Quotes of the Day:

"Kind words do not cost much. Yet they accomplish much." 

– Blaise Pascal

"I am an optimist. It does not seem too much use being anything else." 

– Winston Churchill

"The only thing that saves us from the bureaucracy is inefficiency. An efficient bureaucracy is the greatest threat to liberty." 

– Eugene McCarthy

1. Yoon discusses Mideast tensions, N.K. issues with U.S. envoy

2. US envoy to UN urges Russia, China not to 'reward' North Korea's bad behaviour

3. S. Korea reaffirms capabilities to respond to N. Korean attack after Iran’s missile salvo

4. S. Korea, US hold NK human rights talks in Washington

5. The communist front that North Korea targeted in its unification policy overhaul

6. S. Korea 'strongly' protests Tokyo's renewed claims to Dokdo, calls in Japanese diplomat

7. Pro-Russian hacking group paralyzes website of North Korea’s airline

8. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government confiscates private plots of farmland and forces people to return farming

9. Japan's Ukraine aid creates new rift with Russia

10. How the Sewol Sinking Changed South Korea

11. Senior US officials discuss N. Korea, Taiwan, South China Sea in talks with Beijing officials

12. U.S. envoy, FM Cho discuss ways to build new mechanism for N.K. sanctions monitoring

13. How North Korea exploited the tragic Sewol ferry sinking for anti-ROK propaganda

14. What are implications of US Army's structural transformation for Seoul?

15. 5 kinds of North Korean refugees

16. This is not Lee Jay-myung's victory

17. North can genetically engineer biological weapons, U.S. report warns

18. Satellite imagery reveals nighttime lights at North Korea's Camp 22

1. Yoon discusses Mideast tensions, N.K. issues with U.S. envoy

Yoon discusses Mideast tensions, N.K. issues with U.S. envoy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 15, 2024

SEOUL, April 15 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol held talks with the top U.S. envoy to the United Nations on Monday to discuss issues ranging from tensions in the Middle East to U.N. sanctions against North Korea, his office said.

Yoon's meeting with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield took place at the presidential office as part of her four-day trip to South Korea that also involved talks with the foreign and defense ministers.

The two called for joint efforts to help resolve the Mideast crisis and extend comprehensive and strategic cooperation between South Korea and the United States amid concerns over the regional issue affecting other areas, such as the economy and supply chain, according to the presidential office.

Noting that the South Korea-U.S. alliance has progressed on the basis of universal values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law, Yoon was quoted as saying the alliance is advancing into a global comprehensive strategic alliance.

He expressed hope for South Korea and the U.S. to closely cooperate so that the U.N. Security Council can fulfill its role and emphasized the importance of cooperation within the council to firmly sustain the U.N.'s sanctions regime against the North, the presidential office said.

In response, Thomas-Greenfield reaffirmed support for South Korea's efforts to deter the North's nuclear and missile developments and enhance its human rights conditions, and vowed to closely cooperate with Seoul on North Korean and global issues, it added.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (R, back) and Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield (3rd from L), the top U.S. envoy to the United Nations, hold talks at the presidential office in Seoul on April 15, 2024, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 15, 2024

2.  US envoy to UN urges Russia, China not to 'reward' North Korea's bad behaviour

US envoy to UN urges Russia, China not to 'reward' North Korea's bad behaviour

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-envoy-un-urges-russia-china-not-reward-north-koreas-bad-behaviour-2024-04-16/

By Hyunsu Yim

April 16, 20243:06 AM EDTUpdated 6 hours ago

Item 1 of 5 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield speaks to reporters at the U.S. Army base Camp Bonifas in Paju near the truce village of Panmunjom, South Korea April 16, 2024. JUNG YEON-JE/Pool via REUTERS

[1/5]U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield speaks to reporters at the U.S. Army base Camp Bonifas in Paju near the truce village of Panmunjom, South Korea April 16, 2024. JUNG YEON-JE/Pool via REUTERS Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

PANMUNJOM, South Korea, April 16 (Reuters) - The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations urged Russia and China on Tuesday to reverse course, and stop rewarding North Korea's bad behaviour and shielding it from sanctions evading activities over its weapons programs.

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield made the remarks during a visit to the Demilitarized Zone, a heavily fortified border between the two Koreas, which remain technically at war.

Her trip to South Korea came after Russia rejected the annual renewal of the multinational panel of experts that has over the past 15 years monitored the implementation of U.N. sanctions aimed at curbing North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

Moscow's veto and China's abstention only "empowers" North Korea's efforts to sidestep international sanctions and "shields" it from accountability, Thomas-Greenfield said.

"Hiding the truth does not change it. Rewarding bad behaviour only encourages it," she told reporters. "We urge Russia and China to reverse course and once again to urge Pyongyang to choose diplomacy and come to the negotiating table to commit to constructive dialogue."

Washington will work with South Korea, Japan and other partners at the Security Council to look at "some creative ways, some out-of-the-box thinking" to continue monitoring sanctions enforcement and other work carried out by the panel, Thomas-Greenfield said.

Later in Seoul, she met with a group of young North Korean defectors, lauding their escape to the South as "courageous, inspiring."

"One of my priorities is to raise the profile of human rights violations in the DPRK, to raise the profile and amplify your voices as escapees," she told them, referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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Thomas-Greenfield arrived on Sunday and met President Yoon Suk Yeol and Seoul's foreign and defence ministers on Monday to discuss ways to deter North Korea's weapons programs and promote human rights in the reclusive state.

She will also travel to Japan, where she is expected to meet family members of Japanese citizens who were abducted in the early 2000s by North Korea, and visit Nagasaki, which was hit by a U.S. nuclear bomb in 1945, until Saturday.

Both South Korea and Japan are U.S. allies and members of the Security Council.

The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.

Reporting by Hyunsu Yim; Additional reporting and writing by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

Hyunsu Yim

Thomson Reuters

Seoul-based reporter covering the Koreas with a focus on South Korean politics, North Korea's missile tests and the K-pop industry. Before joining Reuters, he worked at The Korea Herald.

3. S. Korea reaffirms capabilities to respond to N. Korean attack after Iran’s missile salvo

What can we learn from Iran's attack on Israel to support the defense of the South?  

Unfortunately we cannot turn back time. Israel made significant investments in missile defense going back decades that are paying off. The question is whether South Korea and the ROK/US alliance made significant investments decades ago that might pay off in te very near future?

S. Korea reaffirms capabilities to respond to N. Korean attack after Iran’s missile salvo

en.yna.co.kr

S. Korea reaffirms capabilities to respond to N. Korean attack after Iran’s missile salvo | Yonhap News Agency

Chae Yun-hwan

All News 14:10 April 16, 2024

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SEOUL, April 16 (Yonhap) — The defense ministry on Tuesday reaffirmed capabilities to respond to North Korean missile threats amid renewed attention to the country’s air defense system after Israel repelled a missile barrage by Iran.

On Saturday, Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles toward Israel but many of them were shot down by Israel’s defense systems, according to foreign media reports.

Iran’s attack renewed concerns in South Korea over Seoul’s capabilities to counter a possible North Korean salvo of missiles and artillery firing, as the North has developed weapons that could put the entire territory of the South within its striking range.

“South Korea and the United States possess the capabilities to detect and intercept various mixed attacks by North Korea, including ballistic missiles, as well as overwhelming strike capabilities in a contingency,” Jeon Ha-kyou, the ministry’s spokesperson, said in a press briefing.

This file photo, taken May 2, 2023, shows the defense ministry’s spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyou speaking in a briefing at the ministry’s headquarters in central Seoul. (Yonhap)

South Korea operates the homegrown Cheongung-II and the U.S.-made Patriot systems to shoot down low-tier missile threats, while the U.S. military stationed in the country operates the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system that intercepts upper-tier threats.

Jeon said the country is making efforts to further bolster its defense system, noting the development of an interceptor against North Korean long-range artillery firing.

Many of the North’s long-range artillery pieces are stationed within striking distances of the South’s wider capital area — home to nearly half of the country’s 51 million people.

Meanwhile, Jeon said the military has extended the deployment period of military doctors to civilian hospitals to support their operations amid a protracted walkout by trainee doctors nationwide.

Around 120 military doctors have been dispatched since the collective action began in February in protest of the government’s plan to sharply increase the number of medical school seats.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

Keywords

#NK threats #missile defense

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4. S. Korea, US hold NK human rights talks in Washington

We must sustain a combined human rights upfront approach.

S. Korea, US hold NK human rights talks in Washington

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · April 16, 2024

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Start your day with a roundup of key stories from The Korea Herald with news and comment on all that’s happening in Korea.

By Yonhap

Published : April 16, 2024 - 09:11

Chun Young-hee (left), director general for the Korean Peninsula peace regime at Seoul's foreign ministry, shakes hands with Julie Turner, the US special envoy for North Korean human rights issues as they meet for talks in Washington on Monday. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Diplomats from South Korea and the United States held a new session of their bilateral dialogue on North Korean human rights in Washington on Monday, as the two sides see a close link between Pyongyang's weapons programs and its rights conditions.

Chun Young-hee, director general for the Korean Peninsula peace regime at Seoul's foreign ministry, and Julie Turner, the US special envoy for North Korean human rights issues, led the second session of the dialogue that was relaunched in November following a yearslong hiatus, according to the ministry.

The two sides noted that the North Korean regime's "obsession" with its development of nuclear weapons and missiles has led to an infringement on North Korean people's basic rights and further exacerbated the human rights situation.

