Quotes of the Day:

"Let us tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore, the means of knowledge. Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write."

– John Adams

 "Democracy and socialism have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference: while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude.”

– Alexis deTocqueville

"The creed of our democracy is that liberty is acquired and kept by men and women who are strong and self-reliant, and possessed of such wisdom as God gives mankind – men and women who are just, and understanding, and generous to others -- men and women who are capable of disciplining themselves. For they are the rulers and they must rule themselves.”

– Franklin D. Roosevelt

1. Israel considered striking Iran on Monday but decided to wait, officials say

2. Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia

3. Select Committee Unveils Findings into CCP's Role in American Fentanyl Epidemic - REPORT & HEARING

4. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 17, 2024

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2024

6. Why Iran’s attack on Israel failed by Sir Lawrence Freedman

7. 'Mind-boggling': Israel, Ukraine are mere previews of a much larger Pacific missile war, officials warn

8. China sounds warning after Philippines and US announce most expansive military drills yet

9. Army deploys long-range missiles to China’s doorstep

10. 911 outages reported in parts of 4 states, including in Las Vegas, officials say

11. Miscalculation Led to Escalation in Clash Between Israel and Iran

12. As Pentagon awaits supplemental dollars, its operational funding is $2B in the hole

13. Russia, Iran turning Israel and Ukraine into ‘battlefield laboratories,’ experts say

14. How an Obscure Chinese Real Estate Start-Up Paved the Way to TikTok

15. Inside Amazon’s Secret Operation to Gather Intel on Rivals

16. China lobbies Congress behind closed doors on TikTok, staffers say

17. How America Can Prevent War Between Iran and Israel

18. NPR editor Uri Berliner resigns after accusing network of bias

19. Inside the changing world of drone warfare

20. A Confident Putin Has Many in Europe Frightened

21. American trust in US military no longer highest among G7 nations: Survey

1. Israel considered striking Iran on Monday but decided to wait, officials say

Excerpts:

Between the lines: An Israeli official said the decision to respond to the Iranian attack against Israel has been made, and that the only question is when and how.

• The positions of Israel's war cabinet members on a counterattack reflect their backgrounds more than political party lines.
• Israeli and U.S. officials said IDF chief of staff Gen. Hertzi Halevi and the the cabinet's other former generals — Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot — are pushing for a response.
• Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the leader of the ultra-orthodox Shas party, Aryeh Deri, have been more cautious so far.

Updated 15 hours ago -World

Israel considered striking Iran on Monday but decided to wait, officials say

https://www.axios.com/2024/04/17/israel-iran-attack-retaliate-strike-postponed?utm

• Barak Ravid

A member of the Israeli military stands next to an Iranian ballistic missile that fell in Israel on the weekend, during a media tour at the Julis military base in Israel on Apr. 16, 2024. Photo: Gil Cohen-Magen/AFP via Getty Images

Israel considered conducting a retaliatory strike against Iran on Monday night but eventually decided to postpone it, five Israeli and U.S. sources told Axios.

Why it matters: Israel has vowed to respond to Iran's unprecedented missile and drone attack. The Biden administration has warned that an escalation with Iran wouldn't serve U.S. or Israeli interests and urged Israel to "be careful" with any retaliation, U.S. officials said.

Zoom in: The U.S. is concerned that continued counterattacks could trigger wider regional escalation.

• "We are not sure why and how close it was to an actual attack," a U.S. official said. A second U.S. official confirmed Israel told the Biden administration on Monday that it decided to wait.
• A third U.S. official said a "small Israeli strike" inside Iran would likely trigger an Iranian retaliation. But the Biden administration hopes it would be more limited than Iran's strike on Israel on Saturday and would end the exchange of attacks between the two countries.
• This is the second time that a decision on Israel's retaliation has been postponed since Saturday.

Behind the scenes: The Israeli war cabinet on Monday considered giving the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the go-ahead for a strike against Iran. But later that night, a decision was made not to go through with it "for operational reasons," according to two Israeli officials.

• One U.S. official said Israeli officials notified the Biden administration on Monday about the upcoming war cabinet meeting and said they would brief the U.S. about the decisions.
• After the cabinet meeting, Israeli officials told the Biden administration the decision was to wait.

Catch up quick: Iran launched nearly 350 attack drones and missiles against Israel on April 13 in retaliation for an April 1 Israeli airstrike on its embassy compound in Syria that killed a top Iranian general and others.

• Most of the drones and missiles were intercepted outside of Israeli airspace by Israeli, U.S., British, French, Jordanian and Saudi forces, officials said.

Between the lines: An Israeli official said the decision to respond to the Iranian attack against Israel has been made, and that the only question is when and how.

• The positions of Israel's war cabinet members on a counterattack reflect their backgrounds more than political party lines.
• Israeli and U.S. officials said IDF chief of staff Gen. Hertzi Halevi and the the cabinet's other former generals — Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot — are pushing for a response.
• Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the leader of the ultra-orthodox Shas party, Aryeh Deri, have been more cautious so far.

What they're saying: Deri said in an interview to his party newspaper on Tuesday that Israel needs to focus on its war against Hamas in Gaza and on ending the fighting with Hezbollah on the border with Lebanon — and not get dragged into opening new fronts.

• "We need to listen to our friends and partners around the world. I don't see it as weakness," Deri said. He added that rabbis he consulted on this issue told him Israel needs to be restrained and patient and not act just for the sake of revenge.

State of play: Netanyahu met on Wednesday with the foreign ministers of the U.K. and Germany, who visited Israel ahead of the G7 summit in Italy.

• The prime minister's office said Netanyahu told them Israel will maintain its right to defend itself against Iran.
• Netanyahu told the two foreign ministers that Israel will respond to the Iranian attack but will do it in a "thoughtful and calculated way," a source who attended the meeting told Axios.
• The source said he didn't feel a sense of urgency from Netanyahu and said the prime minister mentioned the need to finish the fight against Hamas in Gaza, which Netanyahu said would also weaken Iran's ability to harm Israel.

2. Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia

What is the propaganda message here? Surely this must be sanctioned by the CCP and part of Chinese psychological or media warfare. Does China want Russia to lose (I do not think so). Is China trying to send the message that Ukraine will win so that the US congress will vote against aid, thus helping Putin? What is the intent of China with this message?

I think the Chinese are trying to make this credible because it may comport with how China thinks that we think about war and warfare (resistance, modern weapons, C2 and intelligence) and provides us with what we wish would happen. How would Congress react to this (if it gets any traction at all?)

Excerpts:

Four main factors will influence the course of the war. 

The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. 

The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.

The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems.

The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective.

Note:

FENG Yujun

Vice Dean of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University

Director of the Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University

By Invitation | A Chinese view of Russia

Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia

Feng Yujun says the war has strained Sino-Russian relations

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2024/04/11/russia-is-sure-to-lose-in-ukraine-reckons-a-chinese-expert-on-russia?itm

The Economist

THE WAR between Russia and Ukraine has been catastrophic for both countries. With neither side enjoying an overwhelming advantage and their political positions completely at odds, the fighting is unlikely to end soon. One thing is clear, though: the conflict is a post-cold-war watershed that will have a profound, lasting global impact.

Four main factors will influence the course of the war. The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.

The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective.

In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan?

Though the war has been hugely costly for Ukraine, the strength and unity of its resistance has shattered the myth that Russia is militarily invincible. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO.

The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, from the rebellion by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and other pockets of the military—for instance in Belgorod—to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. These show that political risk in Russia is very high. Mr Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.

Adding to the risks confronting Mr Putin, the war has convinced more and more former Soviet republics that Russia’s imperial ambition threatens their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Increasingly aware that a Russian victory is out of the question, these states are distancing themselves from Moscow in different ways, from forging economic-development policies that are less dependent on Russia to pursuing more balanced foreign policies. As a result, prospects for the Eurasian integration that Russia advocates have dimmed.

The war, meanwhile, has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia detente to an end. Many European countries have given up their illusions about Mr Putin’s Russia.

At the same time, the war has jolted NATO out of what Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called its “brain-dead” state. With most NATO countries increasing their military spending, the alliance’s forward military deployment in eastern Europe has been greatly shored up. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO highlights Mr Putin’s inability to use the war to prevent the alliance’s expansion.

The war will also help to reshape the UN Security Council. It has highlighted the body’s inability to effectively assume its responsibility of maintaining world peace and regional security owing to the abuse of veto power by some permanent members. This has riled the international community, increasing the chances that reform of the Security Council will speed up. Germany, Japan, India and other countries are likely to become permanent members and the five current permanent members may lose their veto power. Without reform, the paralysis that has become the hallmark of the Security Council will lead the world to an even more dangerous place.

China’s relations with Russia are not fixed, and they have been affected by the events of the past two years. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has just visited Beijing, where he and his Chinese counterpart once again emphasised the close ties between their countries. But the trip appears to have been more diplomatic effort by Russia to show it is not alone than genuine love-in. Shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the “no limits” stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties”.

Although China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, it has not systematically violated them. It is true that China imported more than 100m tonnes of Russian oil in 2023, but that is not a great deal more than it was buying annually before the war. If China stops importing Russian oil and instead buys from elsewhere, it will undoubtedly push up international oil prices, putting huge pressure on the world economy.

Since the war began China has conducted two rounds of diplomatic mediation. Success has proved elusive but no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations. That wish shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.

With Russia still attacking Ukrainian military positions, critical infrastructure and cities, and possibly willing to escalate further, the chances of a Korea-style armistice look remote. In the absence of a fundamental change in Russia’s political system and ideology, the conflict could become frozen. That would only allow Russia to continue to launch new wars after a respite, putting the world in even greater danger.■

Feng Yujun is a professor at Peking University.

The Economist

3. Select Committee Unveils Findings into CCP's Role in American Fentanyl Epidemic - REPORT & HEARING

The link to the full report is here: https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/The%20CCP's%20Role%20in%20the%20Fentanyl%20Crisis%204.16.24%20(1).pdf

Links to the statements are at the end of the press release here: https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/select-committee-unveils-findings-ccps-role-american-fentanyl-epidemic-report?f

This makes me think reading Unrestricted Warfare is not a waste of time. We must recognize China's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and then attack it with a superior political warfare strategy. 

Key points:

• Directly subsidizes the manufacturing and export of illicit fentanyl materials and other synthetic narcotics through tax rebates.
• Gave monetary grants and awards to companies openly trafficking illicit fentanyl materials and other synthetic narcotics.
• Holds ownership interest in several PRC companies tied to drug trafficking.
• Fails to prosecute fentanyl and precursor manufacturers.
• Allows the open sale of fentanyl precursors and other illicit materials on the extensively monitored and controlled PRC internet.
• Censors content about domestic drug sales, but leaves export-focused narcotics content untouched.
• Strategically and economically benefits from the fentanyl crisis.

Select Committee Unveils Findings into CCP's Role in American Fentanyl Epidemic - REPORT & HEARING

selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov · April 16, 2024

WATCH: Video summary of the Select Committee's findings on the CCP's role in the American fentanyl epidemic. (Click HERE for a transcript of the video)

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Following a months-long investigation, Chairman Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party revealed their findings of the Chinese Communist Party’s role in the deadly fentanyl epidemic that has killed hundreds of thousands of Americans.

The fentanyl crisis is one of the most horrific disasters that America has ever faced. On average, fentanyl kills over 200 Americans daily, the equivalent of a packed Boeing 737 crashing every single day. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45 and a leading cause in the historic drop in American life expectancy. It has led to millions more suffering from addiction, and the destruction of countless families and communities. Beyond the United States, fentanyl and other mass-produced synthetic narcotics from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are devastating nations around the world. It is truly a global crisis.

The PRC, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the ultimate geographic source of the fentanyl crisis. Companies in China produce nearly all of illicit fentanyl precursors, the key ingredients that drive the global illicit fentanyl trade. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) launched an investigation to better understand the role of the CCP in the fentanyl crisis.

This investigation involved delving deep into public PRC websites, analyzing PRC government documents, acquiring over 37,000 unique data points of PRC companies selling narcotics online through web scraping and data analytics, undercover communications with PRC drug trafficking companies, and consultations with experts in the public and private sectors, among other steps.

The Select Committee's investigation has established that the PRC government, under the control of the CCP:

• Directly subsidizes the manufacturing and export of illicit fentanyl materials and other synthetic narcotics through tax rebates. Many of these substances are illegal under the PRC’s own laws and have no known legal use worldwide. Like its export tax rebates for legitimate goods, the CCP’s subsidies of illegal drugs incentivizes international synthetic drug sales from the PRC. The CCP never disclosed this program.
• Gave monetary grants and awards to companies openly trafficking illicit fentanyl materials and other synthetic narcotics. There are even examples of some of these companies enjoying site visits from provincial PRC government officials who complimented them for their impact on the provincial economy.
• Holds ownership interest in several PRC companies tied to drug trafficking. This includes a PRC government prison connected to human rights abuses owning a drug trafficking chemical company and a publicly traded PRC company hosting thousands of instances of open drug trafficking on its sites.
• Fails to prosecute fentanyl and precursor manufacturers. Rather than investigating drug traffickers, PRC security services have not cooperated with U.S. law enforcement, and have even notified targets of U.S. investigations when they received requests for assistance.
• Allows the open sale of fentanyl precursors and other illicit materials on the extensively monitored and controlled PRC internet. A review of just seven e-commerce sites found over 31,000 instances of PRC companies selling illicit chemicals with obvious ties to drug trafficking. Undercover communications with PRC drug trafficking companies (whose identities were provided to U.S. law enforcement) revealed an eagerness to engage in clearly illicit drug sales with no fear of reprisal.
• Censors content about domestic drug sales, but leaves export-focused narcotics content untouched. The PRC has censorship triggers for domestic drug sales (e.g., “fentanyl + cash on delivery”), but no such triggers exist to monitor or prevent the export of illicit narcotics out of the PRC.
• Strategically and economically benefits from the fentanyl crisis. The fentanyl crisis has helped CCP-tied Chinese organized criminal groups become the world’s premier money launderers, enriched the PRC’s chemical industry, and has had a devastating impact on Americans.

While the PRC government publicly acknowledged in November 2023 that the trafficking of fentanyl precursors and other illicit narcotics materials in the manner described above is illegal under Chinese law, the Select Committee found thousands of PRC companies openly selling these illicit materials on the Chinese internet—the most heavily surveilled country-wide network in the world. The CCP runs the most advanced techno-totalitarian state in human history that “leave[s] criminals with nowhere to hide” and has the means to stop illicit fentanyl materials manufacturers, yet it has failed to pursue flagrant violations of its own laws.

Armed with the knowledge gained in the course of this investigation, the report finds that the United States should:

• Establish a Joint Task Force – Counter Opioids (JTF-CO) that concentrates all non-military elements of state power and executes a coordinated strategy to target the weak points in the global illicit fentanyl supply chain.
• Provide law enforcement and intelligence officials with the statutory authorities, tools, and resources they need to execute their responsibilities, including through enhancing international law enforcement cooperation, appropriately prioritizing fentanyl and anti-money laundering in intelligence and enforcement efforts; and recruiting and retaining top talent to combat the fentanyl threat.
• Strengthen U.S. sanctions authorities and use those authorities in an aggressive and coordinated manner against entities involved in the fentanyl trade.
• Enact and use trade and customs enforcement measures to restrict fentanyl trafficking; and
• Close regulatory and enforcement gaps exploited by PRC money launderers and fentanyl traffickers.

READ THE FULL REPORT HERE.

Read Chairman Gallagher’s opening remarks HERE and the opening video script HERE.

Read former Attorney General William P. Barr’s prepared testimony HERE.

Read former DEA Chief of Operations Ray Donovan’s prepared testimony HERE.

Read Mr. David Luckey’s prepared testimony HERE.

selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov · April 16, 2024

4. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 17, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-17-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and PIJ sites in Beit Hanoun over the previous week.
• Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, including a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers.
• Iran: A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.
• Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel
• Syria: The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.
• Iraq: An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.
• Yemen: US CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 17, 2024

Apr 17, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, April 17, 2024

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Ashka Jhaveri, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and PIJ sites in Beit Hanoun over the previous week.
• Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, including a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers.
• Iran: A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.
• Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel
• Syria: The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.
• Iraq: An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.
• Yemen: US CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on April 17 that Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) sites in Beit Hanoun over the previous week.[1] Israeli forces had collected intelligence on the sites from questioning Palestinian fighters, revealing that Hamas and PIJ used a school building for military activity as well as the civilians inside for cover from Israeli targeting. The IDF said that Israeli forces ordered civilians to vacate the building prior to the raid. The IDF detained and killed an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters in the building.

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 17. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, claimed that its fighters had conducted 14 mortar and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks in Beit Hanoun over the previous 24 hours targeting Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun.[2] A Hamas fighter separately conducted a sniper attack targeting an Israeli soldier in Beit Hanoun.[3] The National Resistance Brigades lastly mortared Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 17.[5] The 401st and Nahal brigades (162nd Division) are operating near Wadi Gaza to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure. The IDF Air Force struck a Palestinian fighter squad that was using an armed drone in the central Gaza Strip.[6] The 215th Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force cooperated to destroy several rocket launchers aimed at Israel.[7]

The IDF Air Force struck over 40 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 17, including explosively rigged buildings, observation posts, and underground military infrastructure.[8]

Palestinian sources claimed on April 17 that Israeli forces are operating in eastern Deir al Balah.[9] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate RPG and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area.[10]

This map displays engagements between Israeli and Palestinian ground forces across the Gaza Strip. The locations depicted are not exact.

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that eight aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip from Ashdod Port in southern Israel on April 17.[11] This instance marks the first time that humanitarian aid has arrived via ship to Israel during the Israel-Hamas war.[12] The Israeli war cabinet approved the opening of the port on April 5.[13] The IDF said that trucks carry aid unloaded from the Ashdod Port into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom crossing[14]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh is meeting with senior Turkish officials. Haniyeh met with the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Qatar on April 16.[15] Haniyeh will also meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara in the coming days.[16]

Palestinian fighters fired a single rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on April 17.[17] The Popular Resistance Committees, which is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted an IDF base in Zikim.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact. 

