv placed great hopes on partisan operations even before Putin launched his expanded invasion (Ura.news, March 11, 2022). The partisan groups that have emerged in the months since have regularly destroyed Russian infrastructure, killed Russian commanders and political figures, and provided key intelligence to Kyiv about the locations and plans of Russian forces (see EDM, May 16, July 25, 2023). (For a detailed but far from comprehensive listing of these activities, see the chronology in the Kyiv Post, especially December 21, 2023.)

Two other signs point to the Ukrainian partisan groups being large and effective. On the one hand, Russian military officials have acknowledged that they have deployed 35,000 soldiers to combat partisans. This figure is undoubtedly too low but shows Moscow is taking them seriously (Kyiv Post, January 8). On the other hand, Russia, after earlier dismissing any role for partisans in the current war, is now organizing its own pro-Moscow partisan groups in Ukraine, even claiming successes for them (Vzglyad, June 29, 2023). This sets the stage for a war in the shadows between the partisans of both countries (Donetskmedia.ru, April 15; Segodnia.ru, April 21).

Yet another reason explains why Moscow is now taking the Ukrainian partisans more seriously: The Kremlin sees their partisan activity as something that has crossed into Russia and become an even more immediate threat to the Putin regime. The attacks have focused on draft centers and, more recently, on industries critical to the war effort and have utilized the rising tide of weapons now in private hands in Russia since the start of the war (see EDM, May 17, 2022; TASS, January 22). In part, the Kremlin is simply accepting its own propaganda as true. The recent attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow highlighted that the Kremlin has tried to link all actions against itself to Ukraine—both to mobilize the population against such actions and to be in a position to impose harsher penalties on those who engage in them (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 2). Perhaps far more consequential, these concerns reflect Russian wariness that Ukraine is now using military means, including partisans, to promote the disintegration of the Russian Federation itself.

Kyiv has infuriated Moscow by reaching out to non-Russian and regional groups inside Russia, backing their aspirations for independence, training such people, and even labeling Putin’s Russia an “evil empire” (see EDM October 13, 2022, January 18, 2023, January 25; Window on Eurasia, December 25, 2023). Moscow’s alarm has certainly intensified further after Roman Svitan, a Kyiv military commentator, said on April 20 that Ukraine is targeting places in Russia with an eye to promoting the country’s disintegration—something that would likely require Ukrainian-trained partisans to succeed (24tv.ua, April 20). Moscow has responded with more repression at home and a greater focus on partisans in Ukraine than ever before.

Ukrainian partisans, despite all the success against Russian forces, will not win the war for Kyiv on their own (Al Jazeera, September 6, 2022). Their actions inside Ukraine, however, suggest that they are playing a far more important role there and inside Russia. (For a useful discussion of these possibilities and how they are shaping Moscow’s thinking, see Irregular Warfare Center, September 21, 2023.) At the very least, the successes of Ukraine’s partisans and Moscow’s decision to counter by setting up its own partisan detachments deserve far more attention and the Ukrainian effort far more support from those who want to see Putin’s aggression stopped.

jamestown.org · by Paul Goble · April 25, 2024

18. US Army to shift aviation force structure back to tailored brigades

US Army to shift aviation force structure back to tailored brigades

Defense News · by Jen Judson · April 25, 2024

DENVER, Colo. — The U.S. Army’s aviation force structure will move away from modular Combat Aviation Brigade designs needed during heel-to-toe rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and return to a model that tailors those units for specific divisions, according to the service’s branch chief.

“Today we have modular CABs, so every CAB looks the same on paper,” Maj. Gen. Mac McCurry, the Army’s Aviation Center of Excellence commander, told reporters April 24 during the Army Aviation Association of America’s annual summit in Denver. During heel-to-rotations “it was imperative that we’d be able to replace a [heavy] capability with a light capability and those changes to modular CABs happened in the early 2000s,” he said.

The Army is returning to what it did prior to years of operations in the Middle East and will design division-based formations that do not look the same.

For example, McCurry said, “a light infantry division is more reliant on mobility than a heavy division is from the air, those soldiers have to move, rapidly reposition. We’re putting more [UH-60] Black Hawk [utility helicopters] into the light divisions and taking some of those Black Hawks out of the heavy divisions and heavy divisions remain focused on lethality.”

For the 101st Airborne Division, the Army is building an extra battalion of 32 CH-47F Chinook cargo helicopters to enable air assault. “That helps with the mobility and the ability to do air assault in that division,” he said.

The Army decided as part of a recent rebalancing of aviation capability announced earlier this year that it would buy Boeing-made CH-47F Block II helicopters that it was not previously planning to buy for the active component. Utwill also complete its 12th CAB based in Europe, and has been operating as a partial CAB, he said.

“By moving the aircraft around and slightly adjusting the design, we’re able to build out that 12th CAB in Europe,” McCurry said.

The force structure changes do “a couple of things for us,” he added. “As we looked at our gaps years ago, we said, ‘Hey, we need more reconnaissance and security capacity and we’ve got to be able to air assault, in one period of darkness, a brigade,’ and so that’s where these focuses are.”

According to a controlled but unclassified document obtained by Defense News that lays out the force structure change recommendationsm based off of a recent total analysis assessment, the Army is planning eight heavy CABS and four light brigades.

The units dedicated to heavy and theater enabling capability will be the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry Division, 2ID, 3ID, 4ID, 16th Combat Aviation Brigade and 12 CAB, according to the document.

The three light CABs will be recapitalized under the 10th Mountain CAB, the 25th Infantry Division CAB, the 82nd Airborne Division and the air assault CAB will be with the 101st Airborne, the document notes.

Conversions are planned to begin this year and won’t fully complete until the fall of 2029, the document notes.

The aviation changes are just a part of a wider push to change the Army’s overall structure. Army leaders announced the overhaul earlier this year and said the changes would focus on what the service needs as it transitions from counterinsurgency missions to large-scale combat operations against technologically advanced adversaries.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

19. Lidar: Another emerging technology brought to you by China

Lidar: Another emerging technology brought to you by China

Defense News · by Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery (ret.) · April 25, 2024

The exponential growth in connected and automated systems has increased the demand for the sensor technology necessary to make them operate safely. Light detection and ranging, or lidar, is just such a remote sensing technology that uses pulsed light to measure and map the surrounding environment. Lidar’s ability to quickly and precisely map complex environments has made it essential for autonomous vehicles, and has given it an increasing role in airports, infrastructure mapping, ports and other emerging connected systems.

For 2022, analysts estimated global automotive lidar revenues at $332 million per year, a number only expected to grow as the technology becomes more widespread and sophisticated. However, the rapid growth of lidar in connected systems and the predominant position Chinese companies have in the marketplace, coupled with the precise data the technology collects, expose the threat posed by untrusted lidar systems. The systems could easily be exploited by malign actors to conduct any manner of malicious actions, including clandestinely mapping U.S. critical infrastructure or conducting cyberattacks that disrupt operations.

