Quotes of the Day:

"We fail to learn the lesson implied by Marshall’s admonition in 1939. To paraphrase, “Before we had time and no money. Now we have money and no time.” We are wasting time and money now. Infuriatingly, thinking is relatively inexpensive except perhaps to one’s career. Buying is easy but expensive. Thinking is hard but cheap. So, what do we do?"

- Robert Simpson

“For most of history anonymous was a woman.” 

– Virginia Woolf

"Either you deal with what is the reality, or you can be sure that the reality is going to deal with you.” 

– Alex Haley

1. Funding Deterrence: Breakdown of the Indo-Pacific Supplemental Bill

2. What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?

3. A US strategy to trump China in SE Asia

4. Hamas official says group would lay down its weapons if a two-state solution is implemented

5. U.S. sent ATACMS missiles to Ukraine following Russia's use of N.K. missiles: White House

6. The Syrsky War: Ukraine’s Supreme Commander Is Betting on Drones, Patience and Discipline

7. ‘We need to move fast’: Pentagon sends Ukraine $1 billion in new aid

8. Russians Doubled Drones on Front Line in Past 3 Months – Ukrainian Pravda

9. The goal of 100K artillery shells per month is back in sight, Army says

10. $1B U.S. Air Package To Ukraine On Its Way, ATACMS Missiles Already Secretly Provided

11. Marine Corps Force Design: In Defense of Chowder II by Gary Anderson

12. Iran is weaker than we think

13. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 24, 2024

14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2024

15. Meritocracy and the Great Power Competition

16. DON’T FORGET ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST

17. Opinion | Why campus protests against Israel probably won’t be effective

18. China’s Intelligence Shakeup Boosts Information Warfare

19. What Barbie Teaches Us About Tactics versus Strategy

20. Extrajudicial killing in Kenya reveals CIA's covert role in global counterterrorism operations

21. Pentagon disputes report of firefight following Abbey Gate bombing

22. Could Emerging Technologies Have Helped to Avoid the Tragic Killing of Humanitarian Workers in Gaza?

23. America’s Economy Is No. 1. That Means Trouble.

24. A More Comprehensive Plan to Push Back Against China’s Fishing Practices

25. US Special Forces are prioritizing Stinger missile training again

26. Katherine Maher’s Color Revolution

27. The Harding Project: A Re-Introduction

28. A Dangerous Game Is Underway in Asia

29. Calling All Wargamers & Wicked Problems Writing Contest | Mad Scientist Laboratory

1. Funding Deterrence: Breakdown of the Indo-Pacific Supplemental Bill

The table with the breakdown is at this link: https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/04/funding-deterrence-breakdown-of-the-indo-pacific-supplemental-bill/

I would be interested to know what is being funded with O&M funds. Also I am curious about this category, "Contribution to the International Development Association" and how the funds will be used with this description "for a contribution to the International Development Association Special Program to Enhance Crisis Response Window." What are the specific actions that will be funded and to what intended effect?

Funding Deterrence: Breakdown of the Indo-Pacific Supplemental Bill - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Connor Fiddler April 23, 2024

In October 2023, the White House requested emergency supplemental appropriations for Fiscal Year 2024 to provide additional aid to Ukraine, Israel, and the Indo-Pacific. After months of debate, the House of Representatives passed an emergency $8.1 billion supplemental appropriations bill to support Indo-Pacific priorities. The content is very similar to the Senate version, and President Joe Biden has stated that he supports the bill. While media reports have labeled this bill as Taiwan aid, the actual provisions have a much more significant impact beyond Taiwan.

Submarine Industrial Base

For decades, American naval shipbuilding has stagnated. According to a new report commissioned by Secretary of the Navy Del Toro, the Navy faces years of delays for several major shipbuilding projects. Defense budget cuts, skilled-labor shortages, confusing demand signals, and supply chain challenges have all contributed to the crisis. Submarine shipbuilding has particularly suffered. The United States has recently produced 1.2 Virginia-class submarines a year, well below the required production rate of two a year. The White House’s plan to sell three to five submarines to Australia under the AUKUS trilateral has increased concerns about domestic shipbuilding capacity and fleet size. Using the White House’s request as a guide, the House emergency supplemental addresses some lingering concerns about maritime infrastructure.

In total, $3.3 billion has been appropriated to support the submarine industrial base. While this investment will certainly bolster deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, it will have a much more immediate impact on American jobs. $1.9 billion was designated for the construction of a Columbia-class submarine and $200 million for a Virginia-class submarine. The vast majority of this money will be spent in the United States. Groton, Connecticut and Newport News, Virginia are the two largest submarine shipyards and will benefit from this influx of cash. However, Groton and Newport News will not be the only beneficiaries. More than 16,000 suppliers across all 50 states contribute to the submarine industrial base and will benefit from this new appropriation. Additionally, $7 million was appropriated for research and development, supporting numerous laboratories and research facilities.

Nearly half of the Indo-Pacific appropriations directly reinforce the submarine industrial base. While this investment will enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the immediate impact will be supporting the American economy.

Talking Tough and Doing Tough

One of the most significant line items is $2 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) “for assistance for the Indo-Pacific region and for related expenses.” Despite many in Washington raising concerns about Chinese coercion toward Taiwan, only recently has Congress taken commensurate actions to support Taiwan.

FMF aid is a critical tool for supporting American allies and partners. FMF allows designated nations “to purchase US defense articles, services, and training through either foreign military sales or, for a limited number of countries, through the foreign military financing of direct commercial contracts program.” The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 was the first time Congress authorized the provision of FMF for Taiwan: up to $2 billion a year in direct loans and loan guarantees and up to $2 billion a year in grant assistance through FY2027. However, the grant assistance was not appropriated. In June 2023, the Biden Administration approved FMF assistance for the first time to Taiwan. It remains unclear if the Biden Administration will use all $2 billion appropriated.

Looking Ahead

As US military support for Ukraine has starkly shown, the US defense industrial base has atrophied over the years. Fixing these issues now is preferable to doing so during a contingency. The considerable investment in the submarine industrial base is promising. Additionally, the $2 billion allocation of FMF to Taiwan indicates that Congress is getting more serious about supporting Taiwan’s defense. Washington must build off this supplemental. In general, military shipbuilding remains slow and insufficient. While FMF loans are helpful, appropriators should allow for FMF grants to better bolster Taiwan’s military. The passing of this emergency supplemental is a much-needed victory.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

Image: US Navy

Connor Fiddler

Connor Fiddler is the Associate Deputy Director for the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

fpri.org · by Connor Fiddler

2. What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?

Some fascinating data. See the charts and tables at this link: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/04/23/what-are-americans-top-foreign-policy-priorities/

The military and foreign policy establishment seems to think the Global War on terroism is over. In fact, I believe USSOCOM is the only command that continues to prioritize terrorism and countering violent extremist organizations as a major priority and line of effort But the American people place defense against terrorism as a top priority.

USSOCOM:

Integrated deterrence in accordance with the National Defense Strategy 60%

Crisis response 20%

Countering terrorosm/violent extremist organizations 20%

These lines of effort are not mutually exclusive - integrated deterrence activities and crisis response also have implications for countering terrorism and violent extremist organizations.

What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?

pewresearch.org · by Jacob Poushter and Laura Clancy · April 23, 2024

Protecting the U.S. from terrorism and reducing the flow of illegal drugs are top issues overall, but Democrats and Republicans have very different priorities

President Joe Biden arrives at the G20 Leaders’ Summit on Oct. 30, 2021, in Rome. (Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)

How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this analysis to better understand Americans’ long-range foreign policy priorities. For this analysis, we surveyed 3,600 U.S. adults from April 1 to April 7, 2024. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

Americans have a lot on their plates in 2024, including an important election to determine who will remain or become again president. But the world does not stop for a U.S. election, and multiple conflicts around the world as well as other issues of global prominence continue to concern Americans.

When asked to prioritize the long-range foreign policy goals of the United States, the majority of Americans say preventing terrorist attacks (73%), keeping illegal drugs out of the country (64%) and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (63%) are top priorities. Over half of Americans also see maintaining the U.S. military advantage over other countries (53%) and preventing the spread of infectious diseases (52%) as primary foreign policy responsibilities.

About half of Americans say limiting the power and influence of Russia and China are top priorities. A recent annual threat assessment from the U.S. intelligence community focused heavily on those countries’ strengthening military relationship and their ability to shape the global narrative against U.S. interests.

Fewer than half of Americans say dealing with global climate change (44%) and getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order (42%) are top priorities. The partisan gaps on these two issues are quite large:

• 70% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say climate change should be a top priority, while 15% of Republicans and Republican leaners say this.
• 54% of Republicans say getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order should be a top priority, compared with 33% of Democrats.

About four-in-ten Americans see limiting the power and influence of North Korea and Iran as top priorities. (The survey was conducted before Iran’s large-scale missile attack on Israel on April 13.) And about a third say the same about the U.S. being a leader in artificial intelligence, a technology that governments around the world are increasingly concerned about.

When it comes to goals that focus on international engagement, like strengthening the United Nations and NATO or finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fewer than a third of Americans mark these as top foreign policy priorities.

Only about a quarter of Americans prioritize promoting human rights in other countries, leading other countries in space exploration and reducing military commitments overseas. And similar shares say supporting Ukraine (23%) and Israel (22%) are top issues.

At the bottom of this list of foreign policy priorities are promoting global democracy (a major policy push from the Biden administration) and aiding refugees fleeing violence around the world – about two-in-ten Americans describe these as top concerns. These assessments come amid a recent global surge in asylum claims. Still, in Center surveys, democracy promotion has typically been at the bottom of Americans’ list of foreign policy priorities, even dating back to George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s administrations.

Overall, a majority of Americans say that all 22 long-range foreign policy goals we asked about should be given at least some priority. Still, about three-in-ten Americans say supporting Israel (31%), promoting democracy (28%) and supporting Ukraine (27%) should be given no priority.

The long-range foreign policy priority questions were also asked in 2018 and 2021, and since then there have been some significant shifts in responses:

• Since 2018, the public has become significantly more likely to say limiting the power and influence of China (+17 percentage points) and finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (+11) are top foreign policy priorities.
• Americans have also increased the emphasis they place on limiting the power and influence of Russia, particularly in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (+8 points since 2021).
• On the decline since 2018 are strengthening the UN and aiding refugees (-8 points each), reducing foreign military commitments (-6), and promoting and defending human rights in other countries (-5).
• Preventing the spread of infectious diseases is down 19 percentage points since 2021 – during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic – and about back to where it was in 2018.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted April 1-7, 2024.

The survey of 3,600 U.S. adults shows that foreign policy remains a partisan issue. Republicans prioritize the prevention of terrorism, reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the country, and maintaining a military advantage over other nations. Meanwhile, Democrats prioritize dealing with climate change and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), but also preventing terrorist attacks.

There are also stark age differences on many of the policy goals mentioned, but for the most part, young adults are less likely than older Americans to say the issues we asked about are top priorities. The exceptions are dealing with climate change, reducing military commitments overseas, and promoting and defending human rights abroad – on these issues, 18- to 29-year-olds are significantly more likely than older Americans to assign top priority.

Even with these priorities, foreign policy generally takes the backset to domestic policy for most Americans: 83% say it is more important for President Joe Biden to focus on domestic policy, compared with 14% who say he should focus on foreign policy.

Americans are even less likely to prioritize international affairs than they were in 2019, when 74% wanted then-President Donald Trump to focus on domestic policy and 23% said he should focus on foreign policy.

Differences by partisanship

Americans’ foreign policy priorities differ greatly by party. The largest divide, by a significant margin, is the 55 percentage point gap between Democrats and Republicans on dealing with global climate change (70% vs. 15%, respectively, see it as a top priority).

Supporting Ukraine, aiding refugees, reducing the spread of diseases, protecting human rights, and strengthening the UN are also issues on which Democrats are at least 20 points more likely than Republicans to prioritize. For example, 63% of Democrats say reducing the spread of infectious diseases is a top priority, compared with 41% of Republicans.

Republicans prioritize supporting Israel, reducing the flow of illegal drugs and maintaining a military advantage over other countries – among other security and hard power issues – significantly more than Democrats do. For example, more than half of Republicans (54%) say getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order should be a top focus in foreign policy. Only a third of Democrats say the same.

The priority assigned to several issues is divided even further by ideology within parties. Take support for Israel and Ukraine as examples. Supporting Israel is generally a higher priority for Republicans than Democrats, but within the Republican Party, 48% of conservatives say it’s a top concern, while 18% of moderates and liberals agree. Previous Center research shows that conservative Republicans are especially likely to favor military aid to Israel.

Supporting Ukraine, something Democrats emphasize more than Republicans, is a top priority particularly for liberal Democrats (47%), while about three-in-ten moderate and conservative Democrats agree (29%). Democrats have also shown more willingness than Republicans to provide aid to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia.

Generally, the partisan differences on the importance of several foreign policy issues have gotten smaller since 2021, when most of these questions were last fielded. This is especially true for items related to the relative power of major countries, like the U.S. maintaining a military advantage and limiting the power and influence of both Russia and China.

However, finding a solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians – a priority that saw no partisan difference at all when it was last asked about in 2018 – has an emerging partisan gap today. The share of Democrats who call this a top priority has more than doubled, while the share of Republicans has changed little.

Differences by age

Age differences persist on foreign policy issues. Older Americans prioritize most of the issues we asked about at higher rates than those ages 18 t0 29.

On four issues, there is at least a 40 percentage point gap between Americans ages 65 and older and young adults ages 18 to 29. The oldest Americans are more likely to prioritize reducing the flow of illegal drugs, limiting the power and influence of China and Iran, and maintaining a U.S. military advantage.

Those in the oldest age group are also more concerned than their younger counterparts on an additional 11 issues, ranging from support for Israel to U.S. leadership in space exploration.

For their part, young adults are more likely to say dealing with global climate change, reducing U.S. military commitments overseas, and promoting and defending human rights in other countries should be top foreign policy priorities.

Even starker patterns appear when looking at partisanship within two age groups – adults ages 18 to 49 and those 50 and older.

Among Democrats, older adults place particularly high priority on supporting Ukraine, strengthening NATO, and limiting the power and influence of Russia amid its war with Ukraine. Older Democrats are also more likely than younger ones to prioritize preventing the development of WMDs, curbing the spread of diseases, strengthening the UN and promoting democracy around the world, among other issues.

Among Republicans, those ages 50 and older are more likely than those ages 18 to 49 to prioritize supporting Israel, limiting the power and influence of Iran and China, getting other countries to assume more foreign policy costs, reducing the amount of illegal drugs entering the U.S., preventing terrorism, and maintaining a military advantage.

pewresearch.org · by Jacob Poushter and Laura Clancy · April 23, 2024

3. A US strategy to trump China in SE Asia

These "simple" recommendations should be key elements to support a free and open IndoPacific strategy.

Excerpts:

By promoting and legitimizing multilateral coordination, we help make partner nations more cohesive and less dependent on China for economic sustenance. This builds confidence in the US and increases opportunities for multilateral coordination on issues with China, leveling the playing field.

Increasing intelligence-sharing, expanding cooperation and presence, and promoting multilateralism in Southeast Asia will enhance the region’s resiliency and remind them that the US is a committed and enduring partner.

These simple initiatives will build confidence, shift perceptions in Southeast Asia and foster trust and partnership with the US, countering China’s influence in the region.

A US strategy to trump China in SE Asia - Asia Times

A few simple initiatives could shift prevailing regional perceptions in favor of US over China

asiatimes.com · by David Geaney · April 24, 2024

The US can enhance trust and partnerships in Southeast Asia and change the region’s prevailing attitudes toward the great powers by focusing on three key pillars: intelligence-sharing, presence and multilateralism.

The region is home to key current and potential US allies and partners who are most vulnerable to Chinese influence and power projection, making perceptions particularly crucial during this time of great power competition.

Elites in Southeast Asia currently view China as having more influential economic, political, and strategic power than the US or any other entity, according to “The State of Southeast Asia 2023” report by the Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

Many decisions made by elites and leaders in Southeast Asia are influenced by these perceptions, so the US must work on changing how it is perceived. Fortunately, there are a few simple initiatives that can quickly alter how Southeast Asia views the US, all of which can be implemented almost immediately.

Intelligence-sharing

The US should establish an intelligence-sharing network with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, specifically with Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. This network will enable the US to quickly communicate Chinese subversive tactics with partner nations and increase transparency.

The goal is for each country to realize the benefits of multilateralism when dealing with China. Intelligence sharing will also demonstrate that the US is a reliable strategic partner with the interests of allies and partners in mind.

We can already see the success of increased information sharing through what Sealight’s Ray Powell and Dr Benjamin Goirigolzarri coined the Philippines’ “assertive transparency” initiative, where China’s aggressive tactics are exposed for the region and the world to see.

This initiative has fostered cooperation between the Philippines and Vietnam and brought international attention to other Southeast Asian nations countering Chinese aggression.

Visibility of Chinese tactics and US-driven predictive analysis will encourage collaboration among ASEAN member states, providing leverage in negotiations with China that single states would not have only working bilaterally.

Being Present

The US already supports countries in Southeast Asia through various means, from foreign aid to humanitarian assistance, joint military patrols, exercises, and exchanges. Simply being present often inspires faith and confidence.

We should further integrate civilian institutions and military organizations with Southeast Asian partner nations to build interoperability and mutually beneficial relationships. The more people and governments in Southeast Asia see Americans helping them, the more likely they will recognize the benefits of expanding the relationship with the US.

However, delivering aid and being physically present is not enough; the US needs to do a better job of highlighting the support it provides.

The US does a poor job of marketing the aid it provides, its purpose and impact to other countries. I remember an occasion during the pandemic when I worked with the State Department to deliver a plane full of Covid supplies to a country in Southeast Asia, only to have it overshadowed by a Chinese public relations campaign highlighting a much smaller support package.

The benefits of the aid and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific should be communicated better to domestic audiences, the recipient country’s public and government, and the international community. Making sure countries know where aid comes from will help them remember the US as a reliable partner.

This will garner public support that could influence government decision-makers in favor of the US.

Promoting multilateralism

In 2010, while speaking to the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi famously declared “China is a big country and you are small countries, and that is a fact.” This veiled threat aimed to intimidate the gathered nations into falling in line with China’s wishes.

To counter this, the US must strengthen multinational organizations like ASEAN or encourage the development of what Richard Heydarian calls “minilateral” cooperation to overcome the region’s historic paralysis on important issues.

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By promoting and legitimizing multilateral coordination, we help make partner nations more cohesive and less dependent on China for economic sustenance. This builds confidence in the US and increases opportunities for multilateral coordination on issues with China, leveling the playing field.

Increasing intelligence-sharing, expanding cooperation and presence, and promoting multilateralism in Southeast Asia will enhance the region’s resiliency and remind them that the US is a committed and enduring partner.

These simple initiatives will build confidence, shift perceptions in Southeast Asia and foster trust and partnership with the US, countering China’s influence in the region.

Major David Geaney is an Air Force Logistics Readiness Officer who has had multiple assignments and deployments to the Middle East and Pacific region. His articles on China have been published in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Foreign Policy, Task & Purpose, and Defense News. He has also been a featured panelist for the International Studies Association and a guest on Air University’s Indo-Pacific Visions.

The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force or US government.

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asiatimes.com · by David Geaney · April 24, 2024

4. Hamas official says group would lay down its weapons if a two-state solution is implemented

Excellent political and information warfare by Hamas. They may be trying to seize the moral high ground knowing full well they will never get this therefore they will never have to lay down their arms. To counter this, we must recognize Hamas' strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack it with a superior political warfare and information campaign.

Hamas official says group would lay down its weapons if a two-state solution is implemented

BY ABBY SEWELL

Updated 1:30 AM EDT, April 25, 2024

AP · April 25, 2024

ISTANBUL (AP) — A top Hamas political official told The Associated Press the Islamic militant group is willing to agree to a truce of five years or more with Israel and that it would lay down its weapons and convert into a political party if an independent Palestinian state is established along pre-1967 borders.

The comments by Khalil al-Hayya in an interview Wednesday came amid a stalemate in months of cease-fire talks. The suggestion that Hamas would disarm appeared to be a significant concession by the militant group officially committed to Israel’s destruction.

But it’s unlikely Israel would consider such a scenario. It has vowed to crush Hamas following the deadly Oct. 7 attacks that triggered the war, and its current leadership is adamantly opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state on lands Israel captured in the 1967 Mideast war.

Al-Hayya, a high-ranking Hamas official who has represented the Palestinian militants in negotiations for a cease-fire and hostage exchange, struck a sometimes defiant and other times conciliatory tone.

Speaking to the AP in Istanbul, Al-Hayya said Hamas wants to join the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by the rival Fatah faction, to form a unified government for Gaza and the West Bank. He said Hamas would accept “a fully sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the return of Palestinian refugees in accordance with the international resolutions,” along Israel’s pre-1967 borders.

If that happens, he said, the group’s military wing would dissolve.

“All the experiences of people who fought against occupiers, when they became independent and obtained their rights and their state, what have these forces done? They have turned into political parties and their defending fighting forces have turned into the national army,” he said.

Khalil al-Hayya, a high-ranking Hamas official who has represented the Palestinian militant group in negotiations for a cease-fire and hostage exchange deal, speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, in Istanbul, Turkey, Wednesday, April 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Over the years, Hamas has sometimes moderated its public position with respect to the possibility of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. But its political program still officially “rejects any alternative to the full liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea” — referring to the area reaching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, which includes lands that now make up Israel.

Al-Hayya did not say whether his apparent embrace of a two-state solution would amount to an end to the Palestinian conflict with Israel or an interim step toward the group’s stated goal of destroying Israel.

There was no immediate reaction from Israel or the Palestinian Authority, the internationally recognized self-ruled government that Hamas drove out when it seized Gaza in 2007, a year after winning Palestinian parliamentary elections. After the Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Palestinian Authority was left with administering semi-autonomous pockets of the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

The Palestinian Authority hopes to establish an independent state in the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Gaza — areas captured by Israel in the 1967 Mideast war. While the international community overwhelmingly supports such a two-state solution, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hard-line government rejects it.

The war in Gaza has dragged on for nearly seven months and cease-fire negotiations have stalled. The war began with the deadly Oct. 7 attack on southern Israel in which Hamas-led militants killed about 1,200 people, mostly civilians. Militants dragged some 250 hostages into the enclave. The ensuing Israeli bombardment and ground offensive in Gaza has killed more than 34,000 Palestinians, most of them women and children, according to local health authorities, and displaced some 80% of Gaza’s population of 2.3 million.

Khalil al-Hayya, a high-ranking Hamas official who has represented the Palestinian militant group in negotiations for a cease-fire and hostage exchange deal, sits in front of a backdrop showing the old city of Jerusalem during an interview with The Associated Press, in Istanbul, Turkey, Wednesday, April 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Israel is now preparing for an offensive in the southern city of Rafah, where more than 1 million Palestinians have fled to.

Israel says it has dismantled most of the initial two dozen Hamas battalions since the start of the war, but that the four remaining ones are holed up in Rafah. Israel argues that a Rafah offensive is necessary to achieve victory over Hamas.

Al-Hayya said such an offensive would not succeed in destroying Hamas. He said contacts between the political leadership outside and military leadership inside Gaza are “uninterrupted” by the war and “contacts, decisions and directions are made in consultation” between the two groups.

Israeli forces “have not destroyed more than 20% of (Hamas’) capabilities, neither human nor in the field,” he asserted. “If they can’t finish (Hamas) off, what is the solution? The solution is to go to consensus.”

In November, a weeklong cease-fire saw the release of more than 100 hostages in exchange for thousands of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. But talks for a longer-term truce and release of the remaining hostages are now frozen, with each side accusing the other of intransigence. Key interlocutor Qatar has said in recent days that it is undertaking a “reassessment” of its role as mediator.

Most of Hamas’ top political officials, previously based in Qatar, have left the Gulf country in the past week and traveled to Turkey, where Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Saturday. Al-Hayya denied a permanent move of the group’s main political office is in the works and said Hamas wants to see Qatar continue in its capacity as mediator in the talks.

Israeli and U.S. officials have accused Hamas of not being serious about a deal.

Al-Hayya denied this, saying Hamas has made concessions regarding the number of Palestinian prisoners it wants released in exchange for the remaining Israeli hostages. He said the group does not know exactly how many hostages remain in Gaza and are still alive.

But he said Hamas will not back down from its demands for a permanent cease-fire and full withdrawal of Israeli troops, both of which Israel has balked at. Israel says it will continue military operations until Hamas is definitively defeated and will retain a security presence in Gaza afterwards.

“If we are not assured the war will end, why would I hand over the prisoners?” the Hamas leader said of the remaining hostages.

Khalil al-Hayya, a high-ranking Hamas official who has represented the Palestinian militant group in negotiations for a cease-fire and hostage exchange deal, speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, in Istanbul, Turkey, Wednesday, April 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Al-Hayya also implicitly threatened that Hamas would attack Israeli or other forces who might be stationed around a floating pier the U.S. is scrambling to build along Gaza’s coastline to deliver aid by sea.

“We categorically reject any non-Palestinian presence in Gaza, whether at sea or on land, and we will deal with any military force present in these places, Israeli or otherwise … as an occupying power,” he said.

Al-Hayya said Hamas does not regret the Oct. 7 attacks, despite the destruction it has brought down on Gaza and its people. He denied that Hamas militants had targeted civilians during the attacks — despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary — and said the operation succeeded in its goal of bringing the Palestinian issue back to the world’s attention.

And, he said, Israeli attempts to eradicate Hamas would ultimately fail to prevent future Palestinian armed uprisings.

“Let’s say that they have destroyed Hamas. Are the Palestinian people gone?” he asked.

___

AP reporter Khalil Hamra in Istanbul contributed to this report.

AP · April 25, 2024

5. U.S. sent ATACMS missiles to Ukraine following Russia's use of N.K. missiles: White House

It is interesting that we are using the north Korea missiles to Russia as contributing rationale for this.

Yes, I am biased with my north Korea focus but trying to be objective, I find that it is north Korea that is connected to nearly every conflict in the news, from Putin's war in Ukraine to support to Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen, and Syria. north Korea has to be one of the worst malign actors in the international community today. north Korea is proliferating a wide range of weapons and training to conflict areas in the Middle East and Africa.

U.S. sent ATACMS missiles to Ukraine following Russia's use of N.K. missiles: White House | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 24 (Yonhap) -- The United States has shipped longer-range tactical missiles to Ukraine for use in the fight against Russian forces following Moscow's use of North Korean ballistic missiles against the war-torn country, the White House confirmed Wednesday.

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said that in February, President Joe Biden directed his aides to provide Ukraine with a "significant" number of the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles for use inside the Ukrainian territory and that the shipments have arrived in the country.

"(The arrival) followed Russia's procurement and use of North Korea's ballistic missiles against Ukraine, as well as Russia's renewed and escalating attacks against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine," Sullivan told a press briefing.

He added that Washington plans to send more missiles, but he did not specify the shipment volume due to "operational reasons."

"I believe they will make a difference," he said.

This file photo, released by Reuters, shows White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan speaking during a press briefing at the White House in Washington on April 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

The missile deliveries came before the U.S. House of Representatives voted Saturday to endorse a US$95 billion aid package for Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan and others in an approval that ended a monthslong political impasse.

The provision of the missiles with a range of about 300 kilometers marked a policy shift. Sullivan said that the U.S. was unable to send ATACMS missiles due to "readiness concerns."

"But behind the scenes, the administration across the board has worked relentlessly to address those concerns," he said. "We now have a significant number of ATACMS coming off the production line and entering U.S. stocks, and as a result, we can move forward with providing ATACMS, while also sustaining the readiness of the U.S. armed forces."

Sullivan warned that the "path ahead" will not be easy as Russia will double down on its attacks. But he expressed confidence in Ukrainians' endeavors to repel invaders.

"Over time, we assess that Ukraine's position in this conflict will improve, and we believe that Ukraine can and will win," he said. "As I've said from this podium before, no one in this room, and no one anywhere else should underestimate the Ukrainian people, and no one should underestimate President Biden's resolve and the American people's resolve."

Asked to comment on suspected military ties between North Korea and Iran, Sullivan pointed to "linkages" in defense cooperation between the two countries.

"Episodically, over the course of many years and many administrations, we've seen various linkages in defense cooperation between North Korea and Iran that's come and gone, ebbed and flowed," he said.

What is new or different over the course of the last two years is cooperation between Russia and Iran and between Russia and North Korea, Sullivan noted.

"We believe that this is a matter of grave concern to the security of Europe, way beyond the borders of Ukraine," he said. "We're also concerned about what may happen in the other direction. What is Russia going to provide to North Korea or Iran that will destabilize the Indo-Pacific or destabilize the Middle East?"

