Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The battles that count aren't the ones for gold medals. The struggles within yourself - the invisible battles inside all of us - that's where it's at."

– Jesse Owens

"If you are able to state a problem, it can be solved."

– Edwin H. Land

"Nothing contributes so much to tranquilizing the mind as a steady purpose - a point on which the soul may fix its intellectual eye."

– Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 21, 2024

3. U.S. admiral refutes report of special forces permanently stationed in Kinmen

4. U.S. Ratchets Up Pressure on Israel With a Vote Friday on Cease-Fire Resolution at U.N.

5. China’s Public Wants to Make a Living, Not War

6. Immigration Is Helping the U.S. Edge Out Asia

7. American Military-Civil Fusion at Risk with the Loss of the Shift Fellowship

8. The Case Against TikTok Is Thin at Best

9. Monthly bonuses for junior troops included in defense budget plan

10.'2054' Is a Novel of the New Atomic Bomb and the Next American Civil War

11. A Japanese Osprey takes flight nearly 4 months after fatal Air Force crash

12. Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann: ‘I pushed until I got the opportunities’

13. Indo-Pacific Command to test prototype of Joint Fires Network this year

14. Use 'hedge forces' to break the Pentagon's force-structure death spiral

15. Army Writing and the Zombie (Noun) Apocalypse

16. Food Weaponization Makes a Deadly Comeback

17. China’s Xi Jinping to Meet U.S. CEOs in Beijing Next Week

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2024

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military command appears to be forming reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine, but these reserves are unlikely to be able to function as cohesive large-scale penetration or exploitation formations this year.
Russian offensive tactics will likely increasingly pressure Ukrainian defenses as long as delays in Western security assistance persist.
Russian forces conducted a larger series of missile strikes targeting Kyiv City on the night of March 20 to 21.
NATO Military Committee Chairperson Admiral Rob Bauer stated that neither Ukraine nor NATO prompted Russia to invade Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces’ adaptations and innovations have in part changed modern warfare.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 21 that Vice Admiral Konstantin Kabantsov became acting Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet.
Bloomberg reported on March 20 that an unspecified source close to the Kremlin stated that the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian incursions into Belgorod Oblast are forcing the Russian military to divert forces from the frontline to Belgorod Oblast, although ISW has not observed such claims.
US sanctions continue to influence the financial sector in post-Soviet countries, as two banks in Kazakhstan recently banned the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent secondary sanctions.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 21.
Russian officials continue to highlight the work of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) in supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 21, 2024

Mar 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2024

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 21, 2024, 6:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on March 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command appears to be forming reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine, but these reserves are unlikely to be able to function as cohesive large-scale penetration or exploitation formations this year. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 21 that the Russian military command plans for the bulk of its “strategic reserves” to be operational ahead of Russia’s reported summer 2024 offensive but suggested that it is unlikely that Russia’s “strategic reserves” will be equipped to their full end strength by this time due to materiel and manpower shortages.[1] Mashovets cited Russia’s 44th Army Corps (AC), a formation that Russia is reportedly forming as part of the Leningrad Military District (LMD), and Russia’s 163rd Armored Repair Plant as examples of how materiel limitations will constrain the formation of Russian “strategic reserves.” Mashovets stated that the Russian military command will likely only be able to provide 55 to 60 percent of the arms and equipment that the 44th AC will need by the end of 2024. Mashovets similarly stated that Russian authorities are attempting to double the 163rd Armored Repair Plant’s production volumes but that this effort will likely not be completed until the end of 2024 instead of in summer 2024 as planned. Mashovets suggested that Russia’s ability to produce new weapons and equipment and modernize old systems “does not correspond” with how quickly Russia hopes to equip its strategic reserves. Mashovets’ assessment is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian defense production is capable of sustaining the current tempo of Russian offensive operations but is unlikely to be able to fully support a potential operational or strategic-level mission in 2024.[2]

Large-scale Russian manpower losses are likely more significant than armored vehicle losses at this point in the war, particularly since Russian forces adjusted their tactics and transitioned to infantry-heavy ground attacks to conserve armored vehicles at the expense of greater manpower losses in fall 2023.[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi previously reported that Russia is capable of generating forces at a rate equal to Russian monthly personnel losses (roughly 25,000 to 30,000 personnel per month) and that Russia would have to conduct “mobilization” (likely referring to large-scale mobilization) to establish a “powerful strategic reserve.”[4] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank reported on February 12 that Russia is likely able to sustain its current rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually and nearly 8,000 since February 2022) for at least two to three years by mainly reactivating vehicles from storage.[5]

It is unclear what kind of “strategic reserve” Russia is forming based on open-source reporting but known Russian manpower and material limitations suggest that Russia will likely not commit these “strategic reserves” as a cohesive formation to fighting in Ukraine but will instead use them as a manpower pool to replenish losses along the frontline. Russia’s “powerful strategic reserves” could in theory be capable of serving as a first-echelon, penetration force or second-echelon exploitation force, capable of conducting large-scale mechanized assaults into Ukrainian defensive lines and making operationally significant advances if they were fully equipped and properly trained. ISW forecasts that Russia will not develop a strategic reserve that can serve in such capacities, however, due to the limitations discussed above.[6] Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts have proven capable of sustaining Russia’s current offensive efforts in Ukraine despite heavy losses and could be capable of recruiting the manpower necessary to form more limited Russian operational reserves.[7] The formation of additional reserves would likely allow the Russian military to backfill losses in Ukraine without taking a significant operational pause between Russia’s ongoing localized offensive efforts this spring and Russia’s anticipated summer 2024 offensive effort, which ISW previously assessed Russian forces are attempting to avoid despite difficult weather and terrain conditions.[8]

Russian offensive tactics will likely increasingly pressure Ukrainian defenses as long as delays in Western security assistance persist. Russian forces are generally relying on their manpower and materiel superiority to conduct a relatively consistent tempo of assaults against Ukrainian positions along the frontline in hopes of wearing down Ukrainian defenders and setting conditions for exploiting Ukrainian vulnerabilities.[9] Russian forces are also expanding their use of tactical aviation, drones, and electronic warfare (EW) systems in Ukraine to prepare for and support these assaults while reportedly conducting artillery fire exceeding Ukrainian artillery fire by a ratio of up to ten to one.[10] Russian forces have significantly increased guided and unguided glide-bomb strikes against rear and frontline Ukrainian positions in 2024, notably employing mass glide-bomb strikes to tactical effect in their seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February.[11] Russian and Ukrainian forces have heavily integrated drones into their reconnaissance-fire complexes (RFC) along the frontline, and Russian forces rely on drones both before and during assaults.[12] A Ukrainian commander stated on March 20 that Russian forces in the Bakhmut direction currently operate first-person view (FPV) drones at night after Russian artillery units conduct indirect fire during the day, suggesting that Russian forces continue to experiment with tactical drones and may be deconflicting artillery and drone strikes temporally.[13] Russian forces are widely employing EW systems throughout the front to disrupt Ukraine’s own drones and are reportedly increasingly equipping armored vehicles with EW systems to minimize the threat that Ukrainian drones pose to mechanized assaults.[14] Russian artillery advantages allow Russian forces to provide extensive artillery preparation and coverage for Russian assaults and are likely allowing Russian forces to systematically degrade Ukrainian fortifications.

Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami stated on March 20 that Russian forces conduct offensive operations near Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna) and in many other sectors of the front according to the following sequence: Russian forces first conduct reconnaissance with drones, strike Ukrainian forces with glide bombs, conduct artillery preparations, advance with small squad- to company-sized infantry or lightly mechanized groups, attack Ukrainian positions from 50 to 150 meters away with FPV drone support, and then, if successful, seize positions and quickly fortify them.[15] Tatarigami added that once Russian forces sufficiently degrade the Ukrainian defense in an area, Russian forces will then commit larger, company-sized assault groups to exploit vulnerabilities.[16] Tatarigami’s observations are consistent with ISW’s observations of the general chronology of the majority of current Russian assaults along the front. Russian forces do routinely change the size of assault groups and the amount of equipment they use in assaults, however, likely to test Ukrainian responses and exploit tactical opportunities in specific sectors of the front.[17]

Overall materiel shortages will likely limit how Ukrainian forces can conduct effective defensive operations while also offering Russian forces flexibility in how to conduct offensive operations. Ukrainian ammunition shortages are reportedly forcing Ukraine to husband artillery shells, constraining Ukrainian artillery units from conducting effective counterbattery fire and likely preventing Ukrainian forces from relying on artillery fire to repel Russian assaults.[18] Tatarigami stated that constrained Ukrainian artillery resources complicate Ukrainian efforts to push Russian forces from recently captured positions and often necessitate that Ukrainian forces conduct more costly counterattacks.[19] Open-source investigations indicate that Ukraine’s ammunition shortage and inability to conduct sufficient counterbattery warfare has likely allowed Russian forces to establish stationary artillery fire positions allowing for higher and more sustained rates of fire.[20] Ukrainian air defense missiles shortages will likely continue to limit Ukraine’s ability to contest air space over occupied Ukraine and threaten the Russian tactical aircraft conducting routine glide-bomb strikes.[21] Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have repeatedly shown that they are able to prevent these Russian offensive tactics from producing tactical gains, however.[22]

Russian forces conducted a larger series of missile strikes targeting Kyiv City on the night of March 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23/Kh-72M Kinzhal ballistic and “aeroballistic” missiles and 29 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from 11 Tu-95MS from Volgodonsk, Rostov Oblast and Engels, Saratov Oblast and that Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire units shot down all of the missiles over Kyiv Oblast.[23] “Aeroballistic missiles” likely refer to air-launched Kh-72M2 Kinzhal missiles, as Iskander-Ms and North Korean KN-23s are ground-launched.[24] The Kyiv City Military Administration noted that Russian forces have not targeted Kyiv City with missiles strikes in the past 44 days.[25] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that its sources in the GUR stated that the Russian missile strikes targeted GUR positions.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Patriot and other Western-provided air defense systems can down Russian ballistic missiles but noted that Ukraine does not currently have enough of these systems to cover other areas of Ukraine.[27]

NATO Military Committee Chairperson Admiral Rob Bauer stated that neither Ukraine nor NATO prompted Russia to invade Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces’ adaptations and innovations have in part changed modern warfare. Bauer stated on March 21 that “Russia’s war against Ukraine has never been about any real security threat coming from either Ukraine or NATO” and that Russian President Vladimir Putin has “not achieved any of his strategic objectives.”[28] ISW continues to assess that Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 not to defend Russia against a nonexistent threat from NATO but rather to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO — a goal he still pursues.[29] Putin has claimed that Russia did not start the war in 2022 and that Russia’s invasions of Ukrainian territory in 2014 and 2022 were part of a defensive campaign aimed at protecting Russian people and the Russian state — false narratives that are meant to hide Russia’s aggression.[30] ISW also continues to assess that Putin’s maximalist goals in Ukraine, which amount to complete Western and Ukrainian capitulation and expansionist territorial gains, remain unchanged.[31]

Bauer also stated that Ukrainian forces have “fundamentally changed many aspects of modern warfare” and have quickly adapted and innovated, including by using Soviet-style equipment with modern Western materiel.[32] Ukraine’s innovations on the battlefield include its successful employment of so-called FrankenSAM hybrid air defense systems and experimentation and production of different drone technologies for combat missions on the battlefield.[33] Ukrainian officials have recently stated that Ukrainian forces have proven that a well-trained army with more advanced weapons can defeat an enemy with numerical manpower and materiel superiority but that Ukrainian forces can only maintain their superior capabilities with Western support, such as the provision of long-range, high-precision munitions and ammunition for Western-provided artillery systems.[34]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 21 that Vice Admiral Konstantin Kabantsov became acting Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet.[35] Kabantsov previously served as the Northern Fleet’s First Deputy Commander and replaced Admiral Alexander Moiseev who became acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.[36]

Bloomberg reported on March 20 that an unspecified source close to the Kremlin stated that the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian incursions into Belgorod Oblast are forcing the Russian military to divert forces from the frontline to Belgorod Oblast, although ISW has not observed such claims.[37] It is unclear what forces Bloomberg’s source is referencing. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian airborne conscripts repelled recent raids in Tetkino, Kursk Oblast and that elements of the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade repelled recent raids in Belgorod Oblast.[38] Russian officials stated that Russian military, Federal Security Service (FSB) border personnel, and Rosgvardia personnel repelled recent incursions into Russia, and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that units of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat“ Battalion repelled raids from Kharkiv Oblast.[39] Russia previously deployed similar forces to defend against Russian pro-Ukrainian border incursions in June 2023.[40] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin must balance between the reputational cost of accepting that pro-Ukrainian forces will sometimes be able to conduct minimally effective cross-border raids into Russia while conserving its military resources for use in Ukraine and the resource cost of allocating additional forces and means to border security to reassure the Russian populace at the expense of its military operations against Ukraine.[41] The Kremlin may not suffer as high a reputational cost for limited border incursions in 2024 as it did in 2023 due to ongoing censorship efforts, however.