American and European companies previously comprised the majority of the global market, but Chinese technology firms like Hesai, RoboSense, Seyond, and Livox (a division of the Chinese drone maker DJI) have rapidly expanded into international markets, including the United States. Hesai has grabbed over 47% of the global market share, benefitting from Chinese domestic industrial policies, including state subsidies and procurement preference. An analysis of filings from publicly traded lidar companies shows that Hesai and RoboSense gained approximately 50% of the North American market share in just a few short years.

While the presence of Chinese companies in lidar competition can drive innovation and competitive pricing, we must be clear-eyed about the threats posed by companies affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party and its strategy of military-civil fusion. Under the military-civil fusion, the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, obfuscates the line between private companies and the government in order to direct technological research and development that would benefit the state both commercially and militarily.

Further, Chinese companies are subject to national security laws that require People’s Republic of China businesses to pass data to Chinese intelligence agencies when asked, even if their operations are overseas. These laws create the distinct possibility that Chinese technology can serve as an access point for CCP-directed intelligence collection and cybersecurity exploitation.

In a form sent to the SEC, Hesai directly admitted the “PRC government has significant authority in regulating our operations and may influence or intervene in our operations at any time.”

U.S. national security leaders have expressed serious concerns about the potential threat posed by Chinese malware installed in critical infrastructure, near military bases and even on American roads. Similar concerns about Chinese-connected systems and lidar have also been corroborated by our close allies. The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service published a report highlighting the threats of Chinese technologies, including lidar, to Estonian national security. Specifically, the report warns the agency is aware of an effort to develop Chinese-manufactured lidar intended to scan the environment and exfiltrate that data back to China.

In addition to the direct cybersecurity threat Chinese lidar systems pose to the United States, they also risk oversaturating the market. Overdependence on foreign technology allows an adversary to disrupt the United States’ economy and security with the implementation of an export control, and limits the development of viable alternatives.

In 2022, the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce added lidar to its proposed “Catalog of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export” because the country considers lidar a “strategic emerging industry.” In a crisis, the CCP could threaten to transition that list from proposed to enacted — and seriously disrupt the U.S. autonomous vehicle, agricultural and industrial sectors.

The U.S. government has begun to pay attention to these security concerns and take action. In November 2023, the House Committee on the Chinese Communist Party encouraged the secretaries of commerce, defense, and the Treasury to investigate PRC lidar firms for ties to the People’s Liberation Army. Two months later, the Department of Defense concluded that Hesai held close ties to the Chinese military and consequently placed Hesai on its so-called 1260H list of Chinese military-linked companies. Hesai’s designation was notable not only because it is the first lidar manufacturer added to the list but also because it is the first publicly traded company on the U.S. stock exchange to be added.

Hesai has since objected to its designation by the DOD as a Chinese military-linked company, claiming it does “not sell our products to any military in any country, nor do we have ties of any kind to any military in any country.”

However, contrary to their claims, Hesai’s lidar systems have appeared on Chinese military vehicles, highlighting the dual-use nature of lidar technology and underscoring the true extent of Hesai’s role in the People’s Liberation Army’s defense industry. The DOD even defended Hesai’s addition to the 1260H list after Hesai threatened to sue.

Hesai’s designation on the Section 1260H list should be a wake-up call about the growing threat posed by untrusted sensing technology companies from countries of concern. Shortly after Hesai’s designation, numerous lobbying firms terminated business with Hesai after reports that congressional offices were considering banning firms that represent 1260H-listed companies.

On March 1, the Department of Commerce issued a proposed rule to identify information and communications technology and services used in autonomous vehicles deserving of regulation, specifically citing lidar. This is an important step toward scrutinizing the use of untrusted lidar in commercial applications. However, more must be done to safeguard U.S. data and prevent dependence on geopolitical adversaries for a critical, emerging technology.

First, Congress should continue its scrutiny of the threat posed by untrusted lidar companies. It is imperative that American lawmakers and the public be aware of how this technology is being employed across the nation’s cities, infrastructure and homes — and what vulnerabilities it creates for malign actors to exploit. Based on their findings, officials should consider placing additional restrictions or regulations on untrusted sensor technology companies.

Second, the Department of Commerce should use its authorities derived from the final rule on “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain; Connected Software Applications” to inform an assessment of regulatory action needed to prevent Chinese lidar companies from posing a risk to U.S. cybersecurity interests.

At a minimum, the departments of the Treasury and Commerce should consider using their authorities to place companies found to have ties to the People’s Liberation Army on the sanctions list and entity list, respectively.

Third, the United States needs to invest in expanding its own trusted lidar-industrial base, drawing from domestic capacity and that of our allies and partners, to offer alternatives to subsidized Chinese lidar companies.

U.S. government investments in emerging sensing technologies, like lidar, through a CHIPS and Science Act-like program will likely be needed to strengthen the competitiveness of American industry.

If the U.S. government does not scrutinize lidar and other emerging technologies produced by companies from countries of concern, we run the risk of our automated future being dependent on untrusted systems that jeopardize our national security and undermine global competitiveness.

Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank. He is also a senior adviser to the chairman of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and as director of operations (J3) at U.S. Pacific Command.

20. Forging the Force: A Joint Task Force in the Indo-Pacific

Excerpts:

Although the means have changed, many of the lessons from World War II in the Pacific remain relevant to a joint force today. Whereas Third Fleet and Fifth Fleet rotated between campaigns in World War II, today the staffs of U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, can relentlessly campaign against the People’s Liberation Army. And while the Army and Navy only integrated at the operational level in the final days of World War II, today the joint force could deliberately incorporate joint capabilities in a campaign to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

While the division of command and control between the Army and Navy in the Pacific during World War II at times presented evidence to the contrary, no one service can compete or fight effectively alone in the Indo-Pacific. While the Navy and Marine Corps team can rapidly establish the cadre of a joint task force headquarters within the congressionally mandated timeline, further deliberate planning is vital to harness the full capabilities of all services in a standing joint task force. Although 2027 is rapidly approaching, the U.S. joint force can forge a force that will relentlessly campaign against the looming threat and defend allies and partners from invasion.

Forging the Force: A Joint Task Force in the Indo-Pacific - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Zach Ota · April 26, 2024

Referring to the People’s Liberation Army, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command recently reported to Congress that “we haven’t faced a threat like this since World War II.” The nature of this threat should compel allied militaries to strengthen their efforts in the Indo-Pacific. One way to do so is by creating a standing joint task force headquarters. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act directed the establishment of such a headquarters in the Indo-Pacific by 1 Oct. 2024, but congressional leaders have conveyed concern with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s current approach.

