Quotes of the Day:

"The only thing worse than being blind is having sight but no vision."

- Helen Keller

"The trouble with most people is that they think with their hopes or fears or wishes rather than with their minds."

- Will Durant

Characteristics of the American Way of War (11 of 13)

11. Impatient. America is an exceptionally ideological society and, to date at least, it has distinguished clearly between conditions of peace and war. Americans have approached warfare as a regrettable occasional evil that has to be concluded as decisively and rapidly as possible. That partially moral perspective has not always sat well with the requirements of a politically effective use of force. For example, an important reason why MACV was not impressed by the promise of dedicated, time-proven counterinsurgency techniques in Vietnam, was the undeniable fact that such a style of warfare was expected to take far too long to show major results. Furthermore, America's regular military minds, and the domestic public, have been schooled to expect military action to produce conclusive results. At Khe Sahn in 1968, for a case in point, MACV was searching for an ever elusive decisive victory. As a consequence, it was lured into remote terrain , far from the cities where the vast majority of the people had congregated. The nationwide popular rising (which never came) was planned and expected by Hanoi to be an urban event, with a little help from the VC, of course. Today, cultural bias towards swift action for swift victory is amplified by mass news media that are all too ready to report a lack of visible progress as evidence of stalemate and error.

Impatience is always a military vice, but never is this more true than in the conduct of war against irregular enemies. Those enemies have to use time as a weapon. We cannot claim we have not been warned. The rationale for, character, and structure of protracted war was described in ample detail 70 years ago by Mao Tse-tung; with local variants, it has been practiced around the world ever since by insurgents of many political persuasions.⁸⁴ It is probably no exaggeration to claim that a campaign plan fuelled by impatience must prove fatal to the prospects for success in irregular warfare. An impatient combatant literally will be seeking to achieve the impossible. Unless the irregular makes a truly irreversible political error, swift and decisive success against him, let alone some facsimile of victory, simply is not attainable. The center of gravity in irregular warfare, which is to say the local people and their allegiance, cannot be seized and held by dramatic military action. Against irregular foes, America's soldiers, and more particularly America's local allies, must be prepared to play a long game. The Army knows this, but whether the American body politic shares in this enlightenment is much less certain. It may be important for this analysis to repeat here a point advanced earlier. Americans are right to be uneasy about open-ended military commitments to allies who are struggling against insurgencies. There is much to be said for U.S. forces to devote most of their distinctive strengths to keeping the fight fair for our local friends. This may well require the taking of suitably violent action, certainly the issuing of some fearsome threats, against foreign backers of an insurgency. But terrorists and other insurgents ultimately can be worn down and overcome only by local initiatives and steady effort, not by American COIN behavior, no matter how expertly conducted. As a general rule, to which there will always be the odd exceptions, irregular wars cannot be won by foreigners, regardless of their good intentions and the high quality of their means and methods. Such high-quality methods are, of course, greatly to be desired, and would stand in healthy contrast with much of America's record in countering irregular enemies over the past 50 years.

1. DPRK (North Korea): Arria-formula Meeting on the Human Rights Situation

2. N. Korea test-fired Hwasong-17 ICBM in warning to enemies holding allied drills: state media

3. Yoon, Kishida bond over drinks at popular eatery

4. Allies to resume large-scale amphibious drills next week after 5-year hiatus

5. Why South Koreans should have access to Pyongyang's propaganda media

6. [ANALYSIS] Too early to hail success of Korea-Japan summit

7. ‘Hunting rifles’ — really? China ships assault weapons and body armor to Russia

8. NK leader says nuclear buildup is to ‘strike fear into enemies’

9. Main opposition slams Korea-Japan summit as 'most humiliating' moment in diplomacy

10. PacNet #14 - South Korea's Indo-Pacific pivot strategy

11. South Korea Could Get Away With the Bomb

12. N. Korean family in Rason rumored to have made soup out of pet dog

13. N. Korean state security officers use remittance brokers to take money from defector families

14. Military Chief Says US Will Defend Indo-Pacific Freedoms

15. The US defector to North Korea no one ever hears about

1. DPRK (North Korea): Arria-formula Meeting on the Human Rights Situation

Human rights upfront.

DPRK (North Korea): Arria-formula Meeting on the Human Rights Situation

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/03/dprk-north-korea-arria-formula-meeting-on-the-human-rights-situation.php

Tomorrow morning (17 March), Albania and the US will convene an Arria-formula meeting titled “the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”. The meeting is being co-sponsored by Japan and non-Council member the Republic of Korea (ROK). The expected briefers are UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK Elizabeth Salmón, Chief of the Prevention and Sustaining Peace Section at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) James Turpin, and two refugees from the DPRK.

The meeting, which will begin at 10 am and take place in the Trusteeship Chamber, will not be broadcast on UNTV, after China raised an objection to webcasting it on the official UN channel. In line with established practice, the webcasting of Arria-formula meetings via UNTV requires the consent of all Council members; it can therefore be blocked if a single Council member objects.

The ROK and member states or observer offices speaking on behalf of two or more member states or observer offices have been invited to deliver statements after the interventions of briefers and Council members. It appears that statements will be delivered on behalf of the EU, the Nordic Group (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), and Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (CANZ).

Albania and the US have prepared a concept note for the meeting, which says that it aims to shed light on the human rights violations perpetrated by the DPRK and their link to international peace and security. Three main objectives for the meeting are outlined in the concept note:

• highlighting the ongoing violations and abuses of human rights by the DPRK;
• identifying opportunities for the international community to promote accountability for the DPRK’s human rights violations and abuses; and
• underscoring how the DPRK’s human rights violations and abuses are inextricably linked with the threats to peace and security posed by the DPRK’s unlawful [weapons of mass destruction] and ballistic missile programmes.

The concept note refers to the Secretary-General’s 29 July 2022 report to the General Assembly on the situation of human rights in the DPRK (A/77/247), which mentions the “widespread and systematic use of torture”, lack of meaningful public participation in the political process, suppression of access to foreign media content, and the “absolute denial of freedom to express views or criticism of the government”, among other matters.

The concept note also discusses Salmón’s 13 October 2022 report to the General Assembly (A/77/522), which draws attention to reports of unresolved cases of persons abducted and disappeared by the DPRK, particularly from Japan and the ROK. Salmón’s report also notes that she will continue to pursue the two-track strategy followed by the previous Special Rapporteur, Tomás Ojea Quintana, which seeks to “ensure the accountability of those responsible for human rights violations, including through referral by the Security Council of the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court (ICC), while continuously seeking engagement with the authorities to bring relief to the people of the [DPRK]”.

The 2014 report of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK (A/HRC/25/63) is also mentioned in the concept note. This report found that the DPRK has prioritised military spending and “failed in its obligation to use the maximum of its available resources to feed those who are hungry” and concluded that DPRK officials are responsible for committing “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations”.

From 2014 to 2017, the Security Council held an annual meeting on the human rights situation in the DPRK every December. Council meetings on this issue have been contentious, principally because members hold differing views as to whether human rights violations in the DPRK constitute a threat to international peace and security. China has argued that the Security Council is not a forum for discussing human rights issues, that such issues should not be politicised, and that discussion of human rights in the DPRK jeopardises the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Russia has adopted a similar position, together with some elected members.

Other Council members, however, feel that the human rights situation in the DPRK merits Council attention and have sought open meetings on the matter under the agenda item “the situation in the DPRK”. In December 2017, for example, nine Council members—France, Italy, Japan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, the UK, the US, and Uruguay—requested a meeting on the issue with briefings from senior officials from the UN Secretariat and OHCHR.

Due to divisions among members, every request for an open Council meeting on the agenda item “the situation in the DPRK” has required a procedural vote. (Council resolutions of a procedural nature need nine affirmative votes to be adopted, and the veto does not apply.) These procedural votes were prompted by objections from China with support from Russia. It appears that the proponents of this meeting have not been able to garner sufficient support to hold an open briefing since 2017.

Council members last discussed the human rights situation in the DPRK on 9 December 2022, following a request from Albania and the US. On the same day, more than 30 member states, including current Council members Albania, Ecuador, France, Japan, Malta, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, issued a joint statement that described several examples of human rights violations in the DPRK and urged all Council members to support an open briefing in 2023 “where we can discuss the human rights violations and abuses committed by the DPRK, the implications for peace and security, and explore ways to incorporate human rights into the peace and security diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula”.