US sanctions continue to influence the financial sector in post-Soviet countries, as two banks in Kazakhstan recently banned the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent secondary sanctions. Kazakhstan’s Freedom Finance Bank stated on February 28 that it suspended operations with the “Mir” payment system due to US sanctions.[42] Kazakhstan‘s Bereke Bank also stopped issuing cash from cards using the “Mir” system on March 6.[43] Russia’s Sberbank, which fell under Western sanctions in 2022, previously owned Bereke Bank, and a company owned by the Kazakh government bought over 99 percent of Bereke Bank’s shares in September 2023, leading the US Treasury Department to remove sanctions on Bereke Bank in March 2024.[44] ISW previously reported that Armenia’s Central Bank will reportedly ban the use of the “Mir” system on March 29 and that 17 of 18 Armenian commercial banks will stop using the system on March 30.[45] The US imposed sanctions against the “Mir” system’s operator, the National Payment Card System Joint Stock Company, in February 2024.[46]

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military command appears to be forming reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine, but these reserves are unlikely to be able to function as cohesive large-scale penetration or exploitation formations this year.
Russian offensive tactics will likely increasingly pressure Ukrainian defenses as long as delays in Western security assistance persist.
Russian forces conducted a larger series of missile strikes targeting Kyiv City on the night of March 20 to 21.
NATO Military Committee Chairperson Admiral Rob Bauer stated that neither Ukraine nor NATO prompted Russia to invade Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces’ adaptations and innovations have in part changed modern warfare.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 21 that Vice Admiral Konstantin Kabantsov became acting Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet.
Bloomberg reported on March 20 that an unspecified source close to the Kremlin stated that the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian incursions into Belgorod Oblast are forcing the Russian military to divert forces from the frontline to Belgorod Oblast, although ISW has not observed such claims.
US sanctions continue to influence the financial sector in post-Soviet countries, as two banks in Kazakhstan recently banned the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent secondary sanctions.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 21.
Russian officials continue to highlight the work of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) in supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 21. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements occurred northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Zolotarivka and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[47] Elements of the Russian “GORB” detachment and of the 2nd, 7th, 6th, 85th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (all of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC) are reportedly operating in the Bilohorivka area.[48] Elements of the 204th “Akhmat“ Spetsnaz detachment are also reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced west of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 21. Geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[50] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces captured the Alebastrova railway station east of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[51] Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka; and south of Bakhmut near Niu York.[52] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division continue to operate northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar.[53]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces captured Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) amid continued positional fighting west of Avdiivka on March 21.[54] Russian milbloggers largely did not corroborate the MoD’s claims, instead claiming that Russian forces advanced in or near Tonenke while capitalizing on gains near Orlivka (west of Avdiivka) on March 21.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control half of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka).[56] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Netaylove, and Nevelske.[57] Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and of the 1453rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Berdychi.[58]

Positional fighting continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Vodyane.[59] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[60]

Positional fighting continued near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 21.[61] Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[63] Elements of the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating near Verbove.[64] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) and 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[65]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advanced north of Pidstepne (4km south of the Dnipro River) in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, although Russian forces likely did not make this advance within the past day.[66] Positional engagements continued in east bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 21.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in dacha areas near the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky).[68] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) reportedly continue operating near Krynky.[69]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed three Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea on March 21.[70]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a missile strike against Mykolaiv City during the day on March 21. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched a ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and damaged an industrial enterprise.[71]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to highlight the work of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) in supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Russian DIB enterprises in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on March 21.[72] The general director of an unspecified Russian plant told Shoigu that the plant began mass producing FAB-3000 aerial bombs in February 2024 and at least doubled its production of FAB-1500 and FAB-500 aerial bombs over the past year, all of which Russian forces likely further modify to use as glide bombs. The plant also reportedly increased its production of artillery and aviation weapons fivefold over the past year. Shoigu visited another plant that produces artillery ammunition and claimed that Russia is producing enough artillery ammunition to supply the Russian military in Ukraine.[73] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev also visited Russia’s Tambov gunpowder plant and called on Russian DIB enterprises to “work faster” to support the Russian military in Ukraine.[74]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continued to threaten escalation as part of Kremlin efforts to constrain Western discussions about support for Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 20 in response to French discussions about possibly sending military personnel to Ukraine that sending foreign troops to Ukraine could lead to “extremely negative...even irreparable consequences.”[75] Russia has not significantly responded to Western security assistance to Ukraine that Russia has previously labeled as significant escalations.[76]

Kremlin mouthpieces continued to criticize the Armenian government's interest in cooperation with the West as contrary to Armenian interests against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian–Armenian relations. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on March 20 that Armenia’s increased cooperation with the European Union (EU) equates to a loss of Armenian sovereignty.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 21, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-21-2024

Key Takeaways:

West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militias cooperating against Israel have likely established at least one cell in Jenin to target Israeli civilian areas outside of the West Bank.
A March 20 IDF airstrike targeting PIJ fighters coordinating a suicide attack cell in Jenin likely failed to destroy this cell, which was responsible for the manufacture, planning, and execution of an attempted March 11 suicide attack.
Palestinian militias in the West Bank almost certainly maintain additional cells focused on attacking Israel proper.
Palestinian militia presence in Jenin and other West Bank cities along the barrier wall—such as Tulkarm—offer geographic advantages for Palestinian militias that the groups could use to launch attacks into Israel proper.
Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 21. Israeli forces detained several high-level Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters at al Shifa Hospital.
Iraq: Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Ala al Walai described Israeli maritime ports and airports as “legitimate targets” on March 21.
Iran: The US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three procurement networks across four different countries on March 20 for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile, nuclear, and defense programs.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 21, 2024

Mar 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, March 21, 2024

Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militias cooperating against Israel have likely established at least one cell in Jenin to target Israeli civilian areas outside of the West Bank. Israeli forces killed a Palestinian man from Jenin carrying a weapon and “ready-to-use explosive device” in Zeita, along the West Bank-Israel barrier, on March 11.[1] The IDF said that the man was en route to conduct a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.[2] A PIJ commander in Jenin organized the attack.[3] PIJ probably received assistance from other Palestinian militias, given PIJ’s role in the Hornets’ Nest operations room and Jenin’s importance as a hub for militia activity. The Hornets’ Nest is a combined operations room that is based in Jenin and led by PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.[4] The IDF conducted a “brigade operation” in Jenin on March 13 following the attempted March 11 attack and arrested seven “wanted persons” and captured three improvised explosive devices.[5] The IDF Air Force killed the Palestinian commanders responsible for planning the March 11 attack in a March 20 airstrike that killed several fighters the IDF said were ”attempting to insert a hazard into the heart of Israel.”[6]

The March 20 airstrike likely failed to destroy the Palestinian militia cell responsible for the manufacture, planning, and execution of the attempted March 11 attack. Suicide attacks require a significant logistical tail to manufacture and deploy suicide bombers.[7] These logistical assets include bombmaking facilities, safehouses, and an area in which to mentally prepare the would-be suicide bomber.[8] A single airstrike eliminating leaders of this cell will not cause the cell’s more important assets, such as bombmakers or recruiters, to cease operations. The airstrike may, however, cause a temporary pause or slowdown in operations as the cell reorganizes itself.

Palestinian militias in the West Bank almost certainly maintain additional cells focused on attacking Israel proper. Israeli border police detained a Palestinian man in Jericho on March 21 that Israeli police alleged planned to conduct a suicide bombing attack against an unspecified target.[9] The logistical tail required to manufacture and deploy suicide bombers indicates that this Jericho attack and other unclaimed attempted attacks are not isolated events or attacks by independent individuals.

Palestinian militia presence in Jenin and other West Bank cities along the barrier wall—such as Tulkarm—offer geographic advantages for Palestinian militias that the groups could use to launch attacks into Israel proper. Jenin is only 5km south of the West Bank-Israel barrier, and Tulkarm is immediately adjacent to the Israeli town of Bat Hafer. The IDF “brigade operation” in Tulkarm on March 21 is notable in this context (see West Bank for more on this operation).[10] The IDF’s ability to disrupt militia attacks into Israel proper and eliminate would-be suicide bombers does demonstrate the difficulties faced by Palestinian militias in conducting these attacks, however. Israeli media reported on March 19 that the IDF had established a unit of engineering and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive tunnels” in the West Bank.[11] The report added that the IDF established the unit after residents in Bat Hafer reported hearing “digging noises” under their homes.[12] Both Jenin and Tulkarm have been hotspots of militia activity before and during the current war.[13] The IDF discovered a tunnel under Jenin refugee camp in July 2023 that Palestinian militias were using to transport weapons and hide fighters.[14] The development of tunnels that could cross under the West Bank-Israel barrier points to the threat posed by militias operating near the barrier wall.

Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 21. Israeli special operations forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 401st Brigade (162nd Division) killed approximately 50 Palestinian fighters and located ammunition depots near the hospital over the last 24 hours.[15] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated on March 21 that Palestinian fighters remain barricaded in the al Shifa Hospital emergency room and that the Israeli forces are focused on evacuating civilians from the area before clearing the full hospital.[16] The IDF said on March 20 that its forces evacuated 3,700 Gazans to the southern Gaza Strip through a checkpoint near the hospital, detaining 300 of the 3,700 evacuees as suspected fighters.[17] Local Palestinian sources said Israeli forces had evacuated all of Rimal neighborhood, where al Shifa hospital is located.[18] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on March 20 that the IDF would continue operations at al Shifa Hospital ”for a few more days.”[19]

Halevi said that Hamas returned to al Shifa hospital and turned it into a command-and-control center as part of Hamas’ efforts to rebuild its governance in the northern Gaza Strip.[20] Local sources also reported Israeli forces raided local government buildings in Rimal neighborhood.[21] Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip aim to destroy both Hamas’ military capabilities and government infrastructure.[22]

Israeli forces detained several high-level Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters at al Shifa Hospital. The IDF spokesperson said on March 21 that Israeli forces detained 600 people, including 358 PIJ and Hamas fighters, since the raid began.[23] The IDF said "very significant" senior Hamas commanders are among those captured but that the IDF would not disclose their identities due to ongoing questioning.[24] Israel said that included among the detainees were Hamas officials responsible for facilitating attacks in the West Bank.[25] The IDF said many PIJ fighters surrendered to Israeli forces as the IDF entered al Shifa hospital.[26] Israeli forces detained PIJ’s Shujaiya Battalion commander, the deputy commander of PIJ's Northern Gaza Brigade, and the PIJ northern Gaza tunnel commander in al Shifa Hospital.[27] Israeli forces also detained two PIJ fighters responsible for intelligence and military communications.[28] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said during his visit to the hospital on March 20 that the raid at al Shifa Hospital is targeting senior Palestinian militia leaders.[29] Halevi added that the IDF operations are causing “severe damage to Hamas, dismantling Hamas, killing the military leadership, [and damaging] the civilian [Hamas] leadership.”[30]

Four Palestinian militias conducted at least 11 attacks targeting Israeli ground forces near al Shifa Hospital on March 21.[31] The four Palestinian militias reported that their fighters engaged Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. Three militias also mortared Israeli forces at the hospital.[32]

Key Takeaways:

West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militias cooperating against Israel have likely established at least one cell in Jenin to target Israeli civilian areas outside of the West Bank.
A March 20 IDF airstrike targeting PIJ fighters coordinating a suicide attack cell in Jenin likely failed to destroy this cell, which was responsible for the manufacture, planning, and execution of an attempted March 11 suicide attack.
Palestinian militias in the West Bank almost certainly maintain additional cells focused on attacking Israel proper.
Palestinian militia presence in Jenin and other West Bank cities along the barrier wall—such as Tulkarm—offer geographic advantages for Palestinian militias that the groups could use to launch attacks into Israel proper.
Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 21. Israeli forces detained several high-level Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters at al Shifa Hospital.
Iraq: Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Ala al Walai described Israeli maritime ports and airports as “legitimate targets” on March 21.
Iran: The US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three procurement networks across four different countries on March 20 for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile, nuclear, and defense programs.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 21. Israeli forces killed about 20 Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[33] Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces at the Netzarim checkpoint killed two Palestinians attempting to enter Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip.[34] PIJ targeted Israeli personnel near the Israel-built highway that divides the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[35] Other Palestinian militias claimed rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli positions in the eastern of the central Gaza Strip.[36]

Israeli forces began an operation to clear new areas of Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 21. The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) killed Palestinian fighters in the area and destroyed military infrastructure, including rocket launch shafts.[37] Israeli forces conducted waves of airstrikes on Qarara as part of the operation.[38] Israeli forces have been operating in Qarara since March 3.[39] PIJ fighters targeted Israeli infantrymen breaching a tunnel in Qarara on March 21 by rigging the tunnel entrance to explode.[40] Hamas fighters targeted two Israeli tanks with rocket-propelled grenades west of Qarara.[41]

The IDF released a summary of the IDF 89th Commando Brigade’s clearing operation in Hamad on March 21. Israeli forces concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.[42] Israeli special operations forces raided 100 buildings, killed “dozens” of Palestinian fighters, and seized weapons during the two-week clearing operation.[43] Israeli intelligence is questioning dozens of Palestinian fighters detained in Hamad. A Palestinian journalist posted a video from Hamad on March 21 showing empty streets and buildings with no IDF vehicles or personnel, indicating that the IDF is no longer operating in Hamad.[44]

Mossad Director David Barnea, the lead Israeli official responsible for ceasefire and hostage negotiations, is expected to return to Qatar on March 22 to meet with high-level US, Egyptian and Qatari officials, according to the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.[45] Barnea departed Qatar on March 19.[46]

PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) fired rockets from the Gaza Strip at Beeri, southern Israel, on March 21.[47]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 20.[48]

PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades attempted to disrupt a major Israeli raid in Nour Shams, near Tulkarm, on March 21. Hamas acknowledged that at least one of the Palestinian fighters killed during the Israeli operation was a Hamas member.[49] Both PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces during the Israeli operation in Nour Shams.[50] The IDF said that it completed a “brigade-level counter terrorism mission” in Nour Shams, near Tulkarm on March 21.[51] The IDF arrested three wanted individuals, uncovered planted IEDs, and killed two unspecified Palestinian fighters during a small arms clash during the operation.[52] The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike that killed two other Palestinian fighters who were throwing IEDs at Israeli forces operating in Nour Shams.[53]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iran-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 10 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 20.[54]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified power plant in Tel Aviv on March 21.[55] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. The IDF did not report any suspicious drone activity near Tel Aviv.

Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Ala al Walai described Israeli maritime ports and airports as “legitimate targets” on March 21.[56] Walai claimed that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada will continue to conduct attacks targeting Israel until Israel “stops [its] aggression” and “lifts [its] siege” on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Walai called in late January 2024 for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to launch a “second phase” of operations against the United States and Israel.[57] Walai specified that this phase would involve blocking Israeli maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea and rendering Israeli ports inoperable. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada is a member of, has claimed six attacks targeting Israeli airports and IDF airbases and one attack targeting an Israeli maritime port since February 4.[58] The IDF has not corroborated these claims.

The Iraqi State Company for Iron and Steel’s Director General Abbas Hayal announced on March 17 that the Iraqi federal government plans to sign a contract with an unspecified “major Chinese company” to construct a steel plant in Basra, Iraq.[59] Hayal said that an Iraqi delegation led by the Iraqi industry and minerals minister recently traveled to China to visit the company’s headquarters. Hayal also said that the Iraqi federal government has granted the Chinese company three square kilometers of land to set up a “large industrial city” in Basra Province to produce steel and other metals.[60] Hayal is reportedly a member of the Islamic Dawa Party, which is headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki.[61] Iraqi authorities previously arrested Hayal in April 2021 on corruption charges.[62]

The US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three procurement networks across four different countries on March 20 for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile, nuclear, and defense programs.[63] OFAC sanctioned companies and individuals based in Germany, Oman, Turkey, and Iran.

A German Navy helicopter operating as part of the European-led Operation Aspides intercepted a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea on March 21 that was targeting the German frigate Hessen.[64] The Hessen previously shot down two Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.[65] Aspides is the defensive European naval coalition operating in the Red Sea.[66]

A French frigate operating as part of Operation Aspides intercepted three Houthi ballistic missiles over the southern Red Sea on March 21.[67] The French frigate was accompanying an unspecified merchant vessel in the area. The General Staff of the French Armed Forces said that the attack posed a direct threat to the freedom of navigation.[68]

US CENTCOM intercepted a Houthi naval attack drone and Houthi aerial one-way attack drone over the Red Sea on March 20.[69] CENTCOM said that the attacks did not cause any damage to US or coalition ships. The Houthis have not claimed responsibility for the attacks at the time of writing.

