Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Insurgent’s actions are similar in character to all others fought by second rate troops: they start out full of vigor and enthusiasm, but there is little level-headedness and tenacity in the long run."

– Clausewitz, On War

"Failure is the key to success; each mistake teaches us something."

– Morihei Ueshiba

“We’re developing a new citizenry. One that will be very selective about cereals and automobiles, but won’t be able to think.”

- Rod Serling

1. Pattern of Collapse in North Korea by Robert Collins

2. South Korea’s Opposition Party Lands Major Legislative Victory

3. South Korea’s 2024 General Election: Results and Implications

4. Yoon suffers blow as leftist opposition scores big in South Korean elections

5. South Korea Opposition Sweep Spells Trouble For Yoon’s Agenda

6. Multifaceted approach to North Korea's missile threats

7. Ruling party's crushing defeat adds pressure on Yoon for change

8. N.K. leader vows to deal 'death-blow' to enemy in event of confrontation: KCNA

9. Footage reveals prominence of Hyon Song-wol, Kim Jong-un’s close aide

10. North Korea leader Kim Jong Un says now is time to be ready for war, KCNA says

11. A deep dive into N. Korea's recent claims about the Hwasong-16B

12. Ahead of Kim Il Sung's birthday, N. Korea intensifies anti-American education for youth

13. N. Korean defectors in Shenyang receive threatening calls from police

14. S. Korea plans trilateral summit with China and Japan in Seoul

1. Pattern of Collapse in North Korea by Robert Collins

For anyone who wants to think about instability and regime collapse in north Korea (and the relationship to war), this is a useful scorecard to keep track of what is happening. You can assess for yourself what phase north Korea is in today.

Pattern of Collapse in North Korea | Small Wars Journal

By Robert Collins

Thu, 04/11/2024 - 8:34am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/pattern-collapse-north-korea

Small Wars Journal

Editor’s Note: This work was originally researched and written by Robert Collins in 1995. His research while in graduate school at Dankook University in South Korea contributed to this. It has never been published in full although it is well known among the “Korea Watcher” community. It has been known by various names such as the Seven Phases or Stages of North Korean Regime Collapse. Robert Kaplan highlighted it in 2006 in an article for The Atlantic, “When North Korea Fail.” This will be included in a forthcoming larger report from the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (www.hrnk.org )

However, what is most significant about this research is that it provided the foundation for the first ROK JCS/UNC/CFC Concept Plan 5029, “North Korean Instability and Regime Collapse” first published in 1999. In addition, the annex “Indicators to Seven Collapse Phases,” also published below, has assisted intelligence analysts with indications and warnings for North Korean instability.

The ROK/US Alliance and the world is focusing on Kim Jong Un’s recent rhetoric about South Korea as the main enemy and that he no longer seeks peaceful unification. Many assess that Kim is preparing for war. There is, however, another consideration and that is that Kim is under great internal stress from the elite, the second tier leadership, and the Korean people in the north. From Kim Jong Un’s perspective the real existential threat to the Kim family regime is not the ROK and US military alliance. It is the very idea, the values, and the example of the Republic of Korea that he fears corrupts the minds of the Korean people in the north. This is why he continues to go to the greatest lengths possible to suppress outside information. But that information is getting into the north, and it is possible to observe growing indications of internal instability as a result.

It is important to focus on the possibility of war and the ROK/US Alliance and the United Nations Command must prepare for it. Importantly, Mr. Collins notes:

“This paper will avoid discussion of war except as a calculated alternative to prevent irreparable fracture to the nKorean political system, which would be perceived by the current leadership as the end of their regime.”

“If the nKorean Core Group perceives that during the suppression phase that combined internal security system/military actions are insufficient to suppress localized independent action, the Core Group will seriously consider the option of war against the ROK as a means to drain the energies of resistance.”

The issue now is whether resistance inside North Korea and irreparable fracture of the regime is possible. Since such conditions could lead Kim Jong Un to make the decision to go to war, observing for the indications and warnings of internal instability will contribute to early warning of an attack on the ROK. Although it seems counterintuitive, focusing only on observing for war preparations will provide less warning time than observing for instability and war preparations.

Note that today we call the “Core Group” the Kim family regime. Please note that this paper is “as is” from 1995. Although there have been some changes in terminology, concepts, organizations, etc., this work is both timeless and timely.

Because there has been a long decline in focus on instability and regime collapse the author agreed to publish this paper to provide analysts and policymakers with a frame of reference to observe and analyze the full range of threats from North Korea. It is also offered to assist a new generation of Korea Watchers to develop their expertise which will be sorely needed as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. They can start by taking this paper as a start point and conducting their own research to understand the dynamics of the Kim family regime and the potential for instability and collapse.

Pattern of Collapse in North Korea

By Robert Collins

Outline

a. Purpose

b. Motivation

c. Assumptions

d. Phase definitions

e. Phase scenarios

f. Variables

g. Conclusions

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine foreseeable patterns of social infrastructure collapse, as brought on by severe resource shortage, and to provide a perspective of the subsequent effects upon the nKorean administrative and political systems. This paper will discuss general, baseline political consequences resulting from these shortages, and link these consequences to a framework of phases leading to the collapse of the nKorean administrative and political systems.

This examination employs assessments based in structure-functionalism analyses of the nKorean administrative system coupled with behavioral analyses of historical Korean socio-political patterns (though the details of those analyses are not included in this paper).

This paper will avoid discussion of war except as a calculated alternative to prevent irreparable fracture to the nKorean political system, which would be perceived by the current leadership as the end of their regime.

Motivation

The focal point for this paper lies in the understanding of the personal and organizational enigma faced by most nKorean citizens and groups when posited between two absolute requirements - the personal requirement to employ unsanctioned methods and circumvention of established procedures to secure basic resources to survive in a collapsing economy versus the requirement of the nKorean state to suppress such unsanctioned methods. This suppression will be the consequence of Kim Chong-il and nKorea’s Core Group’s perception that such methods represent direct challenges to their authority. This suppression will be indiscriminate. Furthermore, it will be carried out by all internal security agencies as well as the military, perhaps in joint operations.

The impetus for this paper is simply the compelling nature of nKorea’s economic resource shortages of food, energy and hard currency to obtain the former two. The more drastic the shortage, the greater the impact on individual citizens and groups.

Exacerbating this dilemma is the totalitarianism of nKorea’s political and economic systems; historical resistance by Koreans to the political center; political polarization by Koreans toward individuals as leaders as opposed to issues; concentrated personal use of localized influence; state prioritized rationing procedures already in place; and the lack of evidence the Kim Chong-il regime is willing to implement reforms to turn around its economy.

Assumptions

a. nKorea will not implement significant political and/or economic reforms in the foreseeable future.

b. nKorea will continue to maintain a policy of military first in all areas of resource allocation.

c. nKorea will go through a series of definable phases in which the development of each phase contributes to the onset of the next phase.

d. It is impossible to predict two things: strict timelines for the beginning and end-state of each phase; and the exact effect of external factors contributing to or slowing collapse.

e. nKorea is led by a totalitarian, cult-centered, family and croney-dominated regime which focuses on self-interests rather than the western standards of national government or national homogeneic ethnic interests.

f. nKorea’s current shortage of food, energy and hard currency is so severe that radical short term fixes replace long-range economic and administrative planning. (an example of radical fix is nKorea’s policy decision to request grants of rice from the ROK. Such “fixes” are radically different from nKorea’s historical problem-solving decision patterns.)

g. nKorea maintains a minimum of five pervasive internal security (I/S) apparati capable of overlapping and competing surveillance, all designed to suppress political and economic dissidence at all levels and in all segments of nKorean society.

h. The primary mission of the I/S system is the maintenance of the nKorean political system. This effort is augmented by totalitarian control of all media information systems, whose mission is political and ideological support of the nKorean political system.

i. The I/S system is linked to the military as necessary, and the military will be employed in dissidence suppression as required.

j. nKorea has moved through phase one into phase two (phases defined below) and is now generally in transition from phase two to phase three. However, some geographic areas are already in phase four while some areas can actually simultaneously incorporate elements of phases two through four.

k. If the nKorean Core Group perceives that during the suppression phase that combined internal security system/military actions are insufficient to suppress localized independent action, the Core Group will seriously consider the option of war against the ROK as a means to drain the energies of resistance.

Phase Definitions

a. Phase One: Resource Depletion - Economic collapse paradigm stresses across-the-board mistakes in domestic and foreign policies that contribute to inputs/outputs in a national production model (nKorea emphasizes heavy industry over light industry at an 8:2 ratio). Policy mistakes and subsequent failures in major components of the economy begin to impact infrastructure and economic sub-systems as major system-maintenance resources become unavailable.

b. Phase Two: Prioritization - Quantity of resources becomes insufficient to supply/maintain each sub-system of infrastructure. Administration employs one or both of two policies of selective provision:

- Selective provision policy one (SPP 1): Each sub-system receives proportionately less than minimum maintenance level; and/or:

- Selective provision policy two (SPP 2): Selected sub-systems receive no resources whatsoever in order to provide subsistence levels to the other sub-systems.

c. Phase Three: Local Independence - Realization of lack of subsistence or perceived near-term lack creates localized independent motivation to acquire subsistence materials, either individually or collectively, through intentional circumvention of established policy. Sub-system types are collective farms, factories and administrative units that are integrated units whereby workers/citizens acquire social identification.

d. Phase Four: Suppression - Empirically, localized independent economic activity implies a corresponding level of independent political intention. This in turn is perceived by the Core Group as violation of state (read Core Group) policies and threatening to Core Group control. National I/S assets will be employed with maximum, even indiscriminate, powers necessary to suppress actions that are in contradiction, or perceived to be in contradiction, of state policies. This is the most pivotal of phases. Successful suppression is critical to regime/Core Group survival and the continuation their policies. The lack of success in suppression implies success in resistance.

e. Phase Five: Resistance - Based on success of suppression (or lack thereof), sub-system groups and/or individual leaders (as opposed to individuals) will elevate levels of resistance both horizontally and vertically, organizationally and violently.

f. Phase Six: Fracture - Progression to this phase is difficult without an extreme amount of violence occurring beforehand. Increased and confident organizational resistance, from the local level upward, will move Core Group members (read military leaders with real power or influential civilians allied with real military power as opposed to mere influential leaders) to splinter into sub-groups. These sub-groups splinter because of opposing views in dealing with the resistance. The splinter process will be consistent with Korean political socialization (loyalty based on family, association and/or classmate, regionalism).

g. Phase Seven: Realignment - Should suppression fail, and the fracture phase be reached, a realignment of national leadership will be unavoidable. The elimination of the entire Core Group is not likely. New national leadership will find it necessary to implement immediate reform consistent with its support base. Realignment of the national leadership does not mean immediate peaceful unification with the Republic of Korea.

