Quotes of the Day:

"If you kill a cockroach you are a hero, if you kill a butterfly you are bad. Morality has aesthetic standards."

– Nietzsche

"The skill of writing is to create a context in which other people can think." 

– Edwin Schlossberg

"The most important scientific revolutions all include, as their only common feature, the dethronement of human arrogance from one pedestal after another of previous convictions about our centrality in the cosmos." 

– Stephen Jay Gould

1. Symbolism or Strategy? Ukraine Battles to Retain Small Gains.

2. Afghanistan withdrawal errors came despite military concerns

3. The senators who could fill Trump’s national security cabinet

4. With pause in US aid, Ukraine’s allies rally to ponder what’s next

5. Uncle Sam’s Guide to Peace and Prosperity

6. Israel Has Killed a Top Hamas Commander in Gaza. It Took Five Months.

7. There will be no ‘short, sharp’ war. A fight between the US and China would likely go on for years.

8. The ‘Lost Decade’ of the US Pivot to Asia

9. The Air Force's Dream of Mounting a Laser Weapon on an AC-130J Ghostrider Gunship Is Dead

10. Army General Pressured Assessment Panel to Help Career of 'Ineffective' Officer

11. “Disabling cyberattacks” are hitting critical US water systems, White House warns

12. The U.S. Military's New Defense Budget Makes No Sense

13. Huge claim about origins of Covid-19 by leading Aussie epidemiologist

14. Only One-Third of Military Families Would Still Recommend Service, Blue Star Families Survey Finds

15. Taiwan Acknowledges Presence of U.S. Troops on Outlying Islands

16. US military hit with embarrassing report exposing failings and vulnerability to China​

17. Pacific force’s wish list seeks $11 billion more than defense proposal

18. SOCOM Cuts Armed Overwatch Buy from 75 to 62 Aircraft

19. Opinion | Ukrainians have a message for Mike Johnson

20. Guam defense tops INDOPACOM's unfunded priorities, NORTHCOM wants more IT

21. Fast food or the military? Recruiting solutions overlook the obvious

22. Two ways to fix Army recruiting

23. Revisiting the Tanker War

24. Swarm Clouds on the Horizon? Exploring the Future of Drone Swarm Proliferation

25. The Creeping Politicization of the U.S. Military

26. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 19, 2024

27. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2024

1. Symbolism or Strategy? Ukraine Battles to Retain Small Gains.

Excerpts:

Military analysts have described Ukraine’s strategy as “hold, build and strike” — holding the line in the country’s southeast, replenishing its units with fresh troops and hitting back with long-range drones attacks on oil refineries and military logistics targets inside Russia.

...

Interviewed last week, soldiers who recently fought there described small sways in the front in both directions, and being badly outgunned by Russian artillery. Overall along the frontline, Russia is firing seven times as many artillery shells as Ukraine, General Ivan Havryliuk, a deputy minister of defense, told Ukrainian media on Monday.

American weaponry that had been donated for the counteroffensive last year, including Stryker armored vehicles, has proved useful in protecting soldiers from these barrages now as they fight defensively.But U.S. politics now threaten the supply of arms. A package worth about $60 billion in military and financial assistance has been stalled in Congress for months over objections from some Republicans. The Biden administration last week announced it would send $300 million in stopgap military assistance using funds remaining from previously approved aid.

Russian forces attacked the pocket around Robotyne and areas nearby nine times over the past day, the general staff headquarters said on Tuesday. When the Ukrainians captured the village last year, they pierced a main Russian anti-tank defensive line; now the Russians are trying to push them back and fill in that gap.

Symbolism or Strategy? Ukraine Battles to Retain Small Gains.

Despite American doubts, Ukrainians say that defending places with little strategic value is worth the cost in casualties and weapons, because the attacking Russians pay an even higher price.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/world/europe/ukraine-russia-south.html?utm

A soldier in Ukraine’s 65th Mechanized Brigade near the village of Robotyne in southern Ukraine in February.Credit...Reuters

By Andrew E. Kramer and Maria Varenikova

Reported from the Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine

March 20, 2024

Updated 7:10 a.m. ET

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Ukrainian soldiers spent hours ducking in trenches as artillery exploded around them, then dashed for the safety of an armored personnel carrier — only to be chased through the open rear ramp of the vehicle by an exploding drone.

“All I could see were sparks in my eyes,” said one of the soldiers, a sergeant, recounting how the pursuing drone blew up, leaving him and his team wounded but somehow still alive. He asked to be identified only by his first name, Oleksandr, according to military protocol.

Fighting on the plain in southern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, where Oleksandr’s vehicle was hit earlier this year, has raged for 10 months now in two phases: first with Ukrainian forces on the offense, and now on defense, as Russia escalates attacks on the area where Ukraine gained ground in last summer’s counteroffensive.

Military analysts have described Ukraine’s strategy as “hold, build and strike” — holding the line in the country’s southeast, replenishing its units with fresh troops and hitting back with long-range drones attacks on oil refineries and military logistics targets inside Russia.

In Zaporizhzhia, this has meant defending an area created by last summer’s counteroffensive, a 10-mile-deep semicircle that presses into Russian-held territory, forming a bulge. Soldiers describe ruined villages, trenches and fields that are a moonscape of shell craters.

At the southern tip of the semicircle lies the village of Robotyne. Ukraine recaptured it last summer, in the high-water mark of a counteroffensive that not only failed to achieve a breakthrough, but left the Russians in a strong enough position to start pushing back across the southern front.

Image

A battlefield near Robotyne in February. Ukraine is now defending area it captured during last summer’s counteroffensive.Credit...Reuters

Ukrainian forces occupying that bulge in the front line can be attacked from three sides, creating a dilemma: Abandoning that pocket would ease the pressure on them, but it would also signal a symbolic setback in the war, losing territory they gained last year at a high cost in casualties and destroyed weaponry.

Interviewed last week, soldiers who recently fought there described small sways in the front in both directions, and being badly outgunned by Russian artillery. Overall along the frontline, Russia is firing seven times as many artillery shells as Ukraine, General Ivan Havryliuk, a deputy minister of defense, told Ukrainian media on Monday​.

American weaponry that had been donated for the counteroffensive last year, including Stryker armored vehicles, has proved useful in protecting soldiers from these barrages now as they fight defensively.

But U.S. politics now threaten the supply of arms. A package worth about $60 billion in military and financial assistance has been stalled in Congress for months over objections from some Republicans. The Biden administration last week announced it would send $300 million in stopgap military assistance using funds remaining from previously approved aid.

Russian forces attacked the pocket around Robotyne and areas nearby nine times over the past day, the general staff headquarters said on Tuesday. When the Ukrainians captured the village last year, they pierced a main Russian anti-tank defensive line; now the Russians are trying to push them back and fill in that gap.

Image

Soldiers of Ukraine’s 65th Mechanized Brigade in a dugout near Robotyne, where they hold defensive positions, while Russian troops are leaving their trenches to attack.Credit...Reuters

Like Bakhmut and Avdiivka, Robotyne, which had a prewar population of about 500 people, is now just ruins. Throughout the war, American officials have repeatedly raised concerns that Ukraine was holding out too long in defending such places, committing soldiers and ammunition to cling to devastated towns with little strategic value.

But for Ukraine, the area around Robotyne remains worth fighting for, at least for now.

“At some point, symbolic becomes strategic,” Yurii Sak, a former adviser to the minister of defense, said of the fighting. Defending the gains of the offensive, he said, is “important for morale, it’s important for the support of the population, it’s important for the inner belief in our potential to win.”

The combat is also more costly in casualties for the attacking Russians than the Ukrainians in their defensive positions, Mr. Sak said. “As long as that calculus continues, it supports holding the ground,” he said. “It’s war, so casualties are inevitable on both sides.”

Russia is now on the offensive along the entire frontline, which stretches in a 600-mile-long crescent from the Russian border in northeastern Ukraine to the southern Dnipro River. The Kremlin’s military has been using its advantage in ammunition, manpower and aviation.

Russia has swelled the ranks of its army by deploying squads of former convicts. It is buying artillery shells, missiles and exploding drones from North Korea and Iran to help replenish its supplies. Its planes avoid Ukrainian air defenses by dropping bombs from a safe distance that glide to their targets.

Just this year, Russia has dropped more than 3,500 glide bombs, Ukraine’s military said. Moscow’s electronic warfare instruments jam signals and scramble coordinates for Ukraine’s satellite-guided weapons.

The result has been a grinding advance that in February pushed Ukraine out of the small city of Avdiivka in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Since then, Russia has been attacking with a combination of ground assaults and aerial bombing at seven points along the front, according to Ukraine’s general staff headquarters.

In the northeast, Russian forces are pushing through pine forests toward the city of Kupiansk on the Oskil River, seeking to reverse gains Ukraine made in a counteroffensive in the fall of 2022.

Image

Ukrainian infantry soldiers in the Sinkiv Forest near Kupiansk, in northeastern Ukraine, earlier this month.Credit...Kostiantyn Liberov/Libkos, via Getty Images

In the Donbas, a region of rolling hills dotted with coal mines and factories, Russia has been pressing along four lines of attack, seeking to exploit openings created by capturing Avdiivka. Ukrainian forces say they are holding defensive positions to the west of the city, though Russia has captured several small villages as it tries to advance.

Near the southern city of Kherson, Russia has been assaulting a Ukrainian outpost across the Dnipro River, on the eastern bank, in an area otherwise controlled by Russia. Russian forces assaulted the position three times on Monday, the Ukrainian military said.

The position there is resupplied by boat and, like the bulge in the lines around Robotyne, it is precarious.

These fights are worthwhile, Ukrainian officials have said, because they cost Russia tens of thousands of soldiers killed and wounded, but there is skepticism in Washington.

“I understand the administration has been frustrated,” Evelyn Farkas, director of the McCain Institute, said, referring to the Biden administration.

“It’s unclear whether military decisions are purely military or influenced by political pressure or even direction,” she said.

Image

Ukrainian troops who pulled out of Avdiivka, in eastern Ukraine, tend to their vehicles in a village west of there in February.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times

At the training for Ukrainian troops fighting in the semicircular area near Robotyne, soldiers noted one advantage to the shift to a defensive strategy: fewer casualties. Russians now must leave their trenches to attack, while the Ukrainians are fighting from the cover of their positions.

Pulling back, said a private, also named Oleksandr, would merely leave Ukrainian troops fighting in other positions in similar conditions. “You need to defend every meter,” he said.

Still, it is a fierce fight in the south, over a landscape of open fields, muddy roads, ruins of farmhouses and countless blown-up vehicles, facing Russian forces on three sides.

Ukrainians have been fighting in the area long enough to give the positions they are defending nicknames like The Wheel, Silicon and Tank Trench.

Russian reconnaissance drones continually fly overhead, directing artillery or mortar fire on the soldiers. Aerial bombardments are common.

Small drones rigged with explosives and cameras buzz in regularly, chasing cars and sometimes people. The one that flew into Sergeant Oleksandr’s armored personnel carrier in January wounded everyone inside, but all survived. Last week, he was training to return to the fighting in the same area.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014. More about Andrew E. Kramer

2. Afghanistan withdrawal errors came despite military concerns

There is always a tension between DOD and State in every NEO. The military wants an early decision to increase the chances of successfully evacuating all civilians. But State wants to be able to wait until the last minute in the hopes that tensions will be reduced to try to prevent the political and economic fallout an evacuation will cause.

Afghanistan withdrawal errors came despite military concerns

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · March 19, 2024

Former Joint Chiefs Chairman Mark Milley on Tuesday reiterated concerns that political decisions made outside the Defense Department led to the chaos and violence of the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, but also emphasized that no single mistake can be blamed for the failures.

“The outcome in Afghanistan was the result of many decisions from many years of war,” the retired Army general told members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “Like any complex phenomena, there was no single causal factor that determined the outcome.”

Milley and former Gen. Kenneth McKenzie Jr., head of U.S. Central Command at the time of the withdrawal, appeared before the panel as part of ongoing congressional investigations related to the final days of the withdrawal, which included the deaths of 13 U.S. service members and hundreds of civilians after a suicide bombing at the Kabul International Airport.

Republican leaders of the committee said the hearing was designed to provide still-unanswered questions from the families of those fallen troops — some of whom attended Tuesday’s hearing — and to determine how mistakes were made.

RELATED

Senators warn more visas are urgently needed for Afghans who aided US

More than a dozen senators said Congress needs to raise the limit on the number of special immigrant visas the U.S. can process for Afghans.

“The president and his administration refuse to acknowledge their failures,” said committee chairman Rep. Mike McCaul, R-Texas. “We launched this investigation to make sure the mistakes made in Afghanistan never, ever happen again.”

But Democrats dismissed the hearing — the latest in a long series of the issue over the last three years — as another attempt by congressional Republicans to score political points ahead of this year’s elections, noting that the chaotic withdrawal was preceded by mistakes from multiple presidential administrations.

“If we’re taking a serious look at this, you can’t just take a peek at one little segment of it and say, ‘This is the reason everything happened,’” said committee ranking member Rep. Gregory Meeks, D-N.Y. “You have to look at all of it.”

That includes former President Donald Trump’s agreement with Taliban leaders in early 2020 to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan, an arrangement that Democrats argue limited President Joe Biden’s options in the country.

Milley and McKenzie both acknowledged that, but also noted that military leaders recommended keeping some military force in the country beyond the August 2021 deadline but were overruled by administration officials.

They also noted that the move to pull civilian workers and allies out of the country came later than they requested, leading to more complications.

“This was not a military decision,” McKenzie said.

But neither man condemned Biden for his political calls, saying that military recommendations are just part of the decision process for the commander-in-chief. They also testified that if U.S. troops were not removed from the country, it likely would have led to renewed fighting with Taliban forces.

Much of the testimony from Milley and McKenzie was repeated from previous appearances before congressional committees. But Tuesday’s hearing marked the first time Milley testified on the issue as a civilian, not a Defense Department official.

He said the move was important to provide as much information as possible to the families of the fallen troops and the service members who served alongside them.

“To all veterans of Afghanistan, hold your heads high,” he said. “Each of you did what the country asked of you under extreme circumstances.”

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

3.  The senators who could fill Trump’s national security cabinet

No surprises here.

The senators who could fill Trump’s national security cabinet | Semafor

semafor.com · by Jay Solomon

The Scoop

Donald Trump is eyeing three Republican senators — Bill Hagerty, Tom Cotton and Marco Rubio — for key national security posts if he wins the White House in November, people close to the Trump campaign told Semafor.

The conservative lawmakers are all prominent hawks on China and Iran and supporters of increased U.S. spending on defense and border security. Trump sees the politicians as potentially partnering with cabinet members and advisors from his first term to create a more unified national security team from day one, these people said.

Among the first-term confidantes Trump is expected to consider for top jobs: former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo; John Ratcliffe, a one-time congressman who served as Director of National Intelligence; former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien; and Trump’s ambassador to Germany, Ric Grenell. Trump also consults with advisors from his ideologically aligned think tank, the America First Policy Institute, such as retired Lt. General Keith Kellogg and former Trump National Security Council staffer, Fred Fleitz.

“I think you’ll see a much much more cohesive and strategic foreign policy team” if Trump wins in November, a person briefed on the candidate’s plans told Semafor.

None of the three senators were initially major Trump boosters, and Marco Rubio ran against him in 2016. But these politicians largely supported Trump’s major foreign policy and domestic security initiatives while he was in office. These included his confrontational approaches towards China and Iran and his diplomatic push to build a Middle East security bloc through alliances between Israel and key Arab states.

In recent months, Senators Hagerty, Cotton and Rubio have also backed Trump’s public skepticism towards funding Ukraine. Aid for the country is emerging as among the most divisive foreign policy issues in the 2024 campaign. And European nations and NATO members are increasingly concerned that Trump could completely pull support for Kiev.

Rubio earlier this month said both Russia and Ukraine needed to accept that neither side is going to win the war. “So then the question becomes if in fact, there’s going to be a negotiated settlement, who’s going to have the leverage here?” he told Fox news.

Hagerty served as Trump’s ambassador to Japan before leaving to campaign for Tennessee’s open senate seat, which he won in 2020. While in Tokyo, the former financier impressed the president with his ability to manage trade and security issues with the Japanese, particularly in relation to China, according to former Trump officials. “He’s very well respected in Asia,” one said of Hagerty. “So, he’s somebody that I would definitely have on my radar.”

Funding for the Pentagon, and its restructuring, is also expected to be a particular focus for Trump if he wins a second term. Cotton, an Iraq war veteran and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is expected to be a candidate for secretary of defense, along with Pompeo. Rubio, who serves as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, could be a fit to head the CIA.

Jay’s view

Donald Trump’s entrance onto the global stage after the 2016 election was marred by an inexperienced White House and deep divisions within his national security team. The Republican candidate’s ability to draw from a more seasoned bench could smooth his transition back into power, if it’s stability he really seeks.

Much of Trump’s first term was undermined by tumult within his cabinet. His first national security advisor, Michael Flynn, resigned after only three weeks when it was revealed he lied to FBI investigators looking into Russian interference in the 2016 election. Trump fired his first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, by social media 2018 only a year into his tenure.

Among the biggest concerns about a Trump re-election is that he’d be solely surrounded by loyalists. During his first term, a range of seasoned military men and business executives, including retired generals James Mattis and John Kelly, and Tillerson, a former ExxonMobil CEO, attempted to challenge the president on key national security issues, according to memoirs by Trump administration veterans. But most of these officials were either fired or resigned due to their differences with Trump; even more officials left his administration in its final weeks following the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol.

The entrance of experienced Republicans like Hagerty, Cotton and Rubio into a second Trump term could assuage some fears about talent recruitment. But it would remain to be seen if these men could navigate the president’s politics and management style better than their predecessors.

Room for Disagreement

Trump raised alarm bells last year when he called into a political rally hosted by Michael Flynn and told the crowd: “We’re going to bring you back.” It’s unclear if Trump was suggesting he’d assign the retired general to another senior position after his 2017 debacle. But it again raised questions about whether Trump would ultimately staff his administration with loyalists and those promoting his most destabilizing foreign policy positions, such as potentially cutting funding to NATO or not defending Taiwan in a war with China.

Axios published in December a list of potential cabinet members that also cited Senator Cotton as a possible defense secretary. But it also indicated some of the most strident members of Trump’s MAGA political movement could get cabinet posts with serious national security implications. These included Kash Patel, who served in Trump’s Pentagon, as a potential CIA director; the radio host Steve Bannon as White House chief of staff; and former White House staffer Stephen Miller as Attorney General.

“If Trump won in 2024, he’d turn to loyalists who share his zeal to punish critics, purge non-believers, and take controversial legal and military action,” Axios quoted sources as telling the publication.

Notable

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly challenged in January Trump’s claim that he could end the war in Ukraine “in one day” if he’s re-elected.

semafor.com · by Jay Solomon

4. With pause in US aid, Ukraine’s allies rally to ponder what’s next

What do you do now Lieutenant?

With pause in US aid, Ukraine’s allies rally to ponder what’s next

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · March 19, 2024

Editor’s note: This story has been updated with a quote from a secretary of defense press conference.

RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, GERMANY — Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin traveled this week to the home of his signature achievement.

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group — a network of more than 50 countries that support Kyiv — has met 20 times since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. In that time, it’s marshaled $88 billion in total security aid that’s been core to Ukraine’s self-defense.

“This coalition will not let Ukraine fail,” Austin said in remarks Tuesday.

And yet, that coalition’s future has perhaps never been less certain, mainly because of the country leading it.

Last week the U.S. announced a $300 million batch of aid for Ukraine, providing air defense, artillery and other ammunition. The package was as essential as it was “extraordinary,” a senior defense official speaking on the condition of anonymity said before the trip. America ran out of money late last year to replace what it sends Ukraine, and the Pentagon only funded this tranche through surprise savings gathered from various Army contracts.

House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., has so far refused to hold a vote on a further $50 billion in security aid.

There may be no better symbol of the challenges to American leadership than Austin himself. The secretary is traveling for the first time this year, after entering the hospital in January due to complications from cancer surgery. His failure to inform the administration and the public of his health status resulted in sharp criticism from lawmakers.

Still, on Tuesday, he spoke at the conclusion of this week’s forum and warned that “Ukraine’s survival is in danger” if U.S. support lapses indefinitely.

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group has been a fixture of Austin’s time in office and American leadership around Ukraine. In fact, said Max Bergmann, a Europe expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, only America could have led this group. Leadership under a NATO banner early in the war might have appeared too provocative. And only the U.S. had the relationships to bring together countries from the Netherlands to New Zealand.

The UDCG is entering a new phase. The question now is what that looks like if America’s role in supporting Ukraine continues to wilt.

“We’re at the pivotal moment,” said Bergmann. “It’s either the U.S. and Europe step up or it was all for naught.”

Three chapters

While speaking with reporters ahead of the trip here, the senior defense official framed the UDCG’s history in three chapters.

The first one was emergency response. The Pentagon helped convene the group for the the first time in April 2022, two months after Russia’s full-scale invasion. And soon, the number of countries involved surged to over 50, rushing support to help Ukraine continue its self defense.

In its second chapter, the official said, the group became a coach as much as a player. The large number of countries involved — various kinds of equipment they donated — created a need for someone to direct it all. For example, the official said, Ukraine has received a dozen types of howitzers. Those have different maintenance and repair needs. The UDCG has helped coordinate this aid.

The group’s latest goal has been the long term. Most of the countries involved have sorted themselves into smaller teams of two or three focused on specific lines of support, such as drones or air defense. These working groups are helping make aid more streamlined and predictable, the official said.

Other countries have tried to fill some of the vacuum left by America’s hiatus. The Czech Republic recently unveiled a plan to collectively buy 800,000 artillery shells. The Netherlands and Denmark continue to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s in an effort to get the jets to Kyiv by the summer.

Still, the official said, there’s no way for allies to compensate for the gap left by America.

Without it, Ukrainian forces are rationing or running out of ammunition on the front lines. Those shortages have led to a loss of territory, including most recently the eastern city of Avdiivka, which Russia seized last month.