"(They) stressed that the international community should pay more attention to the issue of improving North Korean people's access to information so as to make them realize the North's reality by themselves," the ministry said in a press release.

Chun expressed concerns that less than 0.1 percent of the North's 26-million population use the internet, while underscoring the need to raise voices for the removal of the North's tough public control measures to help address the "information divide" between the North and the outside world.

The two sides also agreed to continue joint efforts to spread consensus over the seriousness of the North Korean rights issues and ensure accountability for those responsible for rights violations in the North.

The officials discussed ways to step up cooperation over the issue of abductees, detainees and prisoners of the 1950-53 Korean War, and concurred to continue raising the issue on the multilateral stage.

They also agreed to urge Pyongyang to comply with international human rights norms and faithfully implement the UN resolution on North Korean human rights.

Turner called for close bilateral coordination over specific measures to substantively improve rights in the North.

The two sides agreed to push for the next session of the dialogue in the second half of the year.

While in Washington, Chun also met with US Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak to discuss North Korea's ties with Russia and other issues. (Yonhap)

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · April 16, 2024

5. The communist front that North Korea targeted in its unification policy overhaul

A useful historical review of "united fronts' used by communist parties and especially by north Korea.

I was listening to a former Korean official yesterday describe why the regime is dropping the word unification. It is part of an overall effort to prevent outside information and anything associated with South Korea from going to the Korean people in the north. The regime is defending against the idea of , the values, and the existence of South Korea (other than as its main enemy) . Talking about unification leads to talk about South Korea - positive and negative remarks. But the regime wants to provide all discussion of the South because it is the existence of the South that is the existential threat to the regime. But We should make no mistake: the regime remains committed to domination of the Korean peninsula which includes driving US forces of the Korean peninsula to set the conditions for unification (or domination) by force.

The communist front that North Korea targeted in its unification policy overhaul

Fatherland United Democratic Front started as scheme to legitimize communist rule before shifting focus to South Korea

https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/how-north-koreas-communist-front-became-a-target-in-unification-policy-overhaul/

Andrei Lankov April 16, 2024

A North Korean propaganda poster | Image: Eric Lafforgue

The North Korean bureaucracy, or rather the part responsible for foreign policy issues, is currently in the midst of a storm. 

Institutions that have existed for decades are being disbanded with little warning, and concepts long regarded as sacred cornerstones of the official ideology are no longer supposed to be mentioned. 

When leader Kim Jong Un stated on Dec. 30 last year that the DPRK would no longer view South Korea as a partner in the prolonged march for unification but rather as a foreign and hostile state, he dropped an ideological bombshell, the consequences of which are likely to be felt for decades to come.

One of North Korea’s oldest political institutions, the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea, has been among the casualties of recent bureaucratic reshuffles.

This name, as usually rendered in English, creates a misleading impression regarding its actual role, presenting it as a government or quasi-government agency dealing with North-South unification issues. 

An earlier official translation is more reliable, the Fatherland United Democratic Front (FUDF).

For decades, FUDF has served as a convenient cover for North Korea’s dealings with the South, but it had a completely different function at its inception in July 1946.

A look back at this history can illuminate how the DPRK’s efforts to legitimize communist rule have changed and how the FUDF became an organization that has now outlived its usefulness to the regime.

Workers’ Party of North Korea giant flag during the Arirang mass games in Pyongyang. | Eric Lafforgue (Sep. 12, 2008)

COMMUNIST COALITION

In the late 1940s, after World War II, communists took power in several countries in Eastern Europe and East Asia (usually, but not always, with the active involvement of the Soviet military).

But they faced numerous challenges. In many such countries, the communists were unknown to the majority of the population before 1945, or even actively disliked. The new overlords also understood that, even with Soviet tanks behind them.

They could not instantly remodel those societies in strict accordance with the ideological prescriptions of Stalinism-Leninism. A compromise was necessary, something that was understood in Moscow as well.

Hence, the idea was to create a coalition of all “progressive” political forces, that is, forces that did not really mind the communists’ hegemony, with the communist party playing the leading role in such an alliance.

The idea for these so-called united fronts followed the mid-1930s scheme of a popular front, with an important difference: the popular fronts of the 1930s were conceived as genuine wide political coalitions, albeit with a large role of the communists. In contrast, the united fronts were tools created to justify and mask the communists’ domination.

In the soon-to-be communist countries of the late 1940s, those parties and groups that would refuse to join the united front would be suppressed. There was no legal place in politics for any group that failed to join the united front. 

Members of the Fatherland United Democratic Front in front of the organization’s complex in June 1947 | Image: Public domain via Wikimedia Commons

UNITED WE STAND

Between 1945 and 1948, such united fronts were created in virtually every country of Eastern Europe, as well as in North Korea and Vietnam. Initially, the united front could have some features of a genuine political coalition, but in just a few years, it developed into what Hugh Seton-Watson and other researchers at the time described as a “bogus coalition.”

Eventually, they transformed into purely decorative institutions.

The creation of a united front allowed the introduction of the de facto one-party system while maintaining the attractive veneer of multi-party democracy. 

Many soon-to-be communist states, including North Korea, technically had a number of parties that were sucked into the united front structure.

FUDF was established in July 1946 and initially included 13 parties and organizations. Among its members were the North Korean Communist Party and the New People’s Party of Korea, soon to be merged into the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), as well as two minor non-Communist parties — the Democratic Party and the Chondoist Chongu Party.

In addition to all four parties existing in North Korea in July 1946, FUDF incorporated major mass organizations, such as the Federation of Trade Unions, Women’s Union or Youth Union.

Since then, FUDF has been the only body able to nominate candidates during elections, thus providing a convenient cover for an electoral system that only allowed one candidate per district.

All legally allowed parties and mass organizations were members of FUDF, and of course, no other candidate could be nominated since no political actor could legally exist outside the confines of FUDF. 

In Sept. 1946, just before the first elections run by FUDF, the party-run Rodong Sinmun explained that “FUDF member parties should not wage electoral campaign based on their particular programs, but should unroll a unified, organized propaganda based of the joined position of FUDF.”

An FUDF meeting in 2019 | Image: DPRK Today (Feb. 26, 2019)

1

2

3

UNITED WE FALL 

A similar body existed in South Korea as well. However, it was more reminiscent of the popular fronts from the 1930s — that is, a genuine, if communist-dominated, coalition of left-leaning groups — and it merged with the FUDF in June 1949.

By the mid or late 1950s, FUDF had essentially outlived its initial role. In the late 1950s, the two non-communist parties were virtually annihilated, with all their prominent activists exiled or imprisoned.

As declassified Soviet documents demonstrate, for a while, North Korean leaders even planned to disband these parties formally but then changed their minds and decided to keep the parties as convenient vehicles for contacting the South and waging overseas propaganda. 

In practice, since the late 1950s, both the Democratic Party (eventually renamed the Social Democratic Party) and the Chondoist Chongu Party operated headquarters with a small number of the officials actually assigned by the WPK.

Therefore, in the 1950s, FUDF was assigned a new role: to serve as a vehicle to engage with South Korean parties and groups. It was during this time that the English rendering of its Korean name (조국통일민주주의전선) underwent reinterpretation.

The Sino-Korean grammar of the name allows for two rather distinct interpretations, which are reflected in its old and new English names: Fatherland United Democratic Front in the early days, later replaced by Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea.

Originally, the term tongil (통일) was intended to mean “united,” indicating that the front comprised various like-minded groups operating within North Korea, jointly governing the country. 

However, after the Korean War, the same term began to be understood as “unification,” indicating that the front’s primary objective was to achieve the reunification of North and South Korea.

In its new capacity, the FUDF handled relations with South Korea’s assorted progressive groups while also serving as a quasi-official voice of the North Korean government on matters related to the South. It was the FUDF headquarters that issued countless statements condemning the “fascist clique of southern Korea” and aired “peace unification proposals” of largely propaganda value. 

Now, it seems, its extended lease on life has finally expired, too. The new policy line toward the South means that Pyongyang does not need this institution anymore, so it was finally disbanded on March 23.

Edited by Alannah Hill

6. S. Korea 'strongly' protests Tokyo's renewed claims to Dokdo, calls in Japanese diplomat

​It is hard for us as outsiders to fathom how these rocks could derail all the good work that has been done to improve bilateral relations that is so important for trilateral cooperation among the ROK, Japan, and the US.

(2nd LD) S. Korea 'strongly' protests Tokyo's renewed claims to Dokdo, calls in Japanese diplomat | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 16, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more info in paras 9-15, minor edits throughout)

SEOUL, April 16 (Yonhap) -- South Korea "strongly" protested against Japan on Tuesday after Tokyo issued an annual diplomatic report renewing its territorial claims to the South's easternmost islets of Dokdo.

To lodge a formal protest over the report, South Korea's foreign ministry called in Taisuke Mibae, the deputy chief of mission at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.

The claim, strongly disputed by South Korea, which has long maintained effective control of Dokdo with the permanent stationing of security personnel there, was included in the 2024 Diplomatic Bluebook that was reported to the Cabinet by Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa.

In this year's report, Japan continued to claim that Dokdo is Japanese territory historically and under international law, and that South Korea is carrying on with an "illegal occupation" of the area.