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 16.[18]  Three Palestinian militias—PIJ, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and Jundullah—claimed separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Tubas on April 16.[19] PIJ also claimed that it detonated an IED targeting an IDF bulldozer.[20] Jundallah has claimed two previous attacks in Tubas since the Israel-Hamas war began.[21] 

 Israeli forces detained six wanted Palestinians during overnight operations in the West Bank on April 17.[22] Israeli police separately detained a Palestinian man in Jerusalem on suspicion of planning to conduct a stabbing attack.[23]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on April 17.[24] One of these attacks was a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers, in Arab al Aramsha along the Israel-Lebanon border.[25] The drone that Hezbollah used bears visual similarities to an Iranian-made Adabil-2.[26] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted an IDF reconnaissance company headquarters in Arab al Aramsha.[27] The IDF reported that it conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah air defense sites near Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, in retaliation for the Hezbollah drone strike in Arab al Aramsha.[28]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran on April 16, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[29]  Demonstrators chanted anti-US and anti-Israeli phrases and held posters condemning Jordanian cooperation with the United States and Israel.[30] The Jordanian foreign minister said on April 14 that Jordan intercepted the projectiles because it assessed that the Iranian drones and missiles posed a genuine threat to Jordanian national security.[31] IRGC-affiliated media previously threatened Jordan if it further supported Israel.[32]

CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.[33] The Axis of Resistance has indicated its interest in expanding its militia networks into Jordan, which would facilitate the transfer of materiel to the West Bank as well as create possible opportunities to disrupt Israeli overland trade through kingdom.[34] Iranian and Iranian-backed actors have repeatedly signaled their interest in generating these effects in recent weeks.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah furthermore criticized Jordanian leaders for supporting the US and Israeli interception of the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[36]

Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated on April 17 their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[37] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, who is primarily responsible for Iranian drone and missile operations, told reporters that Iran would strike Israel again if it responds to the April 13 Iranian attack.[38] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi similarly stated that Iran would confront Israel “fiercely and severely” if Israel conducts even the “smallest attack” on Iranian territory.[39] Artesh Commander Maj. Gen. Abdol Rahim Mousavi lastly emphasized that the Iranian armed forces are in a constant state of readiness.[40]

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 17 that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.[41] This report follows several local Syrian reports claiming that IRGC leadership issued evacuation orders to Iranian-backed militias in Deir ez Zor Province.[42] WSJ reported that Iran also advised Lebanese Hezbollah forces in Syria to take ”precautionary measures” ahead of potential Israeli targeting. Unspecified Syrian security officials told WSJ that Hezbollah accordingly reduced its senior officer presence in Syria and transferred personnel away from military sites. The officials also claimed that Hezbollah recently expanded its force presence along the Israel-Syria border to collect intelligence ahead of possible Israeli strikes.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah published a statement criticizing Saudi Arabia on April 17 amid rising tensions between the Axis of Resistance and the kingdom.[43] Kataib Hezbollah accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the US agenda in the Middle East. This statement comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for providing Israel land access to the Persian Gulf.[44] It also comes as Saudi Arabia supported the United States and Israel in intercepting the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel on April 17.[45]

An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed on April 17 that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.[46] Jiyad did not provide details about the timeline for a withdrawal. The Higher Military Commission, which is comprised of US and Iraqi military officials, began talks about the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[47] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political figures have repeatedly called on Sudani to set a timeline for removing US and international coalition forces from Iraq.[48] Sudani traveled to Washington, DC, on April 15, in part to discuss with US officials ending the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq and transitioning to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.[49]

US CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 16.[50] Houthi-controlled media claimed on April 16 that the United States and United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Bajil District, Hudaydah Governorate.[51]

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military airfield in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, overnight on April 16 to 17.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly targeted Russian aviation assets in the Republic of Mordovia, the Republic of Tatarstan, and Samara Oblast on April 17.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov officially confirmed on April 17 that Russian peacekeeping forces began their anticipated withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh, as Russian sources largely blamed Armenian leadership for Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh amid Armenia’s continued efforts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia.
• The Georgian parliament approved a bill in its first reading similar to Russia’s “foreign agents” law on April 17, which Russian state media seized on to further Kremlin efforts to amplify reports of political discord in Western and former Soviet states.
• US President Joe Biden warned that Russia and its partners pose an increasing threat to NATO and stressed that US security assistance to Ukraine can address the Russian threat.
• The US House of Representatives filed a supplemental appropriations bill on April 17 that would provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine, and will reportedly vote on the measure on April 20.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
• The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is preparing a special training course for ROC clergy deployed to combat zones in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 17, 2024

Apr 17, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2024

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

April 17, 2024, 5:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military airfield in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, overnight on April 16 to 17. Geolocated footage posted on April 16 shows explosions at the airfield in Dzhankoi, where the Russian 39th Separate Helicopter Regiment (27th Composite Aviation Division, 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District) is based.[1] The Atesh Crimean partisan movement reported that its agents confirmed that the strike destroyed a S-400 missile system at the airfield, and severely damaged several other unspecified vehicles.[2] Ukrainian sources posted an image reportedly showing three destroyed S-400 launchers following the strike.[3] Russian forces have deployed Mi-8, Mi-25M, Mi-28, and Ka-52 helicopters to the Dzhankoi Air Base, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of damage to any helicopters as a result of the April 16 strike.[4] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used around 12 MGM-140 ATACMS missiles to strike the airfield.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm at this time the type of ordinance Ukrainian forces used in this strike, nor the extent of damage the strike caused. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk noted, however, that the military airfield and affiliated aviation assets are legitimate military targets, tacitly acknowledging the strike.[6] Russian combat and transport helicopters have provided Russian forces with distinct offensive and defensive battlefield advantages, particularly in southern Ukraine, and are legitimate military targets.[7] Ukrainian forces have previously conducted ATACMS strikes against Russian military helicopters at airbases in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast and Luhansk City, Luhansk Oblast in 2023.[8]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly targeted Russian aviation assets in the Republic of Mordovia, the Republic of Tatarstan, and Samara Oblast on April 17. GUR sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on April 17 that GUR agents targeted a S9B6 “Container” over-the-horizon radar station at the base of the 590th Separate Radio Engineering Unit in Kovylkino, Mordovia, but did not specify how the GUR conducted the strike or whether the strike successfully damaged the radar station.[9] The “Container” radar station reportedly has a 3,000-kilometer detection range and 100-kilometer detection height and is over 680 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense destroyed a Ukrainian drone over Mordovia, which if accurate, could explain the lack of footage showing the aftermath of a strike in Kovylkino.[11] Ukrainian special services sources additionally told Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine on April 17 that the GUR also targeted the Gorbunov aviation plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.[12] Geolocated footage shows that Russian air defense likely downed at least one Ukrainian drone near the Shahed-136/131 drone production plant near Yelabuga, Tatarstan.[13] The GUR also cryptically stated on April 17 that unspecified actors destroyed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter at the Kryaz airfield in Samara Oblast and posted footage of a fire at the airfield, suggesting that the GUR may have also been responsible for a strike in Samara Oblast.[14] Ukrainian strikes against Russian aviation assets in occupied Crimea, as well as within Russia, appear to represent a fairly coordinated and wide-reaching series of strikes specifically targeting Russian aviation, air defense, and radar detection capabilities.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov officially confirmed on April 17 that Russian peacekeeping forces began their anticipated withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh, as Russian sources largely blamed Armenian leadership for Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh amid Armenia’s continued efforts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia.[15] The Azerbaijani Presidential Administration’s Foreign Policy Department Head, Hikmet Hajiyev, stated on April 17 that senior Russian and Azerbaijani leadership decided to prematurely withdraw Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh.[16] The November 2020 Russian-brokered ceasefire that ended a month and a half of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas stipulated that Russia would deploy peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh until 2025.[17] Russia previously deployed 1,960 Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh including elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Peacekeeping Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), 31st Air Assault (VDV) Brigade, and 45th Spetsnaz Brigade.[18] Footage published on April 17 purportedly shows a column of Russian armored vehicles leaving Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russian sources did not specify its destination.[19] The limited amount of manpower and materiel that Russian forces are moving out of Nagorno-Karabakh will not substantially affect Russian combat operations in Ukraine, should the Russian military decide to deploy these forces to Ukraine. Russian milbloggers largely responded to the announcement of Russian peacekeepers’ withdrawal by defending Russian forces for their failure to support Armenia during the fall 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and by blaming Armenian leadership for perceived weakness.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Armenian leadership’s and the de facto Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh authority’s failure to respond militarily to the fall 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crisis demonstrates that Armenians deserve “to be deprived of their homeland.”[21] The milblogger further claimed that the current withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the region will allow Azerbaijan to control all Armenian domestic and foreign affairs. Russian milbloggers’ criticism of Armenian leadership is consistent with ongoing Russian criticism of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's efforts to limit security cooperation with Russia.[22]

The Georgian parliament approved a bill in its first reading similar to Russia’s “foreign agents” law on April 17, which Russian state media seized on to further Kremlin efforts to amplify reports of political discord in Western and former Soviet states. The bill will require non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from foreign sources to register as “an organization pursuing the interests of a foreign power.”[23] Pro-Western Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili responded to the vote and stated that she will veto the bill, calling the bill a “Russian strategy of destabilization.”[24] The European Union (EU) also responded to the bill, stating that it could negatively impact Georgia’s EU accession and is not in line with the EU’s norms and core values.[25] Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, a member of the ruling Georgian Dream party, claimed that Georgia will adopt the bill despite Western criticism, however.[26] Kremlin newswire TASS reported extensively on the developments regarding the bill and ongoing protests against the bill.[27] The Georgian parliament passed a similar bill in 2023 but later withdrew the bill from further consideration following widespread public protests.[28] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov continued to deny Russian involvement in the bill’s creation and passage, and Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev insinuated that the West is somehow involved in the protests against the bill.[29] The Kremlin has routinely attempted to portray Ukraine’s and other post-Soviet countries’ politics as chaotic in an attempt to destabilize target states and make them more susceptible to Russian influence or outright attack.[30]

US President Joe Biden warned that Russia and its partners pose an increasing threat to NATO and stressed that US security assistance to Ukraine can address the Russian threat. Biden stated in an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal on April 17 that Russia is intensifying its war against Ukraine with military and non-lethal materiel support from China, Iran, and North Korea.[31] Biden called for the US House of Representatives to urgently pass security assistance for Ukraine as Ukrainian forces continue to face ammunition shortages and the prospect of losing more territory.[32] Biden stated that if Russia achieves its objective to subjugate and subsume Ukraine then Russian forces will move closer to NATO.[33] Biden stressed that support for Ukraine can stop Russia from encroaching on America’s NATO allies and prevent US involvement in a hypothetical future conventional war between Russia and NATO.[34] ISW assesses that a Russian victory in Ukraine would have devastating consequences for the defense of NATO, whereas a Ukrainian victory would make a successful Russian attack on Poland or the Baltic States harder and riskier for Russia.[35]

The US House of Representatives filed a supplemental appropriations bill on April 17 that would provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine, and will reportedly vote on the measure on April 20.[36] The supplemental appropriations bill largely resembles a previous supplemental bill passed by the US Senate and would offer Ukraine $48.3 billion in security assistance: $23.2 billion for replenishing weapons and equipment from the US Department of Defense (DoD) inventory; $13.8 billion for the purchase of weapons and munitions for Ukraine from US manufacturers; and $11.3 billion for continued US support to Ukraine through ongoing US military operations in the region.[37] The overwhelming majority of the proposed assistance for Ukraine, if passed, would go to American companies and US and allied militaries.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military airfield in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, overnight on April 16 to 17.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly targeted Russian aviation assets in the Republic of Mordovia, the Republic of Tatarstan, and Samara Oblast on April 17.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov officially confirmed on April 17 that Russian peacekeeping forces began their anticipated withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh, as Russian sources largely blamed Armenian leadership for Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh amid Armenia’s continued efforts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia.
• The Georgian parliament approved a bill in its first reading similar to Russia’s “foreign agents” law on April 17, which Russian state media seized on to further Kremlin efforts to amplify reports of political discord in Western and former Soviet states.
• US President Joe Biden warned that Russia and its partners pose an increasing threat to NATO and stressed that US security assistance to Ukraine can address the Russian threat.
• The US House of Representatives filed a supplemental appropriations bill on April 17 that would provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine, and will reportedly vote on the measure on April 20.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
• The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is preparing a special training course for ROC clergy deployed to combat zones in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 17 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional fighting continued southwest of Svatove near Novoserhiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova, Hryhorivka, and the Serebryanske forest area.[39] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the best equipped elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are concentrated in the Belgorod Oblast direction and that the Russian military command may need to strengthen its groupings in the Kursk and Bryansk directions ahead of possible future Russian offensive operations against Kharkiv City.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued localized offensive operations northeast of Bakhmut on April 17 but did not make any confirmed gains. Fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[41] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on April 17 that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed four Russian T-80 tanks and six MT-LB infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) during Russian attempts to break through Ukrainian defenses east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanka and Zolotarivka.[42] Butusov’s reporting suggests that Russian forces may have recently conducted a company-sized mechanized assault in the area, assuming Ukrainian forces did not destroy all the vehicles committed to the attack. ISW has not yet observed visual or official Ukrainian confirmation of such mechanized assaults. Russian forces intensified the tempo and size of mechanized assaults throughout Donetsk Oblast in March and April 2024 but have yet to do so northeast of Bakhmut in the Siversk direction.[43]

Russian forces reportedly advanced northeast of Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations in the area on April 17. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 16 and 17 that Russian forces have seized all of Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), advanced closer to Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), and advanced up to 500 meters in depth in dacha areas north of the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar).[44] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Fighting continued northeast of Chaisv Yar near Bohdanivka; near Chasiv Yar and the Novyi Microraion; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka.[45] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attacking with small assault groups in the Chasiv Yar area and are using ATVs to quickly transfer and unload infantry in combat areas.[46] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Chasiv Yar area stated that Russian forces lose between 40 and 70 percent of their equipment during assaults.[47] The battalion commander stated that Ukrainian forces are using first person view (FPV) drones to stop Russian armored vehicles from advancing and that Ukrainian forces use roughly 50 FPV drones to strike between 20 and 25 Russian targets each day.[48] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD], formerly Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka and elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[49] Elements of the 98th VDV Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment; the 11th VDV Brigade; and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka and continued offensive operations in the area on April 17. Geolocated footage published on April 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a railway line southeast of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka).[51] Geolocated footage published on April 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southeastern outskirts of Ocheretyne and entered the northern outskirts of Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[53] Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Novobakhmutivka, Novokalynove, and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka and Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove and Pervomaiske.[54] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Pervomaiske.[55]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on April 17. Geolocated footage published on April 16 indicates that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) advanced up to the Krasnohorivka brick factory, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made further advances within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced several hundred meters within Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and that Ukrainian forces only control one remaining position on the settlement’s western outskirts.[57] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka, Pobieda, and Vodyane.[58]

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 17. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured a stronghold near Volodymyrivka (southeast of Vuhledar), pushed Ukrainian forces away from positions near Mykilske (southeast of Vuhledar), and advanced several hundred meters near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[59] ISW has not observed any confirmation of these claims. Positional fighting also continued near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[60]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne) and near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[61] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin claimed on April 17 that Russian forces have established electronic warfare (EW) systems in trenches that are able to successfully suppress Ukrainian drones controlled via Starlink in the Zaporizhia direction.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian BARS-10 unit (Russian Combat Army Reserve) (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[63]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on April 17, including near Krynky, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[64] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on April 17 that Russian forces have increased the number of EW and mobile air defense systems in east bank Kherson Oblast to counter increasing Ukrainian attacks, likely referring to Ukrainian drone strikes.[65]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted missile strikes against Chernihiv City and Odesa Oblast on the morning of April 17. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Odesa Oblast with an unspecified number of ballistic missiles.[66] Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus stated that three unspecified Russian missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv City, killing 14 people and injuring 61.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched Iskander-M missiles against Chernihiv City.[68]

Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov told the Guardian in an article published on April 17 that Russian forces are attempting to destroy the city’s power supply and intimidate its 1.3 million residents with ongoing strikes.[69] Terekhov stated that Kharkiv City residents experienced several hours of unscheduled power outages due to Russian strikes against energy infrastructure. Bloomberg reported on April 26 that unspecified Ukrainian and Western officials assess that Russia likely intends its increased missile and glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City to force residents to evacuate the city.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is preparing a special training course for ROC clergy deployed to combat zones in Ukraine.[71] The Educational Committee of the ROC reported on April 16 that Patriarch Kirill held a meeting of the Supreme Church Council of the ROC and discussed the activities of ROC clergy in the combat zone in Ukraine and a draft document on a special education course entitled “fundamentals of training clergy for serving in a combat zone.”[72] The ROC’s “chief military priest in the special military operation zone” Dmitry Vasilenkov told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 16 that the new course will train priests to work in combat conditions alongside military personnel, administer “spiritual care” to Russian personnel in combat zones, and survive dangerous combat conditions.[73] The ROC has consistently ideologically and materially supported the Kremlin's aims in Ukraine and appears to be increasingly preparing chaplains to serve in Ukraine.[74]

A Russian insider source claimed that Russian politicians and public figures and their relatives are using special military detachments to secure benefits earned through service despite the fact that they are not participating in direct combat.[75] The insider source previously claimed in March 2023 that Russian elites formed the “BARS-Kaskad” volunteer detachment to allow Russian elites and their families to receive the status of participants in combat activities and the associated monetary benefits without facing the risks of frontline combat.[76] The Russian insider source claimed that the son of Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Andrei Averyanov, Albert Averyanov, is serving in a special detachment called the “BARS-25 Anvar” volunteer detachment.[77] Russian elites, particularly politicians and military officials, may use their service in such special detachments to attempt to soothe domestic discontent over ongoing mobilization efforts by claiming their family members are fighting in Ukraine without risking danger that a real frontline unit does.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the “Patriot” convention and exhibition center in Moscow Oblast on April 17 and highlighted Russian developments in robotic and weapons systems and personnel provision.[78] Shoigu heard reports from various Russian deputy defense ministers and Russian central command bodies on ongoing scientific and technological developments in logistics systems, and observed wheeled and tracked robotic vehicles transporting supplies, simulating evacuation of wounded personnel, and mounting weapons. Shoigu frequently visits Russian defense enterprises to present the Russian armed forces as a modernized and effective fighting force by highlighting ongoing technological innovations.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 17 that Russian authorities are compelling Russian high school-aged children to produce Shahed drones at the Alabuga Polytechnical College in the Republic of Tatarstan.[79] The Resistance Center cited documents reportedly obtained by the Ukrainian “Cyber Resistance” hacker group that show a list of 1,209 Russian teenagers who have enrolled at the Alabuga Polytechnical College—670 students who have general industrial and production “internships” at the college, and 539 students who are working on the “boat” project, which is the Russian code name for Shahed production. The Resistance Center noted that the majority of the teenagers are minors and in the 9th to 11th grades, and that one of the teenagers is a Ukrainian girl who Russian authorities deported from an unspecified place in Ukraine.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces continue efforts to protect armored equipment against Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes. A Twitter aggregator posted an image on April 17 reportedly showing a Russian BMP-1 amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) covered in thin metal “pins” intended to protect it against drone strikes.[80] Several Russian sources also posted footage on April 16 of a “turtle tank” of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps ([DNR AC]) equipped with large metal anti-drone armor plating and electronic warfare (EW) jamming system operating near Krasnohorivka, Donetsk Oblast.[81] Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces have started welding large metal plating onto tanks to protect them against drone strikes and claimed that such “turtle tanks” are effective on the battlefield.[82]

Russian forces continue to integrate robotic systems into frontline formations. Footage posted by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger on April 16 shows personnel of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) using a radio-controlled robotic car along the Kurakhove road west of Donetsk City.[83] The robotic car can reportedly evacuate wounded personnel, can travel up to 12 kilometers, carry a payload of up to 150 kilograms, and move at a speed of 20 kilometers per hour.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Kremlin may attempt to promote Telegram as a new information platform in the West to launch information operations targeting Western audiences. Telegram founder Pavel Durov, in an interview with an American media personality on April 16, positioned Telegram as a preferable alternative to US-based social media platforms.[84] Durov emphasized throughout the interview that the Kremlin does not own Telegram and claimed that he fled Russia after refusing to obey the Russian government’s orders to censor Russian social media VKontakte (later renamed to VK), which he founded in the early 2000s. Durov also claimed that he refused to cooperate with US security and law enforcement agencies, accused Apple and Google of imposing guidelines that promote censorship, and advertised Telegram as a “neutral platform” that would not take sides. Durov has regularly advertised Telegram as a privacy-oriented, independent, and uncensored platform since its founding in 2013.[85] Russian state media and Kremlin officials commented on Durov’s interview on April 17 to promote two narratives aimed at Russia’s domestic audience and English-speaking audiences. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov issued a thinly veiled threat against Telegram, claiming that the Kremlin has routinely asked Durov and Telegram leadership to undertake careful and “necessary measures” to ensure that Telegram does not “turn into a tool in the hands of terrorists.”[86] Peskov made similar threats towards Durov following the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack but claimed that Russia is not considering banning Telegram at this time.[87] These statements likely intend to pressure Durov to cooperate with Russian censorship measures under the threat of the Kremlin blocking Telegram in Russia.[88] Russian state media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, which specialize in targeting English-language and international audiences, promoted Telegram to Western audiences as a preferable social media platform by highlighting Durov’s pitch about Telegram’s supposed neutrality and how Western governments and technology companies have attempted to censor Telegram.[89] English-language Russian state media also downplayed Durov’s statements about the Kremlin’s efforts to coopt Telegram and may have aimed to promote Telegram to their audiences. The Kremlin may support Durov’s efforts to popularize Telegram in the US and the West to amplify the spread and reach of Kremlin information operations through Telegram, regardless of Telegram’s ownership. The Kremlin has increasingly used Telegram for its own messaging after abruptly unbanning Telegram in 2020, and the uncensored nature of the platform allows Russian officials to expand their reach to other audiences abroad.[90]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is reportedly engaged in an information campaign aimed at weakening the West and leveraging a supposed future Russian victory in Ukraine to create a new global order. The Washington Post, citing a classified Russian foreign policy document from April 2023, reported on April 17, 2024 that the Russian MFA is systematically searching for “vulnerable points” in the foreign and domestic policy of Western countries and exploiting these points for Russia’s benefit.[91] The classified document claims that the US is leading a coalition of "unfriendly countries” aimed at weakening Russia because of the threat that Russia supposedly presents to the West and that the outcome of the war in Ukraine will determine the framework of a future world order. The Kremlin likely intends for the supposed Russian-led “world majority,” a group of countries including post-Soviet and non-Western states that Russia intends to rally to oppose the West, to form the basis of this future world order.[92]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on April 17 that the Kremlin is preparing another information operation to discredit the Ukrainian military and government and undermine further Western military aid to Ukraine. The GUR reported that the Kremlin plans to accuse Ukrainian special forces of using US-made weapons in Sudan and leak fabricated photos of “trophy” weapons supposedly taken from Ukrainian forces in Sudan to Russian and Libyan media.[93] The GUR noted that the Kremlin aims to discredit Ukraine and its Western allies by accusing Ukraine of misusing Western-provided weapons and sowing discord within Ukrainian society by criticizing Ukrainian special forces for fighting in Africa while fighting continues in Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. Why Iran’s attack on Israel failed by Sir Lawrence Freedman

interesting discussion of the Tonkin Gulf as part of the analysis of the Iran strike on Israel (and Thomas Schelling as well).