“With every passing day, with every passing week, they have to figure out how to make use of increasingly scarce resources,” the official said, repeating a call for Congress to pass more aid.

A new format?

Even if that doesn’t happen, the U.S. can still play an important role in Ukraine’s war effort, said Bergmann, of CSIS.

But it would be a diminished one, he argued — perhaps donating the amount of aid as a small European country while helping channel the different streams of support. Getting this many countries into the coalition and helping coordinate themhas helped relieve pressure on Kyiv to this point, he argued.

That said, managing aid is only so valuable in a moment when Kyiv’s main problem is scarcity. European and other partner countries have largely emptied their inventories already, Bergmann said.

Recent reporting has suggested that NATO could take a larger role in managing the UDCG, which remains an American-led effort. Keeping it so has become more difficult not only due to the gap in funding but also due to other commitments around the world. On the plane ride to Germany, Austin spoke with members of Congress, the National Security Council and defense officials from Europe and India, from an Airstream-like trailer in the center of the C-17 Globemaster.

The same day, President Joe Biden held his first call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a month as the administration begins to criticize the war in Gaza with greater force.

Speaking with reporters outside the officer’s club in Ramstein where the coalition is meeting, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said he thinks the U.S. will eventually pass more aid and that at the same time more countries in NATO should hit the 2% threshold for defense spending. American political infighting, to him, doesn’t demand a new structue for the group.

“I don’t see any need to change it,” he said. “At least not now.”

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

5. Uncle Sam’s Guide to Peace and Prosperity

Conclusion:

Neither peace nor prosperity are self-reinforcing. The U.S. margin for error is small. Establishing a new security and economic commons may be difficult, but it’s necessary and pressing.

Uncle Sam’s Guide to Peace and Prosperity

American economic and military might can underwrite a new economic and security commons.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/uncle-sams-guide-to-peace-and-prosperity-global-security-economy-5f648a83?mod=googlenewsfeed&utm_medium=social

By Kevin Warsh

March 19, 2024 1:31 pm ET

ILLUSTRATION: DAVID GOTHARD

Economic and geopolitical instability are frequent bedfellows. That’s because policy errors are contagious. Absent the creation of a new American-led economic and security framework, it’s doubtful the U.S. can sustain prosperity and achieve a durable peace.

Massive government spending, surging debt burdens and bank rescues over the past several years have alarmed America’s allies and emboldened its adversaries. The surge in inflation has added considerable weight to America’s woes. It shocked central banks, knocked the economy, and prompted foreign adversaries to challenge America’s geopolitical standing.

The U.S. government is striving to mask the country’s economic and financial troubles. In the past several months, the Treasury Department has issued more short-term bills and fewer long-term notes than expected. Its machinations have lowered 10-year Treasury yields by nearly 1 percentage point, to about 4%. The Federal Reserve has gotten into the act, too. It pledged at its year-end press conference to deliver interest-rate cuts and other policy easing in the new year.

The immediate results include a melt-up in asset prices, a loosening of financial conditions, and higher and less stable prices. Hardworking Americans aren’t fooled. They see the country going down the wrong track. And they watch adversaries plotting to take advantage. Bad actors operating in the Black, Red and South China seas are undeterred. A foreign axis of resistance is unimpressed by the American economic engine, unintimidated by U.S. military might, and unconvinced Washington will rise to the geopolitical challenge. The axis seeks to divide our allies and, worse, to sow domestic discord. U.S. deterrence is flailing. American diplomats are being asked to carry too heavy a burden.

The relationship between the U.S. and the rest of the world is more fragile than it’s been in half a century. French statesman Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) feared that peace might be no more than the interlude between wars. If he’s right, current prosperity will serve as a fleeting interval between economic shocks.

A powerful economic and security commons, in George Shultz’s original framing, was established in 1945. After the devastation of the Great Depression and two world wars, the U.S. fortified its economy and strengthened alliances in a dangerous world. Americans benefited enormously from a surge in economic growth and heightened well-being for decades. America’s leaders made clear that empire-building wasn’t the goal. Rather it was to make the U.S. safer and stronger by supporting allies who supported us.

American peace and prosperity grew shaky in the late 1970s. Economic malaise and runaway inflation, institutional dysfunction and cultural decay, and a weakened military posture caused Americans to lose faith in their country’s prospects. U.S. allies no longer trusted us, and adversaries scarcely feared us. Failed efforts to rescue American hostages held by the mullahs in Iran was illustrative. America’s hegemony risked eclipse.

Ronald Reagan changed all that. He vanquished the Soviet Union and debilitated its proxies. His administration rebuilt an economic and security commons suited to the times. With a bolstered military, the U.S. held close to its allies and deterred its adversaries, occasionally with force. Strong, noninflationary growth and higher standards of living became the norm. The peace dividend wasn’t only prosperity. It was peace, and it lasted for two decades.

The 21st century has brought new challenges: terrorist attacks on the homeland, wars in the Middle East, a financial crisis and a global pandemic. The American economy swings between booms and busts. People have lost faith in institutions. Moral confusion clouds debates about the nation’s history. Finally, a big runup in prices has harmed the least well-off. It’s surprising that populism isn’t more popular.

America’s leaders ought to build a new economic and security commons. The U.S. should act as a sturdy point in a turbulent world. Strong, unapologetic national-security policy begins with a prosperous, sustainable economy. The U.S. must demonstrate again the superiority of its economic system. Washington’s conduct of fiscal, monetary, regulatory and trade policy needs fixing so soft power can share the burden with hard power.

Outspending the nation’s capacity is dangerous. Absent a fiscal anchor, the list of buyers retreating from America’s debt markets won’t be limited to those who wish us trouble.

Monetary policy requires a revamped framework, too. Inflation isn’t caused by workers earning too much and living too well. It’s caused by the government living too well—spending, printing and borrowing too much.

Government-directed industrial policy, as currently practiced, is akin to the command-and-control dictates of foreign regimes. Better for the private sector to out-innovate, outgrow and outsmart the competition. Regulators should take heed of U.S. comparative advantages—including in the energy sector—and better respect the separation between the private sector and the government.

China is actively courting many U.S. trading partners, promising privileged access in exchange for allegiance to Beijing. A revamped economic and security commons should be at least as clear and formidable as sanctions policy with adversaries. Put plainly, if a country acts as a trusted security partner of the U.S. and treats American businesses and citizens as it treats its own, the U.S. will act reciprocally. If, however, foreign countries disfavor U.S. interests, they won’t gain the precious benefit of American protection or ready access to U.S. technology or markets. I prefer a new paradigm to bring allies and partners into closer collaboration. Adversaries would take notice, not comfort.

Neither peace nor prosperity are self-reinforcing. The U.S. margin for error is small. Establishing a new security and economic commons may be difficult, but it’s necessary and pressing.

Mr. Warsh, a former member of the Federal Reserve Board, is a distinguished visiting fellow in economics at the Hoover Institution.

6. Israel Has Killed a Top Hamas Commander in Gaza. It Took Five Months.

Graphic line and block chart at the link.

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-has-killed-a-top-hamas-commander-in-gaza-it-took-five-months-76db1be1?mod=hp_lead_pos7

Israel Has Killed a Top Hamas Commander in Gaza. It Took Five Months.

Airstrike killing Marwan Issa, the No. 3 official in the enclave, isn’t seen as a decisive blow

By Dion Nissenbaum

Follow

 and Summer Said

Follow

Updated March 20, 2024 12:03 am ET

A 2021 Hamas parade in Gaza City. PHOTO: MOHAMMED SABER/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

In years of battle with Israel, Marwan Issa earned the nickname “Shadow Man” for his behind-the-scenes orchestration of Hamas operations as he evaded repeated attempts on his life. 

As the Islamic holy month of Ramadan was about to begin in March, Israel finally got its man. An Israeli airstrike in Gaza killed Issa, the No. 3 official in Hamas’s Gaza hierarchy, the White House said.

It was the first time in five months of war that Israel has successfully met one of its key military objectives in the Gaza Strip: killing the top-tier Hamas leaders responsible for the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, the worst in the nation’s history.

Issa’s death could hamper Hamas’s ability to fight Israeli forces at a crucial time in the war, but doesn’t represent a decisive blow, analysts said. 

It “contributes to the continuous degradation of Hamas’s capabilities as a cohesive fighting force and their ability to coordinate operations against Israeli forces in Gaza in the short-medium term,” said Tariq Kenney-Shawa, the U.S. policy fellow at Al-Shabaka, the New York-based Palestinian think tank.

But Hamas has repeatedly rebounded from previous Israeli assassination campaigns that have killed the group’s leaders over more than two decades.

“Issa’s killing will change little for the guerrilla resistance campaign that will be directed at occupying Israeli forces over the coming months and years,” said Kenney-Shawa.

The White House said Monday that Issa had been killed, but officials from Israel and from Hamas haven’t given confirmation. Egyptian officials said they haven’t heard from Issa, who had been serving as a courier in hostage-release talks, since a few days before the reported Israeli airstrike.

Hamas’s Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar attended a 2022 event in Gaza City. PHOTO: ASHRAF AMRA/ZUMA PRESS

Israel said it targeted Issa this month with an airstrike that hit a central Gaza Strip refugee camp, part of its military campaign to kill anyone involved in the Oct. 7 attack on Israel. U.S. officials said the airstrike got its target.

Israeli military officials, who keep a chart of Hamas leaders they are aiming to kill, say they have taken out many midlevel militant commanders in Gaza, but Issa would be the highest-ranking Hamas official in Gaza killed during the current conflict.

Israel has also vowed to kill all Hamas leaders around the world who helped plan the Oct. 7 attack, which Israel says killed about 1,200 people, most of them civilians. In January, an Israeli airstrike in Beirut killed Saleh al-Arouri, founder of the group’s military wing.

Israel still needs to get the top two Hamas leaders in Gaza—Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif—to deliver a decisive blow to the group, said Mark Regev, who served until recently as spokesman for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Eyal Hulata, a former Israeli national security adviser, said killing Arouri and Issa both send clear messages, but that getting Sinwar “is core to ending the war.”

“Symbols matter,” said Hulata. “Arouri and him down; Sinwar and Deif next.”  

The Hamas leader Mohammed Deif in an undated photo. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Issa’s death will hurt the militant group’s diminishing abilities to organize an effective defense to the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, according to Michael Milshtein, a former head of Palestinian affairs for Israeli military intelligence. 

“His death will cause damage, but will not dramatically undermine Hamas’s stand or make the collapse of its regime more likely,” he said.

Issa served for years as Deif’s right-hand man. He was deputy commander of the Hamas military wing and a member of the political bureau charged with making key decisions for the group, including concessions in negotiations with Israel over the fate of the more than 130 hostages who remain in Gaza—some of whom Israel says are dead.

Issa was part of the Hamas leadership that negotiated a weeklong cease-fire in November, during which Hamas released 105 of the more than 240 hostages abducted on Oct. 7 and secured the release of 240 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.

Egyptian officials said Hamas leaders’ fear over their own lives in Gaza after Issa’s killing might have been a catalyst for the group to return to sputtering cease-fire and hostage talks that restarted this week in Qatar.

Issa was born in 1965 in a Gaza refugee camp to Palestinian parents who were forced from their homes when Israel was created in 1948. He was known as the “Palestinian Commando,” a nickname he earned playing basketball as a teenager for the refugee camp’s sports club.

He joined the Hamas military wing at the age of 19, was arrested by Israeli officials in 1987 at the start of the first Palestinian uprising and spent five years in prison. In 1996, Issa was arrested by the Palestinian Authority and spent four more years in prison.

Israel repeatedly tried to assassinate Issa, according to Hamas officials. Israeli warplanes destroyed his house twice, during invasions of Gaza in 2014 and 2021, killing his brother. His son Mohammed was killed in an Israeli strike in December.

In a rare 2021 interview with Al Jazeera, Issa said he had been injured in one of the attacks. 

“We have paid, and still pay, an expensive price,” he said in the interview, his face shrouded by shadows.

Issa became known as the “Shadow Man” because he largely operated behind the scenes. He played an important role in previous negotiations with Israel, including a 2011 deal that freed more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel in return for Gilad Shalit, a young Israeli soldier who had been captured by the militant group in 2006.

Hamas’s governing structure

Politburo

Leader: Ismail Haniyeh

Includes 15 members

Shura Council

Group that elects the Politburo

Delegations

abroad

Imprisoned members’ affairs

Leader: Salameh Katawi

Palestinian diasporic affairs

Leader: Khaled Meshaal

West Bank affairs

Leader: Saleh al-Arouri

Jan. 2: Killed in Beirut

Gazan affairs

Leader: Yahya Sinwar

Social welfare

system

Hamas government

Leader: Prime Minister

Issam al-Da’alis

Implements policy

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam

Brigades

Commanders: Marwan Issa

(Killed in March)

and Mohammed Deif

Independently

operating cells

Security forces

Ministries

Local authorities

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

Rosie Ettenheim/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Issa’s death isn’t a decisive blow to Hamas, said Khaled Elgindy, director of the Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs at the Middle East Institute think tank in Washington. “There’s no question that Hamas has been degraded, but clearly not enough to be able to say definitively that Hamas is defeated,” he said.

Elgindy said the psychological victory for Israel would be blunted as it took the military more than five months to eliminate its first high-level Hamas leader in Gaza. The campaign there has killed more than 31,000 people, most of them women and children, according to local health officials, whose figures don’t distinguish between civilians and combatants.

“If this had happened in the first few weeks and they had shown that kind of ability to reach the leadership early on, then it might have had a very different psychological effect,” he said. “The massive campaign of destruction was bound to eventually hit some high-value Hamas targets—but look how long it took, and at what cost.”

Hamas members carrying the coffin of Saleh al-Arouri after his killing in Beirut in January. PHOTO: HUSSEIN MALLA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Carrie Keller-Lynn contributed to this article.

Write to Dion Nissenbaum at dion.nissenbaum@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

7. There will be no ‘short, sharp’ war. A fight between the US and China would likely go on for years.

Conclusion:

While these are logical conclusions should a US-China war occur, they usually take a backseat in policy analysis, strategic thinking, and operational planning, eclipsed again and again by a hyperfocus on a limited conflict in and around Taiwan. Committing the preponderance of security studies to the first phases of a global war of attrition is short-sighted, like a chess player who studies openings but fails to study the mid-game or its closing. None of this is easy, of course. Large-scale war disrupts societies and technology in profound and often unexpected ways. But because of this feature and not in spite of it, US policymakers and military leaders must rigorously study and plan for a broad range of implications of a years-long war with China.

There will be no ‘short, sharp’ war. A fight between the US and China would likely go on for years.

By Brian Kerg

atlanticcouncil.org ·· March 19, 2024

China Conflict Maritime Security Politics & Diplomacy Security & Defense Taiwan United States and Canada

New Atlanticist

March 19, 2024

Everyone loves a short, sharp war. They end on time, are won decisively, and provide tight narrative completion for the stories we want to tell.

Among military commanders, planners, and theorists, this often manifests itself in the quest for the decisive battle—one that will inflict such a stunning defeat on the enemy that its will to fight is broken, forcing enemy leadership to sue for peace or otherwise accept terms of surrender. In naval warfare, Alfred Thayer Mahan embodied this ideal in his prescription to mass one’s superior fleet against an adversary’s inferior fleet, seek and win decisive battles, and thereby win command of the sea.

This bias is borne out in modern US war games, in which players command opposing armed forces in simulated warfare. Usually sponsored by military commands or think tanks, such games generally open with a compressed “road to war,” or a backstory and the conditions under which the notional war begins. The players—usually a mix of military officers, officials, policymakers, and think tankers—“fight” a highly kinetic scenario at the opening stage of a conflict. While a war game might theoretically play out over a longer period, time constraints in the real world typically compel game sponsors and facilitators to end these games in a short period, often in a few days or a little over a week. Conclusions are then made based off of the snapshot provided by this brief gameplay. The results inform commanders and policymakers as they approve war plans and military investments.

In the United States, war-game results might, for example, inform prioritization of weapons procurement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the enthusiasm for Congress to invest in security infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. Recently, an unclassified Center for Strategic and International Studies war game played out a scenario in which the United States fought China and won—albeit at great cost. While informative, this game focused largely on a short, decisive fight in and around Taiwan and the first island chain.

Committing the preponderance of security studies to the first phases of a global war of attrition is short-sighted.

The same trend is borne out in the literary genre of “useful fiction.” Recent novels such as Ghost Fleet and White Sun War depict wars fought primarily between the United States and China. Almost always in such works, the war is brought to a satisfying conclusion over a relatively short time frame. In part, this is a function of the commercial format, which almost certainly inclines authors toward tidy endings to satisfy publishers and readers alike. But the novels’ popularity among military readers and their placement on official military service reading lists also reveal a predilection in the US military to think in terms of quick wars with decisive outcomes.

But wars between great powers are rarely short and sharp. They are more often long, grueling slogs of attrition that tend to expand horizontally, ensnaring other regions in their wake. Of course, it is possible that a US-China conflict over Taiwan could be an exception, that it could be brief and limited instead of protracted and wide-spread, but it’s irresponsible to assume such an outcome given history.

For the French and the British, the American Revolutionary War was but a single theater of war in what was then the latest episode of an enduring conflict that spanned the globe. At the outset of World War I, popular opinion in Britain, among other belligerents, held that the war would be “over by Christmas,” only for that nation and the world to endure four long years of slaughter. Imperial Japan launched its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor based on the assessment that it would convince the United States to cede to Japan its interests in the Pacific. Instead, Japan found itself fighting for years on the strategic defensive, until the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced Japan’s unconditional surrender.

Examples abound, but the historical record repeats this simple but critical theme: Great powers rarely settle military conflicts with other great powers in a neat, tidy fashion. Yet despite career requirements to attend professional schools where military history is at the heart of the curriculum, military planners continue to chase the unicorns of decisive battles and short wars. Cathal Nolan documents this phenomenon, and reveals its hollowness, in his masterful The Allure of Battle.

But if one were to write the novel that more precisely illustrates the long, global grind that a war between the United States and China would entail, it might appear something like this:

The opening pages showcase the trends of modern war games and novels, where naval combatants, fifth-generation aircraft, missile forces, and non-kinetic effects wreak havoc in the war’s opening days, crippling the air and naval power of the belligerents. Thousands upon thousands are killed in this first stage of the conflict. But the war expands horizontally, with China, Russia, and North Korea aligned against the United States, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, South Korea, and others. Fighting occurs in multiple theaters within United States Indo-Pacific Command and beyond, including a massive conflagration on the Korean peninsula. Soon, the ability to hurl precision munitions back and forth culminates as expenditure rapidly outpaces production capacity and as US fuel stocks in the Pacific dwindle. With pressure increasing and options decreasing, tactical nuclear weapons are employed on the battlefield . . . and yet the war drives on.

Thus would end the first chapter. The reader turns the page, which says: “Three years later.”

And with some skillfully placed exposition, the author reveals the massive changes that have occurred across society as belligerents commit to a long, bloody war. Nations have fully mobilized their economies to support what is now an existential war. Drafts and conscription are made mandatory to fill and maintain the ranks of multiple field armies, amphibious corps, fleets, and air forces. The war is not limited to the first island chain, but has multiple theaters that span the globe and escalates horizontally, with simultaneous conflicts drawing in additional belligerents. Emergency powers are universally invoked by executive branches, curtailing liberties in even the historically freest societies. The threat of nuclear holocaust is ever-present, and continuous fighting through tactical nuclear exchanges shatters previous conceptions of escalation management.

While these are logical conclusions should a US-China war occur, they usually take a backseat in policy analysis, strategic thinking, and operational planning, eclipsed again and again by a hyperfocus on a limited conflict in and around Taiwan. Committing the preponderance of security studies to the first phases of a global war of attrition is short-sighted, like a chess player who studies openings but fails to study the mid-game or its closing. None of this is easy, of course. Large-scale war disrupts societies and technology in profound and often unexpected ways. But because of this feature and not in spite of it, US policymakers and military leaders must rigorously study and plan for a broad range of implications of a years-long war with China.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Kerg is an active-duty US Marine Corps operational planner currently assigned as the G-5 director of plans, III Marine Expeditionary Force.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

8. The ‘Lost Decade’ of the US Pivot to Asia

Excerpt:

In “Lost Decade,” we enumerate concrete ways to fulfill these principles. In (very) short, the United States should begin by:

1. Continuing to strengthen U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
2. Joining CPTPP and de-risking economic ties with China.
3. Substantially increasing the U.S. defense budget and boosting U.S. military assets and power projection in Asia.
4. Shifting significant military resources from the Middle East to Asia.
5. Shifting substantial U.S. air and naval forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
6. Making European allies central in Washington’s China strategy.
7. Pursuing issue-based coalitions with allies and partners.
8. Intensifying bilateral diplomacy with China.
9. Supporting the forces of democracy and liberalism.

The ‘Lost Decade’ of the US Pivot to Asia

thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo

Insights from Richard Fontaine.

By

March 18, 2024

Credit: Depositphotos

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Richard Fontaine – CEO of the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C. and co-author, with Robert Blackwill, of “Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power” (2024) – is the 406th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Identify the key factors that led to the failure of the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” policy.

In “Lost Decade,” we looked at a perplexing question. The pivot to Asia, first articulated in 2011, won support from political leaders and policymakers, Republicans and Democrats, and successive administrations. So why did it not produce more results? There are several reasons.

For too long, Washington underestimated the China challenge, believing that a combination of incentives and discouragements would induce Beijing to support rather than undermine the international order. That sapped some of the urgency necessary for a major pivot. In addition, crises emerged in other places – from wars in the Middle East to Russia’s invasions of Ukraine. And by declaring an Asia-first foreign policy, the Obama administration attempted a grand strategic shift in the absence of cataclysmic events that might force a reassessment. In the history of American foreign policy, it has generally required such an upheaval – or the emergence of a major new threat, like the Soviet Union or international terrorism – to turn the great ship of state.