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2024

6. The Syrsky War: Ukraine’s Supreme Commander Is Betting on Drones, Patience and Discipline

A fascinating look at the commander and his apparent strategy.

Excerpts:

Ukraine’s strategy of military counterpunching and making the Kremlin pay in blood for every meter gained seems to have become less crisis management, and more the basic structure of the Syrsky plan.

An ethnic Russian with a background in artillery, and old enough (59) to have fought in Afghanistan for the Soviet Union back in the 1980s, General Oleksander Syrsky on Feb. 8 took over the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) under siege. He replaced Valery Zaluzhny, a general popular with troops and the public.

Artillery ammunition had run catastrophically short. Russia had total air superiority. Defeat was staring Syrsky in the face, particularly, in the battleground city of Avdiivka, where battered Ukrainian troops have struggled to hold positions against relentless Russian attacks.

At the same time, relations between the AFU leadership and President Volodymyr Zelensky had, if not broken down, been badly damaged by news reports that Zaluzhny was possibly considering a run for the Presidency. For the past year, Zelensky’s office had been bypassing Zaluzhny and issuing orders to about half the forces the AFU had in the field.

Fast forward 85 days and Oleksander Syrsky has already made some military history. He commands the first military, ever, that is not just waging a conventional ground war with drones – rather than tanks or artillery or bombs – but also a fighting organization that has turned robot aircraft carrying explosives into the main weapon used to kill and wound the enemy and destroy his equipment. In past major wars artillery and mortar shells have dominated the battlefield and have typically been responsible for 80-90 percent of losses.

The Syrsky War: Ukraine’s Supreme Commander Is Betting on Drones, Patience and Discipline

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · April 25, 2024

Three months after General Syrsky took overall command Ukraine’s soldiers are still fighting backfooted, hitting Russia with fierce losses but losing ground. That may be the plan.

by Stefan Korshak | April 25, 2024, 1:10 pm

Ukrainian Armed Forces commander Oleksandr Syrsky (L, holding drone) inspects a locally manufactured reconnaissance robot plane at an undisclosed testing site. A top priority for Syrsky since taking over command of Ukraine’s Armed Forces in February 2023 has been to prioritize combat drone use and production. Official photograph published on Syrsky’s personal Telegram page on April 7. Ukraine Defense Minister Rustem Umerov (R, smiling) is observing.

Ukraine’s strategy of military counterpunching and making the Kremlin pay in blood for every meter gained seems to have become less crisis management, and more the basic structure of the Syrsky plan.

An ethnic Russian with a background in artillery, and old enough (59) to have fought in Afghanistan for the Soviet Union back in the 1980s, General Oleksander Syrsky on Feb. 8 took over the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) under siege. He replaced Valery Zaluzhny, a general popular with troops and the public.

Artillery ammunition had run catastrophically short. Russia had total air superiority. Defeat was staring Syrsky in the face, particularly, in the battleground city of Avdiivka, where battered Ukrainian troops have struggled to hold positions against relentless Russian attacks.

At the same time, relations between the AFU leadership and President Volodymyr Zelensky had, if not broken down, been badly damaged by news reports that Zaluzhny was possibly considering a run for the Presidency. For the past year, Zelensky’s office had been bypassing Zaluzhny and issuing orders to about half the forces the AFU had in the field.

Fast forward 85 days and Oleksander Syrsky has already made some military history. He commands the first military, ever, that is not just waging a conventional ground war with drones – rather than tanks or artillery or bombs – but also a fighting organization that has turned robot aircraft carrying explosives into the main weapon used to kill and wound the enemy and destroy his equipment. In past major wars artillery and mortar shells have dominated the battlefield and have typically been responsible for 80-90 percent of losses.

Other Topics of Interest

The New Mobilization Law. How and Why It Will Help the Army

The long-awaited law on mobilization will take effect in May. Despite criticism of some specific points, most agree that it is a necessary step toward mobilizing all of Ukraine.

A Ukrainian drone screen grab shows five Russian BTR armored personnel transporters, two BMP infantry fighting vehicles and a single T-80 tank knocked out in a space roughly the size of a basketball court, in a field geo-located to the western approaches to the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka. Russian forces captured the city in February after more than six months of assaults. Following the city’s loss, Ukrainian troops have mostly contained Russian attempts to advance westwards by hitting Kremlin troops with limited artillery barrages supported by kamikaze drone swarms. Image published on General Oleksandr Syrsky’s personal Telegram channel on March 15. The tank, probably a T-80BVM, is fitted with anti-drone protective panels on the roof and along its tracks.

In the first quarter of 2024, according to statements by Syrsky’s command group, first-hand accounts by drone operators to Kyiv Post reporters, and an April 9 article in the Foreign Policy journal, fully two-thirds of the Russian tanks lost to the Kremlin, in recent months, were put out of action by drones. According to Russian POW accounts, every second Russian soldier wounded or killed in combat in Ukraine, at least, was targeted and hit by a Ukrainian drone.

According to Zelensky’s office, Ukrainian engineers and volunteers working in garages and underground factories are assembling an astounding 60-80,000 cheap FPV drones a month. In some veteran AFU brigades like the elite 36th Marines and the Kyiv-raised 3rd Assault, for every two battalions of infantry the formation fields, now a full battalion of drone operators also is in the field.

Time magazine Oct. 17 cover 2022 profiling General Syrsky’s predecessor, Valery Zaluzhny, six months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A career officer since 1997, Zaluzhny was lionized in western media for most of his 18-month wartime tour as the commander of Ukraine’s armed forces. Troops generally praised for a sense of humor, but sometimes criticized him for ordering ground held at the price of heavy losses. Zaluzhny’s most controversial command decision was to halt bloody frontal attacks against prepared Russian positions in June 2023 during the early stages of a long-awaited counteroffensive Ukraine’s western allies had hoped would end the war quickly.

Syrsky in March threw the 3rd Assault into a spoiling attack around Avdiivka to push Russian forces back temporarily and allow another, badly damaged brigade to break contact and avoid encirclement. Then Syrsky pulled the 3rd Brigade back and Russian forces captured the city and declared a victory. The fight was tough, but drone swarms and infantry did the job.

It was one of the first times in nearly nine months the AFU had launched an entire brigade into combat, and then managed to extricate it, to preserve another fighting formation.

Discipline in less well-commanded units has, on Syrsky’s watch, become a staff focus, and sometimes previously untouchable heads have rolled. According to reports first published by the major Ukrainian news magazine Ukrainska Pravda, in early April portions of the 67th Brigade – a unit formed mostly from politically connected fighters from the nationalist Right Sektor group – abandoned positions in the Chasiv Yar sector under heavy Russian pressure.

This posed Syrsky and his staff with a typical AFU command problem: By AFU common practice neither the soldiers nor commanders would be held accountable because they all were patriotic volunteers, and the AFU was chronically short of troops.

Official photographs of Ukraine’s top military commander General Oleksander Syrsky during a front-line visit to an air assault brigade in mid-April, in the Avdiivka sector.

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Confronting politically influential volunteers in a way Zaluzhny never did, Syrsky dissolved the brigade without further ado. In peacetime, the decision might have triggered angry protests in the capital. In April 2024, the 67th was stricken from AFU unit rolls and the war went on.

Russian military observers are reporting the AFU they face now seems laser-focused on waiting for the right moment to pile up Russian bodies and cares less about holding ground. The pro-Kremlin milblogger Vault 8 in an April 14 post, citing combat information from the front, wrote:

“The [Ukrainians] leave a position then they start hitting it with everything possible. Between battles, they don’t shoot much at all and that gives the impression they have nothing to shoot with. But if we come out and attack one of their positions everything pours down, from 120mm [mortars] to 155mm [NATO-standard howitzers]. And many FPV drones – from two to four attack each of our soldiers, to get a sure kill. And when the [Ukrainians] observe us trying to pull back, they counterattack immediately, to recover what they lost.”

Syrsky in an extensive March 29 interview with the state Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform said that his goal with maximum drone use is not just to reduce Ukrainian casualties but to cut troop numbers needed on the front lines, and to gain breathing space so soldiers sometimes serving on the front lines for two years can get rest and leave.

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Ukrainian Armed Forces commander General Oleksandr Syrsky (L) shakes hands with Lithuania’s Chief of Defense Valdemaras Rupšys during talks in Kyiv on April 23. Although less of a public figure than his predecessor Valery Zaluzhny, Syrsky has continued a Ukraine military policy of meeting regularly with top NATO nation officers for coordination and demonstration of international military support to Ukraine.

The Russian air threat, although not defeated, has been degraded significantly, Syrsky said in a March 29 interview with the state-run Ukrinform news agency. Taking a calculated risk of placing air defense weapons along the front line at an unexpected site able to attack Russian aircraft paid dividends, AFU missile operators shot down 13 Russian planes in a matter of days including a pair of irreplaceable A-50 AEW&C (airborne early warning and control) surveillance and air command and control planes, he said.

A longer-term goal, Syrsky said, is to change the shape of military planning from something like a fire brigade racing from crisis to crisis, to a professional organization where a chain of command functions and fighting efficiency is the priority. Higher echelons of the AFU will see replacements by combat-experienced officers, he said.

“In some cases, when the commander is not in control of the situation, and the actions and commands directly pose a threat to the life and health of subordinates, I am forced to make personnel decisions,” Syrsky said in part.

In early April comments, Syrsky estimated that Russian artillery firepower is likely to outgun Ukraine’s by six to one for months to come notwithstanding Western commitments to deliver shells. Russian air strikes will continue until Ukraine gets real air defenses or an effective air force of its own. Syrsky said his objective until summer at least is to rebuild the AFU, induct thousands of new soldiers, give veterans a chance to rest and take leave, and train the lot.

In the official policy interview on AFU policy and plans, Syrsky never used the word “victory” – not even once.

Zelensky named Zaluzhny Ukraine’s ambassador to Britain on Monday.

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Stefan Korshak

Stefan Korshak is the Kyiv Post Senior Defense Correspondent. He is from Houston Texas and is a Yalie. He has worked in journalism in the former Soviet space for more than twenty years, and from 2015-2019 he led patrols in the Mariupol sector for the OSCE monitoring mission in Donbass. He has filed field reports from five wars and enjoys reporting on nature, wildlife and the outdoors. You can read his blog about the Russo-Ukraine war on Facebook, or on Substack at https://stefankorshak.substack.com, or on Medium at https://medium.com/@Stefan.Korshak

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · April 25, 2024

7. ‘We need to move fast’: Pentagon sends Ukraine $1 billion in new aid

‘We need to move fast’: Pentagon sends Ukraine $1 billion in new aid

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · April 24, 2024

Just after President Joe Biden signed his long-sought national security supplemental, the Pentagon announced a new batch of security aid for Ukraine.

Valued at $1 billion, this package is the largest sent to Kyiv in almost half a year. It features a host of equipment, including air defense interceptors, armored vehicles, anti-tank weapons and artillery rounds — among which are cluster munitions.

“We need to move fast, and we are,” Biden said from the White House Wednesday.

In addition, the Pentagon confirmed Wednesday the U.S. sent Ukraine long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, earlier this year. Biden made the decision in February, and the missiles were included in a $300 million package gathered from savings on various weapons contracts in March.

The missiles arrived this month, kept secret “to maintain operational security for Ukraine at their request,” said Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Col. Garron Garn. Kyiv had sought the missiles for more than a year, in part to push Russian forces farther back.

Aside from that package, the Pentagon hasn’t given Ukraine any aid since December, when it ran out of money to replace anything it sent. The administration requested a massive round of supplemental funding in the fall, but it sat mired in Congress until this week.

What forced it through was largely the dire situation in Ukraine. Earlier this month, head of U.S. European Command Gen. Chris Cavoli told lawmakers that Russia could fire five artillery rounds to every one Ukraine could return.

“That will immediately go to 10 to one in a matter of weeks,” Cavoli said.

Cavoli and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said this month Russia has been able to rebuild its forces faster than the U.S. expected and even expanded its frontline forces to 470,000, or an army 15% larger than before the war.

The combination of Russia’s quick rebuilding and Ukraine’s dwindling stocks threatened a crisis on the front lines, one the supplemental is meant to avoid.

CIA Director Bill Burns warned this month Russia could win on the battlefield — or at least force a favorable political settlement — by the end of 2024 without U.S. funding.

This set of aid is far larger than even those sent late last year, when the Pentagon still had money to replenish its stocks. While waiting for Congress to act, Pentagon officials planned a ready-to-go package filled with Ukraine’s most pressing needs.

“This package will surge munitions, weapons, and equipment forward to support Ukraine’s ability to defend its frontlines, protect its cities, and counter Russia’s continued attacks,” read a Pentagon announcement.

The $95 billion supplemental bill includes around $48 billion in Ukraine-related funding for the Pentagon. Some $23 billion of that will go to replenishing stocks the U.S. sends to Kyiv.

“Regardless of what anyone says, we are gaining the support we need to continue protecting lives from Russian attacks,” Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy wrote on X, formerly Twitter, on Wednesday.

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

8. Russians Doubled Drones on Front Line in Past 3 Months – Ukrainian Pravda

Excerpts:

The number of Russian drones has doubled, and Ukraine’s jammers can’t cope

Ukraine is preparing a technological response to the Russians

Drones have changed military tactics forever

Russians Doubled Drones on Front Line in Past 3 Months – Ukrainian Pravda

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · April 25, 2024

Ukrainian troops are suffering significant losses from the Russian army’s massive drone use.

by Kyiv Post | April 25, 2024, 1:36 pm |

A Ukrainian serviceman looks at the sky for drones, on March 27, 2023, amid Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Aris Messinis / AFP)

Over the past three months, the Russians have at least doubled the number of drones they’re using on the Russo-Ukrainian front line, Ukrainian Pravda (UP) reported Thursday, April 25.

The number of Russian drones has doubled, and Ukraine’s jammers can’t cope

Not only has the number of drones doubled, but the Russians are modernizing them, making them harder to spot and destroy in time, UP reported, citing sources in the Ukrainian military.

“Updated UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] are difficult to identify and are ‘silent’ for radio-electronic warfare [EW] tools because they are programmed for specific frequency ranges,” one of the sources said.

“Roughly speaking, we did EW systems on the 900 MHz range. This was enough. But now the orcs [a derogatory term for Russian soldiers] are doing drones with a range of 700–1000 MHz. So the radio tools we’ve built are ineffective,” the source said.

Ukraine is preparing a technological response to the Russians

UP sources in the Cabinet of Ministers, however, said that work is underway to create a single system that will be able to collect information about changes in the frequency of enemy drones, so manufacturers can quickly adjust EW’s.

“Radio-electronic warfare has to be constantly modernized. It is a crazy technological race that demands fast responses to the enemy’s adjustments. If you stop – you’ll lose,” a source in the Cabinet of Ministers told UP.

Drones have changed military tactics forever

It is no longer news that military tactics are rapidly transforming in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Drones in particular are changing warfare.

Currently, there are so many drones patrolling the skies above the front line in Ukraine that Ukrainian and Russian troops are practically unable to move anywhere unnoticed.

Kyiv recently purchased and handed over two thousand domestically produced jamming devices to its defensive forces.

The state is also intensively working on improving its own attack drones. As reported by Militarnyi, on April 13, President Volodymyr Zelensky was presented with a new barrage Ukrainian-made ammunition capable of striking targets more than 100 kilometers (62 miles) away

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · April 25, 2024

9. The goal of 100K artillery shells per month is back in sight, Army says

Some good news?

The goal of 100K artillery shells per month is back in sight, Army says

The new supplemental renews the push to boost production sixfold since Russia’s Ukraine invasion.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

The U.S. Army is on a path to triple its monthly production of 155mm shells following the passage of the Ukraine supplemental, its vice chief of staff said today.

“With the supplemental that just thankfully passed last night, we’ll be at 100,000 rounds by next summer,” Lt. Gen. James Mingus said at an event hosted by think-tank CSIS.

That’s more than three times the 30,000 shells that the service’s factories are expected to turn out this month, Mingus said, and will represent a sixfold increase since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Army officials have said reaching their 100,000-round goal depended on $3.1 billion requested in a previous version of the Ukraine supplemental.

The service is expanding production facilities and planning new ones in Arkansas, Kansas, and Texas, Army acquisition chief Doug Bush said last year. Artillery shells are among the few munitions whose production is controlled by the U.S. government, not purchased from private contractors.

Investments to a production facility in Texas “increased the throughput and the productivity of the number of shells by 83 percent,” said General Dynamics CEO Phebe Novakovic in an earnings call Wednesday. General Dynamics operates artillery manufacturing plants on behalf of the Army.

The ramp-up marks a sharp contrast to 155mm manufacturing in Europe, which is managed by private companies. European governments ordering shells for Ukraine must compete with non-European customers and cannot directly order manufacturers to expand or improve production facilities.

In January, EU chief diplomat Josep Borrell said the bloc would miss its goal of delivering one million 155mm rounds to Ukraine by March, and reset the estimated delivery date to the end of 2024. Rounds ordered today from European manufacturers take at least a year to get to Ukraine, according to Kusti Salm, Estonian defense ministry’s top civil servant.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said in February that Ukraine was firing around 2,000 shells per day, while Russia was firing three times that amount. Ukraine uses a mix of NATO-designed 155mm and 105mm shells, plus Soviet-designed 152mm and 122mm shells.

In testimony to Congress earlier this month, European Command chief Gen. Chris Cavoli said that Russia was outshooting Ukraine at a rate of five to one, and would soon outshoot Ukraine ten to one without further U.S. assistance.

Artillery shells will be part of a new $1 billion tranche of various types of military aid to Ukraine announced Wednesday by the White House. Officials did not say how much of that would go toward 155mm artillery rounds, which cost roughly $3,000 apiece. But if, say, one-quarter of the funds are devoted to artillery, the roughly 80,000 rounds that would buy would last Ukraine just six weeks—and that only at their current reduced rate of fire.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

10. $1B U.S. Air Package To Ukraine On Its Way, ATACMS Missiles Already Secretly Provided

The Pentagon was leaning far forward on ATACMS. 

Capabilities of the package are listed below.

$1B U.S. Air Package To Ukraine On Its Way, ATACMS Missiles Already Secretly Provided

The package, which includes artillery shells, HIMARS and air defense munitions, comes as Russia is increasing pressure on Ukraine.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

PUBLISHED APR 24, 2024 1:35 PM EDT

twz.com · by Howard Altman · April 24, 2024

The Pentagon on Wednesday announced a new $1 billion package of arms for Ukraine, which includes badly needed artillery rounds, munitions for U.S. donated M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and air defense systems. At the same time, it is coming to light that the U.S. has already supplied additional ATACMS ballistic missiles to Ukraine, and reportedly, for the first time, longer-range variants, under a secret transfer operation, the works of which we have seen recently.

The announcement came moments after President Joe Biden said during a White House speech that he had signed into law a $95 billion national security supplemental aid package that includes about $61 billion for Ukraine. It passed the House on Saturday, and the Senate approved it Tuesday.

The equipment, much of it already stationed in neighboring European countries, is expected to start flowing into Ukraine quickly, Biden said.

"I'm making sure the shipments start right away," said Biden. "In the next few hours, literally in a few hours, will begin sending equipment to Ukraine for air defense munitions, for artillery for rocket systems and armored vehicles."

The new Pentagon aid package is the 56th round tranche of equipment provided from the Defense Department to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority, which means it is coming from existing U.S. stocks.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

• RIM-7 and AIM-9M missiles for air defense;
• Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
• Small arms and additional rounds of small arms ammunition, including .50 caliber rounds to counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS);
• Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm artillery rounds, including High Explosive and Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions rounds;
• 105mm artillery rounds;
• 60mm mortar rounds;
• Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles;
• Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs);
• High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
• Logistics support vehicles;
• Tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment;
• Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Precision aerial munitions;
• Airfield support equipment;
• Anti-armor mines;
• Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
• Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing; and
• Night vision devices; and
• Spare parts, field equipment, training munitions, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.

The new aid package includes an unspecified amount of additional 155mm artillery shells. (U.S. Army photo) US Army

While the Pentagon did not specify which types of HIMARS munitions it will provide Ukraine, the law Biden signed requires the transfer of longer-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missile variants that are fired by HIMARS systems "as soon as practicable." Those are able to hit targets up to 186 miles (300 kilometers). Previous versions of the weapon sent to Ukraine were earlier types capable of significantly less range, of around 103 miles, and carried only cluster munitions.

CNN reported that the aid package will likely contain the longer-range ATACMS, but additional reporting from multiple outlets now states that those munitions have already been secretly sent to Ukraine.

Ukraine been using the very limited number of these weapons it has received to devastating effect, and most recently used the longer-range variants in an attack on Russian air defense systems in Crimea last week, according to Reuters.

As we noted in our story about that attack, there was a seeming gap in Ukrainian ATACMS launches. The first tranche of about 20 ATACMS short-range variants arrived in Ukraine in October and were apparently mostly used during attacks on Russian-held airfields the same month. Since then, we haven't seem much evidence that additional ATACMS were on hand and the lack of U.S. aid supported the idea that no more were handed over. Then the strike on Russia's airbase occurred, which pointed to a new delivery. So it seems as if additional examples were delivered clandestinely. In addition, today's media accounts gives added context to previous reports in March that additional (cluster-warhead versions) of ATACMS were headed to Ukraine.

Dzhankoi Air Base, which is home to multiple helicopters, tactical jets, and high-end ground-based air defense systems, came under a Ukrainian attack April 17. PHOTO © 2024 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION. PHOTO © 2024 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION.

Marine Lt. Col. Garron Garn, a Pentagon spokesman, would not confirm whether the longer-range ATACMS were included in the package or say how many of the other items are heading to Ukraine.

"Unfortunately, we’re not able to provide additional details to what is already listed in the release," he told The War Zone. "We do not provide the number of munitions, or variants/models in some cases, for operational security considerations and to preserve the tactical advantage for Ukraine on the battlefield."

Whether the U.S. imposes target restrictions on the use of the longer-range ATACMS if they are provided remains to be seen. Those weapon can hit targets well into Russia as well as all of occupied Crimea and the U.S. in the past has asked Ukraine not use its donated arms against targets across the border.

The package that Biden signed into law Wednesday also includes billions for Israel and Taiwan. It "comes on the heels of an announcement by the U.K. on Tuesday, pledging an additional $620 million in new military supplies for Ukraine, including long-range missiles and 4 million rounds of ammunition," according to the AP.

The U.S. measure came after months of U.S. internal political turmoil, which delayed support for Ukraine, which is facing an increasingly tough fight.

Ukrainian officials and U.S. backers of the funding measure have been warning that the lack of assistance from Washington has imperiled Kyiv's forces, which are desperately low on ammunition, particularly 155mm shells and air defense munitions.

Ukraine has seen Russia attempting to make advances across the front, especially in Donetsk Oblast around the towns of Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka and Donetsk City. Those attempts have been helped by Ukrainian ammunition shortages.

With Ukrainian air defense munitions in short supply as well, Russia has been better able to use its tactical aviation to help its ground troops. A recent example is the push toward the town of Ocheretyne near Avdiivka.

"In preparation for this move, Russian aviation conducted air strikes with FAB glide bombs on Ukrainian positions along the planned Russian axis of advance and the Ukrainian-held town of Ocheretyne," the Ukrainian Euromaidan Press news outlet reported Wednesday.

Russia has also been hitting Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure with air, sea and ground-launched missiles, as well as drones. While the new aid package does not include Patriot air defense munitions, it does include RIM-7 Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles, which as we noted previously were integrated onto the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ existing Soviet-era Buk air defense systems. It also includes AIM-9 Sidewinders, which have been incorporated into so-called FrankenSAM air defense systems. You can read more about those here.

The new package also includes an unspecified number of Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The U.S. has already provided Ukraine with more than 200 Bradleys, but a large number of them have already been lost. According to the Oryx open source tracking group, Ukraine has seen 34 Bradleys destroyed, 24 damaged, 14 abandoned and four captured. Those numbers could actually be higher, because Oryx only tabulates equipment for which it has visual confirmation.

Video of destroyed Bradleys first emerged on social media in June 2023, which you can see below.

Despite the ammo shortages, Ukraine has been able to inflict heavy casualties on Russian forces and, in limited cases, claw back some of its lost ground. However, without needed supplies, it remains questionable how long Ukraine can keep pushing back or defend against an expected increase in Russian offensive operations.

During his speech at the White House, Biden said Ukraine has been holding out despite the delay in U.S. help and while Russia's allies have been supplying it with arms and assistance.

"Putin's friends are keeping him well-supplied," said Biden. "Iran sent him drones, North Korea has sent him ballistic missiles and artillery shells. China has provided components and know how to boost Russia's defense production. With all the support, Russia has racked up with airstrikes against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Rained down munitions on brave Ukrainians defending their homeland. And now America is going to send Ukraine supplies they need to keep them in the fight."

Ukrainian officials have expressed tremendous gratitude for the help.

While the equipment may flow into Ukraine quickly, how soon and how much of a difference it will make remains to be seen.

"So we will see when all this cargo arrives in Ukraine," Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Defense Intelligence Directorate, told The War Zone. "We needed this cargo a long time ago. So it will be like fresh air for us now."

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

twz.com · by Howard Altman · April 24, 2024

11. Marine Corps Force Design: In Defense of Chowder II by Gary Anderson

Colonel Anderson should get an award for best opening lines/paragraph. 

Marine Corps Force Design: In Defense of Chowder II

By Gary Anderson

April 25, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/04/25/marine_corps_force_design_in_defense_of_chowder_ii_1027312.html

Ian Whitfield is a part time U.S. Army military police officer and a graduate student at Georgetown University. As a cop, he should know how dangerous it is to blunder into a family domestic dispute without knowing the culture he is encountering. Mr. Whitfield decided to weigh in on an internal Marine Corps dispute in a recent piece in this publication. He accuses a group of retired Marine Corps general officers calling themselves "Chowder II" of undermining the current Marine Corps' leadership and damaging the future recruiting efforts of the organization. I disagree with his analysis and would like to explain why.

First, let me state clearly that I am not a part of Chowder II. I agree with their goals, but we sometimes disagree on methods to attain the goals. The namesake of Chowder II was an informal organization dedicated to saving the Marine Corps from efforts by senior U.S. Army officers and President Harry Truman to emasculate a service that had played a major part in winning World War II in the Pacific. They called themselves "The Chowder and Marching Society". Through newspaper articles and adroit congressional lobbying, they were able to save the Marine Corps and turn it into the ongoing force in readiness that it became until 2020, 

The crux of the conflict is that the former commandant, General David Berger, implemented a radical change in the organization and focus of the Marine Corps from a world-wide naval rapid reaction force capable of accomplishing missions in the planet's most likely trouble spots into a force concentrated primarily on China in the South China Sea (SCS). Berger's vision was to have marines armed with anti-ship missiles occupy small islands and islets in what is called the First Island Chain designed to confine the Chinese Navy to the SCS in the event of a conflict. He planned to buy the anti-ship missiles and associated with his concept called "Force Design 2030,” recently changed to "Force Design." If the general had asked for additional assets to take aboard this new mission, there would likely not have been a major internal struggle. Instead, he adopted a "divest to invest" strategy that gave up previously essential capabilities considered necessary to do traditional -and needed- Marine Corps missions. These included all of its tanks much conventional artillery, assault breaching assets, and much of its infantry as well as aviation assets.

Mr. Whitfield’s' first objection to the Chowder group is that they are undermining the legitimacy of the Marine Corps by causing internal dissent and argues that is not the job of retired officers. There is indeed internal dissent, but it is not limited to the retired community. If one reads the Chowder discussion blog "Compass Points" there is an insurgent group of active duty marines -some fairly senior- who believe FD is folly. They cannot openly dissent because they are under a not so subtle gag order to keep their views to themselves. The senior leaders of the Marine Corps have made themselves illegitimate. Their approach is Stalinist.

Mr. Whitfield's second objection to Chowder II is that it discourages innovation in the Marine Corps. The Corps has been a leader in innovation, and many of the former general officers involved in Chowder II were key in some of the most innovative accomplishments of the 20th century such as the development of maneuver warfare and advanced urban operations. Those innovations were accompanied by healthy -and sometimes heated- internal debate. They also involved war games and force-on-force field experiments where some truly bad ideas were discarded. None of that happened in the development of Force Design. It was the idea of the commandant. He convened a small, trusted group of trusted and discreet advisors, who wrote the concept and then directed a series of classified war games where the participants were sworn to secrecy and forced to sign non-disclosure agreements. A recent Marine Corps Times investigative article casts grave doubts as to the legitimacy of those games that "validate": Force Design.

