Quotes of the Day:

"Irregular warfare is a complex and dynamic form of conflict that requires unconventional solutions."

– Jim Mattis

"Unconventional warfare is like a game of chess played in the dark; the pieces are there, but you can't see them. You have to rely on your instincts and intelligence to make the right moves." 

– John F. Kennedy

“The constitution of a country should not violate the constitutions of its citizens.”

– Stanislaw Jerzy Lec

1. U.S., Japan, Philippines stress Korean Peninsula denuclearization goal, decry N.K. threats

2. Seoul envoy says Russia vetoed U.N. panel mandate extension to hide its 'dark spot'

3. UN Panel of Experts: The Final Act

4. NATO and the Republic of Korea: The AP4 in the Indo-Pacific

5. S. Korea, U.S. reaffirm plan for tabletop exercise on nuclear use by N. Korea

6. U.S.-led IPEF agreement on supply chains to come into force in S. Korea next week

7. Kakao becomes 1st S. Korean firm to join global open-source AI Alliance

8. US Navy secretary says he was 'floored' by a Pacific ally's shipbuilding abilities amid American warship production woes

9. S. Korea, U.S. begin large-scale annual air drills

10. Lots and lots of Dell computers (in north Korea)

11. Satellite images show Russia-North Korea arms trade

12. Why Peace Games? Insights from East Asia

13. South Korea’s national debt escalates by 450 trillion won over 5 years

14. Editorial: S. Korea’s national debt ratio exceeds 50% for the first time - populist policies must be stopped

15. ＜Investigation＞ Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (3) 'We aren't stupid, we don't want have kids who’ll turn into homeless'…Women have quietly rejected Birth Demands

16. High-profile defector-lawmaker Tae Yong-ho loses parliament seat in ROK election

17. Despite opposition win, ROK election just reinforced North Korea status quo

18. N. Korea sends workers to eastern Ukraine to help reconstruction efforts

19. Young N. Koreans find ways to avoid crackdowns on S. Korean dramas, movies

20. Young North Koreans are taking pains to avoid military service

21. China's top legislator Zhao meets key N. Korean official over ways to bolster bilateral ties

22. South Korean military paves way for robotic vehicles in its ranks

1. U.S., Japan, Philippines stress Korean Peninsula denuclearization goal, decry N.K. threats

I would describe the new structure as a web because a web is much stronger than a lattice.

Excerpt:

The three-way summit is part of the Biden administration's initiative to create a "lattice-like" network of regional allies for multilayered cooperation in the face of China's growing assertiveness, Russia's protracted war against Ukraine and North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats.

"Our three nations affirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and strongly condemn the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) escalatory threats and unprecedented number of ballistic missile launches, including multiple intercontinental ballistic missile launches, which pose a grave threat to peace and security," they said in the statement.

U.S., Japan, Philippines stress Korean Peninsula denuclearization goal, decry N.K. threats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 12, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 11 (Yonhap) -- The United States, Japan and the Philippines affirmed their commitment to the "complete" denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and denounced North Korea's growing military threats in their joint statement Thursday.

Following their countries' first-ever trilateral summit in Washington, President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. issued the "joint vision" statement, noting Pyongyang's provocative actions have "severe security implications" for the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

The three-way summit is part of the Biden administration's initiative to create a "lattice-like" network of regional allies for multilayered cooperation in the face of China's growing assertiveness, Russia's protracted war against Ukraine and North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats.

"Our three nations affirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and strongly condemn the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) escalatory threats and unprecedented number of ballistic missile launches, including multiple intercontinental ballistic missile launches, which pose a grave threat to peace and security," they said in the statement.

DPRK is the North's official name.

U.S. President Joe Biden (C) speaks alongside Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida before a trilateral meeting at the White House in Washington on April 11, 2024, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)

The leaders also "strongly" urged the North to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions and refrain from continued development, testing and transfer of ballistic missiles to any country, including Russia.

They pointed out that Russia has used North Korean missiles against Ukraine, while reiterating their "unwavering" support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

In addition, they emphasized the importance of addressing human rights and humanitarian concerns about North Korea, including the immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

On China, they expressed "serious" concerns about its "dangerous and aggressive" behavior in the South China Sea, while reiterating their "strong" opposition to any attempts by China to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea.

"We are also concerned by the militarization of reclaimed features and unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea," they said. "We steadfastly oppose the dangerous and coercive use of Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels in the South China Sea, as well as efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation."

The three sides announced the establishment of a trilateral maritime dialogue to enhance coordination and collective responses to promote maritime cooperation and unveiled a plan to conduct a maritime training activity around Japan next year.

They also decried Russia's threats of nuclear weapon use amid the war in Ukraine as "unacceptable."

"We state unequivocally that any use of a nuclear weapon by Russia in Ukraine would be completely unjustifiable," he said.

Moreover, the leaders welcomed U.S.-led groupings for regional stability, including the trilateral cooperation framework, involving South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that consists of the U.S., Australia, India and Japan.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 12, 2024

2. Seoul envoy says Russia vetoed U.N. panel mandate extension to hide its 'dark spot'

Seoul envoy says Russia vetoed U.N. panel mandate extension to hide its 'dark spot' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 12, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top envoy to the U.N. renewed his criticism Thursday for Russia having vetoed the mandate renewal of an expert panel monitoring anti-North Korea sanctions violations, highlighting Moscow's apparent intention not to reveal its "dark spot" through the panel.

During a U.N. General Assembly meeting, Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook railed against the veto last month of a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution meant to extend the panel's mandate. Absent the resolution, the panel is set to close on April 30.

"It was vetoed by the Russian Federation because Russia didn't want the watchtower, the panel, to shine light on its dark spot," Hwang said.

"The panel included in its recent report that it had been investigating reports of arms deals between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, which constitute a clear violation of multiple Security Council resolutions," he added.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

South Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Hwang Joon-kook speaks during a plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York on April 11, 2024 in this photo captured from a livesteam on U.N. Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Russia's veto followed weekslong negotiations over the UNSC resolution, during which Moscow called for a "sunset clause" for the entire sanctions regime against North Korea -- a demand unacceptable to Seoul, Washington and other UNSC members.

"Russia insisted on a sunset clause for the DPRK to end the sanctions measures in 2025 unless the council decides to extend it," Hwang said in the statement read out by Kim Sunghoon, a counselor at the South Korean mission to the U.N. Hwang left the podium due to a sudden nosebleed.

"Needless to say, none of the P3 or E10 could support the proposal," he added. P3 refers to three of the five permanent UNSC member nations while E10 means the 10 elected non-permanent UNSC members.

Hwang also underscored that Russia's veto will not silence international efforts to uphold the global non-proliferation regime.

"We will find another way to strengthen the monitoring mechanism and keep tracking DPRK's sanctions violations," he said.

Kim Sunghoon, a counselor at the South Korean mission to the U.N., speaks during a plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York on April 11, 2024 in this photo captured from a livesteam on U.N. Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Russian Ambassador to the U.N. Vasily Nebenzya criticized the "indefinite" nature of the North Korean sanctions regime, which he said has "severe humanitarian consequences" with a "heavy" burden on the North Korean population.

"The indefinite maintenance of draconian restrictions is doomed to fail," he said. "The launch of a serious process of reflection on updating the sanctions regime against the DPRK is more necessary than ever."

Nebenzya also said that Russia plans to submit a draft resolution in the "very near future" on a one-year extension of the panel's mandate with a "clear determination of the imperative for the council to take a decision on updating the perimeters of the North Korean sanctions regime."

Russian Ambassador to the U.N. Vasily Nebenzya speaks during a plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York on April 11, 2024 in this photo captured from a livesteam on U.N. Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Kim Song expressed appreciation for Moscow's veto.

"The DPRK highly appreciates the Russian Federation's veto ... as an independent exercise of the right to international justice and impartiality," he said.

He also claimed that UNSC sanctions are a product of a "heinous hostile policy" of the U.S.

Russia's veto came against the backdrop of burgeoning military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow amid Russia's protracted war in Ukraine.

Pyongyang has shipped over 10,000 containers of munitions or munition-related materials to Russia since September, as well as several dozen ballistic missiles, according to the U.S. government, as Moscow strives to replenish its weapons stockpile for use in Ukraine.

North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Kim Song speaks during a plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York on April 11, 2024 in this photo captured from a livesteam on U.N. Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 12, 2024

3. UN Panel of Experts: The Final Act

Excerpts:

It is worth considering whether there could be any way to continue the work of something like the Panel outside the framework of the Security Council. True, nothing is going to make sanctions against North Korea effective at this moment, but it would still be valuable to give the world transparency on how matters are developing on North Korea’s WMD proliferation and continued sanctions evasion.

Over the long haul, it was beneficial to the overall nonproliferation regime to maintain this mechanism and this expertise. The Panel’s reports had become increasingly detailed and valuable over time—in part because of increased support from member states. Revelations in the reports did create friction in the gears for sanctions violators and gave even the most committed violators cause for concern.

While an international panel of experts outside the UN context would have no legal authority and might not be able to receive the same level of information from member states, perhaps a network of non-governmental organizations in cooperation with a coalition of supporting governments might find a way to create structure that could continue the work of the Panel.

UN Panel of Experts: The Final Act

https://www.38north.org/2024/04/un-panel-of-experts-the-final-act/

• BY: JOSEPH DETHOMAS
• APRIL 11, 2024

The United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts (POE) established under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874 published its final report on March 7 of this year. Following the Russian veto of the Council resolution renewing the Panel’s mandate, the finality of that report has to be taken quite literally.

This will be a loss for those interested in the health of the global nonproliferation regime, the state of the UN, and stability on the Korean Peninsula. At a lower level of abstraction, students of sanctions will lose a valuable resource. The Panel left the stage after issuing a thorough report filled with vital information on the sanctions evasion efforts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and its international partners. It is easy to see why the Russians killed the Panel. It witnessed too much and had to be silenced. Covering the entirety of the 615-page report would take far more space (and, in some cases, more expertise) than this writer has to cover everything, but this article will attempt to briefly highlight a few of the Panel’s most important findings and implications of the veto.

A Brief Look at the Big Picture

First, the UN’s role in combatting proliferation will be greatly reduced after the March 28 Russian veto. It is important to recall that UNSC sanctions against WMD proliferators are the exception rather than the rule in international affairs. The initial 2006 sanctions resolutions against North Korea and Iran were a breakthrough in Security Council action against violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).[1] In the current geopolitical environment, we will not see their like again. The UNSC debate over the failed POE mandate renewal made clear that the POE was a direct casualty of the rivalry between Russia and Ukraine’s supporters in the West.

Second, UN sanctions against North Korea will not be enforceable. Legally, the sanctions and the 1718 Sanctions Committee remain in place. But, the debate over the POE mandate and the negotiations between Russia, China and the rest of the Council made clear that Russia and China’s ultimate target is the end of sanctions. They held the POE mandate hostage to a provision that would have sunset North Korean sanctions in one year. The report details how Russia and China have blocked enforcement efforts in the past year. Russian and Chinese violations will escalate and will no longer be reported to the Council. The signal will also be read by other potential North Korean partners in sanctions evasion. To the extent North Korea moderated its behavior at all due to sanctions, we can now expect that moderation to cease.

Finally, and perhaps of greatest concern, the great power rivalry exhibited during the New York debate pretty clearly indicates that preventing proliferation is no longer a common interest of the superpowers. This is a reversal of trends in relations between Washington and Moscow that extend back to the early 1960s. Even at their most idiotic levels of rivalry and nuclear paranoia, US and Soviet leaders figured out after the Cuban Missile Crisis that adding additional fingers to the nuclear button was a recipe for uncontrollable catastrophe.[2] Apparently, that particular lesson has been erased from history.

The Report

These large forces—far beyond the ability of the Panel to navigate—were the cause of its demise. But, within the context of its actual mandate to provide the Sanctions Committee and Security Council with professional, unbiased information, the Panel has left the stage on a high note. Were this writer still teaching graduate students, he could unleash an entire seminar room full of them on the annexes of the report alone. The Panel has left us with a fine summary of the state of play of North Korean nuclear and missile development. More importantly, the report is a definitive source on a wide range of North Korean sanctions evasion techniques.