As civilian and military leaders explore options to meet the operational and congressional requirements for a joint task force, it is worth remembering the lessons of commanding and controlling air, land, and sea forces during America’s largest maritime campaign in history. In the Pacific War, Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz and the U.S. Pacific Fleet staff rapidly adapted to the demands of the campaign and achieved tempo through the close cooperation of multiple staffs. Still, Nimitz was continually challenged by the span of control and responsibility levied upon his command. Although some of these challenges persisted throughout the war, U.S. Pacific Fleet ultimately formed an adaptive, innovative headquarters that relentlessly advanced on their adversary.

A contemporary joint task force headquarters in the Indo-Pacific can build upon these historical lessons by leveraging the teamwork between U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, harnessing the unique capabilities of subordinate and adjacent component commands, and closely cooperating with allies on key terrain. Such a joint task force headquarters can effectively prosecute a predominantly maritime campaign in the competition phase and facilitate the rapid transition to conflict if necessary. Although the People’s Liberation Army may dictate the time and location of future aggressive actions, the U.S. joint force and allies can set the conditions now to rapidly adapt and seize the initiative from an authoritarian invading force.

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Pervasive Challenges of Command and Control in the Pacific

As the fight progressed across the Western Pacific in the final years of World War II, the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet faced the tensions of strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities. Nimitz had to balance his proximity to the fight with relationships to higher headquarters and the necessity to coordinate administrative and logistics support in rear areas. These tensions exacted such a toll on Nimitz that close friends were “shocked at his physical condition,” which was characterized by insomnia and weight loss.

Nimitz was also challenged by the relentless, but ultimately advantageous, pace of Allied operations across the Pacific. Always conscious of the nation’s will to fight, Nimitz prioritized rebuilding morale through rapid, offensive action as an immediate objective after assuming command of U.S. Pacific Fleet. To this end, he was supremely successful. In the 38 months between February 1942 and April 1945, U.S. Pacific Fleet launched 22 battles and campaigns that destroyed Imperial Japanese forces and hastened a conclusion to the war.

One way that Nimitz maintained this tempo was through the employment of two commands and two staffs to fight a single force. He established Third Fleet, commanded by Adm. William “Bull” Halsey, and Fifth Fleet, commanded by Adm. Raymond Spruance, to fight the same maritime force — “Big Blue.” This command and control construct saw Nimitz employ one fleet in the fight while he supervised the planning of a subsequent campaign by another fleet headquarters. Through years of cultivating close cooperation amongst his team, Nimitz created this “vast and efficient organism” that promoted adaptability, fostered flexibility, and ultimately gained tempo over their adversary.

The employment of subordinate task forces in the fleets also yielded additional flexibility that was only possible through a common doctrine and deliberate training. Task Force 56, which commanded U.S. landing forces in multiple amphibious operations, significantly reduced the burden on senior commanders while maintaining unity of command within a maritime campaign. To further relieve Fleet Admiral Nimitz of the growing span of control required to command forces ashore and at sea, the Department of the Navy established Fleet Marine Force Pacific to command multiple corps-level Marine formations. The force’s first commander, Lt. Gen. Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, fulfilled this operational role during the Battle of Iwo Jima, where he commanded three Marine divisions that comprised Task Force 56. These flexible, task-organized headquarters allowed fleet commanders and Nimitz to establish the requisite command and control necessary for a given mission.

Closer cooperation between services also alleviated these persistent command and control challenges. Through the subsequent Battle of Okinawa, the U.S. Army assumed a larger leadership role in the maritime campaign. Directly subordinate to Spruance and Fifth Fleet, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Simon Buckner commanded the U.S. 10th Army, which consisted of a corps from the Army and a corps from the Marine Corps. This task organization harnessed the capabilities and expertise of land forces within a maritime campaign in the Pacific.

Considering these World War II command and control challenges, naval strategist Milan Vego observed that while “the Allies established a sound command structure in the Pacific theater,” Nimitz still “had too many responsibilities.” Accordingly, Vego recommended that “a theater commander should not overly centralize command and control by collecting too many responsibilities but should establish intermediate levels of command.” The Department of Defense’s contemporary doctrine, Joint Maritime Operations, captures these lessons from World War II and recommends that a maritime commander “focus attention on the operational level” and “delegate the authority to plan and execute tactical missions.”

The Navy and Marine Corps made momentous organizational changes in the Pacific to defeat a peer threat in World War II. These changes alleviated the burden of operational and tactical responsibilities on the commander, while unleashing the potential of subordinate commanders through flexible task organization. The type of interservice cooperation employed by the end of World War II also set the foundation for institutional changes that established a more effective joint task force, and that endure to this day.

A Joint Force in a Maritime Campaign

Following the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the establishment of a theater-wide combatant commander, and the subordination of service components to the joint force commander, new opportunities exist to unleash the full potential of subordinate commands in both competition and, potentially, conflict. These subordinate commands can form the core of a joint task force that focuses on operational and tactical problems, thus freeing the joint force commander to focus on strategic and interagency integration. As in World War II, the Navy and Marine Corps team remains the optimal force around which to rapidly build a joint task force in the Indo-Pacific.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s modern-day Navy and Marine Corps team is a formidable power of approximately 233,000 personnel, 2,140 aircraft, and 200 ships that constitute most of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific. Collectively, this maritime team possesses operational control of two numbered fleets and two Marine Expeditionary Forces. Seventh Fleetand Third Fleet operate west and east of the International Date Line, respectively, while I Marine Expeditionary Force and III Marine Expeditionary Force are persistently postured alongside Taiwan and are increasingly employing capabilities to affect a maritime campaign. While “Howlin’ Mad” Smith never attained operational command of two corps-sized Marine formations during World War II, his modern-day successor at U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, now commands and controls two such forces every day.

Although the combatant commander now relieves contemporary component commanders of the primary responsibilities for strategic planning, the span of control for a prospective joint task force commander in the Indo-Pacific far exceeds that in World War II. A former U.S. Indo-Pacific commander framed his area of responsibility as everything from “Hollywood to Bollywood, polar bears to penguins,” including half of the world’s population. Regardless of the boundaries that may be established for a joint task force, component commanders will also likely retain functional responsibilities across the theater — for example, U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters might form the core of the theater joint force maritime component command, and U.S. Army Pacific headquarters might form the theater joint force land component command. Additionally, component commanders retain their Title 10 responsibilities to man, train, and equip their assigned forces in much the same way as Nimitz and Smith did in World War II.

Service components and functional components — such as land, air, maritime, and special operations — are several ways in which a geographic combatant commander can organize headquarters and assigned forces.