Excerpts:

Before its full significance became apparent, Schelling commented on the incident in his 1966 book Arms and Influence. He described the US reprisals as “articulate” and “appropriate”. They were appropriate, he argued, because they struck the facilities connected with the attack on the destroyer. Because they were one-off they were also “neat”, a quality that would have been lost if the attacks had continued over a number of days against a variety of targets. The neatness meant that the sense of “justice” was not diluted and the incident was kept well-defined. It was clearly a reprisal for the attack on the Maddox and not just an excuse for a wider, opportunistic military action.

A reprisal was “a reciprocal action, some punishment for a break in the rules”, while wider action would address the underlying dispute and so seek to change the rules. But Schelling could also see the temptation to communicate much more by the form that the reprisal took. It could be a: “display of determination and impetuosity, not just to dissuade repetition but to communicate a much broader threat. One can even hope for an excuse to conduct the reprisal, as a means of communicating a more persuasive threat.”

So the same “neat” action could communicate both a determination to respond to a provocation and a warning of potential escalation if the enemy failed to react appropriately. In retrospect this was problematic in all sorts of ways, not least because the original trigger was a misapprehension, so the North Vietnamese did not pick up on the messaging. Thereafter the attempt to communicate nuanced messages through the crude mechanisms of armed force had a poor track record in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the idea that force could be used in this way took hold.

Conclusion:

The problem with using armed force to make a political point is that any message depends on the damage caused. If it achieves little then it conveys either timidity or limited capabilities; if it achieves a lot then it risks a wider confrontation. In practice the message rarely goes beyond insisting that no bad deed will go unpunished. When both sides are sending the same message then the result is escalatory, as neither side feels able to let the other have the last word. Going back to Thomas Schelling, these reciprocal attacks are symptoms of the underlying dispute between Iran and Israel, and will continue to occur, but they cannot lead to its resolution.

Why Iran’s attack on Israel failed

https://samf.substack.com/p/why-irans-attack-on-israel-failed?utm=

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

APR 18, 2024

∙ PAID

Explosions light up the Jerusalem sky during Iran’s missile and drone attack on Israel (Photo by -/AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images)

This article first appeared in this week’s New Statesman magazine, we are sending to subscribers with their permission.

One of the most innovative strategic thinkers of the post-1945 era had no military experience and first made his name as a trade economist. Yet as classical military theory struggled to come to terms with the implications of nuclear weapons, Thomas Schelling found innovative and stimulating ways to talk about their transformational impact. He won the Nobel Prize for economics in 2005 for his contributions to game theory and how it might be applied to nuclear deterrence and arms control. His most important insights began with the observation that the shared fear of the ultimate catastrophe meant that within a potentially deadly US-Soviet conflict there could still be elements of cooperation. Superpower crises should be managed so that both sides felt that they had protected their most vital interests while avoiding all-out nuclear war. At the time, and since, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was considered exemplary in showing how this might be achieved.

Schelling, who was behind such ideas as the hotline between Moscow and Washington, saw the advantages in direct communication to keep a dangerous situation under control. But he was also interested in more indirect forms of communication. He was particularly intrigued in how armed force could be used as a form of bargaining to convey to the other side not only a determination to protect interests but also how both sides could benefit from restraint. He sought to move consideration of the uses of violence away from simple assertions of brute strength to impose one’s will towards understanding them as competitions in risk-taking. The way that force was used went beyond any immediate military impact because it could also suggest the possibility of compromise, as well as a readiness to take further action if the compromises could not be found.

Although these ideas were developed with a nuclear confrontation in mind, they had an impact on the way that the Americans thought about how to use all types of armed force, always looking for ways to keep a conflict as contained as possible while at the same time warning opponents of worse to come if they did not behave. An early example came in August 1964 when the US launched air raids against North Vietnamese naval bases as reprisals for (incorrectly) alleged attacks by patrol boats against the US destroyer, USS Maddox, in the Tonkin Gulf of the South China Sea. The “Tonkin Gulf incident” established both the precedent and the Congressional support for later raids on the North, and is now seen as a key inflection point in the Vietnam War.

Before its full significance became apparent, Schelling commented on the incident in his 1966 book Arms and Influence. He described the US reprisals as “articulate” and “appropriate”. They were appropriate, he argued, because they struck the facilities connected with the attack on the destroyer. Because they were one-off they were also “neat”, a quality that would have been lost if the attacks had continued over a number of days against a variety of targets. The neatness meant that the sense of “justice” was not diluted and the incident was kept well-defined. It was clearly a reprisal for the attack on the Maddox and not just an excuse for a wider, opportunistic military action.

A reprisal was “a reciprocal action, some punishment for a break in the rules”, while wider action would address the underlying dispute and so seek to change the rules. But Schelling could also see the temptation to communicate much more by the form that the reprisal took. It could be a: “display of determination and impetuosity, not just to dissuade repetition but to communicate a much broader threat. One can even hope for an excuse to conduct the reprisal, as a means of communicating a more persuasive threat.”

So the same “neat” action could communicate both a determination to respond to a provocation and a warning of potential escalation if the enemy failed to react appropriately. In retrospect this was problematic in all sorts of ways, not least because the original trigger was a misapprehension, so the North Vietnamese did not pick up on the messaging. Thereafter the attempt to communicate nuanced messages through the crude mechanisms of armed force had a poor track record in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the idea that force could be used in this way took hold.

Sixty years on one wonders what Schelling would have made of the Iranian drone and missile attack against Israel launched late on 13 April. This certainly demonstrated how much military action tends to be about making a political point as much as hurting the enemy, although the failure of this attack to hurt Israel qualified any political point being made. There were similarities with the Tonkin Gulf incident.

First, it was a reprisal for a breach of the rules, in this case the 1 April attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus, which in principle is sovereign Iranian territory. Seven officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including top commanders, were killed. Israel, which has not actually admitted responsibility, considered these commanders to be legitimate targets because they were working with Iran’s regional proxies to plot more attacks on Israel.

Second, the attack was claimed to be directed largely at the Israeli base where the aircraft that were used for the Damascus attack are deployed. After the Americans first reported their intelligence on Iranian plans to strike Israel there was intensive diplomatic activity to persuade Tehran to limit its reprisal to military targets and avoid civilians to keep it proportionate. The targets chosen are thought to have included, in addition to the Nevatim and Hatzerim airbases, the Israel Defense Force’s early warning stations and intelligence bases in the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

Third, as with Tonkin, this was presented as a one-off: Iran told the UN Security Council that with this attack it considered the matter concluded. It has also promised that if Israel retaliated with attacks on Iran it would ensure a further and tougher response of its own.

The interaction between the operational and political objectives informing the Iranian strikes was complicated by them being both enormous in scale, showing off Iran’s long-range capabilities, but also ineffectual, demonstrating that Israel’s defences, supported by allies, were more than able to cope. Western intelligence had picked up the preparations for the attacks well before the event, which meant that there was no surprise.

A barrage of some 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles were launched largely from Iran, as well as from a range of sites in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Many failed on their own accord. The US, UK, France and Jordan helped Israel destroy most of the rest before they got close to their targets. Five ballistic missiles got through to the Nevatim airbase in southern Israel, and caused some damage, including to the runway and a transport aircraft, but not enough to put it out of action. A seven-year-old Bedouin girl who was severely injured by shrapnel is the only reported casualty. By Sunday morning the all-clear had sounded, people emerged from their shelters, and Israeli airports were reopened.

This was a very large attack. There is no reason to suppose that Iran did not intend it to cause significant harm to Israel. This is what was claimed, in anticipation, as the attack was launched with Iranian state TV reading out a statement: “the IRGC air force hit certain targets in the territories of the Zionist regime with dozens of drones and missiles”. The circulation on Iranian media of a clip of a burning site (which was actually a Chilean vineyard) suggests Iran wanted its people to believe that honour was satisfied because this had been done.

For those explaining why the damage had not been great, social media was full of post-attack claims that this was a clever move by Iran to learn more about Israeli air defences, as if there had not been ample evidence from the past six months. Or that it had telegraphed its intentions in advance so that no great harm would be done and a wider war avoided: in which case why waste so many drones and missiles? The attack was meant to hurt Israel as well as signal capability and intent, while limiting the consequences by promising that it was a one-off. Because the hurt was limited the signal was one of weakness more than strength. 

In January 2020, following the US killing of General Qasem Soleimani, head of the Quds force of the IRGC, at Baghdad airport, the Iranian military response involved a dozen ballistic missiles that were fired at two Iraqi bases hosting US troops. Then Iran acknowledged direct responsibility and claimed that scores of Americans had been killed or wounded. In practice American injuries did not go beyond concussion as the base commanders were warned and troops took shelter. The Americans did not bother to respond. As far as the Trump administration was concerned it had come out of the encounter ahead.

Israel could make the same calculation. President Joe Biden told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “take the win” following Iran’s attack. Senior Iranian commanders had been killed, Israeli air defences had proved their worth, and Netanyahu could show that Israel still had allies it could work with. Even Jordan, highly critical of the war in Gaza, acted against drones flying through its airspace. Israel nonetheless promised a “significant, powerful response”. The Saudis have also acknowledged working with Israel and have blamed Iran for instigating the current conflicts by backing Hamas.

It is an article of faith in Israel that for every “tit” there must be a more powerful “tat”, normally rationalised as “restoring deterrence”. With the Hamas attack of 7 October the pressure for an immediate and relentless response was intense, and that was never going to be a mere signal. But following Iran’s attack, deciding on an appropriate response is more difficult. Would it be responding to the intent behind the attack or the actual impact?

There are some in Israel who would welcome a wider war with Iran, even while the Gaza campaign is ongoing, on the grounds that it is bound to happen sometime and now is as good a moment as any. But this would mean a fight with the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, as Iran’s main agent in the region, beyond the exchanges that have been ongoing for the past six months. Hezbollah launched 40 missiles against Israel overnight on 13 April, leading to an immediate Israeli counterstrike. Iran is a long way from Israel, and while it could be reached by aircraft, it would be difficult without US logistical support, and Biden has said the US will not be involved in any offensive operations. The Americans want the fighting in the region to start ramping down rather than up.

The problem with using armed force to make a political point is that any message depends on the damage caused. If it achieves little then it conveys either timidity or limited capabilities; if it achieves a lot then it risks a wider confrontation. In practice the message rarely goes beyond insisting that no bad deed will go unpunished. When both sides are sending the same message then the result is escalatory, as neither side feels able to let the other have the last word. Going back to Thomas Schelling, these reciprocal attacks are symptoms of the underlying dispute between Iran and Israel, and will continue to occur, but they cannot lead to its resolution.

7. 'Mind-boggling': Israel, Ukraine are mere previews of a much larger Pacific missile war, officials warn

Excerpts:

Shyu: Directed Energy Is ‘Pretty Awesome’

Indeed, ever since the 2020 Missile Defense Review, the official Pentagon approach has been to nest “missile defense” within a wider approach of “comprehensive missile defeat,” which includes everything from destroying launchers on the ground, to electronic warfare to make them go astray in flight, to more exotic approaches such as directed energy.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force are all developing 300-kilowatt lasers with far greater range than current counter-drone weapons, Shyu said. The Army and Air Force systems will be ground-based, the Navy’s shipborne, she said, declining to give further detail. “Last summer, my shop let out a contract to two different contractors [to develop] greater than 500-kilowatt laser sources,” she said. “By the end of next year expect to see that. … It’s pretty awesome.”

But there’s no single silver bullet, Shyu emphasized to reporters after her remarks to the conference. “What I look at is the entire kill web,” she said. She puts a particular emphasis on early detection, including space-based sensors like the new HBTSS satellites, which can look farther than ground-based systems, and potentially AI pattern-matching algorithms to distinguish different types of drones, missiles, and decoys.

But Shyu said she is also investing in a wide range of countermeasures to kick on once that detection is made. “There are cheaper shooters, and there are other things we’re doing as well,” she said. “I look at things very holistically … all the potential ways I can counter an adversary.”

So, this reporter asked, does that mean lasers? Jammers? “All of the above,” Shyu said. Maybe black magic? “All of the above,” she said again, and laughed.

'Mind-boggling': Israel, Ukraine are mere previews of a much larger Pacific missile war, officials warn - Breaking Defense

MDA Chief Lt. Gen. Heath Collins said more maneuverable missiles and drones have changed the missile defense game: Instead of just preparing to hit “fastballs,” he said, “now we’re hitting sliders and curveballs.”

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · April 17, 2024

This photo taken on April 14, 2024 shows flares from explosions in the sky over Jerusalem as Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system intercepts missiles and drones from Iran. (Photo by Jamal Awad/Xinhua via Getty Images)

WASHINGTON — Instead of congratulating themselves over the allied defeat of Iran’s 300-plus drones and missiles on Saturday, top Pentagon officials said they saw the barrage launched against Israel as a mere preview of the much larger salvos China could launch at Guam, Taiwan, and other targets in a future Pacific war.

There is some good news to celebrate, said Pentagon tech chief Heidi Shyu, the under secretary for research, development, and engineering. The ship-borne Aegis air defense system successfully shot down ballistic missiles aimed at Israel, she said, while the land-based Patriot “has proven itself in Ukraine.”

But the lesson learned from those two conflicts is not one of complacency, Shyu warned. Instead, she and other officials said at an NDIA missile defense conference Tuesday that the sheer scale of the future threat will require more and cheaper interceptors, new defenses such as high-powered lasers, and preemptive or retaliatory strikes on enemy launchers.

“Just look what happened over the weekend,” Shyu told the conference. “In a highly contested fight over the Indo-Pacific, that could be even greater numbers.”

It’s crucial to learn from Iran attack on Israel and Russia’s on Ukraine, said assistant secretary of defense John Plumb, and the most important lesson is that an enemy can launch a lot of missiles and drones at once. “The scale thing just hits me over and over and over” in both conflicts, he told the conference. “We have to have defense at scale, because the adversary can develop cheap systems at scale and then send them simultaneously.”

“We’ve got to be prepared for a level of capability and capacity we haven’t seen,” agreed the director of the Missile Defense Agency, Air Force Lt. Gen. Heath Collins. “As we’ve seen in Israel [and] in Ukraine… it is getting worse.”

“The sheer number of missiles that are out there today and that we’re seeing utilized in some of the more minor engagements is mind-boggling,” he said. “We’ve got to be prepared for major engagements.”

Even adversaries without professional militaries, like the Houthi irregulars in Yemen, are able to procure significant numbers of missiles and drones, Collins told the conference. And while MDA has historically focused on intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles — which follow a predictable but blisteringly fast arc through outer space en route to their targets — the US and its allies now need to prepare for coordinated barrages of slower, lower, but more unpredictable cruise missiles, hypersonics, and drones.

Instead of just preparing to hit “fastballs,” he said, “now we’re hitting sliders and curveballs.”

Even traditional ballistic boosters are increasingly tipped with warheads that are capable of last-minute maneuvers to baffle defenders, added Plumb: “The value of maneuvering [reentry] vehicles is widely understood. … Very few missiles are truly ‘ballistic’ anymore.”

Yet even as the threat is becoming more maneuverable and evasive, it’s also becoming cheaper, thanks particularly to the proliferation of “one-way attack drones.” The supersonic THAAD, Patriot, and Standard Missile interceptors developed to shoot down ballistic weapons are expensive overkill against drones that can cost a few thousand dollars. Militaries can absorb the cost if they’re only shooting down a handful of incoming threats, Plumb argued, but not if you’re dealing with mass attacks like Iran’s 300-strong wave or worse.

No less a figure than the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. C.Q. Brown, emphasized the importance of expanding defenses against low-end drones. “I realize that the Missile Defense Agency tends to look at high end capabilities, but I really believe you’ve got to think about how we defend against all of these [threats],” he said in his remarks, which closed the conference. “This past weekend was a perfect example [of] the expansive use of drones.”

‘Go Against The Archer’

That cost imbalance between defense and offense has driven militaries around the world to look at less expensive options, from lasers and high-powered microwaves to old-fashioned bullets.

In Ukraine, Plumb said, “these guys have literally shot down cruise missiles” with .50 caliber machineguns. That requires a sophisticated but relatively inexpensive network of sensors, deployed as far forward as possible to pick up the incoming threat and rapidly alert mobile air defense guns in its path, he noted. Only if incoming missiles and drones bypass the first, affordable line of defense and threaten critical targets does Ukraine employ its limited supply of Patriots and other high-end Western interceptors, he said.

By contrast, Plumb continued, the US version of “layered” missile defense often fires the most expensive weapon first, because it has the longest range, while low-cost-per-shot alternatives like lasers or guns are so short-ranged they only come into play for close-in, last-ditch defense.

“You want your first layer to be pickets and the pickets have the cheaper shots, then save your most exquisite interceptors at the highest cost for leakers” that get through, Plumb said. “We roughly have that backwards. … Our most expensive interceptors usually have longer reach [and] our cheapest shots at at the end.”

Can the Pentagon procurement system and the defense industrial base turn that around? “Focusing on cost may be a new thing for this audience,” Plumb said drily. “We build very exquisite systems that work very well… Can we figure out a way to introduce much lower-cost interceptors to deal with the scale of the threat?”

One way to improve cost-effectiveness, Plumb emphasized, is to go on the offense and take out enemy drones and missiles before they launch, when they are relatively static and clustered together. “We can’t just sit there” deflecting arrows, he said: “We have to go against the archer.”

US Central Command actually did “left of launch” strikes that this weekend, albeit only against the Houthi irregulars, not their Iranian sponsors. Of the 80-plus drones and “at least six” ballistic missiles it claims to have destroyed before they could hit Israel, a CENTCOM release said, “this includes a ballistic missile on its launcher and seven UAVs destroyed on the ground in Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen prior to their launch.”

Shyu: Directed Energy Is ‘Pretty Awesome’

Indeed, ever since the 2020 Missile Defense Review, the official Pentagon approach has been to nest “missile defense” within a wider approach of “comprehensive missile defeat,” which includes everything from destroying launchers on the ground, to electronic warfare to make them go astray in flight, to more exotic approaches such as directed energy.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force are all developing 300-kilowatt lasers with far greater range than current counter-drone weapons, Shyu said. The Army and Air Force systems will be ground-based, the Navy’s shipborne, she said, declining to give further detail. “Last summer, my shop let out a contract to two different contractors [to develop] greater than 500-kilowatt laser sources,” she said. “By the end of next year expect to see that. … It’s pretty awesome.”

But there’s no single silver bullet, Shyu emphasized to reporters after her remarks to the conference. “What I look at is the entire kill web,” she said. She puts a particular emphasis on early detection, including space-based sensors like the new HBTSS satellites, which can look farther than ground-based systems, and potentially AI pattern-matching algorithms to distinguish different types of drones, missiles, and decoys.

But Shyu said she is also investing in a wide range of countermeasures to kick on once that detection is made. “There are cheaper shooters, and there are other things we’re doing as well,” she said. “I look at things very holistically … all the potential ways I can counter an adversary.”

So, this reporter asked, does that mean lasers? Jammers? “All of the above,” Shyu said. Maybe black magic? “All of the above,” she said again, and laughed.

Breaking Defense’s Valerie Insinna contributed to this report.

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · April 17, 2024

8. China sounds warning after Philippines and US announce most expansive military drills yet

Strategic competition in Southwest Asia.

Excerpts:

China claims almost the entire South China Sea despite a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal that found Beijing’s sweeping claims had no legal basis.

Last week, Joe Biden pledged to defend the Philippines from any attack in the South China Sea, as he hosted the first joint summit with Manila and Tokyo amid growing tensions with Beijing.

On Thursday, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi kicked off a tour of south-east Asia that will see him visit Indonesia, Cambodia and Papua New Guinea.

Indonesia’s president-elect Prabowo Subianto visited China at the beginning of April, where President Xi Jinping praised their ties and laid out a vision for regional peace. China is one of the biggest sources of foreign direct investment in Indonesia and has poured billions of dollars into projects in the country.