On 28 February, Albania and the US sent a letter to the president of the Security Council on behalf of more than 60 member states, including Council members Ecuador, France, Japan, Malta, Switzerland, and the UK, which requested that the agenda item “the situation in the DPRK” remain on the list of items of which the Council is seized. (If a formal meeting is not held on an agenda item for three years, that item is subject to deletion; however, if a member state or group of member states requests its retention, that item will remain on the seizure list for a further year. There is no limit on the number of times a retention request can be made.)

Tomorrow’s meeting takes place against a backdrop of worsening tensions on the Korean peninsula. Earlier today (16 March), the DPRK launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that travelled approximately 1,000 kilometres to an altitude of around 6,000 kilometres before landing in waters outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone. The launch came hours before Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol were due to meet at a summit in Tokyo to discuss economic and security ties between the two states and during ongoing military exercises between the ROK and the US. Days earlier, on 14 March, the DPRK fired two short-range ballistic missiles into waters off its east coast. This launch was carried out the day before the military drills between the ROK and the US began.

It appears that Council members are expected to discuss today’s launch test during a meeting next week. At the time of writing, the request for a meeting had not been made.

On 20 February, the Security Council held an open briefing to discuss the DPRK’s 18 February ICBM test, at the request of Albania, France, Japan, Malta, the UK, and the US. At that meeting, the US indicated that it would pursue a presidential statement on the DPRK. It appears that negotiations on the presidential statement are ongoing. Council members are also negotiating a draft resolution extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, which expires on 30 April. It seems that the first draft of the resolution was circulated to Council members on 10 March and that an initial consultation on the draft took place on 14 March.

Tags: Arria formula, DPRK (North Korea), Insights on Asia

2. N. Korea test-fired Hwasong-17 ICBM in warning to enemies holding allied drills: state media

I think I still owe the Propaganda and Agitation department a new English dictionary and a thesaurus. 

You have to love their English translations of their rhetoric and threats. Their "exceptional militancy?" Really? Is that supposed to scare us? A "frontal confrontation in kind?"

Excerpts:

It confirmed "the war readiness of the ICBM unit and the exceptional militancy of the DPRK's strategic forces and strictly verified their reliability," it added, using the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The KCNA said the ICBM, launched at Pyongyang International Airport, reached a maximum altitude of 6,045 kilometers and flew 1,000.2 km for 4,151 seconds before accurately landing on the preset area in the open waters off the East Sea. The Hwasong-17, called by observers here the "monster missile," was apparently shot at a lofted angle.

...

He emphasized that the North will "react to nuclear weapons with nukes and frontal confrontation in kind" and called for "strictly maintaining the rapid response posture of the strategic forces to cope with any armed conflict and war."

(LEAD) N. Korea test-fired Hwasong-17 ICBM in warning to enemies holding allied drills: state media | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · March 17, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details; MODIFIES headline; ADDS photo, byline)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, March 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has test-fired a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a show of the "toughest response posture" of its strategic forces against "aggressive" massive combined drills by the United States and South Korea, Pyongyang's state media reported Friday.

The nation's leader Kim Jong-un "guided" the launch the previous day together with his young daughter Ju-ae, as it served as an occasion to "give a stronger warning to the enemies intentionally escalating the tension" on the peninsula, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March 17, 2023, shows the North firing a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile from the Sunan area in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

It cited the "unstable security environment" in the region attributable to "provocative and aggressive large-scale war drills," referring to the South Korea-U.S. Freedom Shield (FS) exercise under way in a program coupled with major field trainings.

The drill involving the Hwasong-17 was "aimed at confirming the mobile and normal operation and reliability of the DPRK's nuclear war deterrent," the KCNA said in an English-language report.

It confirmed "the war readiness of the ICBM unit and the exceptional militancy of the DPRK's strategic forces and strictly verified their reliability," it added, using the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The KCNA said the ICBM, launched at Pyongyang International Airport, reached a maximum altitude of 6,045 kilometers and flew 1,000.2 km for 4,151 seconds before accurately landing on the preset area in the open waters off the East Sea. The Hwasong-17, called by observers here the "monster missile," was apparently shot at a lofted angle.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects the test-firing of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile on March 16, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

It came hours before South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol had summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo amid Washington's campaign to bolster trilateral security cooperation with the two key regional allies to counter the North's nuclear and missile threats.

Kim was quoted as stressing the need to "strike fear into the enemies" and warning that the allies' persistent military moves against the North will only bring "irreversible, grave threat" onto themselves.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L), alongside his daughter Ju-ae, inspects the test-firing of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile on March 16, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

He emphasized that the North will "react to nuclear weapons with nukes and frontal confrontation in kind" and called for "strictly maintaining the rapid response posture of the strategic forces to cope with any armed conflict and war."

Photos released by the KCNA showed Kim watching the launch with his second child, presumed to be around 10 years old. The secretive regime announced the first public appearance of his daughter in November last year, as the two inspected the launch of a Hwasong-17 together.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · March 17, 2023

3. Yoon, Kishida bond over drinks at popular eatery

Looks like they are having a couple of beers. See photo at the link: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230317003500315

I am reminded of one of the many great Command Sergeants Major with whom I served who said soldiers bond in one of three ways: shared combat, shared hardship in training, and shared beer drinking.

Yoon, Kishida bond over drinks at popular eatery | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · March 17, 2023

By Lee Haye-ah

TOKYO, March 17 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have bonded over a couple of drinks at a popular eatery in Tokyo, a person familiar with the exchange said.

The two leaders, who held summit talks earlier in the day Thursday, visited Rengatei, a Western-style establishment known as the birthplace of Japanese pork cutlets and "omurice," or omelets on fried rice, where they shared glasses of beer to begin with.

Yoon then suggested they add soju, traditional Korean distilled liquor, to the mix as a symbol of harmony, the person said, and Kishida likened the taste to the taste of the friendship between South Korea and Japan.

The two leaders later tasted a Japanese sweet potato liquor.

Yoon told Kishida he would like to take the bilateral relationship to a new high, to which Kishida responded that he expects relations between the two countries to improve and hopes to have a similar casual meeting with Yoon when he eventually visits South Korea, the person said.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida toast at Rengatei, a Western-style establishment known as the birthplace of Japanese pork cutlets and "omurice," in Tokyo on March 16, 2023. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · March 17, 2023

4. Allies to resume large-scale amphibious drills next week after 5-year hiatus

(2nd LD) Allies to resume large-scale amphibious drills next week after 5-year hiatus | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · March 17, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with multinational air drills in last 2 paras; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, March 17 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States plan to kick off their first large-scale amphibious landing exercise in five years next week, in a show of the allies' "overwhelming" military capabilities, the Navy and Marine Corps here said Friday.

The Ssangyong training is set to take place in and around Pohang, 272 kilometers southeast of Seoul, from Monday through April 3 to enhance the allies' combat readiness and interoperability, according to the armed services. "Ssangyong" means double dragon in Korean.

It had not been held since its last edition in 2018 amid the preceding Moon Jae-in administration's drive for inter-Korean rapprochement. Its resumption comes in line with the allies' push to reinforce combined drills to counter evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

"The upcoming training will demonstrate the South Korea-U.S. alliance's will to realize 'peace through strength,' and we will further strengthen the combined defense posture to defend South Korea," Marine Corps Commandant Lt. Gen. Kim Gye-hwan was quoted as saying.

This photo, taken on March 13, 2023, shows a South Korea-U.S. combined military exercise under way in Yeoncheon, 60 kilometers north of Seoul. (Yonhap)

For this year's exercise, the South and the U.S. plan to mobilize division-level amphibious landing forces and some 30 vessels, including the allies' amphibious assault ships, ROKS Dokdo and USS Makin Island.

They will also deploy some 70 aircraft, such as F-35B radar-evading fighter jets and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and around 50 amphibious assault vehicles.

For the first time, about 40 British Marine troops will take part in the exercise, while personnel from Australia, France and the Philippines are to participate as observers, according to the officials. Troops from Australia and New Zealand took part in past Ssangyong exercises.

It entails an array of contingency procedures, such as clearing mines, removing threat elements on the ground, providing fire support in amphibious landing locations and conducting airborne and seaborne assault operations, officials said.