I was the Director of the Marine Corps Experimental Unit which expanded into the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, and later became its Chief of Staff of that organization. We prided ourselves in trying new concepts and admitting when they failed. This approach was entirely missing in the Force Design concept. We consulted with experts in innovation such as the late Dr. Williamson Murray and Andrew Marshall Director of OSD Net Assessment) to try to cross check our results. There is no evidence that such an approach was used in the development of Force Design, but since the proceedings are classified, we will probably never know.

Mr. Whitfield’s final attack on Chowder is that it discourages Marine Corps recruitment. Frankly, I would not encourage my grandkids to join an organization that has a flawed doctrinal approach that might get them unnecessarily killed. Force Design is bad doctrine, bad operational art, and bad tactics.

Chowder II is trying to have the kind of open and honest debate that should have been conducted before Force Design was implemented. This is not a case of a group of disgruntled retirees resisting change. The Marine Corps is a family, and families occasionally feud. Cops like Mr. Whitfield are best advised to stay out of the line of fire.

Gary Anderson lectures on Alternative Analysis at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

12. Iran is weaker than we think

This is the best description of the Israeli response I have read.

Excerpts:

Israel’s response was on the smallest possible scale but calculated to terrify the regime: an aircraft penetrated all the way to Isfahan, much further from Israel than Tehran, to drop a token UAV next to the Uranium Hexafluoride plant — the country’s major nuclear installation, most incautiously placed in the centre of the city whose population would suffer huge casualties from the highly corrosive poisonous gas if the plant were bombed.

With the exception of Algeria that is absorbed in its own traumas and Libya that has never recovered from its civil war, every Arab Sunni state in the Middle East welcomed the outcome of the aerial war — in which the Jordanian air force actually took part shooting down Iran’s drones — because all of them can and do coexist with Israel, while they abhor the threat of Shia and Persian domination.

As for Iran’s military chiefs, their standard of success is so low that, in the immediate aftermath of the failed aerial offensive, Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, declared that Iran “has achieved all of its goals”. He then unwisely added a vainglorious threat: “If the Zionist regime or its supporters demonstrate reckless behaviour, they will receive a decisive and much stronger response.” It was the sort of comment that gives effrontery a bad name. Iran’s strategists know perfectly well that if they ever come close to assembling a nuclear weapon, Israel will not hesitate to strike first with its manned and unmanned airpower. That too is a reason for the Sunni alliance, perhaps best symbolised by the uninterrupted flights of Air Dubai and Ittihad to Tel Aviv that persisted even as both US and European airlines repeatedly cancelled their own.

Iran is weaker than we think

 Despite Obama's mistakes, Israel retains the upper hand

unherd.com · by Edward Luttwak · April 22, 2024

It is only now, almost 16 years since Obama first entered the White House with the private determination to end Iran’s “death to America” hostility at all costs, that his Iran policy has achieved the exact opposite of what he had wanted: direct warfare, with US fighters intercepting Iran’s bombardment drones. All along, it was a policy that had two different faces: one perfectly reasonable, and the other perfectly delusional.

The delusional part stemmed from the mistaken belief that the US could persuade the Tehran regime to abandon its “death to America” hostility. Perhaps because he relied on his law-school buddy Robert Malley (whose extreme hostility to Israel did not make him an Iran expert), Obama failed to see that, by the time he set out to win it over, the regime’s blend of oppression and institutional corruption had lost it the support of most Iranians. Unmoored from popular opinion, it had instead become entirely dependent on the professional extremists of the Revolutionary Guards, the much larger Basij militia, and the most politicised clerics.

This is why all attempts at mutual reconciliation under Obama were doomed to fail, in spite of two successive nuclear accords and the wholesale lifting of sanctions. Even if Iran’s leaders had wanted to reciprocate they could not abandon their performative hostility to the US, because Iranians at large are so hostile to the theocratic regime that many even tell pollsters that they have renounced Shi’a Islam altogether: visitors report empty mosques in all but the poorest neighbourhoods.

Partly because Obama compelled Biden to take on Malley as his own Iran coordinator (until he lost his security clearance), the Biden Administration moved very fast to repudiate Trump’s hostility to the Ayatollah’s regime, going overboard in its own attempt at reconciliation. One example is sufficient: the Houthi militia that is Iran’s proxy in Yemen, which the US Navy is now battling in the Red Sea, was unilaterally removed from the terrorist list in exchange for nothing at all, merely to signal to Tehran that the Obama courtship of the regime was being renewed after the Trump interval.

The reasonable, even wise, part of Obama’s policy was to disabuse Washington of the illusion that Iran could be knocked off the board as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had been, with a quick march to Tehran by a couple of US divisions. Of course it is a much bigger country (almost four times as large, with twice the population), but the real difference lies in the fact that Iran’s statecraft is derived from the country’s pre-Islamic and imperial past, not from its extremist religion. Those principles are so deeply ingrained in the country’s political culture that even the ruling religious fanatics are high-functioning imperial operatives when it comes to diplomacy and war.

They know how to manipulate foreign perceptions of Iran to suit their aims; for example, they successfully simulated a very warm conviviality with the US negotiators they privately resented, while in confrontations they know how to go right to the edge, without falling into the abyss. Consider how Iran Air still operates out of London several times a week, despite the route being used by Tehran’s goons to fly in, attack dissidents, and return home with a quick taxi-ride to Heathrow. Knowing that the UK Foreign Office is desperate to keep its embassy and its diplomats in Tehran (to have something the US lacks), the regime perpetrates all manner of abuses secure in the knowledge there will be no retaliation.

Most significantly, Iran’s leaders were given the time and the oil revenues to recruit the Shi’a militias from Lebanon to Yemen now holding the Middle East to ransom. Ever since the fall of the Shah in 1979 — for which Khomeini successfully obtained support in the West by pretending that he was a persecuted humanist— Iran’s campaign to dominate the region has been vigorously pursued. To succeed, the regime had to somehow overcome the deepest schism in the Islamic world by persuading Sunni Arabs that the Sunni-Shia divide was less important than their collective hatred for the Jews, and that the ancestral hostility between Arabs and Persians was less important than their shared hostility to Israel. In the meantime, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards revealed true imperial skills in turning Arabic-speaking recruits in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen into obedient soldiers ready to fight for Iran’s aggrandisement — much as the British Army did in India with native troops. In fact, the power of the Revolutionary Guards within the regime steadily increased because of the military strength it generated with its abundant, cheap and, above all, expendable molokh khor “lizard-eater” Arab manpower (Ever since the huge losses of the Iraq war, Iran has been very casualty-sensitive).

But the Revolutionary Guards finally failed strategically because their Arab recruitment policy was so successful that it overshot the culminating point of success: seeing the historic Sunni capital of Damascus under Shia domination, and Baghdad the very seat of the Sunni Arab Caliphate ruled by Iran’s agents, Sunni Arab states from Morocco to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which had repeatedly fought Israel from 1948, moved to abandon their hostility, openly or discreetly. And while the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war on October 7 gained no goodwill for Israel or the Jews, Israel’s overall response proved that it has the strength to resist Iran’s imperial ambitions. When an Israeli air strike decapitated the Revolutionary Guard expeditionary high command gathered in Damascus on April 1, by killing its chief and his entire staff, not a word of criticism was heard in the Sunni Arab world.

Iran’s response was an all-out air offensive with hundreds of ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles. But this very expensive attack failed most miserably, wounding just one Israeli, a seven-year-old Bedouin, and inflicting only trivial damage to the non-functional edge of a runway.

“Israel’s response proved that it has the strength to resist Iran’s imperial ambitions.”

Israel’s response was on the smallest possible scale but calculated to terrify the regime: an aircraft penetrated all the way to Isfahan, much further from Israel than Tehran, to drop a token UAV next to the Uranium Hexafluoride plant — the country’s major nuclear installation, most incautiously placed in the centre of the city whose population would suffer huge casualties from the highly corrosive poisonous gas if the plant were bombed.

With the exception of Algeria that is absorbed in its own traumas and Libya that has never recovered from its civil war, every Arab Sunni state in the Middle East welcomed the outcome of the aerial war — in which the Jordanian air force actually took part shooting down Iran’s drones — because all of them can and do coexist with Israel, while they abhor the threat of Shia and Persian domination.

As for Iran’s military chiefs, their standard of success is so low that, in the immediate aftermath of the failed aerial offensive, Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, declared that Iran “has achieved all of its goals”. He then unwisely added a vainglorious threat: “If the Zionist regime or its supporters demonstrate reckless behaviour, they will receive a decisive and much stronger response.” It was the sort of comment that gives effrontery a bad name. Iran’s strategists know perfectly well that if they ever come close to assembling a nuclear weapon, Israel will not hesitate to strike first with its manned and unmanned airpower. That too is a reason for the Sunni alliance, perhaps best symbolised by the uninterrupted flights of Air Dubai and Ittihad to Tel Aviv that persisted even as both US and European airlines repeatedly cancelled their own.

Professor Edward Luttwak is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.

13. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 24, 2024

​

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-24-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear divided on whether to resume attacks targeting US forces.
• Iran: Iran is continuing to collaborate with other revisionist countries, such as Russia and North Korea, to advance their mutual agendas and undermine the West.
• Gaza Strip: Several Israeli defense and security officials told international media outlets that the IDF is fully prepared for a clearing operation into Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF Air Force conducted a “broad attack” on approximately 40 Lebanese Hezbollah targets around Aita al Shaab, near the Israel-Lebanon border.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 24, 2024

Apr 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, April 24, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Kelly Campa, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear divided on whether to resume attacks targeting US forces. Emirati state media reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH) is advocating for the resumption of attacks but that some militia leaders disagree with KH, citing unidentified Iraqi political and security sources.[1] Emirati state media furthermore reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, did not approve the recent attacks on US forces on April 21 and 22, citing unidentified sources “close to Baghdad and [the Iranian-backed Iraqi] armed factions.”[2] These reported fissures are consistent with other recent reports that KH announced the resumption of attacks on US forces on April 22 and then later rescinded the announcement.[3] KH pushing to restart attacks on American forces is unsurprising, moreover, since the group previously disputed orders from the IRGC Quds Force to halt attacks on US targets in February 2024.[4] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq (True Promise Corps) separately criticized unspecified Shia leaders on April 18 for abandoning their efforts to expel US forces, possibly suggesting that the group similarly wants to resume attacks.[5]

KH and other militias supporting the resumption of attacks are responding at least partly to the recent visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to Washington, DC. Sudani discussed bilateral security cooperation with US officials during his visit, and his administration signaled that it had arrived at a timeline for the end of the US-led international coalition mission in Iraq.[6] KH’s push to resume attacks suggests that it is dissatisfied with Sudani following the visit. Sudani does not seek the removal of US forces, as CTP-ISW previously reported, placing him at odds with some of the Iranian-backed Iraqi factions, including KH. These fissures highlight the risk that KH and other militias could resume regular attacks on US positions independently.

Iran is continuing to collaborate with other revisionist countries, such as Russia and North Korea, to advance their mutual agendas and undermine the West. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, on April 24 while attending the 12th Russian International Security Summit in St. Petersburg.[7] Ahmadian and Patrushev signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to deepen bilateral security cooperation during their meeting.[8] Iran separately hosted a state delegation from North Korea on April 23, marking the first to visit Tehran since 2019.[9] North Korean External Economic Relations Minister Yun Jong Ho led the delegation, which is particularly noteworthy given his prominent involvement in North Korean cooperation with Russia.[10] Yun Jong Ho met with a Russian delegation in Pyongyang in December 2023 and later traveled to Moscow in March 2024.[11] This flurry of meetings highlights the extent to which Iran, Russia, and North Korea are cooperating on several fronts in pursuit of their revisionist ambitions.

Iranian officials could discuss military and nuclear cooperation, among other things, with the North Korean delegation in Tehran. Iran and North Korea have a long history of such cooperation that began in the 1990s with the Iranian purchase of North Korean missile technologies.[12] Some Western analysts have hypothesized that Iran could provide drones and/or energy products to North Korea in exchange for help with the Iranian missile and nuclear programs.[13] Pyongyang could furthermore seek to learn from the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel and the performance of Iranian systems against US and partner air defenses.

Iran and North Korea are separately aligned in their military support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Iran has provided drones and other forms of support to Russia, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively.[14] North Korea has similarly given ballistic missiles to Russian forces to use against Ukrainian targets. Russia had fired around 50 North Korean-sourced missiles as of March 2024, according to Ukrainian officials.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear divided on whether to resume attacks targeting US forces.
• Iran: Iran is continuing to collaborate with other revisionist countries, such as Russia and North Korea, to advance their mutual agendas and undermine the West.
• Gaza Strip: Several Israeli defense and security officials told international media outlets that the IDF is fully prepared for a clearing operation into Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF Air Force conducted a “broad attack” on approximately 40 Lebanese Hezbollah targets around Aita al Shaab, near the Israel-Lebanon border.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Local Palestinian sources reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip on April 24.[16] EIKfir Brigade (99th Infantry Division) previously raided Palestinian military infrastructure, including tunnel shafts, there on April 22. Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun on April 22 but did not claim attacks on April 24, which is consistent with the claim that Israeli forces withdrew from Beit Hanoun.[17] The IDF did not comment on its activity in the northern Gaza Strip on April 24.

Local Palestinian sources reported extensive Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire on Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip but no Israel ground force movement there on April 24. A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire targeted northern and central Beit Lahia overnight.[18] The IDF issued new evacuation orders for Beit Lahia on April 23, stating that Israeli forces would target Palestinian military infrastructure and “subversive elements” in the area.[19] The IDF has frequently used fire to shape dense urban terrain in the Gaza Strip before ground elements move into areas.[20]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations around the Netzarim corridor on April 23. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters and destroyed military infrastructure around the Netzarim corridor.[21] Israeli aircraft separately struck a tunnel shaft and several militia sites in the central Gaza Strip.[22] Hamas fighters mortared Israeli forces stationed on the Netzarim corridor in two separate attacks on April 24.[23]

Two IDF reservist brigades completed training and deployed to the Gaza Strip on April 24.[24] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on April 15 that the IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade and 679th Armored Brigade would secure the Netzarim corridor and the temporary US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip.[25] The two brigades will replace elements of the 162nd Division, including the Nahal Brigade, enabling the division to conduct raids in other parts of the Gaza Strip.[26]  The Nahal Brigade’s commanding officer said on April 23 that the brigade anticipates that it will depart the Netzarim corridor bases soon for Rafah.[27] Nahal Brigade soldiers said on April 23 that they are fortifying their positions along the Netzarim corridor as they expect Palestinian militias ”are trying to spoil our holidays with a high-quality attack” in the central strip.[28] Palestinian militias could try to exploit the planned transfer of responsibility from one unit to another to conduct a particularly significant attack of some kind.

The IDF Gaza Division directed airstrikes on over 50 targets across the Gaza Strip over the past day.[29]

Top Israeli military and intelligence officials met with Egyptian officials in Cario on April 24 about an Israeli operation into Rafah, according to sources cited by Axios.[30] The Israeli delegation included Shin Bet head Ronen Bar and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi who last met with Egyptian intelligence officials in mid-February.[31] Several Egyptian officials have spoken to international media about Israeli’s plans for Rafah. Israeli security officials are likely discussing the current plans for an operation into Rafah, given Israel’s intention to clear and station Israeli guards along the 14-kilometer-long strip of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip known as the Philadelphi corridor.[32] The IDF seeks to clear the corridor to subvert Palestinian militia’s smuggling and tunnel routes out of the Gaza Strip as part of the dismantling of Hamas.[33]

Several Israeli defense and security officials told international media outlets on April 24 that the IDF is fully prepared for a clearing operation into Rafah.[34] An Israeli defense official said that the IDF is only waiting for approval from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[35] Another senior Israeli official said the directive to begin evacuating civilians from Rafah is ”parked at his desk.”[36] Other Israeli government sources reported that the war cabinet ”planned to meet in the coming two weeks to authorize civilian evacuations,” which are expected to take about a month.[37] A spokesperson for Netanyahu’s government told Reuters that Israel was “moving ahead” with a ground operation but gave no timeline.[38]

Israeli officials told Axios that over 250,000 civilians have left Rafah since the IDF concluded its clearing operations around Khan Younis on April 7.[39] Senior US officials said that some of those people had returned to Rafah after they realized ”that the infrastructure and houses in Khan Younis were completely destroyed.”[40] Commercially available satellite imagery supports claims by Israeli officials that Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have established large tent shelters between Khan Younis and in the al Mawasi humanitarian area.[41]

The Palestinian Mujahadeen Movement conducted three rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on April 24. The militia targeted three separate towns.[42] The militia stated the rocket launches were meant to commemorate the death anniversary of the group’s founder.[43] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.[44]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 23.[45] PIJ fighters fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Nour Shams refugee camp.[46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades clashed with Israeli forces overnight in Beit Ummar, north of Hebron.[47] Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters also fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Askar refugee camp on April 24.[48]

The IDF reported that Israeli forces killed a Palestinian woman who tried to stab Israeli soldiers at a military checkpoint in Kiryat Arba, Hebron.[49]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 23.[50]

The IDF Air Force conducted a “broad attack” on approximately 40 Lebanese Hezbollah targets around Aita al Shaab, near the Israel-Lebanon border, on April 24.[51] The IDF targeted Hezbollah storage facilities, weapons depots, and unspecified militia infrastructure in the area with aircraft and artillery.[52] The IDF stated that the attack was part of the ongoing Israeli effort to destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure along the border and noted that Hezbollah makes ”extensive use” of the Aita al Shaab area to organize and conduct attacks into Israel.[53] Hezbollah released statements claiming that it conducted four attacks into northern Israel in retaliation for the Israeli airstrikes.[54]     

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated that the IDF has killed “half of Hezbollah’s commanders in southern Lebanon” during a visit to the IDF’s Northern Command in Safed, Israel, on April 24.[55] Gallant added that the remaining Hezbollah commanders have gone into hiding in other regions.[56] A Lebanese official “close to Hezbollah” refuted Gallant’s estimate to the Washington Post on April 24 and stated that the number of Hezbollah commanders killed by the IDF could be “counted on one hand.” [57] Gallant said that the IDF’s main objective in northern Israel is to allow displaced residents to return to their homes and that the IDF is considering “a number of alternatives” to accomplish the goal.[58]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Sri Lanka and expressed eagerness to deepen bilateral economic ties on April 24.[59] Raisi’s visit marks the first time that an Iranian president has traveled to Sri Lanka since 2008. Raisi met with Sri Lankan President and signed five memoranda of understanding (MOU) on media, technical, and tourism cooperation.[60] Raisi inaugurated a 514-million-dollar hydropower and irrigation project built by an Iranian contractor in Sri Lanka.[61] Raisi visited Sri Lanka immediately following his trip three-day trip to Pakistan.[62]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that Iran will turn sanctions into “opportunities” during a speech to Iranian workers on April 24.[63] Khamenei stated that the United States seeks to impose additional sanctions against Iran and disrupt the Iranian nuclear industry. Khamenei emphasized the importance of the individual worker to increase the overall economic output of the country and combat Western sanctions. Khamenei’s speech comes as Iran continues to face a severe economic crisis.[64] CNBC reported that the Iranian rial reached a record low of 705,000 to the dollar on April 14.[65] Khamenei separately reiterated regime support for the anti-Israel protesters in Western countries.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani criticized the United States for the treatment of anti-Israel protesters on college campuses in a statement on X (Twitter) on April 24.[66]

The Iranian judiciary sentenced a 33-year-old dissident to death on April 24 as part of an expanding crackdown on anti-regime attitudes. An Iranian revolutionary court sentenced Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi to death on the charge that he supported the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini protest movement in Iran.[67] The Iranian Supreme Court previously ruled against the death penalty for Salehi in 2023, and the judiciary instead sentenced him to over six years in prison. Salehi’s lawyer stated that the revolutionary court ignored the Supreme Court’s initial ruling and issued new charges against him.[68] Salehi has until May 14 to appeal the ruling. This ruling coincides with the regime launching a renewed crackdown on women not adhering to the mandatory hijab law in recent days.[69]

14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2024

Key Takeaways:

• US President Joe Biden announced on April 24 that the US will begin sending military equipment to Ukraine  “a few hours” after signing a bill that will provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine.
• The United States reportedly provided an unspecified number of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in March 2024, some of which Ukraine has already used to strike Russian targets in deep rear areas.
• The arrival of long-range ATACMS missiles in sufficient quantities will allow Ukrainian forces to degrade Russian logistics and threaten Russian airfields in deep rear areas, although months of delay may have provided the Russian military time to offset the potential operational impacts that ATACMS will afford Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against Russian energy and industrial facilities in Smolensk and Lipetsk oblasts on the night of April 23 to 24.
• Russian authorities arrested Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes, although other Russian sources reported that Ivanov is suspected of treason.
• Ivanov’s arrest prompted Russian information space speculation about a new round of personnel changes in the Russian military and claims that the arrest is part of Kremlin factional conflicts.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers largely celebrated Ivanov’s arrest and used it as an opportunity to publicly criticize the Russian MoD.
• The Kremlin explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and resume its pro-Kremlin alignment.
• Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova deliberately misrepresented recent Qatari-mediated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine as the first face-to-face negotiations on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly removed and deported by Russia, likely in an effort to minimize Russia’s responsibility for the coordinated removal and deportation of Ukrainian children.
• Moldovan authorities filed a criminal case against Yevgenia Gutsul, the Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, for campaign finance violations as Moldovan officials continue to warn about Russia’s threat to Moldova.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.
• Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated on April 24 that unspecified Russian officials will soon submit a draft law to the State Duma that would ban the extradition of foreigners who have fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine if the foreigners face prosecution for their military service in their home countries.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 24, 2024

Apr 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2024

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 24, 2024, 8:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on April 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Joe Biden announced on April 24 that the US will begin sending military equipment to Ukraine  “a few hours” after signing a bill that will provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine. Biden signed the Ukraine supplemental appropriations bill on April 24 after the US Senate passed the bill on the evening of April 23 and the US House passed the bill on April 20, and Biden emphasized the need to deliver military assistance to Ukraine as quickly as possible.[1] The Pentagon announced that the first tranche of US military assistance from this bill is worth $1 billion and includes: RIM-7 and AIM-9M air defense missiles; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; HIMARS ammunition; 60mm mortar rounds;  105mm and 155mm artillery shells; Bradley infantry fighting vehicles; High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs or Humvees); Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs); Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; precision aerial munitions; and other equipment and transport vehicles.[2] Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations east of Chasiv Yar and northwest of Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in an effort to take advantage of the limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine.[3] The bill’s relatively quick passage through the US Senate has eliminated a potential source of delay, however, and US security assistance may arrive at the frontline in Ukraine within the next few weeks ahead of Russian expectations. The battlefield situation will continue to degrade until Ukrainian forces can receive and use enough military equipment at scale, however, and Ukrainian forces may still struggle to defend against Russian efforts near Chasiv Yar and northwest of Avdiivka in the near term.[4]

The United States reportedly provided an unspecified number of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in March 2024, some of which Ukraine has already used to strike Russian targets in deep rear areas. Western media reported that senior US officials stated that the United States secretly shipped an unspecified number of ATACMS with a range of roughly 300 kilometers to Ukraine in March 2024.[5] A senior US official reportedly stated that Ukrainian forces have since conducted strikes with the ATACMS missiles against a Russian military base in occupied Crimea and an unspecified target east of occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking several radar systems for a Russian S-300 air defense system southeast of occupied Volnovakha (northeast of Berdyansk).[7] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions 10 times in Babakh-Tarama (immediately east of Berdyansk) on the night of April 23 to 24.[8] It is unclear if either of these strikes is the strike to which the US official was referring, and Ukrainian military officials have yet to confirm a Ukrainian strike near Berdyansk. Ukrainian forces appear to have used ATACMS missiles in a strike against a Russian military airfield in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea on the night of April 16 to 17 that reportedly destroyed or critically damaged four S-400 air defense launchers, three radar stations, an air defense equipment control point, and a Murom-M airspace surveillance system.[9] US officials told Western media that the United States will include additional long-range ATACMS missiles as part of the announced $1 billion tranche of security assistance for Ukraine.[10]

The arrival of long-range ATACMS missiles in sufficient quantities will allow Ukrainian forces to degrade Russian logistics and threaten Russian airfields in deep rear areas, although months of delay may have provided the Russian military time to offset the potential operational impacts that ATACMS will afford Ukraine. Ukraine used US-provided ATACMS long-range missiles to strike Russian targets in occupied Ukraine for the first time on October 17, 2023, targeting Russian airfields in occupied Berdyansk and Luhansk City.[11] Ukrainian forces likely aimed to disrupt Russian aviation support for localized Russian offensive efforts at the time but were not provided with enough ATACMS to conduct a sustained interdiction effort against Russian aviation assets at scale.[12] Cluster-munition-armed versions of the ATACMS missiles allow Ukrainian forces to conduct more efficient strikes against airfields that can more widely destroy Russian aircraft and other assets than individual missile strikes on individual aircraft.[13] These strikes may prompt Russian forces to relocate aircraft further away from the frontline, although this would likely be much more significant for Russian rotary-wing aircraft than for most Russian fixed-wing aircraft that have much longer ranges.[14] Russian forces used rotary-wing aircraft to significant effect when repelling Ukrainian mechanized assaults during Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast but have since employed far fewer rotary-wing aircraft in support of ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.[15] Russian forces are currently heavily using fixed-wing aircraft to conduct glide bomb strikes throughout the frontline, and the withdrawal of these aircraft to airfields further away from the front would likely only have marginal impacts on the loitering time Russian pilots have to conduct glide bomb strikes.[16]

The arrival of ATACMS long-range missiles could also pose a significant threat to Russian ammunition depots in rear areas and may force the Russian command to choose between fortifying existing depots and further dispersing depots throughout occupied Ukraine.[17] Russian forces may already have adapted to the potential new Ukrainian strike capabilities following the use of ATACMS in October 2023, although it remains unclear if Russian forces sufficiently hardened ammunition depots or widely dispersed depots.[18] The arrival of HIMARS in Ukraine in June 2022 allowed Ukrainian forces to conduct an operationally significant interdiction campaign in support of counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts and forced the Russian command to extend Russian logistics along longer ground lines of communications (GLOCs), which ultimately complicated the Russian provision of ammunition and supplies.[19] If the Russian command began efforts to offset the impacts of ATCAMS in October 2023, then Ukrainian ATACMS strikes in spring and summer 2024 may present fewer challenges to Russian logistics in Ukraine. Long-range ATACMS will, nonetheless, allow Ukrainian forces to threaten a wider set of Russian targets in deep rear areas, and Ukrainian forces can use the ATACMS to cause more substantial damage to Russian logistics facilities and critical bridges along key Russian GLOCs. Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics or Russian aviation assets in deep rear areas will likely be operationally significant, however, only if Ukrainian forces successfully coordinate them with ground operations to exploit the degraded Russian capabilities resulting from the strikes.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against Russian energy and industrial facilities in Smolensk and Lipetsk oblasts on the night of April 23 to 24. Unspecified sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on April 24 that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) successfully conducted drone strikes against oil depots in Yartsevo and Razdorovo, Smolensk Oblast.[20] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin stated that the drone strikes caused fires at fuel and energy facilities in two raions in Smolensk Oblast.[21] Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows fire and smoke at oil depots near Razdorovo and Yartsevo.[22] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that a drone fell in an industrial zone in Lipetsk Oblast on the night of April 23 to 24.[23] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that two drones struck the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant in Lipetsk City, damaging part of a building and forcing the plant to shut down two oxygen units.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted Ukrainian drones in Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Smolensk oblasts on the night of April 23 to 24.[25]

Russian authorities arrested Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes, although other Russian sources reported that Ivanov is suspected of treason. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on April 23 that Russian authorities detained Ivanov and are investigating whether he accepted bribes, and the Moscow Basmanny Court formally arrested Ivanov on April 24 for the bribery charge.[26] Ivanov has been responsible for property management, troop quartering, housing, and medical support for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) since 2016, and the Basmanny Court stated that Ivanov accepted bribes while conducting contract and subcontract work for the Russian MoD.[27] Russian authorities also arrested Ivanov’s alleged business partner Sergei Borodin for complicity in Ivanov‘s corruption.[28] Ivanov’s lawyer stated that the defense will appeal Ivanov’s arrest.[29] Russian media reported that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has been collecting case materials on Ivanov’s corruption for at least a month and possibly up to five years.[30] The FSB stated that FSB military counterintelligence is involved in the investigation into Ivanov, and Russian opposition sources noted that is not typical for the military counterintelligence department to handle corruption issues.[31]

Russian opposition media outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that two sources close to the FSB stated that Russian authorities suspect Ivanov of treason, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the FSB to detain Ivanov under the guise of bribery after convincing the FSB that Ivanov had committed treason.[32] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded to Vazhnye Istorii’s reporting, claiming that he knows nothing about whether Ivanov is charged with treason and calling for an end to speculation about Ivanov’s arrest.[33] Russian sources have yet to specify what Ivanov‘s suspected treason may be connected to. Ukrainian media reported that sources in Ukrainian intelligence stated that the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a cyber infiltration of MoD networks in March 2024 and obtained official documents and confidential information about Ivanov, prompting Russian authorities to start an investigation into Ivanov.[34] The GUR sources reportedly noted that the Kremlin was already aware of Ivanov’s corruption but did not elaborate on what the reported documents about Ivanov detailed.[35] ISW has yet to observe evidence confirming the allegations of treason.