The IDF intercepted a “suspicious aerial target” over the Red Sea on March 21.[70] The IDF said that the target was heading toward Israel but did not cross into Israeli territory. Israeli media reported that the IDF intercepted the target off the coast of Eilat in southern Israel.[71]

3. U.S. admiral refutes report of special forces permanently stationed in Kinmen

The operative word is "permanent." US forces are likely deployed on a rotational basis which can give the appearance of being permanently stationed if the rotations are continuous.

U.S. admiral refutes report of special forces permanently stationed in Kinmen

focustaiwan.tw

Washington, March 20 (CNA) The head of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral John Aquilino, said Wednesday that contrary to a recent news report, there are no American special forces personnel permanently stationed on Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Island.

Aquilino refuted the report when he was asked during a U.S. House Armed Service Committee hearing whether American Green Berets had been stationed permanently in Kinmen to train Taiwanese troops there.

The question, raised during the hearing on the U.S.’ military posture in the Indo-Pacific region, cited the American military news outlet SOFREP, which reported in early March that military instructors from the U.S. Army Special Forces had “started to take up permanent positions” at the Taiwanese Army’s amphibious command centers in Kinmen and Penghu.

The missions of the American forces there included regular training and exercises alongside Taiwan’s elite forces, and those deployments had been made in line with the U.S. 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, the report said.

Responding to lawmakers’ questions on the issue, Aquilino said the information was inaccurate.

“Let me just say the article is incorrect. There is no permanent stationing of U.S. forces there,” he told the committee. “We can talk in a classified setting for further evaluation, but that is just inherently inaccurate.”

Also during the hearing, Republican Representative Matt Gaetz expressed concern over possible infiltration of Taiwan’s military by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China and the consequences of such a scenario.

“I worry whether or not we’re gonna be able to rely on the uniformed service there [in Taiwan],” Gaetz said. “So, is there a plan at the [U.S.] Department of Defense to kind of make these assessments about a Home Guard and ensure that you have small arms in the hands of these people that might deter a Chinese invasion?”

In response, Aquilino said there “absolutely” is such a plan but he would prefer to discuss it in a classified setting.

(By Chung Yu-chen and Ko Lin)

Enditem/pc

focustaiwan.tw

4. U.S. Ratchets Up Pressure on Israel With a Vote Friday on Cease-Fire Resolution at U.N.

U.S. Ratchets Up Pressure on Israel With a Vote Friday on Cease-Fire Resolution at U.N.

To head off Rafah offensive in Gaza, White House turns to a forum where it usually defends Israel

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-ratchets-up-pressure-on-israel-with-threat-of-u-n-cease-fire-resolution-17c40ca3?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Stephen KalinFollow and Vivian SalamaFollow

Updated March 21, 2024 7:32 pm ET

The U.S. is set to bring a draft United Nations resolution calling for an immediate and sustained cease-fire in Gaza to a vote in the Security Council on Friday, a U.S. official said, raising the pressure on Israel to pause its five-month-old war with Hamas.

The draft resolution is coming up while Secretary of State Antony Blinken is in the region pressing for a cease-fire deal in hopes it will result in a surge in humanitarian aid into Gaza and a release of hostages held by Hamas, the U.S.-designated terrorist group whose bloody Oct. 7 attack on Israel sparked the war.

The Security Council debate is likely to be largely symbolic but represents the most significant public divergence between Washington and Israel since the war began.

The call for an immediate cease-fire in the latest U.S. draft is a shift away from Israel for the Biden administration, which has previously called for a cease-fire “as soon as practicable.”

But wording in the draft that mentions restarting operations in Gaza after a pause–which Israel has said it intends to do– could prompt a veto by Russia or other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, diplomats said. The draft also repeats the past U.S. demand that any cease-fire be tied to the release of hostages from Hamas, as Israel has demanded.

It is rare for the U.S. to back—let alone put forward—a resolution that Israel would oppose at the U.N., a forum where Washington has traditionally used its Security Council veto to shield Israel from proposals that it opposes.

U.S. Submits U.N. Resolution Calling for Immediate Cease-Fire in Gaza

China’s Public Wants to Make a Living, Not War

Discontent about the country’s poor economic reality is starting to drown out nationalist calls to attack Taiwan.

By Tao Wang, a Hallsworth research fellow at the Manchester China Institute at the University of Manchester.

Foreign Policy · by Tao Wang

March 21, 2024, 9:59 AM

“I am opposed to war, unless in self-defense.” This was the most-liked comment on Douyin—the Chinese counterpart to TikTok—in reaction to a speech delivered by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Jan. 9. In his address, Wang previewed China’s top diplomatic goals for 2024 and emphasized “the unwavering resolve of all 1.4 billion Chinese citizens to achieve reunification with Taiwan,” a statement made just days prior to the island’s general elections.

The broader reaction to Wang’s remarks likely wasn’t what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hoped for: Tens of thousands of Chinese social media users responded, many of them with grievances, sarcasm, and defiance, widely questioning the costs of a potential war.

One man from Shanghai complained, “Who is going to fight the war? If I die, who is going to pay my mortgage or my car loan?” Wang’s speech framed “national unification” as one of “China’s core interests,” but as one user from Hunan rebutted, “[China’s] core interests are that every Chinese can be treated equally and have access to elderly care and health care.” The pushback went beyond economic and social grievances. Some posters were even bolder, suggesting that Taiwan’s democracy may demonstrate a political alternative to mainland China: “The fact that Taiwanese choose their own way of life,” said one commentator from Shandong, “might show that Chinese people can take a different route.”

The mood among social media users is a sharp departure from past elections. After almost every Taiwanese general election since 2016, a wave of pro-war fever has swept the Chinese internet. After Taiwan’s 2020 elections, for example, upbeat war enthusiasts in China produced oil paintings that illustrated wild fantasies of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capturing Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen alive after landing in Taiwan and forcing her to sign an official surrender document onboard a Chinese aircraft carrier—a scene reminiscent of the 1945 Japanese surrender that ended World War II.

In 2021, one of the most popular songs to go viral on Chinese social media was “Take A Bullet Train to Taiwan in 2035.” Its allusion to a high-speed rail line connecting Beijing and Taipei was a dog whistle to nationalist masses who hoped that unification was on the horizon—by force, if necessary.

Absent from these fantasies, however, was the blood and violence that accompanies real war. At the time, China’s star was rising on the international stage, and public confidence was riding high on China’s success in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic within its borders. As such, the sentiments surrounding unification and the use of military force were quite romantic; many people believed that victory over Taiwan would be easy, that the Taiwanese would surrender voluntarily if the PLA simply blockaded the island.

In 2024, however, things have changed. The most recent Taiwanese presidential election—in which the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a repeat victory—served as an uncomfortable reminder to the Chinese public that neither Taiwanese politicians nor voters are interested in Beijing’s plans for political unification. Although the forceful unification narrative still exists, any push from nationalists to reignite war fever has now run into a wall of skepticism following the DPP victory.

“Wake up,” one Weibo user wrote in opposition to the broader online calls for forceful unification. “Stop dreaming,” another echoed. The defiant voices are becoming a common reaction to the suggested use of military force to an extent rarely seen, given the massive culture of censorship on Chinese social media.

A clear reason for this change is China’s economic slowdown. While Taiwan went to the polls in 2024, China was grappling with a youth unemployment rate above 20 percent, a housing market crisis with sales down by 45 percent, and a stock market in free fall that lost $6 trillion in just three years, the likes of which haven’t been seen in almost a decade. News about Taiwanese elections failed to arouse the same nationalistic reactions among the preoccupied Chinese public that had occurred in the previous two contests.

Instead, the 2024 elections triggered a flood of complaints: “Sort out our own economy, what a mess.” a Shanghai resident said angrily. “Look at our stock market,” an apparently frustrated investor from Hunan grieved, “It’d be better to keep the status quo, and leave Taiwanese alone.” The gloomy economy has made some commenters question the underlying justification for war: “With low-income people making less than 1,000 yuan a month ($140), and the national insurance tax going up, huge medical bills, and unaffordable apartments, why do you want forceful unification? I don’t get it.”

“It is the economy that really matters,” another person from Tianjin pointed out. “[Taiwan] being independent or not has nothing to do with ordinary people.”

The changing attitudes toward Taiwan’s elections reflect a broader shift in public sentiment in China’s online space. Discontent about the country’s poor economic reality has been growing louder, drowning out calls for a military takeover.

Ironically, the CCP’s own past propaganda efforts contributed to this cooling effect. Right before Nancy Pelosi, then the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan in August 2022, official and semiofficial rhetoric in mainland China was so belligerent that it led many Chinese to believe that the day of unification had finally arrived and that the military would shoot down her plane and launch its attack on Taiwan imminently.

This was the peak of forceful unification hysteria, but it only left its crusaders disappointed. In the end, there was not only no shootdown of Pelosi’s plane, but there also weren’t even military exercises conducted before she left Taiwan. Many Chinese, especially forceful unification advocates, felt betrayed and disillusioned by their government’s failure to follow through on its belligerent rhetoric, and the after-effects of this letdown are still being felt today.

During Taiwan’s 2024 elections, war enthusiasts were continuously reminded of Beijing’s military inaction following Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan. “Have you guys forgotten Pelosi?” one said. One commonly repeated joke, observing the lack of military action, scoffed that the only thing that was fired up when Pelosi visited was the stove in her hotel. The kinds of threats that once resonated with nationalists now drew widespread ridicule online: “delusion,” “talking a big game,” “an unrealistic fantasy,” and “all hat, no cattle.”

Meanwhile, at the other end of the Chinese political spectrum, the 2024 election prompted the resurgence of the view among many liberals that Taiwan’s democracy represents a desirable political model. In the early 2010s, many Chinese saw Taiwan as a beacon of hope for Chinese society—a liberal, civic, and democratic alternative to the one-party state. The liberal Chinese writer Han Han coined a popular phrase—“The most beautiful scenery of Taiwan is its people.”—that encapsulated the view of how trustworthy and free a people can become under democracy.

But after the crackdown on liberal intellectuals and online speech under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the honeymoon did not last long and was gradually replaced by a climate of xenophobia, jingoism, war euphoria, and a longing for unification by force. Making matters worse, a growing nationalist mood in Taiwan led many to believe that Taiwanese looked down on mainlanders.

The 2024 elections, however, prompted a renewed interest from the Chinese public about their neighbor, home to the world’s only Chinese-speaking democracy. News about Taiwanese elections aroused great curiosity on Weibo about the nuts and bolts of the electoral process—what a ballot looks like, how many ballots one can cast, how votes are counted, and how candidates are selected. When a few Taiwanese Weibo users answered these questions, they were liked and retweeted by thousands of Chinese accounts, drawing genuine admiration and blessings from many.

“Are we going to see one day like this?” one user from Gansu wondered with a crying emoji. “Maybe this is accumulating experience for our own future: giving speeches, holding debates, and counting votes,” commented another, from Tianjin.

China’s shifting public sentiment is bound to have repercussions for cross-strait relations, but it would probably be a bridge too far to infer that the Chinese public will fiercely oppose a war in the Taiwan Strait. Ultimately, the nationalist base remains. At present, the euphoria about forceful unification is quieting down, mainly because the party’s over-the-top propaganda failed to meet the expectations of its most ardent supporters. But if aggressive rhetoric were followed by military action in the future, war fever could be easily fanned again.

Despite the prevalence of extreme nationalism, Chinese public opinion is more divided on Taiwan than it seems, and these divisions are only likely to increase. What concerns most ordinary Chinese are decent jobs, good income, accumulating savings for retirement, and getting affordable access to health care and housing.

So long as the economy is struggling and people’s livelihoods are threatened, there is no guarantee that the CCP’s attempts to exploit nationalism will work; quite the opposite, it could be faced with plenty of pushback.

Foreign Policy · by Tao Wang

6. Immigration Is Helping the U.S. Edge Out Asia

Legal immigration is the key to future growth and economic success especially for developed and advanced countries

Countries that refuse to embrace legal immigration are doomed to failure.

Graphics at the link.

Immigration Is Helping the U.S. Edge Out Asia

Antipathy toward large-scale foreign labor is emerging as Asia’s Achilles’ heel

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/immigration-is-helping-the-u-s-edge-out-asia-076971c9?mod=hp_lead_pos6

By Nathaniel Taplin

Follow and Megha Mandavia

Updated March 22, 2024 12:12 am ET

As the world’s postpandemic economic order takes shape, the U.S. has emerged as an unexpected winner. Asian economies that fared relatively well during the pandemic—especially China, but also advanced economies such as Japan and Taiwan—have struggled to maintain steam.

The end of the pandemic-era export boom and Washington’s aggressive stimulus are two reasons. But the U.S. has another ace up its sleeve: big postpandemic immigration inflows.

Immigrants have helped cap inflationary pressures by expanding the workforce, despite falling birthrates, and will boost growth and public finances for years.

Goldman Sachs estimated recently that above-trend immigration this year and last will boost potential growth by around 0.3 percentage point to 2.1% in 2024. Japan, meanwhile, struggled to expand at all in late 2023. Taiwan grew just 1.3% last year.The migrant population has always been a touchy political issue in the U.S., but Northeast Asia’s rich nations have much bigger problems with it. As their populations age more rapidly, the consequences of that attitude are becoming more obvious. Pension systems, which depend on young workers to fund benefits, will become difficult to maintain. Falling populations will make exporters such as Taiwan and South Korea even more dependent on the vagaries of the chip price cycle. Higher government debt issuance could crowd out private investment or impinge on other urgent priorities such as national defense.

Taipei, Tokyo and Seoul recognize the problem and have begun to take steps to address it. But with populations already beginning to decline outright—and powerful political factions opposed to change—Asia could struggle to maintain much of its economic dynamism.

A growing body of research is highlighting the link not just between demography and economic growth but also between migration and growth specifically. A 2020 International Monetary Fund study found that, for advanced economies, a 1 percentage point rise in immigration relative to total employment tends to boost total output by almost 1% five years later. Strikingly, the model also found that productivity boosts delivered by higher immigration tended to raise the average income of native workers as well. One likely reason: Immigrants tend to bring different skill sets to the labor force, helping the overall economy grow more efficiently, and faster.

Japan’s population has already fallen by nearly 2% since 2019, while Taiwan’s is down nearly 1%. The U.S. population, on the other hand, is about 1.4% higher, according to U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data. More than half of that represents new foreign-born residents.

The long-term impact is likely to be substantial. In February, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated that the U.S. economy will be about 2% larger in 2034 than it would have been without the current immigration surge. The federal budget deficit, according to the CBO’s reckoning, will also be nearly 1 percentage point lower as a share of the economy.