Phase Scenarios

a. Phase One: Resource Depletion - This phase is already completed.

b. Phase Two: Prioritization

1/ Four rules of prioritization are:

a/ Support defense industries and activities first.

b/ The lower (localized) the level of administration, the greater the negative effects of prioritization on sub-systems as these sub-systems fail to receive adequate quantities of food and/or supplies.

c/ Political and social contacts take primacy in manipulating resource allocation.

d/ Availability of resources.

2/ Sub-systems are defined as basic production or administrative elements capable of completing state administrative council-directed tasks. Examples of sub-systems are factories, collective farms, fishery cooperatives, county or minor city administrative elements, social welfare units such as hospitals and clinics, schools, day care centers, and public service/work project units.

3/ Non-defense related factories that compete for resources with defense-related factories will cease operations as defense industries receive all short-supplied materials.

4/ A large percentage of remaining non-defense, competing factories (those that produce like products) shutdown due to discontinuation of supply of energy and/or manufacturing components.

5/ Closed factories face insufficient means to support collective worker populace. Lack of production will be justification to reduce food rations for members of collective activity. Reduced food rations, already at basic subsistence level, will create individual initiatives for survival.

6/ Collective farms will be denied sufficient production components such as agri-chemicals, seed, agri-machinery parts. Two possible policy direction models, SPP 1 and SPP 2:

a/ SPP 1: Of the five collective farms in a model county, all five farms receive drastically reduced provisions. All farms then cannot meet quotas. All manage to feed selves. Unless well connected politically, sub-system leadership, both individual and committee, of all farms suffer political consequences of not meeting quotas. This in turn intensifies crisis at sub-system level due to sub-system’s inability to access senior decision-making bodies, whether administrative or political, to modify quotas or obtain resources.

b/ SPP 2: Of the five collective farms in a model county, one farm is targeted for no supplies (sacrificed) to maintain survivability of the other farms. Selection process based on grassroots politics and local personal influence (or lack thereof) with Workers’ Party officials. One collective farm work force and its leadership face alienation from senior administrative supervision. This leadership, both individual and committee, also faces personal crisis due to inability to meet any quotas, much less feed themselves. Again, individuals create initiatives for survival.

7/ Local administrative units, i.e., counties, workers’ wards, and small cities subjected to SPP 1. These units unlikely to be subjected to SPP 2. These units include local works projects, cooperative management committees, supply ration points, and local transportation elements.

8/ Realization of endangerment of survival creates psychological impact on sufficient numbers of the populace to activate survival motivations and creative survival methods independent of approved governmental and ideological means.

c. Phase Three: Local Independence - The more a sub-system is negatively prioritized, the greater the likelihood for that sub-system’s independent subsistence or even economic action. This independent activity will take on social Darwinian principles, i.e., survival of the fittest social unit, as measured by its ability to create survival mechanisms. Independent activity will transition from individual initiative to organized initiative through a variety of social integration methods. The larger the group, the greater the likelihood of detection by internal security (I/S) services. However, the incorporation of grassroots I/S representatives into independent activity facilitates the expansion of that activity.

1/ The first core factor in independent activity is a black marketing system. This system is supported by general theft, illicit border trade, and misappropriation of state assets, particularly food, energy, and transportation means.

2/ The second core factor in independent activity is independent policymaking. As independent activity gains momentum, alternative policy centers at the micro level gain the capability and resources necessary to initiate greater influence on higher administrative units. An example is the provision of food supplies as bribes in exchange for falsifying official reports. Independent policy types are black market price setting, determination of sales points and market access, security payoffs, and integration of government/official activity as cover for misappropriations. The most advanced stage of independent activity is independent, unauthorized production and sales. This begins with a simple proverbial tomato and grows to small, product-line or agricultural items either in high demand or profitable for the risk.

3/ Storage access and transportation means in support of illicit or unreported production implies culpability of local I/S systems.

4/ Misappropriation of food and energy reserves develops from series of unlinked incidents to organized activity. Organized misappropriation slowly begins to replace some functions of the government’s resource allocation system. Leaders of organized misappropriation develop influence spheres that shadow local government influence and illicitly incorporates the use of local logistical support functions.

5/ The success of black market leads to second economy which wins local support and parallels current economic infrastructures. Further success threatens function of government ration points and sales outlets.

6/ Previously alienated local leadership recovers means of influence and expands that influence in direct proportion to independent economic success.

7/ Active-duty rear area military units, those military units stationed along the Chinese or Russian borders, and those units not closely monitored by internal security personnel have a greater capacity to initiate independent activity due to either proximity to opportunity or circumstantial opportunity.

8/ Some local I/S systems, with their inherent surveillance and investigatory capabilities, will manipulate independent activity for personal profit through threat and terror. These elements have the greatest to gain through the least amount of effort. Local I/S officials then become not only culpable but pro-active in independent economic activity.

d. Phase Four: Suppression - Both the incorporation of local internal security elements into independent activity and the activity itself are perceived as direct challenges to the authority of Kim Chong-il and the Core Group. The Core Group will respond to such challenges in both indiscriminate and calculated manners. This phase must be successful to prevent the further breakdown of the regime’s control. The regime’s full energies will address whatever the regime itself perceives as threats. nKorea’s track record at suppressing isolated incidents is well established. Again, success here is paramount to the survival of the regime and world public opinion will not be an effective deterrent.

1/ Internal Security systems (even paramilitary units) will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate force to make examples of groups of citizens or entire sub-system(s). Entire sub-systems, such as collective farms deemed collectively guilty of independent (read politically disloyal) activity, will be instantly converted into political crime camps guarded by military or paramilitary units.

2/ Local active-duty company and battalion-level military units will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate violent force for the most severe cases. A severe case would be organized demonstrations (of any kind, but food riots would be an eminent example) against the local or national government.

3/ Suppression operations could be streamlined to improve overall effectiveness in dealing with dissidence and/or independent activity. An example of this streamlining would be the establishment of local “civil order” commands which consolidate local internal security and military assets. (Inter-agency sharing of information and planning is indeed uncommon to the nKorean political structure. However, the severity of the situation most likely would be perceived as justification to consolidate.) This inter-agency cooperation would facilitate both detection of and response to increased dissidence and/or independent activity. The command function could vary. Two proto-types would be a local ministry of state security official obtaining operational control of a military quick reaction force provided by the local military commander for the purpose of immediate countermeasure. A more likely proto-type would be the requirement for local security officials to report not only up their chain of command but laterally or even directly to the local military commander. The commander then acts on this information and, armed with the authority of the “local civil order command,” orders his troops to suppress the reported dissidence with whatever force necessary.

4/ Mass arrests and purges. nKorea has a long history of this activity. Political reasons are invariably cited as justification, even when activity is clearly not political but civil crime. The nKorean regime has already divided the nKorean populace into 51 distinct categories of loyalty or disloyalty. Those arrested and their families are reclassified to disloyal categories. Arrests and purges become indiscriminate when local authorities feel personally threatened when Pyongyang’s intended impact is not delivered to the expected extent.

5/ Show trials and public executions. These are employed to demonstrate regime’s resolve and demand for adherence to political guidelines.

e. Phase Five: Resistance - This phase presupposes that the suppression phase failed to meet its intended goals. Local groups, even new sub-systems evolving out of independent activity, will gain confidence in their ability not to succumb to the government’s suppression attempts either through open resistance or manipulation of reporting that forwards false data.

1/ Refusal to obey government directives. These directives will be ignored because those that resist perceive enforcement is unlikely.

2/ Usurpation of government assets, such as storehouses or competing sub-systems. This will enhance the power of local resistance activities, whether economically or politically based.

3/ Threats and violence employed against internal security representatives to either win their culpability or simple elimination. Resistance groups will lose their fear of internal security forces and either eliminate them, beginning at the basic level, or incorporate them into their local sub-system to assist in their activity.

4/ The more successful local resistance becomes, the more likely a resource-denied sub-system (which is already a paramilitary unit within the nKorean social system) will begin to employ counterforce against the regime’s mobilized military units. Such an incident will become a central issue dominating the attention of the Core Group.

5/ Successful armed resistance, though only at the sub-system level (company to battalion-sized paramilitary level) will lead the regime’s Core Group to employ combined arms operations against the resistance group. Some military leaders receiving such orders will hesitate to employ maximum indiscriminate force against local citizens and will immediately be relieved if not executed on the spot. Other leaders will execute the executioner. The depth of the resistance phase can be measured by the rank of the officer who does not obey orders from Pyongyang.

6/ Low echelon border units, along both the northern border and the DMZ, will cross the border and the mdl while senior echelons are preoccupied with resistance suppression. Platoon commanders will be capable of initiating a platoon level crossing of the border or DMZ for the purpose of avoiding punishment, chaos, or worse. After eliminating the company’s single political officer, a company commander would be capable of taking a whole company across the DMZ. The senior battalion commander would be forced to call for artillery fires into the DMZ or beyond to halt the platoon or company-sized defections across the DMZ. He would do this knowing that he would probably be immediately executed for permitting it to happen in the first place. This process would not likely end until the division or corps level.

f. Phase Six: Fracture - This phase is the most unpredictable. The current regime and its Core Group members must see the success of the suppression phase as critical to their survival. Failure of the suppression phase likely results in a quick transition through the resistance phase to the fracture phase. Fracture will likely result in violence. The types of fracture are calculable but where the fissures begin is not. This phase will be characterized by the following:

1/ Internal Security systems (regional or national) will be unable to comply with directives due to ineffectiveness.

2/ Core Group members or sub-group(s) openly (as opposed to private consultation) oppose Core Group directives.

3/ Division-sized military unit commanders ignore Core Group orders. They perceive the orders extraordinary and do not believe them or are so appalled (through Korean perception) by the orders they make a conscious decision not to obey.

4/ Public execution employed against core-group member or members. This is an indication of severe disagreement within the Core Group. However, successful execution of one of these Core Group members is also an indication of containment to a limited degree.

5/ Division-sized military unit commanders who oppose Core Group orders ally with one another to oppose counter actions. This amounts to civil war. If Kim Chong-il and the Core Group wait to this point before initiating a nKorean attack against the Republic of Korea (as

a means to put an end to resistance energies), it may be too late. As other dictators have in the past, a wartime footing provides the opportunity for internal security apparati to eliminate military commanders previously perceived by the regime to as supporters of resistance.

6/ Internal security officers executed or neutralized within entire systems or numerous adjacent sub-systems.

g. Phase Seven: Realignment: This will be the most straight forward of the seven phases because the implications of previous actions or non-actions have played themselves out.

1/ Pre-identification of a nKorean individual or an oligarchic group as successor to the leadership of Kim Chong-il is extremely difficult to predict. However, centuries-old historical Korean patterns of political realignment indicate the nKorean military maintains the only power to actually replace the previous regime, resist internal security apparati, and maintain public stability. This process will be simplified if internal security procedures have been streamlined to include consolidation of control.