Ivanov’s arrest prompted Russian information space speculation about a new round of personnel changes in the Russian military and claims that the arrest is part of Kremlin factional conflicts. Russian insider sources claimed that Ivanov was a supporter of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and that his arrest is likely part of an effort to diminish the power and influence that Shoigu has cemented over the MoD since the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023.[36] Russian insider sources differed on which faction is trying to undermine Shoigu’s position, however, with one claiming that First Deputy of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev targeted Ivanov because Ivanov had tried to fire Alekseyev and another Russian insider source claiming that a faction associated with Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev aims to disempower Shoigu.[37] A Russian insider source claimed that Russian oligarch Gennady Timchenko was Ivanov’s patron and that Timchenko routinely defended Ivanov to Putin.[38] A prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ivanov is part of a Kremlin faction that has been lobbying for a “soft exit“ from the war in Ukraine.[39] ISW has not observed a preponderance of Russian claims suggesting that Ivanov’s arrest is associated with a specific factional dispute, however. Russian sources labeled Ivanov’s arrest the first of many expected personnel changes, specifically for Russian deputy defense ministers.[40] A Russian milblogger called the arrest the start of a “purge” within Russian military departments.[41] ISW has not observed indications that the Russian military has begun large-scale dismissals or detentions of Russian military personnel, however.

Russian ultranationalist milbloggers largely celebrated Ivanov’s arrest and used it as an opportunity to publicly criticize the Russian MoD. Russian milbloggers largely called for Russian courts to bring Ivanov to justice for his crimes and lamented the Russian MoD’s failures throughout the war, describing the arrest of an MoD official as long overdue.[42] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger tempered the other milbloggers’ celebrations, asking how much has meaningfully changed since the Russian MoD replaced many other officials throughout the war, including cycling some defense and military officials between posts rather than firing them outright.[43] Other milbloggers noted that Ivanov’s arrest brings much-desired justice even if nothing changes and that Ivanov’s arrest presents an opportunity for the MoD to clean the ”Augean stables” of their filth and corruption.[44] One milblogger even called for Russian authorities to send Ivanov to fight in the “forests of Lyman” - referring to the highly attritional, infantry-led Russian assaults in forest areas west and south of Kreminna.[45] Russian milbloggers have not directly criticized the Russian MoD or officials by name with such vitriol or magnitude since before the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023 and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023.[46] The public nature of Ivanov’s arrest and charges appears to have opened the floodgates of broader Russian milblogger criticism of the Russian MoD, though it is unclear to what degree the milblogger community will sustain these complaints or return to its norm of self-censorship.

The Kremlin explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and resume its pro-Kremlin alignment. Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan announced on April 23 that he would not participate in the International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in St. Petersburg on April 24 and 25.[47] Grigoryan’s refusal to participate in a Russian-led multilateral meeting is likely part of a continuing Armenian effort to distance Armenia from political and security relations with Russia by freezing its participation in the CSTO and refusing to participate in multilateral political and security engagements.[48] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) board meeting on April 23 to discuss promoting Russian interests in the South Caucasus, in which he claimed that the West is attempting to strategically defeat Russia by destabilizing ”other parts of the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus.”[49] Lavrov blamed the West for allegedly attempting to undermine and destroy Russian security and economic relations with countries in the South Caucasus. Lavrov is likely attempting to portray Armenian efforts to deepen relations with the West as a deliberate hostile Western effort against Russia to set information conditions to justify any potential future Russian efforts to coerce or force Armenia to resume its pro-Russian alignment. The Russian MFA also explicitly threatened Armenia by claiming that the West is attempting to “drag the South Caucasus into a geopolitical confrontation” between Russia and the West and warning that Armenia could “go down the wrong path,” following Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s April 5 meeting with senior EU and US officials.[50] CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov (a Kazakh official) also directly threatened Armenia if it did not resume active engagement in the CSTO. Tasmagambetov stated in an interview published on April 24 that the CSTO is aware of NATO’s activity in the South Caucasus and that the CSTO Secretariat’s analysts indicate that the balance of power in the South Caucasus may change if Armenia leaves the CSTO.[51] Tasmagambetov stated that he hopes that the likelihood of a “confrontation” between the CSTO and Armenia is “no more than hypothetical” but that such a confrontation would require all parties to consider their resources and capabilities. Lavrov’s and Tasmagambetov’s threats against Armenia were made around the April 24 Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day indicating that Russia likely intended to tie a tragedy in Armenian history with Armenia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia.

Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova deliberately misrepresented recent Qatari-mediated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine as the first face-to-face negotiations on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly removed and deported by Russia, likely in an effort to minimize Russia’s responsibility for the coordinated removal and deportation of Ukrainian children. Lvova-Belova posted deliberately misleading photos and claimed on April 24 that Qatari officials mediated face-to-face negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Doha and that the Russian delegation agreed to return 29 forcibly deported Ukrainian children from Russia to Ukraine.[52] Lvova-Belova claimed that previous statements that Russian authorities have forcibly deported thousands of Ukrainian children are “nothing more than a myth” and that Qatar is a witness to the truth, the latest talking point in Lvova-Belova's efforts to downplay and censor information about Russia’s illegal removal of Ukrainian children within Russian-controlled territory.[53] Lvova-Belova stated in an October 2023 report that Russia has “accepted” over 700,000 Ukrainian children since February 24, 2022, and the Ukrainian government has confirmed the deportation and/or displacement of 19,546 Ukrainian children as of January 2024, however.[54] Ukrainian Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets explicitly denied Lvova-Belova's claim about face-to-face negotiations and stated that there were “no direct negotiations” between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations on April 24.[55] Lubinets clarified that Qatari officials mediate all discussions and act as intermediaries for all negotiations on the return of Ukrainian children from Russia. Lubinets stated that the Ukrainian delegation met with Qatari International Cooperation Minister Lolwah Rashid Al-Khater to discuss the return of Ukrainian children, civilians, and prisoners of war (POWs) from Russia on April 24 and will meet with the Qatari delegation again on April 25. ISW has extensively reported on Russia’s forced deportation and removal of Ukrainian citizens, including children, and continues to assess that Russia is attempting to eliminate the Ukrainian language, culture, history, ethnicity, and identity, including through activities that appear to violate the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[56]

Moldovan authorities filed a criminal case against Yevgenia Gutsul, the Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, for campaign finance violations as Moldovan officials continue to warn about Russia’s threat to Moldova. Moldovan media reported on April 24 that the Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office completed its criminal investigation into Gutsul’s connections with the Shor Party, a political party that sanctioned pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor founded and financed, and filed a criminal case against Gutsul on two counts of knowingly accepting financial support from an organized criminal group.[57] The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office determined that Gutsul knowingly transported unaccounted funds from an organized criminal group likely based in Russia to Moldova and used those funds to support the Shor Party’s activities in Moldova while Gutsul worked as a secretary for the Shor Party from 2019 to 2022. The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office also charged Gutsul with knowingly organizing and paying anti-government protesters over 42.5 million Moldovan lei ($2.39 million) in illicit funds in October and November 2022. Gutsul denied the Moldovan government’s allegations and claimed that the Moldovan government fabricated the case against her.[58] The new pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, which is also affiliated with Shor, responded to the case and demanded that the Moldovan government end its “groundless” and politically-motivated prosecution of Gutsul.[59] The Victory electoral bloc threatened that “provocations” by the Moldovan government could “destabilize the situation in Gagauzia.” Pro-Kremlin actors may seize on and spin the legitimate criminal charges against Gutsul to justify Russian intervention and aggression in Moldova as necessary to protect Russia’s “compatriots abroad.”

Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi stated during an interview with Bloomberg published on April 23 that Moldova is a “petri dish” of Russian hybrid warfare and election meddling.[60] Popșoi stated that Russia is using a range of covert and informational tactics to destabilize Moldova, including smuggling money into Moldova to bribe voters and protestors, creating deep fake videos of Moldovan politicians, and conducting cyberattacks against Moldovan infrastructure. Russia reportedly conducted a significant cyberattack against the Moldovan postal service and temporarily disrupted postal services in February 2024, and Moldovan authorities notably confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23.[61] Popșoi, citing Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, noted that Russia is conducting daily rhetorical attacks against Moldova and Moldovan officials and that Moldovan officials are monitoring the possibility of a future Russian military threat to Moldova. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely engaged in hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldovan society, degrading Moldova’s democracy, and preventing Moldovan’s accession to the EU.[62]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Joe Biden announced on April 24 that the US will begin sending military equipment to Ukraine  “a few hours” after signing a bill that will provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine.
• The United States reportedly provided an unspecified number of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in March 2024, some of which Ukraine has already used to strike Russian targets in deep rear areas.
• The arrival of long-range ATACMS missiles in sufficient quantities will allow Ukrainian forces to degrade Russian logistics and threaten Russian airfields in deep rear areas, although months of delay may have provided the Russian military time to offset the potential operational impacts that ATACMS will afford Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against Russian energy and industrial facilities in Smolensk and Lipetsk oblasts on the night of April 23 to 24.
• Russian authorities arrested Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes, although other Russian sources reported that Ivanov is suspected of treason.
• Ivanov’s arrest prompted Russian information space speculation about a new round of personnel changes in the Russian military and claims that the arrest is part of Kremlin factional conflicts.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers largely celebrated Ivanov’s arrest and used it as an opportunity to publicly criticize the Russian MoD.
• The Kremlin explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and resume its pro-Kremlin alignment.
• Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova deliberately misrepresented recent Qatari-mediated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine as the first face-to-face negotiations on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly removed and deported by Russia, likely in an effort to minimize Russia’s responsibility for the coordinated removal and deportation of Ukrainian children.
• Moldovan authorities filed a criminal case against Yevgenia Gutsul, the Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, for campaign finance violations as Moldovan officials continue to warn about Russia’s threat to Moldova.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.
• Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated on April 24 that unspecified Russian officials will soon submit a draft law to the State Duma that would ban the extradition of foreigners who have fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine if the foreigners face prosecution for their military service in their home countries.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Artyukh stated on April 24 that Russian forces are increasing air strikes and cross-border raids by sabotage and reconnaissance groups against border areas in Sumy Oblast.[63]

Positional engagements continued near Svatove and Kreminna on April 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional fighting continued northwest of Svatove near Berestove; southwest of Svatove near Hrekivka and Novovodyane; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area.[64]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on April 24, but there were no changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka.[65] Elements of the Russian “GORB” Detachment (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Spirne.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Chasiv Yar (east of Bakhmut) on April 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division continued assault operations near Chasiv Yar.[67] Russian forces continued attacking near the Novyi Microraion in southeastern Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Pivdenne.[68] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating near Chasiv Yar reported on April 24 that Russian assaults against Ivanivske in the past week were unsuccessful and that Russian forces are accumulating forces near Bakhmut to replenish losses and form new assault groups.[69] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes against buildings that provide Ukrainian forces significant cover in Chasiv Yar.[70] A Ukrainian soldier operating in Chasiv Yar told the WSJ that Russian forces usually attempt to advance at dawn and dusk when drone visibility is reduced but when it is not so dark that Russian personnel need night-vision goggles. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating west and south of Ivanivske; elements of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are operating east and southeast of the Kanal Microraion (easternmost outskirts of Chasiv Yar); elements of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are operating near Klishchiivka; and elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) and a brigade tactical group of the 7th Military Base (49th CAA) are operating near Andriivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[71]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance west of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in this area on April 24. Geolocated footage published on April 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and northern Semenivka.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novobakhmutivka (northwest of Avdiivka and just south of Ocheretyne) and advanced east of Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[73] Several Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), while others claimed that Russian forces control most of the settlement.[74] ISW has still not observed visual confirmation of Russian claims that Russian forces have seized most or all of Ocheretyne. Russian forces continued attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, Ocheretyne, Soloyiove, Novobakhmutivka, and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on April 24 that the Russian military has begun introducing reserves from the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) into battle in the Novobakhmutivka-Ocheretyne direction to reinforce the salient to support future Russian combat operations.[76] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Ocheretyne, and that elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are operating in the Novokalynove-Keramik area (northwest of Avdiivka).[77] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment and 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are operating near Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[78] Mashovets also stated that the Russian military is reallocating armored personnel carriers from the 15th Motorized Rifle Peacekeeping Brigade, elements of which recently withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh, to elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating near Ocheretyne and elements of the 90th Tank Division operating near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka.

Russian forces reportedly continue to take risks to make tactically significant gains northwest of Avdiivka. The Telegraph reported on April 24 that Russian forces made their narrow penetration towards Ocheretyne on April 20-21 by attacking during a Ukrainian brigade-level rotation on the frontline.[79] ISW is unable to confirm this report. Russian milbloggers have recently credited Russian advances near Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar to “risky” frontal attacks against Ukrainian positions without waiting for secured flanks.[80] ISW has recently observed that Russian forces only have a limited timeframe to widen their narrow breaches northwest of Avdiivka before promised US and other Western security assistance arrives at the frontline.[81]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on April 24. Geolocated footage published on April 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[82] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced east and southeast of Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[83] Russian forces continued attacking west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Vodyane.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to use ”turtle” armored vehicles – armored vehicles with metal sheets welded on most sides – in combat operations near Krasnohorivka, likely to protect against first-person (FPV) drone strikes.[85] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) reportedly continue operating near Krasnohorivka.[86]

Fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near  Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[87] A Russian milbogger claimed that Russian forces are intensifying drone strikes near Pavlivka to prepare for assault operations in the Vuhledar direction.[88] Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vuheldar.[89]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Robotyne amid continued positional fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 24. Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in central Robotyne.[90] Positional fighting continued in Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that the number of ground assaults in this area has decreased significantly in the past few days but that the Orikhiv direction remains active.[92] Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[93]

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Krynky, Kherson Oblast on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River amid continued positional fighting in the area on April 24.[94] Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in northern Krynky, confirming that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in the settlement.[95]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 and during the day on April 24. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian forces struck Odesa City with unspecified missiles on the morning of April 24, and Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that the strikes hit a residential area and a storage facility for decommissioned automotive equipment in the city.[96] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Horbaty Bridge and Ukrainian military storage warehouses in Odesa City.[97] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Kh-59 missile over an unspecified area of Ukraine during the day, and Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces downed a Kh-69 over Synelynyk Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during the afternoon.[98] Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck civil infrastructure and apartment buildings in Kharkiv City with two S-300 missiles and administration buildings in Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast with two more S-300s during the night on April 23.[99]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated on April 24 that unspecified Russian officials will soon submit a draft law to the State Duma that would ban the extradition of foreigners who have fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine if the foreigners face prosecution for their military service in their home countries.[100] Khinshtein appears to be responding to a video appeal from a Serbian volunteer who claimed that Russian officials denied his requests for Russian citizenship four times because he signed a contract with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and not the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[101] The Serbian volunteer claimed that he is facing charges of mercenarism in Serbia.[102] Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have also recently sentenced some of their citizens on mercenarism charges after those citizens fought with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Wagner Group forces in Ukraine.[103]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast on April 24 reportedly ahead of another launch of the Angara rocket launch vehicle, which the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center is currently developing.[104] Russia test-launched the Angara-A5 for the first time on April 11 at the Vostochnyy Cosmodrome in Amur Oblast.[105] Shoigu claimed that Russia will test launch another three Angara rockets in 2024.[106] Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Deputy Commander Colonel General Alexander Golovko also briefed Shoigu on the development of a new complex for preparing satellites at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome.[107]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Russian forces continue quick and cheap adaptations meant to harden military equipment against Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes along the front. Russian sources amplified imagery and footage on April 24 of a Russian MT-LB infantry fighting vehicle and a Z-STS Akhmat armored vehicle with extensive metal mesh and fencing welded to cover the entire vehicle.[108] Russian and Ukrainian sources also posted footage of a Russian motorcycle with metal mesh attached to the back to protect against drone strikes and a Russian T-80 tank with extensive makeshift armor attached to its turret and its sides.[109]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) joined Kremlin officials in promoting Russian narratives intended to dismiss the future impacts of US military assistance on the battlefield in Ukraine on April 24. The North Korean MFA claimed that US military assistance to Ukraine is a “psychotropic substance” intended to temporarily ease Ukraine’s fear of a Russian victory.[110] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov and Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov claimed that new shipments of US military assistance to Ukraine will not shift the battlefield situation in Ukraine’s favor.[111] Kremlin newswire TASS intentionally misrepresented a statement by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and claimed that Kuleba stated that US military assistance will not stop Russian forces from advancing in Ukraine as Russian weapons are superior to US weapons.[112] Kuleba told the Guardian in an interview published on April 24 that no singular batch of military assistance can stop Russian forces and that it will take a united front of Ukraine and all its partners to defeat Russia.[113] The Kremlin likely originally intended to influence the US military assistance debate using this narrative, but it is unclear how the Kremlin intends to use this narrative now that the US has approved this latest military assistance bill. The Kremlin may hope to assuage domestic concerns in Russia and the Russian military about the positive impacts of US aid on the battlefield. The true impact of US military assistance to Ukraine will be seen and felt in the coming weeks as weapons and equipment arrive on the frontlines.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko reiterated boilerplate Russian narratives aimed at degrading the West during his address at the 7th All-Belarusian People’s Assembly on April 24.[114] Lukashenko reiterated standard Russian rhetoric degrading former Soviet states, the Baltics and Ukraine in particular, for pivoting away from Russia and towards the West in recent years. Lukashenko claimed that the West is responsible for the outbreak of conflicts and color revolutions globally but that efforts to influence Belarus regarding the 2020 Belarusian presidential elections failed. Lukashenko claimed that international organizations like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Group of 20 (G20) are declining while Russia-led international organizations have the potential to prosper.

Lukashenko also claimed that Belarus is flourishing due to its Union State agreement with Russia and increased cooperation with China.[115] Lukashenko claimed that Belarus is flourishing in multiple industries despite Western sanctions, including education, healthcare, energy, oil production, and infrastructure development. Lukashenko credited unspecified Chinese partnership with helping Belarus revamp its domestic automotive production. Lukashenko claimed that the Union State framework should serve as a “model” for international cooperation.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

15. Meritocracy and the Great Power Competition

An interesting review. I have not decided if I am going to add this to my "to read" pile.

Excerpts:

Thus, the paths to social mobility were narrowed to one: the civil service. The enduring effects of the keju system help to explain CCP’s stability.

The longevity of the CCP is astounding, particularly in view of the shocks the party has weathered. These include surviving not only the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution but also the Tiananmen protests of 1989, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the SARS epidemic of 2003, and Covid-19. The Party has implemented draconian reforms, such as the One Child Policy and the mass layoffs from state-owned enterprises in the 1990s, during which between 30 and 50 million people lost their jobs. It has withstood internal power struggles, globalization, the growth of the private sector, and the expansion of the middle class.

Some suggest that the resilience of the CCP should be attributed to “performance legitimacy.” Yet a closer examination of the Chinese Communists’ governance reveals that its stability cannot solely be explained in this manner, especially considering its history of explosive growth alongside political catastrophes.

...

Populist critiques of meritocracy highlight two primary failures. First, the elites produced by this system have demonstrated a poor track record: From the Vietnam War through the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan to the financial crisis of 2008, the “best and brightest” have often fallen dramatically short of expectations. Higher education, rather than enhancing their abilities, often inflates their self-confidence to delusional levels. The second accusation targets universities: they have shifted from recognizing the most deserving individuals to perpetuating privilege.

As Adrian Wooldridge notes in The Aristocracy of Talent, meritocracy is the worst system—except for all the others. The principle that an individual’s place in society should be determined by ability and effort arguably represents the most universal ideal uniting the West today. Far from inherently favoring elites, this ideal originally emerged in opposition to the undeserved usurpation of positions within the social, political, and economic hierarchy.

Meritocracy and the Great Power Competition

The American Conservative · by Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski · April 24, 2024

The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to Its Decline, Yasheng Huang, Yale University Press, 440 pages

Whether you are a globalist or a supporter of economic nationalism, a China hawk or dove, you must consider a number of critical questions. What is the basis for the stability of CCP—how has the party managed to survive so many upheavals and not lose legitimacy? Does Xi Jinping’s rule signify a further strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party’s power, or will it lead to a weakening of its foundations? And finally, is China’s system capable of surpassing the West technologically, and therefore militarily and economically? Yasheng Huang’s latest book, The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to Its Decline, offers a careful analysis of these questions that distinguishes it from the biased and predictable speculations of many commentators.

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According to Huang, the sources of political stability can be found in the institution of keju, the civil service examination, that molded Chinese mentality and institutions. The tradition of examinations dates back to several centuries before Christ, but it was during the Sui Dynasty in the 6th century AD that the keju system was established. This system remained in effect until the fall of the empire in the 20th century.

Thanks to the keju, emperors were able to create a uniform class of educated bureaucrats. The exam enforced an intellectual monoculture; to pass, one had to master Neo-Confucian philosophy. It advocated absolute submission to the ruler’s will and strictly prohibited questioning his decisions. As Huang points out, the examinations focused on the inculcation of complex doctrines to the extent that “there was no time or energy to do much of anything else, whether that was exploring new ideas and natural phenomena, delving into mathematics, organizing a political opposition, or developing a crucial trait in the development of liberalism and science—skepticism. The human capacity was already taxed to its very limit.” This stifling intellectual environment meant that a culture of democratic discussion never emerged.

The keju also curtailed the influence of aristocracy and its regional power; the emperor no longer had to rely on nobility, having a new class of bureaucrats to carry out his orders. Further, this system monopolized human capital. An intelligentsia like that of Czarist Russia—a country with a lower literacy rate than the Middle Kingdom—never developed in imperial China. The class of civil servants absorbed all intellectuals, instilling in them a Neo-Confucian loyalism. For the same reasons, a bourgeois class never emerged. Emperors viewed trade as a disruptive element, and in the hierarchy of Confucian values, market activities were regarded with contempt.

Thus, the paths to social mobility were narrowed to one: the civil service. The enduring effects of the keju system help to explain CCP’s stability.

The longevity of the CCP is astounding, particularly in view of the shocks the party has weathered. These include surviving not only the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution but also the Tiananmen protests of 1989, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the SARS epidemic of 2003, and Covid-19. The Party has implemented draconian reforms, such as the One Child Policy and the mass layoffs from state-owned enterprises in the 1990s, during which between 30 and 50 million people lost their jobs. It has withstood internal power struggles, globalization, the growth of the private sector, and the expansion of the middle class.

Some suggest that the resilience of the CCP should be attributed to “performance legitimacy.” Yet a closer examination of the Chinese Communists’ governance reveals that its stability cannot solely be explained in this manner, especially considering its history of explosive growth alongside political catastrophes.

Huang proposes an alternative explanation for the CCP’s longevity: “axiomatic legitimacy.” According to this perspective, the state’s legitimacy is seen as unconditional; it has been deeply ingrained in the Chinese mentality through the keju, which emphasized obedience to the ruler and created a natural inclination towards statism. Given more than a thousand years of autocracy and intellectual homogenization, such a form of governance does not appear abnormal to the populace.

But can the legacy of imperial meritocracy explain why the PRC did not end up like Soviet Russia? Huang suggests that China’s political history can be understood through the prism of a pursuit of balance between heterogeneity—embracing diversity and autonomy—and the homogenization necessary for governing such a massive country. This delicate equilibrium between what Huang refers to as “scale and scope” has been achieved only a few times throughout the history of the Middle Kingdom, most recently by the CCP reformers.

Huang adopts the concept of M-Form and U-Form organizations from managerial theory to explain this. In U-Form organizations, decisions are made through a tight vertical hierarchy by general offices; for example, the sales department is responsible for sales across all regions. In contrast, in M-Form organizations, each regional branch operates its own sales department. This approach mitigates informational overload and conflicts of interest within individual offices. The Soviet economy worked according to the U-Form model, whereas the Chinese economy has adopted the M-Form structure since the late 1970s.

In Communist China, provinces were endowed with a significant degree of autonomy, creating a set of incentives distinct from those in Russia. Unlike USSR, where regions received funding from the central government, Chinese provinces lived off collected taxes from companies operating within their boundaries, encouraging a more pro-business attitude.

The goal to maximize GDP has spurred innovation within the Chinese system. Successful experiments could be, and often were, replicated across other parts of the country. In contrast, Russia dictated all changes from the center, which lacked the feedback from local levels. Huang observes that regional autonomy prevented Beijing from enforcing central planning. The shift towards a market economy occurred not because the central authorities decided to make this transition, but because they lost the capacity to execute central planning effectively.

GDP served as the meritocratic element within this decentralized structure. Regional leaders were primarily evaluated based on this metric, which, in turn, granted them room for maneuver—the focus was on growth, regardless of how it was achieved. When GDP becomes the primary objective, concepts like class struggle or mass campaigns fade into the background, resulting in a more rational and stable system.

The Gaokao, China’s college entrance exam, and CCP schools represent the communist version of the keju meritocracy. Just as in imperial China, human capital today is channeled through the civil service examination system. The route to the top of the party passes through provincial governance, where GDP serves as the most important metric for assessment.

This system may be witnessing a transformation; Xi is eroding its meritocratic character and restricting its autonomy.

According to Huang, Xi’s leadership represents a profound shock to the reformist system established by Deng Xiaoping and his successors. Xi has steered China away from the political moderation that characterized the party’s approach since the 1990s.

Although Xi’s predecessors also engaged in anti-corruption crackdowns, their efforts were surgical and, in contrast to the current campaigns, did not involve millions of people. Another instance of Xi’s new rigidity is the curbing of fintech and gaming industries, private educational services, and the real estate sector. The equilibrium between autonomy and control, or scope and scale, that has been so rarely achieved in China’s history has been unsettled by Xi’s actions, affecting not only the economy but also the very essence of the CCP system. The meritocratic emphasis on GDP has been overshadowed by vague criteria such as “political integrity,” paving the way for arbitrary political decisions. While the author acknowledges that the focus on GDP has led to issues like the fabrication of statistics or a disregard for environmental concerns, it is crucial to recognize that the alternative, that is political criteria, could prove to be far more detrimental.

As for the downfall of the USSR and the survival of the PRC, Xi has his own interpretation. According to him, the culprit is the so-called “historical nihilism”: the regime was destined to collapse as Marxist faith waned. Huang argues, however, that Xi overlooks the strengths of the reformist system built by previous CCP generations. As a result, the scope for political, intellectual, and economic autonomy has further narrowed: University curricula increasingly focus on Marxism and the Xi Jinping Thought, and private companies are required to introduce Party cells into their organizations. Contrary to viewing the private sector as the “crown jewels” of the economy, he believes China’s development stems from the design of party officials.

This is where Huang’s thesis may show an excessive emphasis on market mechanisms. Undoubtedly, Chinese companies have demonstrated remarkable vitality, yet this vitality might not have been stimulated without the subsidies, preferential loans, or tax breaks provided by the state. The term “industrial policy” is scarcely mentioned in Huang’s book, which is regrettable. A more careful consideration of CCP’s neomercantilism could have lent more nuance to his argument.

Nevertheless, this observation does not diminish the strength of the thesis that under Xi, the issue of succession in the CCP has gained unprecedented importance. In the Chinese empire, succession was determined by heredity; in the PRC, its outcome is shaped by political maneuvering and factional struggles. Huang notes that in modern autocracies, 68 percent of power transitions occur through coups d’état. By contrast, in imperial China, violence accounted for only 38 percent of succession cases. While tensions over succession have frequently sparked crises within the CCP, they have not led to systemic collapse.

On the other hand, under Xi, the author expresses concern that China may be drifting toward the pattern seen in modern autocracies. The elimination of internal opposition, the removal of term limits, and the cult of personality mark a clear departure from the “gentle politics” framework established by Deng Xiaoping, within which the PRC has functioned for the past several decades.

To China’s leadership, technology represents the paramount advantage in securing national power. Take for instance this study from a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Security, which argues that in the realm of great power competition, technology is the critical determinant of success—a perspective repeatedly endorsed by Xi.

In addressing the so-called Needham question—that is, why China, despite once having a significant technological advantage over the West, has lost its edge—Huang offers an original answer: the keju system. He argues that the intellectual homogenization and monopolization of human capital undermined the conditions necessary for innovation. The delicate balance between autonomy and control, crucial for the generation of new ideas and innovations, was reestablished only by the Communist reformers and lasted until the Xi era. Two critical factors contributed to the construction of this balance: Hong Kong and scientific cooperation with foreign countries.