The final reason why the United States did not pivot to Asia, and why it did not adequately respond to the rise of Chinese power, is, however, the simplest: It was more than successive administrations could manage. Moving military assets away from Europe and the Middle East, overcoming domestic opposition to approve the Trans-Pacific Partnership, divesting legacy weapons systems in favor of arms tailored for a China contingency, sustaining intense diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific – each step proved too hard, in the event, to get done.

Explain the period from 2011 to 2021 as a “lost decade” in U.S. foreign policy.

The period from 2011, when the pivot to Asia was first articulated, until roughly 2021, when the Biden administration began a partial and belated shift of focus to Asia, represents a decade of lost opportunity. Had the United States pivoted to Asia as intended, it would be better able to deter war with China today. It would have deeper trade relationships in the region, and countries there would be less dependent on China and less susceptible to Beijing’s economic coercion. America’s diplomatic interactions with key countries would be stronger, and the region would have less reason to hedge against U.S. unreliability.

Had the United States taken full advantage of this decade, its chances of prevailing in a long-term competition with China would be greater. Pivoting to Asia would not have eliminated the Chinese challenge, but it would have made it easier for the United States to manage. Instead, Beijing, not Washington, made the greatest strides in this period.

Analyze how China benefited from this lost decade.

China aims to replace the United States as the most important and influential nation in the Indo-Pacific, and to dominate that region. Across the lost decade, China made increases in virtually every area. Where Washington suffered a shrinking defense budget and was spread thin by conflicts in the Middle East and Europe, Beijing boosted its defense spending, shipbuilding, missile inventory, and defense technology. As the United States withdrew from or ceased pursuing trade pacts, Beijing signed new free trade agreements in Asia and across the world. Where U.S. diplomatic bandwidth was often absorbed by issues in the Middle East and Europe, China increased its engagement in the Indo-Pacific and Global South. As a result, after a decade in which the United States tried to firm up its position in Asia, China was stronger and more influential in that region than when the decade began.

How can U.S. leadership maintain global order amid wars in Europe and the Middle East with the specter of conflict looming in the Taiwan Strait?

The overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve the core pillars of the international order, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. That order is quite obviously under significant pressure in multiple regions, including Europe and the Middle East. Even so, China’s rise, and its ambition to construct an Asian sphere of influence and an order that reflects its illiberal values, represent the chief U.S. foreign policy challenge.

The United States is not, however, a regional power, focused on Asia alone, nor should it seek to become one. Washington retains key interests and commitments in other regions as well. A strategic shift to the Indo-Pacific is necessary even as the U.S. remains active elsewhere. We enumerate in the book some of the specific resource and other tradeoffs such a balance requires. In general, though a U.S. approach to China that seeks only a pivot to Asia is incomplete, a grand strategy that does not pivot to Asia will certainly fail.

Assess what the next decade of U.S. foreign policy and global leadership should look like after the U.S. presidential election this November.

It is useful to start with some overarching strategic principles. First, Washington should articulate a positive vision its own ambitions. The United States is not merely competing against China but working toward the preservation and extension of core international values that serve many other nations well.

Second, it should endorse America’s global role, in addition to devoting new diplomatic, economic, and military resources to Asia. America should tilt toward the Indo-Pacific, but not so far that it topples over.

Third, the United States must calculate difficult, inevitable tradeoffs amid great power competition. This means developing a subtle prioritization of regions and issues, and a policy process that considers the relative importance of multiple crises and opportunities rather than evaluating each on its own.

Finally, Washington must pursue domestic unity. Competition with China should bring U.S. political leaders together rather than driving them apart. That’s the hardest of the four, and the most important.

In “Lost Decade,” we enumerate concrete ways to fulfill these principles. In (very) short, the United States should begin by:

1. Continuing to strengthen U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
2. Joining CPTPP and de-risking economic ties with China.
3. Substantially increasing the U.S. defense budget and boosting U.S. military assets and power projection in Asia.
4. Shifting significant military resources from the Middle East to Asia.
5. Shifting substantial U.S. air and naval forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
6. Making European allies central in Washington’s China strategy.
7. Pursuing issue-based coalitions with allies and partners.
8. Intensifying bilateral diplomacy with China.
9. Supporting the forces of democracy and liberalism.

Authors

Contributing Author

Mercy A. Kuo

Mercy Kuo is Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.

View Profile

thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo

9. The Air Force's Dream of Mounting a Laser Weapon on an AC-130J Ghostrider Gunship Is Dead

I thought this had potential.

The Air Force's Dream of Mounting a Laser Weapon on an AC-130J Ghostrider Gunship Is Dead

military.com · by Jared Keller · March 19, 2024

The Air Force no longer plans on installing and operating a high-energy laser weapon on a special operations gunship due to "technical challenges," an official said, bringing the service's latest attempt at an airborne directed-energy system to an end after years in development.

A spokesman for Air Force Special Operations Command confirmed to Military.com that its Airborne High Energy Laser, or AHEL, missed its "available integration and flight test window" for operations from an AC-130J Ghostrider gunship amid open-air ground testing.

AFSOC had previously stated in November 2023 that airborne testing of the AHEL would commence in January 2024 and finish in June. As The War Zone noted, that window already represented a delay from a previously promised testing period of fiscal 2021.

While the AHEL achieved " significant end-to-end, high-power operation" during ground tests, the missed integration and flight test window prompted AFSOC to "[refocus] on ground testing to improve operations and reliability to posture for a successful hand-off for use by other agencies," the command spokesman said.

In short, the AHEL may live to fight another day as part of a different Air Force agency's directed-energy efforts, but it will likely never see battle from the catbird seat of a special operations gunship.

Air Force Special Operations Command has pursued efforts to mount a high-energy laser on a fixed-wing aircraft since 2015, with Lockheed Martin receiving a contract in January 2019 to integrate and demonstrate an AHEL on an AC-130J. The defense giant delivered the system to the Air Force in 2021.

The AHEL was envisioned as a laser system employed for what's termed low-probability-of-detection use on a complex battlefield to back up special operators against targets such as "communication nodes, light-to-medium duty vehicles and power infrastructures," according to U.S. Special Operations Command's fiscal 2025 budget request.

"Without the slightest bang, whoosh, thump, explosion or even aircraft engine hum, key targets are permanently disabled," as then-AFSOC commander Lt. Gen. Brad Webb put it in 2017 as he described the tactical benefits of the notional AHEL. "The enemy has no communications, no escape vehicle, no electrical power and no retaliatory [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance]."

An AHEL on a gunship wouldn't have been the first time the U.S. military mounted a laser on a fixed-wing aircraft. In 2010, the Air Force's Boeing 747-based Airborne Laser Testbed successfully downed a ballistic missile during a test off the coast of California.

Unfortunately, there appears to be no funding left to make Webb's vision a reality: According to U.S. Special Operations Command budget documents, funding for the AHEL was zeroed out as part of the command's fiscal 2025 budget request, down from $3 million requested in fiscal 2024 and $15.387 million requested in fiscal 2023.

As for the AHEL's future life as part of another laser weapons system, it's unclear what a "successful hand-off for use by other agencies," as AFSOC put it, will look like.

One possibility is that the technological capabilities developed under the AHEL effort will transfer over to the Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator, or SHiELD, program that seeks to mount a laser system on a fighter jet to neutralize incoming missiles, testing of which was delayed for years due ongoing technical challenges and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Testing for the SHiELD system is now scheduled for sometime in 2024, as Breaking Defense previously reported.

military.com · by Jared Keller · March 19, 2024

10. Army General Pressured Assessment Panel to Help Career of 'Ineffective' Officer

If the allegations are true, what was this General thinking? How could he not know this undermines the integrity of the promotion process. I am all for being loyal to subordinates, but these actions, if true, are simply way out of bounds and damaging to our Army.

Army General Pressured Assessment Panel to Help Career of 'Ineffective' Officer

military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 19, 2024

One of the Army's top generals may have abused his authority and subverted the service's process for selecting senior leadership in what some officials have described to Military.com as a conspiracy to prop up a subordinate officer who was deemed unfit for command.

A Military.com investigation found that Gen. Charles Hamilton, who oversees Army Materiel Command, spent about a month last year trying to pull strings behind the scenes for a female lieutenant colonel to breeze through the service's Battalion Commander Assessment Program, or BCAP. This included directly lobbying at least three generals on the assessment panel and successfully pushing officials to let the lieutenant colonel get a second board two days after she failed the first.

The interference became so egregious that the director of the Army Command Assessment Program, Col. Robert O'Brien, penned a memo chronicling Hamilton's conduct on Nov. 1, immediately after the lieutenant colonel was deemed unfit twice in two assessment panels within 48 hours.

"This was a pressure campaign. [Hamilton] has a lot of influence; this violated the integrity of how the best officers are selected to run units," one general with direct knowledge of the situation told Military.com on the condition of anonymity to avoid retaliation. "This was abnormal; it was unprofessional. He should have known better."

O'Brien's memo on the incidents did not characterize Hamilton's conduct, but painted a clear picture that the seasoned four-star commander went out of his way to put his thumb on the scale to favor a subordinate who had been judged unfit for command, possibly skirting Army rules. O'Brien did not respond to a request for comment. It's unclear where he circulated the memo, or whether senior Army leaders read it before Military.com's inquiry on the matter.

"The Army designed the Command Assessment Program (CAP) to make officer selection for key command assignments as fair and objective as possible," Col. Randee Farrell, a spokesperson for Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, told Military.com in a statement. "We are reviewing these events and will take appropriate actions to ensure the integrity of the CAP process."

Hamilton declined to respond to multiple requests for comment.

Starting in at least October, Hamilton on multiple occasions asked officials overseeing BCAP whether he could review the peer and subordinate reports for the lieutenant colonel. Those reports include feedback from soldiers and Army officials who work with officers who are about to be fully assessed at BCAP.

Military.com is withholding the female officer's name because it found no evidence of wrongdoing on her part.

Hamilton reached out to Mike Arnold, the special adviser to the Army Talent Management Task Force, and O'Brien about the documents, according to several sources with direct knowledge of the situation and the memo. Both of them declined to share those private materials with Hamilton.

The lieutenant colonel's first assessment panel was on Oct. 30 and was monitored by Hamilton. Monitoring the assessment panel is technically allowed, multiple Army officials familiar with the process explained to Military.com, but is abnormal.

By a vote of 0-5, the five panel members voted the lieutenant colonel as being uncertified for command, citing "counterproductive leadership."

Psychologists are involved in the process to assess the officer's mental state. After the first failure, Hamilton took issue with the psychologist's remarks about the lieutenant colonel, saying they were "too negative" and could have biased the panel, according to O'Brien's memo. However, the memo and sources familiar with the panel did not point to any specifics that Hamilton took issue with.

Hamilton immediately asked for the lieutenant colonel to be re-paneled, effectively getting another chance -- an unheard-of move, according to some Army officials familiar with the process. Officers who fail typically have to wait a year to try again.

O'Brien granted the repanel "solely based" on Hamilton's request, according to his own memo. However, Col. Townley Hedrick, chief of staff of the Command Assessment Program, told the lieutenant colonel she was being re-paneled due to "technical issues," the memo added.

It's unclear what technical issues would warrant a redo of an assessment panel. The next day, Hamilton called Hedrick, thanking him for "playing a part" in re-paneling the lieutenant colonel.

Between the first panel and the redo, Hamilton called three different panel members -- Maj. Gens. Jeth Rey, Trevor Bredenkamp and Hope Rampy -- to discuss the lieutenant colonel, multiple sources with direct knowledge of the situation told Military.com. Panelists are supposed to be anonymous to avoid lobbying, one Army official explained, and are often finalized just hours before a panel as a safeguard.

Throughout the morning of the second panel, Hamilton repeatedly sent text messages and called senior assessment staff, including Hedrick and O'Brien, asking about interview results, O'Brien explained in his memo.

At noon, the second panel was complete. The lieutenant colonel was again found unfit for command, but this time in a 2-3 vote, according to a source with direct knowledge of the situation. She was found to have "ineffective" and "counterproductive" leadership qualities.

Hamilton inquired about the results several additional times throughout the day until after 9 p.m. It's unclear when, if ever, the results were formally shared with him.

In January, the lieutenant colonel's name was included on a command selection list -- strongly suggesting she will take command of a unit soon. It's unclear whether she managed to get on a third panel and finally passed or skirted what Army senior leaders have long touted as a filtering process to weed out bad leaders.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 19, 2024

11. “Disabling cyberattacks” are hitting critical US water systems, White House warns

Unrestricted warfare?

“Disabling cyberattacks” are hitting critical US water systems, White House warns

Biden administration rallies nation's governors to secure their facilities.

DAN GOODIN - 3/19/2024, 8:26 PM

Ars Technica · by Dan Goodin · March 20, 2024

Enlarge / Aerial view of a sewage treatment plant.

Getty Images

The Biden administration on Tuesday warned the nation’s governors that drinking water and wastewater utilities in their states are facing “disabling cyberattacks” by hostile foreign nations that are targeting mission-critical plant operations.

“Disabling cyberattacks are striking water and wastewater systems throughout the United States,” Jake Sullivan, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Michael S. Regan, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, wrote in a letter. “These attacks have the potential to disrupt the critical lifeline of clean and safe drinking water, as well as impose significant costs on affected communities.”

The letter cited two recent hacking threats water utilities have faced from groups backed by hostile foreign countries. One incident occurred when hackers backed by the government of Iran disabled operations gear used in water facilities that still used a publicly known default administrator password. The letter didn’t name the facility by name, but details included in a linked advisory tied the hack to one that struck the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa in western Pennsylvania last November. In that case, the hackers compromised a programmable logic controller made by Unitronics and made the device screen display an anti-Israeli message. Utility officials responded by temporarily shutting down a pump that provided drinking water to local townships.

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The second threat was publicly revealed last month by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Officials said that a hacking group backed by the Chinese government and tracked under the name Volt Typhoon was maintaining a foothold inside the networks of multiple critical infrastructure organizations, including those in communications, energy, transportation, and water and wastewater sectors. The advisory said that the hackers were pre-positioning themselves inside IT environments to enable disruption operations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors in the event of a crisis or conflict with the US. The hackers, the officials said, had been present in some of the networks for as long as five years.

“Drinking water and wastewater systems are an attractive target for cyberattacks because they are a lifeline critical infrastructure sector but often lack the resources and technical capacity to adopt rigorous cybersecurity practices,” Sullivan and Regan wrote in Tuesday’s letter. They went on to urge all water facilities to follow basic security measures such as resetting default passwords and keeping software updated. They linked to this list of additional actions, published by CISA and guidance and tools jointly provided by CISA and the EPA. They went on to provide a list of cybersecurity resources available from private sector companies.

The letter extended an invitation for secretaries of each state's governor to attend a meeting to discuss better securing the water sector's critical infrastructure. It also announced that the EPA is forming a Water Sector Cybersecurity Task Force to identify vulnerabilities in water systems. The virtual meeting will take place on Thursday.

“EPA and NSC take these threats very seriously and will continue to partner with state environmental, health, and homeland security leaders to address the pervasive and challenging risk of cyberattacks on water systems,” Regan said in a separate statement.

Ars Technica · by Dan Goodin · March 20, 2024

12. The U.S. Military's New Defense Budget Makes No Sense

Excerpts:

Now as in the days of Walter Lippmann, wise leaders set foreign-policy goals and raise resources sufficient to make good on them. They don’t fix expenditures at some arbitrary level, then hope the resulting figure supplies enough armed might to achieve their goals. Wishful thinking is strategic malpractice. If a nation has too few resources to achieve goals entertained by the political leadership, it’s best off scaling back the leadership’s goals to something the nation can afford. Or, if the nation has enough resources but the government, people, and armed forces care too little about their foreign-policy aspirations to tap those resources, the nation is once again best off reducing or jettisoning commitments it cannot or will not afford.

Like family households, nations should live within their means.

America is straying toward monstrous imprudence. Last year Congress capped defense spending at $895 billion under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. That’s a lot. Whether it is enough is doubtful in the extreme. Nevertheless, to comply with the congressional edict, the Pentagon dutifully submitted a budget request asking for that sum. If approved by Congress in its current form, the proposed budget would boost total spending by 0.9 percent in absolute terms. But it would cut defense spending once adjusted for inflation. This on top of a real cut in the 2024 appropriations bill, which has yet to be approved nigh on halfway through the fiscal year.

The U.S. Military's New Defense Budget Makes No Sense

Last week the Biden Pentagon submitted its budget request for fiscal year 2025. If executed as written, the request would shrink the U.S. armed forces at a time when grave dangers—and thus the demands on the armed forces—are surging around maritime Eurasia.

The National Interest · by James Holmes · March 19, 2024

Walter Lippmann, call your office. Last week the Biden Pentagon submitted its budget request for fiscal year 2025. If executed as written, the request would shrink the U.S. armed forces at a time when grave dangers—and thus the demands on the armed forces—are surging around maritime Eurasia. In short, U.S. national purposes and power are on opposite trajectories. Commitments are proliferating and intensifying while the means to handle them wilt. If they don’t reverse the trendlines, officialdom and lawmakers could soon be guilty of what Lippmann, arguably America’s foremost pundit of the twentieth century, termed “monstrous imprudence” in foreign policy and strategy.

Such a verdict would be damning. But just.

By monstrous imprudence Lippmann meant that the United States had taken on colossal geopolitical commitments following the Spanish-American War of 1898 yet radically underfunded them. U.S. naval and ground forces had wrested an island empire from Spain. The war ensconced the United States in the Caribbean Sea, in the Philippine Islands, and on Pacific island steppingstones such as Guam. The latter were invaluable for refueling and reprovisioning steamships voyaging to or from East Asia.

From North America to the Philippines: that’s a lot of geographic space to guard. These were territorial holdings of inestimable worth, yet successive presidential administrations and Congresses funded too few ships of war and ground forces to protect them. According to Lippmann, every administration from 1898 to World War II—with the partial exception of Theodore Roosevelt’s—skimped on defense of the newfound empire. Neglect left the U.S. military ill prepared to cope with the rise of imperial Japan, which rampaged through Manchuria and China starting in 1931 before striking Pearl Harbor in 1941—and summarily stripping America of its post-1898 gains in the Pacific.

Such are the wages of martial neglect. Concludes Lippmann, a monstrously imprudent national leadership neither succeeds overseas nor commands steady popular support at home. Only by bringing military means into alignment with national purposes can a society like the United States prosper in world affairs.

Now as in the days of Walter Lippmann, wise leaders set foreign-policy goals and raise resources sufficient to make good on them. They don’t fix expenditures at some arbitrary level, then hope the resulting figure supplies enough armed might to achieve their goals. Wishful thinking is strategic malpractice. If a nation has too few resources to achieve goals entertained by the political leadership, it’s best off scaling back the leadership’s goals to something the nation can afford. Or, if the nation has enough resources but the government, people, and armed forces care too little about their foreign-policy aspirations to tap those resources, the nation is once again best off reducing or jettisoning commitments it cannot or will not afford.

Like family households, nations should live within their means.

America is straying toward monstrous imprudence. Last year Congress capped defense spending at $895 billion under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. That’s a lot. Whether it is enough is doubtful in the extreme. Nevertheless, to comply with the congressional edict, the Pentagon dutifully submitted a budget request asking for that sum. If approved by Congress in its current form, the proposed budget would boost total spending by 0.9 percent in absolute terms. But it would cut defense spending once adjusted for inflation. This on top of a real cut in the 2024 appropriations bill, which has yet to be approved nigh on halfway through the fiscal year.

The spending cap would be felt across all warfare domains, from an 18 percent cut in purchases of F-35 stealth fighters to ordering just six warships while retiring nineteen. The latter makes for an especially dismaying differential equation. It would reduce the U.S. Navy fleet by thirteen hulls at a time when China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy is growing bigger and badder by the day. The PLA Navy fleet already stands at over 370 ships, to 292 battle-force ships for the U.S. Navy. And, according to Pentagon projections, the Chinese inventory will reach 435 vessels by 2030. But even these numbers, dismaying as they are, disguise the true scope of the challenge. Any likely Pacific contest of arms will take place within reach of shore-based PLA weaponry. In that sense the PLA Air Force and Rocket Force are sea services as well. Land-based air and missile firepower able to affect a nautical fight goes on China’s side of the balance-of-forces ledger. Cutting back American sea power under these circumstances courts disaster.

Imprudent.

Lippmann is not the only one among the pantheon to inveigh against strategic malpractice. Like him, the classics of strategy preach that ends should govern means in normal times. What a contender wants, and how much it wants it, determines how many resources it spends to get it. QED. Now, naval historian Julian S. Corbett, riffing on Carl von Clausewitz, does observe that there’s a mode of strategy in which means prevail over ends. Corbett calls this topsy-turvy approach “war by contingent.” It’s a special type of warfare that involves mounting secondary operations around a foe’s periphery to shape the outcome of a larger armed struggle. It’s a mischief-making strategy, not a war-winner in itself. Corbett makes the Duke of Wellington the face of war by contingent. In 1808, Wellington led a modest expeditionary army into Iberia to fight alongside local partisans and make trouble for Napoleon along France’s western frontier. So disruptive was Britain’s continental foray that the little emperor wryly called it his “Spanish ulcer.”

Such an expedition’s endeavors are limited by means rather than ends. That’s because senior political and military leaders assign the commander a fixed panoply of military means—whatever the larger campaign can spare without undue risk—and bid him or her go forth to harry the enemy. That’s the only goal, not something more discrete. Sowing havoc for an antagonist in a peripheral theater siphons hostile forces from the principal theater, weakening the foe where it matters most—and bolstering the prospects for ultimate victory.

But again, a war by contingent is not the main effort. It’s an adjunct to the main effort, and as a marginal enterprise it can play by different rules. Mapping out the main effort—in current U.S. strategy, the effort to gird against China—must abide by the normal rules whereby policy aims reign supreme and mold the strategies and forces deployed to achieve those aims. Then U.S. strategists can plot when, where, and how to give China a nasty ulcer of its own. Corbett, like Lippmann, would blanch at the thought of deliberately shortchanging means while expecting to accomplish expansive ends.