Wang will finish the tour in Papua New Guinea, where in recent years Beijing has tried to chip away at US and Australian influence.

China sounds warning after Philippines and US announce most expansive military drills yet

Exercises starting on Monday will be the first to be held outside Philippines’ territorial waters, and come amid a rise in tensions in the South China Sea

Helen Davidson and agencies

Wed 17 Apr 2024 20.26 EDT

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · April 18, 2024

Philippine and US forces will carry out their first ever military exercises outside the south-east Asian country’s territorial waters, in a move China has said will only lead to greater insecurity in the South China Sea.

The annual Balikatan or “shoulder-to-shoulder” drills – which will run from 22 April to 10 May – will involve 16,700 soldiers simulating retaking enemy-occupied islands in areas facing Taiwan and the South China Sea.

It will be the first time the maritime exercises are carried out beyond Philippine territorial waters, according to Michael Logico, a Philippine army colonel overseeing the exercises. It will also be the first time the Philippine Coast Guard has taken part in military exercises. The coast guard has increasingly been at the forefront of clashes with China, particularly around the disputed Second Thomas Shoal.

Dynamic in South China Sea is changing through growing US and Japan ties, says Philippines president

Read more

In response to the planned drills, China’s foreign ministry warned that the Philippines should be “sober enough to realise” that bringing in external countries to show off their force in the South China Sea and provoke confrontation will only aggravate tensions and undermine regional stability.

“Attempts to bring in external forces to safeguard its so-called security will only lead to greater insecurity for itself,” ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said at a scheduled news conference, urging both countries to stop provocation.

Chinese state media was also critical of the drills, which they said would have a “destructive impact on regional security”.

On Thursday the Philippines’ foreign ministry said its decision to strengthen ties with Japan and the US was a “sovereign choice”, and urged China to “reflect upon its own actions” in the South China Sea.

“The source of tension in our region is well known to all,” the ministry said in a statement.

“It is China’s excessive maritime claims and aggressive behaviour, including its militarisation of reclaimed features, that are undermining regional peace and stability and raising tensions.”

Logico said US troops and their Philippine counterparts will simulate retaking islands occupied by hostile forces in the northernmost islands of the country, close to Taiwan and in the western Palawan province facing the South China Sea.

More than 16,700 Filipino and US troops will take part. On Thursday Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) spokesperson Rear Adm Armando Balilo said six PCG vessels would take part for the first time. In previous years they have only patrolled the perimeter to keep out other parties.

A small French contingent will join this year’s drills for the first time since the annual exercise began in 1991, deploying a frigate that will sail jointly with Philippines and US naval vessels in Manila’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea.

About 14 nations will join as observers, including Japan, India and countries in Asean and the European Union, Logico said.

Aimed at improving communication and coordination between the US and Philippine militaries, the drills come against the backdrop of recent aggressive behaviour from Beijing in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, flashpoints for Chinese and US tensions.

The so-called “gray-zone” harassment by China has included shining military-grade lasers at the Philippine Coast Guard, firing water cannon at vessels and ramming into Philippine ships running resupply missions near the Second Thomas Shoal, which both Manila and Beijing claim. Some Filipino crew have been injured in the clashes.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea despite a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal that found Beijing’s sweeping claims had no legal basis.

Last week, Joe Biden pledged to defend the Philippines from any attack in the South China Sea, as he hosted the first joint summit with Manila and Tokyo amid growing tensions with Beijing.

On Thursday, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi kicked off a tour of south-east Asia that will see him visit Indonesia, Cambodia and Papua New Guinea.

Indonesia’s president-elect Prabowo Subianto visited China at the beginning of April, where President Xi Jinping praised their ties and laid out a vision for regional peace. China is one of the biggest sources of foreign direct investment in Indonesia and has poured billions of dollars into projects in the country.

Wang will finish the tour in Papua New Guinea, where in recent years Beijing has tried to chip away at US and Australian influence.

Chi Hui Lin, Reuters and Agence France-Presse contributed to this report

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · April 18, 2024

9. Army deploys long-range missiles to China’s doorstep

​Also reports from Mr Gertz on fentanyl and Chinese cyber.

Army deploys long-range missiles to China’s doorstep

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, April 17, 2024

NEWS AND ANALYSIS:

The Army recently dispatched a new long-range missile system to the Philippines for the first time since the U.S. in 2019 exited the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which banned such deployments.

Gen. Charles Flynn, commander of U.S. Army Pacific forces, said the deployment of the new missile system is “historic” and highlights continuous Army transformation to deal with a complex and challenging environment.

“The planning, transportation and deployment of the newest U.S. Army long-range precision fires system supports a safe, stable and secure Indo-Pacific in partnership with our allies from the Armed Forces Philippines,” Gen. Flynn told Inside the Ring.

The new system is called the Mid-Range Capability missile system and was moved to Luzon, Philippines, on April 11 aboard a C-17 transport as part of joint military exercises at a time of mounting regional tensions with China.

Army Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington, commanding general of the First Multi-Domain Task Force, a part of Army Forces Pacific, said the system is a “significant step” in bolstering the military alliance with the Philippines.

The weapon is also known as the Typhon midrange strategic fire system. It includes a command truck and four truck-towed launchers capable of firing either SM-6 anti-ship missiles or Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles.

Both weapons are premier attack weapons in the U.S. military arsenal.

The SM-6 is a high-speed missile with three different types of strike capabilities. It can attack aircraft, ships or ground targets, and ballistic missiles at ranges of up to 230 miles.

The Tomahawk is a much longer-range missile with a range of up to 1,500 miles with precision guidance. Newer Tomahawk versions can loiter over targets before striking.

From Luzon, the Tomahawk missile could strike targets throughout southern China, including most of its major cities — other than the capital of Beijing.

In the future, the Typhon is expected to fire hypersonic maneuvering missiles.

Under the 1987 INF treaty, U.S. and Russian cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 300 miles and 3,420 miles were banned from ground-launched systems.

The U.S. withdrew from the treaty in 2018. Washington said that Russia first violated the pact with its deployment of a new ground-based cruise missile called the SSC-8.

Eric Sayers, a former civilian defense adviser at the Indo-Pacific Command, said the deployment of the new missile system to the Philippines is significant.

“This was illegal under [the] INF treaty just 5 years ago (thanks to Trump admin for withdrawing) and critics said Asian allies would never allow it to be deployed so we shouldn’t develop it,” Mr. Sayers said on X.

Mr. Sayers stated that critics in 2018 falsely asserted the treaty withdrawal would have no impact in countering China.

“Never forget when INF withdrawal critics confidently said it was a mistake, would put U.S. interests in danger, and wouldn’t matter anyway because no ally would host INF range systems,” he said.

The Tomahawk deployment to the Philippines for the exercises is temporary. But stationing it there sends a strategic message to China.

Beijing has engaged in military bullying of Philippine resupply boats traveling to the Second Thomas Shoal, where a grounded Philippine navy ship is being used as an island military base.

China claims the Spratly Islands, where the shoal is located, as its territory and is trying to force the Manila government to remove the grounded ship.

As part of those efforts, Chinese navy and coast guard ships have fired water cannons at the resupply boats, injuring Philippine nationals. In two incidents, the Chinese vessels rammed the resupply boats.

The Army called the deployment of the new system “a significant milestone for the new capability while enhancing interoperability, readiness, and defense capabilities in coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

“We’re grateful to our partners in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and we’re excited to expand our security cooperation as we bring this new capability to Luzon,” Gen. Harrington said.

“This creates several new collaboration opportunities for our bilateral training and readiness, we look forward to growing together.”

The military is seeking to deploy longer-range missiles, both conventionally armed and nuclear-tipped, in response to growing Chinese military aggression in the region.

Richard Fisher, a China expert, said the first long-range missile deployment to the Philippines comes nearly five years after withdrawal from the INF treaty.

The deployment is an important Army achievement but is “a decade late and too little to meet the threat,” he said.

“The U.S. intelligence community credits China with 3,800 theater ballistic missiles, and with three sorties of its fleet of H-6K class bombers, China can launch 2,700 land attack cruise missiles,” Mr. Fisher said.

“Currently the Army only plans to field eight batteries of the Typhon Mid-Range Capability missiles with a total of 197 launchers for global requirements,” he said.

To deter Chinese aggression against the Philippines and Taiwan, an Iranian war against Israel, a North Korean attack against South Korea and Japan, or a Russian war against NATO, the United States needs to produce thousands of theater range missiles a year, but is not doing so, said Mr. Fisher, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

Report: China weaponizing fentanyl

China’s military is working on the weaponization of the deadly synthetic opioid fentanyl, according to a State Department arms control report made public earlier this month.

An annual report on global compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, which China signed in 1993, said the U.S. government is unable to certify that Beijing is complying with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The lack of certification was first uncovered in 2021 and is based on Chinese research into pharmaceutical-based agents, or PBAs, and toxins with potential dual-use, civilian-military applications.

The CWC prohibits signatories from developing or stockpiling chemical weapons.

“The United States is concerned about the PRC’s interest in PBAs and toxins because these agents have utility for [chemical weapons] applications,” the report made public April 4 states, using the abbreviation for People’s Republic of China.

According to the report, “scientists at a PRC military research institute have expressed interest in military applications of PBAs, such as fentanyl.”

“Other PRC research organizations have been conducting and directing military research, discovery, testing and characterization of animal venoms and marine toxins — which raises further questions about the intended purposes of the work conducted by the military researchers,” the report said.

U.S. officials in November held talks with Chinese officials on the issue. In the discussions, the U.S. side raised the issue of China’s “potential development of aerosolized fentanyl.”

The Chinese officials said its police do not use fentanyl for law enforcement purposes.

The report said China opposed a decision at a 2021 CWC meeting that banned the use of aerosolized chemicals such as fentanyl.

The Chinese then issued a joint statement with Iran, Russia and Syria that said toxic chemicals are permitted for law enforcement purposes, including domestic riot-control efforts.

A report made public this week by the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party said China’s government is subsidizing the manufacture and export of fentanyl.

Navy sends torpedo-armed aircraft through Taiwan Strait

A Navy P-8A maritime patrol aircraft flew through the Taiwan Strait in international airspace, a spokeswoman for the Navy’s 7th Fleet said on Wednesday.

“By operating within the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law, the United States upholds the navigational rights and freedoms of all nations,” Navy Lt. Sarah Merrill said in a statement.

“The aircraft’s transit of the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the United States’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States military flies, sails and operates anywhere international law allows.”

In Beijing, a People’s Liberation Army spokesman said Chinese army aircraft followed the P-8 and monitored the flight.

Sr. Capt. Li Xi, a spokesman for the eastern theater command, called the P-8 transit a “provocative move,” state media said.

“The troops of the PLA Eastern Theater Command will remain on high alert at all times and resolutely safeguard China‘s national sovereignty as well as regional peace and stability,” he said.

DOE working to counter Chinese cyber attacks

Chinese government hackers pose threats to U.S. energy infrastructure and the Department of Energy is working to counter the danger, two senior department officials told the Senate on Wednesday.

Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm and Jill Hruby, director of the National Nuclear Security Administration, stated in prepared Senate Armed Services Committee testimony that Chinese state-linked hackers known as Volt Typhoon gained access to critical energy infrastructure.

“We are also actively addressing the increasing cyber threat to U.S. energy infrastructure,” the officials said.

“The recent cyber activity called ‘Volt Typhoon’ conducted by state-sponsored cyber actors from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should alarm all of us,” they said in joint testimony.

“The U.S. government assesses that PRC state-sponsored cyber actors are seeking to pre-position themselves for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”

• Contact Bill Gertz on X @BillGertz.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2024 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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10. 911 outages reported in parts of 4 states, including in Las Vegas, officials say

Are we seeing probing attacks on various parts of US infrastructure e.g., from water treatment plants and other utilities, to financial services, to emergency services? Is this from the Unrestricted Warfare playbook and in preparation for something larger at the time and place of our adversary's choosing? Are they attempting to undermine the people's confidence in government services? (perhaps I am being a sensational conspiracy theorist)

911 outages reported in parts of 4 states, including in Las Vegas, officials say | CNN

CNN · by Melissa Alonso, Dalia Faheid · April 18, 2024

Law enforcement agencies in at least four states have reported 911 service interruptions Wednesday evening.

releon8211/iStockphoto/Getty Images

CNN —

Law enforcement agencies in at least four states have reported 911 service interruptions Wednesday evening, and service was later restored in some areas.

Authorities in South Dakota, Texas, Nebraska and Nevada announced outages in multiple cities, but details about what was causing the outages weren’t immediately available.

The South Dakota Department of Public Safety said it “is aware of a 911 service interruption throughout the state,” the agency said in a statement. Later, the department said service has been restored for the South Dakota 911 system.

“Our emergency system is fully operational and ready to respond promptly to any situation,” the department said on Facebook. “Your safety is our top priority, and we are here to ensure help is just a call away whenever you need it.”

During the outage, the department had said: “Texting to 9-1-1 is operating in most locations. If these methods are not working in your location, citizens can still reach their local police and county sheriff offices emergency services using their non-emergency line,” the department said.

“Efforts are underway to resolve the issue,” the department added.

Officials in Sioux Falls and Rapid City reported their 911 services started working again, they said on their Facebook pages. The Rapid City Police Department urged residents to “only utilize 911 services only if an emergency situation exists.” The City of Sioux Falls said residents could again call or text 911 in case of emergencies.

In Texas, the City of Del Rio Police Department said it was aware of an outage with a “major cellular carrier” affecting residents’ ability to reach 911, emphasizing “the issue is with the carrier, and not the City of Del Rio systems.”

“Our emergency services remain operational,” the police department said. “If you cannot reach 911 via your mobile, please use a landline or another carrier. We are actively monitoring the situation and will provide further updates as they become available.”

Portions of Nebraska, including Chase County, reported outages as well. Officials in the state’s capital city of Lincoln, however, told CNN their 911 system is operational and not affected.

“911 is down across the State of Nebraska again for all cellular carriers except T-Mobile,” Chase County said in a Facebook post. “Landlines can still get through to 911.”

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department earlier reported the same outage issue and said there was no timeline for resolving the matter, but about two hours later said that 911 service had been restored, without immediately detailing the reason for the outage and how the restoration came about.

“Dial 911 on a mobile device, and we will be able to see your number and will call you back right away. 911 calls from landlines are NOT working at the moment,” the department initially wrote on Facebook. “There is no estimate for service restoration.”

During the outage, the department said residents could text 911 instead and urged people to keep the 911 system available for life-threatening emergencies.

“9-1-1 phone service has been restored,” the department said later Wednesday night. “All of the individuals who called during the outage have been called back and provided assistance. Non-emergency calls are also working. As always, please do not call 9-1-1 unless you have an emergency.”

All who called during the outage have been called back and provided assistance, the police department said.

CNN · by Melissa Alonso, Dalia Faheid · April 18, 2024

11. Miscalculation Led to Escalation in Clash Between Israel and Iran

Hindsight.

Excerpts:

The Israelis had badly miscalculated, thinking that Iran would not react strongly, according to multiple American officials who were involved in high-level discussions after the attack, a view shared by a senior Israeli official. On Saturday, Iran launched a retaliatory barrage of more than 300 drones and missiles at Israel, an unexpectedly large-scale response, if one that did minimal damage.

The events made clear that the unwritten rules of engagement in the long-simmering conflict between Israel and Iran have changed drastically in recent months, making it harder than ever for each side to gauge the other’s intentions and reactions.

Since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel by Hamas, an Iranian ally, and Israel’s subsequent bombardment of the Gaza Strip, there has been escalation after escalation and miscalculation after miscalculation, raising fears of a retribution cycle that could potentially become an all-out war.

Even after it became clear that Iran would retaliate, U.S. and Israeli officials initially thought the scale of the response would be fairly limited, before scrambling to revise their assessment again and again. Now the focus is on what Israel will do next — and how Iran might respond.

“We are in a situation where basically everybody can claim victory,” said Ali Vaez, the Iran director of the International Crisis Group. “Iran can say that it took revenge, Israel can say it defeated the Iranian attack and the United States can say it successfully deterred Iran and defended Israel.”

Miscalculation Led to Escalation in Clash Between Israel and Iran

Israeli officials say they didn’t see a strike on a high-level Iranian target in Syria as a provocation, and did not give Washington a heads-up about it until right before it happened.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/17/world/middleeast/iran-israel-attack.html

The Iranian Embassy complex in Damascus, Syria, a day after an airstrike by Israel.Credit...Louai Beshara/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Ronen Bergman, Farnaz Fassihi, Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous and Richard Pérez-Peña

Ronen Bergman reported from Tel Aviv, Farnaz Fassihi and Richard Pérez-Peña from New York, and Eric Schmitt and Adam Entous from Washington.

April 17, 2024

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Iran, Israel and Syria? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Israel was mere moments away from an airstrike on April 1 that killed several senior Iranian commanders at Iran’s embassy complex in Syria when it told the United States what was about to happen.

Israel’s closest ally had just been caught off guard.

Aides quickly alerted Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser; Jon Finer, the deputy national security adviser; Brett McGurk, Mr. Biden’s Middle East coordinator; and others, who saw that the strike could have serious consequences, a U.S. official said. Publicly, U.S. officials voiced support for Israel, but privately, they expressed anger that it would take such aggressive action against Iran without consulting Washington.

The Israelis had badly miscalculated, thinking that Iran would not react strongly, according to multiple American officials who were involved in high-level discussions after the attack, a view shared by a senior Israeli official. On Saturday, Iran launched a retaliatory barrage of more than 300 drones and missiles at Israel, an unexpectedly large-scale response, if one that did minimal damage.

The events made clear that the unwritten rules of engagement in the long-simmering conflict between Israel and Iran have changed drastically in recent months, making it harder than ever for each side to gauge the other’s intentions and reactions.

Since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel by Hamas, an Iranian ally, and Israel’s subsequent bombardment of the Gaza Strip, there has been escalation after escalation and miscalculation after miscalculation, raising fears of a retribution cycle that could potentially become an all-out war.

Even after it became clear that Iran would retaliate, U.S. and Israeli officials initially thought the scale of the response would be fairly limited, before scrambling to revise their assessment again and again. Now the focus is on what Israel will do next — and how Iran might respond.

“We are in a situation where basically everybody can claim victory,” said Ali Vaez, the Iran director of the International Crisis Group. “Iran can say that it took revenge, Israel can say it defeated the Iranian attack and the United States can say it successfully deterred Iran and defended Israel.”

But Mr. Vaez said: “If we get into another round of tit for tat, it can easily spiral out of control, not just for Iran and Israel, but for the rest of the region and the entire world​.

Image

Iranians gathered in Palestine Square in Tehran after their country struck Israel.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

This account of these tense weeks is gleaned from interviews with U.S. officials, as well as officials from Israel, Iran and other Middle Eastern states. All of them spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters they were not authorized to reveal publicly.

Planning for the Israeli strike in Syria started two months earlier, two Israeli officials said. The target was Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the commander for Syria and Lebanon of Iran’s elite Quds Force, a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

About a week beforehand, on March 22, the Israeli war cabinet approved the operation, according to internal Israeli defense records that summarized preparations for the strike and were viewed by The New York Times. The Israeli military did not comment on the internal assessment.

Those records also outlined the range of responses from Iran that the Israeli government expected, among them small-scale attacks by proxies and a small-scale attack from Iran. None of the assessments predicted the ferocity of the Iranian response that actually occurred.

From the day of the strike, Iran vowed retaliation, both publicly and through diplomatic channels. But it also sent messages privately that it did not want outright war with Israel — and even less so with the United States — and it waited 12 days to attack.

American officials found themselves in an odd and uncomfortable position: They had been kept in the dark about an important action by a close ally, Israel, even as Iran, a longtime adversary, telegraphed its intentions well in advance. The United States and its allies have spent weeks engaged in intensive diplomacy, trying to tamp down first the expected Iranian counterattack, and now the temptation for Israel to reply in kind.

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When it came this past Saturday night, Iran’s show of force was significant, but Israel, the United States and other allies intercepted nearly all of the missiles and drones. The few that reached their targets had little effect. Iranian officials say the attack was designed to inflict limited damage.

U.S. officials have been telling Israeli leaders to see their successful defense as a victory, suggesting that little or no further reply is needed. But despite international calls for de-escalation, Israeli officials argue that Iran’s attack requires yet another response, which Iran says it would answer with still more force, making the situation more volatile.