Two Commanders, Two Staffs, One Team

As in World War II, increased cooperation between the services can relieve the burden on the joint force commander. U.S. Pacific Fleet simultaneously manages theater responsibilities, competition, regional crises, and preparedness for conflict, and a distinct and deployable maritime commander and staff would allow U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to manage multiple competing demands and to focus on the threat. The commander and staff of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, offer the potential to serve as the cadre of such a joint headquarters in a maritime campaign.

With increased interoperability between Navy and Marine Corps staffs, the joint task force commander possesses the capability to task-organize two separate but unified commands to simultaneously focus on multiple complex and interrelated problems. Just as Third Fleet and Fifth Fleet alternated between planning and executing operations in World War II, the joint task force commander can now assign highly interoperable Navy and Marine Corps staffs to emerging requirements, thus maintaining a relative tempo advantage over more centralized challengers.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 7-10, Marine Corps Componency, describes this command and control arrangement as “two commanders and two staffs.” With two commanders, two staffs, and one direction undertaken through a single force, a prospective joint task force commander “allows each commander and staff to maintain a single, focused orientation” while allowing commanders to “place himself/herself at the appropriate location.” This employment model was demonstrated in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, when the Marine Corps component headquarters deployed to Bahrain and served as the service component for U.S. Central Command (Forward) and a combined joint task force.

Wallace “Chip” Gregson, a former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs and commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, previously advocated for the establishment of a standing combined joint task forcewith Japan that leveraged the forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps team. Gregson argued that forward-deployed commands — such as Seventh Fleet, III Marine Expeditionary Force, or I Marine Expeditionary Force — could comprise the nucleus of a joint task force. Furthermore, integrated Navy and Marine Corps commands at multiple echelons provide scalable options to form a joint task force headquarters. Task Force 76/3, an integrated one-star command, all the way up to U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, are well positioned to serve as the forward command element for a standing joint task force led by U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The task force construct established in World War II can also be applied to a joint task force prosecuting a maritime campaign.

A Combined Arms Team from Creation

All-domain expertise and capabilities are critical for a joint task force operating in the Indo-Pacific, and the Navy–Marine Corps team is best suited to rapidly form the cadre of such a joint force. Marines and sailors have complemented each other with combined arms since the age of sail, and this mutually supporting relationship is as important as ever at the operational level. As Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (ret.), observed:

Maritime operations now must take account of more land-based forces and the sensors they employ; indeed, sea-based forces often must team with land-based forces that are located in friendly territory. Effective cooperation — in joint and combined operations, both operational and tactical, is a modern-day imperative.

Navy and Marine Corps component headquarters can cross-attach subject matter experts to form the cadre of a deployable joint task force headquarters while maintaining theater functional and service components to exercise Title 10 responsibilities. In addition to the areas of expertise often associated with the Marine Corps, such as ground combat and amphibious operations, Marines can provide expertise in all-domain command and control, regional air defense, fires, and effects. These skill sets diversify and increase the capabilities of a combined arms team and better prime a maritime staff’s potential transition to a joint task force.

While maritime forces are capable of proficient planning in many warfighting areas, joint forces are essential to building expertise in all critical missions. U.S. Army Pacific brings expertise in sustainment and integrated air and missile defense, while Pacific Air Force can provide theater air defense expertise and a conduit to strategic forces. Together, a joint task force in the Indo-Pacific can leverage U.S. proficiency in combined and joint operations to perpetuate an asymmetric deterrent effect against the People’s Liberation Army.

These areas of expertise are amplified when considering regional relationships with foreign military services. Hughes also noted in Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations that “the Navy must plan its operations or battles in littoral waters with an eye towards cooperation and sometimes close coordination with the armed forces of the country that it is trying to support.” Land forces of allies and partners in the first island chain play a critical role in maritime defense across the spectrum of conflict, and both soldiers and marines can serve as interlocuters with these forces on key terrain. The relationship between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Philippine Marine Corps, for example, provides a basis for planning and coordinating a maritime campaign on key terrain. Additionally, the longstanding service relationships between the Australian Army, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps provide a joint headquarters with vital cross-domain linkages to key allies in the region.

These linkages are even more critical as key allies field maritime-focused capabilities, establish new organizations, and increasingly align activities accordingly. The Philippine Marine Corps established its coastal defense regiment in 2021, and the Philippine Army also plans to acquire anti-ship missiles for its artillery regiment. Marines and soldiers from the Philippines and United States are regularly training together on these emerging concepts and capabilities, and greater coordination and planning at higher echelons will accelerate the development of these critical capabilities. These efforts parallel work with the Australian Army’s littoral-focused 1st Brigade and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade. At the operational level, a U.S. joint task force offers the potential to better unify these critical efforts across the Pacific with allied counterparts such as Japan’s recently established joint operational command and Australia’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command.

Preparing for an Uncertain Future

Although the means have changed, many of the lessons from World War II in the Pacific remain relevant to a joint force today. Whereas Third Fleet and Fifth Fleet rotated between campaigns in World War II, today the staffs of U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, can relentlessly campaign against the People’s Liberation Army. And while the Army and Navy only integrated at the operational level in the final days of World War II, today the joint force could deliberately incorporate joint capabilities in a campaign to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

While the division of command and control between the Army and Navy in the Pacific during World War II at times presented evidence to the contrary, no one service can compete or fight effectively alone in the Indo-Pacific. While the Navy and Marine Corps team can rapidly establish the cadre of a joint task force headquarters within the congressionally mandated timeline, further deliberate planning is vital to harness the full capabilities of all services in a standing joint task force. Although 2027 is rapidly approaching, the U.S. joint force can forge a force that will relentlessly campaign against the looming threat and defend allies and partners from invasion.

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Lieutenant Colonel Zach Ota is an infantry officer and international affairs officer in the United States Marine Corps. He currently serves as a planner for U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Department of Defense or the United States Marine Corps.