2/ This military group will be shaped by an associational bond such as common military class, common military training, or regional background. The overwhelmingly dominant common associational bond in existence now is graduation from the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School. Service/duty in the organizational guidance department of the Korean Workers’ Party, whether military or civilian, is also a common associational bond among real power holders. However, this department is so strongly associated with Kim Chong-il that its influence will evaporate with Kim Chong-il’s downfall.

3/ This or any other associational bond is likely to search for solutions/methods which enable them to hold onto power in nKorea for themselves. This groups’ announcement of its intention to reform economically is more likely than an announcement supporting the concept of immediate peninsular unification.

4/ A new Core Group will move to protect its own interests and new domination of power. The new Core Group will attempt to ensure nKorean sovereignty through international efforts at the United Nations and other world bodies. Because they view it as a method of cementing their new-found control, the new Core Group will seek immediate humanitarian relief for the nKorean populace and will seek assistance in improving the nKorean economic infrastructure.

Variables

a. Fracture is preventable through unprecedented levels of suppression or the implementation of the war directive. During the latter, Kim Chong-il and the Core Group will perceive resistance energies at all levels will be diverted to nationalistic motivations targeting the concept of “saving the fatherland.” Possible.

b. Massive foreign economic assistance that perpetuates Phase II - Phase III transition. This is unlikely.

c. Major power intervention. Only China could force substantial changes in nKorea’s policies. Unlikely, too costly for China in terms of resource allocation.

d. Independent Republic of Korea intervention during the fracture or realignment phase. Only likely during full scale civil war in nKorea after central military control has disintegrated.

e. Assassination of Kim Chong-il. Due to the pervasive and overlapping security systems, this is difficult (not impossible). This would require assistance from the inner circles of the Core Group. Possible only during fracture phase when internal security systems compete for power rather than influence. In such abnormal circumstances, one cannot predict the actions of a “Mr. X”, who could be a member of the Core Group or an internal security system.

f. Coup d’état (one of two core components of fracture phase, the other being polarization within the Core Group). Remote possibility. No recorded incidents of successful coups in communist systems due to intense organizational aspects of political control.

g. Flight from country by Kim Chong-il. Possible. However, Kim is likely to consider the use of war to maintain control of his regime prior to flight.

h. Kim Chong-il and Core Group initiate war with the Republic of Korea because Kim and the Core Group see this as the only option for survival as fracture approaches. Indeed, Kim and the Core Group cannot wait for the fracture phase as fissures along loyalty lines may disenable full compliance with war order. Possible.

Conclusions

a. This paper discussed war as a nKorean option only in the form of a tool to suppress extreme dissent as perceived by Kim Chong-il and the Core Group.

b. For the purpose of survival, nKorean individuals and groups will employ unsanctioned methods to circumvent present administrative functions. This circumvention will lead to shadow economic systems, the detection of which will activate extreme suppression measures.

c. The execution of indiscriminate force will be perceived by Kim Chong-il and the Core Group as critical to the maintenance of the nKorean political system and the preservation of the Core Group’s lifestyle. Consequently, nKorean I/S systems will implement a two-fold approach: ruthless suppression of dissidence (real or perceived) at both the grassroots level as well as at the elite level (particularly the military).

d. Further economic decay is unavoidable. Economic collapse will begin to impact the perimeter of those organizations designed to ensure regime survivability. As this process develops, the Core Group itself will be affected by extreme reactions by Kim Chong-il and certain members of the Core Group.

e. Domestic nKorean propaganda will increasingly turn inward at domestic targets as well as blame foreign - read Republic of Korea and American - interference in nKorean domestic affairs.

f. However, though extreme and indiscriminate suppression measures may be successful in preserving the Kim Chong-il regime in the short term, continued economic collapse and prioritization, along with lack of reform, will reinitiate the cycle until the realignment phase is realized.

An annex to this paper includes political-military indicators to the seven phases of collapse.

Annex to Paper Entitled “Pattern of Collapse in North Korea”

Indicators to Seven Collapse Phases

Purpose: The purpose of this list of indicators is to provide general indicators that will be inherent to each phase. The more prevalent the incidents or group of incidents, the more advanced into the phase nKorea has progressed.

Most of these indicators can happen at any time. However, the phases of fracturing and realignment are direct, unambiguous actions and are unlikely to happen without a progression through the first five phases. Indeed, transition from phase four to phase five dramatically increases the likelihood of phases six and seven.

Assumptions

a. Isolated incidents of the type listed below do not constitute, in and of themselves, either collapse or subordinate phases. Concentration of these incidents above usual norms, as perceived by nKorean officials, is a better yardstick to gauge advancement from one stage to another.

b. No indicators related to war preparations will be included in this list. However, some of nKorean government actions to suppress internal dissidence may be similar to actions determined to be indicators for war preparations.

Phase One - Resource Depletion: nKorea has already passed through this phase at almost every level. The only areas likely not to affected by resource depletion are the personal resources of Kim Chong-il and the Core Group. Significant indicators that are already publicly evident are:

a. Consecutive years of negative growth.

b. Discontinuation of major trading agreements.

c. Foreign trading partners demand hard currency in exchange for goods and services.

d. Foreign credit denied.

e. Drastic reduction in energy acquisition due to lack of capital investment instruments.

f. Significant energy prioritization.

Phase Two - Prioritization: This transition is difficult to detect because the process by which non-capitalist nation’s economic planners determine prioritization is politically vice economically based.

a. Closure of production facilities critical to infrastructure support.

b. Adjacent collective farms with similar crops produce significantly different harvest rates.

c. Closure of all “type non-essential” production facilities such as all furniture factories, kitchen utensil factories, or any other production facilities not directly related to the military.

d. Energy blackouts to specific regions for weeks or months at a time.

e. Implementation of policies denying the use of infrastructure (transportation/mobility assets) to non-defense related operations.

f. Consolidation of public welfare facilities. For example, closing local dispensaries to preserve hospital services, thus conserving energy and personnel.

g. Reducing the number of ration points.

Phase Three - Local Independence:

a. Significant rise in misappropriation, as perceived by nKorean officials themselves.

b. Black market operations which conduct transactions on misappropriated items. (In any nation-state there is a shadow - or second - economy to some degree. It is the impression of local officials that indicate “higher than usual” status.)

c. Recognition by local officials that certain sub-systems continue to perform despite negative prioritization.

d. Dramatic increase in arrests of individuals for “economic crimes against the state.”

e. Increase in arrests of internal security officials for inability to control economic crimes.

f. New or increased waves of, or personnel involved in, supply and demand along nKorea’s borders with China and Russia.

Phase Four - Suppression: Ruthless suppression of dissidence has been the modus operandi for Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il regime since the founding of the nKorean state. Furthermore, Kim Il-song has also regularly employed force to suppress resistance against his policies. Therefore, the perspective necessary to the detection of this phase is scale rather than type.

a. Consolidation of means of population control. This can be accomplished through the following or any combination of the following measures: consolidating several internal agencies under a single command system; militarization of one or more security agencies; or militarization of specific departments of the Korean Workers’ Party.

b. Indiscriminate use of force against entire groups of people identified with a geographic sub-region or administrative/economic sub-system. nKorea already employs indiscriminate force against individuals through the Ministries of State Security and Public Security. This force would be carried out directly by military units or by military personnel under the directions of internal security leadership and would result in a large number of human deaths.

c. Increased number of public show trials.

d. Increased number of public executions, particularly of high-ranking personnel.

e. Hereto unforeseen increase in the number and degree of propaganda attacks against domestic “enemies of the state,” “reactionaries,” and “economic sympathizers.”

f. Implementation of martial law in specific regions.

g. An unusual but effective step would be the military mobilization of an economic sub-system such as an individual collective farm or factory. This would increase control of that sub-system’s personnel through court martials or through mass or separate deployments to other areas or projects (never to be reconstituted?).

Phase Five - Resistance:

a. Assassinations of local Korean Workers’ Party and internal security personnel.

b. General local non-compliance with government and party directives.

c. Infrastructure assets such as transportation, energy and storage are employed by sub-systems counter to government directives.

d. Local sub-systems and their personnel employ counterforce to use of government force.

e. Low-level military commanders and internal security forces hesitate to obey orders of indiscriminate force or mass execution.

f. Party propaganda publicly claims Republic of Korea and foreign ideological - read capitalist - infiltration of regional areas within nKorea.

Phase Six - Fracture:

a. Internal security agencies or sub-units fail to comply with orders.

b. General-grade officers at the field level fail to obey orders.

c. Public execution, with or without show trial, of Core Group member(s). (one incident is not enough to designate complete onset of this phase.)

d. Active military units physically oppose or are put in a position to oppose each other.

e. Party propaganda publicly denigrates a number of high-ranking members of the Core Group either by name or by associational affiliation.

Phase Seven - Realignment: simplest phase to detect; straight forward actions.

a. Kim Chong-il is removed from power, either voluntarily or by force. Methods include personal flight from country, assassination, coup d’état, and arrest with imprisonment. Personal resignation is unlikely.

b. Oligarchic leadership from Core Group openly announces authority in all decision-making.

c. Reform resulting in open policies similar to Gorbachev’s Perestroika - economic restructuring. It is not unlikely that glasnost policies of openness would be simultaneously implemented. This is unlikely as long as Kim Chong-il is in power.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The perspective presented in this paper is based upon 22 years of near daily Korean-language study of the nKorean society, political economy, political leadership, and political ideology. This research, entirely concentrated in open source materials, originated as supplementation to professional duties as a military analyst focusing on nKorea, and culminated in graduate study, in the Korean language, at both the master’s and doctorate levels at Korean universities in Seoul. This graduate research required numerous papers on various aspects of nKorea as dictated by course of instruction and professorial approval. A few of these papers have been published in Korean political science journals. The conclusions of this research are employed in the construction of this perspective.

Robert M. Collins completed 37 years of service as a soldier and U.S. Department of the Army civilian employee. He served 31 years in various assignments with the

U.S. military in Korea, including several liaison positions with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Mr. Collins’ final assignment was as Chief of Strategy, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, serving the four-star American commander as a political analyst for planning on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian security issues. He received the Sam-il Medal (Republic of Korea Order of National Security Medal, Fourth Class) from President Lee Myung-bak and the U.S. Army Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service by the Secretary of the Army.

Mr. Collins earned a B.A. in Asian History from the University of Maryland in 1977, and an M.A. in International Politics, focusing on North Korean Politics, from Dankook University in 1988. Mr. Collins is a Senior Advisor at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), where he conducts interviews with North Korean escapees living in South Korea to gather data on the North Korean population and their human rights.