The crew of a Korea Coast Guard ship unfurls banners carrying the phrase "Let's Overcome the Coronavirus" near the country's easternmost Dokdo Islets, in this file photo taken Sept. 2, 2021, eight days ahead of the 68th anniversary of Korea Coast Guard Day. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

"The government strongly protests against the Japanese government's repeated unfair territorial claims over Dokdo, which is clearly our own territory historically, geographically and under international law, as announced in its Diplomatic Bluebook released on April 16, and urges (Japan) to withdraw it immediately," foreign ministry spokesperson Lim Soo-suk said in a commentary.

Lim added that such claims by Japan have no impact whatsoever on South Korea's sovereignty over the islets, which are Korea's inherent territory.

South Korea has long maintained the position that Dokdo is an integral part of Korean territory historically, geographically and under international law.

Japan again took issue with the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling in 2018 that ordered Japanese companies to compensate South Koreans forced into wartime labor during Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.

Tokyo has long held the position that all reparation issues were settled in the 1965 treaty that normalized the bilateral diplomatic ties.

Seeking to mend ties with Japan, South Korea announced the so-called third-party reimbursement plan in March last year to compensate the victims through the foundation without compensation from liable Japanese firms.

Japan has insisted the issue be resolved through the third-party system.

Taisuke Mibae, the deputy chief of mission at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, enters the South Korean foreign ministry building in Seoul on April 16, 2024, after being summoned over Tokyo's renewed territorial claim to Dokdo. (Yonhap)

On the bilateral ties, the bluebook referred to South Korea as a "partner" for the first time in 14 years, pointing out Seoul and Tokyo's close cooperation is needed now more than ever, given the grave security environment of the Indo-Pacific region.

The Seoul ministry said Japan's use of the word "partner" appears to reflect its views on the improving bilateral ties.

"We believe the descriptions of South Korea have improved partially compared with the previous year, including the inclusion of the expression 'partner' in defining our relations," Lim told a regular press briefing.

"We hope the two countries will cooperate closely in establishing a future-oriented relationship ahead of the 60th anniversary of the diplomatic ties next year," he said.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 16, 2024

7. Pro-Russian hacking group paralyzes website of North Korea’s airline

Just for fun?

Pro-Russian hacking group paralyzes website of North Korea’s airline

The ‘Server Killers’ said it targeted Air Koryo’s website last week ‘just for fun’ and to test the carrier’s ‘mediocre’ security.

By Han Dukin for RFA Korean

2024.04.15

rfa.org

A pro-Russian hacking group said it attacked and paralyzed the website of North Korea’s state-owned Air Koryo and later posted a mocking message on the Telegram messaging app about the airline’s inadequate cybersecurity standards.

The “Server Killers” targeted the flag carrier’s website on April 9 using a denial-of-service attack, or DDoS. They then posted a screenshot of Air Koryo’s website that showed the standard “HTTP Error 500” message that users see when a website isn’t accessible.

The group also posted a message that said “North Korea, where is security,” along with a smiling face emoticon on Telegram.

Check-Host.net – an online tool for checking the availability of websites, servers, hosts and IP addresses – showed that Air Koryo’s website couldn’t be accessed for a period of time on April 9. The website was accessible on Monday.

In a response to a message sent on Telegram privately by Radio Free Asia, the “Server Killers” account said that North Korean websites tend to have mediocre security.

Screenshot of the website of North Korean airline Air Koryo as it normally looks. (RFA)

The reason for hacking the Air Koryo website was “for technical reasons, not political or social purposes,” a messenger who asked for anonymity said.

“Server Killers” doesn’t understand why North Korea won’t “pay much attention to security” on its government sites, the messenger said.

‘We attacked it just for fun’

The group has posted on its Telegram channel photos and screenshots from what they claim are dozens of successful hacking attacks on government agencies and private companies in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.

The messenger confirmed to RFA that the group used a DDoS attack on the Air Koryo website. Such an attack paralyzes a server, service or network by providing excessive internet access to a target.

The airline’s website not only didn’t have a DDoS attack prevention function, but also didn’t have a “SSL certificate,” which enables an encrypted connection, the messenger said.

“We attacked it just for fun and to test how resistant the site is to a DDoS attack,” the messenger said. “We attacked the site for only 300 seconds, and the site was offline for more than eight hours.

“We noticed the site was very old and written in PHP programming language. Not only that, but many sites in North Korea were like that,” the messenger said, adding that “this will be the first and last attack targeting North Korea.”

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Matt Reed.

rfa.org

8. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government confiscates private plots of farmland and forces people to return farming

​There is no real private land ownership in north Korea.

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government confiscates private plots of farmland and forces people to return farming

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) A cleared field on a slope is seen behind a woman leading a cow. A countryside in the suburbs of Pyongyang, October 2008. Photograph by Jang Jeong-gil (ASIAPRESS)

North Korean authorities are reportedly confiscating illegally operated private farmland ahead of the farming season and forcing people originally from rural areas to return to farming villages to work the land. Meanwhile, the government has issued general mobilization orders to rural residents, stressing the importance of agriculture this year, according to two reports from a reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province in February and March. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Confiscating private farmland for collective farming

All land in North Korea is owned by the state, and most agricultural activity takes place on cooperative farms. However, the collapse of North Korea's rationing system in the 1990s led to the creation of large tracts of land across the country known as "small plots," where farmers and other residents near rural areas have cleared mountain slopes and stone fields to farm illegally.

In recent years, the authorities have cracked down on small plots, and this year they have launched a major crackdown on "small plots," according to a reporting partner who visited Farm A in late February. Farm A is a medium-sized farm in North Hamgyong Province with about 500 farmers.

The investigation into private illegal farmland is being organized by the Provincial Rural Economy Committee and the National Land Inspection Bureau, and the main target is "small plots."

※Provincial Rural Economy Committee: An administrative organization that comprehensively supervises and controls the agricultural activities of cooperative farms in each province.

※ National Land Inspection Bureau: An organization that protects and supervises the country's natural resources, including mountains, rivers, and fisheries.

"The goal is to survey all the surrounding small plots of land and decide whether to plant crops or create a forest. Even if the land is not assigned to the farm, it will be planted with low-growing crops (such as beans or peppers) for at least a year or two."

The intention seems to be to use the land as much as possible as farmland before the trees get too big.

(FILE PHOTO) Small plots of farmland have taken over the top of a mountain. A suburb of Hyesan, May 2014, photographed from the Chinese side of the border (ASIAPRESS)

◆ Government identifies people leaving rural areas and mobilizes them to farming areas

The authorities also identify people leaving rural areas and return them to the countryside to expand the labor force that can work the newly acquired land.

In an effort to stem the flow of labor from the countryside, North Korea has implemented a de facto North Korea's version of the caste system that binds rural residents to the countryside for life, including their children and grandchildren. However, due to the poor conditions and difficulty of farming, farmers are treated as the lowest social class in the country, so it is every farmer's dream to somehow get out of the countryside. Some of them do, usually by joining the military and becoming officers, or for women, by marrying into families living in the cities. But leaving the countryside doesn't mean that people can erase their past. They are labeled for the rest of their lives as "people from the countryside." Currently, efforts are being made to find them and send them back to the countryside.

"Usually, two or three additional sub-work teams are created on the farms. The city labor department identifies those with rural connections and (forces) them to return to the countryside.”

※ Sub-work teams are the smallest unit of labor at collective farms and are made up of around 10 people.

◆ People are being mass mobilized to farms and companies are being forced to provide farming supplies

Every year, North Korean authorities use the slogan "farms are the priority" to encourage people to support farming communities. But this year, the government's push to encourage support for farming communities is much greater than in previous years, the reporting partner said.

"Normally, compost production ends in February, but this year they're continuing it until April. Workers (in non-agricultural industries) have been mobilized to farms since the beginning of the year, so it's as if they have become farm workers."

Notably, the authorities are demanding that agencies and enterprises at all levels take over surrounding cooperative farms and provide them with the fertilizer, pesticides, and agricultural equipment they lack.

"A factory that makes steel pipes is in charge of a farm in the area, and the workers there have been told to mobilize to help supply the farm. They are supporting the farm by making plows."

※ Steel pipe factory: Factories that bend steel plates to make pipes. These factories mainly produce pipes for use in heavy industrial equipment.

Given the government's tightening control over individuals' economic activities after the COVID pandemic began, the Kim Jong Un regime appears intent on increasing people's dependence on the state by preventing them from growing food on private plots of land. Meanwhile, the regime is increasing agricultural production to strengthen its control over the people by intensifying its control over the country's food supply.

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ 'National Unified Price System' implemented on domestic products...Stores are given booklet showing prices in new system… Government aims to tighten control over economy
• ＜Investigation＞Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (1)　The fertility rate is already severely low…It’s rare to see anyone carrying babies around
• A shocking situation...How are the neglected elderly faring? (1) Poverty-stricken elderly people live off begging and wander the streets
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Implementation of the large-scale restructuring of trading companies (1)　Called “anti-socialist hotbeds,” government forces ‘bases’ of trading companies to close down and consolidate
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ S.Korea is the enemy…Trends after Kim Jong Un’s “anti-unification policy” announcement (1)　People are surprised and confused

asiapress.org

9. Japan's Ukraine aid creates new rift with Russia

 Will Japan step up to be a more full partner in the Arsenal of Democracy providing more than financial support but actual weapons as well. WIll South Korea provide lethal aid to Ukraine as well? It would be useful to have a united front against Russia by both supporting effectively supporting Ukraine

If Japan really wanted to pressure Russia, it could open a northern front and take back the disputed Kuril islands. (note sarcasm)

Japan's Ukraine aid creates new rift with Russia – DW – 04/15/2024

Roman Goncharenko

04/15/2024April 15, 2024

Japan has become one of Ukraine's most important allies, providing billions in aid. How will this affect relations with Russia?