1. Nuclear and Missile Programs: With regard to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, the pages of 38 North already cover most of the information in the report. It does provide rather extensive information on missile testing and confirms that the DPRK’s efforts are focused not on creating a “parade ground” force, but rather one suited to nuclear and conventional warfighting. Its detailed discussion of the short-range missile force, including warfighting drills and tests of air bursts for warheads, was of particular note.The panel notes that the DPRK continues to indigenize its sources of key materials and technology but does detail some continued technical bottlenecks for the missile program, which can remain of value for export control officials. The report surveys the better-known DPRK nuclear facilities. It highlights its view that the Experimental Light Water Reactor may be operating, but one is left feeling that there is much more that needs to be known that is simply beyond the Panel’s reach. Twenty-three of the report’s excellent annexes cover elements of the nuclear and missile program. The missile annexes, in particular, will serve as excellent resources.
2. Sanctions Evasion: The Panel has provided us with a wealth of information on successful DPRK sanctions evasion. It is depressing reading for those of us who worked in the field. Just a few data points from the report are sufficient for an expert to conclude the sanctions have reached a failure point. The DPRK’s chief vulnerability with regard to sanctions is its dependence on oil imports and its need for foreign exchange to deal with its chronic trade deficit. According to the report, Pyongyang has probably overcome both difficulties. UN sanctions cap Pyongyang’s annual import of petroleum. The report details how the DPRK—for the sixth year running—likely breached its annual cap of 500 thousand tons of imports by a factor of two or three by the end of September 2023. North Korean registered tankers made 87 oil delivery runs to North Korean ports during this period. Fifty-five-member states called for action, but were blocked by Russia and China.[3]It also appears as if North Korea’s extensive cybertheft programs have covered a significant fraction of its foreign exchange needs. According to the POE, the DPRK netted approximately $3 billion from 58 suspected cyberattacks on ROK cryptocurrency-related companies over the past six years. It may have acquired $750 million in 2023 alone from 17 other cryptocurrency thefts that the Panel was investigating. Some member states apparently believe this constitutes 50 percent of the country’s foreign income and perhaps 40 percent of the funding for the DPRK’s WMD program.[4] These are alarming numbers, far in excess of what the country earned from past illegal activities (many of which continue). Of course, the POE also noted other continuing activities (foreign workers, arms sales, illegal exports of coal and other minerals, etc.) that continue to earn foreign exchange.
3. Russia: If one could have any doubt about why the Russians silenced the Panel, they would only have to read the account of merchant vessels Angara and Maria, which were dealt with extensively in the report’s annexes.[5] According to information supplied by member states to the panel, the MV Angara is a known ammunition transport ship. It moved hundreds of 20-foot cargo containers from the port of Rajin in North Korea to the port of Dunay in Russia. The vessel was shown delivering 300 containers that originated in Rajin to a Russian naval facility at Konyushkovo Bay on September 12, 2023. The POE also released supporting information that would indicate the vessel carried explosive cargo as well as information that suggests the cargo was subsequently shipped by rail to a Russian military supply site not far from the front in the Ukrainian conflict.There is no irrefutable direct evidence that the shipments were weapons (we will avoid a smoking gun reference here), but the report leaves one just millimeters away from the conclusion that Russia and North Korea were engaged in a historically large violation of UN Security Council sanctions in the summer and autumn of 2023. Even a regime as immune to embarrassment as Putin’s would probably prefer to dim this particular international spotlight. The Panel should probably just be grateful they could not easily be tossed out of hotel or hospital windows like so many Russian witnesses to Putin’s activities have experienced.

The Panel has paid the price for doing the job it was given by the Security Council. It should be congratulated for doing so. Given the choice between whitewashing the violations of a Permanent Member of the Council or getting canned, it took the honorable course.

Is Anything to be Done?

It is worth considering whether there could be any way to continue the work of something like the Panel outside the framework of the Security Council. True, nothing is going to make sanctions against North Korea effective at this moment, but it would still be valuable to give the world transparency on how matters are developing on North Korea’s WMD proliferation and continued sanctions evasion.

Over the long haul, it was beneficial to the overall nonproliferation regime to maintain this mechanism and this expertise. The Panel’s reports had become increasingly detailed and valuable over time—in part because of increased support from member states. Revelations in the reports did create friction in the gears for sanctions violators and gave even the most committed violators cause for concern.

While an international panel of experts outside the UN context would have no legal authority and might not be able to receive the same level of information from member states, perhaps a network of non-governmental organizations in cooperation with a coalition of supporting governments might find a way to create structure that could continue the work of the Panel.

1. [1]
2. It is true that the UNSC acted even more forcefully against Iraqi WMD programs in UNSCR 687, but this was clearly the byproduct of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait rather than a direct response to proliferation.
3. [2]
4. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union quite frequently were stronger in their support for the NPT than many non-nuclear weapon states. Indeed, they initially saw the Treaty as interwoven with their broader strategic rivalry. (To put it bluntly, the Russians wanted to keep German fingers off the button, and the US wanted it kept away from more radical Soviet allies like Castro or Mao.) They also tended to divide the labor in dealing with problem countries. For example, the Soviets provided intelligence information to the US that helped derail a South African nuclear test. The US tended to defer to Moscow on dealing with North Korea through the end of the Reagan administration.
5. [3]
6. United Nations, Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2680, S/2024/215, March 7, 2024, 70-71 and 142-195, https://undocs.org/S/2024/215.
7. [4]
8. Ibid., 60.
9. [5]
10. Ibid., 277-308.

4. NATO and the Republic of Korea: The AP4 in the Indo-Pacific

Excerpts:

The ROK’s engagement with NATO provides a platform and network for building a more comprehensive security policy. The AP4 share interests in keeping the US engaged in the Indo-Pacific, to which deliberations in and with NATO can contribute. While also driven by commercial considerations, Korean arms sales to Poland have contributed to NATO’s efforts to support Ukraine in its legitimate defense. These sales offer an additional alternative sourcing, thereby also contributing to de-risking in a situation where Europe has problems supplying promised armaments, the US Congress is paralyzed by the stand-off between Democrats and Republicans, and Trump II is looming. In addition, and importantly, at the interface of civil-military technology, the ROK is leading in high-end semiconductors, which is also of interest for the European defense industry.

Seen from the EU perspective, the ROK is on the same page concerning rule of law, reform of trade governance and a cooperative stance in the Indo-Pacific, including China. They share the view that economic and technological security cannot be achieved by decoupling but needs careful management to achieve the goal of greater resilience. A transatlantic and transpacific network of partners resolute to maintain a rules-based order strengthens the individual partners and networks. This also adds to deterrence when presented realistically.

In this context, getting the evaluation of security developments in the Indo-Pacific from the AP4 based on their onsite intelligence and regional experience is a strategic asset for NATO. Openness for all those interested in cooperating according to rules could contribute to the stabilization of the Indo-Pacific and counter the narrative of encircling China. It reflects that security has become indivisible, as NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg underlined at the occasion of the 75th anniversary foreign ministers meeting, albeit more from a European perspective:

…the war in Ukraine demonstrates how intertwined the security of Europe is with the security of Asia and the Pacific. North Korea, China, Iran are supporting Russia’s war of aggression in different ways, so this demonstrates that security is not regional security, it’s truly global, and therefore it is important that we work together with our Asia-Pacific partners.

At the same time, experience in the post-Soviet era teaches us that it is crucial to avoid any misconception of NATO’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. French reluctance to agree to a liaison office in Tokyo was also inspired by the concern not to irritate China further—a valid point in expectation management. NATO support for the ROK’s policy of the denuclearization of North Korea and nonproliferation is less sensitive for China. China has been the nearly only backer of North Korea for decades. Thus, the marriage of convenience between Russia and North Korea, which reduces Chinese influence, is not to China’s liking in the long run. As the US regards North Korea as the more immediate threat and China the long-term systemic rival, cooperation on North Korea could become a common cause. Similarly, Japan and Korea focusing on North Korea could help soothe China, which otherwise eyes this new entente with suspicion and as part of a US-lead containment policy.

Given the discussed minilateral as well as the underlying bilateral strategic partnerships, agenda setting for the various institutions and meetings is important in choosing the appropriate forum, especially in terms of inclusiveness and transparency and avoiding ineffective overlaps. For NATO, this means developing an agenda showing added value in combining transatlantic and transpacific strategies to meet threats in both theatres beyond the acute menace, based on mutual interest, to engage partners sustainably. Thus, there is a need for public diplomacy, explaining mutual benefits, especially for preserving peace in the region, as general publics are not familiar with NATO’s tasks. Preventive diplomacy to maintain peace and make sure that Ukraine is not tomorrow’s Taiwan would be in high demand.

NATO and the Republic of Korea: The AP4 in the Indo-Pacific

https://www.38north.org/2024/04/nato-and-the-republic-of-korea-the-ap4-in-the-indo-pacific/

• BY: MICHAEL REITERER
• APRIL 9, 2024

In recognition of the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, its economic and technological prowess, and against the background of the Sino-US rivalry, NATO has intensified its relationships with partners, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), Australia, Japan and New Zealand (AP4). Issues like nonproliferation, cyber defense, science and technology, counterterrorism, interoperability, defense against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents, as well as the hotspots of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), Taiwan, East and South China Sea, Myanmar and the border dispute between India and China, are all areas that can impact directly on the Euro-Atlantic security.

One of the reasons why it took the ROK seventeen years to accredit its Mission in Brussels to NATO (only in 2022) was that Seoul has focused for a long time mainly on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, where NATO was not perceived as an important player. The intensification of the Sino-US rivalry and the ROK’s goal to become a “global pivotal state”—that is, globally engaged and value-inspired—have changed this calculation, resulting in greater cooperation with NATO and individual member states.

This paper first sketches the rapprochement between NATO and the ROK because of geopolitical changes and the indivisibility of security. North Korea and nonproliferation, as well as cybersecurity, are uniting challenges and the need to factor China into the regional and global security equation. For the ROK, this means not only participation in sanctions against Russia but also backfilling much-needed weapons to Ukraine, where Russia uses North Korean shells. Strengthening more formal ties with NATO also serves as a preparatory measure if a transactional US president is returned to office; it can also contribute to rendering the bilateral relationship with Japan within the AP4 network more resilient. The paper concludes by pointing out that NATO needs public diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific to demonstrate its added value to security and diplomacy.

Participation in Summits

The ROK was invited for the first time to the NATO Summit in Madrid in 2022. There, it made a strong impression on both the military and value-sharing fronts. Boasting a defense spending of 2.7 percent of GDP—the Asia-Pacific partner outperforming many NATO members—and demonstrating solidarity in participating in sanctions against Russia because of its illegal war against Ukraine, these key elements and more made President Yoon Suk-yeol a sought-after interlocuter for those seeking to purchase arms at good quality and price at the summits.

The arms deal with Poland consisting of K9 self-propelled howitzers, K2 tanks, armored vehicles and aircrafts, including FA-50 fighter jets, amounted by 2023 to $11.7 billion, up 184 percent from a year earlier. This backfill operation for NATO members supplying Ukraine indirectly was appreciated by the alliance and strengthened the ROK’s positioning itself as a pivotal state in world politics. This policy shift was spurred by China’s “pro-Russian neutrality” and Russia’s growing engagement with North Korea, which also led the ROK to intensify cooperation with the US and warm up to Japan.

The division of and tensions on the Korean Peninsula are reflected in North Korea supplying the other party in the conflict, Russia, with artillery shells, leading to a situation where South and North Korean arms are used on the same battlefield. This is a peculiar situation for two countries where only an armistice reigns, reminiscent of past proxy situations. All at once, these deliveries by the North render a kinetic follow-up to Kim Jong Un’s fierce enemy rhetoric vis-à-vis the South unlikely as stocks are run down, although the probable Russian compensation in technological support for North Korea’s nuclear, weapons and satellite programs add to the tensions.

Reflecting the growing geostrategic interdependence, the NATO 2022 Strategic Concepts refer to the threat emanating from North Korea. “Iran and North Korea continue to develop their nuclear and missile programmes. Syria, North Korea and the Russian Federation, along with non-state actors, have resorted to the use of chemical weapons.” The NATO Secretary General also regularly issues statements, like on the occasion of “…the launch of a military satellite by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, using ballistic missile technology in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. This raises tensions and poses a serious risk to regional and international security.”

NATO support for Seoul’s North Korea policy is a driving force for the ROK to cooperate with NATO. NATO supports denuclearization, condemns the North’s provocative rhetoric, nuclear activities and ballistic missile tests, and shares the view that this conduct poses a serious threat to regional and international peace, security and stability. The triangular arms delivery potentially contributes to standardization and interoperability among partners.

Cybersecurity is another common issue: As the ROK is often the victim of cyberattacks from China and North Korea, participation in NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) improves resilience; for the same reason, cybersecurity is also the pilot project for the European Union (EU)-ROK security cooperation.[1].