He is the author of Marked For Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System; Pyongyang Republic: North Korea’s Capital of Human Rights Denial; From Cradle to Grave: The Path of North Korean Innocents; Denied From the Start: Human Rights at the Local Level in North Korea; North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial; and South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in Crimes Against Humanity; Propaganda and Agitation Department: Kim Jong-un Regimes Sword of Indoctrination which were published by HRNK.

Small Wars Journal

2. South Korea’s Opposition Party Lands Major Legislative Victory

Good summary here for those of us concerned with ROK foreign policy and national security:

Excerpts:

Wednesday’s results suggest Yoon—who dramatically strengthened ties with the U.S. and Japan and took a tougher line with North Korea—will face major difficulties in his final three years of office. At home, Yoon faces hurdles to pursue a domestic agenda, with the National Assembly controlled again by the opposition Democratic Party.

Outside the country, the voter rejection of Yoon creates questions as to whether South Korea’s conservatives will be able to hold on to power during the next presidential election. If those doubts persist, friends—and even foes—of Seoul might operate with the assumption that Yoon’s foreign-policy direction could have an expiration date.

Yoon has steered South Korea more toward the global stage, backing the Western-led liberal order, contributing artillery shells to support Ukraine and attending North Atlantic Treaty Organization summits. But a protracted political gridlock, as domestic issues go unresolved, brings some risk to Yoon’s foreign-policy mission, said Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow who focuses on Korean issues at the Brookings Institution, a Washington D.C.-based think tank.

“It would be a loss for the international community if South Korea turns inward because they have these roiling problems at home,” Yeo said.

Unlike his left-leaning predecessor, Moon Jae-in, Yoon has adopted a more confrontational stance with Pyongyang, believing peace is attained through strength. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un early this year declared the South as his country’s No. 1 enemy. During a Wednesday visit to a top military university, Kim implored students to be “more thoroughly prepared for a war than ever before,” state media reported.

South Korea’s Opposition Party Lands Major Legislative Victory

The outcome is a rejection of the country’s direction under Yoon Suk Yeol, a conservative, who has aligned closer with the U.S. and Japan

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/south-koreas-opposition-party-appears-set-for-major-legislative-victory-5dbed73a?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Timothy W. Martin

and Dasl Yoon

Updated April 10, 2024 10:32 pm ET

Lee Jae-myung, leader of South Korea’s opposition party, spoke to reporters in Seoul on Wednesday. PHOTO: CHUNG SUNG-JUN/GETTY IMAGES

SEOUL—South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s ruling conservatives stumbled badly in legislative elections held Wednesday, an outcome that spawns new foreign-policy questions for allies and foes.

All 300 seats of the country’s unicameral National Assembly were up for grabs. With the vote fully counted, the opposition Democratic Party and an affiliated group comfortably retained their majority control of the legislature, picking up more than 180 seats.

Meanwhile, Yoon’s People Power Party, plus other conservative coalitions, secured just under 110 seats.

Not all legislators represent specific locales. Forty-six are elected as proportional representatives based on the total vote by party. Turnout had been the highest in more than three decades, with roughly two-thirds of South Korea’s 44.3 million voters casting a ballot.

Two years ago, Kim Sun-woo, a 36-year-old office worker in Seoul, had supported Yoon, a political outsider and career prosecutor, in a historically close presidential race. Now, he is disappointed that many of Yoon’s election promises have failed to materialize. He backed the left-leaning party instead.

“Like many people, I voted based on the urge to send a message to the current administration,” Kim said.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol PHOTO: KIM MIN-HEE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The race also featured, for the first time, a bigger swath of eligible older voters than younger ones, prompting some South Koreans like 28-year-old Lee Jin-seo, who generally doesn’t have much interest in politics, to turn out. “I think more of us need to be at voting booths if we want politicians to care about us,” Lee said of younger voters.

By law, the 63-year-old Yoon can’t run for re-election. His five-year term ends in 2027.

On Thursday, Yoon said he would humbly accept the election defeat, vowing to reform state affairs and stabilize the economy, according to South Korea’s presidential office. The ruling party chairman, Han Dong-hoon, said he would resign.

Yoon’s approval ratings have largely remained in the mid-30s over the past year. About a year ago, he traveled to Washington for a state visit at the White House, meeting President Biden and belting out parts of Don McLean’s “American Pie.” Back home, it was a less momentous story: South Korea’s economy grew last year at a far lower rate than other wealthy democracies, and inflation that had been tamed locally over the decades began to spiral upward.

As a presidential candidate, Yoon favored throwing uppercuts at rallies and touted justice as a prosecutor who rooted out corruption. But in office, Yoon’s legal scrutiny of opposition-party figures came off as politically motivated, while he blocked parliamentary attempts to investigate his wife, first lady Kim Keon-hee, who had accepted a $2,200 Dior bag as a gift.

Wednesday’s results suggest Yoon—who dramatically strengthened ties with the U.S. and Japan and took a tougher line with North Korea—will face major difficulties in his final three years of office. At home, Yoon faces hurdles to pursue a domestic agenda, with the National Assembly controlled again by the opposition Democratic Party.

Outside the country, the voter rejection of Yoon creates questions as to whether South Korea’s conservatives will be able to hold on to power during the next presidential election. If those doubts persist, friends—and even foes—of Seoul might operate with the assumption that Yoon’s foreign-policy direction could have an expiration date.

Yoon has steered South Korea more toward the global stage, backing the Western-led liberal order, contributing artillery shells to support Ukraine and attending North Atlantic Treaty Organization summits. But a protracted political gridlock, as domestic issues go unresolved, brings some risk to Yoon’s foreign-policy mission, said Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow who focuses on Korean issues at the Brookings Institution, a Washington D.C.-based think tank.

“It would be a loss for the international community if South Korea turns inward because they have these roiling problems at home,” Yeo said.

Unlike his left-leaning predecessor, Moon Jae-in, Yoon has adopted a more confrontational stance with Pyongyang, believing peace is attained through strength. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un early this year declared the South as his country’s No. 1 enemy. During a Wednesday visit to a top military university, Kim implored students to be “more thoroughly prepared for a war than ever before,” state media reported.

Voter turnout in South Korea’s elections had been the highest in more than three decades. PHOTO: ANTHONY WALLACE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

In his remaining years in office, Yoon is likely to keep the focus on international affairs, said Joan Cho, an East Asian studies and government professor at Wesleyan University. “Yoon’s achievements have mostly been in foreign policy—intensifying economic links with the U.S. and improving bilateral and trilateral relations with Japan,” Cho said.

The outcome hands a major victory to South Korea’s opposition party, and its leader Lee Jae-myung, the man who lost by a razor-thin margin to Yoon in the 2022 presidential election. Lee, who is 60, was stabbed in the neck in January and required emergency surgery. The alleged assailant told police he resorted to violence over fears that Lee and his party would storm to victories for the legislation, and later the country’s presidency.

“The election was an assessment of Yoon’s presidency,” said Duyeon Kim, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington D.C.-based think tank.

With a more than three-fifths legislative majority, South Korea’s left-leaning coalition can fast track legislation and thwart Yoon’s domestic agenda. But the outcome leaves the opposition party short of a two-thirds bloc that could override Yoon’s presidential vetoes or move for impeachment.

Kim Soo-young, a 43-year-old homemaker, said it was difficult to keep track of all the minor feuds between the two major parties. “I feel like the elections were all about attacking the other party rather than policies,” she said.

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com and Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

Appeared in the April 11, 2024, print edition as 'Opposition Gains in South Korea'.

3. South Korea’s 2024 General Election: Results and Implications

It was a tough day for President Yoon yesterday. The big question for us is how will this impact the ROK/US alliance and policies and strategy toward north Korea though CSIS assesses there will not be that much impact on ROK foreign policy.

South Korea’s 2024 General Election: Results and Implications

Critical Questions by Victor Cha, Jinwan Park, and Andy Lim

Published April 10, 2024

csis.org

On April 10, South Korea held its 22nd general election. The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) emerged victorious, winning a majority of the 300 seats in the National Assembly, with 174 of seats to the ruling People Power Party’s (PPP) 109 seats. The overall voter turnout was 67 percent, which was the highest record in 32 years. Traditionally considered as an implicit referendum on the incumbent president, the election received considerable attention as an opportunity to gauge South Korean citizens’ level of approval of President Yoon Suk Yeol. President Yoon’s domestic and foreign policy will face significant headwinds but given that he inherited a divided government two years ago, we do not expect significant changes.

Q1: What happened in the election?

A1: Despite neck-and-neck poll standings, the electorate showed a strong preference for opposition candidates to act as a counterbalance to the incumbent government, rather than strengthening the ruling party’s position. The DP secured 174 seats, the PPP 109, and the Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), led by former justice minister Cho Kuk, captured 12. Specifically, the DP triumphed in 161 districts and added 13 seats via its satellite party, the Democratic Coalition, in the proportional representation seats, where 46 seats were contested based on nationwide party votes. The PPP won 90 districts and 19 proportional representation seats, while the RKP achieved 12 seats solely through the latter, not nominating candidates for district positions.

Remote Visualization

Many issues were on display in this election, ranging from traditionally important issues such as rising price levels, the economy, and candidate controversies to newly emerged issues, including the Yoon government’s plan to increase medical school quotas or the nominations of key personnel. The unfavorable results for the ruling party indicate that the rising prices of essential vegetables for family sustenance, coupled with the opposition’s critique of the administration’s perceived shortcomings in welfare, had a significant impact on the electorate’s mindset. This occurred despite the administration’s attempts to stabilize the economy and actions that were popular with the public during the confrontation with doctors who were striking in opposition to the increase in medical school admissions.

Q2: What does the result mean for President Yoon Suk Yeol domestically?

A2: The victory of the main opposition party suggests the continuation of a strained relationship between President Yoon and the legislative body. Since his inauguration, President Yoon’s domestic policies have frequently faced strong opposition from the National Assembly, predominantly controlled by the progressive opposition, which held about 60 percent of the seats. As of January 2024, only 29.2 percent of the bills submitted to the National Assembly have been enacted, significantly less than the 61.4 percent passage rate under the previous government.

President Yoon has already outlined key future domestic policies, including plans to increase housing supply, relax greenbelt zone restrictions, and implement major infrastructure projects, as promised through numerous town hall meetings since early 2024. Although these initiatives temporarily boosted his domestic popularity, the election outcome, favoring the opposition, will likely complicate efforts to advance these policies, already criticized as “populist” by opponents.

The DP, now joined by the more progressive RKP, is expected to leverage perceived issues within the Yoon administration surrounding his family and controversial nominations to initiate special probes in the assembly. This could also lead to an increase in political maneuvers by the opposition to weaken his standing, including the impeachment proceedings against key administration figures, showcased through earlier cases involving high-profile ministers.

Q3: How will this election outcome affect South Korea’s foreign policy?