“The question now is how does Israel respond in a way to prevent Iran from rewriting the rules of the game without provoking a new cycle of state-on-state violence,” said Dana Stroul, a former top Middle East policy official at the Pentagon who is now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

In fact, Israeli leaders came close to ordering widespread strikes in Iran on the night Iran attacked, according to Israeli officials.

Israeli officials say the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas, which caught them by surprise, changed the ground rules of regional conflict. To its enemies, it was Israel’s bombing and invasion of Gaza that did that, and it led to increased rocket fire by Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. That in turn drew heavy fire from Israel.

The Israeli airstrike in Damascus killed seven Iranian officers, three of them generals, including Mr. Zahedi. In the past, Israel had repeatedly killed Iranian fighters, commanders and nuclear scientists, but no single strike had wiped out so much of Iran’s military leadership.

Image

The funeral in Tehran for seven Iranian commanders and officers killed in an Israeli airstrike in Damascus, Syria.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

By March, the relationship between the Biden administration and Israel had grown increasingly fraught, as Washington criticized the Israeli assault in Gaza as needlessly deadly and destructive — “over the top,” as President Biden put it.

Then came the Israeli strike in Damascus. Not only did the Israelis wait until the last minute to give word of it to the United States, but when they did so, it was a relatively low-level notification, U.S. officials said. Nor was there any indication how sensitive the target would be.

The Israelis later acknowledged that they had badly misjudged the consequences of the strike, U.S. officials and an Israeli official said.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III complained directly to Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, in a call on April 3, U.S. officials said, confirming an earlier report by The Washington Post. Mr. Austin said that the attack put U.S. forces in the region at risk, and that the lack of warning had left no time to ratchet up their defenses. Mr. Gallant had no immediate comment.

Middle East Crisis: Live Updates

Updated 

April 18, 2024, 4:50 a.m. ET3 hours ago

3 hours ago

• The E.U. says it will impose new sanctions on Iran’s drone and missile programs.
• A Gazan describes losing four nieces and nephews in an attack that killed children playing in the street.
• The U.N. seeks $2.8 billion in donations for the response to the crisis in Gaza.

The vulnerability of thousands of U.S. troops deployed in the Middle East became all too clear earlier in the Israel-Hamas war, when Iranian-backed militias fired on them repeatedly, killing three and injuring more than 100. Those attacks stopped in early February only after retaliation by the United States and ominous warnings to Iran.

Image

President Biden returning to the Oval Office on Saturday to consult with his national security team.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

The night of the Damascus strike, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Swiss ambassador in Tehran to convey Iran’s outrage to Washington, along with the message that it viewed the United States, Israel’s primary backer, as accountable for the attack.

Using Oman, Turkey and Switzerland as intermediaries — Iran and the United States do not have formal diplomatic relations — the United States made clear to Iran that it had not been involved and that it did not want war.

The Iranian government went on an unusually open and broad diplomatic campaign, spreading the word that it saw the attack as a violation of its sovereignty that required retaliation.

The government publicized that it was exchanging messages with the United States and that Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian was speaking with representatives of countries in the region, high-level European officials and leaders of the United Nations.

Image

The foreign minister of Iran, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, speaking at a news conference in Tehran on Monday.Credit...Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

On April 7, Mr. Abdollahian met in Muscat, Oman, with his Omani counterpart, Badr Albusaidi. Oman is one of the main intermediaries between Tehran and the West. The Iranian message at that meeting, according to a diplomat briefed on it, was that Iran had to strike back but that it would keep its attack contained, and that it was not seeking a regional war.

Before and after that meeting there was a whirlwind of phone calls between Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken; Mr. Biden; Mr. Austin; Mr. Sullivan; their counterparts in Israel, China, India and Iraq; NATO allies; and others, officials said.

The Biden administration did not think it could dissuade Iran from attacking at all, a U.S. official said, but hoped to limit the scale.

Mr. Blinken talked to senior Israeli cabinet members, assuring them that the United States would help defend against an Iranian attack, and urging them not to mount a rash counterstrike without weighing all considerations.

American and Israeli intelligence agencies worked closely together, with help from Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries, to learn what they could about Iran’s intentions.

Image

A battery that is part of Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system deployed near Jerusalem.Credit...Menahem Kahana/Agence France-Presse — Getty Image

Intermediaries and allies told the United States and Israel that Iran planned to hit military sites and not civilian targets, U.S. and Israeli officials said.

Iran’s message was that it would temper its attack so as not to elicit an Israeli counterstrike, Israeli and Iranian officials said. But in reality, the Israelis said, Iran was expanding its attack plans, and wanted at least some of its weapons to penetrate Israel’s defenses.

Initially, Israel’s military and intelligence services expected Iran to launch no more than 10 surface-to-surface missiles at Israel, an attack they code-named “Late Foliage.” By the middle of last week, they realized Iran had something much bigger in mind, and the Israelis increased their estimate to 60 to 70 surface-to-surface missiles. Even that turned out to be too low.

On Wednesday, Mr. Biden publicly reinforced what he and his aides had repeatedly said: Despite friction with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the American commitment to defending Israel from attacks was “ironclad.”

Still, the Biden administration also redoubled its diplomatic efforts to head off a confrontation, and Iranian officials said their government fielded calls last week urging restraint from countries across Asia, Europe and Africa — an effort they described as frantic.

Turkey, relaying an Iranian message, told the United States that Iran’s attack would be proportionate to the Damascus strike, according to a Turkish diplomatic source. Mr. Abdollahian, Iran’s foreign minister, told state television the day after the Iranian barrage that Iran had given its neighbors 72 hours’ notice of the attack, though the specifics of that warning are unclear.

Israeli officials say that, thanks in part to international cooperation, they had a good idea in advance of Iran’s targets and weapons. The Israel Defense Forces evacuated families from some air bases and moved aircraft out of harm’s way.

Image

The view from Ashkelon, Israel, where an antimissile system was activated after Iran launched a barrage toward Israel.Credit...Amir Cohen/Reuters

The U.S. military coordinated aerial defense efforts with Israeli, British and French forces as well as — crucially — those of Jordan, which lies between Iran and Israel. The United States and Israel had been working quietly for years with friendly Arab countries to develop a regional air defense system with shared detection and alerts. The effort picked up steam after several drone attacks against Saudi Arabian oil facilities in 2019.

News of the first wave of the Iranian attack on Saturday, consisting of 185 relatively slow drones, spread worldwide hours before any of them reached Israel. The three dozen cruise missiles Iran launched later were much faster, but the biggest challenge was Iran’s ballistic missiles, which traveled several times as fast as the speed of sound. Iran fired 110 of them, posing the first major test of Israel’s anti-ballistic missile defense system.

American, British, French, Israeli and Jordanian warplanes and air defense systems shot down most of the drones and missiles before they reached Israel. Only 75 entered Israeli airspace, where most of those were shot down, too, Israeli officials said. The attack did only minor damage to one air base, and only one serious injury was reported.

Throughout the strike, Iran’s Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards kept open a hotline to Oman’s government, to pass messages back and forth with the United States, Iranian officials said.

At 3 a.m., the Swiss ambassador in Tehran was summoned again — not to the Foreign Ministry, the usual practice, but to a Revolutionary Guards base, according to an Iranian and a U.S. official. She was asked to convey a message that the United States should stay out of the fight, and that if Israel retaliated, Iran would strike again, harder and without warning.

Iran cast its barrage against Israel as a measured, justified act that should not lead to escalation.

“We carried out a limited operation, at the same level and proportion to the evil actions of the Zionist regime,” Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami, commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards, said on state television. “These operations could have been a lot larger.”

Image

The house of Amina al-Hasoni, outside Arad, Israel, was damaged after Iran launched drones and missiles toward Israel on Sunday.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

Mr. Biden told Mr. Netanyahu in a call that Israel’s successful defense had demonstrated its technical superiority, according to John F. Kirby, a spokesman for the National Security Council.

“The president urged the prime minister to think about what that success says all by itself to the rest of the region,” Mr. Kirby said on Monday.

But in interviews, Israeli officials described the attack in far more dire terms, in part because of its sheer scale. They emphasized that this was a sovereign nation, from its own soil, attacking Israel directly, and not through proxies abroad.

Israel’s war cabinet had ordered the military to draw up plans for a wide-ranging set of strikes against targets in Iran in the event of a large-scale Iranian attack. After news came of the Iranian launches on Saturday, some leaders argued behind closed doors that Israel should retaliate immediately.

Waiting, they said, would allow international pressure for Israeli restraint to build, and could let Iran think that it had set new ground rules for the conflict, which Israel considered unacceptable. Among the leaders making that argument, according to three Israeli officials, were Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, former military chiefs of staff who were in the Parliamentary opposition to Mr. Netanyahu’s right-wing government and are usually considered less hawkish, but who joined the war cabinet last fall.

The Israeli Air Force was ready to carry out the order, but it never came. On Saturday night, after Mr. Netanyahu spoke with Mr. Biden, and because the damage was limited, the war cabinet postponed a decision, and more postponements followed.

The world is still waiting to see what Israel will do.

Image

A billboard in Tehran offered a message to Israel on Monday.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

Reporting was contributed by Sheera Frenkel, Isabel Kershner, Michael Crowley, Vivian Nereim and Safak Timur.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

Farnaz Fassihi is the United Nations bureau chief for The Times, leading coverage of the organization, and also covers Iran and the shadow war between Iran and Israel. She is based in New York. More about Farnaz Fassihi

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

Adam Entous is a Washington-based investigative correspondent and a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. Before joining the Washington bureau of The Times, he covered intelligence, national security and foreign policy for The New Yorker magazine, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal. More about Adam Entous

Richard Pérez-Peña is an editor for international news at The Times, based in New York. More about Richard Pérez-Peña

A version of this article appears in print on April 18, 2024, Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: How Israel Miscalculation Poked at a Hornet’s Nest. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

12. As Pentagon awaits supplemental dollars, its operational funding is $2B in the hole

Excerpts:

With pressure mounting to increase aid to Israel after Iran’s attack this weekend, Johnson, R-La., sought to deliver a solution that would appease the ultra-conservative members of his party, essentially splitting the Senate supplemental spending bill into three buckets — a move that allows funding for each country to either be approved or die separately.

The measure includes:

• The $60.8 billion Ukraine supplemental includes about $48 billion to replenish US weapons stockpiles, fund US operations in Europe and the Ukraine Security Initiative.
• The $26.4 billion supplemental for Israel and Middle East operations includes $4 billion for Iron Dome and David’s Sling, $1.2 billion for Iron Beam, $3.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Israel and $4.4 billion to replenish US stocks.
• The $8.1 billion Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental includes $2.7 billion for the submarine industrial base, $1.9 billion for support to Taiwan, $1.9 billion for advanced procurement of the Columbia-class submarine, and $200 million in advance procurement for the Virginia-class submarine.

As Pentagon awaits supplemental dollars, its operational funding is $2B in the hole - Breaking Defense

The House is teeing up a series of votes this weekend on separate supplemental spending bills for Israel, Taiwan and Ukraine.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque, Valerie Insinna · April 17, 2024

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer Michael J. McCord provide testimony at a House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense hearing on the Department of Defense fiscal 2025 budget request, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. March 17, 2024. (DoD photo by Chad J. McNeeley)

WASHINGTON — With House lawmakers poised to consider a series of supplemental spending bills this weekend, Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord disclosed today that the department is already $2 billion in the hole for unfunded operations in Europe and the Middle East this year.

And if Congress is unable to act, the department will have to look to cut into “enabler” funds — likely facilities and weapons accounts — in order to make sure forces can remain deployed and supporting operations.

“We have incurred over $2 billion, and counting, of operational costs that if we can’t get the supplemental, will have to be absorbed in the base budget,” he said. If that happens, the goal is to protect the military forces’ ability to train and be ready for combat operations, while “readiness enabling” funds will take the hit.

Make no mistake, he added, “there is an impact on our forces and our readiness as well, if we cannot get the supplemental approved.”

The challenge of unexpected operational costs is becoming a theme during budget hearing season. Since the Oct. 1 start of the fiscal year, the Army has spent about $800 million in unplanned operations costs in Europe and the Middle with service leaders warning they may have to cut training and exercises around the globe. Air Force Gen. Jacqueline Van Ovost, the commander of US Transportation Command, told lawmakers last week that her command has already fronted $172 million in transportation costs supporting operations related to Israel but project that to grow to $550 million this year. And earlier this week, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said his service has incurred $1 billion in unplanned munition costs just from operations in the Red Sea in the last six months.

A Supplemental Vote At Last?

McCord — alongside Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. CQ Brown — appeared before the House committee to field questions about the department’s $849.8 billion FY25 discretionary spending request.

But it was House Speaker Mike Johnson’s evolving supplemental plan that stole the limelight on Capitol Hill today, with the House Rules Committee releasing separate funding bills for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan totaling $95.3 billion shortly after the hearing ended.

Although the Senate passed a $95 billion supplemental spending bill in February, the measure has languished in the House due to opposition from a segment of hardline Republicans, who oppose further spending for Ukraine.

With pressure mounting to increase aid to Israel after Iran’s attack this weekend, Johnson, R-La., sought to deliver a solution that would appease the ultra-conservative members of his party, essentially splitting the Senate supplemental spending bill into three buckets — a move that allows funding for each country to either be approved or die separately.

The measure includes:

• The $60.8 billion Ukraine supplemental includes about $48 billion to replenish US weapons stockpiles, fund US operations in Europe and the Ukraine Security Initiative.
• The $26.4 billion supplemental for Israel and Middle East operations includes $4 billion for Iron Dome and David’s Sling, $1.2 billion for Iron Beam, $3.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Israel and $4.4 billion to replenish US stocks.
• The $8.1 billion Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental includes $2.7 billion for the submarine industrial base, $1.9 billion for support to Taiwan, $1.9 billion for advanced procurement of the Columbia-class submarine, and $200 million in advance procurement for the Virginia-class submarine.

The House bills are a departure from the Biden administration’s six-month old $105 billion supplemental spending request that lumped military aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan together [PDF]. And while the House bills roughly match the Senate supplemental, with the largest change involving language that calls for a plan for Ukraine to pay back certain loans, the Senate may need to start over and pass the individual House bills.

The endorsement of President Joe Biden, who said this afternoon that he strongly supported the House spending package, could pave the way for approval of the House bills in the Democrat-controlled Senate.

“The House must pass the package this week and the Senate should quickly follow. I will sign this into law immediately to send a message to the world: We stand with our friends, and we won’t let Iran or Russia succeed,” Biden said in a statement.

Byron Callan, an analyst with Capital Alpha Partners, said the House bills are a “positive for US defense sentiment,” with a total value equal to the Senate supplemental and a high likelihood of being enacted into law.”

“There will be GOP opposition to some of the bills, but we expect enough GOP support along with Democrats for these to pass,” he said in a note to investors.

As Ukrainian forces encounter ever-increasing materiel shortages, Ukraine needs additional resources as soon as possible, Austin and Brown told lawmakers.

“Ukraine, right now, is facing some dire battlefield conditions and it’s partly because they’re pulling teeth from a resourcing standpoint — whether it’s munitions, whether it’s vehicles, whether it’s platforms. They’re not being outmatched by the Russians,” Brown told lawmakers. Without continued international support, including from Washington, the four-star Air Force general warned that Ukrainian forces will continue ceding ground to Russian forces.

Beyond the supplemental’s direct implications for the war in Ukraine and on Moscow, the measure could stem growing concerns internationally, Austin noted.

“Delaying the supplemental sends a terrible signal to our allies and partners, and they will question whether or not, you know, we are committed,” Austin told House lawmakers.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque, Valerie Insinna · April 17, 2024

13. Russia, Iran turning Israel and Ukraine into ‘battlefield laboratories,’ experts say

Criteria for approving future weapons systems may include an assessment based on lessons from Ukraine and Israel.

Russia, Iran turning Israel and Ukraine into ‘battlefield laboratories,’ experts say

Story by Clayton Vickers • April 17, 2024 • 

https://thehill.com/homenews/4601166-russia-iran-israel-ukraine-battlefield-laboratories/

Russia and Iran are using Ukraine and Israel as “battlefield laboratories” to probe at Western military vulnerabilities, experts told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee Wednesday. 

“Together, Russia and Iran are using Ukraine and the Middle East as battlefield laboratories to improve their weapons and develop techniques to overcome U.S. and allied defensive systems,” Dana Stroul, director of research at the Washington Institute, told lawmakers at a hearing on the “Despotic Duo.”

“Iran is extracting from Russia lessons in combined strike packages as well as insights into the strengths and weaknesses of Western-origin air and missile defense systems,” Stroul said in her written statement. 

The hearing comes just days after Iran launched an unprecedented aerial attack on Israel. The Israeli military said Iran fired approximately 170 drones, 120 ballistic missiles and 30 cruise missiles; nearly all were shot down. 

According to Stroul and other witnesses, Iran’s attack on Israel was “remarkably similar to Russian-perpetrated attacks on Ukraine.” 

“Russia has leveraged the military and political exchanges with Tehran during the Syrian civil war to its benefit,” said Rep. Tom Kean (R-N.J.). 

On Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin called Iran’s attempted strike on Israel “the best way to punish the aggressor and a manifestation of the tact and rationality of Iran’s leaders.” 

According to experts at Wednesday’s hearing, Russia’s reliance on Iranian weapons to continue its invasion of Ukraine has shifted the balance of power in the nations’ relationship, lessening Russia’s sway over the regime, with Iran extracting more capabilities in return. 

“One of the most recent developments that we must disrupt is increased Russian and Iranian weapons and munitions products that will today help Russia overrun Ukraine, but tomorrow could help Iran overwhelm Israel,” said Gabriel Noronha of the Jewish Institute for the National Security of America.

“Recently, leadership at the U.S. Central Command expressed worry that Russia may soon provide Iran with Russian SU-35 aircraft in exchange for Iranian drones and weapons,” Rep. Gabe Amo (D-R.I.) said. 

“Just imagine what an attack [against Israel] with advanced fighters would have looked like,” Amo added. 

Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, warned the U.S. is letting its enemies strengthen each other, emboldened by “the perception of political irresolution and strategic drift emanating from Washington.”

“The Islamic Republic has received gold, cash, Russian diplomatic cover, captured Western weapons and contracts for advanced weapons like the SU-35,” Taleblu said in his written statement. 

Lawmakers across the subcommittee called on the House to pass the long-stalled defense spending package for aid in Ukraine, Israel and the Indo-Pacific, citing President Biden’s “strong support” announced in a statement Wednesday. 

“I will sign this into law immediately to send a message to the world: We stand with our friends, and we won’t let Iran or Russia succeed,” Biden said. 

“The world’s on fire, and we cannot bury our heads in the sand,” Rep. Ann Wagner (R-Mo.) said.

14. How an Obscure Chinese Real Estate Start-Up Paved the Way to TikTok

Some fascinating history (if accurate). I wonder if this is another example of Lenin's "warning."

“The Capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”

― Vladimir Ilich Lenin

If TikTok undermines western civilization we will have only ourselves to blame since it started with us?

Excerpts:

The records also show that Mr. Yass’s firm was more deeply involved in TikTok’s genesis than previously known. It has been widely reported in The New York Times and elsewhere that Susquehanna owns roughly 15 percent of ByteDance, but the documents make clear that the firm was no passive investor. It nurtured Mr. Zhang’s career and signed off on the idea for the company.

Susquehanna has tens of billions of dollars at stake as lawmakers debate whether TikTok gives its Chinese owner the power to sow discord and spread disinformation among Americans. As Susquehanna’s founder, Mr. Yass potentially has billions riding on the outcome of the debate.

Mr. Yass, a former professional poker player, is also the single largest donor this election cycle, with more than $46 million in contributions through the end of last year, according to OpenSecrets, a research group that tracks money in politics.

How an Obscure Chinese Real Estate Start-Up Paved the Way to TikTok

Court records, mistakenly made public, tell a story about the birth of ByteDance, its bumpy road to success and the role of the Republican megadonor Jeff Yass’s firm.

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The former headquarters of ByteDance, the parent company of the video sharing app TikTok, in Beijing.Credit...Greg Baker/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Mara Hvistendahl and Lauren Hirsch

Mara Hvistendahl is an investigative reporter focusing on Asia, and Lauren Hirsch covers deals and the biggest stories on Wall Street.

April 18, 2024

Updated 6:12 a.m. ET

In 2009, long before Jeff Yass became a Republican megadonor, his firm, Susquehanna International Group, invested in a Chinese real estate start-up that boasted a sophisticated search algorithm.