Meanwhile, special warfare forces from the allies' Navies recently wrapped up their regular Flash Knife exercise in Changwon, 301 km southeast of Seoul, and Pyeongchang, 126 km east of the capital. The exercise is known to target an enemy leadership under a crisis scenario.

Separately, the allies' Army troops staged combined logistics support drills in the border county of Cheorwon, 71 kilometers northeast of Seoul, this week.

Some 700 troops took part in the five-day drills through Friday, focusing on strengthening the allies' interoperability, according to the South's Army.

South Korea's Air Force has also participated in the multinational Desert Flag exercise in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that ran from Feb. 26 to Friday. It involved troops from the UAE, the U.S., Britain, France, India, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Australia.

The armed service deployed a C-130 transport plane and some 30 personnel to the exercise at the Al Dhafra Air Base. South Korean troops carried out cargo drops into the desert as well as take-off and landing training in rough terrain.

South Korean and U.S. logistics troops connect a pipe to install a fuel tank in the border county of Cheorwon, 71 kilometers northeast of Seoul, as part of five-day combined logistics support drills that began March 13, in this photo provided by the South's Army on March 17, 2023. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

A South Korean C-130 transport aircraft taxis on an unpaved runway during the multinational Desert Flag exercise held in the United Arab Emirates from Feb. 26 to March 17, 2023, in this photo provided by the Air Force on March 17. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · March 17, 2023

5. Why South Koreans should have access to Pyongyang's propaganda media

I concur. The novelty will soon wear off as people initially view the propaganda with curiosity then with satire and then they will soon tire of the over the top rhetoric. ANd most importantly they will get to see the obvious lies of the propaganda and be able to have a chance of grasping the nature, objectives, and strage of the Kim family regime.

Opponents' concern that some will be influenced by the propaganda messages must never have seen nK propaganda. Oh that's right, they have been prevented from seeing it so they are basing their views on insufficient information.

I remember being in my wife's apartment in Munsan Korea in the 1980s and flipping through the handful of TV channels. We were close enough to pick up the signal from Kaesong in north Korea. I started watching it until my wife noticed and she told me I had to turn it off because it was against the law to watch it. I could not believe it.

Why South Koreans should have access to Pyongyang's propaganda media

The Korea Times · March 16, 2023

North Koreans read a copy of the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's official newspaper, at Mirae Scientists Street in Pyongyang, in this Jan. 11, 2021, file photo. South Korea is stepping up its efforts to lift its ban on North Korean media amid concerns over the potential influence of its propaganda. AFP-Yonhap

Worries about nonsensical ― even risible ― regime messages overblown, experts say

By Jung Min-ho

After the 1950-53 Korean War, ideological conflicts within and outside South Korea intensified. Many South Korean citizens were raising questions about the promises of capitalism; some gravitated to the communist utopian vision promoted by the North. Back when South Korea was poorer than the North economically, the regime's propaganda was a major threat to its very survival, prompting its leaders to enact the National Security Act to counter those messages.

Seven decades have passed since. South Korea today is incomparably more prosperous and influential than its totalitarian rival. Yet the act is still firmly in place, imposing a de facto ban on free public access to North Korean media. Those interested in reading North Korean newspapers such as the Rodong Sinmun need to visit government-designated places where they can access North Korea's mostly outdated "news" after showing their ID.

Experts say the ban is obsolete and only benefits the regime, which shuns ― and fears ― any type of transparency. They call for change, saying that worries about the potential influence of North Korea's propaganda here are overblown.

"After Germany was divided during the Cold War between the capitalist bloc led by the U.S. and the communist one by the Soviet Union, West Germany kept its door open to the media of East Germany. But West Germans showed little interest in reading Neues Deutschland, then the East side's official party newspaper, which is comparable to the Rodong Sinmun," Kim Young-soo, secretary-general at the Seoul office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, a German political body that has promoted Korea's peaceful unification, told The Korea Times.

"If the South lifts its ban on North Korean media, the same thing will happen. After a while, few people will show interest."

In recent months, the South's Ministry of Unification has been stepping up its efforts to expand public access to North Korean media, including broadcasting channels, with the goal of ultimately removing the ban completely. Doing so was one of President Yoon Suk Yeol's pledges during his election campaign. But some have raised concerns that North Korea might exploit the opportunity to spread its lies. Their objections have slowed the progress of the project, officials said.

North Korean journalists film the motorcade of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ahead of a Washington-Pyongyang summit in Singapore, in this June 12, 2018, file photo. AP-Yonhap

Kim believes North Korean propaganda will have little impact on informed citizens in South Korea, just like East Germany's media did on West Germans.

It is North Korean propagandists, not South Korean citizens, who should be afraid of increased openness, he added, explaining that maybe if there were viewers and readers in South Korea, it may lead the North Korean media to self-censor its most outrageous claims for fear of drawing ridicule.

The media ban is not free. Scholars and other experts on North Korea ― and taxpayers who sponsor their work ― bear its cost. Many pay "excessive fees" to overseas-based providers to access North Korean media content, which is available for free or at much lower prices outside South Korea.

Yee Ji-sun, a researcher who studies North Korea's culture and society at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a think tank, pays subscription fees for one such service.

"During the COVID pandemic, the official supply channels for magazines such as Chollima have been blocked, which disrupted my work," she said. "Some internet firms offer paid-for services for what I need. But the one that I use offers only text content without the pictures published in the original magazines … If certain materials are essential, I have no choice but to ask scholars in other countries for them, which are digitally available in where they are."

This screenshot captured from the North's official Korean Central Television shows magazines with pictures of North Korean fashion models. Yonhap

It is ironic, she noted, that South Korean scholars are usually the last in the world to know what is happening in North Korea, which makes it difficult for them to assess the situation promptly. This is also bad for the public which relies on their assessments to understand North Korea.

As a person who has watched many North Korean films and TV dramas among other media content, Yee said she is confident that no sensible South Koreans would fantasize about life in the North today.

Nevertheless, she believes the process of lifting the ban should be gradual, especially on the web.

"My biggest worry is that North Korea, one of the world's cyberwarfare powerhouses, may use its websites or other online channels to compromise users' computers," she said. "Also, North Korea's media has a language issue, with many swear words and vulgar expressions it often uses. We should think about whether it is appropriate to open it to, say, people of all ages. We might need to consider making education programs for media literacy before and after lifting the ban."

The Korea Times · March 16, 2023

6. [ANALYSIS] Too early to hail success of Korea-Japan summit

Yes, we have to be cautious but there has been important progress and President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida must maintain the momentum and address their domestic political opposition.

[ANALYSIS] Too early to hail success of Korea-Japan summit

The Korea Times · by 2023-03-16 22:11 | Foreign Affairs · March 17, 2023

President Yoon Suk Yeol shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during a summit held at the latter's official residence in Tokyo, Thursday. Yonhap

Unresolved historical disputes may hinder 'new era' of ties: experts

By Lee Hyo-jin

A milestone summit between President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on Thursday ended on an upbeat tone. According to diplomatic observers, it has inarguably opened a new chapter in bilateral ties between Korea and Japan.

But analysts viewed the summit as lacking concrete plans from Japan on the compensation of Korean forced labor victims, leaving room for related disputes to resurface in the future.

"The summit has succeeded in putting bilateral relations back on track, and that's a notable achievement. Previous administrations of both countries had failed to hold a summit due to negative public sentiment on each other's leaders," said Yang Ki-ho, a professor of Japanese studies at Sungkonghoe University.

Thursday's summit was the first such event in 12 years. Mutual visits by Korean and Japanese leaders to each other's countries had been suspended since 2011 relations soured over an array of historical, territorial disputes dating back to Imperial Japan's 1910-45 occupation of Korea.

On the surface, the summit seems to be a win-win for both countries.

Major outcomes were achieved. Tokyo decided to lift trade restrictions imposed on Seoul against the backdrop of historical disputes. The Korean government decided to fully restore an intelligence-sharing pact known as the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) that the previous administration had threatened to suspend.

"But in terms of talks on historical issues, Korea had nothing to gain from the meeting," Yang said. "From Korea's perspective, Japan backpedaled on sensitive issues such as the forced labor issue. In that sense, it's difficult to hail the summit as a success for Seoul."

The summit took place less than two weeks after Seoul announced a compensation plan for South Korean victims of Japan's wartime forced labor by using a government fund to compensate them without direct payments from Japan. Korea had been hoping for Japan to show a "meaningful response" to its diplomatic concession.