DW · by In focusIranIsrael-Hamas warUkraine

When Europe talks about aid for Ukraine, it looks to itself and the United States. But for months, politicians in Washington have been unable to agree on a new multibillion aid package for Kyiv.

As a result, other countries have increased their share of support. Among them is Japan, which, according to Ukraine's Finance Ministry, has quietly become one of Kyiv's most important financial backers, leading the way in the first months of 2024.

Aid, not weapons

At a conference in Japan in February, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said the aid provided and pledged would total $12 billion (€11.2 billion). According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Japan was in sixth place for international aid to Ukraine in January, providing more than €7 billion.

This aid from Japan is helping to keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. The National Bank estimates the country's gross domestic product has shrunk by a third since the Russian invasion began in February 2022. While Tokyo cannot supply Kyiv with lethal weapons for historical reasons and national legal restrictions, it can send food, medicine, generators, cars, bulletproof vests and demining equipment.

Missile workaround?

But Ukraine needs weapons, and Japan might be able to help despite its constitutionally enshrined pacifism. The Japanese press has reported there could be a delivery to the US of missiles manufactured in Japan for American Patriot anti-aircraft systems so that Washington could pass them on to Ukraine.

In response, Russian Foreign Ministry representatives said the appearance of Japanese missiles in Ukraine would have "consequences" for Moscow's relations with Tokyo.

Japan may find roundabout ways to supply Ukraine with weaponsImage: Kyodo/IMAGO

Atsuko Higashino, a professor studying the conflict in Ukraine at the University of Tsukuba, is in favor of such a delivery, as the missiles are "not a weapon to kill, but to protect the Ukrainian people." She does not believe that such a delivery can be expected "in the near future," however, because Japan has a "serious deficit" when it comes to defense systems.

James Brown, a professor and expert in Russia-Japan relations at Temple University in Tokyo, believes the deliveries of Patriot missiles to the US are already "largely agreed." He added that the delays are due to regulations, explaining that it's very important to Japan that its missiles aren't delivered directly to Ukraine.

'Radical change' in relations with Russia

But how has Japan become one of Ukraine's most important partners? "When Japan assists Ukraine, when it pushes back against Russian aggression, it’s really thinking about trying to uphold an international system that prevents changes of the status quo by force," said Brown.

He added that Japan aims to "deter China from attempting something similar with respect to Taiwan." Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida discussed this with US President Joe Biden at last week's tripartite summit on the Indo-Pacific in Washington.

Japan's attitude toward Ukraine and Russia has "radically changed," said political analyst Higashino. While Japan "accepted the illegal annexation of Crimea" and "Russian propaganda" in 2014, she said everything was different after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This is due, among other things, to "the clear violation of the UN Charter" and the Russian army's "brutality" in Bucha near Kyiv.

Bucha: 'There was a feeling something horrible would happen'

Exceptions for fossil fuels

A change at the top of the government played a role in this shift. "Under previous leadership, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan pursued very much a rapprochement with Russia. With a real aim to try and develop relations of partnership to resolve the country’s territorial dispute, to sign a peace treaty," said Brown.

"But after 2022, the Japanese government recognized that those efforts are not really going to work, and instead, their priority has become not to create a partnership with Russia but rather to try and ensure that Russian aggression against Ukraine fails."

In contrast to Abe, Prime Minister Kishida has undertaken "very far-reaching sanctions against Russia," said Higashino. "That was simply unthinkable before."

In 2019, Japan's former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe aimed to improve relations with Russian President Vladimir PutinImage: Reuters/Sputnik/Kremlin/M. Klimentyev

Still, Japan has not completely cut off relations with Russia. There are exceptions for some areas of the economy, particularly in the energy sector. Japanese car companies have withdrawn from the lucrative Russian market, but Japan is still involved in the Gazprom-led Sakhalin 2 oil and gas project, although other Western companies are no longer participating. The project supplies Japan with liquefied natural gas (LNG). With virtually no fossil fuels of its own, Japan sources around 9% of its gas from Russia.

Kyiv returns the favor

As a gesture of support for Tokyo, the Ukrainian parliament passed a decree in October 2022 that sided with Tokyo in the Russian-Japanese dispute over the Kuril Islands. It recognizes that the "Northern Territories," as the islands are called in Japan, "continue to be occupied by the Russian Federation.

A similar decree was also signed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

This article was originally written in Russian.

10. How the Sewol Sinking Changed South Korea

​Many of us in the US do not recognize the effects of this tragedy (much less even remember it).

Conclusion:

Among the many things that Sewol brought to light is the sheer banality of risk behind exceptional catastrophes. It was the reckoning of a shared, omnipresent risk that brought hundreds of thousands to the streets in 2014. If we are to take the grief of the campaigning families, too, as in some part ours – or to use Chang-hyun’s mother’s words, “homework to be brought to completion” collectively – perhaps the subsequent anniversaries of Sewol may look a bit different than today.

How the Sewol Sinking Changed South Korea

thediplomat.com

10 years on, bereaved families and their supporters continue to push for justice and accountability in all manner of man-made tragedies.

By Sera Yeong Seo Park

April 16, 2024

An unidentified mother of a high school student among 304 victims of sunken ferry Sewol in 2014 places a light stick on a life vest symbolizing the victims before a candle light vigil calling for impeached President Park Geun-hye to step down in Seoul, South Korea, Jan. 7, 2017.

Credit: AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

The South Korean ferry MV Sewol capsized off the southwestern coast of the peninsula on the morning of April 16, 2014. Sewol’s departure from the port of Incheon the night before had been delayed by nearly two-and-a-half hours, due to a thick, persistent fog. Sewol commenced its journey shortly after the low visibility warning was lifted; it was the only commercial vessel to set sail from the port that evening.

Of the 443 passengers and 33 crew members on board, 304 lost their lives in the sinking. 250 of the victims were students from Danwon High School in Ansan, on their second-year field trip to Jeju Island.

As the nation bore witness to the minute-by-minute sinking of Sewol, it became obvious that this was an utterly preventable tragedy. As I summarized in a previous article:

It quickly became clear that this was an utterly preventable tragedy. The MV Sewol ferry had been illegally modified to carry more cargo and passengers than originally designed; when the ferry took an abruptly sharp turn on the morning of the 16th, the captain and the crew members were among the first to escape, and passengers were told to “stay put.” Those who followed the instructions through the loudspeakers never made it out of the ill-fated ferry, while the dispatched coast guard forces merely circled around during the critical minutes of the rescue operation.

As evidence of gross negligence, dereliction of duty, and breach of regulations piled up, citizens took to the streets out of grief and rage. The South Korean government and subsidiary bodies’ failure to respond as a “control tower” in a moment of acute crisis had already made the authorities a target of public censure; their ensuing attempts to suppress criticism, including arrests of peaceful protesters, tipped the scales.

The Sewol disaster ended up laying a crucial foundation for the first-ever impeachment of a democratically elected president in South Korea. When then-President Park Geun-hye’s flagrant scandal involving her confidante came to light in late 2016, leading to the largest mobilizations South Korea had seen since the Democratic Uprising in 1987, the Sewol families and allied citizens had already been holding weekly protests for months, demanding truth and accountability for the disaster from the administration.

In the mass protests calling for Park’s impeachment, allusions to, and commemoration of Sewol were rife: Protestors hoisted up large yellow ribbons – an emblem of remembrance and call for justice for Sewol – and Sewol families marched with a banner that featured the victims’ photographs.

In a short-answer poll taken by Hankyoreh newspaper in December 2014, the Sewol disaster was voted the second most important historical event in South Korea since the country’s independence, just 1.6 points short of the highest voted event, the Korean War. While the results could be attributed in part to the recency effect, it is difficult to dismiss the significance of a single disaster being voted as one of the most crucial events in the past seven decades, no less in a country that has seen a particularly tumultuous end to the 20th century.

What the Sewol Disaster Brought to Light

The Sewol disaster came to be seen as an illustrative “case in point” of the various ills that had gone unchecked throughout South Korea’s rapid ascension to a global powerhouse. It was Cheonghaejin’s breach of regulations that had made Sewol the most perilous ship in operation in the country, but the shipping company was not the only party to blame. Neoliberal policies that dated back to Lee Myung-bak’s conservative administration – during which several regulations concerning the maintenance and inspection of ships had been relaxed – had set the scene for continued malpractice.

Ten years on, two changes in administration, and three separate investigative bodies later, the bereaved families and citizens continue to search for answers and accountability. The scale and reach of the movement have inevitably waned over the years, and the mobilizations are a far cry from the early aftermath of the disaster. But the movement, led primarily by Sewol Families for Truth and a Safer Society – a collective of bereaved parents of Danwon High School students – and activists have been unwavering in their unified call for an exhaustive investigation into Sewol’s sinking and the botched rescue operation, accountability from culpable parties, and a thorough systemic change that would ensure that no such tragedy recurs.

The 4.16 Memory Cultural Festival in front of Seoul City Hall on Apr. 13, 2024, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Sewol disaster. Photo via the 4.16 Network.

The Significance of the 10th Anniversary

Anniversaries hold particular significance for the families affected by the disaster, and the 10th anniversary is no exception. For many, it is a particularly painful reminder not only of the absence of their loved ones, but also of how little concrete change has been attained.