There have been more immediate effects, too. The U.S. probably owes its soft landing—declining inflation without a big rise in unemployment—in part to the influx of foreign workers who have, according to Federal Reserve officials, helped alleviate labor market pressure. For better or worse, America’s semiporous southern border can act as a safety valve when the economy overheats, drawing in low-skilled workers and making the emergence of a wage-price spiral and persistent inflation less likely.

The situation in Asia is very different. Japan, with its tightly controlled borders and shrinking labor force, has less policy flexibility. Even though the nation narrowly avoided recession last quarter and private consumption actually fell outright by 0.3%, the

Bank of Japan elected to raise rates for the first time in 17 years this month. The main reason: a surprisingly muscular wage increase negotiated by unions this spring, totaling about 5%. Companies cited labor shortages as a major factor.

Falling birthrates have contributed to an economic problem for Japan. PHOTO: KIMIMASA MAYAMA/SHUTTERSTOCK

Aging Japan welcomes inflation, but not too much, because it would further cut into real consumption. Without more workers, it might continue to struggle to get that balance right. A 2019 International Money Fund working paper found that Japan’s “natural” rate of interest, i.e. the rate needed to maintain full employment and stable inflation, was probably already negative, in large part because of demographic headwinds.

If that is correct, Japan could find it difficult to avoid a recession in the coming quarters. It will also struggle to do anything about its mountain of public debt at about 260% of gross domestic product, already among the highest in the world.

Places such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan especially need immigrant labor because birthrates are falling even faster than in the U.S. Japan’s total fertility rate—live births per woman—had already fallen to 1.3 by 2021, according to United Nations data. Taiwan’s was 1.1 while South Korea’s was a dismal 0.9. The U.S. is also well below the replacement rate of around two at 1.7 in 2021, but sustained immigration inflows have kept the U.S. labor force growing.

Japan and other aging Asian societies aren’t standing still. Last year, South Korea announced that it would issue a record number of visas——a 15-fold increase to 30,000—for foreign skilled workers. Japan in 2019 significantly expanded opportunities for low- or semiskilled workers in industries such as agriculture and nursing. It also unveiled a new fast-track long-term residence program for skilled professionals last year. And Taiwan in February signed a memorandum of understanding with New Delhi, paving the way for the recruitment of migrant labor from India.

But such incremental steps might not be nearly enough, especially if governments want to deliver on other priorities such as raising military spending or boosting domestic demand and diversifying the economy away from chips in Taiwan.

Time stands still for no one, but people are constantly moving. If Northeast Asia wants to stay competitive—and fast-growing—it needs to embrace that reality rather than ignore it.

Write to Nathaniel Taplin at nathaniel.taplin@wsj.com and Megha Mandavia at megha.mandavia@wsj.com

7. American Military-Civil Fusion at Risk with the Loss of the Shift Fellowship

Not the article I expected when I read the headline. I did not know about Shift fellowships.

Excerpts:

These fellowships, and the community that Shift built up around them, helped revitalize the defense technology movement.

...

To say that this is an “own goal” is an understatement. Just a few months ago, the Department of Defense’s own 2023 National Defense Science and Technology Strategy specifically mentioned Shift’s Defense Ventures Program as a critical component of the department’s technology strategy. In fact, the Defense Ventures Program was literally the only private effort called out by name in the official document. Now, just a few months removed from publication of that strategy, the department has killed the very program it was counting on.

Putting aside for a moment the value of the fellowship itself, the broader issue is that with this kind of callous disregard for a universally praised and innovative program the Department of Defense cannot possibly hope to win or maintain the trust of the private sector. If industry and investors can’t validate demand signals from the department, they will either try to intuit those signals and waste billions, eventually abandoning the industry entirely, or they will skip the first step and just move on to easier fishing. Repairing trust and regaining the momentum engendered by the fellowship can be accomplished with a few concrete steps. There should be a full accounting of what happened in order to inform policy changes that give industry confidence. A program like the fellowship should be enshrined in the fiscal year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act to keep key relationships alive. Finally, to minimize the devastating impacts that continuing resolutions have on nascent startups building for the Department of Defense, Congress should create a small, expiring, emergency bridge fund for non-traditional defense contractors whenever they pass a continuing resolution. Even a tiny fund can be the difference between a promising company surviving to deliver its capability and a company falling into the valley of death.

American Military-Civil Fusion at Risk with the Loss of the Shift Fellowship - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jake Chapman · March 22, 2024

I often get asked by prospective investors, other venture capitalists, or Department of Defense officials why defense technology has suddenly become salient to venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Over the last five years, venture capitalists have invested approximately $135 billion in defense technologies compared to a paltry $40 billion in the prior five-year period. The answer is Shift, and the Defense Ventures Program that Shift built. For the last five years, the Defense Ventures Program has been embedding high-potential active-duty, reserve, and civilian members of the Department of Defense inside the top venture capital firms and defense-focused startups around the country on one- or two-month high-impact fellowships.

These fellowships, and the community that Shift built up around them, helped revitalize the defense technology movement. In addition to the major influx of private capital, founders and entrepreneurs have begun flocking to the industry, bringing with them hope for rapidly expanding both capability and capacity. A16z is one of the venture capital industry’s most prestigious firms. In January of 2022, they launched a billion-dollar American Dynamism sub-brandfocused on funding solutions to some of America’s toughest national security challenges. Before they started funding the revitalization of the defense industrial base, they were hosting Shift fellows who were contributing to a culture change. True Anomaly, a recent startup focused on space domain awareness and orbital conflict, has raised over $100 million from venture capital firms. Before True Anomaly landed mission-critical contracts with the department, they had hired a graduate of Shift’s fellowship. Apollo, a brand new company focused on getting undergraduates interested in solving national security challenges, hosted the El Segundo defense tech hackathon this past February, which captured imaginations and inspired over 400 engineers. Before the Apollo founders had plotted their course, they attended the Shift Defense Ventures Summit in Washington D.C. and were themselves inspired. Finally, even before I co-founded Marque Ventures as a pure-play national security focused venture firm or spent two years trying to save Army Venture Capital, I was one of the first investors in Shift and was hosting fellows at a sector-agnostic Alpha Bridge Ventures. As an investor in Shift, I have a financial interest in the success of the program but as an American and as a frequent host for fellows I also have a deep personal interest in it or a successor’s fortunes. While the renaissance in national security technology happening right now has many contributing factors, much of the momentum in industry can be traced to the Shift team and to Mike Slagh, Shift’s founder.

While it may seem shocking — especially to those new to the club — this story doesn’t have a happy ending for the fellowship or for Shift. Due to a combination of malignant neglect and gross incompetence inside the Department of Defense, the program was not renewed for 2024. The loss of this program is a perfect demonstration of the capriciousness of the valley of death in action and shows why even successful programs can fail to transition. Unfortunately, the fellowship’s death comes at a pivotal moment for the relationship between the department and the innovation ecosystem. It’s not hyperbole to say that the loss of this program, and what that tells founders and investors about the department’s credibility as a counterpart, is likely to destroy critical trust between the two sides.

To say that this is an “own goal” is an understatement. Just a few months ago, the Department of Defense’s own 2023 National Defense Science and Technology Strategy specifically mentioned Shift’s Defense Ventures Program as a critical component of the department’s technology strategy. In fact, the Defense Ventures Program was literally the only private effort called out by name in the official document. Now, just a few months removed from publication of that strategy, the department has killed the very program it was counting on.

Putting aside for a moment the value of the fellowship itself, the broader issue is that with this kind of callous disregard for a universally praised and innovative program the Department of Defense cannot possibly hope to win or maintain the trust of the private sector. If industry and investors can’t validate demand signals from the department, they will either try to intuit those signals and waste billions, eventually abandoning the industry entirely, or they will skip the first step and just move on to easier fishing. Repairing trust and regaining the momentum engendered by the fellowship can be accomplished with a few concrete steps. There should be a full accounting of what happened in order to inform policy changes that give industry confidence. A program like the fellowship should be enshrined in the fiscal year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act to keep key relationships alive. Finally, to minimize the devastating impacts that continuing resolutions have on nascent startups building for the Department of Defense, Congress should create a small, expiring, emergency bridge fund for non-traditional defense contractors whenever they pass a continuing resolution. Even a tiny fund can be the difference between a promising company surviving to deliver its capability and a company falling into the valley of death.

Become a Member

The Shift Defense Ventures Program and Fellowship

The Shift fellowship was a relatively straightforward program. High-potential active-duty, reserve, and civilian members of the Department of Defense applied on a cohort-by-cohort basis. Once selected, they were embedded within industry hosts who were also competitively selected. The hosts were startups and venture firms interested in working with the Department of Defense. The program facilitated a deep and meaningful exchange of cultures and best practices that resulted in measurable improvements both inside and outside the Department of Defense across retention, continuing education, industry engagement, and private investment. Several months ago, Shift conducted a survey of its hosts and graduated fellows. The results of that survey, which have not been published until now, were telling. On the retention front, of all graduated fellows, 92.2 percent reported either an increased desire (50 percent) or a greatly increased desire (42 percent) to continue serving. Anecdotally, one of the more innovative services was using the fellowship as a means of attracting new top talent into the service. The benefits didn’t stop at retention, the fellowship helped with education as well. At the conclusion of their program, 72 percent of the fellows reported between a threefold and a tenfold increase in technology proficiency and increased understanding of industry best practices. Fellows learned how to assess and evaluate the companies building the weapons and information systems that the Department of Defense relies on and they learned what it is like to interact with the Department of Defense as a non-traditional defense contractor.

While the fellows and the services for which they worked gained direct benefits, the hosts benefited as well, ultimately creating substantial indirect benefits for the Department of Defense. 96 percent of graduates and hosts report that industry would be disappointed or greatly disappointed if the fellowship went away. While the Defense Innovation Unit might have been founded to be the embassy to Silicon Valley (and the technology ecosystem writ large), it is the Shift fellows who are the department’s ambassadors, embedded within the ecosystem itself. Venture capital investment in defense has grown from roughly $12 billion in 2018 to roughly $30 billion in 2023. That is a net increase of $18 billion, which is roughly the size of 4.5 new Defense Advanced Research Projects Agencies. While Shift can’t claim to be responsible for all the increased funding, I don’t believe it’s an exaggeration to say that their program is one of the largest catalyzing factors in what can be described as a revolution in civil-military affairs. To the extent Silicon Valley continues to build without fellows in its midst, it will build products less aligned to warfighter needs and fewer of those products will successfully transition and be fielded. This will inevitably lead to huge cuts in private sector investment in defense relevant technologies, an outcome directly antithetical to the department’s stated goal of leveraging more private investment.

So What Went Wrong?

There are those who will read this and think that if the program were really as useful to industry and to the Department of Defense as described than it would not have failed. They will ask why industry didn’t fund the program or why it did not transition. Here is story of Shift’s failure to transition as relayed to me by company sources and folks on the Hill.The essential elements are that AFWERX made promises it couldn’t keep and pulled the rug out from under the program at the eleventh hour. This was the result of multiple personnel turnovers, an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracting process that stretched for over a year before it was abandoned, and a promised contract extension that was pulled without enough warning for the company to implement a back-up plan. Shift had plenty of interested buyers within the Department of Defense and the intelligence community for seats in the upcoming cohort but because of the continuing resolution, those buyers could not begin a contracting process or fund a new contract. Therefore, the national security customers had to rely on the AFWERX contract already in place, which AFWERX chose not to extend. While this train wreck was slowly unfolding, Shift had lined up millions in private capital from tier-one venture capital firms and defense industry executives. That capital was prepared to meet the department halfway, but when AFWERX announced its intention to drop the contract extension, private capital took the signal and walked away. Shift has died in the valley of death, the space where a program needs to transition from a research, development, and prototyping effort into an acquisition program. It has died not through intention but through inaction.

It might be fair to ask whether Shift has done what the United States needed it to do. There are now 450 fellows who have graduated, scores of firms now investing in defense, and hundreds of new companies building in the space. Maybe we should just say “mission accomplished” and move on. However, this would be a huge mistake. While we shall certainly reap the benefits of the program over the next decade, the program itself compounds. The value it has already created is not an argument that it has outlived its usefulness — it is proof that it was and remains sorely needed.

More importantly, the United States is at a critical point in civil-military relations and the loss of Shift may push things in the wrong direction. In the last two weeks several anecdotes have made me question whether America may already be at the peak of cooperation between the innovation ecosystem and the Department of Defense. In a conversation with a prospective limited partner, someone who is considering investing in our firm behind a defense-focused thesis, the prospective partner expressed grave concerns that continuing resolutions and general congressional dysfunction were risk factors that might prevent them from investing in venture firms investing in the defense space.

Subsequently, an entrepreneur in residence (someone who is a skilled and experienced entrepreneur who is working for a venture firm while they think about their next company) told me that he is abandoning the company he had been working on for the last six months and pivoting outside of defense. Why? Because the department isn’t moving money to non-traditional defense contractors fast enough. Finally, another venture capital firm that had adopted a dual-use investment thesis last year told me that they are pausing their defense investment because their companies aren’t finding material traction.

These are just anecdotes, but they aren’t surprising, and they highlight how fragile the new détente between industry and the Department of Defense really is. The death of Shift will send shivers through this nascent bridge.

The Way Forward

A number of steps could begin to mitigate the damage. First, members of Congress should request a full report on why this program has been allowed to slip through the cracks and should demand accountability. There should be no world where the National Defense Science and Technology Strategy highlights a program or company as a lynchpin and then that same program is allowed to die a few months later. If the United States is going to be successful in harnessing its private sector, the signals it sends to industry must be backed by follow-through.

Next, as the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act begins to take shape, a program like the fellowship should be enshrined in law to ensure that its benefits are not permanently lost. The fellowship has done incredible good in the five years it has operated — that good should not be ignored, and it should be fostered through a successor program that continues the deep engagement with industry pioneered by Shift.

Finally, while the proximate cause of the fellowship’s failure to transition was essentially an acquisitions failure, there were numerous Department of Defense customers ready to step up and purchase access to the program who, due to the ongoing continuing resolution, could not begin their own contracting process in time. While Shift isn’t the first and won’t be the last company killed by the impact of a continuing resolution, Congress should act to minimize the damage caused by budget negotiations. Something as simple as an emergency fund in the tens of millions of dollars dedicated to bridging non-traditional defense companies could have averted this crisis and should be considered for all future defense continuing resolutions.

The Shift Defense Ventures Program was a crown jewel of a program. It was exactly what the United States needs more of today — asymmetric capability. For roughly two million dollars a year Shift delivered energized servicemembers, industry engagement, private capital alignment, counterintelligence in the heart of American innovation, and a whole host of less tangible benefits. That program is now gone and with it will go some of the fragile trust that the Department of Defense has worked hard to develop. There is no way to look at this situation as anything other than a profound failure of the acquisition process. I hope that we can all take this failure seriously and work diligently to address the cracks in the system so that this does not happen again. Even the most patriotic investors can only take so much friendly fire before succumbing. To end on a slightly brighter note, while the fellowship may not exist anymore, the fellows themselves are all hard at work fighting to support the United States. Some of the fellows are in industry, some are back in the Department of Defense, and several have joined me at Marque ventures. Wherever they are, I know that we have only begun to see the good that they can do.