Image: Wikimedia

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Zach Ota · April 26, 2024

21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 25, 2024

Key Takeaways:

Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: Unspecified fighters targeted the humanitarian pier in the central Gaza Strip that is meant to distribute aid to the northern Strip. Unspecified Palestinian fighters mortared construction facilities for the US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip on April 25.
Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya separately implied that Hamas would attack any non-Palestinian presence in the Gaza Strip “at sea or on land.” The US-built pier will be off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
Iraq in Russia: The Iranian-linked Iraqi National Security Adviser discussed intelligence cooperation and “the situation in the Middle East” during two separate meetings with senior Russian officials in St. Petersburg. Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.
Rafah: The IDF Nahal Brigade transferred responsibility for its area of operations in the Netzarim corridor to the IDF 2nd Reservist Infantry Brigade and 679th Reservist Armored Brigade on April 25. The Nahal Brigade will leave the Gaza Strip and rest to prepare for Israeli operations in Rafah.
Iran: The Iranian judiciary confirmed the death sentence of 33-year-old dissident Iranian rapper Tomaj Salehi on April 25.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 25, 2024

Apr 25, 2024 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, April 25, 2024

Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hamas and Palestinian factions are targeting and threatening to target the humanitarian pier in the central Gaza Strip that is meant to distribute aid to the northern Strip. Israeli media report that unspecified Palestinian fighters mortared construction facilities for the US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip on April 25.[1] The mortars struck engineering equipment close to the pier. The World Health Organization (WHO) director general said on April 22 that WHO aid missions to hospitals in northern Gaza have been only “partly successful” due to delays at checkpoints and ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip.[2] Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya separately implied that Hamas would attack any non-Palestinian presence in the Gaza Strip “at sea or on land.”[3] The US-built pier will be off the coast of the Gaza Strip.[4] The decision by Hamas and other Palestinian militia factions to target the pier will further constrict international aid organizations’ ability to distribute aid in the Gaza Strip.[5]

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji met with two senior Russian officials in St. Petersburg, Russia, on April 24 and 25 after meeting with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian on April 23. Araji discussed intelligence cooperation and “the situation in the Middle East” during two separate meetings with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Russian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Sergei Vershinin on April 24 and 25 respectively.[6] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Patrushev on April 24, one day after Ahmadian met with Araji.[7] Araji and Ahmadian discussed expelling US and international coalition forces from Iraq.[8] The Russian ambassador to Iraq has repeatedly met with senior Iraqi military and political figures, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, in 2024 to discuss expanding security cooperation and Russian investment into Iraq.[9] CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.[10] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[11]

The IDF conducted a relief-in-place/transfer of authority in the Netzarim corridor on April 25. The Nahal Brigade transferred responsibility for its area of operations to the IDF 2nd Reservist Infantry Brigade and 679th Reservist Armored Brigade on April 25.[12] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on April 15 that the IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade and 679th Armored Brigade will secure the Netzarim corridor and the temporary US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The Nahal Brigade will rest to prepare for Israeli operations in Rafah.[14]

Key Takeaways:

Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: Unspecified fighters targeted the humanitarian pier in the central Gaza Strip that is meant to distribute aid to the northern Strip. Unspecified Palestinian fighters mortared construction facilities for the US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip on April 25.
Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya separately implied that Hamas would attack any non-Palestinian presence in the Gaza Strip “at sea or on land.” The US-built pier will be off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
Iraq in Russia: The Iranian-linked Iraqi National Security Adviser discussed intelligence cooperation and “the situation in the Middle East” during two separate meetings with senior Russian officials in St. Petersburg. Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.
Rafah: The IDF Nahal Brigade transferred responsibility for its area of operations in the Netzarim corridor to the IDF 2nd Reservist Infantry Brigade and 679th Reservist Armored Brigade on April 25. The Nahal Brigade will leave the Gaza Strip and rest to prepare for Israeli operations in Rafah.
Iran: The Iranian judiciary confirmed the death sentence of 33-year-old dissident Iranian rapper Tomaj Salehi on April 25.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF reported on April 25 that the Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations near the Netzarim corridor in the central Gaza Strip.[15] This IDF report is probably referring to Nahal Brigade operations prior to April 25, given that the IDF also announced on April 25 that two reservist brigades replaced the Nahal Brigade in the Gaza Strip. The Nahal Brigade directed an airstrike targeting two fighters who had attempted to launch rockets or mortars into Israel.[16] The strike also targeted a nearby weapons storage facility. The IDF Air Force struck unspecified Palestinian militia infrastructure along the central Gazan coast after Palestinian militias shelled Israeli forces in the Netzarim corridor.[17] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters mortared Israeli forces operating in an unspecified area of the Netzarim corridor.[18] Hamas fighters mortared an IDF “surveillance site” in an unspecified location east of Juhor ad Dik.[19] Hamas claimed its fighters ambushed Israeli forces in al Mughraqa, south of the Netzarim corridor, using multiple improvised explosive devices (IED), including one IED made from a dud F16 missile that had been recovered by Hamas forces and re-built into an IED.[20]

The IDF conducted a relief-in-place/transfer of authority in the Netzarim corridor on April 25. The Nahal Brigade transferred responsibility for its area of operations to the IDF 2nd Reservist Infantry Brigade and 679th Reservist Armored Brigade on April 25.[21] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on April 15 that the IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade and 679th Armored Brigade will secure the Netzarim corridor and the temporary US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip.[22] The Nahal Brigade will rest to prepare for Israeli operations in Rafah.[23]

The 215th Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force struck a Hamas cell in Nuseirat on April 24.[24]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed one mortar attack targeting Israeli forces in an unspecified area east of Khan Younis.[25]

Palestinian fighters conducted one indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on April 25.[26] The Mujahideen Movement launched one rocket targeting the 143rd (Gaza) Division headquarters in Reim.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 24.[27] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces during Israeli operations in Tulkarm.[28]

Israeli forces detained eight individuals and confiscated weapons across the West Bank during overnight raids on April 25.[29]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 24.[30]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Syrian media reported that the IDF conducted an airstrike on April 24 that targeted a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) building near al Rawadi, Quneitra Province, along the Syrian border with the Golan Heights.[31] The IDF dropped leaflets over Quneitra on April 25 that said that the IDF conducted the strike on the SAA building because the SAA was present in the demilitarized zone between the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and Syria.[32] The leaflets warned that the IDF will not allow the SAA to violate “existing agreements.”[33] Israeli media reported on April 25 that the IDF created a closed military zone over a large section of the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on an unspecified date.[34]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

An Iranian Supreme National Security Council-affiliated outlet said that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s recent visit to Pakistan aimed to signal that Iran and Pakistan “will not submit to the policies of the United States.”[35] Supreme National Security Council-affiliated Nour News Agency said on April 25 that Raisi’s meetings with senior Pakistani officials and new Iranian-Pakistani political, commercial, and security agreements sought to signal that Iran and Pakistan “will not submit to the policies of the United States.”[36] Nour News’ report followed a US State Department warning that Pakistan could face sanctions were it to engage in business and commercial relations with Iran.[37] Raisi met with the Pakistani prime minister and foreign minister on April 22 and signed eight memoranda of understanding (MOU) aimed at increasing cooperation in areas such as security, free trade, judicial proceedings, and the media.[38] This trip was Raisi’s first to Pakistan since Iran and Pakistan exchanged cross-border strikes against each other in January 2024.[39]