Lee Chang-hyun was one of the 250 victims from Danwon High School. Chang-hyun’s mother, Choi Soon-hwa, has been “demanding answers from the government, objecting, sparing no effort in her fight over the past ten years,” but the results that she sees today are “dejecting and despairing.”

Chang-hyun’s mother is right to point out that the search for justice and accountability has been time and again thwarted. As Park Sung-hyun from the 4.16 Foundation remarked: “There were lives lost, but no one held accountable.”

Park added, “if responsible parties are let off the hook, we won’t see anyone committed to saving lives in other instances of disasters.”

Indeed, only one low-ranking member from the Coast Guard has been held accountable for the mishandling of the rescue operations. Just two months ago, President Yoon Suk-yeol pardoned two army officers who had illegally collected intelligence about the bereaved families of Sewol victims to suppress “anti-government organizing.”

Yet, anniversaries also provide an opportunity. Efforts to mark this anniversary with meaning, and provide the movement momentum again, have been well underway for months. The 10th Anniversary Committee – steered by members of Sewol Families for Truth and a Safer Society, 4.16 Network, and the 4.16 Foundation – was made possible through the donation of more than 3,510 individuals and 445 organizations.

Ahead of the anniversary, the Committee organized a march across the country that spanned 21 days. Commencing in Jeju on February 25, the march came full circle in Seoul, in front of the Sewol memorial space. The Sewol families, walking through 21 major cities in South Korea, were joined in by citizens who have been amplifying their cause in their respective hometowns.

April has likewise been teeming with events in remembrance of Sewol, from screening and staging films and theater productions on Sewol, to street protests and rallies organized by grassroots collectives across the country. Someone, somewhere, is bound to be thinking about Sewol throughout this “month of remembrance”.

A map of Sewol-related events being held across South Korea throughout April. Map via the 10th Anniversary Committee.

Exceptionality of Disasters and the Banality of Risk

It has been mobilizations like these that have kept the Sewol movement alive throughout the past ten years. There is a far-reaching network of citizens across the country, each doing their small part. Together, that amounts to an impressive bottom-up solidarity.

As Choi, Chang-hyun’s mother met with citizens over the course of the march back in February and March, she saw clearly that “the shock and pain from the Sewol disaster ten years ago still live on in them.” Supporters saw the work toward uncovering the truth of the disaster not as a responsibility of the affected families alone, but as “homework to be brought to completion by our society.”

And this is one of the many ways in which the Sewol disaster’s legacy lives on in South Korea. While the Sewol movement continues to trudge along the path toward justice and change, it would be remiss to appraise the legacy of the event, and the affected communities’ campaign, based on prosecutions and court rulings alone.

On the night of October 29, 2022, South Korea witnessed yet another appalling social disaster. The Itaewon Crowd Crush claimed the lives of 159, most of them young people. For many, Itaewon’s parallels with Sewol were striking: foreseeable dangers gone neglected, a failure to deliver a timely response, attempts at a cover-up by authorities, and the ongoing search for justice and accountability largely left in the hands of affected families.

Itaewon drove home what Sewol had unveiled: the proximity of risk, an unaccountable political system that fails to assign responsibility, and a dire need for systemic change.

Over the past 10 years, Sewol families, in addition to their campaign for the truth of the disaster, have been extending their solidarity with other victims across the country, in manifold senses of the term: from families affected by comparable social disasters, including the Itaewon Crowd Crush to families fighting for accountability from business owners after losing their loved ones to industrial accidents. The empathetic reach of the Sewol families across these boundaries is yet another way Sewol lives on in South Korea.

The Center for Disaster Victims’ Rights opened in January 2024 as a subsidiary of the 4.16 Foundation, bringing together communities affected by eight major disasters over the past 30 years in South Korea. The first network of its kind in the country, the center provides an important foundation for sustained solidarity among communities affected by mass fatalities like the Sewol disaster, and for support in instances of tragedies alike in the future.

The precise tenors and textures of their grief, and their respective demands, vary. But what unites these communities is that they grieve for lives that are not yet fully grievable. These are deaths that cannot be fully mourned without an adequate explanation and accountability. As experts on mass fatalities and traumatic events highlight, their fight is part and parcel of the effort to bring order and closure – albeit partial and fragmentary – to lives overturned by an event that remains inexplicable.

Among the many things that Sewol brought to light is the sheer banality of risk behind exceptional catastrophes. It was the reckoning of a shared, omnipresent risk that brought hundreds of thousands to the streets in 2014. If we are to take the grief of the campaigning families, too, as in some part ours – or to use Chang-hyun’s mother’s words, “homework to be brought to completion” collectively – perhaps the subsequent anniversaries of Sewol may look a bit different than today.

Authors

Guest Author

Sera Yeong Seo Park

Dr. Sera Yeong Seo Park is associate lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of St. Andrews. Her doctoral research at the University of Cambridge (2022) examined the social movement that emerged in the aftermath of the Sewol Ferry disaster. As an anthropologist, she is interested in activism and social movements in contemporary South Korea, the moral and affective dimensions of political life, and death and memorialization.

thediplomat.com

11. Senior US officials discuss N. Korea, Taiwan, South China Sea in talks with Beijing officials

Oh to be a fly on the wall for these conversations. Did Secretary Kritnebrink wear body armor?

Senior US officials discuss N. Korea, Taiwan, South China Sea in talks with Beijing officials

The Korea Times · April 16, 2024

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink attends a meeting in New York, in this Sept. 22, 2023 file photo. AP-Yonhap

Senior U.S. officials discussed with Beijing officials a range of regional and global issues, including North Korea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea during their visit to China this week, the State Department said Monday.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and National Security Council Senior Director for China and Taiwan Affairs Sarah Beran met with Executive Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu and Yang Tao, director general of the North American and Oceanian Affairs Department at China's foreign ministry.

Their trip to China from Sunday to Tuesday comes as part of ongoing efforts to maintain open channels of communication and "responsibly" manage competition, according to the department.

"The two sides discussed a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues, including the Middle East, PRC support for Russia's defense industrial base, cross-Strait issues, the South China Sea, and the DPRK," the department said in a press release.

PRC and DPRK stand for the official names of China and North Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, respectively.

"The United States emphasized its commitment to advancing its interests and values and those of its allies and partners," it added.

Asked to comment on Kritenbrink's trip in Beijing, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller noted that North Korea is always on the agenda during senior-level diplomatic engagements between Washington and Beijing.

"Certainly, every time that we engage with our Chinese counterparts — whether it is the secretary at his level or assistant secretary at his — one of the things that is always on the agenda is stability on the Korean Peninsula and preventing North Korea from realizing its nuclear ambitions," Miller told a press briefing.

Kritenbrink and Beran also met Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Qiu Kaiming to discuss cross-Strait issues.

"The assistant secretary and senior director underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and reiterated there has been no change to the U.S. one China policy," the department said.

The Taiwan issue has been a source of tension between Washington and Beijing as China hopes for reunification with the self-governing island democracy with the U.S. opposing any unilateral change to the status quo by either side.

The U.S. officials' visit to China came after President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping held phone talks early this month amid a U.S. effort to "de-risk" the bilateral relationship despite a hardening rivalry on multiple fronts, including technology, security and trade. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · April 16, 2024

12. U.S. envoy, FM Cho discuss ways to build new mechanism for N.K. sanctions monitoring

(4th LD) U.S. envoy, FM Cho discuss ways to build new mechanism for N.K. sanctions monitoring | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 16, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with USUN's readout in 6th para; RECASTS dateline)

By Kim Seung-yeon and Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL/WASHINGTON, April 15 (Yonhap) -- The top U.S. envoy to the United Nations and Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul discussed ways to build a new mechanism for monitoring the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea, Cho's office said Monday, after Russia vetoed a resolution meant to renew the monitoring mandate.

The meeting between Cho and Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield came amid growing concerns that Moscow's rejection to extend the mandate for the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korean sanctions could undermine international efforts to monitor violations of sanctions imposed on Pyongyang over its illicit weapons programs.

Thomas-Greenfield arrived in Seoul on Sunday on a four-day trip as part of an Asia swing that will also take her to Japan.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield (L) shakes hands with Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul ahead of their meeting at the foreign ministry in Seoul on April 15, 2024, as provided by Cho's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

"Minister Cho and Amb. Thomas-Greenfield expressed deep disappointment that the bid to extend the expert panel under the U.N. sanctions committee on North Korea was thwarted due to Russia's veto," the ministry said in a release.

"They discussed various ways to establish a new mechanism to monitor the implementation of sanctions against North Korea," it said.

In a separate readout, U.S. Mission to the U.N. spokesperson Nate Evans said that Cho and Thomas-Greenfield talked about the "next steps to ensure a continuation of independent and accurate reporting" of the North's ongoing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile advancements and sanctions evasion activities, following Russia's veto.

As an elected member of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) for 2024-25, Cho expressed hope that South Korea will use the platform to deepen trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan in responding to pending global issues at the UNSC level, according to the foreign ministry.

Thomas-Greenfield also suggested capitalizing on this occasion in which South Korea and Japan are both serving on the UNSC as nonpermanent members, noting how the elected members like South Korea played an important role in the successful adoption of the resolution calling for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

Cho asked for Washington's attention on the human rights situations in North Korea and North Korean escapees. Thomas-Greenfield reaffirmed the importance of the three-way cooperation involving Japan to increase the visibility of the issue within the U.N.