That would turn the world upside down. But that’s where we are. Washington needs to get serious about matching ends with means—and turn the politico-military world right-side up again.

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

The National Interest · by James Holmes · March 19, 2024

13. Huge claim about origins of Covid-19 by leading Aussie epidemiologist

Excerpts:

"The question of origins of a virus cannot be answered by virologists alone, because gain-of-function research (for example a virus which has undergone serial passage in an animal model) may not leave obvious signs of manipulation, and a resulting virus may appear 'natural'," she said.

"Nor can epidemiology alone answer the question.

"This is where risk analysis tools like the GFT are useful, because they include these and other types of intelligence to the assessments... It would be unscientific to silence ongoing investigation of the question, especially because so much new information has been revealed in the last two years through emails from FOIA requests and through several congressional hearings in the US."

Huge claim about origins of Covid-19 by leading Aussie epidemiologist

It's widely accepted Covid-19 has natural origins, but according to a major new study the question of the source of the virus remains 'very much open'.

Joe Attanasio·Senior Reporter

Updated Wed, 20 March 2024 at 2:36 am GMT-4·4-min read

au.news.yahoo.com

One of Australia's most prominent epidemiologists who led a major scientific paper on the origins of Covid-19 said it's a "credible possibility" the virus "did come from a lab" in China — a theory she said is backed by a "large amount of new information released in various congressional hearings" in the US.

Professor Raina MacIntyre with the University of NSW said the possibility the virus was created in a laboratory is just as plausible as the natural origin theory, and it shouldn't be so quickly dismissed by other academics. Speaking to Yahoo News Australia, MacIntyre, one of the country's fiercest supporters of pandemic lockdowns, explained what she uncovered through her research.

"The study uses an established tool, known as Grunow-Finke (GFT), which is cited in military medicine textbooks and well known in military medicine, to show that an unnatural origin is as plausible, if not more plausible, than a natural origin and not a low-probability, fringe theory," MacIntyre told Yahoo News.

One of Australia's most prominent epidemiologists said it is a "credible possibility" Covid-19 "did come from a lab" in China. Source: Getty

Question of the origins of Covid-19 'remains an open one'

"It does this by considering a large range of different intelligence under 11 different criteria, and analyses it using a framework that has been tested and trained on past natural and unnatural epidemics. There is a threshold value which indicates greater likelihood if below or above the threshold."

• China warns Australia of retaliation after 'unacceptable' act
• 'Disturbingly similar' message out of China over mystery illness overwhelming hospitals
• Tensions flare as China rejects new Covid origins claim: 'Be honest'

In epidemiology, the GFT is the most widely used tool to differentiate unnatural epidemics from natural epidemics.

MacIntyre said the "question of the origins of Covid-19 remains an open one" and a variety of different lines of evidence should be looked at when investigating the topic, including not just biology and virology, but also intelligence from government and military sources.

Professor Rania McIntyre said through her research, she's uncovered the very real possibility that Covid-19 originated from a lab leak. Source: Getty

"The question of origins of a virus cannot be answered by virologists alone, because gain-of-function research (for example a virus which has undergone serial passage in an animal model) may not leave obvious signs of manipulation, and a resulting virus may appear 'natural'," she said.

"Nor can epidemiology alone answer the question.

"This is where risk analysis tools like the GFT are useful, because they include these and other types of intelligence to the assessments... It would be unscientific to silence ongoing investigation of the question, especially because so much new information has been revealed in the last two years through emails from FOIA requests and through several congressional hearings in the US."

Majority of unnatural epidemics wrongly classified

The "other types of intelligence" MacIntye refers to can include open source, signals or satellite intelligence, political factors, as well as other "detective work" to piece together the complex question of the origin of SARS-COV-2, according to the paper, published in the journal Risk Analysis.

The majority of unnatural epidemics in history have been wrongly judged as natural, MacIntyre explained, adding that the paper's "findings are consistent with conclusion reached by US Defence Intelligence scientists Cutlip and Chretien".

McIntyre said Covid-19 having an unnatural origin is as plausible, if not more plausible than the alternative. Source: Getty

"It’s notable that US intelligence agencies are split in their verdict, with some like the FBI saying it was a likely lab leak, and others like the CIA saying the opposite – the fact these are credible agencies should tell us we cannot easily dismiss either theory," she said.

Sverdlovsk anthrax leak prime example of lab leak

"When the GFT is used to assess the anthrax leak in Sverdovsk in the Soviet Union in 1979 — which both soviet and US scientists insisted was natural — it comes up as unnatural because there was so much evidence of anomalies.

"US intelligence agencies saw satellite signs of road blocks and decontamination trucks around the bioweapons lab, suggesting a major incident, but the scientists on both sides of the Cold War denied it was a lab leak.

"The Soviets blamed animals in the markets, killed stray dogs in the market to show they were acting on it; and the US experts agreed with the Soviets that it was natural, published papers saying so in top journals, and shouted down anyone who suggested otherwise."

A full 12 years later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin confessed that it had been a lab leak.

Do you have a story tip? Email: newsroomau@yahoonews.com.

You can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter and YouTube.

au.news.yahoo.com

14. Only One-Third of Military Families Would Still Recommend Service, Blue Star Families Survey Finds

Like a low birth rate cannot sustain a nation, a low rate of enlistment from veteran families cannot sustain the military. Does that analogy work?

Only One-Third of Military Families Would Still Recommend Service, Blue Star Families Survey Finds

military.com · by Military.com | By Rachel Nostrant Published March 18, 2024 at 4:47pm ET · March 18, 2024

Only 32% of military families would still recommend military service, citing poor job opportunities for spouses, poor mental and physical health care services, and housing concerns, among other issues, according to a survey conducted by Blue Star Families.

The likelihood of active-duty families recommending military service dropped from 55% in 2016 to just 32% in 2023, according to the survey. Active-duty troops, as well as National Guard and reserve family members, all cited time spent away from their families as their top issue with the military.

The annual survey had more than 7,400 responses between May and July 2023 and is the "most comprehensive" survey of its kind, open to service members, veterans, military families and members of the Guard and reserves, according to the organization's website. It is conducted by Blue Star Families in conjunction with Syracuse University's Institute for Veterans and Military Families.

Blue Star Families is a resource and advocacy organization for military-affiliated communities, founded by a group of military spouses in 2009.

Other key findings of the survey showed that military members and families were greatly concerned with pay, spousal employment, access to affordable child care and housing options, echoing concerns raised by top military officials earlier this year.

Nearly half of respondents were concerned with spousal employment, 38% with time spent away from family, 37% with pay, and 36% and 33% concerned about housing and children's education, respectively.

The senior enlisted leaders of all of the military branches appeared before Congress in January to discuss quality-of-life issues for troops, similarly citing pay and housing issues as the top two concerns.

"A couple of these problems are so big that if we don't start taking immediate action on them now, we're going to miss the curve in the future," Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy James Honea said at the House hearing held Jan. 31.

According to the Blue Star survey, 73% of active duty-affiliated respondents were paying more than $200 a month out-of-pocket for civilian housing options, and 48% of active-duty families noted they had financial stress stemming from general housing costs.

Base housing has been a topic of serious debate for lawmakers and military leadership, as reports of mold, shoddy electrical systems and leaky roofs have continued to spring up as consistently under-addressed concerns.

In recent years, lawmakers have proposed overhauling the military pay chart to give junior enlisted service members a significant pay boost in addition to the annual across-the-board raise for all troops. Lawmakers have also advanced new, targeted bonuses and allowances to make military service more appealing amid the recruitment crisis -- only the Marine Corps and Space Force, the two smallest branches of the Defense Department, met their 2023 recruiting quotas.

But in most cases, civilian defense officials and other administration officials have rebuffed those proposals, arguing they are premature amid an ongoing comprehensive review of military pay that is expected to be done by early 2025.

The findings within the Blue Star Families survey heavily support the suggestion that service members cannot keep up with increasing inflation, food, housing and health care costs. Of its active-duty respondents, one in six reported food insecurity, the survey showed. Among enlisted members, reported food insecurity was even higher, suffered by one in four families, according to the survey.

"We are still in credit card debt from our PCS," one active-duty Army spouse wrote in the survey. "Cost of living is rising. My children are young and need balanced meals. I spend my entire civilian paycheck on child care. We buy cheap food and skip where we can."

In December, the Pentagon made its first announcement of a plan to address food security for troops, but said that more data was needed. Pay increases and new allowances have been floated by Congress, and improved on-base food options are "something the services are leaned into very heavily," a senior defense official told Military.com in December.

"They have been doing a lot of work trying to make sure that the way service members -- the single service members who live on the installations, in the barracks -- have access to food," the official said.

While the results of the survey may raise the alarm for leaders, it should be noted that it is not a scientific study. Its findings, which were the result of multiple-choice and open-ended questions, are not necessarily reflective of demographics within the military as a whole.

The Defense Department launched a similar survey, the 2023 Survey on the Strengths and Challenges of Military Relationships, last April. Its results have yet to be publicly shared.

-- Rachel Nostrant is a Marine Corps veteran and freelance journalist, with work published in Reuters, New York Magazine, Military Times and more.

military.com · by Military.com | By Rachel Nostrant Published March 18, 2024 at 4:47pm ET · March 18, 2024

15. Taiwan Acknowledges Presence of U.S. Troops on Outlying Islands

These recent reports are making the mainstream media. But their patience leads to more in depth reporting rather than sensationalism. And of all the reporting it is only the WSJ that acknowledges that these are not new reports:

The Wall Street Journal first reported in 2021 that a small contingent of U.S. troops had been in Taiwan for at least a year, secretly training the Taiwanese armed forces to defend against a Chinese military that has been building its capability to capture Taiwan in an armed conflict.

I bet there will be multiple questions on this for General Fenton as he testifies this week. What are the blind spots or shortcomings will likely be a question.

Excerpts:

Taiwan needs such exchanges with friendly militaries because its military “may have some blind spots or shortcomings,” Chiu said.

Training by U.S. Special Forces has focused on strengthening Taiwan’s rear security, in particular the prevention of enemy infiltration and sabotage, according to Su Tzu-yun, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (or INDSR), a military-backed think tank in Taipei. “The collaboration between Washington and Taipei is primarily focused on defense,” he said. 

The outlying islands, including Kinmen, are where most of Taiwan’s amphibious soldiers, known as the frogmen, are stationed, according to analysts at INDSR.

Taiwan Acknowledges Presence of U.S. Troops on Outlying Islands

Rare comments came in response to a report that American special forces trainers would be sent to Kinmen, 3 miles off the Chinese coast

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-acknowledges-presence-of-u-s-troops-on-outlying-islands-c81c3b6b?utm

By Austin Ramzy

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 in Hong Kong and Joyu Wang

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 in Taipei

March 19, 2024 9:46 am ET

Taiwanese reserve soldiers taking part in military training on Tuesday. PHOTO: SAM YEH/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

As tensions rise with China, Taiwan’s defense minister has hinted that U.S. troops have been training the Taiwanese military on outlying islands that would be on the front lines of a conflict with its neighbor.  

The defense minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, didn’t offer details of the U.S. deployment, but the outlying islands include Kinmen, which sits 3 miles east of the Chinese coastal city of Xiamen and more than 100 miles from Taiwan’s main island.

“This exchange is for mutual observation, to identify the problems we have, figure out how to improve and to recognize their strengths so we can learn from them,” Chiu said Thursday in response to questions about U.S. troops on Taiwan’s outlying islands.

His comments marked a rare acknowledgment by Taiwan of activity by American troops on its territory.

Taiwan Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng. PHOTO: ANN WANG/REUTERS

Chiu was responding to questions about a report in Sofrep, an online publication focusing on national security, that asserted U.S. Special Forces trainers would be sent to Kinmen and other outlying islands where Taiwan’s elite forces are based.

Lt. Col. Marty Meiners, a Pentagon spokesman, said he wouldn’t comment on specific operations or training. “Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the region,” he said. 

Taiwan needs such exchanges with friendly militaries because its military “may have some blind spots or shortcomings,” Chiu said.

Training by U.S. Special Forces has focused on strengthening Taiwan’s rear security, in particular the prevention of enemy infiltration and sabotage, according to Su Tzu-yun, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (or INDSR), a military-backed think tank in Taipei. “The collaboration between Washington and Taipei is primarily focused on defense,” he said. 

The outlying islands, including Kinmen, are where most of Taiwan’s amphibious soldiers, known as the frogmen, are stationed, according to analysts at INDSR.

Kinmen has been the site of a series of testy maritime exchanges between China and Taiwan over the past month following the death of two Chinese fishermen whose boat capsized while being pursued by the Taiwanese coast guard.

A Chinese official called the deaths a “vicious incident,” and Beijing said it would step up patrols in the area. Tensions have eased somewhat in recent weeks as the two sides have participated in search-and-rescue operations following other fishing boat accidents, but Taiwanese authorities said Chinese coast guard vessels have continued to enter restricted waters.

Anti-landing barricades on a Taiwanese beach. PHOTO: ANN WANG/REUTERS

The Wall Street Journal first reported in 2021 that a small contingent of U.S. troops had been in Taiwan for at least a year, secretly training the Taiwanese armed forces to defend against a Chinese military that has been building its capability to capture Taiwan in an armed conflict.

China’s Communist Party has never controlled Taiwan but considers the self-ruled island to be part of its territory. Chinese leader Xi Jinping told President Biden during their meeting in November that China and Taiwan would be unified and called on the U.S. to support “peaceful reunification.” 

During an annual address delivered earlier this month, Chinese Premier Li Qiang repeated warnings directed against U.S. support for Taiwan, saying China will “resolutely oppose separatist activities aimed at ‘Taiwan independence’ and external interference.”

China has sent an increasing number of military ships and aircraft on regular drills near Taiwan, which analysts have described as efforts to train for a potential conflict and test the island’s defenses. Beijing launched large-scale drills around Taiwan meant to simulate a potential blockade and fired missiles over the island in 2022 after then-U. S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei.

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A conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan has become a commonplace discussion in the national-security community. A military strategist lays out the outcome of a potential war in the Taiwan Strait based on recently conducted wargames.

The U.S. planned to expand its presence of troops in Taiwan to between 100 and 200 last year, up from roughly 30 in 2022, U.S. officials have said. The U.S. and Taiwan have been largely silent on the deployment as they attempt to avoid agitating Beijing.

In the past, Taiwan had sent its special forces officers to train in the U.S., but now the American instructors are coming to Taiwan to train entire companies, according to Shen Ming-shih, acting deputy CEO at INDSR, the think tank. “It makes the training more complete, which I think is very meaningful,” Shen said. 

Analysts say Kinmen is a logical place for training exercises given some of Taiwan’s special forces are based there. 

“If you’re bringing in a training element, you want to train where the troops are rather than have to take the entire command and move it somewhere else for political expediency,” said Drew Thompson, a senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore and formerly a Pentagon official responsible for China. 

Taiwan’s military during the annual Han Kuang military exercises last year. PHOTO: CHIANGYING-YING/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The U.S. doesn’t have official diplomatic ties with Taiwan but maintains a robust unofficial presence. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the U.S. to supply the island with weapons and services it needs to defend itself, though the U.S. has traditionally remained vague over whether it would directly aid Taiwan in the event of a war. Biden has repeatedly said the U.S. would defend Taiwan, but U.S. officials have said there is no change to official policy.

The U.S. military regularly sends delegations to observe Taiwan’s annual military drills, known as the Han Kuang exercises. Last year, members of the de facto U.S. Embassy in Taiwan appeared alongside senior government and top military officials to watch a series of air raid and disaster-response drills. 

Chiu, the defense minister, said Taiwanese defense officials planned to invite their American counterparts to attend this year’s drills, which are typically held in July.

Informal military exchanges with the U.S. are common for Taiwan. A delegation from the U.S. Naval War College visited Taipei last week, holding a joint seminar with INDSR to discuss China’s People’s Liberation Army and its Navy. National security officials and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the seminar. 

Write to Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com and Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Taiwan’s defense minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, didn’t name any outlying islands while discussing training being conducted by U.S. troops. An earlier version of this article incorrectly cited Chiu as noting that Kinmen is among the outlying islands. (Corrected on March 19)

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Appeared in the March 20, 2024, print edition as 'Taiwan Hints Of U.S. Troops On Islands'.

16. US military hit with embarrassing report exposing failings and vulnerability to China​\

Daily Express US

US military hit with embarrassing report exposing failings and vulnerability to China​\

An F- grade, the lowest of the bunch was embarrassingly given to the government for not providing "sufficient and stable funding" for new technologies.

https://www.the-express.com/news/us-news/131645/us-military-report-failures-exposed-china

By REBECCA ROBINSON

13:25 ET, Tue, Mar 19, 2024 | UPDATED: 13:29 ET, Tue, Mar 19, 2024

Story by Rebecca Robinson • March 19, 2024 • 2 min read

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U.S. And South Korea Forces Undergo Military Exercises© Getty

The US military has been hit with a scathing report bashing its poor efforts in modernization and innovation that could see it at a disadvantage to China and other adversaries.

The Ronald Reagan Institute released the report detailing the failings of the Pentagon in reworking defense technologies to give the US a "competitive advantage" over other countries.

The leading defense experts also called for smoother coordination between the government, private sector, and military, warning of embarrassment in potential conflict if nothing is changed.

The grades are handed out to 10 key areas of the US government, assessing the National Security Innovation Base (NSIB). This annual report saw a series of Bs, Cs, Ds, and one F-.

The system is only a year old, and was designed to measure the "collective impact" of the NSIB's "critical yet largely uncoordinated ecosystem."

The report read: "[The US] continues to excel as a global leader in innovation with a vibrant and dynamic private sector [but weaknesses persist as areas of grave vulnerability that undermine our competitiveness and risk leading to US military inferiority."

1:15

Congress also did not come away unscathed by the findings. It was slammed for "dysfunction" that ultimately prevents funds from getting to vital government initiatives that would otherwise help innovation.

The F- grade, the lowest of the bunch was embarrassingly given to the government for not providing "sufficient and stable funding" for new technologies.

Rachel Hoff, policy director at the Ronald Reagan Institute, said the F- grade was "to say, look, Congress is moving in the wrong direction, particularly as it comes to providing stable on-time appropriations."

It comes after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a complete overhaul of his country's military, with the focus being modernization and preparation for modern warfare.

The US's struggle to do the same raises concerns over its ability to compete with China, as well as other potential adversaries such as Iran and Russia.

The annual Ronald Reagen National Defense Survery released last year revealed 51 percent of Americans believe China to be the "greatest threat to the US." That number jumped to 77 percent when asked if they think China is an enemy.

17.  Pacific force’s wish list seeks $11 billion more than defense proposal

​A lot of UFRs in the budget (unfinanced requirements). (or I suppose more accurately, not in the budget)

Pacific force’s wish list seeks $11 billion more than defense proposal

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · March 19, 2024

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is asking Congress for $11 billion more than the White House’s fiscal 2025 defense budget request, an amount that is three times greater than the wish list it submitted last year.

Much of the money requested in the annual list, obtained by Defense News, would go toward constructing infrastructure to host U.S. forces in the region, classified space programs, munitions and Guam defenses. The U.S. is aiming to bolster its presence in the region to deter China.

The largest component of the list by far is military construction in the Indo-Pacific region, with a $3.3 billion request “to enable U.S. Indo-Pacom to develop and deliver footprint requirements in a timely manner.” The military construction amount alone is nearly equal to the total $3.5 billion unfunded priorities list Indo-Pacific Command submitted to Congress last year, which was the largest wish list from any combatant command in FY24.

Indo-Pacific Command’s request to beef up military construction in the region comes after Congress recently renewed assistance to the Pacific island nations of Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, which provide military access for U.S. forces in return.

The unfunded priorities list requests another $40 million for the Navy, specifically for activities in Micronesia to integrate “posture plans, military construction projects, land use negotiations and other joint support activities.”

Meanwhile, the Philippines is expected to begin work on numerous base upgrades this year after its recent agreement to enhance basing cooperation with the United States.

Another $580.7 million on the list would go toward military campaigning in the region, with the bulk of those funds directed toward the Army.

Additionally, $1.4 billion on the Indo-Pacific Command list would go toward classified space programs. Half of that requested amount would help accelerate the development of space-based sensors used to counter missile threats, while the rest would resource “space control and enabling capabilities.”

For munitions, the list asks for more than $1 billion to accelerate development and procurement of the Maritime Strike Tomahawk cruise missile. It requests another $766.9 million for the Navy to procure more of the Standard Missile-6 weapons and another $396.9 million for that service to accelerate fielding Hammerhead mines, “designed to be delivered by unmanned underwater vehicles and surface vessels.”

It asks for $390.7 million worth of Precision Strike Missiles for the Army. For the Air Force, it requests $298.4 million to procure Joint Strike Missiles and another $105.1 million to buy Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles.

Wargames conducted by the House Committee on the Chinese Communist Party last year found a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan would rapidly deplete munitions stockpiles, including the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile.

The command’s wish list is meant to bridge the FY25 funding gap it reported in its annual assessment to Congress, which Defense News obtained last week. That report assessed the command needs $26.5 billion for FY25, $15 billion of which was in the Pentagon’s base budget request.

The command is also asking for $430 million to develop a missile defense system in Guam “against ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missile threats.”

It’s unclear how much funding Congress can provide for either the FY24 or FY25 wish list, as last year’s debt ceiling agreement imposed an $886 billion defense spending cap for FY24 and an $895 top line for FY25. Funding any defense wish lists would require Congress to take money out of other accounts.

Nearly six months into the fiscal year, Congress has yet to pass a full FY24 budget. Lawmakers are expected to release the text of the long-overdue FY24 Pentagon spending bill later this week.

Furthermore, the Defense Department had been relying on the Senate’s $95 billion foreign aid bill for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan to beef up global force posture and ramp up munitions production. That bill includes $542 million for Indo-Pacific Command to fulfill its $3.5 billion unfunded priorities list for FY24.

The Senate passed the bill 70-29 last month, but it has stalled in the House amid opposition from Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., and former President Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee.