At the Vilnius Summit, the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme updated the previous one, specifying “in detail cooperation goals, the background of selecting areas for cooperation, strategic targets, detailed project content and implementation schedule to achieve cooperation.” The Vilnius Summit Communiqué deals with another main concern of the ROK, that is, China. It states: “The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” Therefore, while remaining open to constructive engagement, NATO allies will address “the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies.” While the ROK cannot expect any security guarantee from this arrangement, “shared awareness, enhancing our resilience and preparedness, and protecting against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance” as well as the plea to play a constructive role to end the war in Ukraine, are relevant for its security. While deterrence is achieved through the alliance with the US, the AP4 relationship may add to it, if consultation with the US actually shapes its policies and strategic choices.

Need for a Credible “Out-of-Area” Agenda

The Indo-Pacific remains “out-of-area” for NATO; however, “situational awareness of security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, including Russia’s war on Ukraine, the shift in the global balance of power and the rise of China, and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula” are of mutual importance, recognizing that there is only one comprehensive security. Therefore, the transatlantic and the transpacific dimensions need holistic evaluation and response.

This also applies to the EU, which recognizes that:

A paradigm shift towards more realism without throwing idealism overboard is in the making, which needs conceptual work as started with the Strategic Compass and close cooperation in the Transatlantic and Transpacific theatres with the US and interested partners.

The Strategic Compass specifies that the EU will deepen and expand the “strategic partnership, political dialogue and cooperation with NATO across all agreed areas of interaction, including new key work strands such as resilience, emerging disruptive technologies, climate and defence and outer space.” While the Korean engagement with NATO provides an additional opportunity for comprehensive cooperation between Brussels and Seoul, EU and NATO operations are different and should be kept separate, such as Operation ATALANTA and Operation Ocean Shield.

The informal NATO framework of AP4 cooperation has also helped the rapprochement between Japan and the ROK, providing stepping stones for quadrilateral meetings leading to the trilateral Camp David Summit, the Camp David Principles and the Commitment to Consult. Japan and the ROK are invited for the third time in a row to the 2024 July NATO Summit in Washington. As part of this summit, a trilateral meeting in the Camp David format is under preparation to keep the momentum. This will be necessary to keep historic issues at bay. Recent decisions by the Korean Supreme Court in favor of wartime forced labor workers’ claims on Japanese companies could strain the relationship. However, for the first time ever, a Japanese company paid compensation to the family of a deceased worker, which is potentially an important step in solving the issue and essential for being able to sustain ROK-Japan ties amid the aggravating security situation. In terms of security, the trilateral will serve to discuss further cooperation in the context of NATO and find common ground on North Korea, as Japan seems to be interested in holding a summit meeting.

NATO also plays a role in the context of nonproliferation. Considering the threats emanating from North Korea and China, the ROK’s trust in the iron-clad alliance with the US started to crack during President Trump’s “love affair” with the North Korean leader. Doubts about the US nuclear umbrella fueled discussions in Seoul about “nuclear sovereignty,” that is, the indigenous production or stationing of US nuclear arms in the ROK. In this context, NATO-style weapon sharing, which means participation in the planning of deterrence, could reduce the temptation to go alone. At the occasion of the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2023, the US and the ROK agreed to the Washington Declaration, where Seoul confirmed: “full confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments and recognize the importance, necessity, and benefit of its enduring reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent.” This reassurance should help President Yoon to stand his ground.

However, future developments will depend heavily on the US and its policy towards the ROK: gaining operational control (OPCON) over the military in times of war is an unresolved issue that nourishes the nationalistic undercurrent. The same goes for Seoul’s contribution to burden sharing for US troops stationed in the country (Special Measures Agreement), where President Trump previously pushed undiplomatically and hard for a major increase. These elements could become a push factor for Seoul to strive for nuclear sovereignty. Its diplomatic costs in breaching nonproliferation agreements, the likely spreading of proliferation to include Japan, would need to be weighed against security gained—all negative, in my opinion.

As a return to a transactional US presidency is of concern, there are also efforts underway to strengthen institutional bonds to increase the resilience of US engagement. This was also the main theme of the 75th anniversary meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels in April 2024; as Secretary General Stoltenberg put it, “I do not believe in America alone. Just as I don’t believe in Europe alone. I believe in America and Europe together.” AP4 foreign ministers were invited and had a separate working session with their NATO colleagues.

NATO’s outreach to AP4, in addition to the intelligence network Five Eyes, Quad and eventually Quad+, AUKUS, D-10 Strategy Forum of leading democracies, the Summit of Democracies, and T-12 Techno Democracies could change the US hub-and-spoke alliance system into a more network-based system, establishing links among the various bilateral and minilateral arrangements. The planned trilateral US-Japan-Philippines military exercise is part of this new development. Nevertheless, there is a similarity between the US and China in their strategic approach to their rivalry: both prefer setting up their own arrangements instead of working through existing ones, like the United Nations or G20—a great power attitude to apply strengths directly and unfiltered.

Already before Xi Jinping, the Shanghai Five became the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) was meant to provide a vehicle for an “Asia for Asians” policy. The Boa Forum, BRICS+, the New Asia Development Bank, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and various funds supporting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are further examples, as well as China’s participation in regional free trade agreements like Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and its interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

In contrast, the US or, more specifically, President Trump, dropped out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017. Instead of rejoining that regional trade arrangement, President Biden opted to pursue his own, albeit less ambitious, initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), which has a strong like-minded element but—crucially—does not grant market access. While these cooperative efforts restrain bilateral pressure, they contribute to a bifurcation of global political and economic systems as the guardians of the systems, the UN and World Trade Organization (WTO), are weak.

Conclusions

The ROK’s engagement with NATO provides a platform and network for building a more comprehensive security policy. The AP4 share interests in keeping the US engaged in the Indo-Pacific, to which deliberations in and with NATO can contribute. While also driven by commercial considerations, Korean arms sales to Poland have contributed to NATO’s efforts to support Ukraine in its legitimate defense. These sales offer an additional alternative sourcing, thereby also contributing to de-risking in a situation where Europe has problems supplying promised armaments, the US Congress is paralyzed by the stand-off between Democrats and Republicans, and Trump II is looming. In addition, and importantly, at the interface of civil-military technology, the ROK is leading in high-end semiconductors, which is also of interest for the European defense industry.

Seen from the EU perspective, the ROK is on the same page concerning rule of law, reform of trade governance and a cooperative stance in the Indo-Pacific, including China. They share the view that economic and technological security cannot be achieved by decoupling but needs careful management to achieve the goal of greater resilience. A transatlantic and transpacific network of partners resolute to maintain a rules-based order strengthens the individual partners and networks. This also adds to deterrence when presented realistically.

In this context, getting the evaluation of security developments in the Indo-Pacific from the AP4 based on their onsite intelligence and regional experience is a strategic asset for NATO. Openness for all those interested in cooperating according to rules could contribute to the stabilization of the Indo-Pacific and counter the narrative of encircling China. It reflects that security has become indivisible, as NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg underlined at the occasion of the 75th anniversary foreign ministers meeting, albeit more from a European perspective:

…the war in Ukraine demonstrates how intertwined the security of Europe is with the security of Asia and the Pacific. North Korea, China, Iran are supporting Russia’s war of aggression in different ways, so this demonstrates that security is not regional security, it’s truly global, and therefore it is important that we work together with our Asia-Pacific partners.

At the same time, experience in the post-Soviet era teaches us that it is crucial to avoid any misconception of NATO’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. French reluctance to agree to a liaison office in Tokyo was also inspired by the concern not to irritate China further—a valid point in expectation management. NATO support for the ROK’s policy of the denuclearization of North Korea and nonproliferation is less sensitive for China. China has been the nearly only backer of North Korea for decades. Thus, the marriage of convenience between Russia and North Korea, which reduces Chinese influence, is not to China’s liking in the long run. As the US regards North Korea as the more immediate threat and China the long-term systemic rival, cooperation on North Korea could become a common cause. Similarly, Japan and Korea focusing on North Korea could help soothe China, which otherwise eyes this new entente with suspicion and as part of a US-lead containment policy.

Given the discussed minilateral as well as the underlying bilateral strategic partnerships, agenda setting for the various institutions and meetings is important in choosing the appropriate forum, especially in terms of inclusiveness and transparency and avoiding ineffective overlaps. For NATO, this means developing an agenda showing added value in combining transatlantic and transpacific strategies to meet threats in both theatres beyond the acute menace, based on mutual interest, to engage partners sustainably. Thus, there is a need for public diplomacy, explaining mutual benefits, especially for preserving peace in the region, as general publics are not familiar with NATO’s tasks. Preventive diplomacy to maintain peace and make sure that Ukraine is not tomorrow’s Taiwan would be in high demand.

1. [1]
2. Gertjan Boulet, Michael Reiterer and Ramon Pacheco Pardo, eds. Cybersecurity Policy in the EU and South Korea from Consultation to Action: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (London: Palgrave, 2022).

5. S. Korea, U.S. reaffirm plan for tabletop exercise on nuclear use by N. Korea

This is very much necessary.

S. Korea, U.S. reaffirm plan for tabletop exercise on nuclear use by N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 12, 2024

SEOUL, April 12 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States on Friday reaffirmed a plan to hold a discussion-based exercise simulating North Korea's use of a nuclear weapon as part of efforts to strengthen their joint response to Pyongyang's nuclear threats.

The two sides noted the plan for the tabletop exercise (TTX) during their regular defense talks, the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue, in Washington on Thursday (local time), according to a joint statement.

The allies had agreed to incorporate scenarios of nuclear operations into their regular summertime military exercise in a session of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) last December.

Although the allies held their first TTX on nuclear weapon use by the North in February last year, it would mark the first time such training takes place in conjunction with the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise in August.

As part of efforts to deepen cooperation against the North's threats, President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden issued a joint declaration last April to establish the NCG to discuss nuclear and strategic planning.

Cho Chang-rae (L), deputy defense minister for policy, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner pose for a photo as they attend the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue in Washington on April 11, 2024, in this photo provided by Seoul's defense ministry the next day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

During the latest talks, the U.S. side reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of South Korea, reiterating that any North Korean nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners will result in the end of the North's regime, according to the statement.

The two sides also discussed ongoing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, noting that it undermines peace and stability in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, and pledged to respond to it in close coordination with the international community.

They also held in-depth discussions on cooperation for maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.

"The U.S. side noted the ROK's efforts to collaborate on MRO initiatives and affirmed that such cooperation is in accordance with the direction of enhancing the Alliance's posture and capabilities," it said, referring to the South by the acronym of its official name, the Republic of Korea.

In February, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro visited shipyards in South Korea to explore possible MRO cooperation.

In addition, the two sides agreed to make efforts for a Reciprocal Defense Procurement agreement that will provide reciprocal market access as part of efforts to enhance supply chain resiliency and strengthen defense cooperation, the statement said.

They also agreed to modernize the alliance with advanced technologies, noting that South Korea's recently launched military reconnaissance satellite contributes to their joint surveillance capabilities.

South Korea launched its first military spy satellite into orbit last December and its second one earlier this week under a plan to acquire five such satellites by 2025.

The two sides stressed the importance of trilateral cooperation with Japan, and they agreed on the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, according to the statement.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 12, 2024

6. U.S.-led IPEF agreement on supply chains to come into force in S. Korea next week

U.S.-led IPEF agreement on supply chains to come into force in S. Korea next week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · April 12, 2024

SEOUL, April 12 (Yonhap) -- The United States-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework relating to supply chain resilience will enter into force in South Korea next week, Seoul's industry ministry said Friday.

The initiative will enter into force Wednesday, 30 days after the country's deposition of its instrument of ratification for the initiative, in accordance with its provisions, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said.

The platform was launched by U.S. President Joe Biden in 2022, involving 14 member nations, including South Korea, the U.S., Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

The initiative has four pillars -- trade, supply chain resilience, a clean economy and a fair economy -- and they reached an agreement on the supply chain resilience pillar last year.

The IPEF supply chain agreement has so far come into force in five nations, including the U.S., Japan and India.

The agreement is meant to establish a framework for deeper collaborations among partner nations "to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for supply chain disruptions," such as those experienced in recent years from the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the ministry.

Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun (2nd from L) poses for a photo with his counterparts from member nations of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework agreement in San Francisco, in this Nov. 14, 2023, file photo provided by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · April 12, 2024

7. Kakao becomes 1st S. Korean firm to join global open-source AI Alliance

Kakao becomes 1st S. Korean firm to join global open-source AI Alliance | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 12, 2024

SEOUL, April 12 (Yonhap) -- Kakao Corp. said Friday it has joined a global consortium that promotes open-source artificial intelligence (AI) research and development, becoming the first South Korean corporate member of the initiative.

Kakao said it is the first South Korean firm to join the AI Alliance led by global tech giants IBM and Meta, as part of efforts to help create a local AI ecosystem that meets global standards.

The AI Alliance was founded in December by a range of organizations, from global big tech companies and startups to public institutes and universities, and currently has around 100 members.