The Iranian judiciary confirmed the death sentence of 33-year-old dissident Iranian rapper Tomaj Salehi on April 25.[40] The judiciary added that Salehi is entitled to a sentence reduction and that Salehi can appeal his sentence within 20 days. The judiciary's announcement coincides with international media reports condemning Salehi's potential execution.[41] This ruling coincides with the regime’s decision on April 13 to renew its crackdown on women for failure to adhere to the mandatory hijab law.[42]

The US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) sanctioned at least 12 entities, individuals and vessels on April 25 for facilitating and financing the sale of Iranian drones.[43] The sanctioned individuals and entities conducted sales for the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). OFAC stated that the Iranian MODAFL provides financial support to Iran’s IRGC and Russia’s war in Ukraine.[44]

The United Kingdom and Canada concurrently imposed sanctions against several individuals and entities involved in Iran’s UAV procurement on April 25.[45]

The Houthis claimed drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting a US destroyer, a US-flagged commercial vessel, and a Portuguese-flagged commercial vessel on April 24.[46] US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile targeting the US-flagged MV Maersk Yorktown on April 24.[47] The Houthis claimed that they launched an unspecified attack targeting the Portuguese-flagged MSC Veracruz in the Indian Ocean on April 24.[48] CENTCOM also reported that it destroyed four Houthi drones over Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Houthis had not claimed an attack since April 10 prior to these attacks.[49]

A Greek frigate operating in the Gulf of Aden as part of the European-led Operation Aspides engaged two Houthi drones on April 25. The frigate destroyed one of the two drones on April 25.[50] The second drone retreated.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations said that there was an explosion close to an unspecified commercial vessel 15km southwest of Aden on April 25.[51]

22. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are stabilizing their small salient northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains that could cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka to a more defensible line.
Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka aim to exploit opportunities for tactical gains while the Russian offensive operation to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances.
US officials are reportedly worried that the latest package of US military aid to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all of its territory. US military assistance is only part of what Ukraine currently needs, moreover; but Ukraine is itself working to address other war fighting requirements — primarily manpower challenges and the expansion of its defense industrial base (DIB).
Russian forces are reportedly fielding drones adapted to be more resilient against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on critical sectors of the frontline, likely in an attempt to leverage new technological capabilities to exploit a limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine.
A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a “media school” in the Balkans, likely supporting Kremlin efforts to expand its reach in the international information space.
French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the importance of Europe’s self-sufficiency for its defense and sovereignty during an April 25 speech.
Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Siversk, and Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian President Vladimir Putin justified Russia’s ongoing efforts to nationalize Russian enterprises, including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises on April 25.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 25, 2024

Apr 25, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2024

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 25, 2024, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on April 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are stabilizing their small salient northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains that could cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka to a more defensible line. Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced into central Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) from Novobakhmutivka after likely seizing all of Novobakhmutivka on the night of April 24 to 25.[1] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized all of Solovyove on April 25 and advanced up to two kilometers in depth in eastern Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka) on the night of April 24 to 25.[2] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the Arbat Spetsnaz Battalion made the advances in Novobakhmutivka and Solovyove.[3] Russian forces have committed roughly a reinforced division’s worth of combat power (comprised mainly of four CMD brigades) to the frontline northwest of Avdiivka and appear to be attempting to widen their penetration of the Ukrainian defense in the area following significant advances into Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) as of April 18.[4] These recent Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka have been relatively quick but still relatively marginal, with Russian forces advancing at most roughly five kilometers in depth since April 18. Russian forces continue offensive operations throughout the frontline west of Avdiivka but have so far only achieved gradual marginal gains west and southwest of Avdiivka.[5]

The recent Russian advances in Novobakhmutivka and Solovyove widen the salient Russian forces are advancing along northwest of Avdiivka and afford Russian forces a more stable position from which to pursue a wider penetration. This salient is roughly two kilometers in width at its widest section, however, and would still be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks should Ukrainian forces stabilize the tactical situation in the area. Ocheretyne notably sits on a junction between the Ukrainian defensive line that Russian forces have been attacking since their seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024 and a subsequent defensive line further west, which Russian sources have identified as a more heavily fortified line.[6] Russian forces could further stabilize their salient northwest of Avdiivka and advance further west of Ocheretyne, making positions along the Berdychi-Semenivka-Umanske line increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to hold. The Ukrainian command could decide to withdraw Ukrainian forces further west if it deems Russian tactical gains in the area to be too threatening to current Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian forces withdrew from Avdiivka to relatively poorly prepared defensive positions immediately west of Avdiivka following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February and proceeded to slow Russian advances.[7] Positions further west would likely afford Ukrainian forces similar or better opportunities to blunt Russian advances, and Russian forces would likely have to maintain a relatively high tempo of offensive operations to place these subsequent Ukrainian defensive positions under immediate pressure. Russian forces will likely have to replenish and reinforce attacking units northwest of Avdiivka and will likely not be able to maintain the tempo of offensive operations required to rapidly advance west of the Berdychi-Semenivka-Umanske line. Russian forces will likely continue to make tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka, but these gains are unlikely to develop into an operationally significant penetration, let alone cause the collapse of the Ukrainian defense west of Avdiivka.

Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka aim to exploit opportunities for tactical gains while the Russian offensive operation to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances. Russian forces in the Avdiivka area remain roughly 30 kilometers from their reported operational objective of Pokrovsk and roughly 17 kilometers from relatively large villages east of Pokrovsk.[8] Even if Russian tactical gains do cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw to positions further west, the current Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka are unlikely to become operationally significant advances in the near term. Russian pressure on Chasiv Yar is more significant. Russian forces currently on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar have been intensifying efforts to seize the city since March 2024.[9] The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against cities that form a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.[10] Russian forces do pose a credible threat of seizing Chasiv Yar, although they may not be able to do so rapidly.[11] Russian forces are likely attempting to seize as much territory as possible before the arrival of US security assistance significantly improves Ukrainian defensive capabilities in the coming weeks, and the Russian military command may be intensifying offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka because the area provides greater opportunities for making more rapid tactical gains despite the relative operational insignificance of those gains.

US officials are reportedly worried that the latest package of US military aid to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all of its territory. US military assistance is only part of what Ukraine currently needs, moreover; but Ukraine is itself working to address other war fighting requirements — primarily manpower challenges and the expansion of its defense industrial base (DIB). Politico reported on April 25 that three US officials believe that the recent provision of US aid may not be enough for Ukraine to restore its territorial integrity due to changes in the situation on the battlefield in the past few months.[12] One US official reportedly stated that the “immediate goal” of the US aid package is to stop Ukrainian losses and help Ukraine “regain momentum” on the battlefield, after which the goal will be to help Ukraine regain its territory. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on April 24 that it is “certainly possible” that Russian forces could make further tactical advances in the coming weeks but that the US will be able to provide Ukraine “with what it needs through 2024.”[13] The commander of the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Pavlo Palisa, stated on April 25, however, that Ukraine’s manpower problems are “much more important than ammunition.”[14] Palisa stated that one Ukrainian soldier is currently having to perform the tasks of three to four soldiers and that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces by about five to seven times in the Bakhmut direction. Palisa stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of this numerical superiority by conducting attacks that result in personnel and equipment losses, which Ukrainian forces cannot afford to do.