The military combatant commands and services are legally required to submit unfunded priorities lists to Congress every year.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

18. SOCOM Cuts Armed Overwatch Buy from 75 to 62 Aircraft

SOCOM Cuts Armed Overwatch Buy from 75 to 62 Aircraft

airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · March 19, 2024

March 19, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

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A limited budget has led U.S. Special Operations Command to cut back on its planned purchase of Armed Overwatch, the rugged, lightweight, fixed-wing aircraft to support counterterrorism efforts in permissive airspace—at least for the rest of the decade.

The combatant command is trimming its planned purchases over the next five years of the Air Tractor-produced, L3Harris-modified OA-1K from 75 airframes to 62, according to SOCOM’s 2025 budget request released earlier this month. The 13-aircraft reduction marks a 17 percent cut. By year, the cuts are:

• 2025: From 15 to 12 aircraft
• 2026: From 17 to 11 aircraft
• 2027: From 15 to 11 aircraft

The cut in fiscal 2025 is “due to resource constraints,” the budget notes, and a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine the same issue was at play in the ’26 and ’27 decisions. The spokesperson added that the program requirement remains 75 aircraft, but it is not clear if or when SOCOM will be able to buy the additional aircraft.

The program came under scrutiny in late 2023 when the Government Accountability Office released a report suggesting SOCOM failed to fully justify its order for 75 OA-1Ks and urged the Pentagon to slow down the program until SOCOM makes a better business case for so many planes.

At the time, the Pentagon responded that it was analyzing its plans for the Armed Overwatch force structure. But the SOCOM spokesperson said the GAO report did not cause the command to cut its planned purchase.

“SOCOM’s FY25 budget request for Armed Overwatch is a resource-constrained position and is not a response to the GAO’s recommendations on the program,” the spokesperson said. “SOCOM is committed to addressing the GAO’s recommendation to review the Armed Overwatch force structure requirement and will complete that analysis prior to the next President’s budget request.”

While SOCOM is cutting back on its planned purchases, it is also pushing back on full-rate production for the aircraft, which is based on Air Tractor’s AT-802U Sky Warden. Previously, full-rate production was scheduled to begin in the second quarter of fiscal 2025. That timeline has been delayed a year.

Initial operational capability is still projected for the end of fiscal 2026, and full operational capability is still expected by the end of fiscal 2029.

Compared to previous budget projections, SOCOM will save nearly $300 million by buying 13 fewer aircraft—from $1.1 billion to $810.5 million. The average cost per airframe is now set at around $23.8 million. By comparison, the Air Force says a U-28 Draco, one of the aircraft the OA-1K is supposed to replace, costs $16.5 million each.

Air Force and SOCOM leaders have said they want Armed Overwatch to “collapse the stack”—reducing the number of different intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, light attack, and close air support aircraft it needs for counterinsurgency operations where the airspace is uncontested but the environment can be austere.

“Our methodology for supporting our forces on the ground over the last several decades has really boiled down to the development of what we call an ‘air stack’ over objective areas,” former AFSOC commander and current Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James C. “Jim” Slife told Congress in April 2022. “And so you’ll typically have single-role specialized platforms—AC-130s, A-10s, MQ-9s, U-28s—you have a stack of airplanes over an objective, each platform providing a niche capability to the force on the ground. That averages, in terms of cost per flying hour, over $150,000 an hour … to generate kind of the typical stack for that.”

The Air Force pursued the idea of combining many of those capabilities into one aircraft through its Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program starting in 2009, but the program eventually fell prey to budget cuts and congressional opposition. SOCOM took the lead in launching Armed Overwatch, which Slife has estimated will cost “something less than $10,000” per flying hour.

The Sky Warden that the OA-1K is based on is typically used as a crop duster and firefighter, but L3Harris is heavily modifying it and making it modular—capable of swapping out different sensors, communications equipment, and combat payloads as needed. SOCOM plans to invest several million dollars every year for the next five years in research and development for the program, “capitalizing on Armed Overwatch’s modular and open architecture to rapidly reconfigure platform capability tailored to support Special Operations ground force needs.”

The first aircraft was scheduled to be delivered in October 2023, but budget documents indicate that has been delayed until June 2024.

In the meantime, the Air Force has started making plans for OA-1K. The service is set to get rid of its small fleets of Textron’s AT-6s and Sierra Nevada Corp.’s A-29s that it bought as part of the LAAR program, and it wants to start retiring MC-12 Liberty aircraft in fiscal 2025. It also selected Will Rogers Air National Guard Base, Okla., to host the formal training unit for the OA-1K.

Air

Budget

airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · March 19, 2024

19. Opinion | Ukrainians have a message for Mike Johnson

Excerpts:

Johnson told Politico last week that he now expects to pass a Ukraine assistance bill with Democratic votes, overcoming House Republicans’ intransigence. But he offered no firm timetable for the vote, and even if he succeeds, the fact remains that passing such legislation could have been accomplished last month, or in January, or the month before that. And even if the bill is passed, no doubt months would pass before weapons systems, including air-defense systems and missiles, would start flowing through the pipeline again.

How many Ukrainians will die between now and then?

Opinion | Ukrainians have a message for Mike Johnson

The Washington Post · by Jim Geraghty · March 19, 2024

KYIV — When I speak to Ukrainians, one of my go-to questions is what they would tell Americans if they had the chance.

Miroslava Luzina, a translator and independent political consultant, told me she wishes she could speak to just one particular American: House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.).

Johnson, she said, “is now the biggest obstacle” to U.S. military aid for Ukraine. He is someone “who claims to be Christian,” she said, but “his actions or his political stance is actually costing lives. So, he is the cause of more people getting dead at the front line, and behind the front lines, and in the occupied territories.”

Ukrainians are intensely watching Congress, looking for any sign that a new military assistance package, which has been kicked around for months, will become reality.

Luzina and I chatted in a restaurant on the Dnieper River, which bisects the capital city, but she recently returned from Odessa, where a Russian ballistic missile attack struck a residential area on Friday, killing at least 20 and wounding 70.

One of my other go-to questions for Ukrainians is to simply ask how they’re doing. The answers are often raw. Luzina told me that she now wakes up in the middle of the night, not merely from nightmares, but from an overwhelming sense of grief. Enduring two years of war — along with the uncertainty of how much longer it will last, and whether one will still have a country when it’s over — would be a staggering psychological burden for anyone.

Both on my previous trip to Ukraine in August and this time, I’m struck by how Ukrainians have grown to treat the frequent air raid alerts nonchalantly, like hard-bitten New Yorkers ignoring a car alarm going off down the street.

Luzina laughed a bit upon hearing this description, then related the calculation she makes when she hears the air raid warnings in the middle of the night — the fatalistic sense that the one time you choose not go to the shelter will be the one time the missile strikes your location. She said she has seen missiles flying past her house, targeting railway yards in eastern Kyiv, and watched tracers from antiaircraft fire light the sky from a balcony where she was staying in Odessa.

It has been a quiet few days in Kyiv. I haven’t heard any air raid sirens since my arrival in the city Friday night, but that might well just reflect that Russia is using more missiles and drones on the front lines, and making fewer attempts to terrorize Ukraine’s capital city. The same night as the ballistic missile attack on Odessa, Ukrainian authorities said they shot down “about a dozen and a half” Shahed drones attempting to attack Kyiv.

On March 10, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted of Shaheds that “since the beginning of March, Russian terrorists have already used 175 such killer drones against Ukraine. Fortunately, 151 of them were shot down by our warriors. And this is a very important result. Yes, not all of them. Yes, there are hits. Unfortunately, there are losses. There are casualties. But there are also people saved.”

Back in October, Johnson sat down for an interview with Fox News’s Sean Hannity and declared, “We can’t allow Vladimir Putin to prevail in Ukraine.” And yet, a Senate bill with $60 billion in aid for Ukraine hit a brick wall in the House because Johnson refused to bring it to the floor. Why? Johnson clearly fears an insurrection among the House GOP’s Freedom Caucus, which takes its cues from former president Donald Trump, and could oust him from the speakership, just as it ousted Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) from the position last fall.

Johnson told Politico last week that he now expects to pass a Ukraine assistance bill with Democratic votes, overcoming House Republicans’ intransigence. But he offered no firm timetable for the vote, and even if he succeeds, the fact remains that passing such legislation could have been accomplished last month, or in January, or the month before that. And even if the bill is passed, no doubt months would pass before weapons systems, including air-defense systems and missiles, would start flowing through the pipeline again.

How many Ukrainians will die between now and then?

The Washington Post · by Jim Geraghty · March 19, 2024

20. Guam defense tops INDOPACOM's unfunded priorities, NORTHCOM wants more IT

Again, lots of UFRs.

Guam defense tops INDOPACOM's unfunded priorities, NORTHCOM wants more IT - Breaking Defense

US Indo-Pacific Command’s $11 billion unfunded priority list includes 44 programs, from missiles to maritime mines.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque, Valerie Insinna · March 19, 2024

A Soldier with Task Force Talon, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, observes as a missile pallet is lower, during a practice missile reload and unload drill of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Feb. 6, 2019. (Army photo by Capt. Adan Cazarez)

WASHINGTON — If funding limits were not an issue, US Indo-Pacific Command says it could use an additional cool $11 billion next year, in part to speed up missile defense plans for Guam and buy longer-range weapons, while US Northern Command would kindly request another $35 million for IT.

Every year after the White House delivers its budget request to Capitol Hill, the combatant commands and services submit their respective “unfunded priority lists” to lawmakers. With the Pentagon’s $849.8 billion spending request for fiscal 2025 now in, at least INDOPACOM and NORTHCOM have provided their wishlists, according to news reports and documents reviewed by Breaking Defense.

Northern Command’s list has just one line item, for just under $35 million, that would funnel dollars towards a better “information environment” for several key programs including digital transformation, the Arctic Security Initiative, homeland defense, and more.

Meanwhile, INDOPACOM submitted a more detailed, nine-page, $11 billion wish list that includes 44 priority areas. The majority of those funds are directed towards regional military construction projects ($3.3 billion) and buying new weapons ($2.7 billion). Inside Defense reported the list’s delivery earlier today.

Topping that list is $430 million for the development, procurement and military construction of a missile defense system to better protect Guam against ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missile threats.

While the document does not detail just how those additional dollars could be spent, the Army is leading the charge on rolling out an evolving plan for the US territory that pulls a host of weapons from across the service, including from its own inventory a command and control (C2) system called the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radar and the Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 (IFPC Inc 2) launchers.

A number of other Army initiatives are on the INDOPACOM list, including almost $391 million in procurement and development dollars for the service to move out on future increments of its new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Specifically, the command wants to funnel those dollars to the delayed PrSM Increment 2 that adds a multimode seeker to the baseline missile so soldiers can use it to also strike maritime targets and Inc 4 that will extend the missile range out towards the 1,000 kilometers.

An additional $573.5 million is included for the Army to accelerate development and procurement of the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, which the combatant command calls a “precision strike stand-off weapon… for attacking long range, medium range, and tactical targets.” Then there’s $152 million for the Navy and Marine Corps to continue development work on that missile line and ramp up planned buys.

The INDOPACOM list calls out the need for additional investments in several other Navy programs too, including:

• $767 million for additional Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block IB buys;
• $397 million for the service to accelerate Hammerhead Mine fieldings, a moored-torpedo variant mine system delivered by unmanned underwater vehicles and surface vessels;
• $124 million for a mission network that will enable INDOPACOM to “securely communicate, collaborate, plan, and execute actions with allies and partners, and modernize… [its] headquarters C4IT infrastructure;”
• $125 million for the service’s Powered Quickstrike program, a family of shallow water, aircraft laid mines used to strike surface and subsurface targets; and more.

Several Air Force and Space Force initiatives were also included on that FY25 wishlist, like $298 million for Joint Strike Missile procurement coffers, and an additional $701 million for “classified programs” designed to accelerate the development of space-based sensors “necessary to provide persistent and complete coverage of air, sea, and ground-launched missile threats.”

The new INDOPACOM list comes as lawmakers continue to grapple with plans to fund the Pentagon this fiscal year, six months into FY24 and the department is operating under a continuing resolution, and a supplemental spending request. What they decide to do with those two measures could alter department plans for FY25 too.

“We don’t start with a clean sheet of paper each year,” a senior defense official told reporters earlier this month.

“We kind of depend on having [that] ‘24 bill finish and finish in a way that looks a lot like what we asked for. Otherwise, we’re going to have to go back to the drawing board on a couple of fronts,” they later added.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque, Valerie Insinna · March 19, 2024

2​1. Fast food or the military? Recruiting solutions overlook the obvious

Fast food or the military? Recruiting solutions overlook the obvious

militarytimes.com · by U.S. Army Maj. Gen. (ret.) John G. Ferrari · March 19, 2024

Recruits for our nation’s military are in short supply. Proposed solutions are not. Eliminating “wokeism,” extolling the value of service, and changing recruitment standards, among many others, have all been offered as fixes to the ongoing recruiting crisis.

Caught amid the morass of solutions, it appears that the services have been overlooking the most obvious solution: raising the pay of junior enlisted. Contrasting what an Army E-3 or E-4 earns in the military with pay earned in the fast food industry in California reveals this to be true.

As detailed in my newly published analysis, the need for a large pay increase among the E-1 to E-4 pay grades is clear when one considers the new fast food minimum wage in California. Starting April 1, most fast food workers in the state will be paid a minimum of $20 per hour.

Factor in this wage increase, couple it with free meals (valued at $1,193 per year) provided during shifts, and subtract the cost of medical insurance provided under the Affordable Care Act (valued at $2,256 per year) and a 19-year-old working at a Los Angeles, California-area McDonald’s would earn roughly $40,537 per year.

Now, compare that to the earnings of an Army E-3 with less than two years of service. Starting with base pay, this soldier would earn about $2,377.50 per month, or $28,530 per year. Add in benefits, such as an automatic 1% match on their Thrift Savings Plan account and Basic Allowance for Subsistence pay, while keeping medical costs steady at zero, and the Army E-3 earns $34,338 per year. In other words, the 19-year-old McDonald’s employee would earn about 18% more than the Army E-3.

While the gap narrows if we were to compare a 21-year-old McDonald’s employee with a 21-year-old Army E-4, it still pays less to serve. The implications of this are clear: If it pays less to serve, one may be less inclined to join the military, at least from an economic standpoint.

As a note of caution, comparing civilian and military pay is an inexact science to say the least. The range of benefits that a service member receives differs substantially, in some cases, from what a civilian may receive. That said, in the measure that often matters most and may be the most comprehensible to recruits — cash compensation — the military is falling behind entry-level private sector wages in its largest recruiting market of California.

Given this, what are our service chiefs to do? They should call for a significant wage increase for our junior enlisted, along the lines of 20%. This should be directed to service members in the E-1 to E-4 pay grades, with raises distributed to the E-5 to E-9 pay grades as appropriate.

While 20% seems like a hefty sum, it is far from unprecedented. In the early 1980s, the annual military pay raise increased by over 35 percent. And, during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, raises were targeted to specific pay grades. Last summer, House appropriators also signaled their willingness to provide such an increase in their efforts to rewrite pay tables for the benefit of junior enlisted service members.

Already, we are seeing what failures in military recruiting can do to force structure. While the Army’s recent cuts are the right move, they are a harbinger of what’s to come if the military doesn’t get its recruiting house in order. Putting recruiting back on track will require attention and action in the area where such efforts are needed most: pay for our junior enlisted.

It’s time for the service chiefs to call for such a pay increase, and for the president and Congress to heed it. The costs and implications of an increase are certainly substantial, no less because of the budget caps currently in place that are restraining the Pentagon’s budget. But, a failure to recruit means a failure to man, and thus a failure to deter and fight. And that would be a disaster for our national security.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John G. Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the service.

22. Two ways to fix Army recruiting

Excerpts:

A functional reorganization of Army recruitment may require reducing the number of O-5 regional recruitment commands to optimize the creation of formations task-organized for digital purpose. Necessarily, this reduction aligns with the SFAB battalion commander selection model, and the opportunity for a PMS to lead a recruitment battalion as a follow-on assignment. Fewer eligible commanders will fill fewer battalions with different mission focus than the current geographic structure.

Two ways to fix Army recruiting

Stop organizing its tasks geographically, and put our best people on it.

BY LT. COL. ADAM SCHER

PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY

MARCH 19, 2024 06:00 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Lt. Col. Adam Scher

A student records Lt. Col. Keith Benoit as he talks to students about his Army experience at McLean High School in McLean, Va., on May 11, 2023. Army / Sgt. Jamie Robinson

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Ideas

Stop organizing its tasks geographically, and put our best people on it.

By Lt. Col. Adam Scher

Professor of Military Science, Seton Hall University

March 19, 2024 06:00 AM ET

• Commentary
• Army
• Personnel

The Army can’t do anything about some of the many reasons for its recruiting crisis—but it can better organize its approach and do more to put the right people on the problem.

The Army has more than 40 recruiting battalions, each for a different geographical region. All are trained on the same recruitment toolkit, which mostly involves talking to recruits in person and helping them envision a path to independence and adulthood. But many young people aren’t seeking either of those, or even stable employment. They face anxiety from growing up at the height of the financial crisis, amid political division, and under the pandemic, and they seem to want support and approval from their social networks more than money for college or a guaranteed job after graduation. So showing up in uniform at a high school or a shopping mall and offering an Army career does little to persuade a young person to join. This is true, by the way, even if recruitment suffered because COVID took recruiters out of schools.

In fact, the pandemic helped drive this generation to develop identity and community in virtual spaces, and the Army must now organize itself to meet them where they are. This suggests that the Army should develop engagement strategies with indirect focus beyond the recruit: family, friends, school leaders, and third-party social media influencers. Moreover, it suggests that the Army overhaul the structure of its recruiting command. Instead organizing around geography, Recruiting Command should reorient around line of effort in the digital ecosystem. If done correctly, restructuring from geographic to technological formations has the most potential for revolutionizing the Army approach to digital natives of this generation.

During the COVID vaccination campaign, DoD realized that experts were not the best messengers to convince soldiers to get the shot. Having the “right” message wasn’t meaningful if it was delivered by an ineffectual messenger. The private sector reinforces this lesson. Over fifteen years ago, corporate brands paid bloggers to create content, which began modern influencer marketing. Influencers have both established credibility and an existing audience. Physical geography is barely relevant in that market. While the Army used influencer marketing during COVID, and has acknowledged that IT transcends borders in our fighting doctrine, we have yet to similarly modernize our recruiting formations.

Regional recruiting battalions can be reorganized into functional areas, such as influencer marketing battalions with acquisition authorities to retain independent contractors paid a per-post fee or by click-through rate. These battalions would be responsible for calculating the return on investment of different influencer marketing campaigns, sentiment analysis to analyze audience engagement, assessing platform-specific key performance indicators, and continuously refining the message to the target audience in a way that is an agile supplement to a national television ad campaign. In this model, the target audience may have unique skills and attributes, or the ability to exert influence on those with skills to fill growing gaps in Army operations. A next-gen recruiting battalion might have a specific, dedicated focus on multi-domain operations (similar to medical), targeting young people with a demonstrated digital interest in cyber, who haven’t yet shown an interest in the Army. Other battalions might excel at family education, or high school administration battalions that work with educators and their own social media platforms and digital programming. Cross-functional teams can work together across battalions to meet recruitment goals.

Find better leaders

No functional reorganization can succeed without putting the right people in charge of modern recruiting battalions. Service leaders should start by making command of a recruiting battalion more attractive to excellent officers. It is widely believed—and indeed, statistics show—that officers whose first command is of a recruiting battalion are not as competitive for promotion or advancement as those who lead combat formations. The Army faced a similar problem when it established Security Force Assistance Brigades: the notion that leading an SFAB might be somehow less prestigious than being selected for tactical battalion command. So the service decided to reserve SFABs for second-time commanders, officers who had already excelled in commanding a tactical formation. If it did the same for recruiting battalions, the Army would automatically attract a higher caliber of officer to this vital mission. It would also create strategic leaders and future general officers with a deeper understanding of recruitment challenges.

Additionally, the Professor of Military Science position should count as a key development command position, making the PMS eligible for follow-on command of a recruiting battalion. ROTC programs are on the front lines of recruiting and retention, and PMS’s spend their time and focus communicating with high school students, parents, and faculty. Recognizing the experience our ROTC cadre gain from inspiring, educating, training, and selecting students to become Army officers will allow the Army to leverage the skills and abilities of leaders with existing knowledge and experience translating the Army to civilians.

A functional reorganization of Army recruitment may require reducing the number of O-5 regional recruitment commands to optimize the creation of formations task-organized for digital purpose. Necessarily, this reduction aligns with the SFAB battalion commander selection model, and the opportunity for a PMS to lead a recruitment battalion as a follow-on assignment. Fewer eligible commanders will fill fewer battalions with different mission focus than the current geographic structure.

Lt. Col. Adam A. Scher is the Professor of Military Science at Seton Hall University. His recent prior assignments include serving as Military Assistant to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, executive officer to the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for COVID, and White House Fellow in the Office of Management and Budget. The opinions in this piece are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

23. Revisiting the Tanker War

Excerpt:

It is always better to perform a visit, board, search, and seizure, a “take down” mission to interdict one’s adversary, before they are able to lay mines as in the case of Task Force 160, Special Boat Unit Twenty, and La Salle, or capture weapons before they are transferred in the case of SEAL Team Three supported by Lewis B. Puller. The former mission clearly made an impression. The Houthis claimed they attacked Puller as it sailed through the Gulf of Aden. U.S. defense officials from the Pentagon said that no such attack occurred.

The United States and United Kingdom conducted their third set of coordinated strikes on February 24. More are surely to follow, and thus, this will not be the last the American public hears of Operation Prosperity Guardian or of USS Lewis B. Puller and the mobile sea bases that follow in its class. Indeed, USS John L. Canley (ESB 6), the third ship in the class, was commissioned on Feb. 17, 2024, in Coronado, California.