Iran's attack on Israel, the security situation in the Gaza Strip amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Hamas group, and efforts to expand humanitarian assistance in this region were also among what was discussed at Monday's meeting, Cho's office said.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield (L) speaks to Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul during a meeting at the foreign ministry in Seoul on April 15, 2024, as provided by Cho's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Later Monday, the U.S. envoy met with Defense Minister Shin Won-sik and expressed concern over Russia's recent veto, noting that it could create lapses in implementing U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions on the North, according to Seoul's defense ministry.

The U.S. envoy explained that Washington is making efforts to ensure that an alternative credible report on North Korean sanctions can continue to be produced, and expressed hopes for support from South Korea, it said.

The U.S. envoy called North Korea's advancement of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and an illegal act that undermines the universal values of the international community.

The two sides also expressed concern over increasing uncertainty in the global security situation, and agreed to cooperate to push for projects connected to the U.N. Security Council resolutions, according to the ministry.

Her visit came after Russia last month vetoed the U.N.'s annual renewal of an expert panel monitoring the North's compliance with U.N. sanctions.

North Korea has been under tightened U.N. sanctions, which call for, among other things, a ban on the country's exports of coal and other mineral resources to cut off North Korea's access to hard currency.

With the veto, the panel's mandate is set to expire April 30, a termination that observers say could chip away at international efforts to curb evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

During her trip, the U.S. envoy will also travel to the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, meet young North Korean defectors and speak with students at Ewha Womans University before heading to Japan on Wednesday.

It marks Thomas-Greenfield's first visit to Seoul, and the first trip by a U.S. ambassador to the U.N. since 2016.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik (L) speaks with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield (R), at Shin's office in central Seoul on April 15, 2024, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 16, 2024

13. How North Korea exploited the tragic Sewol ferry sinking for anti-ROK propaganda

How North Korea exploited the tragic Sewol ferry sinking for anti-ROK propaganda

State media has run thousands of articles on disaster to portray South Korea as dangerous place with incompetent leaders

https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/how-north-korea-exploited-the-tragic-sewol-ferry-sinking-for-anti-rok-propaganda/

Gabriela Bernal April 16, 2024

A screenshot from a program on Sewol disaster by South Korean broadcaster MBC | Image: MBC YouTube channel 탐사기획 스트레이트

Tuesday marks the 10th anniversary of the worst tragedy in recent South Korean history: the sinking of the Sewol passenger ferry off the country’s southwest coast. The disaster claimed the lives of more than 300 people — the vast majority high school students on a field trip — and deeply damaged public trust in the government, setting off a series of events that brought down the president three years later.

It has also been one of the single most common topics in North Korean state media over the past decade.

While it’s not uncommon for the DPRK to hurl insults at South Korea, the remarkable scale and fierceness of its criticism of the Sewol disaster stand out. 

North Korean state media has mentioned the tragedy thousands of times, with the Korean Central News Agency writing about the Sewol sinking 650 times in English alone — a staggering amount of coverage for a South Korean domestic issue.

State media first reported on the disaster on April 18, two days after it took place, and while North Korea sent a condolence message through the Red Cross later that month, it was also quick to blame the situation on the Park Geun-hye government. 

Pyongyang accused South Korean conservative forces of branding supporters of the victims’ families who demanded a probe into the sinking as “forces following the north” and launched a relentless media attack against Park that would continue until well after her March 2017 impeachment. 

The North also used the Sewol disaster for propaganda targeting its domestic audience. The message was clear: South Korea is a dangerous place with irresponsible and incompetent leaders, whereas Kim Jong Un ensures the well-being of everyone in the DPRK, especially children.

Citizens expressing condolences for Sewol Ferry victims | Image: Republic of Korea (May 7, 2014)

RELENTLESS COVERAGE

North Korean media often covers instances of South Korean public discontent, such as the construction of a naval base on Jeju Island and the signing of a U.S.-ROK free trade agreement. In recent years, the party-run Rodong Sinmun has frequently carried stories on protests against the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol government.

But the degree of the DPRK’s fixation on the Sewol disaster is striking. Perhaps the only other topic that state media has given comparable attention to is the deployment of THAAD interceptors in South Korea, but that arguably directly affects North Korea, unlike the ferry sinking.

The North’s coverage of the issue has spanned support for South Korean media reporting on the disaster, domestic and international criticism of the Park government’s handling of the incident, actions taken by South Korean civic groups, calls for investigations and commemorations of the tragedy.

From the beginning, state propaganda echoed the positions of South Korean news outlets that criticized the Park administration’s “incompetent” response to the Sewol disaster, referencing reports by KBS, MBC and others. 

KCNA also extensively covered organizations and groups that opposed the government’s handling of the disaster, with many articles focusing on criticism from Koreans in the U.S., China and Canada.

One article labeled President Park “a depraved old lady who has neither human ethics nor conscience and the worst traitor and sycophant.” The North also started covering calls for Park to resign in May 2014, well before the rest of the world started reporting on the candlelight demonstrations that eventually ousted her from power. 

DPRK analysts argued that Park “evaded the responsibility for the case and blamed public officials.” In subsequent years, KCNA focused mainly on the plight of bereaved families and repeated calls for an investigation into the sinking.

A screenshot of a South Korean TV broadcast about North Korea’s coverage of the Sewol ferry sinking | Image: Channel A

1

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PROPAGANDA FODDER 

The popularity of South Korean media in North Korea has increased the pressure on state propagandists to convince citizens that the ROK is not the glamorous, rich, happy place presented in movies, music or dramas. The Sewol disaster provided a golden opportunity to do just that.

Numerous Rodong Sinmun articles fiercely criticized the Park government’s handling of the Sewol sinking aftermath, particularly focusing on alleged human rights abuses committed by the South Korean government. 

One article gave a long and detailed account of how the Park “regime” was suppressing domestic media coverage of the Sewol disaster, while detailing how bereaved families faced persecution for wanting to find out the truth. 

Various other articles used the Sewol incident to liken Park’s government to a dictatorship and drew parallels with the Yushin Constitution era of her father, the authoritarian leader Park Chung-hee.

North Korean media also published articles about Sewol in English to draw a sharp distinction between the two Koreas for foreign readers. 

One May 2014 article titled “Striking Contrast between North and South of Korea,” for example, specifically highlighted the different lives of children on both sides of the border.

The article states that North Korean children go camping at the Songdowon International Children’s Camp, a place filled with laughter. But in the South, “the screams made by so many children” who died in the Sewol sinking continue “to ring loud still now.” 

North Korean media made sure to emphasize the superiority of the country’s leader as well, stating that Kim Jong Un attended the inaugural ceremony for the remodeled camp while blaming Park Geun-hye for failing to do her part to protect children on the Sewol. 

The DPRK also used the Sewol disaster to highlight oppression in South Korea and deflect from its own poor human rights record. 

One July 2015 article criticized the South’s crackdown on the Teachers Union over its support for a Sewol investigation, calling for the Park government to “immediately stop its brutal suppression of progressive and democratic forces.” 

An Oct. 2016 article accused the Park government of blacklisting artists who criticized the government’s response to Sewol. North Korea even brought up the disaster at the U.N. in 2017 to highlight South Korea’s human rights abuses. 

Using the Sewol disaster as a peg, countless articles have underscored the shortcomings of the South Korean government in an effort to remind citizens of how much better life is in the North, constantly quoting ROK media to add legitimacy to these claims.

President Park Geun-Hye holds a moment of silence for the victims of the Sewol ferry disaster in April 2014 | Image: Republic of Korea

DIFFERENT TIMES, SAME MESSAGE

While coverage of the Sewol disaster has declined, North Korean media continues to mention it from time to time, with the Rodong Sinmun publishing an article on Tuesday that referenced the 10th anniversary of the tragedy.

Although Park may be gone, Pyongyang is now framing the Sewol issue in the context of protests against the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, underscoring North Korea’s unchanged propaganda strategy of criticizing conservative governments as corrupt and rife with problems.

KCNA consistently reports on anti-Yoon protests in the South, low approval for the Yoon government and overall public discontent. KCNA has already mentioned him over 150 times in English-language articles during his two years in office, while referring to his progressive predecessor Moon Jae-in less than 100 times throughout his five years in office.

North Korean media will likely continue to step up its anti-South Korea propaganda going forward, particularly after Kim Jong Un declared the country the North’s “main enemy” earlier this year and called for efforts to instill this idea.

And with the memory of Sewol still fresh in the minds of millions of South Koreans, the DPRK will likely continue to hold up the tragedy as representative of its bleak view of the South.

Thousands protesting against Park Geun-hye’s government | Image: Mathew Schwartz

Edited by Bryan Betts

14. What are implications of US Army's structural transformation for Seoul?

Good to see the Ambassador recognizing our US Army transformation and its implications for Korea. He provides a short history (past two decades) of transformation based on updated national security strategy documents.

Someday I would like us to do a combined "bottom-up review" of the alliance military forces and ask and answer the questions: how do we optimize the combined capabilities of ROK and US forces for the defense of the ROK, deterrence, and for security in Northeast Asia? And then specifically answer what forces should be permanently stationed on the Korean peninsula, what should be stationed in the region and what forces should be on the TPFDD to deploy for war or contingencies. We might never attain the optimal combined force structure (and US force presence) but such analysis would inform force deployments as well as identify risks requiring mitigation.

The Ambassador may not be familiar with Total Army Analysis but I am sure our ROK Army counterparts who have attended US PME institutions know and understand it (even if many of us former military officers find it a challenging process!)