Globalization has facilitated the development of international collaborations with research centers around the world, enabling Chinese universities to bypass the need for liberalization. Huang notes that “international collaborations provide access to foreign talent, capabilities, and ideas, as well as to the ‘think-different’ attitude that has been lacking and repressed domestically.”

Hong Kong has played an equally pivotal role in providing Mainland companies with access to venture capital, enabling them to circumvent the constraints imposed on the private sector. Without access to Hong Kong’s financial markets, companies like ByteDance or Lenovo, along with thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, would have faced capital shortages and would never grow in such a rapid way.

Geopolitical tensions have resulted in a reduced scope and frequency of foreign cooperation. The clampdown on Hong Kong has transformed it from a bastion of free market principles and the rule of law into just another Chinese city (some claim that, to the contrary, a tighter integration would be beneficial for economic dynamism). According to Huang, these actions will ultimately harm the PRC, undermining the very foundation necessary for technological competitiveness.

If this book were read by someone with a hawkish view on China, they might draw two conclusions that could be unsettling for liberal minds. First: Further integration of Hong Kong into the PRC is a good thing, precisely because it will be a self-inflicted wound. Second: There is an argument for tighter restrictions on scientific cooperation (making, for instance, the admission of Chinese scientists contingent upon their agreement to work exclusively in the West).

The Rise and Fall of the EAST is a book about the crisis of China’s authoritarian meritocracy, so naturally it provokes reflection on the state of meritocracy in the West, where the idea that ability should determine success has become controversial in recent years.

While meritocracy once received strong support from the left, viewed as a pathway for social mobility for the working class, today’s attitude towards this ideal has shifted dramatically. Criticism of the SATs, justified by claims that these tests are saturated with bias against racial minorities, increased the importance of factors unrelated to ability like ethnic identification.

Populist critiques of meritocracy highlight two primary failures. First, the elites produced by this system have demonstrated a poor track record: From the Vietnam War through the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan to the financial crisis of 2008, the “best and brightest” have often fallen dramatically short of expectations. Higher education, rather than enhancing their abilities, often inflates their self-confidence to delusional levels. The second accusation targets universities: they have shifted from recognizing the most deserving individuals to perpetuating privilege.

As Adrian Wooldridge notes in The Aristocracy of Talent, meritocracy is the worst system—except for all the others. The principle that an individual’s place in society should be determined by ability and effort arguably represents the most universal ideal uniting the West today. Far from inherently favoring elites, this ideal originally emerged in opposition to the undeserved usurpation of positions within the social, political, and economic hierarchy.

In America, its heyday came at the beginning of the Cold War. The launch of Sputnik raised fears in Washington that the Soviets might win the brain race, and thus the geopolitical competition. It was during the early stages of confrontation with the USSR that standardized tests gained prominence, as tapping into the largest possible talent pool—effectively democratizing education—became imperative for national security. As Julius Krein explains: “Driven in large part by great power competition, university education went from a narrow, elitist pursuit—led by the Ivy League and ‘Saint Grottlesex’ feeder schools, along with regional replications—to a national and meritocratic endeavor.”

With the Cold War’s end, both the role of universities and the nature of American meritocracy underwent significant changes. Neoliberal policies, embraced by both the left and the right, led to the abandonment of capital-intensive sectors and spurred deindustrialization. As factories closed, elites promulgated the mantra that education would provide those affected by offshoring with access to “jobs of the future.” These promises failed to materialize. Universities did not usher in a bright future where everyone became knowledge workers; instead, they turned into a form of job insurance for the offspring of privileged families.

Krein suggests that the Claudine Gay scandal may herald a return to reason, as more colleges started to reinstate SAT requirements. The harsh realities of great power competition may dispel previous illusions. Nevertheless, there remains much work to be done. Alongside Krein’s proposal to eliminate diploma prerequisites for many jobs, another idea worth considering (similar to a practice in Singapore) involves financing the education of the most talented students in exchange for their commitment to work in state institutions for a certain period of time.

The drive towards economic nationalism highlights the importance of achieving a degree of self-sufficiency in domains such as semiconductors. The economist Alex Tabarrok points out that this sector—and many others that are technologically challenging—requires workers with exceptionally high IQs. This raises the important questions of how to select these individuals, and how to prevent their talents from being misallocated in fields like finance or law.

Another issue concerns political meritocracy. The projects that policy-makers aim to implement today are so complex and multifaceted that asking questions about the cognitive capabilities of those making these decisions should be inevitable, yet is often overlooked, as this study demonstrates.

Finally, if America wants to take in immigrants, which ones? Research suggests that their potential to thrive and contribute to the modern economy is influenced by their cultural heritage, with notable effects persisting into the second generation. The effort of rebuilding the American system requires not only inventing a new kind of mercantilism, but a new form of meritocracy as well.

The American Conservative · by Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski · April 24, 2024

16. DON’T FORGET ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST

Although I have been focused on the Asia Pacific since I first served in Korea in 1986, I agree that we cannot forget about or neglect the Middle East. On the one hand I would like to see greater focus on Asia. On the other hand, I do believe that we must be able to manage our interests around the world to include critical interests in the Middle East. That is if we want to remain a globally focused power. And it goes without saying that we should recall how and where we first employed our AirLand Battle force that was designed to defend Europe from the USSR - i.e., the First Gulf War.

Excerpt:

Conclusion

It is nearly impossible to predict the next place the United States will commit its military forces. While the U.S. military must prepare for the threats posed by Russia and China, it would be a mistake not to recognize the Middle East as a central strategic area that has historically been critical to U.S. national interests. This means maintaining relationships for access, basing, and overflight. It requires leveraging the Defense Department’s new Defense Security Cooperation Service to strengthen partnerships with influential nations in the region and remain the arms dealer of choice for the Arab world. Finally, it means committing critical military resources—time, equipment, and personnel—to a region that many see as a problem of the past. Instead of pivoting away from the Middle East, the U.S. military should embrace the region’s historical importance for U.S. security to better understand how this piece of the puzzle fits into the broader competition with Russia and China.

DON’T FORGET ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST

 BRENNAN DEVERAUX  APRIL 25, 2024 9 MIN READ

While the United States has recently shifted its efforts to the Indo-Pacific region and increased its military presence in Europe, the Middle East continues to demand attention.

The Middle East problem is not going away. The region has become a proverbial Hotel California; the United States can check out anytime it likes, but it can never leave.

With a rising China and a major land war in Europe, many analysts have called for the United States to move on from the Middle East, penning articles like “The Middle East Isn’t Worth It Anymore,” “The Middle East Just Doesn’t Matter as Much Any Longer,” and “The End of America’s Middle East.” While the United States has recently shifted its efforts to the Indo-Pacific region and increased its military presence in Europe, the Middle East continues to demand attention. From the ongoing clash between Israel and Hamas to an uptick of terrorist attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria, actions in the Middle East are drawing the United States back to the region because instability or degraded U.S. influence comes with strategic consequences. Although the Middle East may no longer be the nation’s top priority, the U.S. military cannot afford to lose focus on a region that is historically ingrained into foreign policy, remains vital to national interests, and has become a competitive space for the great powers.

Enduring Policy: A Willingness to Use Military Force

The United States commitment to the Middle East extends well beyond the Global War on Terror operations that have consumed the attention of the U.S. military for roughly two decades. Presidents have publicly declared support for the strategically important region for generations and included a willingness to commit military force in their policies. While many of these Cold War policies were linked to an existential Soviet threat, they were still fundamentally about protecting U.S. interests abroad.

In January 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower gave a special message to Congress regarding the Middle East. He warned that “a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence” of nations in the region must “be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.” He asked Congress for certain authorities to help strengthen the Middle East and promote stability. This included proposals to develop economic packages and conduct military assistance and cooperation, similar to how the United States operates in the region today. More importantly, his proposal included the authority to employ the armed forces to maintain this stability “against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.” While defeating communism remained the focus in the years to come, stability in the Middle East and access to natural resources became recurring themes.

Facing an energy crisis, President Jimmy Carter outlined his policy for the region in his 1980 State of the Union Address: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” This broader policy did not focus on any individual threat. Instead, the president made it clear that access to the Middle East is critical to national interests, something emphasized through the actions of the following two presidents.

When war broke out in the region between Iran and Iraq in 1980, the United States was once again drawn to the region. In early 1987, President Ronald Reagan expressed his concern with the instability the war had brought to the Middle East. Additionally, he stated that the United States remains “strongly committed to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.” U.S. warships have continually been used to accomplish this very task.

These historical policies finally culminated when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. President George H.W. Bush committed the U.S. military to restore stability and addressed the United States to explain his decision. He highlighted Iraq’s role in the world as an oil producer and invoked the same historical argument made in this piece, outlining as one of his guiding principles that his “administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.”

For roughly seventy years, the precedent was set to support national interests in the region, many of which remain relevant today.

National Interests in the Region

U.S. policy has historically focused on the Middle East because of its value to national interests. However, for many reasons, from the fall of the Soviet Union to the United States becoming more energy-independent, some have argued that these interests are no longer as relevant. For example, Martin Indyk, the former U.S. Ambassador to Israel, argues that “with few vital American interests still at stake there, the U.S. should finally set aside its grandiose ambitions for the chaotic region.” Similarly, Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace fellows, contend that the Middle East “has become decidedly less important to American foreign policy and … interests.”

Although these interests may not be as essential to the United States as they were during the Cold War, they are nonetheless enough to potentially warrant U.S. military action. The strikes against Yemen in January serve as an easy reminder of this fact. In 2020, the Middle East Institute identified five specific economic and security interests that serve as a simple framework for understanding the continued importance of the region.

The first is arguably the most enduring: the need to maintain “the free flow of energy and trade to world markets.” While many anti-war protestors chanted “no blood for oil” in the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq invasion, it cannot be discounted that the Middle East contains nearly half of the world’s oil reserves, and roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, nearly twelve percent of global trade transits the Suez Canal, the shortest sea route from Europe to Southeast Asia. Consequently, stability and access to the region are prerequisites for economic prosperity.

The second and third interests the Middle East Institute identified focus on keeping the region stable. The second interest is “countering the spread of nuclear weapons,” and the third is “combating terrorism groups.” Realistically, these are more general challenges the United States faces globally and can be categorized as critical requirements to a broader interest of global stability and status quo security.

The fourth national interest is allies and partners. Appearing nearly fifty times in the 2022 National Security Strategy, strengthening relationships with allies and partners globally is foundational for U.S. strategy and policy. However, like stability, this objective does not differentiate the Middle East from any other region. Instead, this national interest in the Middle East revolves around a special ally in Israel.

While America’s primary adversaries may be located in the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, the Middle East is likely to be a competitive space.

The U.S. special relationship with Israel has been embedded in U.S. policy since the end of World War II, a linking of common nations based on shared values and beliefs. In modern times, President Joseph Biden called the relationship “just simply unbreakable” and “ironclad.” Even with increased tensions from the Israeli military’s actions against Hamas, the president said to the Israeli Prime Minister, “I am a Zionist,” and pledged his continued support to Israel. Just before the new year, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reinforced this relationship, adding that “the United States will remain Israel’s closest friend in the world. And as I’ve said repeatedly, our support for Israel’s security remains unshakable, and it always will.” While the greatest threat to the United States does not reside in the Middle East, it is unlikely that the nation will abandon this critical ally that has been in a near-perpetual state of conflict since coming into existence.

The final national interest the Middle East Institute identified is the inherent competition in the region with other great powers, as the United States is not the only global power tied to this chaotic area.

Great Power Competition in the Middle East

While it does not garner the same attention as the tensions in the South China Sea or the war in Ukraine, great power competition is ongoing in the Middle East. Russia continues to have a presence in numerous countries in the region and works to improve its influence. As is the case for most nations outside the region, the driver for much of this is economics. As a major oil producer, Russia benefits from its ties to members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, particularly in managing oil prices. Similarly, Russia seeks to maintain relevance as a global arms supplier, leveraging the periodic chaos of the Middle East to be the nation of choice for Middle East countries investing in their military.

China has taken a similar interest in the Middle East. While an aspect of this may be to demonstrate its prestige as a world power, Chinese actions point more to economic growth. China needs access to regional resources and markets and has worked to develop long-term strategic relationships to accomplish that goal. In late 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave the keynote address at the China-Arab States Summit held in Saudi Arabia, aiming at “Building a China-Arab Community with a Shared Future in the New Era.” China’s regional investments have continued to increase, with nearly a quarter of its Belt-and-Road Initiative funds going to the Middle East in 2022.

Russia and China are building relationships in the Middle East and vying for essential markets and resources. Consequently, while America’s primary adversaries may be located in the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, the Middle East is likely to be a competitive space. If the United States is not careful, the nation may find its influence in the region severely degraded.

Conclusion

It is nearly impossible to predict the next place the United States will commit its military forces. While the U.S. military must prepare for the threats posed by Russia and China, it would be a mistake not to recognize the Middle East as a central strategic area that has historically been critical to U.S. national interests. This means maintaining relationships for access, basing, and overflight. It requires leveraging the Defense Department’s new Defense Security Cooperation Service to strengthen partnerships with influential nations in the region and remain the arms dealer of choice for the Arab world. Finally, it means committing critical military resources—time, equipment, and personnel—to a region that many see as a problem of the past. Instead of pivoting away from the Middle East, the U.S. military should embrace the region’s historical importance for U.S. security to better understand how this piece of the puzzle fits into the broader competition with Russia and China.

Brennan Deveraux is a major in the U.S. Army currently serving at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. He is an Army strategist and an Art of War scholar specializing in rocket artillery and missile warfare. He has completed combat deployments to Iraq and the Horn of Africa and has three defense-related master’s degrees, focusing his research on military adaptation and emerging technology management.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: President Eisenhower (L) and Vice President Richard Nixon (R) are shown with their host, King Saud of Saudi Arabia (C), as they attended the regally-arranged dinner given by the Arabian monarch at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington D.C. in 1957.

Photo Credit: Hank Walker via Wikimedia Commons

​17. Opinion | Why campus protests against Israel probably won’t be effective

Interesting analysis.

Excerpts:

The short answer is that they are advocating for a cease-fire in Gaza, for an academic boycott of Israeli universities, and for the administration to “divest all of Columbia’s finances, including the endowment, from companies and institutions that profit from Israeli apartheid, genocide and occupation in Palestine,” as one of the organizing groups put it. The longer answer is that American progressive activism, including Gaza activism, has become quite centered around college campuses.

While this might boost its influence among college-educated professionals, it often weakens the wider cause.

...

This brings us back to our bewildered alien: Why Columbia? Why divestment? The answer is that Columbia is simply where activists are, and the endowment is something the Columbia administration can control, unlike the foreign policy of the United States — or Israel.

By now, this pattern is familiar; on the left, issue after issue has been filtered through the prism of the campuses where so many activists are concentrated. Concerns about sexual assault frequently ended up centered on the campaign against campus rape; concerns about economic insecurity became demands for student loan forgiveness; concerns over the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza have become arguments about elite university endowments.

To some extent, this is natural. Universities have concentrated populations of progressive students whose flexible schedules that can be organized around political action, and of progressive administrators who can be expected to smile on these efforts. But it’s also costly, because 20-year-olds don’t necessarily make the best ambassadors for a cause. The most passionate, possibly, but not the most strategic.

Opinion | Why campus protests against Israel probably won’t be effective

The Washington Post · by Megan McArdle · April 25, 2024

An alien who landed on our planet during the current news cycle could be forgiven for concluding that the biggest foreign policy issue facing America today is what the U.S. government should do about Columbia University’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. Otherwise, why would throngs of protesters be crowding the campus to protest actions more than 5,000 miles away?

The short answer is that they are advocating for a cease-fire in Gaza, for an academic boycott of Israeli universities, and for the administration to “divest all of Columbia’s finances, including the endowment, from companies and institutions that profit from Israeli apartheid, genocide and occupation in Palestine,” as one of the organizing groups put it. The longer answer is that American progressive activism, including Gaza activism, has become quite centered around college campuses.

While this might boost its influence among college-educated professionals, it often weakens the wider cause.

Divestment has become a popular idea on campus, meant to wound companies that offend protesters in various ways, from running private prisons to manufacturing firearms to producing fossil fuels. Many of these activists appear to have been inspired by the late 20th-century global campaign of boycotts, divestment and sanctions against South Africa, which is often credited with helping end apartheid in that country.

More recent campus efforts have had some successes. For example, under pressure from student activists in 2015, the Columbia endowment divested from private prison firms. However, it’s not clear what effect this has had on anything other than the returns of the endowments.

It’s true that U.S. university endowments represent a vast accumulation of capital, at least $839 billion at last count. And it seems as though that much money must be able to change the world, if it could all work together. But not all of that money is invested in stocks or corporate bonds; according to Columbia’s annual trustee report, at the end of last year, only a quarter of its investments, about $3.7 billion, were in global equities. (Another $3.6 billion is in private equity, and the rest is in cash, fixed income and various alternative assets.) This is tiny compared with the roughly $100 trillion global stock market.

Of course, if a university holds an unusually large share of some stock, then selling it might drive its price down, at least temporarily, particularly for smaller firms and markets where trading is less frequent. But as long as there are buyers with fewer ethical scruples — and there always are — the stock’s long-term price will mostly be set by market fundamentals, things such as expected returns, rather than ethical concerns. Even those temporary price changes will affect only the current owners, not the company that sold them stock long ago.

Stock prices can still influence company management decisions through indirect effects, but only to a point. If a company urgently needs to raise money for investment, a sell-off could make that harder. It also might make the now-poorer shareholders angry with management. But there are limits to the power of shareholder anger: Investors might demand that ExxonMobil do something to boost returns, but they are unlikely to demand that the company get out of the oil business altogether, because doing so would incinerate a lot more shareholder money. Similarly, shareholders are unlikely to demand that Boeing stop selling fighter planes to Israel.

It’s harder still to translate divestment’s small effect on companies into a change in the policies of the countries where those companies are headquartered. Countries such as Russia and Iran have persisted for years in the face of sanctions far more punishing than anything that the Columbia endowment, or all university endowments, could possibly impose.

This brings us back to our bewildered alien: Why Columbia? Why divestment? The answer is that Columbia is simply where activists are, and the endowment is something the Columbia administration can control, unlike the foreign policy of the United States — or Israel.

By now, this pattern is familiar; on the left, issue after issue has been filtered through the prism of the campuses where so many activists are concentrated. Concerns about sexual assault frequently ended up centered on the campaign against campus rape; concerns about economic insecurity became demands for student loan forgiveness; concerns over the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza have become arguments about elite university endowments.

To some extent, this is natural. Universities have concentrated populations of progressive students whose flexible schedules that can be organized around political action, and of progressive administrators who can be expected to smile on these efforts. But it’s also costly, because 20-year-olds don’t necessarily make the best ambassadors for a cause. The most passionate, possibly, but not the most strategic.

The best hope that activists have of changing Israel’s behavior isn’t fiddling with university endowments; it’s changing U.S. government policy on weapons sales to Israel. The best hope of doing that lies in convincing ordinary American voters that policy should change. And as political writer Matt Yglesias keeps pointing out, “The median voter is a 50-something White person who didn’t go to college.” Is this protest going to change that person’s mind?

Hardly. It’s difficult to imagine anything less likely to appeal to that voter than an unsanctioned tent city full of belligerent elite college students whose chants have at least once bordered on the antisemitic.

There’s only one real customer for that sort of performance: the participants themselves.

The Washington Post · by Megan McArdle · April 25, 2024

18. China’s Intelligence Shakeup Boosts Information Warfare

Excerpts:

Placing these new organizations directly under the CCP’s Central Military Commission gives Xi more direct control over the military’s efforts in information warfare, space operations, and cyber. 

“The relative success of the functions they moved under the CMC has convinced them that they will have the control they want,” said Joe McReynolds, a top U.S. expert on China’s cyber operations and a Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation (where I, too, am a Fellow) 

A former Western intelligence analyst told SpyTalk that the Information Support Force, or ISF, may be based on the SSF’s Unit 61001, which is engaged in network and signal security work, according to the few Chinese media accounts that have emerged about it. It may also be responsible for SIGINT, though the Chinese media are understandably mum on that sensitive question. Curiously, though, the unit has a social media presence.

China’s Intelligence Shakeup Boosts Information Warfare

https://www.spytalk.co/p/chinas-intelligence-shakeup-boosts?utm=

Top general purged in breakup of key electronic spying agency

MATT BRAZIL

APR 25, 2024

Image from Digital Crew

IN A MAJOR SHAKEUP at the top of China’s intelligence and security apparatus, President Xi Jinping last Friday unexpectedly abolished its key eavesdropping and codebreaking agency, the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and replaced it with three new agencies put directly under the Chinese Communist Party’s military oversight body, the Central Military Commission. 

It’s the rough political equivalent of President Biden abolishing the NSA and creating three new powerful spy agencies under the direct purview of the White House National Security Council. 

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Analysts told SpyTalk that rumors of an intelligence shakeup have been floating around for at least several weeks, but the creation of three separate “forces,” as China calls them, from the SSF, including a new information warfare agency, was a surprise. It reflected Xi’s dissatisfaction with the rate of progress in the development of China’s “intelligentized warfare,” or what the U.S. calls Joint Doctrine, the fusing of ground, air, space, cyber and naval forces operations through digital networks bolstered by artificial intelligence.

The shakeup includes the creation of a new information warfare unit, the Information Support Force, or ISF. It appears to encompass signal intelligence (SIGINT), signal security and network security, while cyber intrusion operations are likely handled by a separate new service, the Cyberspace Force.

China has long sought to unify and add new technology to its traditional military forces. In 2019, the People’s Liberation Army published a national defense white paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” which noted that “War is evolving in form towards informationized warfare, and intelligent warfare is on the horizon.” Now it looks to be standing on the precipice.  

The SSF’s leader, General Ju Qiansheng, has been dismissed, the latest chapter of Xi Jinping’s ongoing purge of the party and army. Ju’s deputy, General Bi Yi, will now reportedly command the new ISF, along with a senior political commissar. 

Ju has been seen only once since July, performing the relatively lowly task of taking notes on a routine “inspection” of Guizhou province in January. There’s been no word from Beijing on his current whereabouts or status since.

Ju was known to be under investigation for corruption, a former intelligence official from an East Asian nation told SpyTalk, but his punishment was light and he appears not to be under detention. Ju’s removal, and the breakup of the SSF were prompted by discussions last year at the top of the Peoples Liberation Army. Senior leaders, including Xi, were dissatisfied at the slow pace of the SSF’s preparations for future conflicts, as it was responsible for crucial operations in space, the cyber realm, and signal intelligence, the former official said. 

Xi Jinping’s wide-ranging purge of the party has been ongoing since his rise to national power in 2012, and in recent months has grown more intensely focused on the military. It has harvested a number of high profile figures as well as thousands of others, including ex-Foreign Minister Qin Gang, the former Minister of National Defense General Li Shangfu, and other top officers, including from the PLA Rocket Forces.

Odd man out: Lt. Gen. Ju Qiansheng (R) on his inspection tour of Guizhou Province, Jan. 2024 (Photo credit Lianhe Zaobao, Singapore)

Who’s up and who’s down indicates that the former SSF might have been partly on the right track but moving too slowly for Xi and his preparations to confront the U.S. and Japan over Taiwan. 

(Recent news reports say China is close to developing laser beams to replace spinning propellers. ”Theoretically, the development could allow a submarine to travel faster than the speed of sound without producing the mechanical noise vibration that usually gives away its location, according to the researchers,” the South China Morning Post reported.) 

Periodic Shakeups

Wholesale reorganizations of CCP intelligence organs have been a regular feature in the party’s history. As described in Chinese Communist Espionage (coauthored by myself and Peter Mattis in 2019), they happened because of an intelligence failure that almost destroyed the party (in 1927), the collapse of clandestine networks in China’s cities (in 1935), abuses blamed on the brilliant but criminal black sheep of CCP Intelligence, Kang Sheng (in 1949), changing international dynamics demanding better foreign intelligence (in 1955), and an unprecedented influx of foreigners and foreign diplomatic missions in China (in 1983). 

But under Xi, there have been two major reorganizations of the party’s intelligence agencies in less than a decade.

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The first was the 2015 reordering of China’s military regions and the reorganization of the PRC Intelligence Community. It created the short lived SSF, demoted the status of the PLA’s foreign espionage program, and enhanced the foreign intelligence responsibilities for the Ministry of State Security, probably in response to increased intelligence requirements regarding the U.S. and its allies.    

Now comes this additional major reorganization, only eight years later. 

The three new agencies were announced in an apparent order of seniority, as is the habit of the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA: the Military Space Force, the Cyberspace Force, and the Information Support Force. According to the Chinese media and a press briefing by the PLA, they are drawing their personnel from three departments in the defunct SSF. 

Placing these new organizations directly under the CCP’s Central Military Commission gives Xi more direct control over the military’s efforts in information warfare, space operations, and cyber. 

“The relative success of the functions they moved under the CMC has convinced them that they will have the control they want,” said Joe McReynolds, a top U.S. expert on China’s cyber operations and a Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation (where I, too, am a Fellow) 

A former Western intelligence analyst told SpyTalk that the Information Support Force, or ISF, may be based on the SSF’s Unit 61001, which is engaged in network and signal security work, according to the few Chinese media accounts that have emerged about it. It may also be responsible for SIGINT, though the Chinese media are understandably mum on that sensitive question. Curiously, though, the unit has a social media presence.

Home Movies

“The Eternal Wave” is Unit 61001’s blog on China’s popular social media app Weibo, It depicts sub-units “from the snowy north to the south seas” engaged in generic military training, propaganda performances for the troops, and such benign activities as teaching hygiene to local villagers. It also indicates that the new Information Support Force may continue to employ the 61001 cover designator.

The blog’s prominent photos include a woman operator “on-poz” (on position), in the lingo of SIGINTers, and troops setting up radio equipment in the field. Also included are insights about everyday life in the unit, its nationwide deployment, and the security messages they are pushing to the PLA’s ranks. One is a version of the World War Two slogan, “loose lips sinks ships.” It depicts soldiers tempted by the convenience of their mobile phones to violate security regulations—including a 27-year-old soldier being nagged by his mother to exchange photos with a girl whom she located through a matchmaker. “Don’t blow it,” she tells him. In another vignette, a private is urgently asked by his squad leader to take a picture of a secret document and send it over by text. 

The squad leader, of course, is testing the private’s security awareness (and he passes with flying colors. Message: taking a selfie in uniform for a prospective girlfriend is verboten. Even more so, of course, trafficking in classified documents.

Analysts will be closely watching what changes at the top mean for the effectiveness of the party’s military and civilian intelligence organs, and whether these are the final shoes to drop, or the last senior officials to be purged, as Xi Jinping continues to push the party and army toward conflict with China’s neighbors and major trading partners.

SpyTalk Contributing Writer Matthew Brazil is a Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and a China analyst at BluePath Labs, LLC. With Peter Mattis, he is the co-author of Chinese Communist Espionage, An Intelligence Primer.

19. What Barbie Teaches Us About Tactics versus Strategy

What a creative and fascinating read. The Angry Staff Officer nails it. This is both a fun read and thought provoking. I am glad my wife and daughter made me watch Barbie with them. I had some of the feelings Angry Staff Officer had but he did a much better job of identifying and articulating them in a very useful way. Brilliant in many ways I think and I envy his creative thinking. I hope this essay is added to PME courses.

I just want to empathize =one point from his introduction.

Excerpt:

However, we could rarely tie tactical success to strategic victory; i.e., providing total security to Iraq and Afghanistan and instilling trust in their governments. Probably because shooting people and breaking things does not equal governance, and something about Jeffersonian democracy not being transplantable. As I’ve been pondering all this, it struck me that the dichotomy between strategic versus tactical problem solving can be seen at work in the 2023 classic, Barbie.

He identifies one of the key problems we suffered from for the past two decades. It was not up to us to provide total security in Iraq and Afghanistan (or it should not have been had we conducted effective stability operations). It certainly was not up to us (nor were we capable of) to instill trust in their governments (especially since those governments were for the most part illegitimate since we tried to create them in our image). And most importantly we get this wrong. We should never try to impose Jeffersonian democracy on any country. Instead we should be supporting the self-determination of the government. Now that seems to be a Jeffersonian ideal I would argue that it is a universal ideal. In fact, Article 21 of the UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights says this: 

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 

2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 

3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 

This is what we should focus on. Yes it might seem like we are trying to impose Jeffersonian democracy and it may be too subtle a difference for many of us, I think it is something that we need to spend a little intellectual horsepower pondering.