The consortium aims to accelerate open innovation across the AI technology landscape to improve foundational capabilities, safety, security and trust in AI.

"We will cooperate with the AI Alliance to create a safe and credible open-source AI ecosystem that meets global standards," Kim Kyung-hoon, head of Kakao's AI safety division, said.

The corporate logo of Kakao Corp. provided by the company (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 12, 2024

8. US Navy secretary says he was 'floored' by a Pacific ally's shipbuilding abilities amid American warship production woes

A partner in the arsenal of democracy.

Perhaps we could make US companies more competitive if we start going to South Korea to have them build ships for us and force them to increase capacity through competition.

US Navy secretary says he was 'floored' by a Pacific ally's shipbuilding abilities amid American warship production woes

Business Insider · by Chris Panella

Military & Defense

Chris Panella

2024-04-11T16:00:18Z

Facebook Email Twitter LinkedIn Copy Link

Read in app

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) is moved to an outfitting berth at Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia, April 8, 2024. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Simon Pike

Amid concerns about American shipbuilding, the US Navy's top civilian official said this week that he was "floored" by a Pacific ally's capabilities in this space.

The Navy secretary's comments came on the heels of an internal review that discovered that most of the Navy's top programs, including high-priority submarines, a first-in-class guided-missile frigate, and the third Ford-class aircraft carrier, are severely delayed by years, fueling worries from US officials about the ability to maintain our pace against great power rivals.

During his keynote speech at the Navy League's Sea Air Space conference this week, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro said his recent trip to South Korea had left him impressed by their shipbuilding.

"When my team and I went to South Korea, we were floored at the level of digitization and real-time monitoring of shipbuilding progress, with readily available information down to individual pieces of stock materials," Del Toro said.

"Their top executives could tell us to the day when ships would be delivered," he said. That's a stark difference from the US, which is facing problems with its shipbuilding capacity, labor availability, and resources.

Back in January, Del Toro ordered a 45-day review to assess the progress of the Navy's top shipbuilding programs, which found that most were delayed. After the review's findings were made public, Del Toro ordered a follow-up review into solutions for the delays.

US Navy

Del Toro paid a visit to South Korea's yards in February, during which he encouraged companies to invest in commercial and naval shipbuilding facilities in the US. He noted "there are numerous former shipyard sites around the country which are largely intact and dormant" that are "ripe for redevelopment."

He also called South Korean shipbuilding "an asset" to the US, especially "as China continues to aggressively pursue worldwide shipbuilding dominance," the Navy said at the time.

That month, retired US Marine Corps Maj. Jeffrey L. Seavy wrote for the US Naval Institute that China had roughly 47% of the global market on shipbuilding, the most of any country, with South Korea coming in second at around 29% and Japan in third with about 17%. The US "has a relative insignificant capacity at 0.13%," he said, referencing numbers from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

During his recent Sea Air Space speech, Del Toro further praised South Korea and commended Japan, saying both Pacific allies could build high-quality ships on time, on budget, and often at a fraction of the cost.

"It's an ethos, a commitment to constant improvement that is the foundation of their reputation for consistently delivering on time and on budget, even during COVID," he said.

Though some delays have stemmed from the challenge of building first-in-class vessels, the Navy has attributed much of the delays currently bogging down its important shipbuilding programs to the COVID-19 pandemic, adding that residual supply chain and labor issues have pushed timelines back and ballooned costs.

The Navy is trying to find solutions though. According to Hon. Nick Guertin, the Navy acquisition executive, the Navy review "identified major initiatives to drive improvement that we plan to pursue."

"Our Navy ships exist to strengthen American dominance and deliver warfighting capability by providing the tools our warfighters need to operate the world's strongest navy. In order to provide these key warfighting tools, shipbuilding challenges must be addressed," he told reporters earlier this month.

Defense

Business Insider · by Chris Panella

9. S. Korea, U.S. begin large-scale annual air drills

S. Korea, U.S. begin large-scale annual air drills | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 12, 2024

SEOUL, April 12 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States kicked off a joint annual air exercise Friday, involving some 100 warplanes, to strengthen their readiness against North Korean military threats, their air forces said.

The two-week Korea Flying Training (KFT) got under way at Kunsan Air Base in Gunsan, 178 kilometers south of Seoul, with plans to mobilize around 25 types of aircraft, including U.S. F-35B and South Korean F-35A stealth fighters, according to a joint release.

The exercise, which will also involve U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel, focuses on integrating advanced fighter jet operations, enhancing precision strike capabilities, and training troops on combat search and rescue scenarios and mass paratrooper airdrops, it said.

"Our ability to train together at this scope enhances interoperability and enables our forces to be ready for any potential situations," said Col. Charles G. Cameron, director of operations and plans at the U.S. 7th Air Force in South Korea, in the release.

KFT is one of the two regular large-scale air exercises the allies hold every year. KFT is held in the first half of the year, while the other -- named Vigilant Defense last year -- takes place in the latter half.

The exercise comes as tensions run high from North Korea's continued weapons tests this year, including its April 2 launch of a purported solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead.

South Korean F-15Ks taxi on a runway at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, in this file photo provided by the Air Force on March 4, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 12, 2024

10. Lots and lots of Dell computers (in north Korea)

Lots and lots of Dell computers

northkoreatech.org · by Martyn Williams · April 9, 2024

Kim Jong Un recently paid a visit to a new political school in Pyongyang that will train the next generation of leaders of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).

Korean Central Television covered his inspection tour of the Central Cadres Training School of the WPK, which appears to be relatively far along in its construction. Kim met with designers and planners of the college and looked around several buildings, including what is likely the “electronic reading room” and study area.

In it, there were tens of desks set up with computer monitors, keyboards, mice and desktop computers, likely for access to the domestic intranet and, possibly, the Internet. A prominent “Dell” logo can be seen on the back of a monitor closest to the camera and on several other monitors in the shot below.

Dell monitors at the Central Cadres Training School in Pyongyang, seen on Korean Central Television on April 1, 2024 (Source: KCTV)

A closer look at the Dell desktops reveal machines that look very similar to computers currently being sold on Dell China’s website.

Despite sanctions that are meant to prevent high-tech equipment from entering North Korea from overseas, the presence of the Chinese economy on its doorstep appears to make it remarkably easy for North Korea to import computer equipment it needs.

In the past, the logos of foreign computer companies have often been obscured in KCTV shots. In this case, state media censors obviously thought that wasn’t needed.

Computers at the Central Cadres Training School in Pyongyang, seen on Korean Central Television on April 1, 2024 (Source: KCTV)

Kim Jong Un at the Central Cadres Training School in Pyongyang, seen on Korean Central Television on April 1, 2024 (Source: KCTV)

northkoreatech.org · by Martyn Williams · April 9, 2024

11. Satellite images show Russia-North Korea arms trade

Imagery at the link: https://www.newsweek.com/satellite-images-show-russia-north-korea-arms-trade-1889337?utm

Satellite images show Russia-North Korea arms trade

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · April 11, 2024

New satellite imagery may give a snapshot of the deepening partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang.

A pair of cargo ships believed to have facilitated illicit munitions and oil transfers between Russia and North Korea have been captured docked next to stacks of containers in the other country's port.

Russia has been supplying oil directly to North Korea, in violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions that cap shipments at 500,000 barrels per annum. North Korea, meanwhile, is suspected of shipping thousands of containers of munitions by sea, rail, and air to help replenish Russia's stockpiles as it runs through resources more than two years into its war with Ukraine.

According to the Washington, D.C.-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) Korea Chair program, one of the satellite photos shows what is likely North Korea-flagged oil tanker the Paek Yang San 1, which the U.N. has flagged over its involvement in illicit oil transfers to the Kim Jong Un regime.

Satellite imagery shared by CSIS shows a cargo ship believed to be the Maria waiting to be loaded with containers at North Korea's port of Najin. The Maria is one of four Russian vessels under... Satellite imagery shared by CSIS shows a cargo ship believed to be the Maria waiting to be loaded with containers at North Korea's port of Najin. The Maria is one of four Russian vessels under U.S. sanctions for alleged involvement in the illicit arms trade. CSIS/Beyond Parallel/Maxar2024

The vessel can be seen docked at Russia's far eastern Vostochny Port. Its arrival followed at least five such visits at the port by North Korean tankers, according to satellite imagery shared with the Financial Times by the British think tank the Royal United Services Institute.

The satellite imagery shows that the Paek Yang San 1 arrived at Vostochny Port's oil terminal sections on April 2 and remained berthed there until Monday, Jennifer Jun, Korea Chair project manager and research associate, told Newsweek.

Based on observations of the ship's past trips, it was likely taking its cargo to North Korea's Chongjin, though this could not be confirmed due to lack of high-resolution photos of the northeastern city at the time, she said.

Jun pointed out that the Paek Yang San 1 had been "dark" since March 10 to avoid detection during its trips between the two countries. This means it had turned off its automatic identification system transponder, which transmits position, identification and other details to other vessels and to coastal authorities.

"To have their AIS turned off, especially in a busy port, is a deliberate and risky choice," June said.

A second, unidentified tanker was spotted at the same location in Vostochny on Wednesday. This vessel was also dark, suggesting involvement in the illicit oil transfers, she said.

The North Korean Embassy in Beijing and the Russian Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to written requests for comment.

The CSIS analysts are confident the other photo showed the Russian cargo ship Maria parked at Najin, a North Korean port city less than 20 miles from the Russian border.

The ship was spotted arriving between April 4 and April 7 and had left by April 8. The Maria appeared in satellite imagery of Vostochny Port on Wednesday, though it had switched its AIS off, Jun said.

The Maria is one of four Russian cargo ships sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control for alleged "proliferation of military equipment and munitions from [North Korea] to Russia."

Along with the Maria, the Lady R, and the Angara, the Maia-1 made 32 port calls at the North Korean city Rason since the supply runs were first tracked last August.

Last month, analyst group NK Pro pointed to satellite imagery showing what appeared to be the Lady R at North Korea's Rason Port, marking a return of Russian cargo ships after a month's absence.

Though Russia has expanded its own munitions production to maintain its ground operations in Ukraine, fluctuating shortages continue.

South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik told reporters in late February that North Korea had sent an estimated 6,700 shipping containers of ammunition to Russia. These potentially contained as many as 3 million 152-millimeter artillery shells, he said—a type of ammunition in particularly short supply.

Ukrainian defense intelligence agency the Main Intelligence Directorate, also known as GRU, estimated in February that Russia had imported some 1.5 million artillery shells from its reclusive neighbor.

Pyongyang has been signaling stronger ties with Moscow while shelving attempts to lower decades-high tensions with Seoul.

Last month, the U.S. and South Korea launched a joint task force to stem the flow of resources fueling Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Ways to counter smuggled oil shipments, including from Russia, were discussed at the inaugural meeting.

Update 4/11/24, 11:50 p.m. ET: This article has been updated with additional analysis.

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · April 11, 2024

12. Why Peace Games? Insights from East Asia

I participated in the north Korea peace game in 2021. It was quite comprehensive taking place over many days virtually with participants in Korea and the US. I believe I was the token former uniformed military participant. :-). But it was very well done.

I would like to see USIP partner with MOU for a unification peace game.

Excerpts:

Few competent militaries would finalize plans and strategies for war let alone attempt real-world execution without testing them first in tabletop exercises. It is only prudent for governments to take a similar tack when formulating policies and strategies for peace. If war games constitute an essential arrow in a warrior’s quiver, peace games should also be considered an essential instrument in a peacemakers’ toolkit.

Why Peace Games? Insights from East Asia

Peace games are not just an academic exercise — they are vital simulations for exploring ways to both prevent a war and strengthen interstate amity.

Thursday, April 11, 2024 / BY: Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.; Frank Aum

usip.org

What are peace games? They should not be confused with war games, which are simulations of military operations between two or more sides that seek to examine and improve warfighting concepts across different scenarios. In short, they focus on the conduct of war. Peace games, however, are simulations of primarily diplomatic engagement (but also using military and economic tools) that seek to explore and improve statecraft to advance peace and reduce the risks of conflict. Just as war games are valuable for militaries to explore how conflicts might play out under different scenarios and to test the efficacy of operational plans, peace games are valuable for studying how adversarial relations can be improved and to test the efficacy of diplomatic strategies.

Peace games are not propelled by flights of fantasy nor are they driven by wishful thinking. They are serious simulations grounded in real-world problems and focused on the difficult challenge of seeking alternatives to hostilities and wars as well as grappling with how to address seemingly intractable and heated disputes via peaceful means.