The company, 99Fang, promised to help buyers find their perfect homes. Behind the scenes, employees of a Chinese subsidiary of Mr. Yass’s firm were so deeply involved, records show, that they conceived the idea for the company and handpicked its chief executive. They said in one email that he was not the company’s “real founder.”

As a real estate venture, 99Fang ultimately fizzled. But it was significant, according to a lawsuit by former Susquehanna contractors, because of what it spawned. They say that 99Fang’s chief executive — and the search technology — resurfaced at another Susquehanna venture: ByteDance.

ByteDance, the owner of TikTok, is now one of the world’s most highly valued start-ups, worth $225 billion, according to CB Insights, a firm that tracks venture capital. ByteDance is also at the center of a tempest on Capitol Hill, where some lawmakers see the company as a threat to American security. They are considering a bill that could break up the company. The man picked by Susquehanna to run the housing site, Zhang Yiming, became ByteDance’s founder.

Court documents reveal a complex origin story for ByteDance and TikTok. The records include emails, chat messages and memos from inside Susquehanna. They describe a middling business experiment, founder-investor tension and, ultimately, a powerful search engine that just needed a purpose.

The records also show that Mr. Yass’s firm was more deeply involved in TikTok’s genesis than previously known. It has been widely reported in The New York Times and elsewhere that Susquehanna owns roughly 15 percent of ByteDance, but the documents make clear that the firm was no passive investor. It nurtured Mr. Zhang’s career and signed off on the idea for the company.

Susquehanna has tens of billions of dollars at stake as lawmakers debate whether TikTok gives its Chinese owner the power to sow discord and spread disinformation among Americans. As Susquehanna’s founder, Mr. Yass potentially has billions riding on the outcome of the debate.

Mr. Yass, a former professional poker player, is also the single largest donor this election cycle, with more than $46 million in contributions through the end of last year, according to OpenSecrets, a research group that tracks money in politics.

Susquehanna has turned over Mr. Yass’s emails as part of the case, according to court documents. But those emails are not included in the trove that was made public, leaving Mr. Yass’s personal involvement in ByteDance’s formation unknown.

Image

The Pennsylvania offices of Susquehanna International Group. The firm first invested in ByteDance over a decade ago.Credit...Mark Makela for The New York Times

The records surfaced in a Pennsylvania lawsuit. Former Susquehanna contractors accuse the firm of taking cutting-edge search technology to ByteDance without compensating them. Susquehanna denies the accusations, saying that ByteDance did not receive any technology from the real estate site. “These claims are without merit and we will defend ourselves vigorously,” a company spokesman said.

Relations Between China and the U.S.

• Rattling the Biotech Industry: A major Chinese firm that makes blockbuster drugs for the American market has come under scrutiny by Congress over national security concerns.
• Feeling Boxed In: President Biden’s effort to build U.S. security alliances in China’s backyard will likely reinforce the Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s view that Washington is leading a containment campaign of his country. And there is not much Xi can do about it.
• Yellen’s Visit: Despite a warm welcome on Janet Yellen’s second trip to China as Treasury secretary, it was evident that the level of trust between Washington and Beijing does not run deep. 
• Biden-Xi Call: Biden spoke with Xi in a call that was aimed at addressing a variety of combative and cooperative issues, as the United States grapples with wars and other global crises.

The records were unsealed this month. After The Times downloaded them and began asking questions, lawyers for Susquehanna said that the documents had been inadvertently made public. The judge resealed them on Tuesday.

Lawyers for both parties declined to comment. ByteDance, Mr. Yass and Mr. Zhang either did not answer questions or did not respond to messages seeking comment.

While the two sides dispute the origins of ByteDance’s technology, the documents make clear that the company itself emerged from 99Fang’s real estate efforts. “Our search, image processing, recommendation, etc. are very powerful,” Mr. Zhang wrote in a 2012 email, “but these things applied to real estate are very limited.”

Rather than match buyers with homes, Mr. Zhang laid out plans that year to match users with lighthearted content, developing prototype pages called Funny Pictures and Pretty Babes. He described the new project as a “brother enterprise” that would share technology with the real estate site.

Years later, a director for Susquehanna in China would write to a colleague that the housing site deal had led to “the birth of ByteDance.”

How It All Started

In 2005, Susquehanna created the Chinese subsidiary, SIG China, to invest in start-up companies.

One early investment was Kuxun, a portal that focused on job listings, housing advertisements and travel. Mr. Zhang, then in his early 20s, was the site’s technical director, and SIG China viewed him as a promising talent.

Our business reporters. Times journalists are not allowed to have any direct financial stake in companies they cover.

He left the company for a job with Microsoft. But in 2009, as SIG China prepared to spin off Kuxun’s real estate section into its own venture, the investment firm lured Mr. Zhang back and installed him as the chief executive of the new company, 99Fang.

“We have recruited the top engineer of the housing channel back to lead the technical team,” SIG China employees wrote in an internal memo.

But the relationship between Mr. Zhang and SIG China was complicated, records show.

He described himself as 99Fang’s founder but owned few shares, the documents say.

In 2011, Tim Gong, an SIG China managing director, vented about Mr. Zhang amid an apparent dispute over shares. “Kuxun and 99Fang were both NOT founded by him,” Mr. Gong wrote to a colleague. The full context is not clear, but he ends the message by seeming to suggest parting ways with Mr. Zhang: “We shall let him go.”

Image

Zhang Yiming in California in 2020.Credit...Shannon Stapleton/Reuters

By 2012, real estate no longer excited Mr. Zhang. After studying the life of Apple founder Steve Jobs, he said in an email to SIG China, he realized that he needed a career change. Social media opportunities were sprouting up as people bought cellphones. He suggested that 99Fang’s search technology needed a different purpose.

The degree to which Susquehanna steered Mr. Zhang’s career over the course of years has never been part of the ByteDance story. In a Chinese-language blog post, Joan Wang, an SIG employee, has written about meeting Mr. Zhang at a coffee shop to discuss what would become ByteDance. He mapped it out on a napkin, she wrote.

Internally, in an investment memo, she wrote that Mr. Zhang sought Susquehanna’s “understanding and permission” to leave 99Fang and create a new company.

‘Pretty Babes’ and a Big Gamble

Pivots in focus are common in venture investing. Less common is a change as dramatic as shifting from real estate to social media. The most successful start-ups — Facebook, WhatsApp, Alibaba — evolved in scope but not drastically in purpose.

By March 2012, court documents show, the nascent project had a new name: Xiangping, which roughly translates to “share comments.”

Mr. Zhang created a prototype app, Pretty Babes, that users seemed to enjoy, the memo read. Fragments of Xiangping’s early existence survive in archived form on the internet.

In the investment memo, Ms. Wang wrote that by selecting content for users, Xiangping could engineer virality and increase “stickiness.” Rather than have users search for what they wanted, in other words, the new company would select it for them.

“Social network technology will be used to track user behavior, predict user interest, and build relevancy and recommendation engine,” the memo reads.

ByteDance’s technology has evolved, but TikTok still delivers videos that users want to see and share. That curation is at the heart of the effort to ban TikTok. Some lawmakers fear having such a powerful algorithm in the hands of a company with Chinese ownership.

In 2012, SIG China valued the start-up at about $9 million and invested a little over $2 million. Its lawyers said in court documents that it had since “contributed hundreds of millions in further investments.”

From there, the company’s story is well known. It rebranded itself as ByteDance and bought the lip sync app Musical.ly, which it used as the foundation for TikTok. By 2018, ByteDance had become one of the world’s most valuable private technology companies.

Susquehanna’s bet on an unproven founder is not rare. What’s unique about ByteDance is that it paid off so well.

“Part of it is they saw something,” said Steven Kaplan, who researches private equity and venture capital at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. “Part of it is they got lucky.”

What’s Next?

The Pennsylvania court case may ultimately go before a jury, but no trial date has been set.

The House passed a bill in March that could force the sale of TikTok, and a Senate vote could come as soon as next week.

Image

Representative Mike Gallagher, a lawmaker who supports the TikTok bill, on Capitol Hill in March.Credit...Kent Nishimura for The New York Times

In addition to his campaign donations, Mr. Yass has funded a major advocacy drive through the libertarian Club for Growth to prevent the banning of TikTok. That has shown mixed results so far, as many House members backed by the group voted for a ban.

As with many pieces of legislation, former President Donald J. Trump is a wild card in the bill’s passage. As president, he tried to force a sale of TikTok. But he has since reversed his stance. He has also acknowledged meeting briefly with Mr. Yass but said that they never discussed TikTok.

Liu Yi contributed reporting, and Kitty Bennett contributed research.

Mara Hvistendahl is an investigative reporter for The Times focused on Asia. More about Mara Hvistendahl

Lauren Hirsch joined The Times from CNBC in 2020, covering deals and the biggest stories on Wall Street. More about Lauren Hirsch

15. Inside Amazon’s Secret Operation to Gather Intel on Rivals

​Espionage. Industrial espionage.

Inside Amazon’s Secret Operation to Gather Intel on Rivals

Staff went undercover on Walmart, eBay and other marketplaces as a third-party seller called ‘Big River.’ The mission: to scoop up information on pricing, logistics and other business practices.

https://www.wsj.com/business/retail/amazon-secret-operation-intel-rivals-eb82ea3c?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Dana MattioliFollow

 and Sarah NassauerFollow

 | Photographs by Grant Hindsley for The Wall Street Journal

Updated April 17, 2024 9:33 pm ET

For nearly a decade, workers in a warehouse in Seattle’s Denny Triangle neighborhood have shipped boxes of shoes, beach chairs, Marvel T-shirts and other items to online retail customers across the U.S. 

The operation, called Big River Services International, sells around $1 million a year of goods through e-commerce marketplaces including eBay, Shopify, Walmart and Amazon AMZN -1.11%decrease; red down pointing triangle.com under brand names such as Rapid Cascade and Svea Bliss. “We are entrepreneurs, thinkers, marketers and creators,” Big River says on its website. “We have a passion for customers and aren’t afraid to experiment.”

What the website doesn’t say is that Big River is an arm of Amazon that surreptitiously gathers intelligence on the tech giant’s competitors.

Born out of a 2015 plan code named “Project Curiosity,” Big River uses its sales across multiple countries to obtain pricing data, logistics information and other details about rival e-commerce marketplaces, logistics operations and payments services, according to people familiar with Big River and corporate documents viewed by The Wall Street Journal. The team then shared that information with Amazon to incorporate into decisions about its own business. 

Amazon is the largest U.S. e-commerce company, accounting for nearly 40% of all online goods sold in the U.S., according to research firm eMarketer. It often says that it pays little attention to competitors, instead focusing all its energies on being “customer obsessed.” It is currently battling antitrust charges brought last year by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and 17 states, which accused Amazon of a range of behavior that harms sellers on its marketplace, including using anti-discounting measures that punished merchants for offering lower prices elsewhere. 

Workers filled orders at an Amazon fulfillment center in Garner, N.C., in 2021. PHOTO: JEREMY M. LANGE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The story of Big River offers new insight into Amazon’s elaborate efforts to stay ahead of rivals. Team members attended their rivals’ seller conferences and met with competitors identifying themselves only as employees of Big River Services, instead of disclosing that they worked for Amazon. 

They were given non-Amazon email addresses to use externally—in emails with people at Amazon, they used Amazon email addresses—and took other extraordinary measures to keep the project secret. They disseminated their reports to Amazon executives using printed, numbered copies rather than email. Those who worked on the project weren’t even supposed to discuss the relationship internally with most teams at Amazon. 

An internal crisis-management paper gave advice on what to say if discovered. The response to questions should be: “We make a variety of products available to customers through a number of subsidiaries and online channels.” In conversations, in the event of a leak they were told to focus on the group being formed to improve the seller experience on Amazon, and say that such research is normal, according to people familiar with the discussions.

Senior Amazon executives, including Doug Herrington, Amazon’s current CEO of Worldwide Amazon Stores, were regularly briefed on the Project Curiosity team’s work, according to one of the people familiar with Big River. 

Some aspects were more Maxwell Smart than James Bond. The Big River website contains a glaring typo, and a so-called Japanese streetwear brand that the team concocted lists a Seattle address on its contacts page. Big River’s team members list Amazon as their employer on LinkedIn—potentially blowing their cover. 

The LinkedIn page of Max Kless, a former eBay executive who led Big River in Germany before moving to a senior role on the team in the U.S., says that he “developed and led a research subsidiary for Amazon in Germany that prototyped and researched new experiences for Small Business sellers and developers.” Kless didn’t respond to requests for comment.

“Benchmarking is a common practice in business. Amazon, like many other retailers, has benchmarking and customer experience teams that conduct research into the experiences of customers, including our selling partners, in order to improve their experiences working with us,” an Amazon spokeswoman said. Amazon believes its rivals also carry out research on Amazon by selling on Amazon’s site, she said.

Big River’s website says it sells on Amazon’s marketplace but doesn’t mention anywhere that it is part of Amazon. It also misspells Seattle.

Focus on Walmart

Virtually all companies research their competitors, reading public documents for information, buying their products or shopping their stores. Lawyers say there is a difference between such corporate intelligence gathering of publicly available information, and what is known as corporate or industrial espionage. 

Companies can get into legal trouble for actions such as hiring a rival’s former employee to obtain trade secrets or hacking a rival. Misrepresenting themselves to competitors to gain proprietary information can lead to suits on trade secret misappropriation, said Elizabeth Rowe, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law who specializes in trade secret law. 

Amazon for years has had what it calls a benchmarking team that sizes up rivals to ensure the best experience for people who shop on its site. The team has placed orders on websites such as Walmart.com for delivery around the U.S. to test things such as how long it takes competitors to ship. Other companies also have teams to compare themselves to rivals.

In late 2015, Amazon’s benchmarking team proposed a different sort of project. The business of hosting other merchants to sell their products on Amazon’s platform was becoming increasingly important. So-called third-party sellers on Amazon’s Marketplace, which the company started in 2000, surpassed half of the company’s total merchandise sales that year, and rival retailers had started similar marketplaces.

Amazon wanted to better understand and improve the experiences of those outside vendors. The team decided to create some brands to sell on Amazon to see what the pain points were for sellers—and to sell items on rival marketplaces to compare the experiences, according to the people familiar with the effort.

The benchmarking team pitched “Project Curiosity” to senior management and got the approval to buy inventory, use a shell company and find warehouses in the U.S., Germany, England, India and Japan so they could pose as sellers on competitors’ websites. 

The benchmarking team reported into the chief financial officer, Brian Olsavsky, for years, but this year changed to report to Herrington, the consumer chief. Olsavsky and Herrington didn’t respond to requests for comment made through Amazon. 

Once launched, the focus of the project quickly started shifting to gathering information about rivals, the people said. 

The operation, code named ‘Project Curiosity,’ was used to learn about rivals’ marketplaces and logistics operations.

In the U.S., the Big River team started by scooping up merchandise from Seattle retailers holding “going out of business” sales. Some of its first products were Saucony sneakers from a local retailer that was closing. The company registered for a licensing agreement with the popular Marvel superhero franchise to sell Marvel-branded items, and bought items including Tommy Bahama beach chairs from Costco to resell.

In the pitch, Project Curiosity leaders identified online marketplaces that they wanted to sell on, including Best Buy and Overstock. 

The top goal was Walmart, Amazon’s biggest rival. But Walmart had a high bar for sellers on its marketplace, accepting only vendors who sold large volumes on other marketplaces first. Big River initially couldn’t qualify to be a Walmart Marketplace seller, but it did sell on Jet.com, which Walmart acquired in 2016 and later closed in 2020. And in India, it sold on Flipkart, the giant Indian e-commerce marketplace in which Walmart owned a majority stake. 

In order to meet Walmart’s revenue threshold, the Big River team focused on pumping products through Amazon.com to bolster its overall revenue, some of the people said. Big River’s goal wasn’t to do massive amounts of volume on the competing platforms, but to simply get on them and gain access, they said. 

The Amazon spokeswoman said that in 2023, 69% of Big River revenue worldwide was on Amazon.com.

In 2019, Big River finally got onto Walmart’s website. This month, Big River had around 15 products listed on Walmart.com under the seller name Atlantic Lot, including Tommy Bahama beach chairs, cooking woks and industrial-size food containers. In 2023, Big River had more than $125,000 in revenue on Walmart.com alone, according to a person familiar with the matter. 

Walmart wasn’t aware that Amazon ran the seller accounts on the Walmart and Flipkart sites before the Journal told it, according to a person familiar with the matter. 

Walmart labeled Atlantic Lot, a seller created by Big River, as a pro seller, a distinction for top performers. The website shows that Atlantic Lot uses Walmart’s fulfillment services.

Rivals’ logistics services

Atlantic Lot is listed as a “Pro Seller”—a distinction Walmart says is for “top-performing Walmart Marketplace sellers.” Listings show that Walmart Logistics, another Amazon rival, handles storage and shipping for it.

Amazon at the time also was building up its logistics business to store and ship items for sellers for a fee to compete with FedEx and United Parcel Service. The business has boomed over the past decade. Amazon’s total revenue from what it calls third-party seller services has grown nearly twelvefold since 2014 to $140 billion last year, accounting for nearly a quarter of Amazon’s total.

To get information about rival logistics services, the Big River team stored inventory with companies including FedEx. Other targets, according to an internal document, included UPS, DHL, Deliverr and German logistics company Linther Spedition. 

FedEx in 2017 launched FedEx Fulfillment, a competitor to Fulfillment by Amazon, for offering logistics to sellers. Big River was accepted into the FedEx Fulfillment program as an early customer, and the team received early details about pricing, rate cards and other terms as a result of the partnership, according to the people. FedEx had several phone calls and email exchanges with Big River team members who represented themselves as Big River employees and didn’t disclose their employment at Amazon, according to some of the people. 

The team presented its findings from being part of the FedEx program to senior Amazon logistics leaders. They used the code name “OnTime Inc.” to refer to FedEx. Amazon made changes to its Fulfillment by Amazon service to make it more competitive with FedEx’s new product as a result of the information it learned from the partnership, according to one of the people.   

For such meetings, the team avoided distributing presentations electronically to Amazon executives. Instead, they printed the presentations and numbered the documents. Executives could look at the reports and take notes, but at the end of the meeting, team members collected the papers to ensure that they had all copies, the people said. 

Big River became a customer of FedEx’s fulfillment program, a competitor to Fulfillment by Amazon. Above, a FedEx facility in Queens, New York. PHOTO: GABBY JONES FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Amazon took other measures to hide the connection with Big River. Staffers were instructed to use their second, non-Amazon email address—which had the domain @bigriverintl.com—when emailing other platforms to avoid outing their Amazon employment. 

“We were encouraged to work off the grid as much as possible,” said one of the former team members, about using the outside email. 

Amazon’s internal lawyers reminded Big River team members not to disclose their connection to Amazon in their conversations with FedEx, according to an email viewed by the Journal. 

Staffers, who worked in private areas of Amazon offices, were told not to discuss their work with other Amazon employees who weren’t cleared to know about the project. In the early days, some Big River team members had to take time away from their Amazon desk jobs to go to the warehouses to fulfill orders and pack them in boxes to send out. 

When gaining access to rival seller systems, Big River members were instructed to take screenshots of competitor pricing, ad systems, cataloging and listing pages, according to the people. They weren’t allowed to email the screenshots to Amazon employees, but instead showed the screenshots to the Amazon employees on the Marketplace side of the business in person so they didn’t create a paper trail, some of the people said. Amazon then made changes it believed improved the seller experience on its site based on the information. 

The Amazon spokeswoman said the team was secretive so that it wouldn’t get any special treatment as a seller on Amazon.com. 

Still, there were telltales. Registration documents filed with the Washington Office of the Secretary of State for Big River Services, while not mentioning Amazon, list a management team made up of current and former Amazon employees, including lawyers. The management team lists its address as 410 Terry Ave. in Seattle, which is Amazon’s headquarters. 

Corporate filings for Big River in the United Kingdom and other foreign countries also named officials who are senior Amazon employees and lawyers. In one U.K. disclosure, Amazon is named as owning more than 75% of the company. 

Amazon officials felt confident that competitors wouldn’t look up filings to see who was behind the company, some of the people said. 

Workers on the Big River project made efforts to keep the relationship with Amazon secret. Above, the Seattle headquarters.

A Las Vegas conference

Some team members were uncomfortable with the work they were doing, according to some of the people.

Among the anxiety-inducing activities was representing themselves as employees of Big River in person while attending conferences thrown by rivals. For instance, team members attended eBay’s Las Vegas conference for sellers, according to some of the people. EBay describes the event as a way for sellers to meet with eBay management and learn of planned big changes coming for sellers and “exclusive information.” 