Become a Member

Jake Chapman has been in and around the venture industry for almost 20 years as a lawyer, three-time founder of successful companies, and venture capitalist, including as managing director of the Army Venture Capital Corporation. He is the managing director of Marque Ventures, a venture capital firm focused on national security technology. He writes all too frequently on Twitter as @vc and somewhat less frequently on LinkedIn.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jake Chapman · March 22, 2024

8. The Case Against TikTok Is Thin at Best

Excerpts:

Banning TikTok will not make us safer from any of these challenges. In fact, in the guise of claiming to make us safer, this bill will do the opposite. It will be used by proponents as a demonstration that steps are being taken to guard against the misuse of data by foreign actors without actually impeding the ability of foreign or domestic actors to misuse that data. There are real issues of how our personal data is used, who collects it, where it is stored, and how it is bought and sold.

There are dangerous shoals as China and the United States attempt to navigate profound differences in values and governmental systems. The determination of the CCP to stay in power and eliminate any opposition means that its approach to speech and democracy will remain antithetical to the West. But one of the remaining strengths of the United States is that it is an open society, where ideas flow freely and are not easily controlled.

TikTok is one of several platforms where ideas flow—maybe not in complete anarchic freedom, but certainly they do flow. That’s also why the app is not available in China. Removing it in the name of security may feel like a positive step in a dangerous time. In truth, it is a hollow gesture that sacrifices openness for the illusion of action.

The Case Against TikTok Is Thin at Best

There are real issues—but they go far beyond one app.

By Zachary Karabell, the author of Inside Money: Brown Brothers Harriman and the American Way of Power.

Foreign Policy · by Zachary Karabell

March 21, 2024, 2:46 PM

The U.S. Congress hasn’t passed a budget on time since 1996, and many members spend more time preening and posturing than legislating. Yet at the beginning of the month, the Energy and Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives voted 50-0 on a bill that would have de facto given the president the authority to force ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, to divest its control of U.S. operations or face a ban of the app. The full House passed the bill less than a week later by a margin of 352-65.

But that speed should give us pause. The question of what to do about TikTok depends on what TikTok is actually doing. And the evidence of clear and present danger just isn’t there yet. As things stand, banning TikTok is not just bad policy; it’s hollow as well. It won’t make the United States safer, and it will allow those in government—both in the national security bureaucracy and in Congress—to pretend that it is doing something without doing much at all to address the real issues of data, privacy, and foreign influence.

The main national security argument for forcing TikTok to sell to a U.S. owner or face an effective ban is that Chinese laws require ByteDance to turn over user data to the Chinese government if requested. That leads to fears that user data could provide a way for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to perform massive surveillance of Americans, and that the party could (and may already) use the algorithms that power TikTok’s feed to manipulate public opinion in the United States to the detriment of U.S. democracy and civil society, and hence tilt the nascent China-U.S. cold war in China’s favor.

Each of these cases rest on very thin reeds. And what’s more, almost all of the threats cited are about what TikTok could potentially do, and not about what it has been or is doing.

First, yes, Chinese law does obligate companies to turn over data. Arguably, though, every government can commandeer user data through whatever laws empower either domestic police or foreign intelligence gathering (in the United States, that would include the FBI for domestic issues, and the CIA and National Security Agency for foreign intelligence, though the lines blur at times). But in the United States, companies can often resist initial demands to turn over data, although courts can compel them. No such recourse exists in China.

And yes, ByteDance has by necessity genuflected toward the CCP, a stance that it and any other Chinese company has no choice but to take. TikTok has countered that its data is not housed on servers accessible to the CCP, but rather on Oracle servers in the United States, though it has also said that some data provided by content creators is stored in China.

But as for the concern articulated by White House national security spokesman John Kirby “about data security and what ByteDance and what the Chinese Communist Party could do with the information that they can glean off of Americans’ use of the application,” that is, well, a bit much. In essence, the issue should not be that TikTok is obligated to hand over data to the CCP; it should be whether any of that data is really private anyway, and whether it could be obtained by the CCP regardless of if ByteDance turned it over willingly or not.

User data is constantly harvested by apps of all kinds, from social media platforms to financial institutions. That data has some protections for sure, and most of it is anonymized. But as anyone in the ecosystem of data mining knows, enough user data can render those anonymity protections almost useless, and there is, to say the least, a robust private market for that data. Monetizing user data is the business model for countless tech companies, and one of the easiest ways is to sell it to other people.

And as a recent Wall Street Journal report so clearly demonstrated, so much data is collected by private companies—and collected so effectively—that government agencies often buy from them on the sly rather than spending the money to collect and collate it themselves.

It all goes back to what early internet tech titan Scott McNally said in the early days of the IT revolution: “You have no privacy. Get over it.” Consumer data has some of the least comprehensive privacy protections in the world, whether it’s gathered through Facebook, TikTok, Amazon, Snapchat, Walmart, or on and on. Even benefits and financial data—or at least, in anonymized form that can often trace back to specific individuals—is more easily obtainable than most of us would like to think.

The idea that TikTok user data is somehow uniquely susceptible to being hoovered by the Chinese government flies in the face of the reality that most of our data is hooverable by both private companies and governments. TikTok is not unique in that.

Hence, banning TikTok or forcing its divestiture won’t make it significantly more difficult for China’s spy agencies to obtain that data if they want it, either via buying it from private companies or collecting it themselves. Yes, it might make it harder as in more time-consuming or expensive, but not sufficiently more time-consuming or expensive to create real friction.

And it would not make U.S. user data meaningfully more secure; if the CCP were a private company with limited resources, then raising time and cost just might be a security buffer for U.S. data. But the CCP runs a government, and if it wants to obtain the data by fair means or foul, it can. This bill won’t alter that equation.

In short, if the concern is spying and the security of the kind of consumer data that can be gathered from those using the TikTok app, then there would need to be far more aggressive legislation of all social media and data companies to even begin to move that needle.

Yes, some believe that the presence of the TikTok app on your phone is akin to Chinese spyware that could covertly activate your camera, snatch your email, and even access encrypted WhatsApp and iMessage communications. None of that has been proven, and those who have sat in on classified briefings to lawmakers have not testified that such concerns have been validated by any U.S. intelligence agency, though all of those agencies have banned TikTok from their personnel’s phones.

Is such spyware via the app technologically possible? Probably, but that then goes back to the issue that if TikTok could do that, so could countless other apps. Data is easy to copy and sell, whoever collects it originally.

The other issue is whether the Chinese Communist Party could direct ByteDance to manipulate the feed algorithms to then either sow chaos in U.S. public opinion or engineer outcomes and decisions favorable to China at the United States’ expense.

The usual benchmark for that concern is the belief that Russia took advantage of social media to muddy the waters of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and hence TikTok could do so in the future even more effectively. But that assumes a) that in the worlds of pet videos and cooking videos and comics and dating and essentially everything, algorithms could effectively force a binary or specific outcome and b) that it is relatively simple to engineer specific outcomes.

The concern is also that information can be effectively censored for political ends, or that some ideas or videos can be buried by the algorithms. The skew of anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian content on TikTok has been offered by congressional Republicans as one proof point, but it has been clear on deeper analysis that the skew of that content closely follows attitudes among the largely younger demographic that uses the app.

There has been some evidence that before 2020, TikTok did reduce the visibility of anti-CCP videos, but since the explosion in usage, that pattern has been less evident. With so many users, it is actually quite difficult to bury content that people want to see.

Others have floated the idea that while the algorithms aren’t yet sophisticated enough to effectively manipulate public attitudes and behavior in some Manchurian Candidate style of mass brainwashing, that is because these tools are still relatively primitive compared to what they will be in an artificial intelligence-fueled data world coming soon. Hence, we need to cut off TikTok from the Chinese threat now, while the capabilities are still nascent.

If that happens, Americans will need far more domestic protections, law and technologies to guard against a myriad of possible threats to privacy, democracy, and security that changing ownership of TikTok will do nothing to ameliorate.

Banning TikTok will not make us safer from any of these challenges. In fact, in the guise of claiming to make us safer, this bill will do the opposite. It will be used by proponents as a demonstration that steps are being taken to guard against the misuse of data by foreign actors without actually impeding the ability of foreign or domestic actors to misuse that data. There are real issues of how our personal data is used, who collects it, where it is stored, and how it is bought and sold.

There are dangerous shoals as China and the United States attempt to navigate profound differences in values and governmental systems. The determination of the CCP to stay in power and eliminate any opposition means that its approach to speech and democracy will remain antithetical to the West. But one of the remaining strengths of the United States is that it is an open society, where ideas flow freely and are not easily controlled.

TikTok is one of several platforms where ideas flow—maybe not in complete anarchic freedom, but certainly they do flow. That’s also why the app is not available in China. Removing it in the name of security may feel like a positive step in a dangerous time. In truth, it is a hollow gesture that sacrifices openness for the illusion of action.

Foreign Policy · by Zachary Karabell

9. Monthly bonuses for junior troops included in defense budget plan

Recruiting impact? If we have to provide monthly financial aid to junior servicemembers what kind of message does that send to potential recruits?

And how effective will the military bureaucracy be in adminstratering this "benefit?"

Excerpts:

The monthly bonuses for junior enlisted troops were already approved as part of the annual defense authorization bill approved in December. But money to fund the bonuses has been held up by the appropriations delay.

The new budget plan includes $43 million for the program, which allows the Defense Secretary to award “junior enlisted monthly economic hardship bonuses” for troops of rank E-6 and below “as economic conditions dictate.”

Monthly bonuses for junior troops included in defense budget plan

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · March 21, 2024

Junior enlisted troops could receive financial support bonuses within a few months after congressional appropriators included funding for the economic support initiative as part of their final $824 billion defense budget proposal for fiscal 2024 released Thursday.

Lawmakers also included money to cover troops’ 5.2% pay raise this year and a pledge to push for even more improvements to military pay tables next year, calling the low pay of some enlisted troops a “crisis” that must be addressed soon.

“The Department of Defense must work with Congress during fiscal year 2025 to provide legislative options … to include increases to junior enlisted basic military pay as well as other ways to incentivize new recruits and prepare them for duty,” appropriators wrote in a report accompanying the defense spending bill.

Senators eye pay boost for junior troops, more funds for housing fixes

Both House and Senate lawmakers want to pass targeted pay raises for junior enlisted troops, but budget caps may complicate those plans.

Congress has until Friday night to adopt the full-year appropriations bill, already nearly six months late. If not, the Defense Department will head into a partial shutdown, with troops’ paychecks delayed and hundreds of thousands of workers at risk of furlough.

The monthly bonuses for junior enlisted troops were already approved as part of the annual defense authorization bill approved in December. But money to fund the bonuses has been held up by the appropriations delay.

The new budget plan includes $43 million for the program, which allows the Defense Secretary to award “junior enlisted monthly economic hardship bonuses” for troops of rank E-6 and below “as economic conditions dictate.”

The monthly bonuses are only authorized for 2024, and are not expected to carry over into 2025.

The exact amounts and timing of the program are still to be determined by Pentagon leaders following passage of the legislation. Department officials have not yet publicly announced any details of those plans, or if they may decline the option to award bonuses altogether.

But lawmakers are hopeful the extra money will help offset low salaries for some of the youngest service members. Under the current pay tables, some junior troops can make as little as $23,000 annually in base pay.

Pentagon officials are currently conducting its Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, expected to be delivered to Congress early next year.

The appropriations bill includes language “to more rapidly review and consider any proposed changes to compensation” and mandates an interim report on findings by May, to help inform potential legislative changes for 2025. House and Senate members have already eyed plans to boost all troops’ basic pay to at least $31,000 annually.

Lawmakers are expected to vote on the full $1.2 billion appropriations package in the next few days.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

10. '2054' Is a Novel of the New Atomic Bomb and the Next American Civil War

'2054' Is a Novel of the New Atomic Bomb and the Next American Civil War

military.com · by Blake Stilwell · March 21, 2024

As an Amazon Associate, Military.com earns from qualifying purchases.

The year is 2054. The United States is recovering from a destructive war with China. When the otherwise healthy president of the United States suddenly dies of a heart attack, the American people begin to question what's real. They start to demand answers -- and are willing to fight each other to make sure the real truth is known.

This is the background to Marine Corps veteran Elliot Ackerman's ("Green on Blue") and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Adm. James Stavridis' new book, "2054." It's the second in what will be a trilogy about the most important geopolitical issues faced by the world today, written in a compelling narrative that brings home the very real consequences of these global events.

"For each of these books, there have been the mountaintops we're driving to, but then you have what is a multi-generational character arc," Ackerman said. "These stories are about all these high-level concepts. But fundamentally when you're reading the book, our hope is that you're reading about characters you care about."

Author Elliot Ackerman is a Marine Corps veteran and Silver Star recipient. (Courtesy of Elliot Ackerman)

Their well-developed characters, ones the authors say reflect a bit of each of us, are the firm base for the authors' geopolitical "mountaintops." In the first book, "2034," the authors detail the possibilities surrounding a potential Third World War, one sparked by China's expansionist aggression in the Pacific. This time around, their focus is on how emerging technology could lead the United States into a new civil war.

"We thought all along this was going to be focused on AI," Stavridis told Military.com. "Then, events here in the United States added the piece of it that became civil conflict, ... because that's something we ought to be concerned about mid-century, I would say."

But the technology discussed in "2054" goes far beyond artificial intelligence. It also discusses the effects of remote gene editing, quantum computing and another, more troubling advancement: the Singularity.

Described in the 2005 book "The Singularity Is Near," by futurist Ray Kurzweil (a central figure in "2054"), the Singularity is a theoretical (but very real possibility) point in human history where technological development grows uncontrollably, leaving the future of humanity uncertain. Not only will machine intelligence outpace human intelligence, but the Singularity will lead to a merger between the two.

In "2054," the authors liken the pursuit of the Singularity to the race for the atomic bomb during World War II.

"We are all waking up Americans, as humans, that we're at the dawn of a new age," Stavridis said. "One of the things I would point to in the culture is the fact that 'Oppenheimer' just won Best Picture, because that is a film about America at the dawn of the nuclear age, and we know we're at the dawning of this age of artificial intelligence. There are going to be contests that we see between nations as to who can outpace the other one in this new technological competition."

In "2054," that competition includes the United States, which is rebuilding after a nuclear exchange with its main rival, China. It also includes emerging powers such as Nigeria, India and Brazil. When Americans learn the president of the United States was likely assassinated, they begin to question everything about their government, including who is its legitimate leader. The problem is not only compounded by AI, but also wild theories about other advanced technologies. The country splits into two factions, "Truthers" and "Dreamers."