What Barbie Teaches Us About Tactics versus Strategy

angrystaffofficer.com · by Angry Staff Officer · April 25, 2024

One of my mentors dropped this quote on me a few years back: “The United States military is obsessed with tactical solutions to strategic problems.” After I picked my jaw off the floor because it was such an apt description of the last 20 years, I began to chew on the meaning of what they’d said. Because, yes, for two or more decades, the U.S. has conducted a largely tactically-focused series of conflicts. And why not? At the tactical level, we’re very successful. There were few firefights across the length of the global war on terror we didn’t win. However, we could rarely tie tactical success to strategic victory; i.e., providing total security to Iraq and Afghanistan and instilling trust in their governments. Probably because shooting people and breaking things does not equal governance, and something about Jeffersonian democracy not being transplantable. As I’ve been pondering all this, it struck me that the dichotomy between strategic versus tactical problem solving can be seen at work in the 2023 classic, Barbie.

Yes, you heard me. Barbie.

A political and social situation ripe for destabilization. (Warner Bros)

A Nation-State in Trouble

In Greta Gerwig’s masterpiece, we are introduced to the nation-state of Barbieland. Barbieland is a constitutional republic, with three branches of government, a robust and thriving economy, free press, and entirely without conflict. The CIA World Factbook remains very silent on Barbieland’s demographics, but from what we can tell, it does not have a standing army, navy, air force, or even a militia system. At face value, Barbieland is a utopia that any of the mid-19th century American utopianists (sure, it can be a word, why not?) would be proud of.

However, there is something rotten in the state of Barbie. Land ownership, positions of governance, and even suffrage are only held by the tribe known as the Barbies. The other major player in the region, the Kens, have no political power but also do not seem to suffer persecution for it. They are free to pursue lives of ease trying to impress the Barbies, which seems to be their main occupation. As far as U.S. intelligence can gather, it would seem to be their raison d’être. While on the surface this division of power seems to work, it is clear that the introduction of any radically new ideas might destabilize this idyllic society. Lacking diversity of thought, Barbieland is rife for revolution.

This moment comes when Barbie and Ken travel to the Real World, a dystopian nightmare, where Ken becomes introduced to the ideology of radical masculinity. Not having experience with any ideas at all, and nursing a slight grudge against the Barbies for not paying enough attention to his amphibious operations, Ken falls to indoctrination immediately and rushes back to Barbieland to spread his new political dogma. Much like Lenin’s train arriving in Russia courtesy of the Germans in 1917, Ken’s arrival in Barbieland sets off a total political and social revolution.

The Coup

The Patriarchal Revolution is swift and complete, undercutting the Barbies’ will to resist through political programming via the arts, gender norms, and equine maneuvers. The Kens establish a patriarchal society based on the Mojo Dojo Case House Compact and prepare to legitimize their coup through an amendment to the Barbieland constitution which would disenfranchise the Barbies in favor of the Kens. They declare their new government Ken-Land. They’re not very inventive in their terminology.

At the same time, the Kens begin the construction of Ken-Land, nee Barbieland’s first defensive barrier: a wall on the border with the Real World. However, the Kens lack basic engineering capability and what might have posed a formidable obstacle to control the movement of ideas and peoples around Ken-Land only results in a pile of stones. This oversight results in the introduction of even more ideas, and peoples, into the safe harbor for toxic masculinity.

In addition to failing to secure their lines of supply and advance, the Kens overlook several key population demographics that might resist Ken-Land. Namely, Weird Barbie and Allen. Failing to conduct a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or even just a simple ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) assessment results in safe havens available to any insurgent Barbies. However, in the immediate aftermath of the Patriarchal Revolution, any type of resistance does not appear to exist. This would seem to be why the Kens could not see past their initial victory and neglected to consolidate their gains in any meaningful way. This in flagrant violation of Field Manual 3-0. You hate to see it.

Politics by Other Means

Barbie’s return with a mobile training team (MTT) from the Real World results in the first insurgency against the Kens. Barbie and the MTT make contact with Weird Barbie and Allen, forming a complex network of divergent interests for one single purpose. Their strategic ends are simple: return to the status quo, but with a more heterogeneous society to preserve the security of the nation-state. To do this, the insurgency would rely on chaining tactical victories into an operational framework aimed at their strategic end.

Rather than strike at the visible means of power – Mojo Dojo Casa Houses, guitars, and horses, for example – the insurgency targets the Kens’ center of gravity: their need for the Barbies to approve of them. As the other Barbies gradually go through political and social reprogramming to peel them away from their loyalty to the state, the Barbies use them to sow widespread doubt and fear in the society of the Kens. This has the result of destabilizing the peace of Ken-Land, resulting in the formation of the first two armed forces in (probably) the history of either Barbieland or Ken-Land. Robust militarization and mobilization of manpower taxes the meager resources of Ken-Land and distracts their attention from the nascent insurgency under their very noses.

Attacking with horse cavalry from the sea with no line of retreat is a tactical blunder made of desperation and having more abs than brains. (Warner Bros)

However, rather than attacking the insurgency, the Kens turn on each other, igniting a vicious civil war. Failing to understand the dynamics of Ken-Land/Barbieland’s Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical environment, and Time, the Kens end up marshalling all their forces against each other. This was precisely the goal of the Barbies and the end result of a series of tactical victories which created the operational space for this conflict. With the Kens entirely bogged down in a war of attrition, the Barbies are able to retake the government and restore the nation’s original constitution. This results in the Barbies’ return to power and the downfall of Ken-Land.

Analysis

Okay, yes, this is all utterly ridiculous. But is it? The Barbies are able to overturn an entire regime because they properly understand the levels of war – and also because they understand that strategic victory does not come about just because of fighting. Their insurgency, which is just begging to be studied by some COIN nerd out there (PLEASE, study it, and then publish it here), achieves its objectives with relative completeness.

The Kens, on the other hand, find waging a counterinsurgency to be beyond their ken (SORRY, I couldn’t help it, it was just sitting right there). They cannot see beyond the immediate tactical level and so they identify the threat as each other. Divided, they are helpless to stop the political change sweeping the country. With their focus purely on the social change in their society, they fail to take into account the political, economic, and information war that the Barbies bring against them. Indeed, their social changes were not even hard-wired into their new society since once they found out that the patriarchy wasn’t just about horses, they lost significant ideological fervor. The Patriarchal Revolution needed heavier underpinnings than that to be able to succeed.

What we can learn from the Barbies is that success comes from building cohesive coalitions with a clear, unified strategic endstate gained by achievable operational goals brought about by tactical victories aimed at the enemy’s center of gravity. By nesting their objectives and pairing them with an appropriate whole-of-Barbieland approach, they were able to overturn Ken-Land. In the end, the Kens radical fervor was not Kenough to stop the Barbies’ operational framework.

Enjoy what you’ve just read? Please share on social media using the buttons below.

Views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Cover image courtesy Warner Brothers Studios

angrystaffofficer.com · by Angry Staff Officer · April 25, 2024

20. Extrajudicial killing in Kenya reveals CIA's covert role in global counterterrorism operations

The fourth estate is holding us accountable. We must defend and protect the free press whether we like it or not.

How will this affect and possibly compromise operations around the world?  

How will Russia and China (and Iran and perhaps even north Korea - all of whom are conducting their own operations in Africa) exploit this information and what actions might they take in countries around the world to undermine US legitimacy or hinder operations by these forces (assuming these forces actually exist). Knowing that our rivals and adversaries will use this information (and they were probably already well aware of the operations) what can we do to counter their responses? Can we exploit what they will do or are doing?

On a separate but related note, terrorism and counterterrorism operations are an element of strategic competition.

Often misattributed to Voltaire: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" (Evelyn Beatrice Hall)

Extrajudicial killing in Kenya reveals CIA's covert role in global counterterrorism operations

https://thehighside.substack.com/p/extrajudicial-killing-in-kenya-reveals?utm=

JACK MURPHY AND SEAN D. NAYLOR

APR 25, 2024

∙ PAID

The first 18 Rapid Response Team trainees, pictured in the United States with their CIA advisers. Photo courtesy of an anonymous source via Namir Shabibi

Kenya’s Rapid Response Team commandos were sure they had got their man, shooting suspected terrorist Fuad Abubakar Manswab dead as he tried to flee the apartment they had just broken into.

But they soon realized that they had hit the wrong apartment and shot the wrong person. In a case of mistaken identity, they had killed Omar Faraj, a cashier at a butcher's shop.

On March 19, 12 years after Faraj’s death, the Kenyan High Court declared the killing “unlawful” and awarded Faraj’s wife the equivalent of $60,000 in compensation.

The Faraj killing not only exposed the RRT to public scrutiny and litigation. It also cast a spotlight on the Kenyan operations of the RRT's foreign sponsor, the CIA, and in doing so allowed a glimpse into the agency’s secretive Counterterrorism Operations Program, through which the CIA creates, pays, and directs proxy forces in countries around the globe, according to agency veterans.

The death of Faraj, and similar alleged extrajudicial killings by the RRT, also leave the CIA officers who work with the unit on shaky legal ground, according to a former U.S. intelligence community lawyer.

A CIA spokesperson declined to comment after The High Side submitted a detailed list of questions to the agency about the RRT and the workings of the Counterterrorism Operations Program in Kenya.

Details of the RRT’s mission and its links to the CIA and Britain’s MI6 intelligence agency were exposed in a two-part series by British investigative journalist Namir Shabibi. The deeply-reported series was published in 2020 Declassified UK and South African news site the Daily Maverick. Although it received little attention elsewhere, Shabibi’s reporting formed the basis of the ultimately successful legal action brought by the Kenyan organization Muslims for Human Rights that resulted in the March 19 judgment against RRT.

Based on interviews with RRT veterans and former U.S. intelligence officers, among others, Shabibi revealed that:

• The RRT has been linked to a series of extrajudicial killings, including targets who could have been captured but were given no chance to surrender.
• 
  
• The CIA hands the RRT its targets based on intelligence developed by the agency and MI6, and the two intelligence organizations determine whether the target is to be captured or killed.
• The RRT participated in the response to two of Kenya’s worst terrorist incidents of the past decade, the April 2015 attack on Garissa University and the January 2019 attack on the DusitD2 hotel complex in Nairobi. The Somali terrorist organization al-Shabab were the attackers in each case. Individuals linked to al-Shabab are the RRT’s usual targets.
• The CIA trains RRT members in the United States and equips them with M4 rifles, Glock pistols, M79 grenade launchers, body armor, helmets, custom-made Toyota Land Cruisers, and M67 and Stinger CS grenades.
• 
  
• RRT members disguised themselves as employees of the United Nations World Food Program while hunting for al-Shabab members in Kenyan refugee camps.

The CIA’s relationship with the RRT’s nominal parent organization, the General Service Unit’s Recce Company, began years before al-Qaida’s 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, according to former CIA officers interviewed by The High Side. (The GSU is part of the Kenyan Police Service.) Then 9/11 happened, and the CIA showed up around the world with a new presidential finding for counterterrorism and the resources to carry it out.

The agency put the Counterterrorism Operations Program to work, not just in Kenya, but across the globe. Other CIA-funded proxy forces exist in the Philippines, where the CIA's CTOP works closely with a police paramilitary unit called the Special Action Force, and the tri-border region of South America, a former CIA paramilitary officer told The High Side.

Unlike programs such as the Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams in Afghanistan, however, in most cases CIA paramilitary officers are not running the CTOP proxy forces on a day-to-day basis, nor going out on missions with them, according to former CIA officers. Instead, the program uses liaison relationships with other countries’ security services to identify – or create, if none exists – direct-action forces that can use CIA-provided intelligence to go after terrorist targets, they said. (However, in the case of the RRT, CIA operatives have “occasionally…participated in operations,” according to Shabibi, who quotes a Kenyan paramilitary officer saying that if CIA officers “really, really want the results, they will even assist directly.”)

The CTOP program is folded under and coordinated by the CIA's Counterterrorism Mission Center (formerly called the Counterterrorism Center) and is separate and distinct from the U.S. military's 127e programs, under which U.S. special operations forces use foreign surrogate forces to pursue U.S. counterterrorism targets. The 127e programs are run under Department of Defense Title 10 authorities while the CTOP is run using the CIA’s Title 50 covert action authorities.

The CTOP filled a gap that the CIA had identified when it asked friendly security services in underdeveloped countries for help going after terrorists.

“In most countries where we set up these CT programs, we always would have a surveillance element, a HUMINT [human intelligence] element, and sometimes technical elements, and then CTC comes in with covert action authorities,” a former CIA staff operations officer told The High Side, referring to capabilities that the host nation brought to the fight. However, “we always needed a takedown unit,” the former CIA officer added. In cases where one was lacking, he said, the agency would persuade its local counterparts “to assign a dedicated unit to CIA to be a dedicated arm of the agency.” 

While the host nation has a say over which operations are approved and which aren't, as the paymaster for the unit and its training, the CIA wields considerable influence, according to the former CIA staff operations officer. Indeed, Shabibi writes that “multiple RRT sources” told him that the unit “is not to be deployed … without the knowledge and consent of its U.S. Embassy handlers.”

A global network of proxy forces

Sometimes, when the host nation security service doesn’t have a unit that it can provide the CIA, the agency creates one. Such was the case in Kenya in 2004 as the CIA ramped up its counterterrorism operations there. The agency recruited members from the GSU to form the RRT, then brought in paramilitary officers from the Ground Branch of the CIA’s Special Activities Division to provide additional training, according to the former CIA officer. (Both MI6 and the CIA already enjoyed close relationships with Kenya’s National Intelligence Service.)

The CTOP program in Kenya also involved a few operators from Joint Special Operations Command, the U.S. military headquarters tasked with conducting some of the United States’ most secret and sensitive missions. These included a couple of operators from the Army’s 1^st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta, better known as Delta Force, who helped with the training, according to the former CIA officer. The command also sent an operator from the special operations intelligence unit known as “Task Force Orange” to Nairobi to function as a liaison to the CIA station there, the former CIA officer said.

Shabibi reports that the RRT grew from an initial strength of 18 personnel to about 60 commandos, and is based in Ruiru, a suburb about 10 miles northeast of Nairobi.

The U.S. advisers trained the RRT in basic tradecraft and close-quarter battle, with a focus on low-visibility takedowns, such as detaining suspected terrorists right off the street. The CIA also equipped the unit with U.S. M4 rifles and other modern gear, according to two former CIA officers, confirming Shabibi’s reporting.

Folded into the effort was also a “covert influence element, a hearts-and-minds effort to work with imams and mosques” in promoting counter-extremism, the former CIA staff operations officer said, adding that this component existed because “you just can't door-kick your way out of the problem.” A former CIA staff operations officer explained that the covert influence element was considered one of the pillars of the CTOP and most of individual programs in different countries included that line of effort.

The RRT initially concentrated on al-Qaida targets, but as the United States’ “war on terror” stretched into the 2010s, its focus increasingly turned toward threats emanating from al-Shabab, the Islamist militant group in Somalia that officially merged with al-Qaida in 2012. The RRT did conduct some cross-border work in order to support the CIA's “Black Hawk” team, which was stationed in Nairobi but operated two CTOP proxy paramilitary units known as Ghoshan (“Shield”) and Waran (“Spear”), elements of which were in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe. However, such cross-border work was the exception, rather than the rule, for the RRT, according to the former CIA staff operations officer.

It was the RRT’s missions in Kenya that have invited the harsh glare of publicity.

The problems allegedly began about 14 years ago but took more than a decade to come to light. In 2010 “the Kenyans started EJKing people,” the former CIA staff operations officer said, referring to extrajudicial killings.

The former CIA officer was keen to distance the RRT from these killings, preferring to blame other Kenyan security forces. “Maybe it was counterterrorism police and [the] security service,” he said. “They started unilaterally killing. Not [GSU], but more the Kenyan security service who had been chasing people for decades and didn't think they could get a traditional legal case, so they ended up obviously being authorized by someone in the government,” the former officer said. “They started smoking them.”

However, according to Shabibi’s reporting, the RRT’s methods also began to shift in 2011, after Kenyan forces entered Somalia to fight al-Shabab, and Islamist suspects in Kenya became more likely to fight back when confronted.

The CIA was apoplectic over the assassinations, according to the former CIA officer. “We literally have to go and tell the [Kenyan] service we don't like this shit and you can't be doing that,” he said. (These, however, were awkward conversations, as the Kenyans were well aware that the CIA’s rendition program involved the agency routinely kidnapping people, while its drone strike campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen were exercises in extrajudicial killing.)

“That was a big [problem], because every time an African country did an EJK we would have people up in arms,” said a former senior official, in whose opinion the U.S. government should not “put up barriers for the Kenyans, who are good partners.”

But in their interviews with Shabibi, RRT veterans made it clear that their American handlers did not seem overly concerned with legal niceties. “We were taught human rights come later,” one told Shabibi. “If you have this bad guy and you cannot get him for interrogation then you’d better execute [him].”

If the RRT was determined to kill someone from the outset, based on orders – or even suggestions – from CIA officers, then those Americans placed themselves in legal jeopardy, according to a former intelligence community lawyer, who said CIA personnel cannot ask foreign surrogates or proxy forces to commit acts that would be illegal for the CIA officers themselves to commit. “It doesn’t matter if they’re in formal or informal command of the unit,” the lawyer said.

“If you can feasibly capture someone…and the person attempts to surrender, you have to accept the surrender,” the lawyer said. “You can’t go out and say, ‘We’re going to wack this guy, even if he surrenders.’”

In Kenya, “there is a different attitude toward crime and apprehension of criminals,” said former CIA paramilitary officer and senior Pentagon official Mick Mulroy, who served in the CIA’s Nairobi station on the Black Hawk team that operated in Somalia. He cited the example of a major firefight that occurred near his house shortly after he first arrived in Kenya. He discovered that the local police would park expensive cars on the street and stake them out, waiting for thieves to try to steal them. As soon as the would-be thieves tried to break into the vehicles, the police would kill them and leave their bodies in the street to send a message, according to Mulroy.

The neighborhood that Manswab and Faraj lived in. Photo courtesy of Khelef Khalifa.

Manswab and Faraj each lived in this building, but in different apartments. Photo courtesy of Khelef Khalifa.

But Omar Faraj’s crime was simply being at the wrong place at the wrong time – the wrong place being his own home, which happened to be in the same building as that of a suspected terrorist. In the early hours of Oct. 28, 2012, a source named Titus Nabiswa had mistakenly led the RRT to Faraj's front door, according to the Kenyan newspaper The Star, which reported that Manswab lived in an apartment above that of Faraj and his wife.

With armed men breaking down their front door and firing tear gas, Faraj and his wife, Rahma Ali, attempted to escape by climbing out of their bedroom window. Faraj was balanced on top of a flowerpot trying to scramble over a garden wall into his neighbor’s property when the RRT killed him with a gunshot to the temple. His body fell on top of Rahma Ali, who then played dead, thinking she was about to be abducted or killed.

Twelve years after her husband’s death, Kenyan Justice Olga Sewe awarded Rahma Ali $60,000 in compensation. “It doesn't sound like a lot but [in Kenya] that can set someone up for life,” a former senior CIA officer said.

As for Nabiswa, according to the Kenya Human Rights Commission, he was later found dead from a bullet wound to the head, apparently the victim of another police execution.

​21. Pentagon disputes report of firefight following Abbey Gate bombing

Pentagon disputes report of firefight following Abbey Gate bombing

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · April 24, 2024

Military officials are disputing allegations that they withheld details about additional attacks on U.S. forces following the deadly August 2021 bombing in Afghanistan and insisting that the tragedy was the result of a lone insurgent, not a coordinated assault.

The pushback comes in response to a CNN report released Wednesday which appears to show multiple rounds of gunfire following the explosion at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on Aug. 26, 2021. That attack killed 13 U.S. servicemembers as well as dozens of Afghan civilians.

In a newly released video from the network — reportedly filmed by a U.S. Marine providing security in the area — American military personnel are seen taking defensive positions around the perimeter of the airport as periodic gunfire is heard nearby. Afghan civilians, some injured, rush in and out of view.

RELATED

Review says Abbey Gate bombing wasn’t preventable

A new review says the suicide bombing at the Kabul airport that killed U.S. troops and Afghans in August 2021 was not preventable.

Less than two weeks ago, Pentagon officials released a second review of the attack, again concluding that “a lone ISIS-K suicide bomber had carried out the attack, and that the attack could not have been preventable at the tactical level.”

But troops and Afghan civilians interviewed by CNN said they heard nearly a dozen instances of gunfire after the initial explosion, more than what would be common for just warning shots to disperse crowds in the area. Witnesses also suggested that civilians may have been killed by American troops who believed they were under attack.

Army Lt. Col. Rob Lodewick, public affairs adviser to the Abbey Gate Supplemental Review Team, said in a statement that military personnel were not allowed to review the CNN video ahead of publication.

“The Abbey Gate investigation thoroughly investigated the allegations of a complex attack, as well as allegations of outgoing fire from U.S. and coalition forces following the blast,” he said. “The supplemental review found no new evidence of a complex attack, and uncovered no new assertions of outgoing fire post-blast.”

Lodewick said department officials have “long acknowledged both the presence of gunfire and the fact that U.S. and coalition forces produced outgoing fire in the form of warning shots.”

He also added that “any accusations of a deliberate attempt [by military officials] to mislead or deceive are categorically false and disingenuous.”

Specifics of the deadly attack, its leadup and its aftermath have been a point of contention among congressional lawmakers and administration officials over the past three years, with Republican lawmakers repeatedly accusing White House and military officials of downplaying details in an effort to move past the messy exit of American forces from Afghanistan.

Of particular contention has been testimony by former Marine Sgt. Tyler Vargas-Andrews, a sniper who was wounded in the attack. He has said his teammates spotted the suicide bomber ahead of the deadly event but were not given permission to kill the individual.

Military officials have insisted that no such positive identification was made ahead of the attack.

The latest military review is available on the Defense Department’s website.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

22. Could Emerging Technologies Have Helped to Avoid the Tragic Killing of Humanitarian Workers in Gaza?

As long as they were combined with effective tactics, techniques, and procedures, doctrine, and leadership that emphasizes protection of NGOs/civilians. Technology will not be the silver bullet.

Could Emerging Technologies Have Helped to Avoid the Tragic Killing of Humanitarian Workers in Gaza? - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Larry Lewis, Daphné Richemond-Barak · April 25, 2024

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The killing of seven employees of World Central Kitchen in Gaza is as deplorable as it was avoidable. A substantial body of research suggests that technology can mitigate civilian harm in war, particularly mistakes that result in the deaths of humanitarian workers, but unfortunately few of the solutions it points to have been implemented.

World Central Kitchen has been a key player assisting the population of Israel and Gaza since the outbreak of hostilities on October 7, 2023. It had just delivered one hundred tons of food to Gaza when seven of its workers (from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, along with one Palestinian staff member) were killed in an Israel Defense Forces strike. The Israel Defense Forces hit three vehicles—two armored (but unarmed) vehicles bearing the organization’s logo and another passenger vehicle—as they drove south along al-Rasheed Road, heading to staging areas for more supplies near the Egyptian border. World Central Kitchen, like many humanitarian organizations operating in war zones, notified the Israel Defense Forces about this activity and planned route of operation. The Israel Defense Forces gave the organization clearance to operate in this area, though it claims that the route eventually chosen by the convoy was different from that which had been coordinated.

At 11:09 p.m. local time on April 1, 2024, without warning, one of the vehicles was struck by an attack from an airborne drone. Within a few minutes and within a mile and a half of each other, all three vehicles were struck, tragically killing all seven aid workers.

A few days later, an investigation carried out by the Israel Defense Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism and presented to the Israel Defense Forces chief of the General Staff concluded that the strike was “based on the misclassification of the event and misidentification of the vehicles as having Hamas operatives inside them” and ordered in “serious violation of the commands and IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Standard Operating Procedures.” Specifically, it found that the Israel Defense Forces had made several fundamental mistakes.

First, the Israel Defense Forces misidentified the humanitarian workers as a threat after two individuals with guns boarded some of the vehicles, additional vehicles joined the convoy, and the convoy later split. Second, information regarding the identity and route of the World Central Kitchen convoy did not make its way to the military personnel in charge of the military operation. Third, the Israel Defense Forces failed to recognize the logos displayed on the roof of some of the vehicles, designed to clearly indicate their protected status under the law of armed conflict.

Mistakes happen all the time in war. Despite their best efforts, even the most professional, responsible militaries can harm innocent civilians in their operations. In 2015, the US military mistakenly struck a building in Kunduz, Afghanistan that turned out to be a hospital operated by Médecins Sans Frontières. Forty-two civilians, including Médecins Sans Frontières staff, were killed.

At the time, a comprehensive investigation directed by the commander of US Forces–Afghanistan concluded that “this tragic incident was caused by a combination of human errors, compounded by process and equipment failures. Fatigue and high operational tempo also contributed to the incident. These factors contributed to the ‘fog of war,’ which is the uncertainty often encountered during combat operations. The investigation found that this combination of factors caused both the ground force commander and the air crew to believe mistakenly that the air crew was firing on the intended target, an insurgent-controlled site approximately 400 meters away from the MSF [Médecins Sans Frontières] Trauma Center.”

The mistakes that happened then are similar to those emerging from the World Central Kitchen incident: a humanitarian entity was misidentified as a threat, a humanitarian organization notified military forces of its activities but that information was not subsequently shared with units operating in the area, and the military force did not recognize the distinctive signs and logos used by humanitarian organizations to identify themselves.

The tragic World Central Kitchen incident is therefore (and sadly) not unique, and the mistakes made by the Israel Defense Forces are mistakes that militaries make regularly in war. The need to enhance coordination within militaries and improve deconfliction processes is highlighted time and time again, whenever such incidents occur.

In this context, two questions must be asked. First, are strikes mistakenly directed at humanitarian sites and humanitarian personnel avoidable in war? And second, if they are, what is needed for militaries to implement policies to reduce their occurrence?

On the first question, there is no doubt: steps can be taken to reduce mistakes in identification in war. CNA research has shown that artificial intelligence can reduce misidentification, avoid miscorrelation (for example, by recognizing that a swap has occurred between a threat vehicle and a civilian vehicle), and enhance the recognition of protected symbols.

Both of us have written about how emerging technologies can help protect civilians during and in the wake of conflict. With Laurie Blank and Eric Jensen, we advocated for a greater use of technology to alleviate human suffering and uncertainty as wars come to an end. We have also discussed the need to shape a humanitarian role for technology in war, and promote “humanitarian AI” as part of the emerging norm of responsible artificial intelligence in the military domain. Though challenges naturally exist, we strongly believe that technology may be channeled to uphold humanitarian values and responsible artificial intelligence commitments as expressed in, inter alia, the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy.

Here, we discuss how the use of emerging technologies can help address each of the three main mistakes that led to the World Central Kitchen attack, and what is needed to implement technological solutions that mitigate civilian harm.

Misidentification

The Israel Defense Forces inquiry noted that “those who approved the strike were convinced that they were targeting armed Hamas operatives and not [World Central Kitchen] employees.” This is a classic example of how misidentification—the mistaken belief that civilians or civilian objects are legitimate military targets—may result in civilian harm in war. The Israel Defense Forces engaged these vehicles in the belief that they were military targets when they were, in fact, civilian. This differs significantly from situations in which military forces engage with a military target and civilians in the vicinity of the target are maimed or killed.

The decision to strike was influenced by the mistaken belief that there was one or more armed individuals in, on, or around the vehicles. The World Central Kitchen employees wore protective vests (standard practice after a World Central Kitchen vehicle was hit by an Israel Defense Forces sniper’s bullet days earlier) but did not carry weapons. While we emphasize that simply carrying a weapon does not necessarily involve a loss of protection from attack, it seems that decision-makers failed to accurately assess the presence or absence of weapons.

This is something that technology can help with. The United States Department of Defense has developed automated image recognition tools to identify objects of interest within full-motion video sources, including weapons, structures, vehicles, and people. The purpose is not to classify threats but to cue the attention of humans to those objects of interest so that operators can focus on what matters most. This kind of functionality could have helped in this case by indicating that no weapons were present.

The Israel Defense Forces investigation also reveals some confusion regarding the general pattern followed by the convoy, the types of vehicles involved (trucks as opposed to individual cars), and the route chosen. Artificial intelligence can enhance operational awareness in such cases by shaping a pattern of life around the activity of humanitarian actors in general, and specific vehicles in particular. As a 2022 CNA report points out, artificial intelligence could be used to detect whether a vehicle drove to a humanitarian organization’s location as part of its stops during its previous activities. This could help make a more informed determination regarding the status of the vehicle as a threat.

Humanitarian Deconfliction

The Israel Defense Forces noted that the events of that day did not fully align with the information provided to it by the World Central Kitchen (see illustration included in the Israel Defense Forces statement). The process through which humanitarian organizations share information about their planned activities and locations to parties to the conflict is known as humanitarian notification or deconfliction.