A3: Probably not much. South Korea’s foreign policy is likely to stay on its current course because Yoon’s foreign policy is not based on populism. Since the beginning of his presidency, strong opposition from the DP in the legislative body and a relatively low approval rating have not deterred Yoon from reversing the previous government’s foreign policy. Yoon has followed his campaign pledge to strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance and take a strong stance on North Korea’s provocations and has also shown that South Korea and the United States are in tight alignment over their regional strategy. Most notably, Yoon has pushed forward to improve South Korea’s strained relationship with Japan despite the risk of political backlash at home.

Expect the opposition party to turn up the volume on its criticism of Yoon’s foreign policy as impractical. Notably, DP leader Lee Jae-myung has advocated neutrality in issues concerning the Taiwan Strait and Ukraine during the recent election campaign. This stance sharply contrasts with Yoon’s approach, which has sought to enhance South Korea’s global profile through enhanced support for Ukraine, hosting the Summit for Democracy, and promoting value-based diplomacy. With the new National Assembly, this strategic division is likely to deepen.

Q4: What are the implications?

A4: First, President Yoon and his party experienced a pyrrhic victory of sorts. Some may take solace in the fact that despite historical trends going against the incumbent president during a midterm election, Yoon’s low approval ratings, and pre-election prediction suggesting a big loss, the actual number of seats that the PPP lost was only five. Initial exit polls suggested a landslide, sweeping victory for the main opposition DP, with some predictions of a near-supermajority (200 seats) that would have greatly emboldened the opposition during the last three years of Yoon’s term.

Second, the DP scored a big victory in this election but did not manage to achieve the goal of the desired three-fifths majority (180 seats) or supermajority (200+ seats) that would have given them much more room to operate on measures such as ending a filibuster or advancing bills to the plenary session for unilateral passage without the PPP.

Third, Cho Kuk’s splinter party, the RKP, has gained critical leverage as a result of this election. His party’s 12 seats could now potentially play a pivotal role if the DP aims for legislative actions that require a three-fifths majority (180 seats). However, the future of the party could hinge on the outcome of the South Korean supreme court’s decision regarding allegations against Cho Kuk of falsifying documents for his daughter’s college admission. A guilty verdict, consistent with the previous two rulings, would strip Cho of his legislator status, though he could still lead the party under its approval.

Lastly, many of the key partisan players on both sides of the aisle won their races, including Lee Jae-myung (DP leader, Incheon-Gyeyang B district), Ahn Cheol-soo (former presidential candidate, Seongnam Bundang A district), Choo Mi Ae (former justice minister and hardline DP progressive, Gyeonggi Hanam district), Na Kyung-won (former floor leader and hardline PPP conservative, Seoul Dongjak B district) and Lee Jun-seok (former head of the PPP, Gyeonggi Hwasung B district), ensuring or even further cementing political polarization. On a positive note, a number of foreign policy experts and former diplomats won seats on both sides of the aisle, including Wi Sung-lac (former ambassador to Russia), Kim Joon-hyung (former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy), Park Jie-won (former director of National Intelligence Service, South Jeolla Haenam–Wando–Jindo district), Kim Gunn (former special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs), and two former unification ministers, Kwon Young-se (Seoul Yongsan district) and Lee In-young (Seoul Guro A district), ensuring substantive knowledge on foreign affairs in the legislature amid the polarized politics.

Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. and professor at Georgetown University. Jinwan Park is an intern with the CSIS Korea Chair. Andy Lim is associate fellow with the CSIS Korea Chair.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Yoon suffers blow as leftist opposition scores big in South Korean elections

Outreach to Japan, hard line on North Korea could face challenges

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, April 10, 2024

SEOUL, South Korea – South Korean voters dealt a blow to conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol on Wednesday, with exit polls showing he will face a left-wing opposition-dominated National Assembly for the final three years of his term.

Projections by the country’s three main broadcasters give the opposition Democratic Party of Korea between 168 and 197 seats in the 300-seat unicameral legislature, with the upstart Rebuilding Korea Party, a party formed in March by former Justice Minister Cho Kuk, set to win 12 to 14 more seats and expected to ally with the DPK in the new Assembly.

Mr. Yoon’s right-wing People Power Party was projected to secure just 85 to 105 seats, including those obtained through proportional representation by its satellite party, the People Future Party. Mr. Yoon’s single five-year term ends in May 2027, while the lawmakers elected Wednesday will sit for four years.

“Our party did our best to engage in politics that reflect the will of the people, but the exit poll results are disappointing,” Han Dong-hoon, the PPP’s interim leader, told reporters as the election results were rolling in Wednesday. All told, opposition parties have about 180 seats in the current Assembly, and the enhanced majority may severely limit Mr. Yoon’s agenda in the coming years.

Of the 300 seats, 254 were determined through direct votes in local districts, and the other 46 to the parties according to their proportion of the vote. The final voter turnout for South Korea’s 44 million eligible voters was tentatively estimated at 67%, the highest for a parliamentary election since 1992, according to the National Election Commission.

While the loss will likely have larger implications for the conservative president’s domestic policies, the opposition gains will bring new challenges for diplomats in South Korea, Japan and the U.S.: In a bold initiative for a South Korean president, Mr. Yoon has tried to cool Seoul’s long-heated relations with America’s other key ally in the region, Japan, during his first two years in office.

That outreach has irked many voters here, who customarily view Japan as an unrepentant, ex-imperialist power. It has gratified Tokyo, which questions some Korean historical claims and says it has offered multiple remunerations and apologies.

Warming South Korean-Japanese ties have been welcomed in Washington, which has long sought to upgrade trilateral cooperation against the regional threats posed by China and North Korea.

As president, Mr. Yoon retains control over the defense and foreign ministries, but his political brokering ability will be weakened if exit polls are accurate.

“Constitutionally, the president has authority over foreign and national security policy,” said Moon Chung-in, who advised previous governments on North Korean policies. “But the Assembly can, as in the U.S., intervene by controlling budgets and if the opposition coalition has a majority, the ruling party will have limited leverage.”

Mr. Moon, a professor emeritus at Seoul’s Yonsei University, reckons that won’t suit Mr. Yoon, whom critics say finds it difficult to compromise. The president “would have to bargain with the opposition,” Mr. Moon said. “But given his style, that is unlikely. I see a collision course.”

The result will be felt well beyond South Korea.

“As the Assembly has many tools for policy intervention, the U.S. and Japanese governments will have serious concerns about the ability of the Yoon government to deliver,” Mr. Moon said.

‘Punishing’ the government

Asked about the campaign, most voters did not mention foreign policy, while those who did were strongly opposed to Mr. Yoon’s unconventional policies.

“I am a regular voter for the DPK, but this time I voted especially to punish the government,” said Mr. Chang, a 40-something design firm CEO, who like several voters, asked The Washington Times not to use his full name. “That includes Yoon trying hard to please Japan, and letting the Fukushima water out.”

Many Koreans were infuriated when the Yoon administration took Tokyo’s side last year in its release of irradiated coolant water from the earthquake-stricken Fukushima Nuclear Plant into the Pacific. Before its release, the water was filtered and treated under United Nations auspices, and no dangerous radioactivity has been detected since the release.

Other voters backed Mr. Yoon’s desire to move beyond past grievances with Tokyo.

“The leftists still go on and on about anti-Japan,” said Jun Arum, a 37-year-old housewife who voted for the PPP. “It is too backward — and not based on truth, even.”

Although it’s a prime concern for Washington, the threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea does not factor into domestic politics as an electoral concern, Mr. Chang said.

“If we have a war with North Korea, it is going to be like a world war,” he said. “I don’t think it’s only a matter of [South] Korea.”

Personalities and policies

A week of campaigning saw intense but good-natured electioneering in one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies.

In Seoul, open-topped trucks roamed the streets, blaring music and slogans, while campaigners on their rear decks danced. On street corners, party workers and volunteers — often shoulder to shoulder with opposing party workers and volunteers — waved placards showcasing their respective candidates’ mug shots, under electioneering banners slung from lamp posts and trees.

For many voters, the election was less about approval of policy positions and more about disapproval of political personalities.

Angry citizens voted to oppose key politicians – notably Mr. Yoon and DPK leader Lee Jae-myung. Mr. Lee, whose win Wednesday could boost a widely expected presidential run in 2027, faces multiple court challenges, but — like former President Donald Trump in the U.S. — so far has repelled all legal attacks.

“I don’t like either party, but my city’s former mayor is a nasty guy, and I don’t believe him or his party,” said PPP voter Lee Sung-min, a food and beverage manager in Seongnam City, the DPK leader’s political base. “I’ve heard more than two dozen allegations, including from people in the neighborhood office.”

“I want Yoon Suk Yeol out,” shot back DPK voter Lim Ji-young, an office worker in Seoul. “He has not done anything as president. He has to concentrate on the economy.”

The government has struggled to deal with a strike by trainee doctors that started Feb. 20, and Mr. Yoon, whose approval ratings have rarely risen above the mid-30% range, also has been hit by flak aimed at his wife, Kim Keon-hee. Wildly unpopular, she stands accused of accepting a pricey Dior bag from a person seeking access to her husband.

Even PPP voters concede the first couple have issues, including an incident when Mr. Yoon was caught swearing and criticizing U.S. lawmakers in a hot mic moment after a meeting with President Biden at the United Nations in 2022.

“The Yoon government has lost voters’ credit: They should apologize over the Dior bag issue and the Biden issue,” said Ms. Park, a wealthy businesswoman in her 60s who voted PPP. “Koreans are very soft toward those who bend a knee, but these two pretend nothing happened, and that gives the other party more issues, more stories.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

5. South Korea Opposition Sweep Spells Trouble For Yoon’s Agenda

With only a single 5 year term in the ROK Constitution, every ROK president is a lame duck the day he assumes office.

South Korea Opposition Sweep Spells Trouble For Yoon’s Agenda

Democrats’ strong performance could render president a lame duck

asiasentinel.com · by Asia Sentinel

By: Shim Jae Hoon

The opposition Democratic Party’s landslide victory in South Korea’s April 10 parliamentary elections casts a heavy shadow over President Yoon Suk Yul’s remaining term in office, threatening to undermine his ambitious pro-business commitments and strong security posture on North Korea’s missile threats, and raising concerns in Washington over the possibility of a softening stance against both the North and China.

Yoon, a business-oriented former public prosecutor, came into office in 2022 in a backlash against former President Moon Jae-in’s hesitancy in dealing with North Korea. He has sought to implement a muscular foreign policy including a more demanding stance toward the North as well as seeking closer ties with Japan, which has antagonized many because of Japan’s brutal 35-year colonization of the Korean peninsula, which ended in 1945. Those policies, as well as allegations of corruption against the president’s wife and his brusque manner in attempting to push through his policies, cost him at the ballot box.