"It's a commentary on how these technologies affect our sense of reality and what it means to live in a democratic society where there is not, broadly speaking, a shared sense of what's real," Ackerman said. "it's very difficult for a democratic society to function under those conditions."

"Watch the political party structure. By mid-century, Republican and Democratic parties are gone," Stavridis said. "Our hypothesis is that the rump elements of the Republican and Democratic parties actually come together, and that is who become the Truthers. In the middle, you have the Dreamers, and so it's a reshuffling of political parties, which I think is a very real possibility when you look at the dissatisfaction, the schism and the inability to work together to solve things."

Adm. James Stavridis, then-Supreme Allied Commander Europe, visiting Greece in 2009. (U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class TaWanna Starks)

So what should U.S. troops do if this kind of schism forces them to take sides?

"The thing that is never spoken about is although the U.S. military is, on its surface, an apolitical organization, that doesn't mean that people who wear the uniform don't have their political beliefs, as they should, but there's a culture in the military of 'Omerta' [a code of silence]. It's not something we talk about; it's something we share. We all just serve the flag that's on our left shoulder," Ackerman said.

"In our actual Civil War, people were forced to choose, and if you read the contemporaneous account, it was a horrible choice for people on both sides, a choice nobody wanted to make. The one thing that really rang true to me is that none of the people in uniform are going to be gleeful about the decision they're going to make."

"I just think it's so real and you pray that the nation never has to face those choices," Stavridis added. "What I really love about '2054' is that the military is not the bad guy. The military are the people who have to deal with this division in the country. In my view, it's something that anybody in the military could identify with very deeply. I know I do."

"2054" by Elliot Ackerman and Adm. James Stavridis is in bookstores now. You can catch up with the ongoing saga by first reading "2034." A third book, "2084," is in the works.

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military.com · by Blake Stilwell · March 21, 2024

11. A Japanese Osprey takes flight nearly 4 months after fatal Air Force crash

A Japanese Osprey takes flight nearly 4 months after fatal Air Force crash

Stars and Stripes · by Hana Kusumoto and Kelly Agee · March 22, 2024

A V-22 Osprey with the Japan Ground Self-Defense flies over Kumamoto, Japan, Oct. 18, 2023. (Kyle Chan/U.S. Marine Corps)

TOKYO — Japan’s military resumed flights of its V-22 Ospreys on Thursday, a week after the U.S. Marines flew theirs again and nearly four months after the fatal crash of a U.S. Air Force CV-22 in southern Japan.

An Osprey of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force took off from Camp Kisarazu, southeast of Tokyo, following maintenance and other safety measures, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said at a news conference.

“As preparations were completed, I have been told that a Ground Self-Defense Force Osprey hovered within the facility at Camp Kisarazu from around 11:40 today and then flew in the airspace around Kisarazu airfield,” Hayashi said Thursday.

Japan grounded its 14 Ospreys following the Nov. 29 crash of an Air Force Osprey off the southern Japanese coast, killing all eight crew members aboard. It was assigned to the 21st Special Operations Squadron at Yokota Air Base in western Tokyo.

Hayashi said Japan’s other Ospreys will return to the air in stages, starting with those that have undergone the necessary safety measures.

Japan, the only country outside the U.S. whose military operates the tiltrotor aircraft, took delivery of its first Ospreys in May 2020. The revolutionary aircraft type is manufactured by U.S. contractor Bell Boeing.

The Marines, Air Force and Navy returned their Ospreys to flight status after Naval Air Systems Command lifted a three-month flight ban on March 8. The Marines on Okinawa were first to report an actual flight in Japan by hovering an Osprey at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on March 14.

“The MV-22 Osprey is back to full flying operation,” Maj. Rob Martins, spokesman for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing on Okinawa, told Stars and Stripes by phone Friday.

At Yokota, a spokesman for the 374th Airlift Wing declined to comment on when the Ospreys there may resume flight.

“Due to operational security concerns, we do not comment on specific aircraft movements,” Master Sgt. Nathan Allen said by email Friday. “The timing for the 21st Special Operations Squadron to resume flight operations is based on operational requirements unique to the unit’s mission profile. Any decision to return to flight will fully implement all necessary maintenance, safety, and any necessary procedural changes.”

Allen said the resumption of Osprey flights by U.S. forces in Japan will be closely coordinated between the governments of Japan and the United States.

The loss of the Osprey crew — call sign Gundam 22 — and the return of Osprey pilots and crews to the skies over Japan is treated with sensitivity, Allen said.

“However, it’s important to emphasize that the safety of operators and the effectiveness of operations are top priorities,” he said. “Every step towards resuming CV-22 flights has been done with the diligence necessary to ensure that the return to flight operations is conducted with the utmost regard for the safety of aircrew members and surrounding communities.”

An Air Force investigation into the fatal crash just off Yakushima, an island south of Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s four main islands, found “a material failure of a V-22 component.”

The Defense Department has yet to identify the failed component or release a report of the accident investigation.

The Osprey, which takes off and lands like a helicopter but flies like a fixed-wing plane, had been plagued by a problem called hard clutch engagement that can result in catastrophic loss of control.

Japanese communities have expressed concerns about the Osprey’s safety.

Okinawa Gov. Denny Tamaki met Thursday with the III Marine Expeditionary Force commander, Lt. Gen. Roger Turner, to say he is concerned about the resumption of Marine Osprey flights, public broadcaster NHK reported that day.

Turner told Tanaka he is sure that Ospreys can operate safely on Okinawa, NHK reported.

Stars and Stripes reporter Jonathan Snyder contributed to this report.

Stars and Stripes · by Hana Kusumoto and Kelly Agee · March 22, 2024

12. Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann: ‘I pushed until I got the opportunities’

A great American and very impressive and accomplished Command Sergeant Major. I have been observing her leadership from afar for a number of years and she is an inspiration on many levels. (I get excellent reading recommendations from her social media).

Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann: ‘I pushed until I got the opportunities’

https://www.army.mil/article/274634/command_sgt_maj_joann_naumann_i_pushed_u

By Jonathan Austin, Army News ServiceMarch 19, 2024

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WASHINGTON — Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann, the senior enlisted leader at Army Special Operations Command, says good leadership traits are taught by good mentors, handed down from one generation of NCOs to the next.

Such a philosophy is part of what ultimately led Naumann to stay in the Army for the last 28 years instead of pursuing her initial dream of becoming a Foreign Service officer.

Naumann enlisted in the Army in 1996 after earning a dual-major degree in American Studies and Government from the College of William and Mary. She wanted to go to the Defense Language Institute to learn Arabic.

“I had a plan to learn another language and to get a clearance … and get some experience to increase my likelihood of being hired by the Foreign Service,” she said.

She didn’t seek a commission because she had no intention of staying in the Army.

When she finished language training, however, the Army threw her a curveball, assigning her to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

“I had never in my life considered the fact that when I joined the Army as an Arabic linguist that I might go to a light infantry division. But that's where I wound up,” she said.

She completed Air Assault School and training as a rappel master. Then she went to the Basic Airborne Course and the Military Freefall School for parachuting.

Naumann discovered that she enjoyed being in an infantry division. She enjoyed the Army.

“I feel really fortunate to have had amazing leaders in my time at the 101st, who made me really understand what I could do in the Army and how to be a good leader, and how the Army just takes care of people and feels like a family,” she said.

“More than anything, it was the leaders that made me want to stay in the Army,” she said.

As a sergeant at age 25, Naumann was NCO of the Year in the 101st Division.

“I was the only woman competing. I saw that I could compete with the men, and I did it the same way that I approached my job,” she said.

She knew there were some events that she couldn't win.

“I just made sure I won every event I could win, and then I just held my own…”

Naumann can trace that attitude back to her youth, when she ran cross country and track in high school.

“I was never the most talented runner on the team. I was probably always the runner most willing to suffer on the team. The way I would break other runners is by being more willing to be in pain at the end of a race than other people were, and I think it's that kind of attitude that just has allowed me to succeed,” she said.

Recruited by Special Operations Command in 2001, Naumann faced a dilemma in the aftermath of 9/11 when she was a staff sergeant and squad leader.

“I felt like I couldn't leave my squad. It would be their first time going into combat, and I didn't feel like I could let them go without me,” she recalls.

She sought guidance from division Command Sgt. Maj. Clifford West.

“He looked at me and all he said to me was, ‘Sergeant, if you've done your job, they don't need you.’”

After SOC training, Naumann had assignments to special mission units and completed 14 deployments throughout Central Command and Africa Command.

In those years after 9/11, being a female Arabic translator paid off.

“It made me far less of a threat … being underestimated is a superpower,” she said.

Naumann said she never sought a job or promotion to be a trailblazer and doesn’t really think of herself as one.

She thinks she developed her drive, in part, from her mother, who retired as the pilot of a Boeing 747 after years in the cockpit.

“I never realized that it made a difference to me,” Naumann said, but being the daughter of such a professional meant that no one told her women couldn’t succeed.

“It never was in my head that I couldn't do whatever job I wanted to do, because no one ever told me that there were things girls didn't do. And so, I just didn't hesitate to do things that I wanted to do,” she said.

She said people often thank her for advancing career possibilities in the Army, whether it is because she is a woman or because she rose in the ranks from a non-traditional specialty.

“If me being here makes other people see that they have the same possibilities, then I'm glad that it does,” she said.

For anyone, she said, the biggest challenge is convincing yourself to try.

“Everyone has challenges, right? These [Army] programs are not easy for anyone,” she said.

Naumann said there were certainly times when people told her she could not do a job because she was female.

When confronting that attitude, she would respond, “I graduated from the same course you did. So, tell me again, why I can't do that job?”

She demanded better reasons why a woman could not grow and advance in the Army.

“It turns out there weren't better reasons. So, I pushed until I got the opportunities I thought I should have. That's my personality,” she said.

That is also reminiscent of how she ran track and cross country.

“I'm still not going to be the best at everything,” she added.

There are times when she relies on others to help out.

“I focus the majority of my energy on the things that I singularly can do,” she said.

People can often succeed if they make others be the ones to say ‘no,’ she explained.

“Sometimes we talk ourselves out of doing things,” Naumann said. We say “I'm not going to try it because I don't know if I'm going to make it, I don't know if I'm good enough. I don't know if I'm smart enough, or strong enough. I don't know if I'll do a good job.”

Her message? Don’t sell yourself short.

Naumann says the best moments of her career are likely when she has held a promotion board and been able to reward someone who worked hard and stayed out of trouble and earned advancement.

“That’s the moment, when you tell them: ‘Congratulations, I'm recommending you for promotion.’”

13. Indo-Pacific Command to test prototype of Joint Fires Network this year

Indo-Pacific Command to test prototype of Joint Fires Network this year

The first version of the JFN will be tested at the Valiant Shield exercise, Adm. John Aquilino said.

MARK POMERLEAU

MARCH 21, 2024

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · March 21, 2024

The U.S. military’s Indo-Pacific Command will be gearing up to demonstrate a prototype of its Joint Fires Network later this year, providing key data for an operational instantiation of the Pentagon’s top priority to better connect its systems and improve decision-making.

The Joint Fires Network is a prototyping effort that addresses the immediate needs of combatant commands while serving as a pathfinder for the broader Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJAD2) effort, which envisions how systems across the entire battlespace from all services and key international partners could be more effectively and holistically networked to provide the right data to commanders, faster.

The system will serve as a battle management platform and display real-time, fused, actionable threat information to joint and partner forces, according to fiscal 2025 budget documents recently released by the Department of Defense.

“Geographically dispersed commanders will share a common understanding of the battlespace simultaneously, fed by platform sensors that can provide targeting guidance to key weapons systems,” the documents state. “Coupled with the lethality of current and future munitions, joint force commanders will use JFN to underpin conventional deterrence and achieve decision advantage for combat success.”

Testifying before Congress this week, outgoing Indo-Pacom chief Adm. John Aquilino explained how he’s trying to leverage various efforts across the department to improve the command’s ability to hit enemy targets and deny their actions when discovered.

“The approach we’ve taken with the Joint Fires Network is to pull together a best-of-breed approach of Project Convergence from the Army, Overmatch from the Navy and Marine Corps and then ABMS from the Air Force along with the DARPA aspect of Assault Breaker II, to pull all those together and deliver a real near-time, best-of-breed solution to be able to command and control the joint force and ultimately close the kill chain,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee Thursday. “The way we have articulated it and linked it with the building … is we’re going to provide some insights into the further development of CJADC2 as it goes forward.”

Assault Breaker II, modeled after the initial effort in 1978, aims to alter how the U.S. military thinks about designing, buying and deploying systems in the future using existing and emerging technologies across the services and commercial industry to address capability gaps. Budget documents note it’s critical to designing and fielding near-, mid- and far-term solutions to outpace adversaries.

Indo-Pacom asked Congress for an additional $122.7 million for the Joint Fires Network in its unfunded priorities list for fiscal 2025 to accelerate the development of the battle management system.

To some, these various service initiatives have raised concerns that the ultimate aim of the effort — true joint integration of systems, networks, sensors and weapons — will still be too stovepiped because they’re run by the services and not the combatant commands, which are charged with integrating the services’ capabilities in a joint fashion.

“The way that you have discussed the Joint Fires Network makes it sound like an actual joint solution to the problem set that the department has identified in which the JADC2 is supposed to solve … My question to you relates to my concern that each service is apparently designing its own approach to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control program. We’re talking air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. How and when do you see the department bringing all of these separate lines of effort together?” Sen. Mike Rounds, R-N.D., asked Aquilino.

“From the combatant command perspective, we don’t do anything in stovepipes. We fight as a joint force,” Aquilino quipped.

He added that the command has participated in the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) — run by the Chief Digital and AI Office to test, optimize and integrate the department’s data systems with artificial intelligence — and also pulled in efforts from Central Command and what European Command has done in support of Ukraine.

“We’re going to demonstrate the first version of that, of JFN, in Valiant Shield in [20]24,” Aquilino told the House Armed Services Committee Wednesday, telling senators a day later that it will provide useful insights for the Pentagon’s ongoing CJADC2 efforts.

“We think we’ll be informative, but ultimately, I’m going to produce a prototype, if you will, that will be demonstrated in our next big exercise this year, to see where we are, what we’re doing, is it right, is it at scale,” he said. “Our lens is this is a best of breed and a pretty good indicator on what we think the future should look like.”

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks earlier this year announced a minimum viable product for CJADC2, but declined to offer details on what it is, where it’s deployed or what it does — citing classification concerns.

Written by Mark Pomerleau

Mark Pomerleau is a reporter for DefenseScoop, covering information warfare and cyberspace.