Excerpts:

Seoul needs to heed the implications of these transformations and proactively respond to these changes. For that, Korea will have to start with a rigorous assessment of its security needs and force structure. The U.S. white paper explains that the U.S. arrived at the above decisions through such assessments using a process known as Total Army Analysis.

Over the past two decades, on top of the changes in the security environment in the world and in Northeast Asia, significant changes have taken place on the Korean Peninsula as well. With respect to North Korea's nuclear capability alone, it conducted nuclear testing no less than six times, now alleging that it succeeded in testing a hydrogen bomb. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the cooperation between Russia and North Korea has evolved to an unprecedentedly high level, with Russia providing oil, materials and diplomatic support to North Korea, quite possibly even weapons of mass destruction technologies. In comparison with the early 2000s, these are highly ominous developments on and around the Korean peninsula. They call for Seoul's proactive response.

What are implications of US Army's structural transformation for Seoul?

The Korea Times · April 16, 2024

By Ahn Ho-young

Ahn Ho-young

The U.S. Army issued a white paper titled "Army Force Structure Transformation" on Feb. 27. The transformation reflects the systemic changes in the security environment in the world and in Northeast Asia over the past two decades. At the same time, the transformation is to have a significant impact on the security cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States. Let me highlight some outstanding points in the white paper.

The report repeatedly emphasizes that the transformation is called for so that the U.S. can effectively conduct large-scale combat against technologically advanced military powers. After the end of the Cold War, in particular, after Sept. 11 when the U.S. fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Army's structure has been transformed to conduct counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations more effectively. Today, in the U.S.'s assessment, more imminent threats to national security are posed by technologically advanced military powers. Now, the U.S. Army's structure must be refocused on conducting large-scale combat operations.

The report then lists and elaborates the transformations the U.S. Army intends to make. One of the most significant new structural additions is to complete the buildout of the Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs). The U.S. military has long recognized the necessity of multi domain operations in view of the fact that the spatial scope of modern warfare surpasses land, sea and air and extends to cyberspace and space. The U.S. launched its Cyber Command in 2010 and re-launched its Space Command in 2019.

The MDTFs are being formed at the brigade level and optimized to effectively fight modern warfare. They will consist of, among others, a multi-domain effects battalion, a long-range fire battalion and an indirect fire protection capability (IFPC) battalion.

These battalions will work to conduct intelligence gathering and synchronization, deliver non-kinetic space and cyber effects to shape operations, and deliver long-range firing in support of joint force maneuvers. The long-range weapons will range from the M142 HIMARS with a range of 500 kilometers to hypersonic missiles with more than 2,500-kilometer range. The IFPC battalion will provide mobile, ground-based protection to defeat cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft systems, rockets, artillery and mortars. The importance of IFPC capability became all the more apparent in the wake of the Ukrainian war.

Three task forces will be assigned to the U.S. Army Pacific. One will be assigned to the U.S. Army Europe-Africa, and another will likely focus on the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Significant investments in the force structure supporting multi-domain effects, long-range fire and indirect fire protection capability in particular will be made at the corps and division levels as well.

What are then the implications of this transformation for security cooperation between South Korea and the U.S.? The U.S. national security strategy was changed significantly through the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy report. That change was eventually reflected in the U.S. Global Posture Review and brought about important changes in security cooperation between South Korea and the U.S., such as the redeployment of U.S. troops in the South, the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the construction of Camp Humphreys, updated strategic flexibility for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and the transfer of responsibility to the South Korean military.

The U.S. national security strategy underwent another important change through the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy report. The current U.S. Army Force Structure Transformation is conducted in line with that change. As we experienced in the early 2000s, the ongoing transformation will, in turn, impact the security cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. As an example, the white paper states the inactivation of legacy formations, including cavalry squadrons in continental U.S.-based Stryker brigade combat teams. They are, in fact, deployed in Korea on a rotational basis.

Seoul needs to heed the implications of these transformations and proactively respond to these changes. For that, Korea will have to start with a rigorous assessment of its security needs and force structure. The U.S. white paper explains that the U.S. arrived at the above decisions through such assessments using a process known as Total Army Analysis.

Over the past two decades, on top of the changes in the security environment in the world and in Northeast Asia, significant changes have taken place on the Korean Peninsula as well. With respect to North Korea's nuclear capability alone, it conducted nuclear testing no less than six times, now alleging that it succeeded in testing a hydrogen bomb. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the cooperation between Russia and North Korea has evolved to an unprecedentedly high level, with Russia providing oil, materials and diplomatic support to North Korea, quite possibly even weapons of mass destruction technologies. In comparison with the early 2000s, these are highly ominous developments on and around the Korean peninsula. They call for Seoul's proactive response.

Ahn Ho-young is chair professor at the Kyungnam University. He served as Korean ambassador to the U.S. and vice foreign minister.

The Korea Times · April 16, 2024

​15. 5 kinds of North Korean refugees

5 kinds of North Korean refugees

The Korea Times · April 16, 2024

By Casey Lartigue

Reporters, researchers and curious minds often ask me about my long-term plans, goals and mission with North Korean refugees. I started to anticipate that question being asked at the end of interviews or discussions, but I now bring it up to provide context for my work.

Some of the people asking me the question are no longer hosting those radio and TV shows, so perhaps I should have asked them about their long-term goals and plans.

My long-term mission mirrors my short-term goals and plans: to partner with and empower North Korean refugees to engage in activities or studies according to their stated goals and dreams.

I first knowingly met North Korean refugees during a trip to South Korea in 2010. I neither planned on staying here nor working with them. As someone who likes to “do” freedom, I was honored to meet people who had escaped to freedom. But that was it.

After almost two years of learning and meeting North Korean refugees, I suddenly got active and seemed to be a bolt of lightning sent either from heaven or hell, depending on the viewpoint of others. I helped send USBs, air balloons and information to North Korea, met some paramilitary North Korean refugees, volunteered at a school for North Korean refugee youth and organized speeches and events. It seemed North Koreans were ready to storm North Korea’s bastille, and I would hold their coats as they did so.

I began meeting North Korean refugees who were not interested in radical activism but did want to raise awareness about North Korea. I started working with them.

Circling back, the first North Korean refugee I met praised me for my activities, then she paused and added, “but.” But what? She praised me more and said I was doing great things, but that didn’t help North Korean refugees who had already escaped. They had left North Korea behind and wanted other things, such as to improve their English language skills. That’s when I reorganized my focus and co-founded what has now become Freedom Speakers International (FSI).

The merging of activists, advocates and English learners under one project highlighted the diverse needs of North Korean refugees, but some challenges popped up. North Korean refugees who were neither activists nor advocates felt pressure to share their stories with volunteer tutors. We divided our program in half so those seeking to speak out could do so and those who wanted to anonymously study English could do so.

After FSI co-founder Eunkoo Lee and I quit our full-time jobs to focus on building the fly-by-night project into an organization, we had more time to have deeper discussions with North Korean refugees. We began to identify more reasons that North Koreans were coming to us.

There were storytellers who didn’t see themselves as activists or advocates. They wanted to tell stories of North Koreans who were still in North Korea, had been killed by the regime, or fellow North Korean refugee who could not speak out because their stories were too painful. When we had a speech contest focused on the lives of North Korean women, two of the speakers were men who movingly spoke about their mothers and sisters.

Han Bong-hee, a North Korean refugee whose father was killed by the North Korean government more than two decades ago, said, “I have now fulfilled my father’s mission, thanks to Freedom Speakers International,” after we published his memoir in English.

We identified another group that wanted to heal their own hearts and hoped others could also be healed. They said they had overcome trauma after telling their stories. Han Song-mi said her memoir she wrote with me helped her get over the trauma she had quietly suffered from for years.

We became aware of North Korean refugees who said their confidence had increased after they engaged in public speaking. On March 31st, FSI published Sharon Jang’s memoir, “Girl with Black Makeup” and she explained that publishing the book was like therapy that had increased her confidence.

FSI co-founder Lee Eun-koo and I work with North Korean refugees based on their individual levels and missions, ranging from activists, advocates, storytellers, those seeking to heal hearts, and others who find solace in our work to boost their confidence.

I try to briefly explain to reporters, researchers and curious people that we don’t have a particular agenda beyond partnering with and empowering North Korean refugees to find their own way. We have been able to work with a range of North Korean refugees long-term because we keep their individual needs at the center of our engagement.

Some of my fans have called me a “miracle worker.” I deny the compliment and explain we create opportunities for North Korean refugees to make their own miracles.

Casey Lartigue Jr., (CJL@alumni.harvard.edu) is co-founder of Freedom Speakers International with Lee Eun-koo and co-author with North Korean refugee Songmi Han of her memoir “Greenlight to Freedom.” He blogs at “Workable Words” for the Korea Times and on Patreon.

The Korea Times · April 16, 2024

16. This is not Lee Jay-myung's victory

Complicated Korean politics.

This is not Lee Jay-myung's victory

donga.com

Posted April. 16, 2024 07:56,

Updated April. 16, 2024 07:56

This is not Lee Jay-myung's victory. April. 16, 2024 07:56. .

Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung, having secured a substantial majority with 175 seats, may view this as a validation of his leadership, considering the challenging nomination process marked by 'screaming demise' and 'defection relay.' However, it's crucial to note that this outcome is not solely a defeat for the ruling party but also a significant victory for Lee Jae-myung.

The general elections, strategically scheduled during the third year of the government's term, naturally favored the opposition. They had a plethora of issues to attribute to the ruling party, from the 'gold apple price' and 'medical crisis' to the 'green onion controversy.' In contrast, the ruling party’s strategy of blaming the opposition only served to highlight their own failures, thereby underscoring their inefficacy.