In a joint conference held after the summit, Kishida reiterated his administration's stance that it "upholds the historical position held by its past administrations, including the 1998 joint declaration." In the statement, announced by then Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, the latter expressed deep remorse and apologized for the "tremendous damage and suffering" to the Korean people during the 35-year occupation.

Members of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) hold a rally at Gwanghwamun Square in central Seoul, Friday, condemning the summit between the leaders of Korea and Japan, which they called the "most humiliating moment" in the country's diplomatic history. Yonhap

In response to criticisms about the absence of a straightforward apology from Kishida, a senior official at the Korean presidential office said the Japanese leader's remarks inheriting the past government's views on history seem "sufficient" at this point.

"With the absence of a sincere apology or meaningful reactions from Japan, it will be difficult for Korea to maintain its diplomatic leverage in discussions on other pending issues such as Fukushima nuclear water and the Sado mines," Yang said.

 "And when the two governments begin to discuss the matters in earnest, Yoon's diplomatic capability will be put to the test."

Lee Won-deog, a professor of Japanese studies at Kookmin University, described the summit as a "normalization of bilateral ties that had been abnormal for years."

"Now that the two leaders have managed to rebuild mutual trust, the two countries will be able to actively discuss bolstering ties in the economy and security sector as well as people-to-people exchanges."

However, he also pointed out that the summit has failed to address the "elephant in the room."

"Korea's compensation plan for forced labor victims will not be completed without support or a response from Japan's side. The ball is in Tokyo's court," Lee said, expressing regret that Kishida did not make a direct statement on the issue, nor issue a fresh apology.

But Lee was quite optimistic that the two countries may be able to advance talks on sensitive issues. "The summit was only the beginning of restoring ties. Small steps on resuming talks will lead to better relations on historical matters as well," he said.

The Korea Times · by 2023-03-16 22:11 | Foreign Affairs · March 17, 2023

7. ‘Hunting rifles’ — really? China ships assault weapons and body armor to Russia

I guess you need that body armor because the deer shoot back when you are firing a hunting rifle at them.

Excerpt:

China North Industries Group Corporation Limited, one of the country’s largest state-owned defense contractors, sent the rifles in June 2022 to a Russian company called Tekhkrim that also does business with the Russian state and military. The CQ-A rifles, modeled off of the M16 but tagged as “civilian hunting rifles” in the data, have been reported to be in use by paramilitary police in China and by armed forces from the Philippines to South Sudan and Paraguay.

Russian entities also received 12 shipments of drone parts by Chinese companies and over 12 tons of Chinese body armor, routed via Turkey, in late 2022, according to the data.

‘Hunting rifles’ — really? China ships assault weapons and body armor to Russia

By ERIN BANCO and SARAH ANNE AARUP

03/16/2023 01:00 PM EDT

Updated: 03/16/2023 05:11 PM EDT

Politico

Customs data obtained by POLITICO reveals direct shipments of Chinese assault rifles, as well as drone shipments and body armor routed via Turkey and the UAE.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo prior to their talks in Beijing, China, Feb. 4, 2022. Beijing continues to deny that it is ramping up support for Russia in Ukraine. | Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin Pool Photo via AP Photo

By Erin Banco and Sarah Anne Aarup

03/16/2023 01:00 PM EDT

Updated: 03/16/2023 05:11 PM EDT

Chinese companies, including one connected to the government in Beijing, have sent Russian entities 1,000 assault rifles and other equipment that could be used for military purposes, including drone parts and body armor, according to trade and customs data obtained by POLITICO.

The shipments took place between June and December 2022, according to the data provided by Import Genius, a customs data aggregator.

China North Industries Group Corporation Limited, one of the country’s largest state-owned defense contractors, sent the rifles in June 2022 to a Russian company called Tekhkrim that also does business with the Russian state and military. The CQ-A rifles, modeled off of the M16 but tagged as “civilian hunting rifles” in the data, have been reported to be in use by paramilitary police in China and by armed forces from the Philippines to South Sudan and Paraguay.

Russian entities also received 12 shipments of drone parts by Chinese companies and over 12 tons of Chinese body armor, routed via Turkey, in late 2022, according to the data.

Although the customs data does not show that Beijing is selling a large amount of weapons to Moscow specifically to aid its war effort, it reveals that China is supplying Russian companies with previously unreported “dual-use” equipment — commercial items that could also be used on the battlefield in Ukraine.

It is the first confirmation that China is sending rifles and body armor to Russian companies, and shows that drones and drone parts are still being sent despite promises from at least one company that said it would suspend business in Russia and Ukraine to ensure its products did not aid the war effort.

The confirmation of these shipments comes as leaders in the U.S. and Europe warn Beijing against supporting Russia’s efforts in Ukraine. Western officials have said in recent weeks that China is considering sending weapons to Russia’s military, a move that could alter the nature of the fighting on the ground in Ukraine, tipping it in Russia’s favor. Officials are also concerned that some of the dual-use material could also be used by Russia to equip reinforcements being deployed to Ukraine at a time when Moscow is in desperate need of supplies.

Da-Jiang Innovations Science & Technology Co., also known as DJI, sent drone parts — like batteries and cameras — via the United Arab Emirates to a small Russian distributor in November and December 2022. DJI is a Chinese company that has been under U.S. Treasury sanctions since 2021 for providing the Chinese state with drones to surveil the Uyghur minority in the western region of Xinjiang.

In addition to drones, Russia has for months relied on other countries, including China, for navigation equipment, satellite imagery, vehicle components and other raw materials to help prop up President Vladimir Putin’s year-old war on Ukraine.

It’s currently unclear if Russia is using any of the rifles included in the shipment data on the battlefield — Tekhkrim, the Russian company, did not respond to an emailed request for comment. But the DJI drones have been spotted on the battlefield for months. DJI did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The National Security Council did not comment on the record for this story. The Chinese embassy in Washington said in a statement that Beijing is “committed to promoting talks for peace” in Ukraine.

“China did not create the crisis. It is not a party to the crisis, and has not provided weapons to either side of the conflict,” said embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu.

Asked about the findings in the data obtained by POLITICO, Poland’s Ambassador to the EU Andrzej Sadoś said that “due to the potential very serious consequences, such information should be verified immediately.”

Although Western sanctions have hampered Moscow’s ability to import everything from microchips to tear gas, Russia’s still able to buy supplies that support its war effort from “friendly” countries that aren’t following the West’s new rules, like China or the Gulf countries.

“Some commercial products, like drones or even microchips, could be adapted. They can transform from a simple benign civilian product to a lethal and military product,” said Sam Bendett, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center of Naval Analyses Russia Studies in Washington, noting that dual-use items could help Russia advance on the battlefield.

Experts say it is difficult to track whether dual-use items shipped from China are being sold to buyers who intend to use the technology for civilian purposes or for military means.

“The challenge with dual-use items is that the export control system we have has to consider both the commercial sales possibilities as well as the military use of certain items,” said Zach Cooper, former assistant to the deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism at the National Security Council.

In cases where the Kremlin craves specific technology only produced in say the U.S., EU or Japan, there are wily ways for Moscow to evade sanctions, which include buying equipment from middlemen located in countries with cordial trade relations with both the West and Russia.

Russia managed to import almost 80 tons of body armor worth around $10 million in December last year, according to the customs data from Import Genius. Those bulletproof vests were manufactured by Turkish company Ariteks and most were imported straight from Turkey, although some of the shipments arrived to Russia via the United Arab Emirates. Russia also imported some body armor from Chinese company Xinxing Guangzhou Import & Export Co.

Trade data also shows that Russian state defense company Rosoboronexport has imported microchips, thermal vision devices and spare parts like a gas turbine engine from a variety of countries ranging from China to Serbia and Myanmar since 2022.

Dual-use items could also be a way for China to quietly increase its assistance to Moscow while avoiding reprisals officials in Washington and Europe have been threatening in recent weeks if China goes ahead with sending weapons to the Russian military.

Most recently, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told reporters last week that there would be “consequences” if China sent weapons to Russia, although he also said that he’s seen “no evidence” that Beijing is considering delivering arms to Moscow.

“We are now in a stage where we are making clear that this should not happen, and I’m relatively optimistic that we will be successful with our request in this case,” he said.