Together, the authors of this article possess decades of policy and analytic experience in the U.S. national security community. All of us view simulations as a valuable tool to explore major global security challenges and glean fresh insights into how to address them. We both specialize in the strategic landscape of East Asia and each of us have wrestled over the course of our careers with the daunting real-world security challenges posed by China and North Korea. Moreover, we are veterans of numerous war games involving these two states. In sum, we do not approach simulations as an academic endeavor or intellectual avocation.

Different Flavors of Peace Games

There are different gradations of peace games. Just like war games, they can vary in length, scope and complexity. The authors have conducted multi-day, multi-move peace games with numerous players in multiple rooms on different teams and involving complex scenarios. We have also designed and run half-day simulations with a dozen-plus participants in a single room as one group intensely grapples with multiple dimensions of a simple but perilous scenario.

There are also different types of peace games. One type run by USIP focuses on how weary warring parties within a single strife-torn country or community can come together to build peace. Yet, these authors have focused on a different category of peace game: those involving elevated tensions between two or more countries. These fall into two variants: Just as peace can be defined as the absence of violence (“negative peace”) or the presence of cooperation and constructive relations (“positive peace”), USIP peace games seek to prevent a war and/or contemplate how to strengthen diplomacy and engagement. Peace games we have convened involving China have tended to concentrate on the former while peace games involving North Korea have focused on the latter.

Left of Bang: China

China is currently not in a state of outright war with any other country, yet there continue to be multiple confrontations and ongoing tensions in the Indo-Pacific. Unsurprisingly, this has led to considerable speculation in multiple countries — including the United States — about the specter of imminent war with China. Relations between China and a good number of countries have worsened in recent years and there have been confrontations, skirmishes and/or clashes between the armed forces of China and those of other parties, including India, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, as well as the United States.

Currently, relations between China and the United States are especially fraught and most analysts assess the bilateral relationship to be at its lowest point in many decades. Indeed, in recent years confrontations and standoffs between the armed forces of the United States and China have occurred on an alarmingly routine basis. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, during a two-year period from late 2021 and late 2023, there have been 180 documented instances of dangerous “air intercepts” involving People’s Liberation Army and U.S. military aircraft in the Indo-Pacific — more than occurred over the previous 10 years. While the most likely location of a U.S-China conflict is in the Taiwan Strait, what is noteworthy is that these confrontations have also occurred in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

The outbreak of military conflict between China and another country is a frightening, but increasingly plausible, prospect. Moreover, once a conflict begins, the potential for escalation is significant in terms of intensity of conflict, size of combatant forces and elevation to nuclear war as well as expansion of geographic scope and number of countries involved. For example, a war between China and Japan or China and the Philippines would almost certainly draw in the United States — since Washington is a treaty ally of Tokyo and Manila — and conceivably become a brutal, intense and extended conflict waged across vast swathes of the Western Pacific and beyond.

The irony of this looming specter of war is that no country intentionally seeks war. And yet, this fact does not guarantee that war will be averted. Indeed, the most plausible scenario for military conflict between China and another country is that hostilities break out inadvertently, unintentionally escalating from accidental collision and loss of life into full-blown cataclysmic war.

It has never been more urgent for all countries to give far greater attention to what the Pentagon calls “phase zero.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscores that war remains a real possibility and the world ignores the prospect of conflict at its peril. Serious games allow us to examine notional but frighteningly plausible crisis scenarios that could lead to war and explore how military conflict might be averted. Two takeaways from multiple USIP-sponsored, China-focused simulations in recent years are worthy of note.

First, these games highlight the propensity of both China and the United States swiftly to assume malevolent intentions behind any proposal or action of the other. While these are only games, they are serious ones with carefully constructed scenarios designed with real-world features. Furthermore, the players are experienced practitioners or seasoned subject matter experts from the United States and other countries. If this degree of deep suspicion and distrust arises in games involving experienced and knowledgeable players, then the issue is almost certainly going to be more acute under real-world conditions involving less seasoned practitioners. Indeed, research suggests this type of misperception is quite common in international relations.

A second takeaway from USIP simulations is that while China tends to pay close attention to strategic messaging, the United States and most other countries do not. In multiple games, China took time to formulate and articulate a coherent public narrative whereas the United States focused on the details of a particular scenario and specifics of how best to respond. This is not necessarily to suggest that China’s narrative automatically resonates; rather, it is to suggest that the Chinese narrative exists without a public counter-narrative.

As the United States scrambles to formulate a multipronged response tailored to a specific scenario, Beijing’s overarching narrative stands alone. Private warnings and quiet assurances are important but without Washington publicly and consistently articulating a clear message of deterrence to China and one of reassurance to allies, rumors can flourish, and seeds of doubt can grow. While clear U.S. public messaging does not guarantee war can be averted, it does offer allies and adversaries alike clarity on where the United States stands and provides less room for misunderstanding and uncertainty. These peace game experiences are consistent with real-world practices: where strategic communication is concerned, China appears to be “running rings around” the United States.

Right of Conflict: North Korea

Although Korean War hostilities ended in June 1953 with an armistice agreement, no peace agreement was ever concluded. The two principal combatants — South and North Korea — remain in a state of suspended animation armed to the teeth, confronting each other along a 160 mile-long Demilitarized Zone that dissects the peninsula. Moreover, the unresolved conflict enmeshes two major off-peninsula powers — the United States and China. Any re-ignition of the Korean War will immediately involve the United States because Washington maintains a robust mutual defense treaty with Seoul and over 28,000 U.S. forces continue to be stationed in South Korea. China, meanwhile, is also committed to support North Korea under the terms of a 1961 treaty.

Under such tense real-world circumstances, exploring a pathway to peace on the peninsula is essential. Yet, the repressive nature of the Pyongyang regime, its unwillingness to abandon its sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and its siege mentality make it difficult for many in Seoul or Washington to conceive of a negotiated settlement. Similarly, North Korea’s concerns about “hostile” alliance policies, such as large-scale military exercises, U.S. strategic asset deployments, multilateral and unilateral sanctions, trade embargoes, human rights criticisms, and insinuations of regime change, have reinforced its commitment to keeping its nuclear deterrent and its wariness of U.S. outreach.

To help overcome both sides’ narrow focus on deterrence and risk aversion and explore diplomatic risk-taking that pushes progressively toward a negotiated settlement, USIP, in collaboration with the Quincy Institute and the Sejong Institute, conducted a virtual peace game exercise in October 2021 that simulated diplomatic negotiations aimed at making tangible progress toward improving relations on the peninsula. The simulation reframed the assumptions of traditional war games, which tend to focus on deterring conflict, managing instability, or winning a war, and instead employed new assumptions that emphasize the goals of improving mutual relations, achieving tangible security benefits, reducing tensions and reaching a final and comprehensive peace settlement. The exercise revealed some interesting findings. The U.S. and North Korean teams acted as the principal actors in the exercise, determining whether negotiations remained static or moved forward, while South Korea and China played a lesser role. But these teams perceived potential losses in negotiations more acutely than potential gains, which resulted in diplomatic inertia. Also, both teams appeared open to negotiations as long as the other side took the first conciliatory step, but presidential leadership was required to overcome inaction. In addition, the U.S.-China rivalry fueled a zero-sum mentality that hindered opportunities for progress and heightened misunderstandings between the U.S. and South Korean teams.

These observations suggest potential policy recommendations for the countries involved. Advancing peace and denuclearization will require significant presidential leadership and intervention from all parties to build support for a final agreement. In addition, all parties should start with smaller, more reversible measures, mitigate the risk of failure and highlight potential gains. The United States should consider employing unilateral confidence-building measures to jump-start negotiations as long as they do not undermine its own security interests. Lastly, to achieve progress, all parties should separate issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula from U.S.-China competition.

Conclusion

Few competent militaries would finalize plans and strategies for war let alone attempt real-world execution without testing them first in tabletop exercises. It is only prudent for governments to take a similar tack when formulating policies and strategies for peace. If war games constitute an essential arrow in a warrior’s quiver, peace games should also be considered an essential instrument in a peacemakers’ toolkit.

usip.org

13. South Korea’s national debt escalates by 450 trillion won over 5 years

South Korea’s national debt escalates by 450 trillion won over 5 years

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2024/04/12/GEZ4ED7AUNHXDJZRIHN6TIJYMA/

By Kim Ji-seop,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.04.12. 10:41

Updated 2024.04.12. 13:41

Illustrated by Park Sang-hoon

South Korea’s national debt has been rapidly increasing in recent years, reaching nearly 450 trillion won over the past five years (2018-2023). This surge represents a staggering 2.3-fold increase compared to the previous five-year period, which saw an increase of 190 trillion won. The primary drivers behind this escalation are the substantial rise in fiscal expenditures due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the burgeoning welfare budget prompted by low birth rates and an aging population.

Amid stagnant economic growth rates hovering around 1-2%, government revenue struggles to keep pace with spending, leading to a continuous rise in debt issuance. This trend has sparked concerns about a potential economic crisis stemming from a downgrade in sovereign credit ratings.

According to the ‘2023 Financial Statement’ released by the South Korean government on April 11, last year’s government debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 50.4%. This marks a significant increase from 2020 when the ratio first breached the 40% threshold at 43.6%. It took South Korea seven years (from 2004 to 2011) to transition from the 20% range to the 30% range of government debt as a percentage of GDP, and nine more years (from 2011 to 2020) to climb from the 30s to the 40s.

Projections suggest that the government debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to rise, reaching 51% this year and 53% by 2027. However, amid the backdrop of low growth rates, there are concerns that intensified populist competition in the political arena could accelerate this trend, potentially surpassing the 60% mark in the near future. Kim Woo-cheol, a professor at the University of Seoul’s Department of Taxation Science, remarked, “Given the plethora of tax cuts and fiscal spending policies aimed at garnering votes in elections, there’s a high likelihood that the government debt-to-GDP ratio will deteriorate more than projected.”

Some argue that there’s less cause for alarm regarding South Korea’s government debt-to-GDP ratio compared to major advanced economies. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as of 2022, South Korea’s general government liability-to-GDP ratio stood at 53.5%, significantly lower than that of the United States (144.2%), the United Kingdom (104.0%), France (117.3%), and Japan (254.5%). However, experts caution against direct comparisons between South Korea and countries holding reserve currencies like the dollar, euro, or yen.

The Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) suggests that reserve currency countries have estimated appropriate general government liability-to-GDP ratios ranging from 97.8% to 114%, while non-reserve currency countries should aim for ratios between 37.9% to 38.7%. South Korea surpasses this benchmark by more than 10 percentage points, indicating a relatively high level of government debt compared to other non-reserve currency countries.

Furthermore, South Korea’s projected general government liability-to-GDP ratio for this year stands at 55.6%, making it the third-highest among the 13 non-reserve currency countries classified by the IMF as advanced economies, following Singapore (168.3%) and Israel (56.8%).

The continuous expansion of national debt reflects a situation where spending exceeds the revenue generated through taxes and other means. Last year, South Korea’s consolidated fiscal balance recorded a deficit of 36.8 trillion won. The consolidated fiscal balance without social security fund reported an even larger deficit of 87 trillion won. The consolidated fiscal deficit without social security fund-to-GDP ratio, a crucial indicator of a nation’s fiscal health, reached 3.9%.

Another concerning factor is the persistent increase in debt without payment resources. According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, debt without payment resources reached 726.4 trillion won last year, marking a 7.5% increase from 2022. The proportion of debt without payment resources to total government debt also rose from 63.3% to 64.5% during the same period.

14. Editorial: S. Korea’s national debt ratio exceeds 50% for the first time - populist policies must be stopped

Excerpt:

The promises made by both ruling and opposition parties during the general election, along with the policies announced by the president to address livelihood issues, should be implemented only if they fall within the government’s financial capacity. Due to the worsening fiscal conditions, the government should prioritize spending on urgent policies such as countermeasures for low birth rates and securing growth engines.

Editorial: S. Korea’s national debt ratio exceeds 50% for the first time - populist policies must be stopped

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/04/12/PXFU4H25XZHNZDKBI4IRGZRMAI/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2024.04.12. 08:48

A bank employee organizing 50,000 won bills at Hana Bank in Jung-gu, Seoul. The photo is unrelated to the article content. /News1

Last year, South Korea’s national debt increased by almost 60 trillion won ($43.8 billion) to 1,126.7 trillion won ($822.7 billion). For the first time, the debt-to-GDP ratio went over 50%, reaching a record 50.4%. Due to the reduction in tax revenues, the country’s finances recorded a deficit of $63.6 billion for the year, which was about $21.2 billion more than the initially forecasted $42.4 billion (based on Operational Fiscal Balance) presented in the government’s budget plan.

Due to this, the fiscal deficit ratio to GDP of the country reduced from 5.4% in 2022 to 3.9%. However, it still exceeded the European Union’s (EU) sound financial management recommendation of 3.0%. This indicates that the rapid fiscal deterioration that began during the former Moon Jae-in administration is continuing.