ISW previously assessed that Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and eventually challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the US provision of military aid and on Ukraine’s efforts to restore and reconstitute existing units and create new ones.[15] US military assistance is currently en route to Ukraine, and Ukraine has recently taken steps to address its manpower issues.[16] Ukraine is also dramatically expanding its defense industrial capacity to develop the ability over time to satisfy its military requirements with significantly reduced foreign military assistance.[17] Russian forces are likely trying to take advantage of the limited period of time before US aid appears on the battlefield by intensifying offensive operations on certain sectors of the front in order to make tactical gains in the coming weeks.[18] Russian forces are unlikely, however, to translate these tactical advances into operationally significant gains before this window closes.[19] The timeline for Ukraine’s resolution of its manpower challenges is less clear. Ukraine has recently taken steps to increase significantly the pool of manpower conscripted into the army and will need time to induct and train new conscripts. The Ukrainian command has been taking steps to get more manpower to front line units already on a limited scale, as ISW has previously reported.[20] The arrival of new ammunition and equipment will likely help blunt ongoing Russian offensives, but the timeline for the incorporation of new manpower will likely play a larger role in determining the timeline for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

Russian forces are reportedly fielding drones adapted to be more resilient against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on critical sectors of the frontline, likely in an attempt to leverage new technological capabilities to exploit a limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine. Ukrainska Pravda reported on April 15 that its sources in the Ukrainian General Staff stated that the number of Russian drones in “hot” sectors of the frontline has “at least doubled” in the past three months.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff sources reported that Russian forces are using modernized drones that operate on frequencies between 700 to 1,000 MHz, which are difficult for Ukrainian EW to jam because Ukrainian EW systems are chiefly designed to jam Russian drones operating on frequencies around 900 MHz. The sources stated that Ukraine is developing a unified system to collect information about Russian drone adaptations in order to quickly adapt Ukrainian electronic warfare systems to counter the Russian drones. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are attempting to adapt their drone technology and tactics along the frontline as part of an offense-defense arms race to mitigate Ukrainian technological adaptations designed to offset Russian material advantages.[22] The Russian military likely chose to deploy drones operating on a frequency more difficult for Ukrainian EW to jam to support continued ground operations in critical sectors of the frontline to further exploit Ukrainian materiel shortages. The Russian military may have assessed that Ukrainian forces would eventually adapt their EW systems to jam drones at a larger frequency range and employed them now to support ongoing offensive operations as Ukrainian forces wait for US security assistance to arrive. The pattern of one side seizing on a fleeting technological advantage to support immediate ground operations while it lasts will likely become a characteristic of this kind of conflict.

A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a “media school” in the Balkans, likely supporting Kremlin efforts to expand its reach in the international information space. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on April 25 that it opened the “Rybar Media School” in the Balkans and that a Rybar team spent the past week in Serbia and the territory of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina).[23] Rybar claimed that its team taught students, journalists, politicians, and academics how to create and run Telegram channels, organize these channels into networks, distribute “correct” content, and fight “misinformation.” Rybar claimed that founder Mikhail Zvinchuk gave lectures, adopted 10 “bright and promising” projects, and reached agreements to hold regular in-person masterclasses with authors of unspecified Russian Telegram channels. Rybar previously gave a masterclass on the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads and communications personnel at Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without involving the Kremlin.[24] Rybar’s public expansion to international media influence operations is notable, particularly as the Kremlin seeks to expand its influence over the Russian information space and coopt more Russian milbloggers like it has with Rybar.[25] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev met with Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik in St. Petersburg on April 23 and discussed increasing interstate cooperation and the situation in the Balkans and Europe.[26]

French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the importance of Europe’s self-sufficiency for its defense and sovereignty during an April 25 speech.[27] Macron stated that Russia has “no inhibitions” and “no limits” and threatens Europe’s ability to ensure its security.[28] Macron called on Europe to build a strategic concept of “credible European defense” and develop its defense industry to build its sovereignty and autonomy.[29] Macron stated that European countries should give preference to European suppliers when buying military equipment and supported proposals for an EU loan program to finance preferential buying. Macron also supported increasing Europe’s cybersecurity and cyber defense capacities, closer defense ties with the UK, and the creation of a European academy to train high-ranking military personnel.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are stabilizing their small salient northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains that could cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka to a more defensible line.
Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka aim to exploit opportunities for tactical gains while the Russian offensive operation to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances.
US officials are reportedly worried that the latest package of US military aid to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all of its territory. US military assistance is only part of what Ukraine currently needs, moreover; but Ukraine is itself working to address other war fighting requirements — primarily manpower challenges and the expansion of its defense industrial base (DIB).
Russian forces are reportedly fielding drones adapted to be more resilient against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on critical sectors of the frontline, likely in an attempt to leverage new technological capabilities to exploit a limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine.
A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a “media school” in the Balkans, likely supporting Kremlin efforts to expand its reach in the international information space.
French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the importance of Europe’s self-sufficiency for its defense and sovereignty during an April 25 speech.
Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Siversk, and Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian President Vladimir Putin justified Russia’s ongoing efforts to nationalize Russian enterprises, including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises on April 25.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian Border Service reported on April 25 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian sabotage-and-reconnaissance group on the Sumy Oblast border.[30]

Positional fighting continued on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 25, but there were no changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued northwest of Svatove near Berestove and Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Novovodyane, Druzhelyubivka, Makiivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Zarichne; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[31] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are fighting towards Berestove; elements of the 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 26th Tank Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st GTA) are deploying to the front in the Kupyansk direction; and elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps, Baltic Fleet) are operating in the Kyslivka direction (southeast of Kupyansk).[32] Mashovets also reported that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are fighting near Makiivka; elements of the 283rd and 488th infantry regiments (both of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are fighting near Novosadove (northwest of Kreminna) and Terny, respectively; and elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are fighting near Torske.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on April 25. Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced further east of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) than previously assessed but likely did not make this advance recently.[34] Fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka.[35]

Fighting continued near Chasiv Yar on April 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Fighting continued on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar, in the Novyi Microraion (southeastern Chasiv Yar), and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Klishchiivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[37] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 11th VDV Brigade are operating near the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and that elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 11th VDV Brigade are operating near Ivanivske.[38] Mashovets stated that elements of the 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are fighting near the Novyi Microraion and trying to advance west of the Siverskyi Donetsk-Donbas Canal. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command likely understands that it is risky for Russian forces to attempt further advances towards Chasiv Yar and Stupochky without making further advances on the southern flank near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka. Mashovets stated that Russian command is likely preparing elements of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) for assaults near Klishchiivka from the east and elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd AC) and 83rd VDV Brigade for assaults from the north and northwest.