Formal humanitarian notification processes protect humanitarian organizations and humanitarian workers who operate in volatile and dangerous environments. Once the locations or routes of humanitarian organizations have been communicated, the organizations operate under a greater level of safety and protection.

Unfortunately, however, these processes are still largely ad hoc in nature and vary from country to country. They are rarely foolproof. The deconfliction process—whereby humanitarian entities’ positions and activities are incorporated into the operational picture used by a military for operational decision-making—tends to be incomplete and limited in reach. The information about humanitarian organizations is often retained at higher headquarters and may inform some operations, but operational decision-makers at lower echelons may remain unaware that humanitarians are operating in proximity to a zone of combat or, as in the World Central Kitchen attack, have been identified for targeting.

Emerging technologies can help here too. The United States Agency for International Development supported the development of a prototype humanitarian notification system—implemented by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory and supported by CNA and Stanford University—that provides a streamlined, digital approach to humanitarian notification. The system uses blockchain to provide a permanent, inalterable record that can be consulted to determine the facts when tragedies result. Because the prototype uses APIs (application programming interfaces), a type of software that enables communication between various computer systems, this information can easily be imported into military networks and data links to develop a more complete operational picture. This same information can also be shared with lower echelons through the prototype. This can help avoid the common and tragic situation where humanitarians share their information with militaries but are killed because militaries do not share this information internally with operators.

In the case of World Central Kitchen, it seems that the addition of the smaller vehicles to the humanitarian convoy had been coordinated with the Israel Defense Forces, but the division directing the operation (known as the “front division”) was not aware of this change and operated on the belief that only trucks were part of the convoy. The information simply did not make its way down to the decision-makers. This is precisely the type of problem that an advanced humanitarian notification system could mitigate.

In addition, the Israel Defense Forces assert that the route chosen by the convoy was different from that which had been coordinated previously. Whether or not this is the case, it illustrates that processes used currently for humanitarian notification can tend to be slow and bureaucratic, making it a challenge to provide last-minute updates necessary in a dynamic and insecure environment. Having a more automated system for reporting and deconflicting humanitarian movements would help to address this need for dynamic adjustments.

Identifying Protected Logos and Symbols

The Israel Defense Forces noted that although the smaller vehicles bore the logos and distinctive signs of the World Central Kitchen, those were not visible in the dark to the drone’s infrared sensors.

It can be difficult for tactical units to identify humanitarian organizations on the battlefield. In conflict zones, humanitarian organizations are not always in clearly distinguishable structures such as established hospitals. And while the law of armed conflict is clear about their protected status, the only practical identification measure it provides is contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which require humanitarian organizations to display recognized emblems to inform the parties to the conflict of their protected status. (We note that these entities have protected status, regardless of whether the identification measure is present.)

Unfortunately, recent advances in military technology for sensors can make this measure less effective. A colored marking will not be evident to a pilot in an aircraft conducting an air strike using an infrared sensor. This was seen to be a contributing factor in several air-to-ground friendly-fire incidents during the US-led war in Iraq, where ground forces or vehicles marked with orange panels were attacked: the pilots were using infrared sensors for targeting and did not observe the orange markings intended to identify friendly forces. In other cases, friendly forces were equipped with infrared markers, but they were attacked because pilots lacked infrared sensors. The conclusion was that markers combining visual and infrared signatures would reduce the risk of inadvertent attacks. Humanitarian organizations could employ similar solutions to reduce such risk, with markings compatible with various kinds of sensors (e.g., a low-cost combination of color and infrared beacon, or a combination of color and infrared reflective materials in physical markings on vehicles or structures).

Emerging technologies also offer an opportunity for strengthening the protection of humanitarian organizations by improving identification during attacks—for example, recognizing protected symbols or humanitarian organizations’ logos by using machine learning to identify a set of symbols and alerting the operator or the chain of command accordingly. The presence of protected symbols does not mean that the location is, in fact, protected from attack: the location may have lost its protection, or an unscrupulous party may be using the symbol to deter attacks, in violation of international humanitarian law. But this capability would provide a safety net in cases where the protected symbol is present but was overlooked by operating forces.

The increased use of networks in targeting underscores the importance of information being shared at various military command echelons. Considering that militaries increasingly use data links and systems for situational awareness, having them display humanitarian organizations such as hospitals and convoys could improve situational awareness and avert unintended attacks even when the broader deconfliction process fails.

The strike that killed seven humanitarian workers from World Central Kitchen calls for a rethinking of military practices regarding the mitigation of civilian harm in war. All too common mistakes of misidentification and miscommunication can be minimized with the help of technology, raising hopes that the recent tragedy will trigger a much-needed shift in priorities.

We have pointed to ways in which tech can help—by more accurately assessing the nature of the target, the presence of weapons, and a pattern of civilian life; by developing tools that protect information shared by humanitarian actors and can share it across systems and military echelons; and by improving the ability of belligerents to identify protected logos and emblems.

This is just the tip of the iceberg, and more is needed to understand how technology can help mitigate the type of errors witnessed on April 1, 2024. A broad range of technologies and capabilities are currently in use for the protection of friendly forces and for identifying threats, yet the corresponding level of investment has not been made so far for the identification and protection of humanitarian and civilian entities. Military forces could benefit from additional practical guidance and protocols for improving the identification and deconfliction of humanitarian actors in war, and implementing lessons learned from previous mistakes.

More broadly, this discussion underscores the positive role technology can play in war, particularly by reducing uncertainty and alleviating the effects of war on those most vulnerable. The protection of humanitarian action and humanitarian actors is one important aspect of this role. Using emerging technologies to reduce the cost of war on civilians is within the realm of the possible. Tragedies like the World Central Kitchen attack should lead states and militaries to ask how technology can be used to uphold legal obligations, to improve the practical protection of civilians, and to lessen the infliction of suffering, injury, and destruction overall.

Larry Lewis leads a program on civilian harm mitigation at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization dedicated to the safety and security of the nation.

Daphné Richemond-Barak is an assistant professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at Reichman University in Israel.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or the opinions or views of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including CNA and its sponsors.

Image credit: Esri, via USGS EarthExplorer (adapted by MWI)

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Larry Lewis, Daphné Richemond-Barak · April 25, 2024

23. America’s Economy Is No. 1. That Means Trouble.

I have to admit that reading about the economy is hard and makes my head hurt.

America’s Economy Is No. 1. That Means Trouble.

Solid growth, big deficits and a strong dollar stir memories of past crises

https://www.wsj.com/economy/global/us-economy-strongest-world-imf-projections-8e707514?mod=hp_lead_pos3

By Greg Ip

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April 24, 2024 9:00 pm ET

Demand for weapons systems is helping to boost U.S. growth. PHOTO: MATT ROURKE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

If you want a single number to capture America’s economic stature, here it is: This year, the U.S. will account for 26.3% of the global gross domestic product, the highest in almost two decades.

That’s based on the latest projections from the International Monetary Fund. According to the IMF, Europe’s share of world GDP has dropped 1.4 percentage points since 2018, and Japan’s by 2.1 points. The U.S. share, by contrast, is up 2.3 points.

China’s share is up since 2018, too. But instead of overtaking the U.S. as the world’s largest economy, the Chinese economy has slipped in size to 64% of the U.S.’s from 67% in 2018.

In other words, despite trade wars, the pandemic, inflation and societal division, the U.S. is gaining on its economic peers based on this admittedly simple metric.

A caveat: These figures are based on current prices and exchange rates. Using purchasing power parity, which adjusts for different price levels across countries, the U.S. share of world GDP would be lower and that of big emerging markets—such as China and India—much higher.

But you don’t pay for oil, iPhones or artillery shells at purchasing-power parity. Current prices and exchange rates better capture a country’s relative economic power. Moreover, currencies are barometers of economic strength, and the U.S. has outperformed its peers even after adjusting for inflation and exchange rates.

Real U.S. economic growth has been much faster than Japan’s or Europe’s in the last two years. China has grown faster, but there are reasons to suspect that its data overstates reality.

U.S. wages (adjusted for inflation) are roughly level with just before the pandemic, whereas they are lower in other advanced economies, the IMF found.

This isn’t to suggest Americans should somehow be content with stagnant real wages or high inflation just because people elsewhere are even more miserable.

Still, it’s worth studying the reasons the U.S. is outperforming. In a nutshell, there’s an encouraging reason and a worrisome one.

The encouraging reason is that structurally, the U.S. continues to innovate and reap the rewards, judging by big-tech stocks and artificial intelligence adoption. The U.S. has done better at boosting productivity (output per worker).

It has also benefited from what economists call its terms of trade: The price of what it exports, notably natural gas, has risen more than the price of what it imports. In Europe, the opposite has happened.

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The second, more worrisome, reason for stronger U.S. growth is government borrowing—including former President Donald Trump’s 2018 tax cut, bipartisan Covid-19 relief in 2020 and President Biden’s 2021 stimulus.

In fact, Washington continues to inject stimulus, albeit not with that label: hundreds of billions of dollars for veterans’ benefits, infrastructure, semiconductor manufacturing and renewable energy.

U.S. deficits have run roughly 2% of GDP higher than the IMF expected back in late 2022. They will be the highest, by far, among major advanced economies for the foreseeable future.

In the long run, deficits inflate future interest bills and crowd out private investment. But they might be leading to dangerous imbalances right now.

Deficits were justified when unemployment was high, private demand moribund and inflation and interest rates low. None of that is true now.

Instead, Biden and Congress continue to stoke demand in an economy that already has plenty. Through February, Biden had canceled $138 billion in student debt—and he has just unveiled plans to erase billions more—which directly boosts debtors’ purchasing power. Of the $95 billion in aid to Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel just approved by Congress, $57 billion will flow back to U.S. producers in the form of more weapons purchases.

U.S. natural gas exports are a strong point for the American economy. PHOTO: ANGUS MORDANT/REUTERS

It’s one reason inflation, though down from a year ago, has stalled above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target. The IMF thinks core inflation (which excludes food and energy) is a half percentage point higher than otherwise would be because of fiscal policy.

This, in turn, is keeping the Fed from cutting short-term interest rates. That, along with the flood of Treasury debt to finance the deficit, is pushing up long-term bond yields.

Textbooks predict that a combination of tight monetary and loose fiscal policy will suck in capital from overseas and drive up the dollar. That has often precipitated financial crises in emerging markets as exchange rates are devalued, governments default and banks fail.

The dollar has, indeed, risen this year. It hasn’t undermined emerging markets, which are generally in better shape than in previous crisis eras, though the risk bears watching. It might, however, destabilize the international economy another way: through protectionism.

In 1971, high U.S. inflation and government deficits led to an overvalued dollar and trade deficits. After the Nixon administration imposed a 10% surcharge on imports, West Germany and Japan agreed to revalue their currencies against the dollar.

In 1985, the script repeated: Higher U.S. interest rates and budget deficits had driven up the dollar and trade deficit. At New York’s Plaza Hotel that September, the Reagan administration persuaded Japanese and European officials to boost their currencies against the dollar. It followed with trade actions against Japan, in particular on autos and semiconductors.

The dollar hasn’t risen nearly as much now as it did in 1985, yet similar frictions are emerging. The Biden administration badly wants to boost American manufacturing, in particular of electric vehicles, and is watching with dismay as China, aided by a weaker yuan, floods the world with cheap exports. The U.S. trade deficit, after shrinking through most of last year, is growing again.

The macroeconomic solution would be for the U.S. to stimulate its economy less and China to stimulate its economy more. Neither seems likely. And unlike in 1971 and 1985, when West Germany and Japan felt compelled to raise their currencies to mollify the U.S.—their ally and protector—China feels no such obligation.

The result will almost certainly be more protectionist pressure. Biden is already planning higher tariffs on China. If Trump returns to the White House, expect no action on the deficit and, if his first term is a harbinger, more tariffs and a push to weaken the dollar.

The U.S. economy might still be king, but the reign will not be harmonious.

Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com

24. A More Comprehensive Plan to Push Back Against China’s Fishing Practices

Excerpt:

More aggressively pushing back against Chinese illegal fishing practices is an opportunity for the U.S. government to highlight its global leadership in a way that directly defends the rules-based international order, challenges its most capable global competitor, helps rehabilitate the maritime environment, and increases the food security and economic opportunity for some of the world’s poorest and most helpless people. But Chinese fishers are not the only ones that engage in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and the U.S. government should not take its own institutions and those of its partners and allies for granted. The U.S. government should also ensure it is effectively pushing back against the lesser but not insignificant numbers of American, allied, and partner fishers who conduct the same activities. To truly defend the rules-based order against all violators, the U.S. government should ensure U.S. fishers follow the rules, and it should be willing to defend the rules from its best friends and most fierce competitors alike.

A More Comprehensive Plan to Push Back Against China’s Fishing Practices - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael E. Clark · April 25, 2024

After spending years working and living in Africa, I have learned you cannot take anything for granted. Even though foreign navies and coast guards exist on paper, that does not mean they have boats that float and work. Even if they do have boats that float and work, that does not mean they have fuel or spare parts. Even if the boats are able to regularly operate, that does not mean they put a dent in maritime crime because maritime law enforcement is only one component of a government effectively policing its waters.

In December 2022, U.S. Coast Guard Cmdr. Aaron Delano-Johnson and U.S. Navy Cmdr. Chris Bernotavicius published an article in War on the Rocks where they argued that the U.S. government should more aggressively confront Chinese illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing practices across the globe. Unlike current U.S. strategies, the authors consider these practices a “coercive tool of Chinese statecraft” and frame them as a component of strategic competition. Delano-Johnson and Bernotavicius propose that the U.S. Coast Guard, due to the service’s unique capabilities and relationships, lead efforts against Chinese fishers by helping partner governments to develop more effective maritime enforcement capabilities that ideally become self-sufficient.

This proposal, however, takes the functioning of other state institutions for granted and fails to address the larger problems that facilitate harmful Chinese fishing practices.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in general and Chinese fishing practices in particular do pose significant threats to international and U.S. national security. Meaningfully addressing these threats, however, would require a more robust response than what Delano-Johnson and Bernotavicius propose. A more effective U.S. approach should more directly confront the system of factors that prevent a foreign government from effectively policing its waters. In addition to maritime enforcement, two other significant factors include corruption and economic coercion. All these factors significantly impact many U.S. partner governments’ ability to police their waters, and focusing on maritime enforcement while failing to address corruption and coercion would likely result in a failure to effectively push back against harmful fishing practices even if the U.S. Coast Guard is able to train a perfect foreign counterpart.

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A Significant National Security Threat

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing practices, particularly as practiced by the Chinese fishing fleet, pose multiple threats to international and U.S. national security. These practices often lead to overfishing, which depletes local fishing stocks and makes it difficult for the poorest in costal countries to afford the fish they rely on as their primary source of protein. Overfishing depresses local fishing industries, eliminating the livelihoods of many of the same people. These practices also challenge global norms and infringe upon the sovereignty of any country in which they occur.

The Chinese government heavily subsidizes the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet, which is the largest in the world and often engages in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. The Chinese government further aids this fleet by coercing foreign governments to minimize enforcement against Chinese vessels, and it uses many of the same fishing vessels as part of its maritime militia, which operates in waters closer to home.

The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy mentions the necessity for U.S. support to allies and partners that “stand on the frontlines of the [People’s Republic of China] coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and prosperity.” Governments that suffer from illegal Chinese fishing practices are on the frontlines of daily Chinese government coercion and threats to autonomy, security, and prosperity.

Challenges to Enforcement

There are many challenges that enable illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing practices beyond poor maritime enforcement. Two main challenges include corruption and susceptibility to economic coercion, and both of these permeate through many of the countries the U.S. government wants to help combat such practices.

A government’s ability to police its exclusive economic zone, 200 nautical miles from its coastline, neither starts nor stops on the water. Before maritime enforcement takes place, governments pass laws, participate in international agreements, and issue permits to regulate how fishing should be conducted. Should a navy or coast guard apprehend illegal fishers, a government’s criminal justice system levies punishments to disincentivize further violations.

Corruption is pervasive throughout the global fishing industry and undermines regulation through bribes to politicians who oversee the process, officials who issue fishing permits, law enforcement personnel, investigators, prosecutors, and judges, among others. Fighting corruption presents a significant challenge to a majority of the partners the U.S. government wants to engage with to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. The October 2022 U.S. Interagency Working Group on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing’s National 5-Year Strategy for Combatting Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing lists 57 priority countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean where U.S. government assistance is most needed. The World Bank assessed 50 of these 57 priority countries in 2021. Thirty of them scored in the bottom 50th percentile for control of corruption, and 17 of those scored in the bottom 25th percentile.

As an example, Ghana is one of the U.S. government’s strongest partners in West Africa, one of the strategy’s priority countries, and scored just above the 50th percentile for control of corruption, making it an above-average country. The Environmental Justice Foundation, a British non-governmental organization, found in an October 2022 study about the Chinese-owned fishing fleet in Ghana that a “culture of corruption” exists throughout the official Ghanaian fishing management system. The majority of the Ghanian fishing sector personnel who the foundation interviewed had witnessed corruption from port authorities, members of the navy, and official government fishing observers.

Furthermore, according to a January 2023 BBC story, most of the Ghanian government fishing observers take bribes due to “fear, corruption, and neglect.” The neglect the article is referring to is that the government is paying these observers meager salaries infrequently, if at all, driving them to seek alternate sources of income to make a living and support their families. In my experience, this form of neglect among government workers is common throughout much of Africa and often leads to corruption out of economic necessity. Ghana’s relatively high scores in controlling corruption make it likely that corruption would pose an even greater challenge when trying to confront illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in a majority of the working group’s priority countries.

The Chinese government adds to these difficulties, making its support to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing particularly acute. With the second-largest economy in the world, the Chinese government uses its significant power and influence to coerce governments into minimizing enforcement against Chinese fishing vessels. As Delano-Johnson and Bernotavicius point out, one way the Chinese government does this is by forcing governments to choose between prosecuting Chinese fishing vessels or accepting Chinese aid. “It’s hard to say no to China when they are building your roads,” as one former head of Senegal’s Oceanic Research Institute puts it. Senegal is one of five “flag states” that the working group’s strategy designates as a focus of U.S. government-to-government engagement to counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Many of the strategy’s priority countries are also underdeveloped, making them vulnerable to coercion with foreign aid. The United Nations assessed 49 of the strategy’s 57 priority countries in 2021. Twenty-one of them, including Ghana, are in the medium human development category. Eight, including Senegal, are in the low human development category. These are the two lowest human development categories of four.

Challenges to Self-Sufficiency

Pervasive corruption and susceptibility to economic coercion would make it extremely difficult for Delano-Johnson and Bernotavicius’ solution to become self-sufficient. They propose that the U.S. Coast Guard’s maritime security cooperation efforts be modeled after the Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative, but this initiative is also unlikely lead to lead self-sufficiency. Its primary goal is to help partner militaries develop forces that contribute to U.N. peacekeeping operations, and the authors provide examples of notable successes. The successes, however, rely on the United Nations to pay governments directly for their troop contributions.

For maritime enforcement capabilities to reach true self-sufficiency, countries need a reliable internal source of income. Some portion of this income could come from governments issuing fishing licenses and imposing fines on guilty illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishers. The governments, however, must be capable of effectively doing both to collect enough revenue to pay for the operations. Corruption and economic coercion undermine these processes.

An ineffective system to effectively punish illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishers could also create motivation and morale problems within a maritime force, no matter how well-trained, further hindering its performance. To paraphrase what a senior African counterpart once told me, “Why should military members risk their lives on the high seas to catch illegal fishers if they know the fishers will just be let free when they are pulled into port?” In other words, if the navy or coast guard knows nothing will happen to any illegal fishers they catch, then why should they bother patrolling their country’s waters?

Finally, government leaders must want to maintain a capability before the capability can become self-sufficient. One adage of security cooperation is “you can’t want it more than they do.” For any maritime security cooperation to bear long-term dividends and produce capable maritime forces after U.S. trainers leave, host-nation government and military leaders must want to maintain the forces. If government leaders are gaining financially through corruption or politically through economic aid, then they may have little to no motivation to start enforcing fishing regulations and see their income and political support disappear.

A More Holistic Solution

The U.S. Coast Guard is the right organization to lead security cooperation efforts against Chinese illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing practices. Focusing on security cooperation without addressing the other issues that prevent partner governments from effectively policing their waters may result in short-term success but would likely result in long-term failure. Instead, other agencies, like the Department of State or U.S. Agency for International Development, should lead a more holistic approach to challenge Chinese fishing practices at sea as well as challenge corruption within the fishing industry and propose viable alternatives to Chinese economic coercion.

A more effective U.S. approach would seek to change the incentives for enough partner government officials to want to effectively police a country’s waters and maintain a maritime enforcement capability after U.S. trainers leave. Many of these officials would likely not be in the military, like fishing observers and judges.

The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development specialize in conducting holistic approaches to security issues due to their unique capabilities and relationships. They work with foreign governments to decrease corruption and improve criminal justice systems. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s specialty is economic development, which would likely be necessary to provide viable alternatives to Chinese economic coercion. The Biden administration’s “Memorandum on Combatting Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses,” released four months prior to the working group’s strategy, calls on the U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator to lead anti-corruption and judicial reform efforts as well. The Department of State works regularly with and funds U.S. Coast Guard and military security cooperation efforts, like the Global Peace Operations Initiative, and it has a bureau that specializes in training police and strengthening criminal justice institutions. The Department of State also recently opened the Office of China Coordination to manage U.S. competition with China.

Conclusion

The Chinese government uses subsidies and coercion to enable the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet to conduct illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing across the globe. These activities represent a direct threat to the rules-based international system, and they occur daily in multiple countries that have a minimal capacity to push back and have structural governance issues that disincentivize them from doing so. These illegal fishing activities also represent a daily threat to the lives and livelihoods of the poorest citizens within these countries.

For the U.S. government to more effectively push back against harmful Chinese fishing practices and help create indigenous, self-sustaining maritime enforcement capabilities, it should not focus its efforts primarily on maritime security cooperation led by the U.S. Coast Guard. Instead, the U.S. government should address the system of factors that enable illegal Chinese fishing practices, including government corruption and Chinese economic coercion as well as maritime enforcement. A more holistic approach would likely have to be led by a more holistic agency that already addresses similar issues, such as the Department of State or U.S. Agency for International Development.

More aggressively pushing back against Chinese illegal fishing practices is an opportunity for the U.S. government to highlight its global leadership in a way that directly defends the rules-based international order, challenges its most capable global competitor, helps rehabilitate the maritime environment, and increases the food security and economic opportunity for some of the world’s poorest and most helpless people. But Chinese fishers are not the only ones that engage in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and the U.S. government should not take its own institutions and those of its partners and allies for granted. The U.S. government should also ensure it is effectively pushing back against the lesser but not insignificant numbers of American, allied, and partner fishers who conduct the same activities. To truly defend the rules-based order against all violators, the U.S. government should ensure U.S. fishers follow the rules, and it should be willing to defend the rules from its best friends and most fierce competitors alike.

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Michael E. Clark is an active-duty U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel, F/A-18 weapons systems officer, and Africa foreign area officer.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, or U.S. Marine Corps.

Image: U.S. Navy

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael E. Clark · April 25, 2024

25. US Special Forces are prioritizing Stinger missile training again

When I came into the Army we were still using the previous MANPAD – the Redeye. I hope the 18Bs are the only ones getting this training as the other candidates need to focus on their critical MOS tasks. The weapons sergeants can cross train the rest of their teammates as this is not a difficult system to employ.

US Special Forces are prioritizing Stinger missile training again

This is one of many recent changes to the Special Forces Qualifications Course.

BY JOSHUA SKOVLUND | PUBLISHED APR 24, 2024 3:55 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · April 24, 2024

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During the War on Terror, the military could conduct operations unhindered due to complete air superiority. The modern battlefield in Ukraine has proven that air superiority is no longer guaranteed, so U.S. Special Forces are preparing accordingly.

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) has brought older weapons of war — including the Stinger surface-to-air missile — out of retirement to prepare future Special Forces weapons sergeants for a new era of warfare.

“We may have a window of advantage but the reality with our partners is we may have to provide small unit air defense capability, and that involves the ability to operate systems like the Stinger,” Commanding General of SWCS Brig. Gen. Guillaume Beaurpere said.

This is one of the recent changes to the Special Forces Qualifications Course — commonly called the Q-course, which all soldiers must pass to earn the Green Beret. Many of the weapons and tactics from World War II and through the Cold War era, like digging tank ditches, have also made their way back into the Q-course.

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“It’s important to understand and see how certain things can become cyclical while it progresses throughout time,” said Chris (who asked that his last name not be used), the operations officer for 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). “So, recognizing what is applicable from the past to not forget the lessons that were learned in blood through previous conflicts, I think it’s extremely important to incorporate that moving forward.”

Chris said they’ve also brought back anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), another tool from the Cold War era. Whether it’s anti-air or anti-tank missiles, Chris considers it all a part of the pertinent skills students need to master as they progress throughout the Q-course and prepare for future wars.

The training is being implemented in the weapons sergeant course, which has always included training on a wide range of firearms and weaponry. The priority for training on certain weapons, like stingers and ATGMs, has shifted over the years, but it’s “always been there” in some way, Chris said.

“The priority over the past five to six years has been shifting back over to the understanding of what the conventional forces are doing in those environments and how [special operations forces] fit into it,” Chris said. “It’s always been there as kind of a background, but now it’s moved more towards [the forefront] while still maintaining a focus on unconventional warfare.”

The Senate recently passed a foreign aid package worth $95 billion to support Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. As part of that package, weapons, and equipment worth $1 billion will be immediately sent to Ukraine, including 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 9,000 Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles, and 10,000 Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems.

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Joshua Skovlund

Joshua Skovlund is a staff writer for Task & Purpose and a former U.S. Army forward observer. He has been covering the military, veterans, and first responders for over three years, reporting on assignment from Ukraine during the opening salvo of the Russian invasion, multinational military exercises in Germany, and during the 2020 civil unrest in Minneapolis. His previous bylines include Coffee or Die Magazine and Outdoor Life. Contact the author here.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · April 24, 2024

26. Katherine Maher’s Color Revolution

Conspiracy theory? This is bizarre. the CEO of NPR and the color revolutions? I have no other knowledge of Ms Maher other than the current NPR controversy. This is quite a hit job.

But if she is a contributor to the color revelations we need to start consulting with her on unconventional warfare. (note my sarcasm)

Katherine Maher’s Color Revolution

The NPR boss is a symbol of regime change—foreign and domestic.

City Journal · by Christopher F. Rufo · April 24, 2024

The Color Revolution is restless. Beginning in the former Soviet republics in the early 2000s, it moved along the coast of North Africa with the so-called Arab Spring in the 2010s, and, into the current decade, has spread further.

The ostensible purpose of Color Revolutions—named after the Rose Revolution, Orange Revolution, and Tulip Revolution in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively—is to replace authoritarian regimes with Western liberal democracies. American and European intelligence services are often heavily involved in these revolutions, with ambitions not only to spread modern ideologies but also to undermine geopolitical opponents.

The West’s favored methods of supporting Color Revolutions include fomenting dissent, organizing activists through social media, promoting student movements, and unleashing domestic unrest on the streets. Americans hold varying opinions on such efforts, but what many don’t realize is that they occur not only overseas but also here in the United States. The summer of rioting following the death of George Floyd, which ushered in the new DEI regime, was in many ways a domestic Color Revolution, advanced by progressive NGOs, media entities, and political actors.

A minor figure in these movements, a woman named Katherine Maher, has recently come to greater prominence. Maher was involved in the wave of Color Revolutions that took place in North Africa in the 2010s, and she supported the post-George Floyd upheavals in the United States in the 2020s. She was also the CEO of the Wikimedia Foundation, which runs the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, and was just recently named the new CEO of National Public Radio.

At NPR, Maher has already been embroiled in controversy. Longtime editor Uri Berliner, who has now resigned, accused her of left-wing bias and suppressing dissent. Following these accusations, I did extensive reporting demonstrating that Maher has a troubling history of arguing against the notion of objective truth and supporting censorship in the name of democracy.

Now I have gathered additional facts that raise new questions about Maher’s role as a regime-change agent, both foreign and domestic. She has brought the Color Revolution home to America.

In the first part of her career, Maher seemed to follow the wave of U.S.-backed revolutions through the Middle East and North Africa.

She had the perfect background for this kind of work. She held a degree in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies from New York University and had studied in Cairo and Damascus. And, at every step, she had managed to connect with powerful institutions, repeating their slogans and climbing their ranks. (Maher did not respond to request for comment.)