Among the military items China has been considering shipping to Russia are drones, ammunition and other small arms, according to a list that has circulated inside the administration and on Capitol Hill for months, according to a person who read that document. And intelligence briefed to officials in Washington, on Capitol Hill and to U.S. allies across the world in the last month, suggests Beijing could take the step to ship weapons to Russia.

“We do see [China] providing assistance to Russia in the context of the conflict. And we see them in a situation in which they’ve become increasingly uncomfortable about the level of assistance and not looking to do it as publicly as might otherwise occur and given the reputational costs associated with it,” Avril Haines, the U.S. director of national intelligence, said in a congressional hearing March 8. “That is a very real concern and the degree of how close they get and how much assistance they’re providing is something we watch very carefully.”

As data about dual-use item shipments to Russia becomes available, Western countries are expected to ramp up efforts to quell these flows.

“We’ve already started to see sanctions against people [moving] military material to Russia. I’m sure we’re going to be seeing the EU and other countries target those people that are helping a lot of this material to get to Russia,” said James Byrne from the Royal United Services Institute, a U.K.-based defense think tank.

Beijing continues to deny that it is ramping up support for Russia in Ukraine. However, several of its top officials have recently traveled to Moscow. President Xi Jinping is expected to make an appearance there in the coming weeks. China recently presented a 12-point peace proposal for the war in Ukraine, though it was criticized by western leaders for its ambiguity and for its lack of details about the need for the withdrawal of Russian troops.

Leonie Kijewski contributed reporting from Brussels.

POLITICO

Politico

8. NK leader says nuclear buildup is to ‘strike fear into enemies’

My recommendations for a response. And I concur with President Yoon's comments a few months ago when he called for an information response to provocations.

•First, do not overreact. Always call out Kim Jong-un's strategy As Sun Tzu would advise- “ …what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; … next best is to disrupt his alliances.” Make sure the international community, the press, and the public in the ROK and the U.S. and the elite and the Korean people living in in the north know what Kim is doing.

•Second, never ever back down in the face of north Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.

•Third, coordinate an alliance response. There may be times when a good cop-bad cop approach is appropriate.  Try to mitigate the internal domestic political criticisms that will inevitably occur in Seoul and DC. Do not let those criticisms negatively influence policy and actions.

•Fourth, exploit weakness in north Korea - create internal pressure on Kim and the regime from his elite and military. Always work to drive a wedge among the party, elite, and military (which is a challenge since they are all intertwined and inextricably linked).

•Fifth, demonstrate strength and resolve. Do not be afraid to show military strength. Never misunderstand the north's propaganda - do not give in to demands to reduce exercises or take other measures based on north Korean demands that would in any way reduce the readiness of the combined military forces. The north does not want an end to the exercises because they are a threat, they want to weaken the alliance and force U.S. troops from the peninsula which will be the logical result if they are unable to effectively train.

•Sixth, depending on the nature of the provocation, be prepared to initiate a decisive response using the most appropriate tools, e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, information and influence activities, cyber, etc. or a combination.

•

North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Test: A 6 Step Strategy To Respond

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-test-a-6-step-strategy-to-respond/

NK leader says nuclear buildup is to ‘strike fear into enemies’

N. Korean state media confirms launch of Hwasong-17 ICBM on Thursday

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · March 17, 2023

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 17, 2023, shows the North firing a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile from the Sunan area in Pyongyang the previous day. (Yonhap)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un reiterated the nation's push for nuclear buildup to “instill fear” into South Korea and the United States as they conduct large-scale joint military exercises.

Kim's threat was delivered while he was guiding the “launching drill” of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile Thursday. He was accompanied by his teenage daughter, Kim Ju-ae, North Korean state media reported on Friday.

“Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong-un said he continues to make the US and South Korea, which frequently conduct large-scale military exercises on the Korean Peninsula flagrantly showing enmity toward the DPRK, aware of the recklessness of such acts,” state media said in a Korean language dispatch, referring to North Korea as the acronym of its official name, the Democratic People’s Public of Korea.

“Kim emphasized the policy of confronting and countering enemies that aim to make them realize on their own that the more they continue to step up military provocations against the DPRK, the more they will face an irreversible and grave threat.”

North Korean state media said the launching drill was aimed at making South Korea and the US “aware of the looming threat of armed conflicts and clearly show the will of our Party and government to take action to respond with overwhelming offensive measures at any time.”

The launching drill of the Hwasong-17 was ordered by the Central Military Commission of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea in tit-for-tat military action against the ongoing Freedom Shield exercise between South Korea and the US, according to state media.

The drill was aimed at “verifying agile and constant operational capabilities and reliability of the DPRK’s nuclear war deterrence,” North Korean state media said, claiming that the drill “proved the war readiness of the ICBM unit.”

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March 17, 2023, shows an image of Earth apparently shot from space. The North claimed to have test-fired a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile from the Sunan area in Pyongyang the previous day. (Yonhap)

North Korean state media also notably released photos of Earth likely taken from the Hwasong-17 in space.

Experts pointed out that the photos suggest the possibility of North Korea utilizing the Hwasong-17 ICBM launch as a groundwork to prepare to launch its first military reconnaissance satellite.

Pyongyang claimed that it conducted a “final-stage” test to develop a military spy satellite in December last year, elucidating that it would complete preparations by April.

Kim Dong-yub, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, pointed out that North Korea could use the ICBM launch as a venue to test satellite imaging and data transmission technologies to prepare to launch a spy satellite.

North Korea fired the ICBM from Sunan in the capital city of Pyongyang toward the East Sea on Thursday morning, according to the South Korean military.

The ICBM traveled around 1,000 kilometers, following a lofted trajectory before falling into the East Sea, the JCS said, without further details. Japan’s Defense Ministry said the IBCM appeared to have traveled for around 70 minutes with a maximum altitude of around 6,000 kilometers.

North Korea has continued its saber-rattling in protest against the 11-day, defense-oriented Freedom Shield exercise that South Korea and the US kicked off on Monday. The allies are staging the largest military exercises in years in light of escalating missile and nuclear threats from North Korea.

Pyongyang fired a total of 11 ballistic and cruise missiles on four discrete launches in 8 days from March 8 to Thursday.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry on Friday expressed deep regrets that North Korea exploited combined military exercises between South Korea and the US as a pretext for provocation. The ministry underscored that the cause and responsibility for the heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula clearly lie in North Korea’s reckless development of nuclear and missile capabilities.

By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · March 17, 2023

9. Main opposition slams Korea-Japan summit as 'most humiliating' moment in diplomacy

The opposition should be pressed to answer the question of how the ROK government should ensure national security and national prosperity.

Yes, the historical issues must be respected but national security and prosperity must come first. The opposition should use caution but they will put partisan politics over national security and prosperity.

Main opposition slams Korea-Japan summit as 'most humiliating' moment in diplomacy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · March 17, 2023

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, March 17 (Yonhap) -- Opposition leader Lee Jae-myung lashed out at President Yoon Suk Yeol on Friday, calling his summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida the "most humiliating moment" in the country's diplomatic history.

Lee, chairman of the main opposition Democratic Party (DP), made the remarks a day after Yoon and Kishida held summit talks and agreed to move past historical disputes, including a row over wartime forced labor, and restore long-strained relations.

Lee denounced the summit as the "most humiliating and dreadful moment in the history of our diplomacy," saying the Yoon administration has chosen to become a "puppet" of the Japanese government.

"Japan's apology or regret on the biggest issue of forced labor was nowhere to be seen," Lee said during a party meeting.

Yoon's trip came after South Korea announced a solution to the long-running disputes over compensation for Koreans forced into hard labor for Japanese companies when Korea was under Japan's colonial rule from 1910-1945.

Under the plan, South Korea plans to compensate victims on its own without Japan's involvement.

"Victims have officially rejected the government compensation plan and people are against it, but Yoon tiptoed around Japan, saying there will be no request for reimbursement," Lee said.

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) defended the summit results as reaping meaningful results.

Saying that they will give "new opportunities and energy" to the economy, PPP floor leader Joo Ho-young said that "a wall of distrust and lack of communication between the two countries that has built up over the years has started to crumble."

Joo criticized the DP for using anti-Japanese sentiment for political interests, saying that history will properly assess the decision Yoon made for future generations.