The center-left Democrats won 174 seats against 108 for Yoon’s conservative People Power Party in the 300-member unicameral National Assembly under the constituency district system. The remainder of the seats, chosen under a proportional representation system, have gone mostly to splinter parties largely sympathetic to the opposition. That means that Yoon has to face the rest of his five-year term in office with parliamentary control in opposition hands.

Yoon’s policy proposals such as fiscal discipline and pro-business tax legislation are likely to face tough challenges given the opposition majority’s commitment to strongly populist programs of big spending on social welfare programs. The Democrats for instance won the election partly on a plan to offer a flat cash payment of ₩1 million (US$740) to each Korean family of four this year, given slackening consumer demand that resulted in lackluster 2.4 percent GDP growth in 2023 against a consumer price index rise of 3.6 percent. The opposition has also focused attacks on Yoon’s peremptory style of running the administration, including over a recent decision to increase the number of medical doctor trainees without first forming a society-wide consensus.

The newly energized opposition Democrats are vowing to launch an independent counsel investigation into allegations of corruption on the part of Yoon’s wife, who is accused of illegal stock trading and accepting an upmarket Dior handbag from someone claimed to be a family acquaintance. The opposition lawmakers have demanded a special counsel investigation to bring her to justice. Other Democrats have hinted at bringing a no-confidence motion against members of the government. With the whole election process being swept by emotional charges and countercharges, and hardliners gaining over moderates, quite a few respected politicians were swept out of office, including former foreign minister Park Jin on the government side, and former premier Lee Nak Yon on the opposition camp. Both lost the election.

Corruption however remains a pervasive issue across party lines that looks likely to come back to bite Lee Jae Myung, the Democratic Party leader, who himself faces multiple charges of graft, embezzlement, and unauthorized contacts with North Korean officials. These charges stem from his years as mayor of Songnam City, a Seoul suburb. While Lee claims the charges are politically inspired, five people close to him have taken their lives to avoid facing subpoenas. The Democratic Party has voted down the prosecution’s request for Lee’s arrest. Lee himself has resorted to a range of evasive tactics including a hunger strike to avoid being questioned by prosecutors.

Nor is Lee the only prominent opposition figure facing potential prosecution. Cho Kuk, a former Justice Minister, and Lee’s onetime fellow party member, is appealing a two-year prison term on charges of illegally helping his daughter gain admission to a medical college. He stands to be arrested and sent to prison if the Supreme Court rejects his final appeal. He will also lose his parliamentary seat.

With leading opposition figures like Lee and Cho fighting for their political life, South Korea looks into a period of future political turbulence even after the recent elections. With the issue of corruption and political reprisals overtaking the national debate, more serious agendas like North Korean threats and inflation control have taken a back seat. In fact, the newly strengthened Democratic Party comes to parliament devoid of serious policy alternatives.

On the hustings, Lee betrayed a serious lack of heft in his economic and foreign policy thinking, condemning, for instance, the government’s trade policy as “failure” despite a hefty 2023 trade surplus. He also said Seoul should not concern itself with Taiwan’s increasingly difficult security situation in the face of China’s threats. Lee called on the government not to “provoke” North Korea despite the North’s recurrent nuclear and missile test aggravations.

Lee’s lightweight policy positions have earned him the sobriquet of being Korea’s Donald Trump. At least for the next few months, all eyes will be on the progress of the prosecution’s investigation on both Lee and Cho. The best the government can hope for at this stage is to cushion the impact of coming political clashes in the Assembly, with the prosecution continuing its investigation of the two towering opposition leaders.

asiasentinel.com · by Asia Sentinel

6. Multifaceted approach to North Korea's missile threats

As much as anyone would like negotiations and peaceful co-existence I just do not think that is in the cards as long as the Kim family regime remains in power.

Excerpts:

North Korea is fighting an imaginary enemy. The real enemy is the tyrannical political system that North Korea is based on. South Korea does not want war but it has become an option now that North Korea has launched its series of satellites into space. ABMs will not be enough but already laser weapons are becoming operational and will be affordable enough to deploy and will make the most capable missiles obsolete.

The logical conclusion is to negotiate and find ways to coexist. North Korea's recent missile advancements pose significant challenges to regional security, necessitating a multifaceted approach that combines deterrence, defense and diplomacy. As tensions persist, it is imperative for stakeholders to prioritize dialogue and seek peaceful resolutions to avoid the potentially catastrophic consequences of a military confrontation.

Multifaceted approach to North Korea's missile threats

The Korea Times · April 11, 2024

By Chun In-bum

Chun In-bum

On April 3, North Korea announced it had successfully launched a solid-fuel rocket engine with a hypersonic glide warhead vehicle that was nuclear capable. The Hwasong-16 Na was launched from a seven axle mobile vehicle, which is longer than previously observed North Korean transporter erector launchers (TEL). This hints at North Korean capabilities to produce and improve its construction of such mobile vehicles. The deployment of such advanced weaponry underscores North Korea's relentless pursuit of military advancements despite international sanctions and condemnation.

The mobile launchers and solid-fuel engines give the North Koreans the ability to launch missiles with very short notice at most, if not all, locations of their choosing. The launch video also shows a short boost stage for the missile that protects the mobile launcher from the initial blast and heat. This in turn will allow the launcher to be reused for future deployments.

The warhead is hypersonic which means it can travel more than 10 to 20 times the speed of sound and it is maneuverable. The maneuverability of the warhead will enable the warhead to zig-zag through airspace and make it much harder for anti-aircraft missiles to neutralize the incoming warhead.

Finally, the North Koreans claim that the Hwasong-16 Na is capable of reaching Guam and some even speculate that it might have the range to target Alaska. But there are others like the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff who think that these claims and estimates are exaggerated.

Whatever the details, the North Koreans are gradually gaining ground. Since the launch of the Pukguksong (liquid-fuel engine) ballistic missile in 2015, it has taken the North Koreans nine years to perfect a missile that has a solid-fuel engine, a maneuverable warhead capable of hypersonic speeds and carrying a nuclear payload.

This will make the defense of South Korea and its allies much more difficult. Even with a three-layered air defense, there will be no guarantees that we will be able to intercept all incoming missiles from North Korea. The thought of a barrage of hypersonic glide missiles heading toward our homes would be a nightmare that now has become a real problem.

As we think and contemplate solutions to this problem, one option is to destroy these TELs before they are used. A preemptive strike and a robust anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense would reduce the North Korean ballistic missile effectiveness. The greatest problems are that the South would be seen as the perpetrator of hostilities if we attacked first and that there is no way to be absolutely sure that a North Korean attack was imminent and that we would be successful.

Although North Korea celebrates its success in achieving an offensive ballistic missile capability, the fact of the matter is that these very capabilities will invite a possible attack from an adversary that had no intention to do so in the first place.

South Korea is not standing by idly. On April 8, South Korea successfully put into orbit its second military reconnaissance satellite, which has a Synthetic Aperture Radar system that will provide all-weather coverage of North Korea. Additional satellites in various orbits and sizes will give South Korea the ability to track and target North Korean TELs. Add artificial intelligence into the equation and North Korea will have a hard time surprising the South and its allies.

While discussions of preemptive strikes and enhanced missile defense systems are on the table, diplomatic solutions remain paramount. Despite the escalation in military capabilities, the logical conclusion remains the pursuit of peaceful coexistence through dialogue and negotiation. International cooperation and diplomatic engagement are essential in addressing the underlying issues driving North Korea's aggressive posture and fostering stability in the region.

North Korea is fighting an imaginary enemy. The real enemy is the tyrannical political system that North Korea is based on. South Korea does not want war but it has become an option now that North Korea has launched its series of satellites into space. ABMs will not be enough but already laser weapons are becoming operational and will be affordable enough to deploy and will make the most capable missiles obsolete.

The logical conclusion is to negotiate and find ways to coexist. North Korea's recent missile advancements pose significant challenges to regional security, necessitating a multifaceted approach that combines deterrence, defense and diplomacy. As tensions persist, it is imperative for stakeholders to prioritize dialogue and seek peaceful resolutions to avoid the potentially catastrophic consequences of a military confrontation.

Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.

The Korea Times · April 11, 2024

7. Ruling party's crushing defeat adds pressure on Yoon for change

Ruling party's crushing defeat adds pressure on Yoon for change

The Korea Times · April 11, 2024

President Yoon Suk Yeol attends a policy review meeting at the presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul, April 4. Courtesy of presidential office

President says ‘humbly accepts will of people,’ aides offer to resign

By Nam Hyun-woo

President Yoon Suk Yeol faces mounting pressure to reassess his approach to governing and managing state affairs, as the ruling People Power Party's (PPP) decisive defeat in Wednesday's general elections underscores widespread public dissatisfaction with his job performance.

In response, the president said he would accept the election result and make an effort for reform, while his aides offered to resign.

In the general elections to select 300 members of the National Assembly, the PPP and the People Future Party, its satellite party for proportional representation seats, obtained 108 seats combined, while the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and its satellite party, the Democratic United Party, gained 175.

"The president expressed his intention to humbly accept the will of the people as demonstrated in the general elections and vowed to do his utmost to revamp the government's approach, stabilize the economy, and improve the people's livelihood," Yoon's Chief of Staff Lee Kwan-sup said in a press briefing.

The presidential office said Yoon's remarks about reform indicate his administration's commitment to cooperating and communicating with the opposition in governing the country.

"Even before the general elections, the president has consistently emphasized that regardless of the election outcome, it serves as an evaluation of his governance thus far," a senior official at the presidential office said. "We will take time to thoroughly examine ourselves, analyzing both the election results and the underlying causes that led to them."

Along with Yoon's remarks, his key aides, including Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, offered to resign.

"Except for the Office of National Security, all presidential senior secretaries, including the chief of staff and the director of national policy, offered to resign," the senior official said.

As of Thursday afternoon, Yoon had not yet accepted their resignations.

Presidential Chief of Staff Lee Kwan-sup speaks during a press briefing at the presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul, Thursday, a day after the general elections for the 22nd National Assembly. Yonhap

Yoon's comments and his aides' resignations were prompted by the election outcome, which saw the DPK and other minor liberal parties critical of the Yoon government, such as the Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), the Saemirae Party, and the Jinbo Party, securing a total of 189 seats.

With the PPP holding 108 seats, slightly over one-third of the Assembly, the party retains the ability to prevent the opposition from unilaterally passing bills on constitutional amendments or neutralizing Yoon's presidential veto power, as both measures require approvals by two-thirds of the Assembly. But it still empowers the opposition to control the country's legislation, effectively limiting Yoon's policies.

The election outcome has sparked criticism suggesting that Yoon bears responsibility for the defeat. The elections were widely regarded as a midterm assessment of the Yoon administration, and the public sided with the opposition bloc, which campaigned under slogans calling for a verdict on the Yoon administration.