See topline text for updates on the Avdiivka area.

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on April 25. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault from two directions and advanced in southern and southeastern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[39] Several Russian sources amplified footage purportedly showing personnel of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) hoisting a flag over a building in the Krasnohorivka brick factory in central Krasnohorivka, although ISW has only observed visual confirmation that Russian forces advanced up to the southwestern outskirts of the factory.[40] Russian forces continued attacking west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Vodyane.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted 30 FAB-500 glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian positions in Krasnohorivka on April 24.[42] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and of the 242nd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) continue to operate along the Heorhiivka-Pobeida-Novomykhailivka line.[43] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are operating within Novomykhailivka.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements in the area on April 25. Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults against Urozhaine’s southern outskirts after conducting intense air strikes for several days.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes near Urozhaine.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[48] Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue operating near Hulyaipole (northeast of Robotyne).[49]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on April 25.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently intensified drone operations and shelling near Krynky.[51]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted missile strikes against Ukrainian railway and logistics infrastructure on April 25. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces struck a logistics and railway connection point in Smila, Cherkasy Oblast likely with an Iskander-K missile.[52] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian forces struck a railway station in Balaklia, Kharkiv Oblast with an unspecified missile, wounding civilians in train cars.[53] Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed an unspecified cruise missile over Kryvyi Rih Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[54] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces launched the cruise missile from an Su-57 fighter aircraft over the Black Sea and that the missile travelled through Mykolaiv Oblast to Kirovohrad Oblast before changing course towards Kryvyi Rih Raion.[55] ISW recently assessed that Russian forces may be shifting their target set to strike Ukrainian transportation infrastructure to delay the improved capabilities that the arrival of US security assistance will afford Ukrainian forces and constrain Ukraine’s ability to sufficiently distribute manpower and materiel to critical sectors of the frontline.[56]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin justified Russia’s ongoing efforts to nationalize Russian enterprises, including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises on April 25.[57] Putin stated at the Congress of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs that Russian law enforcement agencies have opened an unspecified number of cases to nationalize companies when the actions of the owners of the nationalized enterprises caused direct damage to Russian interests, which Putin labeled as the only acceptable circumstance for the Russian state to seize a company.[58] Exiled Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on March 12 that Russian authorities filed 40 demands to nationalize more than 180 companies worth over one trillion rubles (about $10.8 billion or about 0.6 percent of Russia’s GDP) since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[59] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s northwestern Russia service Sever Realii stated on April 25 that Russia has nationalized companies that manufacture rare earth metals, defense industrial products, electronics, methanol, ferroalloys, and explosives, as well as several companies not related to military needs, such as a Rolf car dealership owned by former State Duma deputy Sergei Petrov, who criticized the Russian government.[60]

Russian defense industrial enterprises continue to struggle with labor shortages. Putin stated at the April 25 congress that Russia expects the labor shortage to continue in the near term and that migrant labor cannot solve these shortages, so Russia must find develop new methods to mitigate the shortages.[61] Sever Reallii reported on April 25 that a manager at the St. Petersburg Special Technology Center (STC), which makes Orlan-10 reconnaissance drones, stated that several employees left after a Ukrainian drone struck a building in St. Petersburg recently.[62] The manager stated that STC authorities are considering creating an “electronic warfare (EW) dome” around the enterprise but have not resolved the issues this EW dome will cause to the enterprise’s own electronics. Sever Reallii reported that an employee at the Kingisepp Machine Building Plant in St. Petersburg, which produces armored vehicles and military boats, stated that many of the plant’s workers are from Uzbekistan and Russian authorities often conduct raids targeting the migrant workers – prompting many employees to leave. The Kingisepp Plant is reportedly offering monetary awards to employees who recruit additional workers or promote a bumper sticker with the enterprise’s logo on their cars.

China continues to indirectly support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine by providing dual-use goods to Russian DIB enterprises. US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told Politico on April 24 that the US is increasingly observing that China is supplying dual-use products, such as machine tools, microelectronics, drone technologies, and nitrocellulose (used for gunpowder), to Russia.[63] Smith noted that there is no evidence of China providing “lethal support” to Russia. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told the Telegraph on April 25 that satellite imagery indicates that the Russian Angara ship, which likely transported North Korean ammunition to Russia recently, has been moored in China’s Zhejiang province since February 2024.[64]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continued information operations aimed at deterring further Western security assistance to Ukraine in reaction to reports that the US secretly provided Ukraine with long-range ATACMS in April 2024. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that providing Ukraine with ATACMs will not change the war’s outcome in favor of Ukraine and claimed that Russia will win the war.[65] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the ATACMS delivery shows that the United States is not committed to peace and wants to support terrorism.[66] Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov suggested that providing ATACMS to Ukraine only escalated tensions between Russia and the US.[67] US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink and US Department of State (DoS) Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel confirmed on April 25 that the US sent the long-range ATACMS to Ukraine in April.[68]

The Russian MFA summoned Latvian Charge d’Affaires Dace Rutka and declared two Latvian diplomats persona non grata on April 25. The Russian MFA stated that these acts were retribution for the Latvian MFA declaring two Russian diplomats persona non grata on March 27, and the Russian MFA threatened “painful” steps if Latvia continues “hostile actions” towards Russia.[69] It is unclear why the Russian MFA only responded nearly a month after the Latvian persona non grata declaration. Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have consistently targeted Latvia and other Baltic states with information operations aimed at portraying these states as hostile to both the Russian state and Russian “compatriots” in their countries.[70] Zakharova criticized Latvia on April 25 for allegedly discriminating against Russian speakers by not teaching Russian as a second language in schools.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Senior Belarusian officials made false claims about alleged Western threats to Belarus, resembling recent Russian efforts to baselessly tie the West to alleged “terrorist” acts against Russia.[72] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko oddly claimed that Belarusian opposition actors abroad want to seize a part of Belarus with NATO support.[73] Belarusian Commitee of State Security (KGB) Chairperson Ivan Tretel claimed on April 25 that the Belarusian KGB and other security forces prevented drone attacks on Minsk from Lithuania.[74] Tertel claimed that Lithuania and Poland are attempting to produce combat drones to attack critical targets in Belarus and are attempting to create an extremist force to conduct “terrorist attacks” against Shmyany, Smorgon, and Braslav raions, which border Lithuania. Lithuanian military spokesperson Major Gintautas Ciunis called Tertel’s claims “nonsense.”[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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