Benchmarking-team leadership ordered up what Amazon calls a PRFAQ that would outline what to do if competitors or the press discovered the project. In the event of a leak, leadership was to say that the group was formed to improve the seller experience on Amazon.com, and that Amazon pays attention to competition but doesn’t “obsess” over it. They were also told to act like this was normal business behavior in the event of a leak, according to one of the people. 

In 2017, Amazon formally changed the name of Project Curiosity to the Small Business Insights team to make it sound less cryptic, some of the people said.

The Big River team invented its own brands to sell on the competing sites, including “Torque Challenge” and “Crimson Knot.” 

Teams often changed the brand name once they sold out its inventory, creating new brands when they received new products. 

In India, Amazon gained access to e-commerce giant Flipkart in March 2018 with the Crimson Knot brand, around the time rumors of a Walmart acquisition swirled in local media. Walmart bought a majority stake in Flipkart in May of that year.

Crimson Knot makes wooden home goods, with its website’s “About Us” page saying: “Based in a small wood workshop in Bangalore, our dedicated team of 8 skilled craftsmen work consistently to handcraft each piece from scratch, transforming them into stunning showstoppers.” 

Crimson Knot still lists products on Flipkart and stores them with Flipkart’s logistics services. 

16. China lobbies Congress behind closed doors on TikTok, staffers say

This excerpt is a key point:

“For once, Chinese diplomats have done America a favor,” said Sobolik, the author of a book on U.S.-China relations called “Countering China’s Great Game.” “By lobbying congressional staff to protect TikTok’s relationship with ByteDance, [People’s Republic of China] officials are revealing how valuable TikTok is to the Chinese Communist Party. Losing control of the app would neuter Beijing’s most potent weapon against Americans.”

​Chinese strategy depends on leading with influence which is the essence of its three warfares (psychological warfare, media or public opinion warfare, and legal warfare or lawfare.

China lobbies Congress behind closed doors on TikTok, staffers say

By HAILEY FUCHS

04/17/2024 03:08 PM EDT

Politico

After a bill that would force the sale of the company passed the House, diplomats from the Chinese Embassy met with Hill offices to push talking points defending the app.

The social media platform TikTok has been the subject of legislation in Congress that could force its sale from its Beijing-based parent company, ByteDance. | Loic Venance/AFP via Getty Images

04/17/2024 03:08 PM EDT

The Chinese Embassy has held meetings with congressional staff to lobby against the legislation that would force a sale of TikTok, according to two of the Capitol Hill staffers.

TikTok, which is owned by the Beijing-based company ByteDance, has repeatedly denied a relationship with the Chinese government and sought to distance itself from its Chinese origins. But now, with the fate of legislation to force the sale of the company facing an uncertain path forward in the Senate, the Chinese Embassy appears to be leveraging its political weight to protect the company’s future in the United States.

The meetings with Hill staff were initiated by the Chinese Embassy in outreach that did not initially mention TikTok, according to the congressional staffers, one of whom worked for the House and the other for the Senate, and who were granted anonymity to discuss conversations that they were not authorized to reveal publicly. The meetings, which took place with Chinese diplomats, were held after the House in March overwhelmingly voted in favor of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, the legislation that would force ByteDance to sell TikTok.

Additionally, in a separate phone call to set up a meeting, an embassy official said that the Chinese ambassador was interested in discussing, among other matters, the House’s TikTok bill, according to a third staffer, a Democratic Senate aide who was approached.

The embassy downplayed the national security concerns with TikTok in both meetings, the two staffers said, and sought to align the app with American interests: In one meeting, the embassy said a ban on TikTok would harm U.S. investors who hold some ownership in ByteDance. In the other, the embassy emphasized that not all ByteDance board members were Chinese nationals.

The embassy also sought to claim the company as Chinese, the staffers said, despite TikTok’s public efforts to distance itself from the origin of its founders. TikTok, unlike ByteDance, is based in Singapore and the United States. In one of the meetings, the embassy argued that the legislation amounted to a forced data transfer of a Chinese company, according to the House staffer. In the other, the embassy argued that the effort was not fair to a Chinese company because the U.S. would not treat a company with a different national origin the same way, according to the Senate staffer.

TikTok said in a statement that the embassy meetings were “news to us, and it’s absurd to ask us to comment on anonymous sources we know nothing about.”

“Since the bill’s introduction, we’ve been publicly vocal about why we oppose the ban bill,” said Alex Haurek, a TikTok spokesperson. “This so-called reporting doesn’t pass the smell test and it’s irresponsible for Politico to print it.”

The Chinese Embassy, however, did not deny having held the meetings. In a statement, embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu said that the “Chinese Embassy in the US tries to tell the truth about the TikTok issue to people from all walks of life in the US.”

“This is not about lobbying for a single company,” the spokesperson added, “but about whether all Chinese companies can be treated fairly.”

The statement went on to repeat some of the arguments that staffers said had been made at the meetings, including pushing back on national security concerns, and emphasizing international investment in ByteDance.

The statement also emphasized that although TikTok’s operation is legal, the United States “has tried every means to use state power to suppress it.”

TikTok has armed itself with dozens of lobbyists and spent millions of dollars to push back on the narrative around the company in Washington, where the app’s opponents have repeatedly argued that it’s a powerful tool for China to influence sentiment in the United States. The company has also spent millions on advertisements to rally public support against the legislation and leveraged its consumer base via push alerts that allowed the app’s users to easily call Congress. The conservative Club for Growth, the political kingmaking group funded in part by major ByteDance investor Jeff Yass, has also pushed lawmakers on the bill.

The broad efforts to sway congressional offices may ultimately prove successful, as the Senate remains at an impasse. Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), chair of the Senate Commerce Committee, has been negotiating with other offices about the bill’s language, as part of an effort to solidify its legal standing. The House bill’s champion, Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chair of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, will leave the House this month. The forced sale of TikTok is expected to be included in a series of bills released by the House Speaker Mike Johnson on Wednesday around foreign aid and foreign adversaries.

Lobbying from diplomats is largely shrouded from public view, as they are not usually covered by the rules on transparency into foreign efforts to influence U.S. politics. The Foreign Agents Registration Act includes provisions that expressly exempt some embassy officials, said David Laufman, who previously oversaw enforcement of the foreign influence law at the Department of Justice.

“If there were other parties assisting them, like U.S. lobbying firms or strategic communications firms crafting message and preparing talking points, things like that, [those parties] might have registration risk,” said Laufman. “Embassy officials here would not.”

One of those staffers who attended the meetings with Chinese officials noted that the embassy had also previously tried to fight U.S. actions against another Chinese technology company, Huawei.

Publicly, China has also been critical of Congress’ actions on TikTok. In the wake of the House bill’s passage, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the legislation “puts the US on the wrong side of the principles of fair competition and international trade rules.”

Michael Sobolik, senior fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council, argued that the revelations of the embassy’s lobbying campaign underscored the need to separate TikTok from its Chinese parent.

“For once, Chinese diplomats have done America a favor,” said Sobolik, the author of a book on U.S.-China relations called “Countering China’s Great Game.” “By lobbying congressional staff to protect TikTok’s relationship with ByteDance, [People’s Republic of China] officials are revealing how valuable TikTok is to the Chinese Communist Party. Losing control of the app would neuter Beijing’s most potent weapon against Americans.”

POLITICO

Politico

17. How America Can Prevent War Between Iran and Israel

Maybe the better question is how can we help protect and defend Israel and help defeat Iran?

Excerpts:

A full-force effort by Biden to pause the war could well succeed. When Biden has utilized U.S. leverage with Israel, as he did recently after an Israeli strike killed aid workers, he has achieved real progress. If the president redoubled his efforts, it could enable an infusion of food and other desperately needed relief to Palestinians and create space to hold talks aimed at stabilizing tensions with Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border. Doing so will begin to limit Iran’s room for maneuver. Biden should also press Israel to calibrate any retaliation to avoid precipitating further Iranian escalation. Israel can then again work toward deepening its security cooperation with its neighbors—which, as April 14 showed, is critical to the state’s safety.

None of these steps will conclusively eliminate the threat posed by the Iranian regime to its neighbors, including Israel, and to the world. Ultimately, the fate of that regime remains in the hands of the Iranian people. But Washington can help deter Tehran and address the instability that gives the Islamic Republic such dangerous opportunities. Even a cold-blooded cost-benefit analysis justifies an investment, once again, of American blood, treasure, and leadership attention. Like Beijing and Moscow (and often in concert with them), Tehran is seeking to reshape the regional order to its advantage. Only the United States can lead an effort to ensure that it does not prevail.

How America Can Prevent War Between Iran and Israel

Threaten Tehran, Pressure Netanyahu

By Suzanne Maloney

April 18, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Suzanne Maloney · April 18, 2024

In the immediate aftermath of Tehran’s spectacular, but almost entirely thwarted, attack on Israel, it appeared that the Middle East had dodged a bullet. Iran’s barrage of more than 300 drones and missiles enables its leadership to claim vengeance for Israel’s April 1 assassination of seven senior Revolutionary Guards commanders. Israelis, meanwhile, can revel in the extraordinary operational success of the country’s sophisticated air defense systems, reinforced by an impressive array of wingmen from the American, British, French, and Jordanian militaries, who helped ensure that Iran did not hit a single Israeli target.

Washington is certainly hoping that there will now be a lull in the Iranian-Israeli conflict. Six months of grueling war and dire humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip have strained U.S. domestic politics and decision-makers’ bandwidth, and so Washington has little appetite to address another crisis. That is why, in the wake of the failed strikes, U.S. President Joe Biden urged the Israelis to “take the win” and “slow things down and think through” any reprisal that might precipitate a wider war in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, Biden’s prudence is not shared by his counterparts in Jerusalem and Tehran. Especially after the October 7 Hamas massacres, Iran’s unprecedented strike on Israeli territory has transformed the confrontation from one taking place mainly in the shadows to an imminent existential peril. As a result, any initial restraint could prove fleeting.

A wider conflict would have a cascade of devastating implications for the region and the world. It would exacerbate violence and displacement across the region, torpedo progress toward Arab-Israeli normalization, generate significant economic disruptions with far-reaching effects. Staving off such a disaster will require that Washington use its unmatched diplomatic and military resources in ways that it has hesitated to deploy so far. It must both push for a pause to the fighting in Gaza—which would deprive Iran of reasons to keep attacking Israel—and seriously threaten Tehran to deter it from further retaliation. Washington may not be happy about taking these measures, but it has no choice. Only the Biden administration, beleaguered as it may be, can head off a catastrophic escalation.

IN THE SHADOWS

Iran has engaged in armed confrontation with Israel for more than 40 years. But it has done so indirectly and covertly. As I laid out in a recent Foreign Affairs essay (“Iran’s Order of Chaos”), Tehran has invested in and relied on proxy militia groups, which expand the regime’s influence while still insulating its leaders from risk. Iran, for example, collaborated with Hezbollah in 1992 to carry out a bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 22 people, but Iranian forces did not take part in the attack itself. In recent years, Tehran has funded, trained, and sent advanced weaponry (and knowledge about how to produce it) to a panoply of terrorist organizations that have killed Israelis at home and around the world, including Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias Iraq and Syria militias, as well as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Yet until last week, its own troops never struck Israel or Israelis.

Over time, the violence became a two-way street, with Israel mounting increasingly inventive efforts to preempt and retaliate against aggression from Iran and its proxies. Analysts, officials, and news organizations believe that Israel is responsible for the assassinations of at least six Iranian nuclear scientists (building on its long history of covertly killing terrorists). This includes the architect of Iran’s nuclear program, who was killed in an extraordinary 2020 operation involving a remote-controlled weapon. Israel has also conducted acts of sabotage and cyberattacks to slow Iran’s nuclear advancement. It even absconded with the official archives of Iran’s nuclear program. But Israel has never acknowledged its part in any of these measures. The country has been more open about its long-term military campaign to degrade and disrupt Iranian capabilities in Syria, including its airstrikes on Iranian weapons shipments and military positions. Yet Israel has never overtly attacked Iranian territory, either.

The bloodshed, in other words, had a clearly defined limit. Both states observed an unstated injunction against any frontal assault on their respective home turfs, which would threaten to turn their simmering conflict into an all-out war that could engulf the broader region. Such a war would precipitate even greater dangers: for Israel, an Iranian nuclear weapon, for Tehran, U.S. military intervention. Multiple Israeli leaders have mulled taking military action against Iran’s steadily expanding nuclear infrastructure, as they did with Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, but they ultimately deferred in favor of other tools. Meanwhile, Tehran’s experience during its devastating eight-year war with Iraq conditioned a hard-won realism about the prospects of easy victory in a battle against an adversary with superior power. As a result, the regime’s wily strategists understood that their advantage lied in using asymmetric capabilities, including their proxies.

WISHFUL THINKING

To some observers, Iran’s attack is just a blip in this long-running pattern. In this interpretation, the strikes may have been merely symbolic or signaling. Tehran’s heavy-handed efforts to preview its plans for neighboring governments were intended to ensure that its slow-moving drones would be neutralized en route and that the overall impact of the strike would be negligible. After all, early analysis showed that only five of the 120 ballistic missiles fired from Iran actually crossed into Israeli territory, and that none of the 170 drones or 30 cruise missiles did. Iranian officials also issued a statement declaring an end to the clash before it was even over.

This rationalization is reasonable in the wake of Iran’s dramatic failure, but it does not hold up to scrutiny. Having held back for more than four decades, Tehran must have appreciated the implications of its decision to defy one of the few taboos in the enduring conflict with Israel. It also understood the copious alternatives available to them to even the score, including attacking via proxy forces.

An intentionally ineffectual Iranian attack would also hardly serve as a compelling deterrent. The failure to hit a single target might persuade Tehran’s adversaries that the regime is a paper tiger. Instead, the scale, scope, and complexity of the strikes was so considerable—larger than Russia’s biggest aerial assaults on Ukraine—that they seem to have had a greater aim: overwhelming Israel’s vaunted aerial defense systems. On that basis, Iranian leaders had to anticipate at least some Israeli casualties. From experience, they would understand that this would precipitate reprisal attacks. And yet they went forward nonetheless, in defiance of specific admonitions from Biden.

Iran’s readiness to escalate betrays a shift that has taken place gradually over the past decade, as Iran’s original generation of revolutionary leaders has given way to a narrower and more hard-line faction. The pragmatic self-interest that drove historic compromises by previous Iranian leaders, evident in former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s push to end the war with Iraq in 1988 and former President Hassan Rouhani’s determination to achieve a nuclear truce, has dissipated. Instead, foreign policy decisions are increasingly in the hands of battle-hardened veterans of Iran’s regional adventures. The result is a new assertiveness, even recklessness, underpinned by an affinity with China and Russia that has displaced any interest in rehabilitating its relationships with the West. As a result, the regime may be inclined to attack Israel again in an effort to compensate for the embarrassing result of its most recent performance.

PRIMED TO FIGHT

Iran is not alone in being pushed toward escalation. Tehran’s attack ups the ante for an Israeli leadership that is already primed for action, as a result of past precedent and Israeli security doctrine. The country’s small size, its unique place as the homeland for the Jewish people, and the weight of historical memory have inspired a commitment to military self-reliance as well as a determination to ensure no adversary can act on threats to Israel’s existence. The government is also under substantial pressure to respond given its failure to foresee or mount an effective initial defense against Hamas’s shock attack. The country is still reeling from the terror and trauma of October 7, as well as the continued hostage crisis, and so few of its citizens are in the mood to hold back.

There are, of course, contradictory precedents, such as the 1991 missile attacks by Saddam Hussein—which Israel ultimately left unanswered. There are also countervailing pressures. The Iranian attacks have reinvigorated strong public solidarity with Israel in Europe. They pushed Israel’s regional partners, which have deplored the humanitarian crisis created by Israel’s Gaza campaign, to participate in its defense. If Israel responded, it might lose this goodwill. A show of restraint, by contrast, could bear fruit. It might help Israel build a robust strategic coalition and restore some momentum to its pre–October 7 plans to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia. Perhaps that is why Benny Gantz, a centrist politician who is a member of the country’s war cabinet, has demurred on the question of whether Israel should retaliate and advocated for using this opportunity to strike new deals with Arab states.

But the country’s all-out war in Gaza leaves no doubt about its leadership’s determination to eliminate its adversaries at almost any price. Casualties or not, the specter of future Iranian drone and missile barrages will harden Israel’s desire to degrade or eliminate the threat posed by Iran, its proxies, and its nuclear program. Those attacks may not come immediately or in the following weeks and months. But the baseline of Israeli-Iranian antagonism will remain elevated, the threshold for escalation lower, and the odds of miscalculation harrowingly high.

AMERICA’S CONUNDRUM

This new normal is especially unwelcome for the Biden administration. Since taking office, the president has tried hard to extricate the United States from the Middle East’s conflicts. He has worked to complete Washington’s long attempted pivot to Asia, and he has focused heavily on helping Ukraine defend itself from Russia’s invasion. He rushed to Israel’s defense after October 7, but the White House has pushed hard for an end to the war in Gaza over the last several months. Biden certainly does not want to have to contend with even more turmoil in the region, especially in the midst of a fraught U.S. election where the politics of Middle East policy have featured in dramatic ways.

But even for an administration prepared to ruthlessly prioritize American national security interests, a spiraling Iranian-Israeli conflict creates too many severe human, strategic, and economic risks to ignore. Like it or not, Washington is going to have embrace the thankless task of stabilizing the Middle East through energetic diplomacy and by projecting power.

Biden can start by amplifying his warning to Tehran and making clear that future attempts to attack Israel will be met with U.S. reprisals. He should make clear that Washington will respond to attacks on its partners and build on the success of foiling Iran’s strikes to deepen regional security integration. In addition, Biden should invest the copious political capital he has accumulated with Israel since October 7 to meaningfully shift the country’s approach to the war in Gaza away from indifference, or worse, toward the lives and futures of Palestinian civilians. Instead, Israeli leaders must develop a strategy that is designed not just to eradicate Hamas but to ensure good governance and security in the aftermath. It is time for Israel and the United States to recognize that the humanitarian crisis and governance vacuum in the enclave undermines Israel’s legitimate effort to remove Hamas from power and that the crisis provides an opening for Tehran.

A full-force effort by Biden to pause the war could well succeed. When Biden has utilized U.S. leverage with Israel, as he did recently after an Israeli strike killed aid workers, he has achieved real progress. If the president redoubled his efforts, it could enable an infusion of food and other desperately needed relief to Palestinians and create space to hold talks aimed at stabilizing tensions with Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border. Doing so will begin to limit Iran’s room for maneuver. Biden should also press Israel to calibrate any retaliation to avoid precipitating further Iranian escalation. Israel can then again work toward deepening its security cooperation with its neighbors—which, as April 14 showed, is critical to the state’s safety.

None of these steps will conclusively eliminate the threat posed by the Iranian regime to its neighbors, including Israel, and to the world. Ultimately, the fate of that regime remains in the hands of the Iranian people. But Washington can help deter Tehran and address the instability that gives the Islamic Republic such dangerous opportunities. Even a cold-blooded cost-benefit analysis justifies an investment, once again, of American blood, treasure, and leadership attention. Like Beijing and Moscow (and often in concert with them), Tehran is seeking to reshape the regional order to its advantage. Only the United States can lead an effort to ensure that it does not prevail.

• SUZANNE MALONEY is Vice President of the Brookings Institution and Director of its Foreign Policy program.

Foreign Affairs · by Suzanne Maloney · April 18, 2024

18. NPR editor Uri Berliner resigns after accusing network of bias

It seems the crux of the problem is the new NPR CEO Katherine Mayer.  

Here is FOX News view on her: https://www.foxnews.com/media/new-npr-ceos-social-media-posts-show-progressive-views-support-clinton-biden

NPR editor Uri Berliner resigns after accusing network of bias

The public radio network is being targeted by conservative activists over the editor’s essay, which many staffers say is misleading and inaccurate

By Elahe Izadi

Updated April 17, 2024 at 5:05 p.m. EDT|Published April 17, 2024 at 12:53 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Elahe Izadi · April 17, 2024

An NPR editor resigned Wednesday morning, eight days after publishing a lengthy essay accusing the network of journalistic malpractice for conforming to a politically liberal worldview at the expense of fairness and accuracy.

Senior business editor Uri Berliner’s resignation came after a week of blowback to his comments, published online April 9 in the Free Press, that prompted criticism of NPR’s new chief executive and has left the newsroom in turmoil.