Main opposition Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung speaks during a meeting of the party's Supreme Council at the National Assembly on March 17, 2023. (Yonhap)

President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida toast at Rengatei, a Western-style establishment known as the birthplace of Japanese pork cutlets and "omurice," in Tokyo on March 16, 2023. (Yonhap)

Ruling People Power Party floor leader Joo Ho-young (C) speaks during the party's policy response meeting at the National Assembly on March 17, 2023. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · March 17, 2023

10. PacNet #14 - South Korea's Indo-Pacific pivot strategy

Very useful analysis here.

Excerpt:

Much of the SFPPIP was uncontroversial, such as cooperation across the Indo-Pacific on economic, environmental, counterterrorism, and international crime issues. The SFPPIP identified ASEAN as a “key partner” for peace and prosperity and noted wider formats for economic cooperation like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

However, the SFPIPPR also displayed sharpness of purpose on the security front. First, it announced that it would “pursue partnerships with minilateral groupings”; specifically, the South Korea-Japan-US trilateral, a future Australia-South Korea-US trilateral, and the AP4 (Australia-Japan-New Zealand-South Korea) NATO Partners format. Second, the SFPPIP singled out continued participation in (the US-led) RIMPAC, and Pacific Dragon (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United States) naval exercises. On the minilateral front, the SFPPIP announced South Korea would “gradually expand” cooperation with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

PacNet #14 - South Korea's Indo-Pacific pivot strategy - Pacific Forum

• David Scott
• Member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC)

pacforum.org

2022 ended with South Korea adopting specific Indo-Pacific terminology with the Dec. 28 release of its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region (SFPPIP). The key takeaway: The SFPPIP, and President Yoon Suk Yeol, signal an end to South Korea’s “strategic ambiguity” under the previous president, Moon Jae-in. Seoul pivoting away from Beijing and toward Washington—delicately, but clearly.

This “Free, Peaceful Prosperous Indo-Pacific” formulation from South Korea converges with the US and Japanese “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) formulation(s) enunciated since 2016-17. The key shared element is the SFPPIP assertion that “in realizing the vision for a free Indo-Pacific, the Republic of Korea is committed to partnering with like-minded countries that share the values of freedom, rule of law, and human rights as well as international norms.” This indicates a normative base for foreign policy.

Much of the SFPPIP was uncontroversial, such as cooperation across the Indo-Pacific on economic, environmental, counterterrorism, and international crime issues. The SFPPIP identified ASEAN as a “key partner” for peace and prosperity and noted wider formats for economic cooperation like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

However, the SFPIPPR also displayed sharpness of purpose on the security front. First, it announced that it would “pursue partnerships with minilateral groupings”; specifically, the South Korea-Japan-US trilateral, a future Australia-South Korea-US trilateral, and the AP4 (Australia-Japan-New Zealand-South Korea) NATO Partners format. Second, the SFPPIP singled out continued participation in (the US-led) RIMPAC, and Pacific Dragon (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United States) naval exercises. On the minilateral front, the SFPPIP announced South Korea would “gradually expand” cooperation with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

In 2022 Chinese state media had attacked South Korea over such participation—warning in April with regard to the Quad; in July with regard to the AP4 format at NATO and trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo; and in August regarding the Pacific Dragon exercises in the Western Pacific.

On the bilateral front the SFPPIP was careful but revealing. It stated that:

our inclusive Indo-Pacific Strategy neither targets nor excludes any specific nation. We will work with every partner that is aligned with our vision and principles of cooperation.

This is conditional inclusivity; China falls short in specific normative values enunciated in the SFPPIP vision and principles. Mounting distrust of China in South Korea cuts across the SFPPIP linkage that “our partnerships will be based on strong mutual trust.”

In bilateral relations, the SFPPIP focus was to “continue to strengthen our alliance with the United States.” It identifies Canada as “a comprehensive strategic partner with common values,” and Australia as “a comprehensive strategic partner” with whom South Korea further “deepen[s] our ties by identifying new cooperation agenda in the areas of national defense.” It made a similar pledge to “advance our special strategic partnership with India, a leading regional partner with shared values.” Concerning Japan, despite previous frictions, it aspires to “seek a forward-looking partnership that supports our common interests and values.” Security convergence with those countries is predicated by their shared values; namely democracy, the rule of international law, and norms embedded in the “free” component within the SFPPIP formulation.

In the wake of a strained Yoon-Xi Summit in November, the SFPPIP’s China section was one sentence. It proposed that with China,

a key partner for achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific region, we will nurture a sounder and more mature relationship as we pursue shared interests based on mutual respect and reciprocity, guided by international norms and rules.

This language was limited and revealing. To hope for a sounder and more mature relationship in the future implies the current relationship is rather unsound. “A partner for peace” was strained given that the SFPPIP’s “peace” section pinpointed the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait as (China-related) flash points threatening peace, with freedom of navigation specifically called for. Talk of guidance via international norms and rules raises the question of a China not guided by universal norms and rules. “A partner in prosperity” pointed to potential economic cooperation; for which the SFPPIP advocated resuming the China-Japan-South Korea Summit, which last met in 2019, and reinforcing the CJSK Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, to focus on green and digital transitions. This reflects the weakness and marginality of the CJSK mechanism.

Some China-related barbs are discernible in the SFPPIP. On the one hand, the SFPPIP contained no reference to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which South Korea has distanced itself from. On the other hand, the SFPPIP announced South Korean participation in the launching of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022 as “building economic security networks…in support of open and free trade,” an initiative denounced in China. The SFPPIP outlined that “to stabilize supply chains of strategic resources, we will seek cooperation with partners with whom we share values.” This values-driven rationale pointed to the Indo-Pacific supply chain initiatives developed by the Quad countries and, again, denounced by China. Trilateral cyber-security cooperation with the United States and Australia was another China-related issue arising in the SFPPIP.

Very different responses ensued from Washington and Beijing to the SFPPIP. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan immediately welcomed the whole SFPPIP and its focus on shared “universal values” underpinning cooperation. In contrast, China’s foreign ministry merely “noted” the SFPPIP while warning about Korea being involved in “exclusive coteries,” leaving its state media to criticize the SFPPIP as South Korea “pivoting towards the US.”

The biggest areas of ambiguity in the SFPPIP rest with South Korea’s reiteration of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. South Korea could, like Washington, consider raising those two issues at regional platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.

Regarding the South China Sea, Seoul is unlikely to carry out freedom of navigation exercises, though it could consider giving verbal public support to such US operations. Seoul’s increasing deployments and exercises in the West Pacific with the United States and like-minded states like Japan, Australia, and Canada could also be extended into the South China Sea. Seoul calling for observance (i.e., by China) of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea could advance the SFPPIP call for the rule of law in the South China Sea. Side-stepping the still-uncomfortable US-China confrontation, Seoul could quietly strengthen the maritime capabilities of South China Sea littoral states like Vietnam and the Philippines most under threat from China.

Regarding the Taiwan Strait, it is again unlikely for Seoul to deploy its naval units on transit operations there, though South Korea could consider giving public verbal support to such US transit operations. South Korea could strengthen some links with Taiwan, though. Military-to-military links are probably too much to expect, given the furor from China. However, they could maintain political-economic links, including supporting Taiwan’s application for membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Seoul’s responses to Chinese actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait during 2023 will show up the exact nature of South Korea’s delicate tilt signaled in its new Indo-Pacific strategy

David Scott (davidscott366@outlook.com) is member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and is a prolific writer on Indo-Pacific geopolitics (www.d-scott.com/publications).

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol introduces his officials to U.S. President Joe Biden before their meeting at the presidential office on May 21, 2022 in Seoul, South Korea. (28 June 2022, The Heritage Foundation) by Jung Yeon-Je-Pool/ Getty Images

pacforum.org

11. South Korea Could Get Away With the Bomb

Very interesting analysis here.

What should take precedence - the NPT or the necessary measures a country must take to ensure its defense? How much protection is the NPT providing to countries like South Korea?  

Conclusion:

The above isn’t a call for South Korea to go nuclear. That decision belongs to the South Korean leadership and people, and the Yoon government has reiterated that it does not plan to go down this route. But the developments leading Seoul to consider the nuclear option are not going to reverse any time soon, and it’s not out of line to suggest that Seoul could probably develop nuclear weapons without facing major long-term repercussions. Eventually, the rest of the world—and the United States in particular—will need to grapple with the fact that its nonproliferation regime may not be strong enough to contain one of its own.