During the lead-up to the elections, the PPP's support experienced declines whenever political problems arose from the presidential office. A senior secretary resigned after making a controversial comment on press freedom, while Yoon faced backlash after appointing a former defense minister who is under investigation as ambassador to Australia. The president was also mired in controversy over a remark suggesting his ignorance of the actual price of spring onions as the public reels from soaring inflation.

The president and the ruling party also failed to foster harmony. Yoon and PPP interim leader Han Dong-hoon clashed over a scandal involving the first lady, Kim Keon Hee, receiving a luxury handbag. Additionally, the PPP criticized Yoon for his perceived inflexibility in addressing a walkout by doctors to protest the president's proposal to expand the admissions quota of medical schools.

This was compounded by the opposition party's criticism that the president consistently refuses to compromise or engage in dialogue with the DPK on most contentious issues throughout his presidency, resulting in lower job approval ratings.

People Power Party interim leader Han Dong-hoon speaks at the party's election monitoring room in the National Assembly on Yeouido, Seoul, Wednesday, after exit polls for the general elections were revealed. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul

With Yoon expressing regret and his aides tendering resignations, the spotlight now shifts to how Yoon will alter his approach to handling state affairs. This includes considerations such as reshuffling his Cabinet and actively seeking talks with the opposition more than before.

“With the election outcome, the Yoon government finds itself in a politically weakened state, where its ability to enact significant changes is severely limited. It seems the best course of action for Yoon is to focus on maintaining state affairs while actively listening to the voices of the opposition,” political commentator Park Sang-byeong said.

“The election result indicates that the president's change should revolve around listening to and cooperating with the opposition,” Park added.

The Korea Times · April 11, 2024

8. N.K. leader vows to deal 'death-blow' to enemy in event of confrontation: KCNA

Kim continues to externalize his problems because he is under great internal stress.

(2nd LD) N.K. leader vows to deal 'death-blow' to enemy in event of confrontation: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 11, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS details, remarks in paras 4-9)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, April 11 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has vowed to mobilize all means to deal a "death-blow" to the country's enemy without hesitation should it opt for military confrontation with the North, state media said Thursday.

Kim made the remark during his visit to the Kim Jong-il University of Military and Politics on Wednesday, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, calling the university named after Kim's late father a military training school for core commanding officers.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) visits the Kim Jong-il University of Military and Politics on April 10, 2024, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

"He said that now is the time to be more thoroughly prepared for a war than ever before and that the DPRK should be more firmly and perfectly prepared for a war, which should be won without fail, not just for a possible war," the KCNA said, referring to the North by its formal name.

Kim was also quoted as instructing the university to nurture new military talents who are absolutely loyal to the ruling Workers' Party of Korea and are capable of overwhelming the enemy with "ideological, mental, militant, moral and tactical superiority," it added.

The KCNA said Kim inspected lecture rooms as well as dorms and a mess hall at the university and vowed to improve living conditions for students.

Photos released by the state media outlet showed Kim speaking to officials in a room filled with blurred maps and a topographic model that appeared to map major roads in South Korea and central Seoul.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) visits the Kim Jong-il University of Military and Politics on April 10, 2024, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Noting that the KCNA reported on how Kim inspected the living conditions of students and brought "various dishes" for them, an official at South Korea's unification ministry said the visit was likely aimed at shoring up unity of military officials.

"It appears that the focus of the visit is to encourage the military and thus induce loyalty and unity as observed in the March 24 visit to the Ryu Kyong Su Guards 105th Tank Division," the official said.

During the visit to the tank unit credited for being first to enter Seoul during the 1950-53 Korean War, Kim inspected its facilities such as the unit's cafeteria as soldiers had their meal.

North Korea has been dialing up tensions on the Korean Peninsula with weapons tests and harshly worded rhetoric this year after Kim defined inter-Korean ties as relations between "two states hostile to each other" in a year-end meeting.

In January, the North's leader called for revising the country's constitution to define South Korea as its "primary foe" and codify a commitment to subjugate the South Korean territory in the event of war.

Last week, it claimed to have successfully test-fired a new intermediate-range ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead, saying that all missiles the country has developed are solid-fuel, nuclear capable with warhead control capability.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (seated) visits the Kim Jong-il University of Military and Politics on April 10, 2024, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 11, 2024

9. Footage reveals prominence of Hyon Song-wol, Kim Jong-un’s close aide

For the Kimologists (formerly known as Kremlinologists) Photos at the link.

I wonder how much political, foreign policy, or national security experience she has? But of course that does not matter to Kim Jong Un as long as her ideology is pure.

Excerpts:

Hyon, a former popular singer, gained international recognition when she led a North Korean art troupe to South Korea during the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Since then, she has risen through the ranks under Kim’s regime and now oversees his event-related affairs as the vice director of the propaganda and agitation department, a position akin to Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong.

Footage reveals prominence of Hyon Song-wol, Kim Jong-un’s close aide

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/04/09/WBKHXWYENBDFLM7OIJU226INXY/

By Lee Ka-young,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.04.09. 14:49

Updated 2024.04.09. 14:59

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un supervises the construction site of residential buildings in the Hwasong District of Pyongyang on April 5, 2024, as reported by Korean Central Television on April 6. In the footage, while other officials are seen jotting down Kim's instructions in notebooks, Hyon Song-wol, the vice director of the propaganda and agitation department, is captured looking at her mobile phone./Korean Central Television

Recent footage from a visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to a construction site in Pyongyang sheds light on the prominence of Hyon Song-wol, the vice director of the propaganda and agitation department.

According to reports from Pyongyang’s state-run Korean Central Television on April 5, Kim supervised the construction site of residential buildings in the Hwasong District of Pyongyang, nearing completion. During his visit, Kim walked the streets, pointing here and there with his hand, and directed detailed instructions, even using a miniature model of the Hwasong District as a pointer. Surrounding him were officials, each holding notebooks, diligently recording his instructions.

Amid the scene of officials attentively following Kim’s directives, one figure stood apart, engrossed in her mobile phone. This figure was Hyon Song-wol, responsible for Kim’s protocol.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un supervises the construction site of residential buildings in the Hwasong District of Pyongyang on April 5, 2024, as reported by Korean Central Television on April 6. In the footage, while other officials are seen attentively following Kim’s directives, Hyon Song-wol, the vice director of the propaganda and agitation department, is captured looking at her mobile phone./Korean Central Television

Despite trailing behind Kim, Hyon was seen taking out her mobile phone, paying no attention to the directions indicated by Kim, unlike the other male officials who were focused on him.

Experts speculate that information to be reported to Kim might be transmitted through his close aide, Hyon. Ko Yong-hwan, a special adviser to Seoul’s unification minister, suggested in an interview with SBS, “Kim’s secretariat might convey reports or urgent messages to him through Hyon,” further noting, “During Kim’s attendance at events, Hyon, responsible for his protocol, could exert significant influence.”

Hyon Song-wol during her visit to South Korea at the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics./News1

Hyon, a former popular singer, gained international recognition when she led a North Korean art troupe to South Korea during the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Since then, she has risen through the ranks under Kim’s regime and now oversees his event-related affairs as the vice director of the propaganda and agitation department, a position akin to Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong.

It is known that Kim shares a deep connection with Hyon, to the extent that they communicated via international calls during Kim’s time studying in Switzerland. There have been claims suggesting that Hyon bore a child out of wedlock with Kim. Former North Korean spy agent Choi Soo-yong asserted in an interview with The Monthly Chosun, “Kim has two illegitimate children with Hyon and a woman from The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.”

Allegedly, the son born to Hyon is named ‘Kim Il-bong’. Choi described, “The illegitimate son, Kim Il-bong, is sturdy, but the first son born to Ri Sol-ju, Kim’s wife, is skinny to the extent of being described in North Korean terms as ‘pitiful’.”

10. North Korea leader Kim Jong Un says now is time to be ready for war, KCNA says

Again, internal stress requires focus on creating an external threat.

North Korea leader Kim Jong Un says now is time to be ready for war, KCNA says

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-leader-kim-jong-un-says-now-is-time-be-ready-war-kcna-says-2024-04-10/

By Reuters

April 10, 202411:20 PM EDTUpdated 10 hours ago

Item 1 of 3 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits a military university in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this picture released on April 11, 2024 by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS

[1/3]North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits a military university in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this picture released on April 11, 2024 by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SEOUL, April 11 (Reuters) - North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said unstable geopolitical situations surrounding his country mean now is the time to be more prepared for war than ever, as he inspected the country's main military university, KCNA news agency said on Thursday.

Kim gave field guidance on Wednesday at Kim Jong Il University of Military and Politics, named after his father who died in 2011, which KCNA said is the "highest seat of military education" in the country.

North Korea has stepped up weapons development in recent years under Kim and has forged closer military and political ties with Russia, allegedly aiding Moscow in its war with Ukraine in return for help with strategic military projects.

Kim told university staff and students that "if the enemy opts for military confrontation with the DPRK, the DPRK will deal a death-blow to the enemy without hesitation by mobilizing all means in its possession," KCNA reported.

DPRK is short for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

"Outlining the complicated international situation ... and the uncertain and unstable military and political situation around the DPRK, he said that now is the time to be more thoroughly prepared for a war than ever before," KCNA said.

Earlier this month, Kim supervised the test launch of a new hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile using solid fuel, which analysts said would bolster the North's ability to deploy missiles more effectively than liquid-fuel variants.

North Korea has accused the United States and South Korea of provoking military tensions by conducting what it called "war maneuvers" as the allies have conducted military drills with greater intensity and scale in recent months.

(This story has been refiled to add an opening quotation mark in paragraph 4)The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.

Reporting by Jack Kim; Editing by Chris Reese and Sonali Paul

11. A deep dive into N. Korea's recent claims about the Hwasong-16B

A deep dive into N. Korea's recent claims about the Hwasong-16B - Daily NK English

Military leaders have "come to the conclusion that we must prevent the U.S. and Japan from supporting the South Korean puppet regime in an inter-Korean war just as the U.S. was unable to directly support Ukraine," a high-ranking source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - April 11, 2024

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · April 11, 2024

On Apr. 2, 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un conducted an on-the-spot inspection of the first test launch of a new medium- to long-range solid-state ballistic missile, the Hwasongpo-16B, equipped with a newly developed hypersonic glide flight combat vehicle (warhead), according to Rodong Sinmun on Apr. 3. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

The North Korean authorities’ exaggerated claims about their test launch of a hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile called the Hwasong-16B, which was fired into the East Sea on Apr. 2, appear to be aimed at flaunting the North’s technological achievements while confusing the South Korean and U.S. militaries.

Asked about the North Korean media’s coverage of the Apr. 3 test launch, a high-ranking North Korean source told Daily NK on Monday that “the Rodong Sinmun report concerns the potential of the hypersonic missile technology that has been developed.”