The legacy of mobile sea bases will also continue in other parts of the globe as other nations recognize the value of employing vessels like MV Hercules and USS Lewis B. Puller for special missions at sea. Even the legacy of the Vietnam War mobile sea bases continues. Recently, the Philippines grounded BRP Sierra Madre (LT 57) on Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands with a contingent of Philippine marines aboard as a demonstration of sovereignty in their dispute over the islands with China. Thus, the former USS Harnett County (LST 821) still serves as a mobile sea base today.

As Operation Prosperity Guardian continues, the U.S. Navy should continue to look to history, to its institutional memory, to garner lessons from the past on force structure both for platform design and the number of assets in the fleet. This should begin by comparing and contrasting the number of ships that enabled the Vietnam War and Operation Earnest Will, both Cold War period conflicts that were enabled by a total fleet size of over 600 ships.

Revisiting the Tanker War - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Stephen Phillips · March 20, 2024

A flight of three U.S. Army special operations helicopters conducting a night patrol over the ocean encountered a small Iranian freighter. Commonly known as MH-6 “Little Birds” due to their small size and nimble performance, the helicopters also carried a disproportionate amount of firepower. This flight was outfitted with rocket pods on both sides of the aircraft. If the 2.75-inch rockets were not enough, the pilots all carried small arms and were ready to use them for more than self-defense.

The ship turned off its deck lights. This provided the aircrew an advantage. Now, they could observe the vessel through their night vision devices. The after section had a deckhouse rising about four stories above the ocean’s surface with the ship’s bridge on the top level. A large open platform lay in front of the deckhouse with a tarp covering about a fourth of the space. Almost immediately after the lights extinguished, a group of men pulled the canvas sheet back, revealing what looked like trash cans or carts. They maneuvered these toward a gangplank and then pushed the cylinders over the side, splashing them into the ocean one by one.

One of the pilots keyed his radio and reported, “They’re pushing those … shopping carts … over the side now.”

This message was received miles away in the combat information center of a U.S. Navy command ship. There were more sailors in combat than usual, especially at night. Everyone was expecting something to happen since earlier in the evening, a staff intelligence office cryptically reported to the watch, “There are indications of Iranian activity up north.”

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Among all the men in combat, Rear Adm. Harold “Hal” Bernson, commander, U.S. Middle East Force, looked at Lt. Mark Helmkamp. A naval reservist, Helmkamp was recalled to active duty to support operations in the Middle East due to his expertise on mine warfare. Despite his best efforts, everyone aboard called him “the mine guy.”

“What do you think they are doing?” the admiral asked.

“Sir, I think they are laying mines.”

“Take them!” Bernsen commanded.

In seconds, the Little Birds were told they were clear to engage. They began to make runs on the ship, firing rockets at the deck, bridge, and engine room.

Helmkamp was surprised that Adm. Bernsen reacted so quickly to his analysis. He was unaware that Bernsen expected to hear the Iranian ship was laying mines and had already discussed rules of engagement with higher authority. It was determined that Iranian ships caught mine-laying would be deemed to be conducting an act of war. A kinetic response would be immediately authorized.

This event was not part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led mission started in December 2023 to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden, but of Operation Earnest Will, a U.S.-led mission to ensure freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman in 1987 and 1988. The history of this operation is important to understand because of its parallels to ongoing U.S. combat operations in the Red Sea. Just as is the case today, the U.S. Navy had to commit to an open-ended effort to protect commercial shipping. This effort in the late 1980s did not completely deter or stop attacks on either U.S. Navy ships or the tankers they were escorting. Looking back at the “Tanker War,” the Iran-Iraq war at sea, is interesting to provide lessons for current operations in the Red Sea but also for how to think about contingencies in other parts of the world.

History Does Not Repeat Itself, But It Rhymes

Travel through the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and beyond creates a shorter, more economical route between Europe and Asia. Similarly, the route through the Strait of Hormuz to all the nations of the Persian Gulf region has been an important source of energy, one that enables globalization. In the 1980s, 60 percent of the world’s oil passed through the strait. It is for this reason the U.S. Navy intervened in the Iran-Iraq War in July 1987.

For the Iraqi government, the war was about territory and prestige; Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Iran to obtain full control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and two additional ports on the Iranian side of the river. For the Iranian leadership, the war was an extension of the Islamic Revolution as many Shiite holy sites were found in the more secular Iraq. Both adversaries attacked the other’s seaborne commerce, primarily the petroleum trade, to erode the other’s ability to finance the conflict. Iraq’s tactics focused on air-to-surface attacks. Supported by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi Air Force enjoyed overflight rights, enabling them to fly south through their neighbors’ territories. Then, the Iraqi aircraft would turn east over the Persian Gulf, find an Iranian oil tanker, and dispatch it with an Exocet missile. The Iranian navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy attacked tankers trading with Iraq, to include Kuwaiti tankers. Sometimes they attacked ships with Chinese-made Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles, firing them long ranges from positions such as the al-Faw peninsula — captured Iraqi territory — at tankers laying at anchor or moored pierside in Kuwait. Iran also covertly mined the Kuwaiti port of Mina al-Ahmadi.

During this period, the United States did not trade much in Middle East oil, but many of its allies, like Japan, did. Eventually, the Tanker War led to an increase in insurance rates for shipping, which affected the entire oil market. In January 1987, the Kuwaiti government proposed a clever scheme to deter Iranian attacks against their shipping. They asked the United States if they could reflag Kuwaiti tankers as American and receive the protection of the U.S. Navy. The administration of President Ronald Reagan debated this idea but finally agreed to it on March 7, 1987. The surge of forces into the Persian Gulf assigned to commander, Middle East Force under Adm. Bernsen became Operation Earnest Will.

Bernsen and his staff planned for the traditional naval mission of convoy escort. A group of reflagged and renamed Kuwaiti tankers would marshal in the Gulf of Oman to meet a flotilla of three to four U.S. Navy warships. These would steam in company through the Strait of Hormuz, follow the shipping channels, to include the narrow but deep channel near Farsi Island in the central gulf, then finish the two- to three-day transit in a Kuwaiti port.

The first collection of two tankers and three warships got under way from the Gulf of Oman on July 22, 1987. The convoy enjoyed protective surveillance from E-3A airborne early warning aircraft. On the night of July 23, an E-3 observed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Boghammers, small patrol craft that carry heavy crew-served weapons, maneuvering in the Farsi Island ship channel that the deep-draft ships would be forced to employ. Onboard USS La Salle (AGF 3), the command ship sitting pierside in Bahrain, Adm. Bernsen and his staff decided to slow the convoy so that if the Iranians were rehearsing for an attack, the protective flotilla would have daylight visibility.

Proceeding on their transit on the morning of July 24, the newly reflagged MV Bridgeton was rocked by an explosion in the forward part of the ship at 6:55am. Sailors on the bridge saw a shockwave travel aft that knocked them to the deck. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy was not rehearsing an attack the night before. Anticipating the convoy’s arrival, they mined the channel. Bridgeton hit an Iranian M-08 contact mine that exploded and tore a 50-square-meter hole in the ship’s hull. Though Bridgeton was able to remain afloat and nobody on the ship was killed, the shock reverberated around the gulf as the U.S. Navy realized that the Iranians were willing to attack ships no matter the flag they sailed under. And now there was a minefield that needed to be cleared.

This provided the context for the night of Sept. 21, when the special operations helicopters from Task Force 160 discovered Iran Ajr, the Iranian navy auxiliary sowing mines near the U.S. Navy base in Bahrain. American warships were clearly the intended target.

The next morning, two groups of Navy SEALs conducted a take-down of Iran Ajr. A SEAL platoon deployed to the Persian Gulf aboard USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7) captured the ship. SEALs and other sailors from Special Boat Unit Twenty found Iranian sailors in a life raft and captured them, to include the wounded captain.

U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal technicians took control of the mines that remained aboard Iran Ajr. They were transferred to La Salle. Intelligence analysis conclusively demonstrated Iran had mined Mina al-Ahmadi. The mines were of the same design and had serial numbers sequential to those swept from the Kuwaiti waters.

Mobile Sea Bases, Barges in the Persian Gulf

Naval warships assert influence through their presence. There are more economical means to create similar influence by positioning forces on islands, such as expressed in the U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept. Manmade islands work just as effectively, as suggested by the Chinese manmade islands in the South China Seaand the oil platforms employed by Iran in the Tanker War. Each of these concepts allowed a force to remain on station for longer periods of time, with minimal resupply or refueling compared to a surface vessel.

After the Bridgeton mine strike, Bernsen realized a sustained presence was required to wrest control of the Farsi Island shipping channel and the surrounding area from the Iranians. The MK III patrol boats of Special Boat Unit Twenty and the MH-6s of Task Force 160 would be perfectly suited to put the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in check. But without a friendly geographic feature nearby, some form of a manmade island was needed to serve as the “mother ship” for these boats and aircraft — a platform that could be their source of fuel, ammunition, and hotel services, a safe haven in the middle of the gulf.

To meet this need, Adm. Bernsen remembered his previous tour in Bahrain. He had been the commanding officer of USS La Salle, the Middle East Force command ship. During that tour, Bernsen visited an oil and gas barge named MV Hercules. Ironically, because of the Tanker War, the barge was not employed. Bernsen arranged for Hercules and another barge, MV Wimbrown VII, to be leased from Brown and Root. Hercules was 400 feet long and 140 feet wide and could accommodate 200 people. It had a crane that could lift the Special Boat Unit Twenty MK III patrol boats out of the water, plenty of deck space, and a helicopter pad for the Task Force 160 helicopters. Wimbrown VII was smaller, but at 250 feet by 70 feet to include a helicopter pad, it would be equally valuable.

Adm. Bernsen’s concept of employing a manmade island as the means to get his special operations forces closer to the Iranian adversary “rhymed” with a similar operation during the Vietnam War. In late 1968, then–Vice Adm. Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt was commander of Naval Forces Vietnam. He was tasked with interdicting the Viet Cong’s supply lines that flowed from Cambodia through the Mekong Delta’s various swamps, streams, and rivers into South Vietnam. Zumwalt directed Operation SEA LORDS, an acronym that meant “Southeast Asia Lake Ocean River Delta Strategy.” He envisioned a sustained presence in the area to put pressure on the Viet Cong while also encouraging the South Vietnamese population that the communists could be thwarted.

Yard, Repair, Berthing, and Messing Barge-16 served as the home for River Division 522. Later, “Sea Float,” a series of nine barges moored together on the Cua Lon River, became the manmade island that housed Navy SEALs, underwater demolition teams, and other riverine forces in close proximity to their adversaries.

Mobile sea bases had already proven to be the best means to maintain the riverine forces in the Mekong. Each incorporated the same key features Bernsen and the commander of Middle East Forces staff was looking for twenty years later: the ability to moor, launch, and recover small boats; helicopter pads to ensure robust air support; spaces for command and control and planning; force protection for the platform; and berthing and hotel services for those embarked.

The Navy reactivated and commissioned four tank landing ships in 1966 to serve as mobile sea bases in Vietnam: USS Garrett County (LST 786), USS Harnett County (LST 821), USS Hunterdon County (LST 838), and USS Jennings County (LST 846). The initial thought was that each would be stationed in the mouth of a river in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta or Rung Sat zone. The Navy planned for ten riverine boats and two helicopters to be assigned to each tank landing ship.

After these four, a number of tank landing ships deployed to Vietnam to serve as mobile sea bases. Other ships and barges were also suited to the task and employed. USS Benewah (APB 35), the first in a class of barracks ships, served as the sea base for commander, River Assault Flotilla One. Built on the hull of a tank landing ship, the ship housed 1,100 sailors and soldiers and included a hospital and a helicopter pad.

The junior officers of the Vietnam War were in command during Operation Earnest Will, to include Adm. Bernsen and the commanding officer of Special Boat Unit Twenty. It was easy for them to see the value of MV Hercules and Wimbrown VII.

Battle of Middle Shoals Buoy

The joint force of Special Boat Unit patrol boats and Task Force 160 helicopters became known as Operation Prime Chance. The helicopters continued to deploy from frigates and destroyers in the gulf but also maintained a contingency on the two barges moored near Farsi Island to conduct operations with the MK III patrol boats. Just as SEA LORDS in Vietnam hampered the Viet Cong, their combined presence changed the game for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. A “control area” was established in which the Iranians could no longer lay mines, with a “patrol area” in which regular operations significantly reduced the opportunities for minelaying.

On Oct. 8, 1987, another flight of three Task Force 160 Little Birds approached the Middle Shoals Buoy near Farsi Island to conduct a reconnaissance of it ahead of one of the Special Boat Unit Twenty patrols that intended to set up a listening post on the structure. As they closed with the buoy, a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile was launched at them, followed by machine gun fire. The Little Birds returned fire with mini-guns and rocket pods. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy patrol was destroyed in minutes. A Boghammer was sunk, and a Boston Whaler on the surface burned. Several Iranian sailors were killed, and others were wounded. The Little Birds returned to MV Hercules to rearm while the Special Boat Unit Twenty patrol moved in to collect intelligence and capture any Iranians that were alive. A SEAL boarded one of the Iranian patrol boats to see if there was anything of interest aboard. He saw something he recognized — a battery case for an American-made Stinger missile, the one that was fired at the Little Birds. Later, the serial number was verified as from a lot that the United States had transferred to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.

Mobile Sea Base in the Gulf of Aden

The operational complexities of Operation Prosperity Guardian have brought the lessons of the Mekong Delta and Operation Earnest Will to the fore. The mobile sea base concept continued to rhyme, to reverberate in the U.S. Navy’s concepts for deploying sailors and marines conducting specialized missions in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

In the current conflict, Iran is not the main antagonist. Rather, it is Iranian-backed Houthi rebels that began attacking international shipping in the Red Sea in November 2023. The Iranian government supplies the Houthis with missiles, drones, and speedboats. Providing arms to the Houthis is a violation of U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law. The Houthis in turn used these weapons to strike ships in the Red Sea. Like Iran’s claim in the 1980s that it only targeted Iraq and its allies, the Houthis asserted that in solidarity with their Hamas brethren fighting in Gaza, they would only strike Israeli vessels. And yet one of the first victims was a Japanese car carrier named Galaxy Leader. Dozens of attacks on commercial vessels followed. Maritime insurance rates have quadrupled. While some nations need not worry about transiting the area — the Houthis announced specifically they would not target Russian or Chinese traffic — traffic in the region is reduced as major shipping companies are employing other routes.

In response, the United States is leading Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of nations and various forces focused on stopping Houthi aggression and restoring the sea lanes through the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. At its inception in December 2023, the United States was joined by the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain.

The force package for Operation Prosperity Guardian includes a unique Navy ship that is employed for specialized missions like visit, board, search, and seizure and mine-countermeasures. Named for a Marine, crewed by a mix of civilian and military personnel, USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) is lead in the class of six expeditionary sea bases. In effect, it is a modern-day mobile sea base, reminiscent of the mobile sea bases of both Operation Earnest Will and the Vietnam War that incorporates the best features of each. Built on a merchant ship profile, it is 760 feet long and has a flight deck that can embark vertical take-off aircraft to include MV-22s and CH-53s. Like MV Hercules and Wimbrown VI, Puller has a mission deck from which small boats can be loaded and unloaded for SEALs, explosive ordnance disposal, or unmanned undersea vehicle mine-countermeasures operations. It includes a hangar, something the platforms in Vietnam lacked, plus berthing for all the embarked forces as well as command and control facilities. Because it is a ship, based on an Alaska-class tanker, Puller enjoys the mobility that tank landing ships and other ships that served as mobile sea bases in the Mekong had and does not require a tug to move it as the barges did in Operation Earnest Will. It transits with a maximum speed of 15 knots and has a range of 9,500 nautical miles.

A unique aspect to Lewis B. Puller is its crew. The ship was originally categorized as a U.S. Naval Ship with a Military Sealift Command crew. Now, Puller is a United States Ship with a mixed crew of civilian mariners and military personnel. The uniformed personnel are divided into Blue and Gold crews so that the ship can remain in theater for long periods of time as the sailors cycle aboard and conduct a turnover with their opposite number.

Puller has already proven its worth. In January, the ship had members of SEAL Team Three embarked. U.S. Central Command reported that they deployed from Puller in a mission very similar to the takedown of Iran Ajr. It was supported by helicopters and a drone to conduct a visit, board, search, and seizure of a vessel off the coast of Somalia that was resupplying the Houthis with “Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missile components … propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles.”

During the operation, two SEALs perished. Special Warfare Operator Second Class Nathan Gage Ingram fell into the ocean while boarding the vessel. Special Warfare Operator First Class Chris Chambers heroically jumped into the sea after him, attempting to save his life. Wearing heavy equipment and weapons, both were soon reported missing and eventually determined to be lost at sea.

It is always better to perform a visit, board, search, and seizure, a “take down” mission to interdict one’s adversary, before they are able to lay mines as in the case of Task Force 160, Special Boat Unit Twenty, and La Salle, or capture weapons before they are transferred in the case of SEAL Team Three supported by Lewis B. Puller. The former mission clearly made an impression. The Houthis claimed they attacked Puller as it sailed through the Gulf of Aden. U.S. defense officials from the Pentagon said that no such attack occurred.

The United States and United Kingdom conducted their third set of coordinated strikes on February 24. More are surely to follow, and thus, this will not be the last the American public hears of Operation Prosperity Guardian or of USS Lewis B. Puller and the mobile sea bases that follow in its class. Indeed, USS John L. Canley (ESB 6), the third ship in the class, was commissioned on Feb. 17, 2024, in Coronado, California.

The legacy of mobile sea bases will also continue in other parts of the globe as other nations recognize the value of employing vessels like MV Hercules and USS Lewis B. Puller for special missions at sea. Even the legacy of the Vietnam War mobile sea bases continues. Recently, the Philippines grounded BRP Sierra Madre (LT 57) on Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands with a contingent of Philippine marines aboard as a demonstration of sovereignty in their dispute over the islands with China. Thus, the former USS Harnett County (LST 821) still serves as a mobile sea base today.

As Operation Prosperity Guardian continues, the U.S. Navy should continue to look to history, to its institutional memory, to garner lessons from the past on force structure both for platform design and the number of assets in the fleet. This should begin by comparing and contrasting the number of ships that enabled the Vietnam War and Operation Earnest Will, both Cold War period conflicts that were enabled by a total fleet size of over 600 ships.

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Stephen Phillips has a Ph.D. in war studies from King’s College London. His dissertation was a study of Operation Earnest Will. Steve is one of the hosts of the Preble Hall Podcast, the naval history podcast of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum.

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warontherocks.com · by Stephen Phillips · March 20, 2024

24. Swarm Clouds on the Horizon? Exploring the Future of Drone Swarm Proliferation

Conclusion:

Drone swarms are here. And while it is too early to precisely forecast the speed and trajectory with which the technologies will advance and swarms will spread throughout the world, the United States must prepare for their proliferation now.

Swarm Clouds on the Horizon? Exploring the Future of Drone Swarm Proliferation - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Zachary Kallenborn · March 20, 2024

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A 2020 New America report cataloged thirty-eight states with armed drone programs, twenty-eight with programs in development, and eleven that have used drones in combat. In less than four years since that report was published, drones’ rapidly growing influence on battlefields from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine to Gaza has almost certainly increased states’ interest in developing armed drone programs. As such, existing programs are likely to expand, new programs created, and new states pursuing and using drones. This explosion in drone interest comes as global warfare is entering a third age of drone warfare, defined by autonomy, saturation attacks, increased precision and range, and full-spectrum drone warfare across land, sea, and air.

Increasingly, states are integrating multiple drones into drone swarms, which communicate and collaborate to accomplish shared objectives. At least eleven states have announced drone swarm programs—from Armenia and China to South Korea and the United States. In May 2021, Israel used Elbit Systems’ Legion-X drone swarm in combat against Hamas, with the drones searching for targets and relaying information to the Israel Defense Forces.

Like any military system that proves its worth, drone swarm technology is likely to proliferate globally—perhaps even faster than some high-end exquisite weapons and platforms. But that proliferation is likely to be erratic and take place over years or even decades. Some states might assemble hundreds or thousands of drones into integrated, multidomain swarms, perhaps to defeat enemy submarines or defend against amphibious landings. Others might content themselves with simple, unarmed drone swarms for intelligence gathering and disaster response, and only after a fair amount of prodding. Although options to curb drone swarm proliferation are limited, they do exist.

Proliferation Dynamics of Drone Swarms

There are significant unknowns that will influence the shape and pace of swarm proliferation—how effective drone swarms prove in combat, in which missions, and the requirements to build or buy the most effective drone swarms. Theoretically, however, drone swarms can be applied to almost any mission. Numerous drones might search out, overwhelm, and destroy enemy air defenses, paving the way for manned aircraft. Swarms would be especially well suited for attacking transport and landing craft because they are often lightly defended, with swarms of cheap unmanned surface vehicles spreading across maritime flashpoints and hitting transport craft at the water level while unmanned aerial vehicles strike the military assets packed onboard the transport craft. Or perhaps they will take on the tactical role of mortars—small, aerial drone swarms providing longer-range effects with more maneuverability and native intelligence collection capabilities. The proliferation dynamics will look different depending on a swarm’s purpose, because purpose will determine the technology required.

Proliferation will also depend on drone swarms’ forms. Swarms consisting of small, homogenous unmanned aerial vehicles are likely to proliferate most quickly. A simple drone swarm capability is not necessarily all that difficult. Almost a decade ago, a team at the Naval Postgraduate School used commercial off-the-shelf technology to build a swarm of fifty unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Building or buying fifty UAS is relatively easy, and although getting them to work together is harder, it is not necessarily as hard as some might expect—the Naval Postgraduate School swarm’s drone communicated with one another through Wi-Fi. The manufacturer needs to ensure the signals do not interfere with one another, build the command-and-control systems, and create any necessary user interfaces for human command. That all requires technical know-how, but basic knowledge is not necessarily hard to acquire. The DoD Strategic Capabilities Office’s Perdix drone swarm, for example, was designed by MIT engineering students.