South Korea Could Get Away With the Bomb

The global norm against nuclear proliferation is strong, but Seoul’s political and economic ties are stronger.

By Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance.

Foreign Policy · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo · March 16, 2023

In January, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol commented that his country may have to consider developing its own nuclear weapons in response to the escalating nuclear and missile threat it faces from North Korea. Although the government soon clarified that South Korea is not actively pursuing this policy, the remarks were echoed by Chung Jin-suk, the leader of Yoon’s conservative People Power Party, and even more recently by Oh Se-hoon, Seoul’s mayor and a possible 2027 presidential candidate. South Korea’s nuclear debate is no longer held only on the fringes of its politics and cannot be simply wished away. In fact, with Pyongyang’s continued military provocations, it might even be coming to a head.

Prior to North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, there was limited public debate in South Korea about developing its own arsenal. Over the past decade of polling, there has been reliable support—held among roughly two-thirds of the South Korean public—for an indigenous nuclear weapons program. Today, support hovers around 70 percent, according to various polls, meaning the country’s leaders could develop the bomb without fear of a significant domestic backlash. Even though Kyiv never had operational control over Soviet nuclear systems, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine merely three decades after the latter decided to voluntarily relinquish its nuclear weapons has reinforced the perception among many that a nuclear deterrent is the only credible protection against a determined invader.

The question South Korea is now asking itself is not whether it is capable of building nuclear weapons, but whether the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Not only can Seoul withstand these costs, but they would likely be far less severe than those publicly discussed by the nonproliferation community.

For more than half a century, the treaties, agreements, arrangements, and verification tools that make up the global nonproliferation regime—in particular, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—have largely prevented new states from developing nuclear weapons. Key to eliciting compliance with this bargain are the penalties and punishments imposed if states are found violating their safeguards agreements—above all, economic sanctions. Iran and North Korea, the most notable NPT pariahs, are among the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world, and as a global economic powerhouse, South Korea would stand to lose a great deal if it were subject to similar retribution.

Yet South Korea’s current security environment is so fraught that its decision may be understandable to many. While Seoul continues to respect the January 1992 joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang has gone in the opposite direction, to put it lightly.

It is precisely this threat that could help Seoul maintain moral and legal high ground—and avoid the kind of backlash Pyongyang faced for its actions. As enshrined in Article X of the NPT, South Korea has the “right to withdraw” in the case that it “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” In September of last year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared that his country’s nuclear status is “irreversible,” and the rubber-stamp Supreme People’s Assembly passed a law that month enshrining Pyongyang’s (self-anointed) right to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to lay claim to the whole of the Korean Peninsula. This publicly established threat would give South Korean leaders a powerful legal case to argue that withdrawal from the NPT to develop nuclear weapons is a matter of pure survival.

Withdrawal from the NPT in and of itself may make South Korea the target of criticism. But there’s good reason to believe that the way in which it develops its nuclear program could mitigate some of the reputational costs and diplomatic fallout.

Israel, for example, is widely acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons even though it has refrained from publicly conducting a nuclear test. Nuclear tests are particularly inflammatory because they serve as a vivid reminder to other countries of the threat they face—not to mention the environmental harm these tests cause. Yet Israel’s (test-free) nuclear status has not prevented it from becoming one of Washington’s strongest allies. While the South Korean Army would ideally want to conduct at least one nuclear test to assess and collect valuable data on its technology, it could instead follow Israel’s lead and rely on its civilian nuclear energy know-how, computer modeling, and data gathered from other countries’ nuclear tests—including North Korea’s—to quietly develop its own program. This would certainly reduce the reputational hit Seoul would take.

Further, as the case of India shows, the backlash from conducting a nuclear test would not necessarily be insurmountable. The Clinton administration criticized New Delhi’s 1998 tests and imposed a series of economic sanctions on India. But for the United States, strengthening relations with India eventually became more important than upholding the nonproliferation regime. Sure enough, by 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had issued a joint statement lifting a three-decade-old nuclear trade moratorium, and the countries continue to cooperate across a range of issues today.

In today’s geopolitical context, the Biden administration has shown a willingness to put its security interests above all else in its competition against China. To that end, the United States is now party to the AUKUS security pact, whereby the United States and the United Kingdom will share nuclear propulsion technology and, potentially, highly enriched uranium with Australia. Although the AUKUS partners have vehemently stated that Australia’s intent is peaceful and that the agreement doesn’t undermine the NPT, some experts believe this creates a loophole for other non-nuclear states to develop nuclear weapons outside of the nonproliferation regime.

Critics can certainly argue that the cases of Israel, India, or now AUKUS are different from South Korea’s. Yet these cases make clear that under certain circumstances, strategic considerations can trump proliferation concerns in the eyes of the United States and its partners.

South Korea has indeed become an invaluable strategic partner to many of the countries that would be responsible for imposing costs—reputational or otherwise—for Seoul going down the nuclear route. Since the turn of the century, Seoul has forged a global network of geopolitical and economic linkages that would mitigate and perhaps even prevent any long-lasting reputational, diplomatic, or even economic backlash were it to decide to develop nuclear weapons. These include arms exports, among others, to NATO members, including the United States, in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as to Southeast Asia and the Middle East; nuclear power plant construction, particularly in the Middle East so far but potentially also in Europe in the future; factories and supply chain links with the United States, Europe, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia; and burgeoning security ties with NATO, Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Poland, and other partners—plus trilateral United States-South Korea-Japan cooperation. Because South Korea has become so important to much of the global system, its partners would be forced to conduct a difficult cost-benefit analysis between upholding the nonproliferation regime or continuing their cooperation with Seoul. Whether implicitly or explicitly, Seoul could use these links as a bargaining tool. This may be seen as transactional, and it would be. But such is the nature of contemporary international relations.

Even economic sanctions—one of the nonproliferation regime’s most powerful tools—may not be a realistic deterrent. In 2016, China imposed unofficial sanctions on South Korea after the Park Geun-hye administration agreed to the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system on Korean soil. The sanctions hit the South Korean economy, but they did not wreak havoc on it, even though China accounts for 25 percent of South Korean exports. Eventually, Beijing removed the sanctions, in no small part because Beijing also needs access to South Korea’s semiconductors and other high-tech products to compete in the global economy.

Likewise, any economic measures that the United States and its allies and partners could take against South Korea would have to be balanced against deep existing economic links with Seoul. Among the world’s leaders in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, electric batteries, green ships, and 5G/6G technologies, many countries would find it difficult to sever ties with South Korea to the detriment of their own economies.

Not to mention, nuclear-armed or not, the United States, Europe, and other likeminded partners would certainly much rather have South Korea in their diplomatic and political corner as they focus on competition with China and Russia. Former U.S. President Donald Trump, if reelected, or a Trump-like successor, may even welcome South Korea stepping up and taking greater responsibility for its own security instead of “free-riding” on Washington’s largesse. Quietly, many Western officials would probably not be opposed to a nuclear South Korea in a region where it has to confront the nuclear arsenals of North Korea, China, and Russia.

The above isn’t a call for South Korea to go nuclear. That decision belongs to the South Korean leadership and people, and the Yoon government has reiterated that it does not plan to go down this route. But the developments leading Seoul to consider the nuclear option are not going to reverse any time soon, and it’s not out of line to suggest that Seoul could probably develop nuclear weapons without facing major long-term repercussions. Eventually, the rest of the world—and the United States in particular—will need to grapple with the fact that its nonproliferation regime may not be strong enough to contain one of its own.

Foreign Policy · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo · March 16, 2023

12. N. Korean family in Rason rumored to have made soup out of pet dog

• HeadlineNewsSociety

N. Korean family in Rason rumored to have made soup out of pet dog

“This incident sums up how bad the food shortage has gotten," a reporting partner claimed

By Lee Chae Un - 2023.03.17 11:00am

dailynk.com

FILE PHOTO: Vendors and customers at the Rason Market in North Hamgyong Province. (Daily NK)

Food shortages appear to be growing more severe for people in the city of Rason, home of North Korea’s first free economic zone, Daily NK has learned. The city community was recently scandalized by the news that a local family made soup out of a pet dog dug out of the ground.

“People have been growing more anxious about the scarcity of food following the recent news that a Rason family boiled up the body of a pet dog as a meal. It’s awful to contemplate the level of hunger that would drive someone to eat a dead pet dog,” a reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Mar. 10, speaking on condition of anonymity.