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · March 21, 2024

14. Use 'hedge forces' to break the Pentagon's force-structure death spiral

Excerpts:

Incorporating hedge forces into defense planning would do more than help manage the risks posed by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As Pentagon leaders grapple with the end of U.S. dominance, more scenarios will emerge that are beyond the capability or capacity of the general-purpose U.S. military. Dedicated groups of uncrewed systems or manned-unmanned teams could be applied to situations like the threat of Russian submarine attacks against the U.S. East Coast or countering missile and drone attacks in the Middle East.

Creating dedicated units for specific geographies and scenarios runs counter to decades of DoD force planning, which has pursued standardization and efficiency since the Soviet Union fell. With the era of U.S. military dominance ending, the DoD will need to embrace the specialization of hedge forces or risk losing America’s capacity to protect its allies and interests.

Use 'hedge forces' to break the Pentagon's force-structure death spiral

The U.S. military must move away from exquisite general-purpose units and weapons.

By BRYAN CLARK and DAN PATT

MARCH 21, 2024 02:34 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Bryan Clark

Many have criticized the Biden administration’s fiscal 2025 defense spending proposal as insufficient to its time, because U.S. allies and partners are under attack in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These critics—and the administration officials who say Congressional budget caps have tied their hands—miss the bigger picture: America’s military is in a force-structure death spiral.

After decades of pursuing ever-more-sophisticated ships and aircraft, spurred most recently by the need to pace the People’s Liberation Army, the Defense Department has fielded a force that is now too expensive to grow. Next year, the Pentagon plans to retire more ships and aircraft than it will buy, just as it did this year. With new platforms like the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter, DDG(X) destroyer, and SSN(X) submarine on the horizon, this trend is likely to continue, ultimately shrinking the U.S. military to a small force optimized to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

The Pentagon can only arrest the trend toward fewer, more sophisticated platforms by changing its approach to force planning. Instead of pursuing a “one size fits all” military that can both pace China and deal with other situations around the world, the DoD will need to increasingly tailor forces for specific regions or events. And the most urgent and obvious place to start is with the Taiwan-invasion scenario.

Hedging, not dominating

The fundamental challenge facing U.S. forces is the erosion of the dominance they had enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. Today, technology proliferation and the geostrategic advantages enjoyed by “home teams” like China or Russia that lack global responsibilities have undermined U.S. military advantages.

To stay ahead, Pentagon budgets privilege high-end systems and platforms that can survive and fight at long range and in the most contested environments. They are more expensive to buy—and yet the real problem is these ships, aircraft, and ground formations cost more to crew, operate, and maintain than their predecessors. This challenge will only get worse due to shortfalls in recruiting and industrial base capacity.

As many analysts have argued, Congress could simply increase defense spending, but that would address the symptoms, not the underlying disease. To pull out of its force-structure death spiral, the DoD will need to slow or shrink its efforts to field new cutting-edge crewed ships, aircraft, and vehicles.

For almost all situations the U.S. military could face in the near to-mid-term, the current generation of multi-mission platforms is sufficient. But there are some scenarios, like a short-notice Chinese invasion of Taiwan, that are beyond the reach of today’s force at acceptable levels of risk. As multiple recent wargames suggest, although Taiwan’s defenders would likely succeed, they would only do so with substantial losses that would leave the U.S. force ill-prepared for subsequent aggression.

To hedge against the risk posed by a Taiwan invasion, the DoD could complement the existing force with a dedicated unit designed to disrupt and slow the Chinese assault: a “hedge force” that could slow, disable, or even sink some PLA amphibious vessels and troop transports, and make the rest easier targets for long-range U.S. fires. Due to the threat from China’s air and missile forces, this hedge force could be entirely uncrewed and act essentially as a mobile minefield in areas near Taiwan’s coast. Earlier this year, prospective Indo-Pacific commander Adm. Sam Paparo proposed a similar approach of creating a “hellscape” in the Taiwan Strait to help stop a Chinese invasion.

The technology for a hedge force is available today and affordable. As Ukrainian troops showed in the Black Sea, uncrewed vehicles can effectively deny areas to a capable adversary and in a challenging electromagnetic environment. And the cost to buy and own a viable hedge force is on par with that of two DDG(X)s or a single SSN(X).

By increasing uncertainty for PLA leaders, a hedge force could improve deterrence against China. Perhaps more important, by making long-range attacks more effective, a hedge force would reduce the risk to U.S. forces and potential losses, which could improve the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to allies.

Stopping the death spiral

Incorporating hedge forces into defense planning would do more than help manage the risks posed by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As Pentagon leaders grapple with the end of U.S. dominance, more scenarios will emerge that are beyond the capability or capacity of the general-purpose U.S. military. Dedicated groups of uncrewed systems or manned-unmanned teams could be applied to situations like the threat of Russian submarine attacks against the U.S. East Coast or countering missile and drone attacks in the Middle East.

Creating dedicated units for specific geographies and scenarios runs counter to decades of DoD force planning, which has pursued standardization and efficiency since the Soviet Union fell. With the era of U.S. military dominance ending, the DoD will need to embrace the specialization of hedge forces or risk losing America’s capacity to protect its allies and interests.

Bryan Clark and Dan Patt are Senior Fellows at the Hudson Institute.

defenseone.com · by Bryan Clark

15. Army Writing and the Zombie (Noun) Apocalypse

I am going to reflect more on this when I re-read this piece this weekend. I think we all have some work to do.

Excerpts:

Doctrine is a good place to start changing Army writing culture into one that values simple, direct prose. And the change is quietly underway. Over the last few years, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth has made doctrine simpler and easier to read. For example, the 2022 edition of FM 3-0, Operations has seven fewer words per sentence than the 2017 version. This change is a great start, but more work is needed.

Doctrine is moving in the right direction. The rest of the Army must follow. Effective writing is easy to read and understand, and Army writing is no different. From professional journals to evaluation reports to routine emails, writers across the Army should produce and demand simple, concise, and clear writing.

P.S. The article you’ve just read averages 5.1 characters per word. It scores 48.2 for reading ease and 10.0 for grade level. Zombie nouns make up 3 percent of the text.

Army Writing and the Zombie (Noun) Apocalypse - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Trent Lythgoe · March 22, 2024

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The undead lurk among us—zombie nouns. These word cannibals have invaded Army writing, where they consume lively prose, leaving it dense and dead. When we, the living, find ourselves slogging through esoteric emails or impenetrable information papers, zombie nouns are close by.

Zombie nouns—nominalizations, formally—are nouns created from other parts of speech, such as adjectives (quick becomes quickness) and other nouns (favorite becomes favoritism). But the most insidious zombie nouns feed on verbs, turning them into undead, abstract nouns. Plan becomes planning. Prepare becomes preparation. Execute becomes execution.

Professor Helen Sword coined the term zombie noun to stress that nominalization words rob them of liveliness. For example, we can rehearse a briefing because rehearse is a lively verb. But we cannot rehearsal a briefing. Reanimating zombie nouns requires us to add a verb. We must conduct a rehearsal of a briefing.

Although zombie nouns are perfectly correct—and occasionally necessary—overusing them produces dense, wordy writing. We could plan, prepare, and execute a task. But when we nominalize these verbs, we must conduct planning for, perform preparations for, and implement the execution of it.

To be sure, many factors contribute to tedious Army writing. However, zombie nouns stand out as especially irksome yet easily fixable. To improve Army writing, let’s slay zombie nouns.

Readable Writing

I started this study not to find zombies but to understand what’s wrong with Army writing—the professional writing soldiers produce in everything from emails to memorandums to doctrine to published articles. Army standards demand clear, concise writing that conforms to federal plain language guidelines. Yet, much Army writing does not meet these standards. The problem is not new. Army writers have struggled for decades to write plainly and clearly. The struggle continues. One author recently criticized the Army’s operations doctrine—a prominent example of Army writing—as needlessly dense. Indeed, Army doctrine is more challenging to read than War and Peace, according to one study. But it’s not just doctrine. Dense Army human resources documents, for example, require readers to have two years of college to readily understand them (good luck, Private Snuffy).

To better understand why Army writing is often difficult to read, I compared it to effective civilian writing. I chose one book and two articles from civilian authors and publications known for clear writing on complex topics: How the Mind Works, Steven Pinker’s study of psychology in everyday life, “How the Higgs Boson was Found,” Brian Greene’s Smithsonian Magazine piece on recent advances in quantum physics, and “What Does It Actually Take to Build a Data-Driven Culture?”, a Harvard Business Review article from Mai AlOwaish and Thomas Redman.

I chose three Army doctrine manuals to represent Army writing: Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, and ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession. Importantly, I’m interested in understanding the problems with all Army writing, not just doctrine. But doctrine is a visible and influential example of Army writing. As the Army’s professional language clearinghouse, it reflects and perpetuates the Army’s de facto writing style.

I analyzed ten-paragraph samples from each text using the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level tests. Army writers can access both using Microsoft Word’s Editor tool. The Flesch Reading Ease formula scores a text from 1 (hard to read) to 100 (easy to read). The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level describes the education level needed to understand a text. Notably, the grade level does not measure the intellectual content of the texts, only how much education a reader needs to understand them.

Results

The results (Figures 1 and 2) show that Army doctrine is harder to read than the civilian texts. The most challenging civilian text, Greene’s quantum physics article, is significantly easier to read than the most manageable doctrine text, ADP 6-22. The civilian articles, despite their complex topics, require only a high school education to understand them. In contrast, the doctrine requires readers to have two to four years of college.

Figure 1: Army doctrine reading ease compared to civilian texts.

Figure 2: Army doctrine reading grade level compared to civilian texts.

Before discussing why the civilian texts are more readable than the doctrine, it’s reasonable to ask if I’ve made a fair comparison. The civilian texts are not military doctrine or technical writing. How can I justify these choices?

It’s a fair test because the civilian authors have the same challenge as Army writers: communicating complex ideas to a general audience. While it’s true that the Army writes doctrine for practitioners, many of its practitioners are more like a general audience than seasoned professionals. According to DoD data, junior enlisted (E1–E4), noncommissioned officers (E5), warrant officers (W1–W2), or officers (O1–O3) comprise 68.9 percent of all soldiers. If Army writing is comprehensible only for people with ten years of service and a master’s degree, we’re leaving much of the Army behind.

When Brian Greene explains particle physics at a tenth-grade reading level, some see an apples-to-oranges comparison. But I see an example of the simple, clear writing Army standards demand.

Superfluous Sesquipedalian Syntax (Needless Big Words)

The main reason Army doctrine struggles? Big words. The Flesch and Flesch-Kincaid tests are based on a simple premise: short sentences and simple words are easy to read. Although sentences are slightly shorter in the doctrine compared to the civilian texts (18.1 words versus 19.7, on average), the words are significantly longer (5.9 characters versus 4.8).

Big words make writing hard to read. Consider, for example, this 1942 government blackout order:

Such preparations shall be made as will completely obscure all Federal buildings and non-Federal buildings occupied by the Federal government during an air raid for any period of time from visibility by reason of internal or external illumination.

This thirty-eight-word sentence averages 5.5 characters per word. It scores a dismal 7.3 on reading ease and 21.7 on grade level. After reading the order, President Franklin Roosevelt said, “Tell them that in buildings where they have to keep the work going, to put something across the windows.” The revised version cuts the word count by half (thirty-eight to nineteen) and the characters per word to 4.4. The changes improve reading ease to a breezy 77.6 and lower the grade level to 7.2.

We might argue Army writers need big words because they write about complex ideas. But the civilian texts, which discuss difficult topics in readable language, undermine this idea. More likely, at least some of the big words in Army writing are unnecessary—namely, zombie nouns.

Zombies!

Zombie nouns feature prominently in a wordy, abstract writing style many professionals use to sound . . . well, professional. Academese. Bureaucratese. Legalese. Officialese. All of these are variations on a style featuring insider jargon, passive voice, and zombie nouns. The blackout order above—an excellent example of bureaucratese—has four zombie nouns: preparations, government, visibility, and illumination. Roosevelt’s brisk rewrite axes all of them.

I analyzed the samples’ zombie noun content using Professor Helen Sword’s Microsoft Word add-in, The Writer’s Diet. The results (Figure 3) confirm that zombie nouns have overrun the Army samples. Zombie nouns comprise 8–12 percent of the Army texts compared to 3–4 percent of the civilian texts (To be fair since operations is a zombie noun, a manual called FM 3-0, Operations discussing multidomain operations was never going to do well).

Figure 3: Army doctrine zombie nouns compared to civilian texts.

If zombie nouns are so bad, why do Army writers use them? First, zombie nouns tend to be big words, and many writers (not just Army types) mistakenly believe big words make them sound smart. In a recent survey, 58 percent of people admitted they tried to sound more intelligent by using a word they didn’t understand, and 78 percent said using big words makes someone seem smarter.

But they’re wrong—at least in writing, where research finds the opposite effect. When asked, people may say that big words indicate higher intelligence. But when people read complex texts, they judge the writer as less intelligent than writers who use simple words.

The second reason Army writers use zombie nouns is culture. They are part of the Army’s de facto writing style. For example:

The current methodology of the employment of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) is routinely seen as the separation of components and a risk reduction mechanism for the employment of fires that effectively inhibits the dynamic and full execution of fire support in [response] to a rapidly moving non-contiguous force that is enemy centric in its defeat mechanism.

It’s easy to criticize this zombie-infested passage. But the author, an Army officer, writes no differently than other Army professionals—in the de facto Army style. And he’s not the only one. From the Army’s strategic documents to its lessons learned, we find difficult writing teeming with zombie nouns.

The Cure: Simplicity

Happily, verb-eating zombie nouns are far easier to kill than their cinematic namesakes. Just use verbs. Instead of implementing a restructuring of combat formations, just restructure them. Don’t improve the retention of soldiers; simply retain them. Rather than making use of all combat power, just use it.

Satisfying as it may be, dispatching verb-killing zombies won’t solve all the Army’s writing woes. But it’s a good start, and it moves the Army’s de facto writing style closer to published guidelines. Army standards tell writers to use short words and avoid jargon. Killing zombie nouns helps them do both.

Reducing zombie nouns can also shift Army culture toward valuing simple, clear language. Needless zombie nouns are a symptom; infatuation with complex language is the disease. Doctrine is a visible example, but this isn’t a doctrine problem. Anyone who’s read Army writing—evaluation reports, award citations, situation reports, even emails—knows this is an Army problem. I know it because I’ve done it:

PowerPoint briefings often circulate within organizations as standalone communications, which can lead to misinterpretation of ideas.

Three zombie nouns (organizations, communications, and misinterpretation) in one sentence courtesy of yours truly.

Doctrine is a good place to start changing Army writing culture into one that values simple, direct prose. And the change is quietly underway. Over the last few years, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth has made doctrine simpler and easier to read. For example, the 2022 edition of FM 3-0, Operations has seven fewer words per sentence than the 2017 version. This change is a great start, but more work is needed.