Last year’s fiscal balance of the nation was organized and executed under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which solely reflects the current government’s performance. President Yoon criticized the previous administration for causing the national debt to surpass $730 billion through “ill-advised populism”, but he himself failed to uphold the principle of sound fiscal management rigorously.

Despite President Yoon having reduced discretionary spending, a downturn in the economy and a slump in real estate led to a decrease of $37.3 billion in national tax revenue and a $18.2 billion decrease in non-tax revenue, resulting in a deficit. The announcement of last year’s financial close was unusually delayed by a day past the Apr. 10 deadline specified by the National Finance Act, likely postponing the release of negative indicators of the government because it might affect the result of the general election.

The consequences of the populist policies promised by both the ruling and opposition parties during the general election are now becoming apparent. The ruling party pledged to implement various tax cuts, including a reduction in value-added tax on essential goods, the withdrawal of financial investment income tax, and an expansion of child tax credits.

President Yoon has held 24 discussions on livelihood issues this year alone, announcing policies that require substantial resources, such as underground railway projects, expanding the scope of national scholarships, and constructing a Korean version of the Autobahn.

The opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea, released different policies, including handing out cash to citizens, such as a $182 livelihood support payment for every citizen, a monthly payment of $146 for children aged 8 to 17, and full scholarships for national and junior colleges. With a significant majority, the opposition party is expected to demand the allocation of a supplementary budget to fulfill the $9.5 billion worth of promises for livelihood support payments.

The promises made by both ruling and opposition parties during the general election, along with the policies announced by the president to address livelihood issues, should be implemented only if they fall within the government’s financial capacity. Due to the worsening fiscal conditions, the government should prioritize spending on urgent policies such as countermeasures for low birth rates and securing growth engines.

15. ＜Investigation＞ Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (3) 'We aren't stupid, we don't want have kids who’ll turn into homeless'…Women have quietly rejected Birth Demands

The key point is the statement in the headline: 'we are not stupid." The Korean people in the north are not stupid. Despite the indoctrination and the suppression of outside information, the Korean people are smart and they know what is happening. They just have no tools for seeking change. They need outside assistance.

Another reason for unification. Unification could positively alter the birth rate for the entire Korean peninsula.

＜Investigation＞ Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (3) 'We aren't stupid, we don't want have kids who’ll turn into homeless'…Women have quietly rejected Birth Demands

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) Women washing clothes on the Yalu River. Household work, childcare, and the livelihood of the family are the responsibility of women. Taken from the Chinese side of the border in September 2019. ISHIMARU Jiro

＜Investigation＞Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (1)　The fertility rate is already severely low…It’s rare to see anyone carrying babies around

North Korean authorities are struggling to cope with the country’s declining birth rate. The regime touts its various policies through events such as a mothers' convention and lectures, but the response from the population has been lukewarm. In the third installment of this series, we'll take a look at women's reactions to Kim Jong-un's childbirth promotion policies. In February and March of this year, ASIAPRESS spoke to three women in the northern part of the country. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Government criticizes older women without babies for being influenced by capitalism

The Kim Jong-un regime has been actively touting its childbirth promotion policy since a mothers' convention held in Pyongyang last December, promising a range of support and calling on women to create “revolutionary families” to combat the phenomenon of marriage avoidance among women, the reporting partners said.

"They promised that the state would provide food (for childbearing households), and that women's league branches and organizations would exempt such families from non-tax burdens and provide support for pregnant women." (Reporting Partner "A")

Kim Jong Un speaking at the Fifth Mothers' Convention. Rodong Sinmun, December 2023

Alongside this, propaganda regarding childbirth has also been intensified.

"They keep giving lectures, emphasizing that women should fulfill their roles as mothers, that it is a capitalist idea to live well on their own (without children), and that families that have only one child are unpatriotic." (Reporting Partner "A")

However, this propaganda does not seem to work well with women.

"There is dissatisfaction among women who live alone because they are secretly criticizing older women without kids, saying that they only care about themselves, and that they have been imbued (colored) with capitalist ideas and only know how to make money," said Reporting Partner "C.”

"The lecturer's talk was a bit sketchy, too, because it didn't really make sense." she added.

◆ “We’re not stupid,” women say. “We just don’t want our kids to become homeless on the streets”

Women are apathetic to the government’s ineffective and disingenuous policies and propaganda, according to another reporting partner in Ryanggang Province.

"The mothers' convention was just a formality, and no one actually thought that they should have a baby after the event. Everything that is shown in the newspaper and on the TV is propaganda, and it is meaningless to a woman who is having a baby." (Reporting Partner "B")

Reporting Partner "C" in Ryanggang Province told a similar story.

"When a woman who belongs to the women's league says that she is pregnant, organizations make her chicken soup and collect money to support her, and (the authorities) ask the organizations to voluntarily support her, but it's not like the child will grow up on that (kind of support) alone."

The reporting partner was even more critical about policies aimed at promoting multi-children families that have been a focus of propaganda since the mothers' convention last year.

"They're giving lectures, they're talking about national support, and nowadays I hear (around me) that they're pregnant, but that's because they're stupid people, and smart people don't want to get pregnant. If they have one child, they'll raise it well, and if they have two, they get treated like they're stupid. People call poor people who try to have just one child stupid, asking whether they want their kid to wind up as homeless on the streets." (Reporting Partner "A")

(FILE PHOTO) A small child basks in the brief early winter sun, barely propping himself up on a table in an empty marketplace. Will he live to see the next spring? Photographed by ASIAPRESS in Hyesan, November 2012.

◆ Government accuses women who get abortions or live with their lovers without getting married of non-socialistic behavior

But when this policy failed to gain traction due to how women actually feel about childbearing, the authorities pulled out the "non-socialist" card to increase the fertility rate, one reporting partner said.

"There was a meeting held about cohabitation and abortion, and they said that cohabitation is an act of shirking marriage and disrupting public morals. They also said that not registering a marriage is an non-socialist act and should be actively reported and cracked down on." (Reporting Partner “B”)

※ In North Korea, if a man and woman who have not registered their marriage live together, they are subject to legal penalties for having committed “non-socialistic behavior.”

◆ Intense crackdown on abortion

The reporting partner went on to say that the regime is particularly tough on abortion.

"The most intense crackdown is on early-term and mid-term abortions, but everyone involved in the abortion is considered a problem by the government. Women who pay others to do an abortion are being threatened with prison time.”

In December of last year, a midwife from Hyesan Hospital who performed an early-term abortion at her home was sent to a forced labor camp, and although the woman who had the procedure was not punished because she was still young, she was humiliated by the organizations she was affiliated with.

◆ Women who give birth because the government tells them to are considered idiots

The government’s fear-mongering is not changing women's minds. Rather, it's creating a backlash, one reporting partner said.

"If (the state) told you to give birth, would you do it? And even if you're pregnant, why would you give birth to a child? Why would you give birth just because you have (a child)? No matter how much it costs, you'd rather have an early-term abortion, unless you're a fool." (Reporting Partner “B”)

Another reporting partner described women's reaction to the government’s policies as follows.

"(After a women’s league meeting) they were saying negative things like, ‘How can I have a child when I am starving,’ and, ‘I don't want to have a child, so why should the state say anything about it?’”

Participants respond to Kim Jong-un's speech at the Fifth Mothers' Convention. Women's League cadres from across the country were sent to Pyongyang to participate in the event. Rodong Sinmun, December 2023.

The reporting partner went on to say that there are also many cases of women having clandestine abortions or using unsafe methods to get rid of their fetuses to avoid punishment from the authorities.

"The crackdown has gotten so bad that some women go to other areas to get treatment for their illnesses and stay there for a few days after the operation. They don't talk about it because they don't want to offend each other, so they rarely get caught unless someone reports it." (Reporting Partner “A”)

"Nowadays, people use acupuncture needles to kill a fetus. The government is cracking down on this and arresting people, but I've seen women going around looking for someone who knows how to do it." (Reporting Partner “B”)

Editor's note: This seems to refer to the forced abortion of a fetus by stabbing it to death with a needle. It's an extreme method that's hard to imagine, but it illustrates how North Korean women feel about childbirth.

There is a need to further investigate the health of women undergoing abortions in secret given the seriousness of the issue.

In the meantime, the only people who are excited about the situation are the people who are secretly performing abortions, one reporting partner said.

"No matter how much they crack down on illegal medical practices, the women who work in obstetrics and gynecology departments make a lot of money by performing (illegal) early-term abortions at home. No matter how much they crackdown on the practice, the women still conduct abortions…" (Reporting Partner “A”)

North Korea's low fertility rate is no longer surprising when viewed in context. The current decline in fertility is the result of a covert, powerful, and long-running offensive by women who have rebelled against anachronistic authorities and patriarchal men.

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

＜Investigation＞Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (1)　The fertility rate is already severely low…It’s rare to see anyone carrying babies around

＜Investigation＞Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (2)　Women increasingly avoid marriage to protect themselves...Men are considered a burden to women in N. Korean society

• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Overseas worker deployments accelerate, some leave within a month...There’s a surge in applicants amid hardship
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Implementation of the large-scale restructuring of trading companies (1)　Called “anti-socialist hotbeds,” government forces ‘bases’ of trading companies to close down and consolidate
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Regime tightens reigns on young people...A public trial and ideological struggle in February led to intensive attacks and forced participation in firing squads
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Surveillance cameras are popping up in markets, restaurants, roadsides... "They are used to identify those responsible for increased crime and disturbances"
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Preparation for construction mobilizations for Kim Jong-un’s “20x10 policy” are complete, but there’s already unrest and complaints among workers over supplies of food

asiapress.org

16. High-profile defector-lawmaker Tae Yong-ho loses parliament seat in ROK election

I hope Thae Yong Ho (and Ji Seong Ho as well) can find a way to continue to contribute to Korea.

High-profile defector-lawmaker Tae Yong-ho loses parliament seat in ROK election

Ex-North Korean diplomat’s defeat brings number of defectors in National Assembly to one, drawing concern from experts

https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/high-profile-defector-lawmaker-tae-yong-ho-loses-parliament-seat-in-rok-election/?utm

Jeongmin Kim | Joon Ha Park April 11, 2024

Defector-lawmaker Tae Yong-ho (right) poses with Han Dong-hoon, interim leader of the ruling People Power Party, during a campaign event in Seoul's Guro district. | Image: People Power Party (March 30, 2024)

High-profile defector-lawmaker Tae Yong-ho lost his seat in parliament in South Korea’s general election on Wednesday, in a major setback to the former North Korean diplomat’s political career.

Tae’s resounding defeat to former Blue House official Yun Kun-young in Seoul’s Guro district came as the opposition trounced the lawmaker’s People Power Party (PPP) across the board, limiting the ruling party to just 108 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly.

While Tae is on his way out, the young DPRK escapee Park Choong-kwon, a newcomer to South Korean politics, secured a seat for the first time after the PPP won 18 seats under the proportional representation system.

But Park will be the only defector in the National Assembly for the next four years after the PPP dropped defector-lawmaker Ji Seong-ho from the ballot ahead of the election.

Experts voiced concern about the decline in the number of defectors in parliament, irrespective of the particular circumstances that led to Tae and Ji losing their seats.

“It is essential to recognize the value of the experience gained by these lawmakers over their term and avoid constantly replacing them with new faces,” said Lee Sang-sin, the director of the Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy at the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU). 

“Rectifying these issues is crucial to prevent the loss of invaluable legislative experience and ensure fair representation for North Korean defectors in politics.”

As of May 2023, more than 30,000 defectors have settled in South Korea.

WHY TAE LOST

Tae entered politics as perhaps the most famous North Korean defector in South Korea and attracted attention for his views on DPRK issues and expertise in Pyongyang’s foreign policy.

But controversial remarks that he made last year hurt his popularity and damaged his standing in the PPP, leading him to be assigned to a more competitive district in Wednesday’s election.

The controversy began when he claimed last February that North Korea orchestrated communist riots on Jeju Island in the 1940s that resulted in a South Korean government massacre to quell the uprising.

He also attempted to link the Democratic Party (DP) to a controversial religious group and was accused of illegally collaborating with a senior presidential office staffer on party elections, leading the PPP to suspend him for three months.

Lee of KINU told NK News that Tae stood little chance of victory after being assigned to the DP stronghold of Guro.

This was especially the case given the overriding negative public sentiment toward the Yoon administration and PPP ahead of this election, the expert said.

Tae garnered only around 40% of the vote on Wednesday against some 60% for his opponent.

The defector lawmaker previously represented Gangnam-A District, one of the most right-leaning precincts in Seoul.