During the volatile Arab Spring period, under a constantly rotating series of NGO affiliations, Maher went to multiple countries that were undergoing U.S.-backed regime change. Beginning in 2011, for example, she traveled multiple times to Tunisia, working with regime-change activists and government officials. In 2012, she traveled to a strategic city on the Turkey-Syria border, which had become a base for Western-backed opposition to Bashar al-Assad. That same year, she traveled to Libya, where the U.S. had just overthrown strongman Muammar Gaddafi.

During much of 2011, Maher worked for the National Democratic Institute, a government-funded NGO with deep connections to U.S. intelligence and the Democratic Party’s foreign policy machine. The organization was “set up to do independently what CIA had done covertly worldwide,” says national security analyst J. Michael Waller. While initially some distance supposedly existed between NDI and the intelligence services, that relationship has devolved back to “the gray zone,” per Waller, and it appears that they often work in concert. “NDI is an instrument of Samantha Power and the global revolution elements of the Obama team,” Waller explains. “It has gone along with, and been significant parts of, color revolutions around the world. It is very much a regime-change actor.”

American adversaries such as China agree with this sentiment and have accused NDI of being a “second CIA.” Some nations, fearing American interference, have banned NDI from operating in their territories. In 2012, for example, Egypt accused NDI and other organizations of serving as unregistered foreign agents and working “in coordination” with U.S. intelligence to subvert the Egyptian state.

During her time at NDI, Katherine Maher was “part of a revolutionary vanguard movement,” says Waller.

I have obtained access to several now-deleted blog posts written by Maher during this period, which support Waller’s thesis and shed additional light on her work at NDI. In August 2011, Maher wrote a post about NDI’s work in Libya, which was then in the midst of its revolution: Gaddafi was still alive and U.S.-backed rebels had set up a headquarters in the city of Benghazi. During the conflict, Maher wrote, “a member of the NDI Middle East team walked into our office and asked how difficult it would be to wire downtown Benghazi” for Internet communications.

This was not mere democratic institution-building but a plan to provide communications to Libya’s political and military opposition, in the middle of a civil war. Maher seemed to suggest that restoring connectivity was essential to overthrowing Gaddafi’s government. (NDI did not end up executing the plan, according to Maher; Internet was restored through other means.)

The Internet, Maher learned, was a key asset on the new battlefield. The primary lesson of the Arab Spring was that Western technology—social media, encrypted messaging, mobile connectivity—had become a powerful tool of regime change. Twitter, in particular, was an asset for dissidents in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere.

Over time, however, some of those dissidents grew skeptical of Maher, who seemed to be using the same platforms to penetrate activist and opposition circles. In 2016, after Maher became the CEO of the Wikimedia Foundation—to the puzzlement of some observers—one of her Tunisia contacts accused her of working with the CIA. “Katherine Maher is probably a CIA agent,” said Slim Amamou, a digital activist and cabinet minister in Tunisia’s transition government, who had spent a significant amount of time with her. “[S]he was constantly trying to get introduced in the activist social network.”

Maher responded defensively, shaming Amamou for supposedly turning against her, and denying the charge. “I’m not any sort of agent,” she said. “Don’t defame me.”

There is no way to discern whether Maher was an agent, asset, or otherwise connected with the CIA. But her official status, however interesting it may be to speculate about, is irrelevant. In practice, Maher was undoubtedly advancing the agenda of the national security apparatus and working to advance the agenda of the Color Revolution.

The promotion of “democracy,” however, does not stop overseas. A Color Revolution has now arrived on American shores, too.

Maher’s résumé provides us with a map of modern power, connecting political revolutions overseas with the cultural revolution here at home. She has been affiliated with key foreign policy and intelligence institutions: the Atlantic Council, World Economic Forum, State Department, World Bank, and Council on Foreign Relations. More recently, she has obtained power at several key strategic assets for the flow of information within the United States: CEO of the Wikimedia Foundation, CEO of National Public Radio, and chairman of the board of the encrypted-messaging application Signal.

When Maher was selected as CEO of the Wikimedia Foundation, many members of the Wikipedia community expressed surprise. But seen through the prism of the Color Revolution, the online encyclopedia is a key strategic way station. The site defines the terms, shapes the narrative, and launders mostly left-wing political ideologies into the discourse, under the guise of “neutral knowledge.” Additionally, in recent years, it has served as training data for artificial intelligence, which then incorporates Wikipedia’s biases into its outputs.

Some suspect that intelligence services have used Wikipedia as a tool in the information war. “The bias of Wikipedia, the fact that certain points of view have been systematically silenced, is nothing new,” co-founder Larry Sanger told me in an interview. But he suspects more is at play, noting that research as far back as 2007 suggests that the CIA may be manipulating the site’s entries. “We know that there is a lot of backchannel communication and I think it has to be the case that the Wikimedia Foundation now, probably governments, probably the CIA, have accounts that they control, in which they actually exert their influence.”

Maher, for her part, was not shy about her political agenda. As I have reported, during her tenure as CEO of the Wikimedia Foundation, she advanced a policy of censorship under the pretense of fighting “disinformation.” I wrote:

In a speech to the Atlantic Council, an organization with extensive ties to U.S. intelligence services, she explained that she “took a very active approach to disinformation,” coordinated censorship “through conversations with government,” and suppressed dissenting opinions related to the pandemic and the 2020 election.

In that same speech, Maher said that, in relation to the fight against disinformation, the “the number one challenge here that we see is, of course, the First Amendment in the United States.” These speech protections, Maher continued, make it “a little bit tricky” to suppress “bad information” and “the influence peddlers who have made a real market economy around it.”

Maher’s general policy at Wikipedia, she tweeted, was to support efforts to “eliminate racist, misogynist, transphobic, and other forms of discriminatory content”—which, under current left-wing definitions, could include almost anything to the right of Joe Biden.

Wikipedia is important because it shapes perception and closes the circle of information production. Wikipedia replicates left-wing news reporting, news reporting replicates left-wing Wikipedia entries, and artificial intelligence replicates both. It’s a closed loop that operates surreptitiously, using its reputation for unbiased knowledge as a cover for its own disinformation.

How does NPR fit into what we might call the American Color Revolution? It is another key component in our domestic culture war. NPR has formative power in many culture-shaping institutions and increasingly represents the voice of blue elites. It is state radio, in the Soviet sense: it produces propaganda to advance its own cultural power and move the nation toward a desired end-state.

Maher understood the power of media—and radio, in particular—early in her career. In 2010, according to a now-deleted blog post that I have obtained, Maher speculated that seizing control of radio could be a way to “Govern a Country.” The specific context of the post was the U.S.-supported revolution in the African nation of Cote d’Ivoire, where the incumbent president had refused to concede to a Western-backed candidate, sparking a civil war. Eventually, the opposition prevailed, took control of communications, and rules the country to this day. “Control over the flow of information in a closed society can be tantamount to control over the state,” Maher wrote.

While Maher was more descriptive than prescriptive in this 2010 blog post, the implication of what she described seems clear enough: control the narrative, control the regime. The production of media works in Cote d’Ivoire as it does in America; the difference is only a matter of scale and complexity.

The same principles of Color Revolution apply to the encrypted-messaging application Signal, where Maher currently serves as chairman of the board. Signal was originally funded, in part, by the government-backed Open Technology Fund, where Maher sits on the advisory council and which has deep connections with technologies used for regime change. According to some analysts, Signal’s purpose is to provide overseas activists with secure communications; it is, in the positive sense, a way to promote dissent and spread controversial political opinion.

On the surface, this appears to be a contradiction. Maher backed dissent abroad but suppressed it at home. She not only censored content at Wikipedia but also supported deplatforming then-President Donald Trump, who opposed the domestic revolution following the death of George Floyd. “Must be satisfying to deplatform fascists,” Maher wrote on Twitter, after Trump was effectively removed from social media. “Even more satisfying? Not platforming them in the first place.”

This is not hypocrisy; it is the politics of friend and enemy. For Maher, “democracy” means the advancement of left-wing race and gender ideology all over the world. This requires elevating progressive dissidents overseas, while suppressing conservative dissidents at home. For partisans of Color Revolution, dissent and censorship are not in contradiction—they are two sides of the same coin.

It’s easy to understand Katherine Maher as a curriculum vitae—she has collected affiliations and positions, traversing the hierarchy of progressive culture—but it is harder to understand her as a human being.

Public information offers a likely clue. Maher grew up in an affluent, nearly all-white Connecticut town. Her father worked at the most prestigious firms on Wall Street and, according to family lore, her grandfather had been a spy in Europe. Her mother is a Democratic state senator in Connecticut and dutifully follows the party line; she supported Hillary Clinton for president, stands with Planned Parenthood, and donates to the ACLU.

I spoke with some of the people in Maher’s personal orbit, who have a further impression. Maher, in their telling, anyway, is immensely ambitious, calculating, and cold. She rose through the ranks of power and built a network of influential patrons, but never maintained close relationships, with some wondering whether she had any friends at all. She traveled constantly, built her Rolodex, and spoke alongside establishment players, such as former CIA director Michael Hayden, but her personal life was reportedly chaotic.

She had been through a series of relationships, apparently, and always disguised her ambition in the language of ideology—a means to power, rather than an authentic commitment. “That’s Katherine in a nutshell: the privileged white girl with a savior complex,” said one contact with knowledge of Maher’s personal life.

For the better part of her thirties, Maher had her sights on powerful men in the tech sector—a high-tech entrepreneur; an early Facebook employee—but also considered finding someone lesser as she approached 40. “I was advised by a more senior female exec that as a woman, I ought to seek a husband who wouldn’t mind being supported,” Maher wrote in 2020. “An artist, perhaps. Someone with co-equal ambition would be a drag on my career, make me less competitive.”

When Maher did get married, to corporate lawyer Ashutosh Upreti in 2023, she earned coverage in the New York Times, but it was hardly flattering. She had mistaken her first date for a job interview. “I thought he was more interested in being my general counsel than my date,” Maher told the newspaper. She had refused to answer his proposal for five weeks, before relenting. They eventually settled down and adopted a designer dog.

Maher, in public and in private, then, appears to be a vessel for power, with few original thoughts. But she has a charismatic appeal and is willing to do what it takes to turn power into more power—to the delight of the institutions that have orbited around her for the past 20 years. As Wikipedia co-founder Larry Sanger told me: “It is getting to the point where you can’t accuse people like Katherine Maher of hypocrisy anymore, because they’re not being hypocritical. They’re actually saying it out loud: ‘We don’t really believe in this freedom stuff anyway.’”

Sanger, perhaps, is being naïve. The American Color Revolution does not exist to advance principles but to accumulate power and entrench ideologies. Freedom is a tool: sometimes it is helpful to the cause; sometimes it is an impediment. The evidence certainly suggests that this is how Katherine Maher sees the world.

Christopher F. Rufo is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a contributing editor of City Journal, and the author of America’s Cultural Revolution.

Photo By Stephen McCarthy/Sportsfile for Web Summit Qatar via Getty Images

City Journal · by Christopher F. Rufo · April 24, 2024

27. The Harding Project: A Re-Introduction

An excellent effort here.

Harding Project Substack

99+

The Harding Project: A Re-Introduction

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/welcome-to-the-harding-project?utm=

Allow us to reintroduce ourselves

ZACHARY GRIFFITHS AND LEYTON SUMMERLIN

APR 25, 2024

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In 1934, the Army raced to transform itself for the next war. The Great Depression, surplus equipment from World War I, and limited manning challenged the Army. Knowing his branch would need to think harder, the Chief of Infantry appointed then-Major Edwin “Forrest” Harding as the editor of the Infantry Journal. Harding renewed the Infantry Journal, doubling circulation and fostering debates on mechanization, the tank, and the Army profession. Today, the Army again finds itself in an interwar period, seeking to transform before the next war.

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Today, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army renews professional writing through the Harding Project. Free of Common Access Card controls or classifications, the Army’s professional journals link leaders to win our nation’s wars. Writing can directly impact policy (like tracking foreign disclosure officers), share lessons that improve the Army, or influence broader Army debates on topics like Multi-Domain Operations. Crucially, writing harnesses our profession, helping us think harder without significant new costs. 

Both senior leaders and junior leaders have important roles to play. Senior leaders should encourage professional writing by recognizing those who influence them and encouraging those with good ideas to commit them to paper. More junior leaders should share their ideas and help others get started. 

While long-time readers are familiar with this story, this post seeks to “catch-up” new readers. 

The Harding Project: What it is

The Harding Project aims to renew the Army’s system of professional journals, but not to supplant them with something new. Broadly, we’re pursuing a four-point platform as we inform the Army about these changes.

• Modernize. Longtime readers of Infantry or Engineer will see them modernized to a web-first, mobile-friendly format that reaches the scrolling Soldier. This website is under development and will launch this summer. 
• Archives. We’re also making archives more accessible. Armor dates to 1888. Infantry to 1930. Through partnership with the Defense Technical Information Center, the Army will soon make about 120,000 articles searchable on Google and other search platforms.
• Staffing. After decades of cuts, the Army will right-size journal staffing. The uniformed staff will ensure journals remain relevant in content and format, while the civilians bring editorial expertise and continuity. Look for a new Broadening Opportunity that competitively selects, develops through graduate education, and employs uniformed editors this fall.
• Education. The Army is also looking at low-cost changes to professional military education curriculum. For example, adding requirements to cite military journals will familiarize the force with them, but not add burdensome new requirements. 

Outreach

Beyond those largely internal efforts, the Harding Project reaches out to formations across the Army to explain why professional writing is important and the changes coming. Key actions include:

• Chief of Staff of the Army’s Articles of the Month. General George recognizes three articles a month by Army authors. In addition to their recognition at Army University Press, recognized authors receive a star note and coin from the Chief. 
• Writings on the Substack and with the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point. The Harding Project publishes writing on writing here on the Substack, and longer form articles at MWI. Some recurring features there include #ArmyAuthor and Know your Branch Magazine. 
• How-to Articles and Special Issue of Military Review. We continue to publish “how-to” articles for those that want to write articles or start a unit writing program. This summer, we will publish a special issue of Military Review focused on professional discourse that will be mailed across the Army and also available online. 
• Other outreach. We also speak on podcasts, speak to Army forums, and visit posts depending on our schedule and yours to spread the word about professional writing in the Army. 
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We hope you stick around. This Substack will keep you informed of new how-to guides or events related to renewing professional discourse in the Army.

28. A Dangerous Game Is Underway in Asia

What is another world for accommodation and restraint?

Excerpts:

Washington and its allies should shift to a more positive approach to China, aimed at fostering accommodation and restraint. This could include working to secure credible mutual assurances regarding limits on Chinese military deployments, such as amphibious forces and missile capabilities relevant to Taiwan, in return for U.S. limits on the levels and types of arms that it sells to the island. They could also explore increasing security cooperation with China regarding cyberattacks, the defense of sea lanes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as better collaboration to combat climate change and the outbreak of another pandemic.

China, of course, has its own role to play. In the end, Beijing, like the United States, wants to avoid a crisis and conflict in the region. Given that, it should respond to a more cooperative American and allied approach by moderating its own coercive behavior regarding maritime disputes.

None of this will be easy, given the intense suspicion that now exists between Beijing and Washington and its allies. But new thinking and new diplomatic efforts could incentivize China to reciprocate in meaningful ways. At the very least, it’s necessary to try. Focusing on military deterrence alone won’t work. Trying to find a way to cooperate with China is the best way — perhaps the only way — to steer the world away from disaster.

OPINION

GUEST ESSAY

A Dangerous Game Is Underway in Asia

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/opinion/china-asia-us-relations.html?utm

April 24, 2024

Credit...Ritchie B Tongo/EPA, via Shutterstock

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By Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael D. Swaine

Dr. Mochizuki is a professor at George Washington University. Dr. Swaine is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

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This month, President Biden threw one of the most lavish state dinners in Washington’s recent memory. Celebrities and billionaires flocked to the White House to dine in honor of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, posing for photos in front of an elaborate display of Japanese fans. Jeff Bezos dropped by; Paul Simon provided the entertainment.

The spectacle was part of a carefully orchestrated series of events to showcase the renewed U.S.-Japan relationship — and the notable transformation of the United States’ security alliances in Asia. The next day, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines was also in the U.S. capital for a historic U.S.-Japan-Philippines summit, during which a new trilateral security partnership was announced.

Both events were directed at the same audience: China.

Over the past several years, Washington has built a series of multilateral security arrangements like these in the Asia-Pacific region. Although U.S. officials claim that the recent mobilization of allies and partners is not aimed at China, don’t believe it. Indeed, Mr. Kishida emphasized in a speech to Congress on April 11 that China presents “the greatest strategic challenge” both to Japan and to the international community.

China’s recent activity is, of course, concerning. Its military has acquired ever more potent ways to counter U.S. and allied capabilities in the Western Pacific and has behaved aggressively in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere, alarming its neighbors.

But Washington’s pursuit of an increasingly complex lattice of security ties is a dangerous game. Those ties include upgrades in defense capabilities, more joint military exercises, deeper intelligence sharing, new initiatives on defense production and technology cooperation and the enhancement of contingency planning and military coordination. All of that may make Beijing more cautious about the blatant use of military force in the region. But the new alliance structure is not, on its own, a long-term guarantor of regional peace and stability — and could even increase the risk of stumbling into a conflict.

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The security partnership rolled out this month in Washington is only the latest in a string of new defense configurations that reach across Asia and the Pacific. In 2017 the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, was revived, promoting collaboration among the United States, Japan, Australia and India. In September 2021, Australia, Britain and the United States began their partnership, known as AUKUS, and the United States, Japan and South Korea committed to closer cooperation in a summit at Camp David last August.

All of these moves have been motivated primarily by concern over Beijing, which has, in turn, castigated these countries as being part of a U.S.-led effort to create an Asian version of NATO designed to contain China. None amount to a collective defense pact like the NATO treaty, whose Article 5 considers an armed attack on one member as “an attack against them all.” But China will nevertheless almost certainly regard the latest agreement among the United States, Japan and the Philippines — with which it is engaged in an active territorial dispute — as further confirmation of a Washington-led attempt to threaten its interests.

It’s not yet clear how Beijing will respond. But it may double down on the expansion of its military capabilities and intensify its use of military and paramilitary force to assert its territorial claims in the region, especially regarding the sensitive issue of Taiwan. Beijing could also promote further Chinese military cooperation with Russia in the form of enhanced military exercises and deployments.

The net result may be an Asia-Pacific region that is even more divided and dangerous than it is today, marked by a deepening arms race. In this increasingly contentious and militarized environment, the chance of some political incident or military accident triggering a devastating regional war is likely to grow. This is especially likely, given the absence of meaningful U.S. and allied crisis communication channels with China to prevent such an incident from spiraling out of control.

To prevent this nightmare, the U.S. and its allies and partners must invest much more in diplomacy with China, in addition to bolstering military deterrence.

For a start, the United States and key allies like Japan should make a sustained effort to establish a durable crisis prevention and management dialogue with China involving each nation’s foreign policy and security agencies. So far, such dialogues have been limited primarily to military channels and topics. It is critical that both civilian and military officials understand the many possible sources of inadvertent crises and develop ways to prevent them or manage them if they occur. This process should include the establishment of an agreed-upon set of leaders’ best practices for crisis management and a trusted but unofficial channel through which the relevant parties can discuss crisis-averting understandings.

The immediate focus for the United States and Japan should be on avoiding actions that add to tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The deployment of American military trainers to Taiwan on what looks like a permanent basis and suggestions by some U.S. officials and policy analysts that Taiwan be treated as a security linchpin within the overall U.S. defense posture in Asia are needlessly provocative. They also openly contradict America’s longstanding “one China” policy, under which the United States ended the deployment of all U.S. military forces to Taiwan and does not view Taiwan as a key U.S. security location, caring only that the Taiwan issue be handled peacefully and without coercion.

Japan, for its part, has also become more circumspect about its own “one China” policy by being reluctant to reaffirm explicitly that Tokyo does not support Taiwan’s independence. Recent statements by some political leaders in Tokyo about Japanese military forces being ready to help defend Taiwan will almost certainly inflame Chinese leaders, who remember that Japan seized Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and ’95.

Washington and Tokyo should clearly reaffirm their previous commitments on the China-Taiwan dispute. Tokyo also should confirm that it does not support any unilateral move by Taiwan toward independence and resist U.S. efforts to compel Japan to commit to Taiwan’s defense. Although American officials have reportedly been prodding Japan to join military planning for a Taiwan conflict, a large majority of Japanese residents do not favor fighting to defend Taiwan. Tokyo can best contribute to deterring China by focusing on strengthening its ability to defend its own islands.

Washington and its allies should shift to a more positive approach to China, aimed at fostering accommodation and restraint. This could include working to secure credible mutual assurances regarding limits on Chinese military deployments, such as amphibious forces and missile capabilities relevant to Taiwan, in return for U.S. limits on the levels and types of arms that it sells to the island. They could also explore increasing security cooperation with China regarding cyberattacks, the defense of sea lanes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as better collaboration to combat climate change and the outbreak of another pandemic.

China, of course, has its own role to play. In the end, Beijing, like the United States, wants to avoid a crisis and conflict in the region. Given that, it should respond to a more cooperative American and allied approach by moderating its own coercive behavior regarding maritime disputes.

None of this will be easy, given the intense suspicion that now exists between Beijing and Washington and its allies. But new thinking and new diplomatic efforts could incentivize China to reciprocate in meaningful ways. At the very least, it’s necessary to try. Focusing on military deterrence alone won’t work. Trying to find a way to cooperate with China is the best way — perhaps the only way — to steer the world away from disaster.

More on U.S. policy in Asia

Opinion | W.J. Hennigan

The U.S. Has Received a Rare Invitation From China. There Is Only One Right Answer.

April 15, 2024

Opinion | Michael Beckley

A Peaceful Solution on Taiwan Is Slipping Away

Jan. 17, 2024

Mike M. Mochizuki is a professor at George Washington University and a nonresident fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Michael D. Swaine is a senior research fellow focusing on China-related security topics at the Quincy Institute.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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29. Calling All Wargamers & Wicked Problems Writing Contest | Mad Scientist Laboratory

487. Calling All Wargamers & Wicked Problems Writing Contest | Mad Scientist Laboratory

madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil · by user · April 18, 2024

Crowdsourcing the Intellect of the Nation

[Editor’s Note: Crowdsourcing remains an effective tool for harvesting ideas and concepts from a wide array of individuals, helping us to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions. Army Mad Scientist seeks to crowdsource the intellect of the Nation (i.e., you — our community of action!) with two concurrent opportunities this Spring. In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, we explore these crowdsourcing opportunities — Read the highlights here, listen to the podcast, then get busy crafting your inputs to both!]

In today’s episode of The Convergence podcast, Army Mad Scientists Matthew Santaspirt and Raechel Melling discuss our two concurrent crowdsourcing opportunities: Calling All Wargamers and Wicked Problems Writing Contest — check out the highlights from this conversation below.

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

1. Calling All Wargamers!

Regular consumers of Army Mad Scientist content — via this blog site and The Convergence podcast — understand how wargaming can enhance Professional Military Education (PME), hone cognitive warfighting skills, and broaden our understanding of the Operational Environment. Wargaming removes hierarchies and encourages players to attempt innovative solutions, while also creating a safe environment in which to fail repeatedly and learn from mistakes. Wargaming can also help us assess concepts and capabilities with a reasonable degree of verisimilitude — before committing the Nation to costly, and in some instances, irrevocable courses of action. In challenging our assumptions and reinvigorating our thoughts about Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), wargaming can be a useful tool in facilitating life-long learning and guarding against that most fatal of flaws in assessing the Operational Environment — the failure of imagination!

Army Mad Scientist wants to hear from you about your wargaming experiences:

• What are you learning about LSCO?
• What wargames do you find useful for learning about military operations?
• If you could imagine the perfect wargame, what would it look like?
• What Great Power peripheral flashpoints are you gaming?
• What emergent technologies (or convergences) are you integrating into your wargaming?
• What compelling insights from gaming would you most like to share with the U.S. Army?

Submit your responses to these questions and more at: madscitradoc@gmail.com NLT 11:59 pm Eastern on May 1, 2024.

Check out the following Mad Scientist Laboratory blog posts on wargaming:

Live from D.C., it’s Fight Night (Parts One and Two) and associated podcasts (Parts One and Two)

Using Wargames to Reconceptualize Military Power, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth

Gaming the System: How Wargames Shape our Future and associated podcast, with guest panelists Ian Sullivan, Mitchell Land, LTC Peter Soendergaard, Jennifer McArdle, Becca Wasser, Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, Sebastian Bae, Dan Mahoney, and Jeff Hodges

A New American Way of Training and associated podcast, with Jennifer McArdle

From Legos to Modular Simulation Architectures: Enabling the Power of Future (War) Play, by Jennifer McArdle and Caitlin Dohrman

The Storm After the Flood virtual wargame scenario, video, and Lessons Learned presentation and video, presented by proclaimed Mad Scientists Dr. Gary Ackerman and Doug Clifford, The Center for Advanced Red Teaming, University at Albany, SUNY

Gamers Building the Future Force and associated podcast

Fight Club Prepares Lt Col Maddie Novák for Cross-Dimension Manoeuvre, by now COL Arnel David, U.S. Army, and Major Aaron Moore, British Army, along with their interview in The Convergence: UK Fight Club – Gaming the Future Army and associated podcast

2. Operational Environment Wicked Problems Writing Contest

During the past decade, conflicts around the globe have shaped our understanding of Twenty-first Century warfighting. The convergence of battlefield transparency, autonomous systems, and massed and precision fires have resulted in an increasingly lethal OE. Inexpensive, expendable, man-portable precision munitions in the hands of dismounted infantry are attriting exquisite, expensive, and finite combat systems — main battle tanks, capital warships, and strategic bombers — once the “gold-standard” of global military strength and dominance.

Army Mad Scientist is hosting a writing contest to explore this aspect of the OE. All entries must address the following topic:

How have innovations in asymmetric warfare impacted modern large scale and other combat operations, and what further evolutions could take place, both within the next 10 years and on towards mid-century?

We are accepting three types of submissions:

• 1500-word Non-Fiction Essay
• 1500-word Fictional Intelligence (FICINT) Story
• Hybrid 1500-word submission incorporating a short FICINT vignette, with a Non-Fiction Essay expounding on the threat capabilities described in the vignette

Anyone can participate (Soldiers, Government Civilians, and all global citizens) — Multiple submissions are encouraged!

All entries are due NLT 11:59 pm Eastern on May 16, 2024 at: madscitradoc@gmail.com

Click here for additional information on this contest — we look forward to your participation!

Check out the following Mad Scientist Laboratory blog posts associated with previous writing contests:

The Future of the AI Battlefield:

Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield

The Guy Behind the Guy: AI as the Indispensable Marshal, by Brady Moore and Chris Sauceda

The Human Targeting Solution: An AI Story, by CW3 Jesse R. Crifasi

Back to the Future:

Task Force Wolf, by proclaimed Mad Scientist LTC Daniel Gomez

The Operational Environment: What Will Change and What Will Drive It – Today to 2035?

Splinternets, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Howard R. Simkin

The Operational Environment in 2035 Writing Contest:

Louisiana Maneuvers for the Age of Artificial Intelligence, by proclaimed Mad Scientist MAJ Michael B. Kim

The Information Disruption Industry and the Operational Environment of the Future, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Vincent H. O’Neil

Military Implications of Smart Cities, by Alexander Braszko, Jr.

Information Warfare Vignettes Writing Contest:

Three Best Information Warfare Vignettes, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Davis Ellison, Tony Stark, and Rob Kunzig

Competition, Crisis, Conflict, and Change Writing Contest:

The U.S. Joint Force’s Defeat before Conflict, by proclaimed Mad Scientist CPT Anjanay Kumar

The Future of War is Cyber! by CPT Casey Igo and CPT Christian Turley

A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat, by 1LT Carlin Keally

CALLING ALL CREATORS ~ An Army Mad Scientist Multi-Media Contest:

Kryptós, by proclaimed Mad Scientist CPT Katherine Hathaway

2nd Dense Urban Armored Brigade (DUAB) Personnel Evaluations, by Ed dos Santos, Jr.

Fall / Winter 2021 Writing Contest:

OASIS: A North American Proving Ground, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Steve Pomper

The Army’s Next Failed War: Large Scale Combat Operations, by proclaimed Mad Scientist MAJ Anthony Joyce

On Surprise Attacks Below the “Bolt from the Blue” Threshold, by Lesley Kucharski

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence podcast on 2 May 2024, featuring Dennis Eger, Senior OSINT Advisor, and Shawn Nilius, Director, Army OSINT Office, discussing why OSINT is important to the Army, how it’s being used in contemporary operations, and how they see it evolving over the next 10 years!

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post and podcast do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil · by user · April 18, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com