Doctrine is moving in the right direction. The rest of the Army must follow. Effective writing is easy to read and understand, and Army writing is no different. From professional journals to evaluation reports to routine emails, writers across the Army should produce and demand simple, concise, and clear writing.

P.S. The article you’ve just read averages 5.1 characters per word. It scores 48.2 for reading ease and 10.0 for grade level. Zombie nouns make up 3 percent of the text.

Trent J. Lythgoe, PhD, is an associate professor of military leadership and the Fox Conner Chair of Leadership Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Dr. Lythgoe is the project editor of Professional Writing: The Command and General Staff College Writing Guide.

The views expressed are author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, US Army Command and General Staff College, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Trent Lythgoe · March 22, 2024

16. Food Weaponization Makes a Deadly Comeback

Excerpts:

A global treaty banning food weaponization may appear highly aspirational, as most treaties do before they are realized. But every country has an interest in banning food weaponization. For the United States, food weaponization around the world poses a security risk as well as an economic threat, with the potential to harm American farmers and consumers. China, a major food importer, also has an interest in restraining the use of food as a weapon and could prove a valuable partner in promoting a treaty. Developing countries have been harmed the most by the weaponization of food and have good reason to back a treaty that would constrain larger powers. If key powers, such as Russia, decline to participate, signatories could agree to impose collective penalties on nonsignatories that violate the treaty’s tenets, universalizing aspects of the treaty even in the absence of universal ratification.

Global food interdependence has amplified the risks of food weaponization beyond war’s immediate theaters. These new risks create new responsibilities. Unimpeded, the weaponization of food may precipitate a more hungry and violent world. While the memory of war is fresh, world leaders must take the food weapon off the table.

Food Weaponization Makes a Deadly Comeback

How to Combat the Revival of an Ancient Tactic

By Zach Helder, Mike Espy, Dan Glickman, Mike Johanns, and Devry Boughner Vorwerk

March 22, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Zach Helder, Mike Espy, Dan Glickman, Mike Johanns, and Devry Boughner Vorwerk · March 22, 2024

Food is a weapon of war. Like nuclear weapons, the weaponization of food can bring about mass civilian deaths and unthinkable horrors, provoking rightful moral outrage at the prospect of its use. But unlike nuclear weapons, food weaponization is routinely used in warfare. And in our globalized world, these tools have become more dangerous than ever.

Conflict has long been a central driver of global hunger. This enduring pattern is on tragic display today in places such as the Gaza Strip, Haiti, and Sudan, where millions of civilians are now on the brink of famine. The link between conflict and hunger stems in part from the weaponization of food itself, a method of warfare that exploits the coercive potential of disrupting (or threatening to disrupt) critical food supplies through the looting and destruction of farms, the manipulation of food supplies to exert domestic political control, and the use of sieges and blockades calibrated to starve the civilians trapped inside. More recent examples of the weaponization of food include the Syrian civil war, during which the regime of Bashar al-Assad waged what it called a “Starvation Until Submission Campaign,” prohibiting the entry of food in residential areas thought to harbor rebel forces. On both sides of the civil war in Yemen, combatants have targeted agricultural production for destruction, disrupted local food markets, and obstructed or diverted humanitarian aid.

But since invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia has taken the tool to a new level. The Kremlin is not only targeting Ukraine’s agricultural capacity but also threatening the broader global food supply. In an interdependent global economy, food weaponization in one region could affect the food security of all. Moscow has exploited this interdependence, deliberately disrupting the food supply to further the Kremlin’s military objectives. Over the course of the war, Moscow has imposed export restrictions, blockaded the Black Sea, and bombed granaries—crushing Ukraine’s agricultural exports, gaining leverage over neutral importer countries, and testing Western resolve in the process.

At the outset of the invasion, global food prices rocketed to an all-time high. Food price inflation and volatility continue to buffet low-income countries today. The war’s shock to agricultural production and trade is a key driver of a global food crisis that has nearly tripled global acute hunger since 2020, leaving as many as 333 million people at risk of starvation.

This shock to the global food system represents an opportunity to rally the world to ban one of humanity’s most shameful and enduring weapons of war. To that end, Washington should campaign for an international treaty prohibiting food weaponization. The negotiation and ratification of treaties is notoriously challenging, but it is that very challenge that gives treaties their outsize political and moral weight. A treaty process would engage the whole of society, from ordinary citizens to world leaders, to reckon with the danger of food weaponization and, if successful, produce a legally binding commitment to abandon the practice.

“FOOD IS A WEAPON”

In 1974, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz made a bold and now infamous pronouncement to Time magazine: “Food is a weapon. It is now one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit.” In the context of the Cold War, Butz viewed American agricultural abundance as an instrument of coercion that Washington could wield in the Third World: food aid and trade in exchange for political concessions. The same Time article observed, “This may be a brutal policy . . . but Washington may feel no obligation to help countries that consistently and strongly opposed it.” Butz drew on an intuition as old as the agricultural revolution, that food bestows control to those possessing it and renders vulnerable those who do not. To exploit that vulnerability—by, say, laying siege to and starving an enemy’s civilian population—is to weaponize food.

Food is indeed a weapon, and Butz was hardly the first public official to state it so plainly. Throughout the Russian Civil War, from 1917 to 1922, Bolshevik leaders were obsessed with the acquisition and distribution of grain. Famines across eastern Europe—at first an unintended consequence of civil war and societal collapse—offered the Bolsheviks such leverage over domestic opposition that they even contemplated rejecting food aid from the American Relief Administration, explicitly telling the Americans that “food is a weapon.” During World War II, the relative strength of U.S. food production was critical to the Allied war effort, so much so that the U.S. Office of War Information promoted food rationing with a striking slogan: “Food is a weapon. Don’t waste it!”

Before World War II, the effects of food weaponization were local in scope, as food security was largely a function of domestic or regional food supplies. But as regional food systems became woven into an interdependent global system, Butz envisioned something even grander: American dominance of the global food trade as a tool of economic and political warfare. He failed to foresee that global interdependence made the targeting of individual states unfeasible.

The United States first tested Butz’s proposition in 1980, imposing a grain embargo on the Soviet Union. The plan failed: Moscow swiftly found alternative suppliers, and the Carter administration incurred fierce domestic political blowback. But the American experiment with what some then called “the food weapon” offered a grim lesson: food trade restrictions could have dangerous and unpredictable consequences. It became evident that a liberal democracy leading an international order had no use for such an imprecise weapon, which was as likely to harm one’s allies and domestic constituencies as it was to harm one’s intended target.

But Russian President Vladimir Putin is not so constrained. He believes that a more chaotic world improves his relative power, protects his regime, and advances his military objectives. The Kremlin’s actions have demonstrated that a single state can inflate the price of food, imposing grave harms on hungry people around the world.

FAILURE TO GOVERN

The West has few tools to deter rogue states from weaponizing food on a global scale. International humanitarian law, much of which was crafted in the early twentieth century, could not have envisioned today’s interconnected food system. Existing agricultural trade agreements do not prevent the use of export restrictions as coercive tools. Maritime law is permissive of blockades as long as humanitarian aid is unrestricted. Even the Geneva Conventions’ prohibition on civilian starvation as a method of war includes exceptions and ambiguities, such as when starvation is unintentional or incidental to military objectives.

Of course, intent is difficult to establish in the heat of conflict. It is also largely irrelevant to the civilians who suffer the consequences. A tactic that incidentally or unexpectedly brings starvation upon an enemy’s civilian population and thereby confers some military advantage is often indistinguishable from the most brazenly deliberate uses of food as a weapon. The complexity of the food system and warfare itself make parsing intent ever harder. If Kyiv were to destroy Russia’s wheat and fertilizer exports to damage the Russian economy, many would surely argue that such behavior was acceptable, even if many civilians outside the zone of conflict were harmed in the process. Existing international agreements intend to protect civilians in the line of fire, not guard against systemic threats to civilians around the world. In an interdependent food system, the disruption of critical food supplies is food weaponization, regardless of intent.

If the weaponization of food were judged by its outcome rather than by the perceived motivations of the perpetrators, states that agree to prohibit the practice would be much more constrained in how they wage war. If intent is inscrutable, as it is with modern food weaponization, then it is plausibly deniable. To meaningfully restrain the use of food as a weapon, strong norms against the practice must be paired with new rules and explicit obligations.

THE CASE FOR A TREATY

The international community’s long-standing moral objection to starvation as a method of warfare needs a new mechanism of enforcement and accountability: a treaty banning the use of food as a weapon. Ideally, the treaty would have four conventions, or agreements. The first would define and prohibit the use of food as a weapon in conflict. The second would cover the use of export restrictions as a tool of economic coercion. The third would strengthen the international community’s commitment to prevent food crises. And the fourth would commit member states to fund research and development that would help countries diversify their food supply chains, mitigating their vulnerability to the weaponization of food.

To better protect civilians in conflict, the treaty would need to make clear that there is no legitimate military purpose for attacks on food or its means of production. The treaty would specify that land and facilities that are used primarily for agricultural production or storage must be treated as demilitarized zones. It would hold combatants explicitly responsible for the civilian food supply in territory they control, requiring parties to provide sufficient in-kind or financial contributions to the World Food Programme, the UN agency tasked with providing food aid worldwide, as a cost of waging war. Military interference in trade, economic sanctions, and trade policy are all forms of global food weaponization, and the treaty should address each of these tools.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative—an agreement among Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey to temporarily lift the Russian blockade of Ukraine and resume grain exports through the international waters of the Black Sea—provides an instructive model for preventing military interference in the food trade. In July 2022, the initiative established a joint coordination center between the parties and the UN to administer the safe passage of food shipments in and out of the Black Sea; the center directly supervised shipments to make certain that the initiative was not abused for military operations. A treaty banning food weaponization could institutionalize such a framework. In the event of a war, the parties would be required to set up joint coordination centers with the involvement of the UN—sites that would monitor the flow of food supplies to conflict zones and ensure that food shipments were not diverted, monetized by combatants, or exploited to smuggle military supplies.

Economic sanctions can also function as a form of food weaponization, intentionally or not. Western countries imposing sanctions against Russia took pains to safeguard the food supply, yet food markets were nonetheless affected due to a phenomenon called “overcompliance,” or the tendency of private firms to play it excessively safe under uncertain sanctions rules. A treaty banning food weaponization would automatically carve out food and critical agricultural inputs from sanctions, but also provide universal implementation guidelines to solve the overcompliance problem

Unimpeded, the weaponization of food may precipitate a more hungry and violent world.

Finally, export restrictions on critical food and fertilizer exporters pose a serious and ongoing risk to global food security. Export restrictions tend to be contagious, triggering panic buying and domestic food hoarding in a process resembling a bank run. Consequently, a large and hostile agricultural power can, as the Kremlin did, choke its export supply, stoking inflation and price volatility, before reentering global markets to sell food and inputs at extortionate prices or exerting political pressure on food-importing countries desperate for affordable supplies. For that reason, the treaty on food weaponization should prohibit countries that produce significant quantities of food and fertilizer from imposing export restrictions on those goods.

Parties to the treaty should also mitigate the developing world’s heightened vulnerability to food weaponization. Underlying food crises, such as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and climate disasters, make some countries particularly vulnerable to food weaponization. For this reason, the parties to a treaty would need to commit to preventing and responding to food crises. One way to do so would be to obligate the parties to make additional financial commitments to multilateral institutions such as the World Food Programme, the UN agency tasked with preventing food insecurity worldwide, as well as to a new research fund aimed at strengthening the developing world’s food supply.

A global treaty banning food weaponization may appear highly aspirational, as most treaties do before they are realized. But every country has an interest in banning food weaponization. For the United States, food weaponization around the world poses a security risk as well as an economic threat, with the potential to harm American farmers and consumers. China, a major food importer, also has an interest in restraining the use of food as a weapon and could prove a valuable partner in promoting a treaty. Developing countries have been harmed the most by the weaponization of food and have good reason to back a treaty that would constrain larger powers. If key powers, such as Russia, decline to participate, signatories could agree to impose collective penalties on nonsignatories that violate the treaty’s tenets, universalizing aspects of the treaty even in the absence of universal ratification.

Global food interdependence has amplified the risks of food weaponization beyond war’s immediate theaters. These new risks create new responsibilities. Unimpeded, the weaponization of food may precipitate a more hungry and violent world. While the memory of war is fresh, world leaders must take the food weapon off the table.

ZACH HELDER is a graduate student at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs and served as Senior Adviser for Food and Agriculture Policy at the U.S. House of Representatives.
MIKE ESPY is former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Mississippi’s Second District. He is the 2024 Advanced Leadership Initiative Fellow at Harvard University.
DAN GLICKMAN is former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Kansas’s Fourth District. He is a Senior Fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center.
MIKE JOHANNS is former U.S. Senator from Nebraska and former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.
DEVRY BOUGHNER VORWERK is CEO of DevryBV Sustainable Strategies. She was Global Head of Corporate Affairs at Cargill and served as Lead Economist for the Chair of the U.S. International Trade Commission.
This article was developed by a working group that also included Ertharin Cousin, Joseph Glauber, Phil Karsting, G. John Ikenberry, Emily Holland, and Miguel Centeno.

Foreign Affairs · by Zach Helder, Mike Espy, Dan Glickman, Mike Johanns, and Devry Boughner Vorwerk · March 22, 2024

17. China’s Xi Jinping to Meet U.S. CEOs in Beijing Next Week

China’s Xi Jinping to Meet U.S. CEOs in Beijing Next Week

Rare meeting planned after business forum as China faces economic headwinds

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-jinping-to-meet-u-s-ceos-in-beijing-next-week-e72a2d80?st=15w8kuas3f3tcv6&utm

By Liza Lin

and Lingling Wei

March 21, 2024 12:03 pm ET

Chinese President Xi Jinping at this month’s National People’s Congress in Beijing. PHOTO: TINGSHU WANG/REUTERS

Chinese leader Xi Jinping plans to meet a group of U.S. business leaders next week after a government-sponsored forum as Beijing steps up efforts to woo American firms amid an exodus of foreign capital.

The meeting with China’s top leader is set for Wednesday, and insurer

Chubb’s CEO, Evan Greenberg, along with Stephen Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and Craig Allen, president of the U.S.-China Business Council, are expected to attend, people familiar with the matter said. The list of participants is still being completed and the people said that Beijing could cancel the Xi meeting at the last minute.The sponsor of the meeting, China’s State Council, didn’t respond to a request for comment.

U.S. executives are heading to the Chinese capital this weekend for the China Development Forum, an annual gathering where global business leaders rub shoulders with Chinese policymakers. The two-day meeting is slated to start on Sunday. The topics set to be discussed include China’s economic growth, artificial intelligence and climate change, according to a draft agenda seen by The Wall Street Journal.

How China’s Falling Consumer Prices Threaten the Global Economy