Simple swarms are increasingly available commercially, though not yet on any significant scale. In February 2024, Geoscan, a Russian drone manufacturer, released a drone swarm starter kit providing ten quadcopters to practice with swarm intelligence algorithms for collective navigation and search. In 2022, Red Cat Holdings announced a “4-Ship” product, providing a prepackaged system of six UAS for automated surveying and area photography. The system enables simultaneous use of four UAS, with the other two UAS replacing the others as they run out of power. That said, the commercial market for drone swarms is probably limited. Environmental monitoring, safety inspections, and light shows might all benefit from drone swarming, but they do not necessarily need it. Federal Aviation Administration Part 107 regulations also require operators to obtain a waiver to fly multiple drones at once, so the drone swarm hobbyist market in the United States will probably be small. Of course, as more states pursue drone swarms, their availability on the market may increase. In April 2022, the Israeli company Elbit Systems’ UK branch was selected to provide the British Ministry of Defense with five autonomous swarms of six drones each.

However, not all drone swarms are as simple as these small, mainly quadcopter-based commercial examples. The Air Force is developing highly sophisticated Collaborative Combat Aircraft like the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie that escort and support F-22 and F-35 fighters in achieving air dominance and other roles. The CCAs are estimated to cost between $20.5 and $27.5 million each, incorporating cutting-edge advancement in artificial intelligence and autonomy. The Air Force reportedly aims for these drones to be capable of swarming. Likewise, large, multidomain drone swarms integrated into a specially designed mothership for transport will typically require much greater technical skill and resources to develop than a small swarm of quadcopters. Building and sustaining such a swarm will also require significant logistics, production, and maintenance capability.

The common constraints of drone proliferation will necessarily also constrain drone swarms. Stealth drones designed with low-observable features and radar-absorbent materials will be much slower to proliferate, and even more so if they are also swarming capable. Although stealth could significantly increase the costs of drones, making them less attritable, that may be desirable for certain missions. Likewise, drones that require more financial resources, specialized technical know-how, and infrastructure will proliferate slower, and adding swarming capability necessarily adds additional requirements. Just as a lone-wolf terrorist could build a crude fixed-wing drone in his garage, but not an MQ-9 Predator with a 66-foot wingspan, states with resource constraints might be able to field small swarms of inexpensive drones that communicate in rudimentary fashion, but comparatively few will manage to develop large and technologically advanced swarms with exquisite capabilities.

Managing Proliferation

Global proliferation of basic drone swarms should be assumed, but the proliferation of more complex drone swarms with advanced capabilities should not—at least not soon. And while proliferation cannot be completely controlled, the United States can take some actions to shape how quickly drone swarms proliferate. In cases where proliferation is all but certain—small, homogenous, aerial drone swarms, for example—the United States might want to encourage proliferation to partners and allies. If these swarms are expected to be a prominent feature on future battlefields—and based on observations from Ukraine and elsewhere, this is precisely what we should expect—then there is advantage in fostering close partnerships with allied states to not only develop such swarms, but also develop effective and responsible practices surrounding their integration into force structures, organizations, concepts, and doctrine.

Swarms that could meaningfully change regional or global balances of power, or that would provide more advantage to adversaries than to the United States, however, are an entirely different category. For example, concerns have been raised that antisubmarine drone swarms coupled with artificial intelligence and data analytics could pose significant risks to nuclear submarines, creating windows of opportunity for decapitation strikes. Compared to basic swarms, the proliferation of which should be assumed, these potentially destabilizing swarms require much more deliberate policy attention. The United States might attempt to limit proliferation through multilateral export controls on swarming-capable undersea drones, for instance. At a minimum, significant caution should be exercised in sharing relevant technology and know-how. And because certain drone swarms may actually represent a new category of weapons of mass destruction, the global community might develop new international norms concerning their proliferation.

Drone swarms are here. And while it is too early to precisely forecast the speed and trajectory with which the technologies will advance and swarms will spread throughout the world, the United States must prepare for their proliferation now.

Zachary Kallenborn is the lead researcher at Looking GlassUSA, a UAS and counter-UAS consulting and investment firm. He is also affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Schar School of Policy and Government, the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. His extensive research, writing, and analysis on drone warfare, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and existential risk has received global news coverage and influenced a broad range of state, federal, and global security policies and strategies.

This article is derived from “The Plague Beckons: On the Proliferation of Drone Swarms,” recently published in the Global Policy – ORF special volume, Future Warfare and Critical Technologies: Evolving Tactics and Strategies.

Thank you to Josh “JB” Bryan for edits on the article. All remaining errors and awkward turns of phrase are the author’s own.

Image credit: UK Ministry of Defence

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Zachary Kallenborn · March 20, 2024

25. The Creeping Politicization of the U.S. Military

There is only one loyalty test. And that is embodied in our oath. If we think anything more is required then we should reconsider our understanding of America, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, and the Federalist Papers.

The Creeping Politicization of the U.S. Military

How Republicans’ Loyalty Tests Erode National Security

By Risa Brooks

March 20, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Risa Brooks · March 20, 2024

When Senator Tommy Tuberville finally lifted his blanket hold on promotions for 440 senior military officers last December, many in the Pentagon breathed a sigh of relief. The Alabama Republican had blocked the promotions to protest a Biden administration policy granting paid leave and travel reimbursement for abortion services to military personnel based in states where the procedure is illegal. For nearly ten months, officers awaiting promotion were prevented from taking on new assignments, creating bottlenecks in the chain of command and disrupting the lives of service members and their families. With the hold lifted, many may have hoped that things could finally get back to normal.

In fact, politicization of the military may soon get even worse, especially if some in the right wing of the Republican Party have their way. In the past, politicians often used service members as political props and military policies as wedge issues to appeal to voters, with the military as bystander in its own politicization. In the next phase, politicians may seek to impose ideological litmus tests in promotions and appointments of senior officers. If successful, such tactics would transform the military from the nonpartisan force it is today to an ally of one faction of the GOP.

The result would be profound damage to national security. Today, military leaders strive to be impartial in offering advice to the president, lawmakers, and other civilian officials about the use of force. In the future, they may instead tailor their recommendations to the interests of their preferred political party. Apart from undermining the rigor of the advisory process, such internal politicization would erode the overall unity of the military as partisan tensions spread through the ranks. And the American people’s trust in the military would decline as they came to see it as just another politicized institution, as many already see the Supreme Court.

None of this is inevitable, however, if enough politicians in both parties work to stop the military’s politicization. Republicans especially must push back on their colleagues’ efforts to drag the military into policy disputes; they should warn their party of the dangers of turning the military into a partisan force. Military officers, meanwhile, should bolster their profession’s ethic of nonpartisanship while resisting being drawn into the partisan fray themselves.

THE NEXT PHASE OF POLITICIZATION

Since the 1990s, politicians have sought to capitalize on the military’s popularity—for example, by using soldiers as a backdrop for their foreign policy speeches. Politicians have occasionally wielded statements by military leaders as a cudgel against the opposing party or relied on popular military leaders to sell their wartime policies to the public.

In recent years, this brand of politicization has taken an ugly turn. While officer promotions have occasionally been delayed, Tuberville’s sweeping effort to hold the military hostage in protest of the Biden administration’s policies is unprecedented. In the past, politicians praised the military for partisan advantage. Now, many Republicans criticize it for the same reason; one way they do so is by disparaging Pentagon policies that help to bring the demographics of the military closer to those of society. Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, and Representative Chip Roy of Texas have even claimed that the military is weak because its senior leaders are “woke.”

The next variant of politicization could be even worse. Rather than using the military merely to curry favor with voters, politicians may manipulate appointments and promotions to install a military leadership willing to harness its resources and personnel to advance the agenda of the right wing of the Republican party, regardless of what that means for the well-being of the organization, let alone the country’s security.

Such an outcome would be a dramatic departure from current conventions. Today, military leaders strive to be nonpartisan in their interactions with political appointees and elected officials, as well as with the public. Norms and rules, including Department of Defense regulations, limit service members’ partisan activity—barring them from campaigning for politicians or publicly endorsing them during elections, for example. Officers subject to partisan litmus tests might be inclined to bend those rules. Even if they do not explicitly campaign on behalf of their party, they might make public statements supporting its views on, say, Pentagon personnel policy, the use of the military for immigration enforcement, or the country’s relations with allies—or advocate that party’s preferred approach when giving Congressional testimony.

Republicans must push back on their colleagues’ efforts to drag the military into policy disputes.

Fortunately, this kind of transformation would be hard to accomplish, given senior officers’ current commitment to nonpartisanship. But the politicization of appointments and promotions is a powerful tool for breaking down that tradition. Making advancement in the institution contingent on one’s ideological leanings would send a strong signal to officers that they should act like partisan allies of the president, or at least keep quiet when others do.

The right wing is already scrutinizing the views of military officers, regardless of the skill and experience they bring to their jobs. The American Accountability Foundation, a far-right nonprofit organization, has circulated the names of several generals and admirals singled out for their allegedly “woke” agendas and questioned their qualifications on those grounds alone. Last August, Tuberville reposted a message from the American Accountability Foundation describing one Army nominee for promotion to brigadier general as an “Ivy League Social Justice Warrior.” Even after Tuberville allowed an up-or-down vote on military promotions in December, another Republican senator, Eric Schmitt, stalled the promotion of an Air Force colonel who had written an op-ed about the pernicious effects of racism in the ranks.

Perhaps the most sobering example of the effort to inject partisan politics into military appointments is the right’s treatment of Charles Q. Brown, Jr., an Air Force general who now serves as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prior to becoming chairman, Brown was confirmed as Air Force chief of staff in 2020 in a Senate vote of 98-0. Then, last July, leaders of thirty political groups on the right signed an open letter opposing Brown’s appointment as chairman. Despite his accomplished career as fighter pilot, 11 Republican senators voted against him when he was confirmed as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last year. The number of “no” votes for the chairmanship was unprecedented, as were the stated reasons for them. Tuberville attributed his “no” vote to the general’s support for “equal opportunity” in the military. Senator Mike Braun, an Indiana Republican, asserted that the general, who is Black, had favored “woke policy initiatives” over effectiveness in the Air Force.

Should Donald Trump win the presidency in November, these dynamics are sure to intensify. The former president has said that he will make Pentagon leaders—both civilian and military—fully deferential to him. Trump’s actions in his final months in office foreshadow how that process could unfold. After he lost the 2020 election to Joe Biden, Trump appointed close political allies with limited experience and qualifications to top Pentagon jobs. He also fired Mark Esper, the secretary of defense, in part because Esper had pushed back on some of Trump’s controversial proposals, including using active-duty troops to quell protests over the killing of George Floyd by police officers in Minneapolis in the spring of 2020.

In his final days in office, Esper was so worried that Trump would veto appointments of two women to senior leadership roles in the military solely because of their gender that he delayed putting their names forward until Biden took office. Esper later warned that if his replacement was “a real yes man,” “then God help us.” If elected, Trump will likely install close political allies on the Pentagon’s civilian side, especially in the offices of the secretary of defense and the secretaries of the army, navy, and air force.

Making advancement in the military contingent on one’s ideological leanings would erode the institution's ethic of nonpartisanship.

To be sure, political appointees are supposed to translate administration priorities into Pentagon policies. But they are also tasked by the American people to protect the country’s national security, not just the parochial interests of the president. The appointment of civilian leaders who do the latter would be another departure from convention, paving the way for the politicization of the uniformed side as well.

If elected, Trump may seek to appoint a pliable general to replace Brown as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is customary for secretaries of defense to compile a list of potential candidates from which a president chooses a chairman. A healthy rapport between the president and a candidate for chairman is usually an important criterion for selection. The candidate’s party affiliation is not. That norm might be one of the first to go.

The secretary of defense or other Pentagon officials might then move to ensure the political fealty of other senior officers. While a mass firing of officers is unlikely, there are other ways in which a new administration could signal that partisan alignment is a priority. A handful of military leaders viewed as ideologically suspect or insufficiently compliant could be moved to dead-end jobs, pressured to retire early, or asked to resign on the ground that the president has lost confidence in them. If any senior officers failed to leave, the president could seek to fire them, paving the way for more ideologically aligned officers to assume key positions. Others might preemptively retire early—a dynamic that could spread throughout the officer corps and eventually even to the rank and file.

The Senate could push back on efforts to engineer promotions on the basis of political loyalty. But if a partisan tug of war over officer promotions were to ensue, restraint on both sides could erode even further, since it would become risky to respect the military’s nonpartisan ethic when the other party did not. In the future, both political parties might work to ensure that the military—especially its senior leadership—shares their partisan views.

PUSHING BACK

The United States has much to lose if the military abandons its nonpartisanship. Its national security would suffer because of how politicization would warp military advice. Senior military leaders, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regularly advise civilian officials about the use of force, Pentagon policy, and other national security concerns. The president depends on their impartial views to make tough informed decisions. But if a president chose political allies for top roles in the military’s senior leadership, he would no longer receive neutral military advice. The consequences would be grave, be the president a Republican or Democrat. If aligned with the GOP, senior officers might feel pressured to conform their advice to a Republican president’s preferred options—or might fail to offer counterarguments or to outline risks. Alternatively, a Democratic president might place his or her own partisan officers in top positions, with similarly devastating effects on the quality of advice offered. This could be especially dangerous in any future debate about major policy shifts, such as pulling out of NATO or committing forces to a new war.

Politicization of the military could also have downstream effects on its unity. If service members felt free to express partisan views on the job, tensions over political differences could become endemic in the ranks. This could undermine trust among service members, which is the linchpin of the U.S. military’s effectiveness. Citizens will also lose confidence in the military if they believe that its officers prioritize the interests of a political party over those of the country. Indeed, the military’s reputation has already suffered in recent years, partly because of its creeping politicization.

Congress should consider adopting new legislation to insulate the military from efforts to turn it into a partisan force.

Reversing this trend will be difficult, but the stakes are too high not to try. Members of both political parties must resist the right’s efforts to politicize appointments and promotions. It is heartening that some Republicans, alarmed by the damage wrought by Tuberville’s hold on promotions, pressured the senator to end it. Still, the right’s misplaced criticism of the military has often gone unanswered by the rest of the Republican Party. If members of Congress have concerns about personnel policy in the Pentagon, there are ways to address it other than publicly lambasting senior military leaders—such as by exercising their regular oversight responsibilities through committees tasked with monitoring the armed forces. Meanwhile, Democrats should temper their rhetoric when responding to the right’s tactics to avoid drawing the military deeper into partisan fights and worsening its politicization in the process.

Beyond pushing the Pentagon to better enforce existing regulations, members of Congress from both sides should consider adopting new legislation to insulate the military from efforts to turn it into a partisan force. This kind of restraint and bipartisanship may seem idealistic, given today’s fractious politics, but while there are officials in Congress willing to violate norms for their own advantage, there are also many in both parties who want to do the right thing.

The military, too, needs to ensure its house is in order. Senior officers should remind one another of the necessity of keeping the military out of domestic politics. They should educate their subordinates about the nonpartisan ethic, and the Pentagon’s civilian leaders should support those efforts. Surveys of military personnel have long shown that many do not fully grasp the reasons for the norm, even as they comply with it. If military leaders instead neglect the nonpartisan ethic or, worse still, violate it themselves, such as by publicly praising politicians or their policies, adherence throughout the force could rapidly decline.

Military leaders must take seriously the challenges posed by civilian efforts to politicize the armed forces. Paradoxically, because of their commitment to the nonpartisan ethic, not to mention the responsibilities of their jobs, many are unaccustomed to thinking about their role in protecting the institution from being pulled into partisan politics. As understandable as that may be, it is a luxury that the country can no longer afford.

• RISA BROOKS is Allis-Chalmers Professor of Political Science at Marquette University.

Foreign Affairs · by Risa Brooks · March 20, 2024

26. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 19, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-19-2024

Key Takeaways:

• The Caucasus: Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit Russia’s focus on its invasion of Ukraine to increase their influence in the Caucasus.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
• Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt that would “surround Iran from the north” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”
• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its raid at al Shifa Hospital on March 19. Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: IDF Egoz and Maglan special operations forces concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.
• West Bank: Israeli media said on March 19 that the IDF has established a unit of engineers and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive” tunnels in the West Bank. The unit has not discovered any offensive tunnels in the West Bank at the time of this writing, according to Israeli media.
• Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria: Israel likely conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Hezbollah facilities in southern Syria.
• Lebanese Hezbollah in the Region: Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa traveled to the UAE on March 19 to negotiate the release of Lebanese detainees suspected of having ties to Hezbollah, according to Lebanese media.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 19, 2024

Mar 19, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, March 19, 2024

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the security situation in the Caucasus with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call on March 19.[1] Raisi told Putin that Iran is “ready to maintain stability” and protect Iran’s strategic interests in the Caucasus.[2] Iran’s interests in the Caucasus include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from using Azerbaijan’s territory to operate against Iran, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran’s Azeri minority.[3] Russian readouts of Raisi and Putin’s phone call notably did not mention that the pair discussed the Caucasus.[4]

Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit the Russian focus on Ukraine to increase Western influence in the Caucasus. Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[5] Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt stretching from Istanbul to Xinjiang that would “surround Iran from the north and Russia from the south” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”[6]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has pursued closer ties with NATO and Western countries in recent months. The Armenian and French defense ministers signed an arms contract in late February 2024.[7] Armenia’s foreign minister discussed normalizing ties with Turkey during a meeting with Turkey’s foreign minister in Antalya, Turkey, on March 1.[8] Pashinyan separately stated that Armenia seeks to “continue and develop the existing political dialogue and expand our partnership with [NATO] and some of its members” during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Yerevan on March 19.[9]

Raisi and Putin’s phone call on March 19 comes amid a deterioration in Russo-Armenian relations after Russia failed to support Armenia during Azerbaijan’s two-day offensive targeting Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023. Azerbaijan seized Nagorno Karabakh—an enclave in Azerbaijan previously home to a large Armenian population—during a two-day military offensive in September 2023.[10] Armenia began seeking external security assistance from parties other than Russia—Armenia's traditional security partner—after the offensive, claiming that Russia had failed to help Armenia defend Nagorno Karabakh against Azerbaijan.[11] Armenia’s relations with Russia have further worsened in recent weeks. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced in late February 2024 that Armenia “froze” its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[12] The CSTO is a Russian-led security organization that, like NATO, requires member states to come to one another’s assistance if a member state is attacked.[13] Pashinyan later stated that the CSTO “creates a threat” to Armenia’s “security and territorial integrity.”[14] Pashinyan also called on Russia to remove its border guards from Armenia’s international airport in Yerevan in early March 2024.[15]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its raid at al Shifa Hospital on March 19.[16] The IDF reported on March 18 that it had intelligence that senior Hamas officials were using the area to conduct and direct attacks in the Gaza Strip.[17]  The IDF 162nd Division and Shin Bet led the raid targeting al Shifa Hospital and killed over 50 Palestinian fighters and detained 300 suspects during the operation.[18] The IDF detained Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas rocketry and intelligence personnel. Israeli forces also seized ammunition near the hospital.  Palestinian militias, including Hamas, targeted Israeli forces operating at al Shifa Hospital at least six times.[19]

Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters conducted at least four attacks targeting Israeli forces in the al Shifa area on March 18 and 19, indicating Hamas retains some fighting forces near the hospital.[20] The large number of suspects that Israeli forces detained at al Shifa hospital also indicates the success of Hamas and its allies in rebuilding their fighting strength in the north.[21] Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023, targeting a Hamas tunnel network underneath the hospital.[22] Israeli forces began to decrease their presence in the northern Gaza Strip in December 2023, citing the degradation of Hamas forces in the area.[23] Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip after the Israeli drawdown. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2024 that the Israeli military establishment assesses that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local, Hamas-controlled police there.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• The Caucasus: Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit Russia’s focus on its invasion of Ukraine to increase their influence in the Caucasus.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
• Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt that would “surround Iran from the north” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”
• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its raid at al Shifa Hospital on March 19. Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: IDF Egoz and Maglan special operations forces concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.
• West Bank: Israeli media said on March 19 that the IDF has established a unit of engineers and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive” tunnels in the West Bank. The unit has not discovered any offensive tunnels in the West Bank at the time of this writing, according to Israeli media.
• Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria: Israel likely conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Hezbollah facilities in southern Syria.
• Lebanese Hezbollah in the Region: Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa traveled to the UAE on March 19 to negotiate the release of Lebanese detainees suspected of having ties to Hezbollah, according to Lebanese media.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

See topline text for additional details on the al Shifa Hospital raid.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 19.[25] Nahal Brigade forces killed several Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[26] The IDF Nahal Brigade has been operating in the area between the northern and central Gaza Strip for two weeks.[27] The IDF has been constructing a highway in this area, which the IDF has dubbed the “Netzarim corridor.”[28] Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces in the Netzarim area with rocket and mortar fire.[29] Palestinian groups also fired rockets at Israeli armor and infantry in the eastern Central Governorate.[30]

The IDF Egoz and Maglan special operations forces (SOF) concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.[31] Hamas-affiliated media said that Israeli forces departed Hamad on March 19.[32] Israeli forces expanded clearing operations into Hamad on March 3.[33] Israeli SOF raided a building used by a Hamas battalion deputy commander and killed over 100 Palestinian fighters during the two-week operation in Hamad.[34]

The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.[35] The 7th Brigade targeted Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in Qarara on March 19, including a building that Palestinian fighters used to fire anti-tank guided missiles at Israeli forces on March 17.[36]

Israeli forces are continuing to target Hamas police officers in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets.[37] Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[38] The Israeli Air Force killed the Hamas police director in the Nuseirat camp, Mahmoud al Bayoumi, on March 19.[39] An airstrike targeted his police vehicle.[40]  An Israeli airstrike also killed a Hamas police lieutenant colonel in Jabalia on March 19.[41] Hamas-affiliated media said that the police officer facilitated aid deliveries to Jabalia Camp.[42]  Hamas police officers, as well as Gazan clans and political factions, have provided escorts for aid convoys through the Gaza Strip.[43] Israel has sought to organize alternative security escorts for the shipments, including by using international private security contractors.[44]  Israeli forces killed Faiq al Mabhouh, who is a senior official in the Hamas-run Interior Ministry, during their operation in al Shifa Hospital on March 18.[45]

Mossad Director David Barnea, who is the lead Israeli official responsible for ceasefire and hostage negotiations, departed Qatar after one day of indirect ceasefire talks in Qatar, according to the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson.[46] Lower-level negotiating teams remain in Qatar.[47]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 19.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters at least nine times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 18.[48] An al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighter fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Gush Etzion, south of Bethlehem.[49] The fighter injured two Israeli Shin Bet officers before Israeli security forces killed him.[50] Israeli media reported that the fighter was from Jenin.[51]

Israeli media said on March 19 that the IDF has established a unit of engineers and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive” tunnels in the West Bank.[52] The IDF reportedly established the unit after residents in Bat Hefer, which is across the Israel-West Bank border from Tulkarm, heard digging noises near their homes. The unit has not discovered any offensive tunnels in the West Bank at the time of writing, according to Israeli media. An unspecified security official said that the unit is aware that “terrorist organizations [in the West Bank] are trying to mimic some of the combat methods in Gaza” and that these organizations use underground facilities for weapons storage.[53] The unit has located approximately five shafts in the Jenin refugee camp and Nour Shams refugee camp, but Israeli media said that the shafts did not lead to tunnels without elaborating further upon the nature of the shafts.[54] The IDF discovered one tunnel dozens of meters long in Jenin refugee camp in July 2023 that connected an apartment to a mosque, however.[55]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 18.[56]

The IDF established a specialized brigade on March 19 to defend two areas in northern Israel from attacks from Syria and Lebanon.[57] The IDF created the new Mountain Brigade to “defend the Mount Dov and Mount Hermon sectors.” The brigade will replace the Hermon Brigade, which presumably operated in the same area. The IDF did not explain whether the Hermon Brigade would relocate or merge with the Mountain Brigade. The new Mountain Brigade will specialize in combat in mountainous terrain and will begin operating in the next several weeks.

Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa traveled to the UAE on March 19 to negotiate the release of Lebanese detainees suspected of having ties to Hezbollah, according to Lebanese media.[58] The UAE has previously detained dozens of Lebanese nationals over suspected ties to Hezbollah.[59] Safa is the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit.[60] This unit is responsible for coordination with Lebanese state entities, including political parties, Lebanese armed forces elements, and other state institutions. The unit is also responsible for bribing Lebanese officials to secure their assistance in covering up and enabling Hezbollah’s criminal activity.[61] The United States sanctioned Safa in July 2019 for serving as the head of Hezbollah’s security apparatus and using Lebanese ports and border crossings to smuggle weapons and transfer funds for Hezbollah.[62] Safa is also the Hezbollah official responsible for engaging the international community and Lebanon’s security forces, according to the US Treasury Department.[63]

Israel likely conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Lebanese Hezbollah facilities in southern Syria on March 18. The Syrian Defense Ministry said on March 19 that Syrian air defense systems intercepted at least one Israeli missile and that several other missiles struck unspecified military targets in the Damascus countryside.[64] Unspecified Syrian sources told Reuters that the strikes targeted Hezbollah ammunition depots near Yabroud in the Qalamoun Mountains north of Damascus.[65] An unspecified Western intelligence source said that the airstrike on March 18 also targeted “Hezbollah infrastructure” in Qutayfah, which is also north of Damascus.[66] Unspecified Syrian sources and ”regional intelligence” claimed that Israel has increased its rate of strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Syria.[67] Yabroud and Qutayfah are located on main roads used by Iran and Iranian-affiliated militias to transport weapons and personnel through southern Syria and into Lebanon.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad in Damascus on March 19.[68] Grossi and Mekdad discussed “the factors that hinder cooperation” between the IAEA and Syria.[69] Emirati media previously reported that Grossi would likely discuss the suspected nuclear reactor in eastern Syria that Israel destroyed in an airstrike in 2007.[70] The Syrian regime has denied that the site Israel struck in 2007 was a secret nuclear facility.[71] The IAEA concluded in 2011 that the site was “very likely” a nuclear reactor. Grossi said on March 19 that he visited Syria to “reignite high-level dialogue between the IAEA and Syria.”[72]

IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri warned that Iran would retaliate if “foreigners” seize Iranian oil tankers anywhere in the world during a speech for the anniversary of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry on March 18.[73]  Tangsiri is probably implicitly warning the United States. Iran has previously seized US commercial vessels in response to US seizures of Iranian vessels.[74] These US seizures aim to enforce sanctions on Iran.

Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji discussed bilateral cooperation and the oil market in a telephone call with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak on March 19.[75] The ministers discussed the development of unspecified oil and gas field projects. Iran previously signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) with Russian oil companies to develop oil and gas fields, invest in the energy sector, and construct liquefied natural gas plants.[76] The two sides have not moved forward with these MoUs by converting them into contracts.

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri reached an agreement to secure gubernatorial positions for their respective political parties.[77] Maliki will nominate State of Law Coalition member Wadah al Tamimi as governor of Diyala Province and Ameri will nominate Fatah Alliance member Abbas al Zamili as governor of Qadisiyyah Province.[78] Zamili served as a member of the Qadisiyyah provincial council and as the head of the Badr Organization’s Shura Council in Qadisiyyah between 2016 and 2017.[79]

The Houthis claimed a missile attack targeting the Marshall Islands–flagged, Greek-operated MADO tanker in an unspecified area of the Red Sea.[80] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations has not confirmed this attack on the MADO at the time of writing. The UKMTO previously reported two attacks on the MADO on March 15 and March 16, respectively.[81]

The Houthis claimed a missile attack targeting Eilat, southern Israel, on March 19. The IDF said on March 18 that a “suspicious aerial target” crossed into Israeli territory from the Red Sea and fell into an open area north of Eilat.[82]

US CENTCOM conducted multiple preemptive strikes targeting Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen on March 18.[83] CENTCOM said that it destroyed seven anti-ship missiles, three Houthi attack drones, and three weapons storage containers. Houthi-affiliated media previously reported on March 18 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.[84]

27. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin presented the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) as a key guarantor of Russian security and sovereignty following his victory in the Russian presidential election, likely signaling that Russian security services and siloviki will continue to represent his core constituency in his fifth presidential term.
• Russia continues efforts to build a coalition to counterbalance the West by pursuing bilateral relationships with Iran, North Korea, and China.
• Armenia's Central Bank will reportedly ban the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent Armenia from falling under secondary US sanctions.
• Pro-Russian actors in Moldova are continuing efforts to support wider Kremlin hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to stand up significant initiatives to provide military support to Ukraine.
• The Russian military confirmed that Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.
• Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Avdiivka on March 19.
• Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on March 19 that the Russian military will not increase the number of conscripts summoned during the upcoming semi-annual spring conscription cycle in comparison to the previous fall 2023 conscription cycle.
• Kremlin officials continue to implicate themselves directly in the illegal removal of Ukrainian children to other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine and the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
• 
  

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 19, 2024

Mar 19, 2024 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2024

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 19, 2024, 5:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on March 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin presented the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) as a key guarantor of Russian security and sovereignty following his victory in the Russian presidential election, likely signaling that Russian security services and siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence) will continue to represent his core constituency in his fifth presidential term. Putin delivered his first major address following his March 18 electoral victory speech at the FSB board meeting on March 19 and praised FSB officers for ensuring Russian security and sovereignty.[1] Putin thanked FSB officers for successful operations in Ukraine, for suppressing attempts to interfere in Russian internal affairs, and for repelling “terrorist” attacks against Russia (in reference to limited raids by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteers in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts).[2] Putin also highlighted the FSB’s role in suppressing attempts by unnamed actors to provoke internal unrest and interethnic conflict within Russia and the FSB‘s responsibilities to ensure Russia’s economic security, combat corruption, and protect critical infrastructure.[3] Putin’s appeals to these FSB functions likely sought to remind his domestic constituency that his regime has the backing of an extensive security apparatus, which the Kremlin has been attempting to expand since the start of the full-scale invasion, particularly since the Wagner Group‘s failed rebellion in June 2023.[4] It is notable that one of the greatest challenges to the stability of Putin’s rule came from a silovik, deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Putin likely aims to signal that Russia’s siloviki are firmly united in support of his fifth presidential term and his war effort in Ukraine.[5] Putin, a former KGB officer himself, may be highlighting the FSB as an organization that has his current favor, although Putin has traditionally pitted Russia’s security organizations and siloviki against each other to compete for his support and prevent any singular entity from amassing too much power.[6]

Russia continues efforts to build a coalition to counterbalance the West by pursuing bilateral relationships with Iran, North Korea, and China. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko met with Chinese Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs Liu Xiaoming in Moscow on March 19 to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula.[7] Rudenko and Liu accused the United States and its allies of threatening the military situation in northeastern Asia and warned the United States against the proliferation of Cold War-style “bloc thinking.”[8] Russia has notably been pursuing an intensified relationship with North Korea and has received ballistic missiles and artillery ammunition from North Korea in exchange for likely technological cooperation and other unspecified support, which has generated concern in Seoul about the security situation on the peninsula.[9] Russian Ambassador to China Igor Morgulov additionally met with Chinese Xinhua News Agency Head Fu Hua to discuss bilateral cooperation in the media sphere.[10] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 19 to discuss bilateral cooperation, and Raisi affirmed his willingness to help Russia stabilize the South Caucasus region, potentially in reference to ongoing developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan.[11] Russia’s pursuit of a stronger political and diplomatic bilateral relationship with Beijing while also leveraging its bilateral relationships with Iran and North Korea for military benefit represents the type of ”bloc thinking ” of which Liu and Rudenko accused the US and its allies. The Kremlin has exploited the war in Ukraine to pursue bilateral relationships and create a coalition of states to counterbalance the West, which has long been a central aspect of Russia’s foreign policy.[12]

Armenia's Central Bank will reportedly ban the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent Armenia from falling under secondary US sanctions.[13] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 19 that a high-ranking source in the Armenian banking sector stated that Armenia’s Central Bank will ban local Armenian banks from using the “Mir” system starting on March 29.[14] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian service Radio Azatutyun reported that 17 of 18 Armenian commercial banks will stop using the ”Mir” national payment system on March 30 and that only VTB-Armenia, a subsidiary of the Russian VTB Bank, will continue to use the system.[15] Turkey and Uzbekistan stopped using the “Mir” system in 2022, likely to avoid secondary sanctions.[16] The United States imposed sanctions against VTB Bank in February 2022 and against ”Mir” national payment system’s operator the National Payment Card System Joint Stock Company in February 2024.[17]

Pro-Russian actors in Moldova are continuing efforts to support wider Kremlin hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) informed Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov that the Moldovan government is expelling an unspecified Russian diplomat in connection with their organization of polling stations in Transnistria for the Russian presidential elections despite the lack of official Moldovan consent.[18] Vasnetsov and Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded, stating that Russia will not leave Moldova’s “unfriendly” actions unanswered.[19] Ilan Shor, a US-sanctioned, pro-Russian Moldovan politician, stated in an interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused outlet RTVi published on March 16 that he plans to become the Moldovan Prime Minister following the 2025 Parliamentary elections.[20] Governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, stated on March 19 that she will sue Moldovan President Maia Sandu for defamation after Sandu stated to journalists on March 18 that Gustul works for a “criminal group and not the residents of Gagauzia” and Sandu would therefore not sign the decree to include Gutsul in the Moldovan government.[21] Sandu stated in September 2023 that she would not sign the decree until the Moldovan Prosecution Service completed its investigation regarding corruption and bribery in the Gagauzia gubernatorial election that brought Gutsul to power.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russia and Russian-linked actors in Moldova are engaged in a hybrid campaign that is most likely aimed at destabilizing Moldova from within ahead of the upcoming Moldovan presidential election in late 2024 and Parliamentary elections in summer 2025.[23] Shor is currently living in exile in Israel after he fled Moldova in 2019 to avoid serving a prison sentence for massive fraud and money laundering charges.[24] The Moldovan Constitutional Court also deemed Shor’s pro-Russian political party, the Shor Party, unconstitutional in 2023.[25] Shor’s confident statement that he plans to become the Moldovan Prime Minister in 2025 indicates that he hopes a pro-Russian politician will become Moldovan president in 2024, exonerate him, vacate his prison sentence so that he can safely return to Moldova and then presumably appoint him prime minister. It is also notable that Gutsul plans to sue Sandu for defamation now, as Sandu made identical statements in November 2023 about her refusal to allow Gutsul into the Moldovan government because of Gutsul’s involvement in a ”criminal group,” which did not prompt Gutsul to press charges at that time.[26] Gutsul’s avowed decision to press charges now suggests that charges against Sandu are part of a wider effort to discredit or distract Sandu in her campaign for re-election.

Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to stand up significant initiatives to provide military support to Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on March 19 that the European Union (EU) has prepared draft legislation that would allow the transfer of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as early as July 2024.[27] EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated that the EU should transfer 90 percent of Russian frozen asset revenue to an EU-run fund to finance security assistance for Ukraine and that he will submit a formal proposal for this mechanism to EU member states on March 20.[28] Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz additionally announced on March 18 that Germany and Poland are creating an “armored vehicle coalition” to support Ukraine and noted that Sweden, the UK, and Italy have already declared their willingness to participate in the coalition.[29]

The Russian military confirmed that Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. The Russian military officially introduced Moiseev as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy at a Russian Navy ceremony in Kronstadt in St. Petersburg on March 19.[30] ISW recently assessed that Moiseev may have been appointed as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy to retain a high-ranking command role as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deprives the Northern Fleet of its status as an “interservice strategic territorial organization” (a joint headquarters in Western military parlance) to restore the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts (MMD and LMD).[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin presented the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) as a key guarantor of Russian security and sovereignty following his victory in the Russian presidential election, likely signaling that Russian security services and siloviki will continue to represent his core constituency in his fifth presidential term.
• Russia continues efforts to build a coalition to counterbalance the West by pursuing bilateral relationships with Iran, North Korea, and China.
• Armenia's Central Bank will reportedly ban the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent Armenia from falling under secondary US sanctions.
• Pro-Russian actors in Moldova are continuing efforts to support wider Kremlin hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to stand up significant initiatives to provide military support to Ukraine.
• The Russian military confirmed that Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.
• Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Avdiivka on March 19.
• Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on March 19 that the Russian military will not increase the number of conscripts summoned during the upcoming semi-annual spring conscription cycle in comparison to the previous fall 2023 conscription cycle.
• Kremlin officials continue to implicate themselves directly in the illegal removal of Ukrainian children to other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine and the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled “Ukrainian” (likely referring to the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps [RDK]) sabotage and reconnaissance attempts near Kozinka, Belgorod Oblast.[32]

Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked near Kupyansk and Kreminna on March 19, and there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[33] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue operating near Bilohorivka.[34]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 18 that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces, operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction, consists of a maximum of 80,000 personnel.[35] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian Western Military District (WMD), including the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA), and 11th AC (Baltic Fleet, WMD) operate in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets noted that elements of the 138th and 25th motorized rifle brigades (both 6th CAA) and 11th AC are operating along the Synkivka-Petropavlivka line (northeast of Kupyansk, and that elements of the 2nd and 4th motorized rifle divisions, 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (all 1st GTA), and 11th AC are operating southeast of Kupyansk along the Stepova Novoselivka-Tabaivka-Pishchane line. Mashovets concluded that Russian forces have five regiments and up to three battalion-sized units in reserve in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets also stated that elements of the Russian 20th and 25th CAA (both Central Military District [CMD]) and individual elements of the 1st GTA (WMD) are deployed in the Lyman direction and that elements of the 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (20th CAA) are attempting to advance near Terny while elements of the 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA) are trying to advance to Torske.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional fighting west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka, Klishchiivka, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora.[36] Russian milbloggers noted that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the western outskirts of Ivanivske and that heavy fighting is ongoing in the settlement.[37] Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade, 98th VDV Division, 3rd AC, and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating around Bakhmut.[38]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Orlivka, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces fully controlling the settlement. The Russian MoD claimed on March 19 that elements of the Central Grouping of Forces seized Orlivka, northwest of Avdiivka.[39] Several milbloggers amplified this claim, and one prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces fully captured and began clearing Orlivka on March 17 but faced challenges in fully consolidating control over the settlement due to Ukrainian counterattacks.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are intensifying attacks on Berdychi (just north of Orlivka and northwest of Avdiivka) and Tonenke (south of Orlivka and west of Avdiivka) and that Russian aviation is conducting constant FAB glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in these two settlements.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force near Russian positions north and northwest of Avdiivka.[42] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are operating near Orlivka.[43]

Geolocated footage published on March 19 shows that Russian forces recently advanced on the northwestern edge of the Pervomaiske Dam in Pervomaiske, southwest of Avdiivka.[44] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[45]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing near Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), but that Russian forces have been unable to significantly advance in this area despite conducting frequent armored and infantry assaults.[46] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[47] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Krasnohorivka.[48]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne.[49] Elements of the Russian Baltic Fleet, 14th Spetsnaz Brigade and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Vuhledar (30km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating south of Velyka Novosilka.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed any confirmation of this claim.[51] Positional fighting continued near Robotyne and Verbove.[52]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson oblast, including near Krynky, on March 19.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that a small number of Ukrainian forces remain in Krynky and that the majority of Ukrainian forces in east bank Kherson Oblast hold positions west of the settlement in coastal and forest areas.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in dacha areas near the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky).[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces have launched 130 missiles of various types, 320 Shahed drones, and 900 glide bombs since the beginning of March.[56]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on March 19 that the Russian military will not increase the number of conscripts summoned during the upcoming semi-annual spring conscription cycle in comparison to the previous fall 2023 conscription cycle. Kartapolov stated that Russian authorities will issue both electronic and paper summonses during the spring cycle, which will occur from April 1 to July 15.[57] Kartapolov also stated that the number of conscripts called up in the upcoming conscription cycle will not change from the previous call-ups and that conscripts will not go to the “special operation zone” in Ukraine.[58]

The Russian State Duma adopted a law on March 19 that will release individuals from criminal liability if they sign contracts for military service.[59] The bill will likely allow Russia to expand its recruiting base outside of existing convict recruitment schemes.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Kremlin officials continue to implicate themselves directly in the illegal removal of Ukrainian children to other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine and the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova stated on March 19 that Russian authorities removed 84 Ukrainian children from occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts to occupied Crimea under the guise of rehabilitation programs and that Russian authorities removed a total of 150 Ukrainian children and brought them to sanatoriums in occupied Crimea in 2023.[60] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) stated on March 19 that Yana Lantratova, a Russian Duma deputy, and Inna Varlamova, wife of Just Russia Party leader Sergei Mironov, are also involved in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[61] The SBU stated that its investigation found that Lantratova and Varlamova previously traveled to Kherson City when it was under Russian occupation under the guise of an official visit and took a newborn girl and a two-year-old boy from an orphanage to Moscow. The SBU stated that Ukrainian officials discovered fake documents detailing these illegal deportations with Lantratova’s and Varlamova’s signatures when Russian forces left Kherson City. BBC Panorama and Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii published investigations in November 2023 detailing how Mironov adopted a 10-month-old Ukrainian infant whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from a Kherson City orphanage in autumn of 2022 alongside over 40 other children.[62]

Russian officials likely falsified record high support for Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian presidential election. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) claimed that more than 1.4 million people voted for Putin in occupied Luhansk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated that this number exceeds the oblast’s current total population.[63] Ukrainian partisan movement Yellow Ribbon stated on March 18 that actual voter turnout in occupied Ukraine was significantly lower than the Kremlin’s claimed numbers, in part due to the fact that the Kremlin knows that Russian journalists largely do not work in occupied Ukraine and Russian occupation authorities do not have clear numbers about how many Ukrainians still live in Russian-occupied areas.[64]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue to threaten escalation to stifle discussions about Western support for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin baselessly claimed on March 19 that France is preparing to send a contingent of 2,000 French soldiers to Ukraine and asserted that any French military unit within Ukraine would be a legitimate and priority target for Russian forces.[65] French officials have not confirmed Naryshkin’s claim about the French contingent. French President Emmanuel Macron has recently discussed proposals to send Western troops to Ukraine but has stressed that the current situation does not require it.[66] Macron discussed these proposals while calling on the West to expand the level and types of security assistance it sends to Ukraine, and Naryshkin likely aimed to portray these wider calls as possible routes to confrontation with Russia. Russian officials have routinely attempted to portray any level of Western security assistance to Ukraine as inherently escalatory, although Russia has not previously significantly responded when Ukrainian forces and Western assistance to Ukraine have crossed Russia’s supposed and self-defined “red lines.”[67]

Russian officials rejected the possibility of bilateral arms control discussions with the United States and dismissed potential future talks as non-viable. US Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated on March 18 that the US is willing to engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia without preconditions, but Russia’s First Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Dmitri Polyanskiy stated that Russia does not see any basis for a dialogue on new arms control agreements with the United States.[68] Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev attempted to portray possible arms control talks with the United States as outlandish by comparing them to hypothetical Soviet negotiations with Hitler about lowering the threshold for the use of ”offensive weapons” during the Second World War.[69] The Soviet Union, of course, had concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany that partitioned Poland and ceded the Baltic States to the USSR in 1939. Russian officials routinely place the onus for negotiations and “strategic stability” on the United States despite increasingly framing Russia’s war in Ukraine as a geopolitical confrontation with the West.[70]

Kremlin officials continue to accuse the West of interfering in Russia’s presidential election. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on March 18 that unfriendly countries attempted to interfere in the Russian MFA’s administration of the Russian presidential election abroad.[71] The Russian Embassy in London claimed on March 19 that United Kingdom (UK) officials are trying to discredit the Russian presidential election and accused UK diplomatic and consular missions in Russia of ”essentially” inciting damage to ballot boxes during the election, referencing limited acts of disruptions by Russian citizens at polling stations in Russia between March 15 and 17.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com