People Power Party lawmaker Ji Seong-ho at the ROK National Assembly in June 2023 | Images: Ji Seong-ho via Naver, edited by NK News

THE PPP DROPS JI

Unlike Tae, defector-lawmaker Ji Seong-ho did not even get to run in the recent election after the PPP disqualified him from candidacy earlier this year.

While Tae was elected as a district candidate, Ji was elected under South Korea’s proportional system, in which voters choose a party and each party then gets a certain number of seats depending on how many votes they received.

The PPP had invited him into the party as someone who symbolizes a young, non-elite North Korean who risked his life to seek freedom in South Korea’s democracy.

In parliament, Ji took a different route than Tae and focused more on South Korean social issues as a member of the environment and gender committees. He spoke far less about North Korea or foreign policy issues, particularly after he ended up in hot water for falsely predicting that Kim Jong Un was in a coma in April 2020.

The PPP does not announce the scores it gives candidates when evaluating who to select for proportional representation, but its scoring system prioritizes candidate popularity based on opinion surveys, followed by legislative achievements, party contribution and morality.

Park Choong-kwon at a welcoming ceremony for new party recruits of the People Power Party at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul. | Image: People Power Party (Aug. 8, 2024)

A NEW FACE

In Tae and Ji’s absence, the PPP’s newly elected lawmaker, Park Choong-kwon, told NK News that he hopes to better represent South Korea’s defector community over the next four years.

Thirty-seven-year-old Park studied ballistic missile technology at a prestigious North Korean university, now called Kim Jong Un National Defense University, from 2003 to 2007.

Upon his defection to South Korea in 2009, he received a Ph.D. in materials engineering at Seoul National University and later became a senior researcher at Hyundai Steel, where he specialized in automotive components. The PPP recruited him as a “new talent” in Dec. 2023.

Park was then nominated by the PPP satellite party that fielded the party’s proportional representation candidates.

• READ MORE: How a North Korean defector’s daring escape led him to ROK politics

The new lawmaker told NK News on Thursday that he was disappointed to see his party’s defeat in the election but said he will do his best to serve the people “so the voters do not consider any tax spent on legislative activities wasted.”

Park said one of his first objectives is to propose a revision to restore the investigative authority of the National Intelligence Service following its transfer to the police. He also said he plans to support fellow scientists and help update the settlement budget for defectors to address their evolving needs. 

“Despite the challenges of uniting the fragmented North Korean defector community here in the South, I am committed to improving employment support and fostering defectors’ integration into South Korean society,” Park told NK News. 

Park and his fellow lawmakers-to-be are set to begin their roles in May.

People Power Party lawmaker Ji Seong-ho (left) during a field meeting of the Labour Reform Special Committee, and lawmaker Tae Yong-ho (right) during a ceremony opening his 2024 election campaign. | Image: Ji Seong-ho via Naver (June 2023), Tae Yong-ho via Facebook (Feb. 2024), edited by NK News

CHALLENGES OF DEFECTOR POLITICIANS

Commenting on Tae and Ji’s departures, Lee of KINU said defector lawmakers often fail to be re-elected to the National Assembly, calling this a concerning pattern that points to their marginalization in their parties and a lack of institutional support to sustain long-term success.

Lee also critiqued the practice of assigning defector lawmakers to compete in constituencies where few defectors actually live.

Kim Young-hee, a defector-turned-economist who serves as director of external cooperation at the South-North Hana Foundation, welcomed Park Choong-kwon’s election to the National Assembly, stating that he will bring a fresh outlook on how to improve defectors’ lives in the South. 

But she also argued that defector lawmakers need to be more creative and thorough when drafting such policies.

“New ideas are great, but they can become better by more informed discussions with those who support the settlement of North Korean defectors in our society and defectors who have been settling in the South for a long time,” Kim noted. 

Lee argued that defector lawmakers should broaden their focus beyond North Korea-related matters, which appeal mostly to South Korean conservatives.

“By delving into non-politicized issues relevant to daily life, they can augment their expertise and appeal to both center and progressive perspectives,” he said.

Edited by Bryan Betts

17. Despite opposition win, ROK election just reinforced North Korea status quo

Interesting analysis. Can the hard core north Korea apologists and sympathizers be restrained? I fear not. Or is Kim Jong Un and his actions providing them with a wake up call?

Despite opposition win, ROK election just reinforced North Korea status quo

Democratic Party appears unlikely to focus on challenging Yoon’s hardline policy on DPRK as Pyongyang shuns diplomacy

https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/despite-opposition-win-rok-election-just-reinforced-north-korea-status-quo/

Gabriela Bernal April 12, 2024

GIFT THIS ARTICLESHARE PRINT

Democratic Party of Korea (DP) leader Lee Jae-myung (left) and DP candidate for Yongsan-gu Kang Tae-woong (right) at Yongsan on April 9, 2024 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea

The outcome of South Korea’s general election on Wednesday dealt a major blow to President Yoon Suk-yeol, with the opposition Democratic Party (DP) winning 176 seats and the People Power Party (PPP) 109 seats in the 300-member National Assembly.

But while the DP majority appears set to frustrate many of Yoon’s policy priorities, its election victory is unlikely to derail the conservative president’s more hardline approach to North Korea, or his efforts to bolster cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.

DPRK issues barely featured in the recent election despite the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and worsening security situation on the peninsula, with voters more concerned about the economy, governance and cost of living.

Still, the opposition and ruling parties have repeatedly clashed over North Korea in the past, and while parliament has little control over foreign and inter-Korean policy, the DP could use its majority to challenge government budgets that support Yoon’s priorities.

Public disinterest and Kim Jong Un’s rejection of unification, however, limit what either party might hope to accomplish and add to the inertia pushing against the possibility of change.

DP members and supporters gathered in Yongsan ahead of the April 10 elections | Image: Democratic Party of Korea (April 9, 2024)

DIFFERENT VISIONS

In terms of North Korea policy, the DP has mostly followed the approach of former President Moon Jae-in, advocating for engagement, easing sanctions and cooperation with China and Russia. This is in stark contrast to the ruling PPP, which prioritizes ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation, “peace through strength” and deterrence.

The current government has been particularly vocal about its anti-communist stance, with Yoon stating in Oct. 2022 that it is “impossible to work with” those who support North Korea and framing his opponents as DPRK sympathizers who pose national security threats. The PPP has also pounced on allegations that DP leader Lee Jae-myung was involved in a company’s illegal remittances to North Korea in 2019.

Lee was not very vocal about North Korea during the latest election, but during the 2022 presidential election, he pledged to resume South Korean tours to North Korea’s scenic Mount Kumgang and work to achieve “de facto unification” through inter-Korean cooperation.

But Yoon has pushed a hardline North Korea policy since he was elected in May 2022. His five-year defense plan for 2023 to 2027 called for a 6.8% spike in spending per year, and he has also called for strengthening the military’s Three-axis System that includes plans to take out the DPRK’s “core facilities” if it attacks with a weapon of mass destruction.

The government has also moved to scale down unification ministry departments related to exchange and cooperation with North Korea, while expanding those focused on human rights and analyzing the DPRK’s political situation. 

The DP strongly criticized the move, as well as Yoon’s pick for unification minister, arguing that the university professor was “unfit” for the job given his past calls for DPRK regime change and promotion of fringe theories on his YouTube channel.

Yoon Suk-yeol visiting a South Korean Navy unit | Image: ROK Presidential Office

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

While the DP disagrees with much of Yoon’s North Korea policy, it does seem to realize that the current environment on the peninsula has changed remarkably compared to the summit era of 2018 and 2019 under former President Moon.

The tide for inter-Korean relations significantly turned since Kim Jong Un abandoned unification as a policy goal for the first time and declared South Korea his country’s “main enemy.”

After this announcement and North Korean missile tests in the following weeks, opposition leader Lee Jae-myung urged Pyongyang to “immediately stop its missile provocations and put an end to its hostile acts.”

At the same time, he called on Yoon to refrain from engaging in tit-for-tat behavior: “We should not make the mistake of taking out the safety pin of peace just to teach North Korea a bitter lesson.” 

Lee again condemned North Korea’s military actions later that month while calling for Yoon to restore the inter-Korean hotline, which Pyongyang stopped answering last year. 

The opposition thus seems to be treading a fine line between calling for engagement with North Korea, while also acknowledging the security situation has changed.

Jung Kim, an associate professor at the University of North Korean Studies, told NK News that the DP will likely continue to criticize Yoon’s policies but won’t expend significant political capital on the issue for the time being.

“The DP surely understands that as long as North Korea maintains its hostilities toward South Korea, any policy changes will not work for a while,” he said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects artillery drills on the west coast on March 7 | Image: KCNA

CHANGE ON THE HORIZON?

Since its election win on Wednesday, the DP has signaled that it will focus on solving problems related to people’s livelihood and the economy, suggesting that it will continue to sideline North Korea issues.

Still, the DP could try to push for some changes in the Yoon government’s approach to the DPRK, experts told NK News.

“With increased control in the National Assembly, the Democratic Party could influence the government’s budget allocations related to North Korea [issues],” said Sangsoo Lee, associated senior fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy.

“Opposition leaders might even attempt to establish direct contact with Pyongyang, bypassing the Yoon government.”

The DP could also push for South Korea to increase its diplomatic cooperation with China, given the important role Beijing plays on the peninsula, Lee said.

However, a significant shift in policy will be difficult to achieve. South Korean presidents have the authority to set foreign and inter-Korean policy, and Yoon has already pushed forward his agenda during his first two years in office with a DP majority in parliament.

“What the National Assembly elections have confirmed is the status quo in South Korea rather than change,” said Troy Stangarone, senior director at the Korea Economic Institute.

He told NK News that the opposition-dominated parliament will continue to limit Yoon’s “ability to maneuver on domestic legislation, but the first two years of the Yoon administration suggest this is unlikely to have a significant impact on North Korea policy.”

Edited by Bryan Betts

18. N. Korea sends workers to eastern Ukraine to help reconstruction efforts

In Russian occupied Ukraine.

N. Korea sends workers to eastern Ukraine to help reconstruction efforts - Daily NK English

North Korea made the decision after concluding that Russia had gained the upper hand in its war with Ukraine

By Seulkee Jang - April 12, 2024

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · April 12, 2024

Tupolev Tu-204-300 of Air Koryo at Vladivostok Airport. Photo taken in 2013 (Wikimedia Commons)

North Korea recently sent workers to the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine to help with reconstruction efforts, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, as source in North Korea told Daily NK on Thursday that about 150 new North Korean workers were sent to the Donbass last January.

A first group of workers flew from Pyongyang to Vladivostok on Air Koryo and then traveled to Donbass via Moscow. The rest of the workers traveled from Vladivostok to Volgograd and then on to the Donbass.

The workers were divided into three workplaces under North Korea’s External Construction Guidance Bureau and the Ministry of Social Security, the source said.

The North Korean workers are currently helping to rebuild various structures in the Donbass, including houses, schools and shopping centers. Russians are also involved in the reconstruction work, but they generally handle more technical projects, such as bridges and communication facilities, while the North Korean workers are in charge of repairing buildings.

The North Korean authorities had drawn up plans as early as 2022 to send some of the workers already in Russia to the Donbass, and had even selected the workers in question.

“Although we supported the independence of the Donetsk People’s Republic, that was before our leader met with the Russian leader, and [North Korean] people who were in Russia could not be sent to Donetsk for various reasons,” the source said.

Then, in September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia for a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since then, the two countries have apparently not only discussed practical matters related to personnel exchanges, such as operating more flights and sending more workers to Russia, but have also reached an agreement on involving North Korean workers in post-war reconstruction work.

Previously, the source said, North Korea was reluctant to send its own citizens to hard-fought battlefields, which would mean violating ongoing sanctions against the North.

But this year, North Korean authorities agreed to send workers to help rebuild Donbass after concluding that Russia had gained the upper hand in its war with Ukraine and that the Donbass region was firmly under Russian control.

“We [North Korea] agreed to mobilize workers [in the Donbass region] after consultations with Russia because we believe that Russia is winning the war against Ukraine,” said another source in North Korea.

According to a source in Russia, North Korea’s government recently provided workers assigned to Russia with educational materials detailing how Ukraine is losing to Russia and promoting the superiority of the socialist system.

Relatedly, North Korea recently ordered that young people be given more training in anti-American and anti-imperialist class consciousness, and that the training sessions mention the progress of Russia’s war against Ukraine and teach young people that imperialist fantasies have fatal consequences.

The source in Russia also said that Russia has agreed to pay North Korean workers in Donbass hazard pay in addition to their regular wages.