“The hypersonic glide warhead [. . .] reached its first peak at an altitude of 101.1 kilometers and the second [at] 72.3 kilometers while making [a] 1,000-kilometer flight as planned to hit the waters of the East Sea of Korea accurately,” Rodong Sinmun reported on Apr. 3.

But South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the 1,000-kilometer flight distance claimed by North Korea appeared to be “exaggerated because it contradicts our military’s analysis,” while reporting that “analysis by South Korea, the U.S. and Japan found [a distance of] about 600 kilometers.”

Given the discrepancy of about 400 kilometers between North Korea’s claim and the Joint Chiefs’ analysis, some analysts raised the possibility that the South Korean military may not have fully detected the North Korean missile, given the characteristic course adjustments of a hypersonic missile.

“The distance announced in the newspaper was the target figure from the computer simulation. The target range was not achieved in the test because the [missile’s] altitude and speed were deliberately limited,” the source said.

The Rodong Sinmun also said that the test launch “was carried out in the way of verifying the characteristics of the glide-skip flight trajectory and cross-range maneuvering capability of the hypersonic glide vehicle [warhead] while limiting its range to less [than] 1,000 kilometers, taking safety into consideration, and forcibly controlling the speed and altitude by delaying the start of the second-stage engine and rapidly changing the flight trajectory in the active region.”

North Korea had three goals in mind in reporting on the launch

So why did North Korea exaggerate the missile’s range in its report? Daily NK’s high-ranking source insisted that it was actually “not an exaggeration,” explaining that it was not dishonest to describe the missile’s true capability, which was deliberately limited for the purposes of the test.

The source said that the North Korean authorities had three main reasons for releasing the missile’s potential capability rather than the actual test results after the missile launch.

First, North Korea wanted to assess the South Korean and U.S. ability to detect its missiles. The goal was to cast doubt on the South Korean and U.S. military’s ability to track missiles while creating a rift between South Korea and the U.S., as well as within South Korea. A related goal was to reinforce the fact that North Korean missiles cannot be shot down by Patriot missiles, which are a major component of South Korea’s and Japan’s air defenses.

A second goal, the source said, was to show that while North Korean missiles are aimed at U.S. military bases in Guam or Hawaii, they could also penetrate South Korean and U.S. air defenses and hit the Japanese island of Okinawa.

“The North Korean leadership is formulating a new military strategy based on its observation of the war between Russia and Ukraine. It has come to the conclusion that we must prevent the U.S. and Japan from supporting the South Korean puppet regime in an inter-Korean war just as the U.S. was unable to directly support Ukraine.”

In other words, the North Korean military leadership is developing a strategy to prevent the U.S. from sending military assets or troops from bases on Guam or Okinawa to help South Korea in the event of a conflict.

“The reason North Korea emphasized that it had ‘forcibly controlled’ the flight distance was no doubt primarily out of concern for the safety of neighboring countries, as North Korea claims. But it was also meant to show that North Korea has the capability to strike not only U.S. bases on Guam but also targets 1,000 kilometers away, including U.S. bases in Japan and aircraft carriers in the area,” Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told Daily NK in a telephone interview.

The third and final goal, the source said, is to strengthen internal cohesion by showing that progress is being made in developing defense technology. However, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been briefed on the actual altitude, range and trajectory of the test missile launch and is aware of the differences between the simulation and the actual test results.

The source also said that Kim praised scientists and researchers in the field of defense technology, noting that “this test launch is the greatest gift of all the reports made during the Eighth Party Congress period.”

“We can attack Guam or Japan whenever we want. The greatest achievement is that the enemy can’t intercept our missiles,” Kim reportedly said.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · April 11, 2024

12. Ahead of Kim Il Sung's birthday, N. Korea intensifies anti-American education for youth

Knowledge and information are a threat to the regime. The regime must disparage the US to undermine the legitimacy of information from America.

Ahead of Kim Il Sung's birthday, N. Korea intensifies anti-American education for youth - Daily NK English

The authorities ordered that training sessions should mention that Ukraine, which has been dependent on the U.S., is losing its war against Russia

By Jong So Yong - April 11, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jong So Yong · April 11, 2024

On Apr. 1, 2024, Rodong Sinmun called for an anti-American and anti-imperialist struggle, saying never to forget the evil deeds of the United States during the Korean War. This photo shows people being given education at the Sincheon Museum, a North Korean anti-American cultural center. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Ahead of the Day of the Sun (Apr. 15, a holiday celebrating the birthday of Kim Il Sung), North Korea has ordered that the country’s youth be further indoctrinated with an anti-American and anti-imperialist class consciousness, Daily NK has learned.

“The Central Committee ordered the Socialist Patriotic Youth League at the end of March to hold a series of training sessions for the Day of the Sun, noting that it is more important than ever to inculcate anti-American and anti-imperialist class consciousness in young people in view of the current political situation,” a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Apr. 5, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Given the current political tensions, the North Korean authorities seem eager to stir up hostility toward South Korea and the U.S. in order to strengthen loyalty to the regime and prevent ideological laxity among the youth.

According to the source, the North Korean authorities have outlined the main problems hindering efforts to raise anti-American and anti-imperialist class consciousness among the youth.

First, young people are only interested in earning money and maintaining their own economic stability when they should be armed with socialist convictions and brimming with loyalty to the party and the state.

The authorities emphasized the need for the youth league to hold more training sessions on ideology and class consciousness so as not to disappoint the Workers’ Party in its desire for the loyalty of the youth on whom the country’s future depends.

In particular, these training sessions should mention that Ukraine, which has been dependent on the U.S., is losing its war against Russia, while impressing upon the youth that imperial fantasies have fatal consequences.

To this end, the North Korean authorities ordered that model class-consciousness training sessions be held in every province and that instructors organize lectures and debates to instill in the youth a strong hostility toward the United States, Japan and South Korea (which North Korea calls a “puppet state”).

As a result, the North Hamgyong Province branch of the youth league decided to hold its model training session at the Musan Mine, and officials from the city and county branches of the league dutifully gathered at the mine in late March. The training session conducted by the Musan Mine branch of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) served as a model for other branches of the KPA.

Relatedly, the North Korean authorities stressed that the various branches of the youth league must take the initiative in finding various ways to improve the quality of the anti-American, anti-imperialist and anti-Korean class-consciousness education instead of relying entirely on the materials provided by the central committee and the provincial leadership.

The youth league branches were also told that class consciousness education should not be regarded as a temporary but as part of ongoing efforts with additional sessions to be held on a monthly or quarterly basis.

North Korea’s government has also instructed various levels of the party hierarchy to help organize intensive class-consciousness training sessions that include performances by experts and artists such as orators and singers.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

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dailynk.com · by Jong So Yong · April 11, 2024

13.

N. Korean defectors in Shenyang receive threatening calls from police - Daily NK English

"You were lucky to be released last time, but you won't be lucky again," a police officer told one defector living near the city

By Lee Chae Un - April 11, 2024

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · April 11, 2024

FILE PHOTO: A sentry post on the Sino-North Korean border in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)

North Korean defectors living in Shenyang, in China’s Liaoning Province, have been receiving phone calls from local Ministry of Public Security officials warning of forced repatriations to North Korea if they are caught traveling to South Korea, Daily NK has learned.

“Since last month, local Chinese police officers have been warning North Korean defectors not to travel to South Korea by using excessive and frightening language,” a source in China told Daily NK on Apr. 4, speaking on condition of anonymity. “This has been discouraging for defectors who dream of making it to South Korea.”

According to the source, police officers called defectors on a watch list and told them that “those who are caught trying to go to South Korea will be forcibly repatriated to North Korea with no exceptions, and those who are repatriated will be executed, so don’t even think about going.

This message is a stern warning, especially to defectors who have previously been arrested for attempting to travel to South Korea.

“Chinese police officers usually call defectors in their hometowns a few times a month to check in and make sure there are no problems,” the source said. “Recently, however, officers in Shenyang have been calling to warn defectors to keep their heads down because those caught going to South Korea will be repatriated and executed. Their message is meant to instill fear.”

On Mar. 28, a defector living in Shenyang picked up the phone to hear the following message: “Don’t even think about going to South Korea. You’ll be fine if you live a quiet life here, but if you’re caught going to South Korea, you’ll be repatriated immediately. I’m giving you a warning, so please listen to me carefully. If you don’t, you will regret it.

Another defector who had previously been arrested on his way to South Korea also received a phone call from an officer who said, “You were lucky to be released last time, but you won’t be lucky again. If you are sent back to North Korea, you will be executed, so stay home and don’t even think about going to South Korea.”

This defector was caught by Chinese police while trying to go to South Korea and was sentenced to six months in prison. Since her release, the defector has experienced extreme emotional distress when she hears the phone or doorbell ring.

According to the source, the defector suffered considerable anxiety when she received the call from the police.

“For North Korean defectors, nothing is more terrifying than repatriation and execution,” the source explained. “This defector doesn’t know how to move forward after receiving such a frightening phone call in an already incredibly emotionally taxing situation.”

Translated by Audrey Gregg. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

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dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · April 11, 2024

14. S. Korea plans trilateral summit with China and Japan in Seoul

S. Korea plans trilateral summit with China and Japan in Seoul

donga.com

Posted April. 11, 2024 08:06,

Updated April. 11, 2024 08:06

S. Korea plans trilateral summit with China and Japan in Seoul. April. 11, 2024 08:06. by 도쿄=이상훈, 신규진 sanghun@donga.com.

The Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun reported on Wednesday that South Korea is in discussions with China and Japan to convene a trilateral summit in Seoul around May 26 to 27.

The South Korean foreign ministry has also confirmed that the three countries have agreed to hold the summit and are finalizing the details. On Tuesday, a foreign ministry official stated that the three nations have reaffirmed the need for the summit and are currently negotiating the specific date. Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yeol mentioned on Monday that the timing of the trilateral summit is in the final stages of being determined.

If the summit proceeds as planned, President Yoon Suk Yeol, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang will convene in Seoul. Prime Minister Kishida's visit will mark his second trip to South Korea since May 2023, and Li's visit will be his first since assuming office in May 2023. China has consistently sent its incumbent prime minister to these trilateral summits with South Korea and Japan rather than President Xi Jinping.

The last trilateral summit was held in December 2019 in Chengdu, China. Subsequently, these summits were put on hold due to the Covid-19 pandemic and strained relations between Seoul-Tokyo and Tokyo-Beijing. South Korea has persistently sought the resumption of trilateral summits, but scheduling has been challenging due to China's reservations. However, China's recent change in attitude has facilitated negotiations to convene a trilateral meeting.

At the upcoming summit, leaders are expected to comprehensively discuss the political landscape in East Asia, including issues related to North Korea and trilateral economic cooperation. However, there is skepticism about the summit's potential for achieving meaningful outcomes due to ongoing tensions between China and Japan over Taiwan and the East China Sea and slower-than-expected progress in improving relations between South Korea and China.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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