This context paints Han Dong-hoon, the interim leader of the People Power Party, who led the campaign focusing solely on the 'Judgmenent of Lee Jae-myung & Jo Guk, as a political novice. Despite garnering support in the presidential race, their administration failed to deliver over two years, now irresponsibly requesting the public to assess Lee Jae-myung and Jo Guk again. The result was a dismal defeat, a reflection of Yoon Suk Yeol's incompetence and Han Dong-hoon's ineptitude.

Lee Jae-myung also significantly misjudged several aspects. Notably, the defeat in Seoul's Dongjak-B district was severe. Lee actively campaigned in Dongjak-B, where Na Kyung-won, a seasoned politician from the People Power Party with four-term records, faced off against Ryu Sam-young, a political newcomer from the Democratic Party. The election, effectively a face-off between Na Kyung-won and Lee Jae-myung, tilted decisively when Lee derogatorily referred to Na as 'Nabe' (combining her name with that of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe), sparking a gender bias controversy. Na's response, proclaiming herself "the last barrier and the ultimate frontline," secured her a strategic win.

Additional unexpected defeats occurred in districts such as Seoul's Dobong-A and Mapo-A. Dobong-A has been a Democratic stronghold since 1988, except for one instance in 2008. Mapo-A, cultivated over 20 years by Congressman Roh Woong-rae and his son, also fell. In Dobong-A, the People Power Party's Kim Jae-seop overcame An Gwi-ryong, who campaigned under the slogan 'Lee Jae-myung over Cha Eun-woo.' In Mapo-A, Lee Ji-eun, a recruit branded by Lee Jae-myung, lost to Jo Jeong-hoon, a former Together Citizens' Party member.

The loss in Gyeonggi's Hwaseong-B, a district held by the Democratic Party since 2012, further underscores the failures in Lee's nomination strategy. Democratic candidate Gong Young-woon, closely associated with Lee and embroiled in a 'daddy’s chance' controversy, was defeated by the New Reform Party's Lee Jun-seok. This surprising victory for a third-party candidate in a three-way race highlights the Democratic Party's flawed nominations and poor campaign strategies.

Rep. Park Yong-jin of the non-Lee Jae-myung faction commented in a March 13 interview, a month before the general elections, that victory would allow the leader to claim his choices were justified. However, he countered, "The public is not foolish. They do not believe that a good outcome can compensate for a bad process. Memories of the process are distinct, and the process must be evaluated on its own merits." Despite losing the last presidential election, the Democratic Party has neither reflected on nor eval‎uated Lee Jae-myung's candidacy. The evaluation of this general election's results remains to be seen.

한국어

donga.com

​17. North can genetically engineer biological weapons, U.S. report warns

Tuesday

April 16, 2024

Published: 16 Apr. 2024, 14:36

North can genetically engineer biological weapons, U.S. report warns

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-04-16/national/northKorea/North-can-genetically-engineer-biological-weapons-US-report-warns/2026511

North Korea has the capability to genetically engineer biological military products, an annual U.S. report showed Monday, noting Pyongyang has a "dedicated, national-level offensive" biological weapons (BW) program.

The State Department issued the report titled "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." It was prepared in consultation with the Department of Defense, Department of Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"The DPRK also has the capability to genetically engineer biological products with technologies such as CRISPR, which have been reported by its State Academy of Sciences and other sources," the report said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

CRISPR is an acronym for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats. It is a technology used to selectively edit genes.

In last year's edition of the report, North Korea was described as having "at least a limited capability" to genetically engineer biological products.

The change in the wording raised speculation that the North's biological weapons production capability might have improved.

The report noted that the North has had a steady focus on its BW program.

"The United States assesses that the DPRK has a dedicated, national-level offensive BW program," it said.

"The DPRK has the capability to produce biological agents for military purposes. The DPRK has the technical capability to produce bacteria, viruses, and toxins that could be used as BW agents," it added.

Yonhap

18. Satellite imagery reveals nighttime lights at North Korea's Camp 22

Satellite imagery reveals nighttime lights at North Korea's Camp 22 - Daily NK English

It is difficult to confirm whether the camp has been closed because it is possible to see an outer fence in satellite imagery of the area

By Bruce Songhak Chung - April 16, 2024

dailynk.com · by Bruce Songhak Chung · April 16, 2024

North Korea’s political prison camps – which the regime denies even exist – are referred to by their number, as in Camp XX. According to Daily NK reports, North Korea had six political prison camps as of June 2023: Camp 14 in Kaechon, Camp 15 in Yodok, Camp 16 in Hwasong, Camp 17 in Kaechon, Camp 18 in Pukchang and Camp 25 in Susong. These camps housed 198,900 people.

In recent nighttime Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) images, I detected lights at Camp 22 in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province, a camp which has been reported closed since June 2012. Using Google Earth imagery, I zoomed in on the area around the camp and examined its nighttime lights and key areas.

The Camp 22 area and its nighttime appearance

Reportedly closed, Camp 22 is located in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province, in the far north of the country. Lights were detected in three mountainous areas in early March. (Google Earth, VIIRS)

Hoeryong is the hometown of veteran actor Lee Soon-jae. Camp 22 covers the Chungbong district and Haengyong village of Hoeryong. Ahn Myeong-cheol, executive director of NK Watch and general secretary of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, worked as a prison guard there. The camp is a completely restricted area, notorious for its high mountains, deep valleys and tight patrols – once inside, not even your spirit can escape after you die. Ahn exposed the horrific conditions there to the world for the first time. The camp covers an area of 22,380 hectares, about 77 times the size of Seoul’s Yeouido. According to Ahn’s lectures on YouTube, the camp had a crematorium where authorities burned the bodies of dead prisoners (marked with a star in the image to the right).

Nighttime VIIRS images showed lights in three locations. I zoomed in on these three locations – two in the villages of Haengyong and Saul, and one on the outskirts of Kungsim – to examine them more closely.

Lights of Camp 22 at night

Lights can be seen in three places in Camp 22. The lights are coming from reclaimed agricultural fields in the hills. (Google Earth and VIIRS)

This VIIRS image of Camp 22, taken at 1:30 AM on Mar. 5, shows lights in three locations. The photo shows light emanating from reclaimed agricultural fields on a hillside in an area near the crematorium in Haengyong Village. Light was also seen emanating from hillside fields in Saul Village. In addition, light was detected emanating from an empty hillside on the outskirts of Kungsim Village. Lights emanating from hillside agricultural fields at night suggest that people are working day and night or engaged in some other unknown activity.

Camp 22 was reportedly closed in June 2012. According to Daily NK, the camp was closed because Hoeryong – the birthplace of anti-Japanese revolutionary Kim Jong Suk, mother of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and grandmother of current leader Kim Jong Un – is a sacred historical site and therefore unfit to house a political prison camp full of reactionary criminals. On the other hand, some people claim that North Korea did not close the camp, but merely disguised it to evade firm demands from the international community, including the U.N., to open the camp for inspections. Zooming in on the Google Earth image, I can see the remains of a fence on the outskirts of the camp. It is difficult to determine whether the camp is truly closed based on satellite imagery alone.

Changes in Haengyong village housing after the camp’s closure

About 20 buildings have been demolished and 10 have been rebuilt in the residential area of Haengyong Village. We can also see springtime agricultural activities, such as preparing seedbeds and watering fields before the early spring planting season. (Google Earth)

Looking at the residential area of Haengyong Village in 2011, before the camp was closed, we see small, house-like dwellings for inmates scattered here and there. It’s also possible to see workplaces, a furniture factory, a threshing floor, grain storehouses and other facilities. There’s also administrative facilities such as a command room, an interrogation room, and a transportation department. To determine what these facilities are, I referred to the satellite analysis materials released by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea on October 22, 2012.

Let’s compare this to a satellite image taken 11 years later, in May 2023, after the camp was closed. About 20 buildings have been demolished, including prisoners’ quarters, workplaces, and especially the interrogation room. On the other hand, about 10 new buildings were built. The Haengyong Stream flows through the village, flanked by agricultural fields. Agricultural activity can also be seen as farmers prepare seedbeds and water their fields before the spring planting season in early May. Comparing the two images, some of the facilities appear to have changed, with old buildings demolished and new ones built, but the farming and other highland agricultural work continues unabated.

A crane and conveyor belt can be seen at the coal storage site in the mining area of the Chungbong district. The spoil piles are getting larger, indicating that mining activity is continuing. (Google Earth)

A mining zone is located in the Chungbong district within Camp 22. There is a train station where coal is loaded onto trains, and we can see a sawmill where wood is turned into lumber. We can also see a conveyor belt and crane in the coal storage area, and spoil piles – discarded excavated material – near the mine entrance. The satellite image, taken 11 years later, shows that some buildings have been demolished or rebuilt. At the same time, the spoil piles have grown into tall mounds, indicating that while the prisoners may have left, mining activity continues.

After Camp 22 was closed, the authorities reportedly moved the prisoners to other locations while civilians moved in. However, because it is still possible to see an outer fence in satellite imagery, I cannot confirm that the camp has been closed. We did confirm that the facilities have changed, with dozens of buildings, such as detention and interrogation facilities, demolished and new ones built. We also observed that the mining and farming activities that were carried out by the prisoners in the past continue unchanged, albeit now carried out by migrants to the area.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Bruce Songhak Chung · April 16, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com