“Workers going to Donetsk will not have to give the North Korean government as big a cut as those working elsewhere in Russia. Since the workers will receive a danger pay on top of their wages from the Russian company, they will probably have to pay the state 60,000-70,000 rubles (KPW 870,000-1,020,000) per month,” the source said.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · April 12, 2024

19. Young N. Koreans find ways to avoid crackdowns on S. Korean dramas, movies

Like the bomber in WWII, information will always get through. There is a great thirst for outside information among the Korean people in the north.

Young N. Koreans find ways to avoid crackdowns on S. Korean dramas, movies - Daily NK English

"...young people are using notetels to avoid detection when watching illegal media," a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Un - April 12, 2024

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · April 12, 2024

FILE PHOTO: A DVD and mp4 player used in North Korea. (Daily NK)

Despite heavy crackdowns by North Korean authorities on the viewing of South Korean media, young people are finding various ways to continue watching it under the noses of the government.

“Enforcers from the Sinuiju Task Force against Anti-Socialist and Non-Socialist Behavior have been closely watching for signs of illegal video viewing, conducting two or three searches of residents’ homes every day. But young people are using notetels to avoid detection when watching illegal media,” a source in North Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Monday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Notetel, short for “notebook television,” is a Chinese-made portable media player that is widely used in North Korea. One feature of notetels is that they can play a wide range of media files stored on compact discs (CDs), SD cards and USB flash drives.

This has inspired young people to keep a CD of legal movies or dramas in the drive while watching illegal media on an SD card or USB flash drive. They store illegal media on SD cards or USB flash drives because they are smaller and easier to remove and conceal than a CD.

When someone knocks on the door, the teens quickly remove the SD card or USB flash drive and immediately play the legal media on the CD in the drive so it looks like they were watching it all along, the source explained.

This was the method used by a young man in Sinuiju to fool enforcers who paid him an unexpected visit on March 30 while he was watching a South Korean movie.

According to the source, the young man removed the USB flash drive from his notebook as soon as he heard a knock at his door. After hiding the flash drive, he opened the door.

Enforcement officers checked the CD in his notebook for illegal media and then opened all the drawers in the house to look for storage devices that might contain illegal videos. When nothing objectionable was found, they left the house.

“When you ask who is at the door, the enforcers do not identify themselves, they just ask people to open up. So now people are in the habit of hiding anything that could get them in trouble if there’s a knock at the door. And that’s exactly what this young man was doing,” the source said.

“The enforcers will search you if they find something suspicious, but otherwise they’ll just move on to the next house. People here [in North Korea] have been dealing with searches since they were born, so they’re smart enough to trick the enforcers. That’s how they get away with watching South Korean dramas and other illegal media,” the source said.

Since North Korean leader Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea late last year as relations between hostile and belligerent states, watching South Korean media is now being treated as a more serious crime than in the past. Reports from inside the country, however, suggest that government crackdowns have not made young North Koreans any less curious or interested in South Korean culture.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · April 12, 2024

20. Young North Koreans are taking pains to avoid military service

Young North Koreans are taking pains to avoid military service - Daily NK English

"The KPA Reserve Forces Division says it has filled only 60%of the slots it had planned to fill during this spring's conscription period," one source told Daily NK

By Jeong Tae Joo - April 12, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 12, 2024

A meeting between Kim Jong Un and his military leaders on Dec. 31, 2023, as reported by state-run media on Jan. 1, 2024 (Rodong Sinmun - News1)

Editor’s Note: In Sep. 2021, North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the “Youth Education Guarantee Act,” one of the “big three” oppressive laws passed during the COVID-19 period. The law concretely defines a number of behaviors that young people must not engage in and obligates the government to control and crack down on these behaviors. Is this issue of youth education so grave that legal remedies are truly necessary? In a new series, Daily NK investigates how the lifestyles and ways of thinking among the MZ generation (early 1980s-early 2000s) compare to previous generations of North Koreans.

Article 41 (What Youth Must Not Do) of the “Youth Education Guarantee Act” prohibits North Korean youths from “using the pretext of family problems or illness to refuse to serve, marrying young to avoid conscription, improperly undergoing physical examination or personnel examination, evading service by inflicting physical injury, or any other act to evade mobilization for military service or otherwise failing to serve faithfully.

The problem of young North Koreans evading military service has now become serious enough to be explicitly mentioned in North Korean law. The phenomenon was particularly widespread during this spring’s conscription drive and was observed in several regions, including Pyongyang and Sariwon.

Daily NK worked with several sources inside the country to find concrete examples of young people dodging the draft, and took a deep dive into the reasons and environment driving young “MZ generation” North Koreans to avoid military service.

An astute new generation that values their personal lives and sees no benefit in military service

A source in Pyongyang told Daily NK that “there has been a big change in the way the new generation views its national defense duties. Many young people are avoiding military service in order to escape economic hardship [caused by military service], and this trend was especially pronounced during the conscription period this spring.”

A source in North Hwanghae Province similarly reported uncovering several examples of draft evasion. “During the conscription period in March, some young people in Sariwon avoided joining the military by joining the labor force, while other families with little disposable income were able to pay bribes to falsify medical records or otherwise have their children removed from the conscription list.”

This year, a particularly large number of households used their political or financial power to exempt their children from military service. In one case, a young North Korean was summoned to appear before the Socialist Patriotic Youth League after openly stating, “Why should every boy who graduates from high school have to go into the military? People with power should use their power [to contribute to the country], those with money should use their money, and those who have nothing should contribute to the fatherland by joining the military.”

Even though North Korea continues to emphasize the importance of military service in its ideological education, poor economic conditions and changing social values have contributed to a more widespread negative attitude toward military service, the source explained.

“Today, the new generation has a stronger desire to earn money and live well economically rather than dedicating their youth to their country through military service. This seems to be influenced by the values of the new generation, which prioritize the life of the individual [over the collective].”

In the past, most people could join the party after being discharged at the end of their military service, barring any major incidents. As a result, military service and joining the party were seen as stepping stones to improving one’s social status. Now, however, the barrier to joining the party has been raised and the social rewards of membership are less certain, leaving many smart members of the young generation ambivalent about the necessity of military service.

The source in Pyongyang added, “Even if you’re lucky and can join the party, the special treatment and social benefits for discharged soldiers who become party members are not as good as they used to be, and in fact, being a party member can even get you pushed to the front of the line to take on some of the hardest and most difficult tasks on behalf of the country and the party. So it’s not worth it for the younger generations who are more self-prioritizing and more concerned with finding ways to survive in the present moment.”

A direct challenge to the regime’s stability, “Determine the needs of the young generation and put forth new policy”

Why is the North Korean government so intent on cracking down on young people avoiding military service? Draft evasion is a serious problem for the regime because it directly affects the stability of the regime and the party’s initiatives to strengthen North Korea’s military power.

“The KPA Reserve Forces Division says it has filled only 60%of the slots it had planned to fill during this spring’s conscription period,” the source in North Hwanghae Province reported. “The division believes that the new generation’s avoidance of military service, combined with their growing reluctance to have children, is a serious problem directly related to the future of our country and the combat readiness of the KPA, which is vital for national defense.”

The North Korean authorities emphasize the importance and significance of military service as they focus their efforts on preventing ideological backsliding among young North Koreans. Article 12 of the “Youth Education Guarantee Act” declares that “as a major national task crucial to the accomplishment of great socialist achievements, we must not neglect our national defense even for a moment, and [national defense] should be the most sacred responsibility of the ardent young people [of North Korea],” effectively codifying the government’s obligations to control and take responsibility for young people who avoid military service.

“If [the government] wants to change the way the new generation views their military service, [it] must make efforts at the state level to address basic issues, such as putting forward policies to solve [the current] economic hardship and improve living conditions in the military,” the Pyongyang source concluded, adding: “Instead of putting all its energy into ideological education that emphasizes loyalty to the state and the party, the government should find out what young people want and formulate appropriate policies.”

Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 12, 2024

21. China's top legislator Zhao meets key N. Korean official over ways to bolster bilateral ties

Kim is maintaining relations with his key "allies" (China is an ally and Russia might be a quasi ally)

China's top legislator Zhao meets key N. Korean official over ways to bolster bilateral ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 12, 2024

SEOUL, April 12 (Yonhap) -- China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, has met with Choe Ryong-hae, a senior North Korean official, to discuss ways to further develop bilateral ties, Pyongyang's state media said Friday.

The trip by the No. 3 official in the Chinese Communist Party came as the two countries mark the 75th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations.

The two "discussed the issues of positively promoting exchange and cooperation in all fields, including politics, economy and culture ... and thus further developing the traditional" bilateral relations, the KCNA said, a day after Zhao arrived in Pyongyang for his three-day trip in a bid to attend the opening ceremony of the "North Korea-China Friendly Year."

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 12, 2024, shows China's top legislator, Zhao Leji (L), meeting with Choe Ryong-hae (R), chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

They also exchanged views about bilateral cooperation, as well as regional and international issues of mutual concern, the KCNA said, without elaborating.

Zhao, chairman of the National People's Congress of China, said Beijing hopes to strengthen high-level exchanges and deepen reciprocal cooperation with North Korea on the occasion of the friendship year, according to China's foreign ministry.

They also signed documents of cooperation in such fields as mutual waivers of diplomatic visas, customs clearances and quarantine measures.

Zhao is the first high-ranking Chinese official to visit North Korea since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.

North Korea appears to be ramping up high-level exchanges with Beijing, as much as it has been expanding its relationship with Russia, including military cooperation.

Seoul's unification ministry said Thursday that Zhao's trip to Pyongyang may lead to a full-fledged recovery in bilateral relations between the two nations. Observers see the possibility of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visiting China later this year for a possible summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

North Korea began resuming exchanges with China, its longtime ally and largest economic benefactor, in a limited manner after partially opening its border in August last year following its tight COVID-19 border shutdown.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 12, 2024, shows Zhao Leji (5th from L), China's top legislator, and Choe Ryong-hae (5th from R), chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, holding talks in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 12, 2024

​22.​ South Korean military paves way for robotic vehicles in its ranks

South Korean military paves way for robotic vehicles in its ranks

Defense News · by Gordon Arthur · April 11, 2024

CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — As its military looks to tap new technologies to compensate for a dwindling conscript force, South Korea has launched a tender to procure unmanned ground vehicles for the nation’s Army and Marines Corps.

A tender published by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration earlier this month lists a budget of 49.63 billion won (U.S. $36.56 million) for multipurpose variants of the ground robots.

The vehicles will be purchased domestically, said the notice, via a competitive tender. After contract signature, production of an unspecified quantity will proceed till December 2026.

The bid marks the first major acquisition program for Seoul’s ground troops to procure operational UGVs, Kim Jae Yeop, a senior researcher at the Sungkyun Institute for Global Strategy in Seoul, told Defense News. The vehicles are envisioned to carry out reconnaissance, transportation and lightly armed missions alongside manned ground formations.

According to Kim, there are two leading candidates for the bid: Hyundai Rotem and Hanwha Aerospace. “Both companies are important Korean defense contractors, especially for land systems, and have been proceeding with their own UGV development programs,” he said.

Hyundai Rotem confirmed to Defense News that it will participate in the tender, though it declined to specify what platform it will offer.

As for its credentials, a spokesperson noted that the company “was the sole bidder selected for a rapid demonstration acquisition project after initially proposing it to the Korean Army” in November 2020.

That $3.6 million project, a precursor to today’s procurement effort, involved battery-powered HR-Sherpa-based 6x6 UGVs. “Hyundai Rotem’s UGV is the only vehicle that has been in actual operation for more than two years in various terrains in Korea,” the company spokesperson said.

Hanwha Aerospace also has been active in the UGV field, and the company can point to overseas experience. For example, the U.S. military chose Hanwha’s Arion-SMET 6x6 UGV to participate in a Foreign Comparative Testing program that occurred in Hawaii last December. It was the first Korean UGV ever evaluated for potential adoption by the United States.

The Arion-SMET, its name standing for Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport, weighs 1.8 tons, and its batteries permit a road range of 100km. South Korea’s army tested it in 2021, and it was demonstrated to U.S. Forces Korea the following year.

In separate news, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration approved a two-year pilot project, beginning in the third quarter of this year, for a UGV-based air defense system for the Marine Corps. A prototype is to be ready by the second half of 2026.

Armed with a 40mm weapon, the vehicle is meant to automatically detect, track and destroy intruding drones. The new platform is intended to replace existing manned antiaircraft systems, thus streamlining personnel numbers.

Nearby Japan is also adopting UGVs. According to a Rheinmetall press release issued April 8, the German company will supply three Mission Master SP vehicles. Japan is slated to receive these UGVs equipped with cargo, surveillance and remote weapon station payloads in January 2025.

About Gordon Arthur

Gordon Arthur is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. After a 20-year stint working in Hong Kong, he now resides in New Zealand. He has attended military exercises and defense exhibitions in about 20 countries around the Asia-Pacific region.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com