Berliner submitted his resignation letter one day after he disclosed that the network had temporarily suspended him for not getting approval for doing work for other publications. NPR policy requires receiving written permission from supervisors “for all outside freelance and journalistic work," according to the employee handbook.

An NPR spokeswoman said Wednesday that the network does not comment on personnel matters. Berliner declined The Washington Post’s request for further comment.

In his resignation letter, Berliner called NPR “a great American institution where I have worked for 25 years,” and said that he doesn’t support calls to defund NPR. “I respect the integrity of my colleagues and wish for NPR to thrive and do important journalism,” he wrote in the letter posted on his X account. “But I cannot work in a newsroom where I am disparaged by a new CEO whose divisive views confirm the very problems I cite in my Free Press essay.”

My resignation letter to NPR CEO @krmaher pic.twitter.com/0hafVbcZAK

— Uri Berliner (@uberliner) April 17, 2024

Berliner’s 3,500-word essay, titled “I’ve Been at NPR for 25 Years. Here’s How We Lost America’s Trust,” seemed to confirm the worst suspicions held by NPR’s fiercest critics on the right: that the legendary media organization had an ideological, progressive agenda that dictates its journalism. And the Free Press is an online publication started by journalist Bari Weiss, whose own resignation from the New York Times in 2020 was used by conservative politicians as evidence that the Times stifled views to the right; Weiss accused the Times of catering to a rigid, politically left-leaning worldview and not defending her against online “bullies” when she expressed views to the contrary. Berliner’s essay was accompanied by several glossy portraits and a nearly hour-long podcast interview with Weiss.

Conservative activist Christopher Rufo — who rose to fame for targeting “critical race theory,” and whose scrutiny of Harvard president Claudine Gay preceded her resignation — set his sights this week on NPR’s new CEO, Katherine Maher, surfacing old social-media posts she wrote before she joined the news organization. In one 2020 tweet, she referred to Trump as a “deranged racist.” Others posts show her wearing a Biden hat, or wistfully daydreaming about hanging out with Kamala Harris. Rufo has called for Maher’s resignation.

Maher, who started her job as NPR CEO last month, previously was the head of the Wikimedia Foundation, the nonprofit that operates the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. An NPR spokesperson said in a statement Tuesday that Maher “was not working in journalism at the time” of the social media posts; she was “exercising her first amendment right to express herself like any other American citizen,” and “the CEO is not involved in editorial decisions.”

In a statement, an NPR spokesperson described the outcry over Maher’s old posts as “a bad faith attack that follows an established playbook, as online actors with explicit agendas work to discredit independent news organizations. ... Spending time on these accusations is intended to detract from NPR’s mission of informing the American public and providing local information in communities around the country is more important than ever.”

Last week, Maher indirectly referenced Berliner’s essay in a note to staff that NPR also published online. “Asking a question about whether we’re living up to our mission should always be fair game: after all, journalism is nothing if not hard questions,” she wrote. “Questioning whether our people are serving our mission with integrity, based on little more than the recognition of their identity, is profoundly disrespectful, hurtful, and demeaning.”

Many NPR staff members — including prominent on-air personalities — took issue with Berliner’s essay, calling it an unfair depiction that lacked context or journalistic rigor, and didn’t seek comment from NPR for his many claims.

“Morning Edition” host Steve Inskeep, writing on his Substack on Tuesday, fact-checked or contextualized several of the arguments Berliner made. For instance: Berliner wrote that he once asked “why we keep using that word that many Hispanics hate — Latinx.” Inskeep said he searched 90 days of NPR’s content and found “Latinx” was used nine times — “usually by a guest” — compared to the nearly 400 times “Latina” and “Latino” were used.

“This article needed a better editor,” Inskeep wrote. “I don’t know who, if anyone, edited Uri’s story, but they let him publish an article that discredited itself. ... A careful read of the article shows many sweeping statements for which the writer is unable to offer evidence.”

“Morning Edition” host Leila Fadel told The Post: “Many feel this was a bad faith effort to undermine and endanger our reporters around the country and the world, rather than make us a stronger and more powerful news organization. "He wrote what I think was a factually inaccurate take on our work that was filled with omissions to back his arguments.”

In the piece, Berliner accuses NPR of mishandling three major stories: the allegations of the 2016 Trump campaign’s collusion with Russia, the origins of the coronavirus, and the authenticity and relevance of Hunter Biden’s laptop. Berliner’s critics note that he didn’t oversee coverage of these stories. They also say that his essay indirectly maligns employee affinity groups — he name-checks groups for Muslim, Jewish, queer and Black employees, which he wrote “reflect broader movement in the culture of people clustering together based on ideology or a characteristic at birth.” He also writes, without proper context, about the size of NPR’s newsroom — that NPR’s D.C. headquarters is politically homogenous because it employs 87 registered Democrats and zero Republicans.

Tony Cavin, NPR’s managing editor of standards and practices, told The Post that “I have no idea where he got that number,” that NPR’s newsroom has 660 employees, and that “I know a number of our hosts and staff are registered as independents.” That includes Inskeep, who, on his Substack, backed up Cavin’s assessment.

Berliner also wrote that, during the Trump administration, NPR “hitched our wagon” to top Trump antagonist Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) by interviewing him 25 times about Trump and Russia. Cavin told The Post NPR aired 900 interviews with lawmakers during the same period of time, “so that’s three percent. He’s a business reporter, he knows about statistics and it seems he’s selectively using statistics.”

“Weekend Edition” host Ayesha Rascoe told The Post that no individual or news organization is “above reproach,” but one should not “be able to tear down an entire organization’s work without any sort of response or context provided or pushback.” There are many legitimate critiques to make of NPR’s coverage, she added, “but the way this has been done — it’s to invalidate all the work NPR does.”

In an interview Tuesday with NPR’s David Folkenflik (whose work is also criticized in his essay), Berliner said he thinks Maher was not fit to run NPR. “We have great journalists here,” Berliner said to Folkenfilk. “If they shed their opinions and did the great journalism they’re capable of, this would be a much more interesting and fulfilling organization for our listeners.”

This story will be updated.

The Washington Post · by Elahe Izadi · April 17, 2024

19. Inside the changing world of drone warfare

Inside the changing world of drone warfare

What worked in the past won’t work in the future

BY JOSHUA SKOVLUND | PUBLISHED APR 16, 2024 4:35 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · April 16, 2024

The threat of small drones and how they are implemented has changed the way the military trains for war. Some drones are used as a reconnaissance platform for detecting troop movements, while others are rigged with hardware to drop grenades and mortars on enemy fighters.

Either way, small commercial drones will be a permanent fixture in modern warfare.

“Talk to any soldier in Ukraine,” said Brig. Gen. Guillaume Beaurpere, commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). “You don’t go anywhere without a drone flying either in support of you or against you.”

First-person view (FPV) drone footage and other videos have poured onto social media feeds since Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. The videos have put the horrors of war on center stage as Russians and Ukrainians have been stalked and killed by off-the-shelf, modified small drones.

“What we are seeing these things used as today is a lot of reactive adaptation of technology. So, in the war in Ukraine, we’re seeing both sides kind of adapting to the disruptive nature of this tech,” said Dylan Hamm, a former Navy SEAL who currently works for PDW, a defense contractor focused on drone technology. “They’re figuring out: ‘What, can I zip tie to this drone?’ ‘How can I get this kinetic payload delivered?’ And they’re just making it happen.”

Small drones have played a major role during the war in Ukraine. Hamm said there have been several instances of quadcopters being rigged up with an RPG-7 rocket, modified from a direct, shoulder-fired weapon to a “maneuverable shape charge” that creates a nightmare for armored vehicles.

“That’s kind of flipped all strategy up on its head because now what do you do? How do you counter that capability?” Hamm said. “How do you protect folks against it? And how do you employ that capability on your own side to the greatest effect?”

Small unmanned systems

Dylan Hamm spent 12 years in the Navy and deployed to locations around the world eight times. But it wasn’t until later in his career that he started seeing the use of small unmanned systems.

“As I got toward the end of my time — 2017 through 2020 — we really started to see kind of the disruptive nature of small unmanned systems. I mean, we’ve always had larger systems like ScanEagle that we had in [Operation Enduring Freedom], which was able to provide us route clearance […],” Hamm said. “But it wasn’t until the implementation of those really small quadcopters and things of that nature that we started to see how capable these systems were.”

Hamm dove head first into the technology and explored their capabilities to see how the technology could support the missions they were conducting.

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“That included design, fabrication, prototyping, configuration, tuning, deployment—all of it,” Hamm said. “So, with that, I kind of learned a good amount of that holistic process of product design, and I carried that with me as I transitioned out [of the Navy] in 2020.”

It wasn’t just the small off-the-shelf quadcopters that he was experimenting with and evaluating. He was testing unmanned, track-driven technologies as well. But, he found the small drones had a more agile and practical use for their missions.

“The small unmanned aerial systems have quite a bit more agility,” Hamm said. You can go up and over and around obstacles where the track ground vehicles are great. They have endurance, but they do have quite a bit of limitations in their ability to maneuver.”

Defense against small unmanned systems

There are several tactics employed throughout Ukraine to mitigate the risk of drone attacks, including weird-looking ‘guns’ that look like something straight out of a sci-fi movie.

Hamm thinks the technology is still in the early stages of development. The devices are fairly static and designed and developed to target certain frequency ranges or identify and target certain protocols, like a commercial DJI drone. The electromagnetic pulse weapon sends out DJI’s protocol command, forcing a drone to land or disarm.

“[the electromagnetic pulse weapons] lack a certain amount of agility. What we’re seeing overseas right now is really that cat-and-mouse game every week. Folks are innovating, changing the frequency bands they’re operating in, and changing the protocols they’re using,” Hamm said. “So, I think those systems are going to have to become more agile or just be iterated upon to continue to keep up with these changes.”

Hamm said tactics and fortifications are being changed to help ward off the threat of small unmanned drones. Nets are being implemented as a means to safely intercept a quadcopter, preventing it from delivering an impact-detonated munition.

Trench warfare is a major part of the war in Ukraine. The presence of drones changed the approach from tactics used during World War I and II.

“I don’t want a long linear trench if a quadcopter is going to come in at a long linear approach to deliver a kinetic payload,” Hamm said.

But with every change in tactics and every new technology implemented, there needs to be a comprehensive understanding of how to use it and how it can affect troops on the ground. For example, Hamm said jamming technology may be able to down a drone, but that could risk detonating the attached explosives when it hits the ground.

“I don’t know that there is a safe way in that implementation to down one of those drones without really risking those contacting each other and activating the device,” Hamm said.

Drone effects on military communication

In addition to jamming technology, cell phone towers and infrastructure emitting high energy levels can disrupt radio signals by disrupting operational frequencies.

PDW was recently awarded a $6.9 million contract from the U.S. Special Operations Forces Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (ATL) office for its jammer-proof radio technology, BlackWave. This helps ensure a reliable digital radio link in both intentional and unintentional jammed spaces. Due to the sensitive nature of that contract, Hamm was unable to elaborate on the new tech.

“I think it’s well suited for that particular conflict,” Hamm said. “They’re operating in trench warfare with artillery, and these systems are the disruptive tool they need to clear trenches and maneuver ground forces.”

Whether it’s different trench-clearing procedures or installing drone-stopping mesh over your armored vehicle, understanding the strengths and weaknesses of unmanned drones is a vital skill both Ukraine and the U.S. militaries are working to master.

“Everybody’s taking notes, adjusting tactics, figuring out how they can resource against it, and how they can potentially change unit structures to support these capabilities,” Hamm said. “Ukraine stood up an unmanned systems branch of their armed forces because they are fully invested in this capability.”

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20. A Confident Putin Has Many in Europe Frightened

A Confident Putin Has Many in Europe Frightened

thecipherbrief.com

Posted: April 17th, 2024

John E. McLaughlin is the Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July to September 2004 and as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from October 2000 to July 2004. He was a US Army Officer in the 1960s, with service in Vietnam.

OPINION — The dynamics of the Ukraine war are changing rapidly, with consequences that are profound and global. The battlefield is the most obvious area of change; it is now clear that Russia has learned enough from past errors to gain momentum and that Ukraine, which has gone without substantial U.S. aid for six months, is at much greater risk of defeat.

Ukraine has lowered the conscription age from 27 to 25, acknowledging a growing shortage of troops, but its most desperate needs are for artillery ammunition and air defense. The top U.S. commander in Europe estimates that Russia will have a 10-to-1 advantage in artillery shells “within weeks.” Meanwhile, Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot and other air defense systems is leaving major cities including Kharkiv and Odesa open to regular attack, including by Russian “glide’ bombs” that are particularly difficult to intercept. Against this backdrop, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said for the first time that Ukraine could “lose the war” if U.S. aid remains stalled.

A frightened continent

Beyond the battlefield, the change is less obvious but equally impactful.

The Europeans are scared — scared in a way they have not been since the darkest days of the Cold War and before the Berlin Wall came down in 1989.

In many European capitals, the question of what happens if Russia prevails in Ukraine is no longer a matter of debate. Russia’s persistence there and the disappointing result of last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive have convinced many European leaders that Putin will head for their countries next if he is not stopped in Ukraine.

This is felt most acutely in the “frontline states” – beginning with Poland, Moldova and the three Baltic nations, but including new NATO members Sweden and Finland, and even in Germany. Polish President Andrzej Duda almost certainly spoke for many when he said that Russia might attack a NATO country as early as 2026 or 2027. Poland’s national security agency is on record as saying such an attack could come within 36 months.

This is very much in line with what I heard at the Munich Security Conference a few weeks ago. Representatives of the frontline states all talked as though a Putin move on Europe was a foregone conclusion. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas called Putin’s behavior “the dictator’s handbook in real life”, adding “we can’t depend on others to defend us”.

Danish Prime minister Mette Frederiksen left the conference pledging to send all of Denmark’s artillery to Ukraine, and European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised to appoint the EU’s first Defense Commissioner if, as expected, she wins a second term. Von der Leyen’s aim is for a new EU position that focuses on increasing and coordinating defense production and improving weapons interoperability in Europe.

Europe’s fears are reinforced by a declining confidence in the U.S. as a security guarantor. While Europeans have been impressed with President Joe Biden’s strong support for Ukraine (56 percent favorable), Pew organization surveys in 2023 showed weaknesses in European attitudes toward the U.S. — with only 18 percent thinking the U.S. will lead the world five years from now. This ambivalence rests on deep anxiety about the outcome of the November presidential election; only 1 in 6 Europeans sees the U.S. as a model democracy, and 56 percent believe the transatlantic alliance will be weakened if Donald Trump returns to the White House. Pledges of support from the U.S. congressional delegation at the Munich conference got only rolled eyes and barely concealed disgust.

So Europe is in turmoil over Ukraine – fearing what Putin will do and what the US may not.

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A more confident Putin?

The second major change has come in Russia, where Vladimir Putin’s confidence is only growing.

Putin’s confidence rests on many things, but the key pillar is the gathering evidence that he will be able to outlast Ukraine and its backers. How can he feel otherwise, given the Kremlin’s strength in manpower and munitions, contrasted with divisions in the West, faltering aid deliveries, Ukraine’s dwindling weapons stocks, and its shortage of conscripts?

Putin must also take comfort from NATO’s desire to avoid escalating the conflict or risking direct confrontation between Russia and the western alliance. While the U.S. just used its aircraft and Patriot missile batteries to help defend Israel from Iranian air attacks, Putin knows that the U.S. will not intervene that directly in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Putin’s Chinese partners remain solidly with him, much of the Global South hesitates to condemn him, and he has been welcomed on trips to the the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. For their part, African leaders journeyed to meet Putin in St. Petersburg, and his troops have been welcomed in Sahel countries such as Mali and Burkino Faso, where the U.S. is on the outs.

In short, Putin appears – for now – to have escaped the pariah status that many (myself included) predicted for him. It’s hard to escape the conclusion that Putin is, to put it simply, feeling good.

Meanwhile, the Russian public is mostly either with their leader, or too afraid to say otherwise. I admit to having expected more pushback than we have seen, based on the decency of many Russians I’ve known – but many of those people have either left the country or lack outlets for protest, and the vast middle of the Russian public, a majority, has been pushed by propaganda and harsh repression into what one scholar has termed “learned indifference”.

Gauging Russian public opinion is always a chancy game, given the retaliation many Russians fear for expressing their views. Still, the independent Levada organization has managed to capture views that seem reasonably accurate and accord with assessments by Russian scholars I’ve spoken with outside the country. Surveys Levada conducted in 2022 and 2023 show roughly 22 percent of Russians are strongly supportive of the war, and 19-20 percent strongly opposed. Those who are opposed seem disinclined to protest publicly, probably because such protests have a long record of futility – due to harsh repression and penalties such as loss of employment or designation as a foreign agent. Of course the country’s most prominent dissident, Alexei Navalny, has paid the highest price of all.

As for the large group in the middle – roughly 65 percent — one Russian journalist, now in exile, told me that these people would rather not think about the war and take refuge in the constant barrage of pro-war propaganda telling them that the West is the aggressor, hell-bent on crushing Russia. And to the extent that the regime can succeed with this argument, there will always be a tendency, as in most countries, to rally round “our boys.”

Meanwhile, all of Putin’s slippery rationales for the “special military operation” – such as rooting out Ukrainian “Nazis” – have moved into the background. Most Russians probably now see this as just another war — and it’s now just about winning and losing. Most will want to win.

Glimmers of hope?

All this said, the Russians could of course still surprise us – recall the ease with which the late Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin cut through Russian mainline forces during his failed rebellion last June, with civilians standing aside as he marched toward Moscow. But as Putin’s clever manipulation of the rebels and Prigozhin’s ultimate demise attest, the chances are infinitesimal that anti-war sentiment or related protest could achieve critical mass and threaten Putin’s hold on policy and the state.

There are two things that could cut into Putin’s confidence. First, if the U.S. and other key countries put into legislation long-term commitments to substantial Ukraine aid, it would send a message that we are in this for the long haul. Second, if the NATO summit in July provides a clear road map for Ukrainian membership, with achievable steps along that path, that would say to the Kremlin that sooner or later Russia will be up against the alliance directly.

In the absence of such steps, we might as well let go of any hope that Russians themselves will ever stop Putin’s war. He will have to be beaten on the ground the hard way – by Ukrainians in Ukraine. And if he is not beaten there, it might not be long before we learn whether the Europeans were right to be afraid.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.

21. American trust in US military no longer highest among G7 nations: Survey

A chart at the link.

American trust in US military no longer highest among G7 nations: Survey

https://thehill.com/homenews/4600480-american-trust-us-military-no-longer-highest-g7-nations/?utm

BY MIRANDA NAZZARO - 04/17/24 2:45 PM ET

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U.S. soldiers operate a tank while participating in a military drill.

Omar Marques, Anadolu via Getty Images

U.S. Army soldiers drive a tank trough the Vistula River during the DRAGON-24 NATO military defense drills March 4, 2024, in Korzeniewo, Poland.

Americans’ confidence in the U.S. military dipped last year, losing its top spot among the other Group of Seven (G7) countries, according to a new Gallup poll.

American’s confidence in the U.S. military dipped to 81 percent in 2023, down 5 points from 2022, when confidence stood at 86 percent. That’s according to a new Gallup World Poll released Wednesday.

Since 2006, Americans’ confidence in their nation’s military has typically ranked highly among the G7 nations — the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom — Gallup noted.

The U.S. was knocked from the top spot by France, where confidence in the country’s military is about 86 percent, the poll found. Confidence in the U.K.’s military ranks the second highest among the nations at 83 percent.

Japan is slightly behind the U.S. at 80 percent trust in its military, with Italy following closely behind at 79 percent, then Canada at 78 percent.

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The findings follow a decline in Americans’ confidence in their military observed across other Gallup polls in recent months. In a Gallup survey released last July, Americans’ trust in the military dropped to 60 percent, the lowest level since 1997. Confidence had not been lower since 1988, when it sunk to 58 percent.

Other institutions in the U.S. have seen a drop in numbers in recent months, Gallup noted.

The U.S. is now tied with Italy for having the least faith in its judicial system among the G7 nations, at 42 percent confidence, according to Gallup. When it comes to trust in its national government, the U.S. has the lowest standing among the G7 nations with 30 percent.

The Gallup World Poll measures attitudes and behaviors of the globe’s residents. It is conducted through telephone surveys or in-person interviews, depending on the nation. The typical survey includes at least 1,000 individuals and the margin of error for the U.S. data set is plus or minus 3.5 percentage points, Gallup noted.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com