According to the reporting partner, North Korean officials began caring for pet dogs in the late 1980s as a way of flaunting their power and wealth. The practice began to spread through the general population in the mid-1990s.

While dog meat is widely eaten in North Korea, there is a strong sense that pet dogs should not be eaten. That is why locals were so shocked to learn that a family recently consumed a pet dog that had been buried by a Chinese resident.

“Early this month, a resident of Rason saw a Chinese person burying a pet dog on a hill nearby. That evening, they dug up the dog’s body and brought it home to eat with their family. The story spread through the city like wildfire,” the reporting partner said.

Most Rason locals who encountered the tale could not hide their astonishment and had trouble imagining how hard up the family must be to engage in such behavior.

“This incident sums up how bad the food shortage has gotten. Discontent is growing among people fed up with the government for boasting that happy North Koreans have no reason to envy other countries while not taking any actual steps to relieve the food shortage,” the reporting partner said.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

13. N. Korean state security officers use remittance brokers to take money from defector families

Just another indication of the corruption and the potential for instability inside north Korea.

N. Korean state security officers use remittance brokers to take money from defector families

“With times growing tougher, people are turning into heinous wolves wearing human skins," a reporting partner claimed

By Lee Chae Un - 2023.03.17 10:40am

dailynk.com

North Korean soldier stationed at the Sino-DPRK border. (Roman Harak, Flickr, Creative Commons)

North Korean state security officers have recently been using remittance brokers to squeeze money out of the families of defectors, a reporting partner in South Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Wednesday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Security agents in the province’s cities and counties “frequently use remittance brokers to extort money from the families of defectors,” the reporting partner said, adding that the families “can’t use one cent of the money they receive and even suffer legal punishments.”

According to the reporting partner, North Korea has restricted interprovincial travel since the COVID-19 pandemic began, severely restricting travel to border regions in particular. This has made travel from interior parts of the country to the border more difficult.

Given these circumstances, it is complicated to transfer remittances to the families of defectors who live in interior parts of North Korea.

If people have phone numbers, remittance brokers in the border region can call and tell them the address of a broker in the interior region where they can pick up the money. However, if they do not have phone numbers, remittance brokers in the border region tell relatives or acquaintances who live in the interior to bring the families their money.

Amid these transactions, some remittance brokers in the interior are colluding with local state security agents to extort money from the families of defectors.

The reporting partner said state security officers in the interior were worse off than their counterparts in border regions to begin with, and with their situation worsening following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, they have been busy finding prey.

“Their first targets are the families of defectors,” he said.

In January, the state security department in one county in South Hamgyong Province took all the money sent to the family of a defector, the reporting partner said.

The reporting partner told Daily NK that the remittance broker visited the home of the family and handed over the remitted money, saying it had been sent by family members living in South Korea. The broker received confirmation of the transfer and left, but security agents barged into the family’s house immediately after.

The security agents seized all the money the family had received, and one member of the family was given six months of forced labor. The reporting partner told Daily NK that the family member is still at the labor camp.

What’s more, the remittance broker who transferred the money visited the family again and said he could get their kin out of the forced labor camp for RMB 10,000 (around USD 1,450).

“With times growing tougher, people are turning into heinous wolves wearing human skins,” the reporting partner claimed.

That being said, while some brokers harm the families of defectors with bad intent, others cooperate with state security agents under duress, he pointed out.

“If remittance brokers don’t do what the state security agents ask, they themselves become prey, so they have no choice but to do what they demand.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

14. Military Chief Says US Will Defend Indo-Pacific Freedoms

Excertps:

Aquilino said China has a role to play in the world if it adheres to the rules-based order, especially in regards to North Korea.

In 2022 alone, Pyongyang launched 70 missiles, which Aquilino called the most provocative action in history. He noted that earlier Thursday, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile hours before the leaders of South Korea and Japan were to meet at a Tokyo summit.

Pyongyang’s actions have threatened South Korea and Japan and it has “developed the capabilities to threaten the United States as well,” he said.

“It is destabilizing, it’s unpredictable, it’s continuing, it’s not slowing down. The potential for the People’s Republic of China to help to dissuade the DPRK from executing these events would be helpful,” Aquilino added, using the official names of China and North Korea.

Military Chief Says US Will Defend Indo-Pacific Freedoms

U.S. doesn’t seek conflict or to contain China INDOPACOM chief Aquilino said, but would take action to support the region against bullying.

thediplomat.com · by Associated Press · March 17, 2023

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United States Indo-Pacific Command chief Adm. John Aquilino said Thursday that Washington does not seek to contain China, nor seek conflicts in the region, but it would take action to support the region against coercion and bullying by authoritarian regimes.

Speaking at a lecture in Singapore, Aquilino said the era of globalization has evolved into one of “renewed great power competition” where the security environment influences economics, trade and investment.

“My concern is that this foundation of this rules-based international order … is under direct assault by authoritarian regimes,” he said, without naming any nations, though he noted recent actions by China to “grab a foothold” in Solomon Islands.

A security alliance between China and Solomon Islands a year ago sent shudders throughout the South Pacific, with many worried it could set off a large-scale military buildup.

Aquilino also addressed China’s protests over U.S. vessels and aircraft in the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing has renewed its threats against Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory to be brought under its control by force if necessary.

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While the United States is not seeking conflicts nor supporting Taiwan’s independence, he said the military will continue to “fly, sail and operate” in the region to uphold the navigational rights and freedom of all nations.

“Revisionist powers seek to disrupt and displace the current system in ways that benefit themselves, and at the expense of all others. They use coercion, intimidation to achieve their objectives and they justify their action under a theory of ‘might equals right,'” he said.

“They make illegal excessive territorial claims not based on anything other than revisionist history. They empower law enforcement entities to harass nations operating legally within their own exclusive economic zones. They break formal commitments. They ignore international legal rulings. They avoid requirements delivered under the U.N. Charter,” he said, in a reference to aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea and rising Chinese incursions into Taiwanese air defense zones.

Aquilino said China has a role to play in the world if it adheres to the rules-based order, especially in regards to North Korea.

In 2022 alone, Pyongyang launched 70 missiles, which Aquilino called the most provocative action in history. He noted that earlier Thursday, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile hours before the leaders of South Korea and Japan were to meet at a Tokyo summit.

Pyongyang’s actions have threatened South Korea and Japan and it has “developed the capabilities to threaten the United States as well,” he said.

“It is destabilizing, it’s unpredictable, it’s continuing, it’s not slowing down. The potential for the People’s Republic of China to help to dissuade the DPRK from executing these events would be helpful,” Aquilino added, using the official names of China and North Korea.

thediplomat.com · by Associated Press · March 17, 2023

15. The US defector to North Korea no one ever hears about

We all learned about PFC White when we were on the DMZ in the 1980s.

The US defector to North Korea no one ever hears about

wearethemighty.com · by Team Mighty · March 13, 2023

Defectors fleeing North Korea are a topic of international concern. They must either pass through the heavily-armed and mined demilitarized zone at the border with South Korea, or make the perilous trek across North Korea’s Tumen River border with China, also heavily patrolled by North Korean troops.

Once in China, North Korean defectors face hard choices. They must cross a massive desert to Mongolia, frozen Siberian emptiness to Russia, or attempt to make their way to South Korea through China, where Chinese police will be searching to send them back to North Korea. If captured, they face certain death, torture, imprisonment or all three.

The stories that come out of North Korea through these defectors should be enough to make anyone wary of the propaganda that comes from the world’s last Stalinist dictatorship, but it doesn’t. Since the end of the Korean War, at least six American soldiers have defected into North Korea.

The Korean War ended in 1953, and the United States has maintained a powerful military presence in South Korea ever since. The six U.S. troops who have crossed the line into the communist north came from the military units stationed there. Four who crossed during the Cold War are arguably the most infamous, having appeared in North Korean propaganda films and in magazines after crossing.

The Tumen River near Songhak-ri.

Pvt. Larry Allen Abshier crossed in 1962 and died there in 1983. Pfc. James Joseph Dresnok crossed to avoid being arrested; he also died there. Cpl. Jerry Wayne Parrish came to North Korea across the DMZ in 1963 and spent his life there, dying in 1997. Sgt. Charles Robert Jenkins defected in 1965, met his wife who came back to the West in 2002. Jenkins followed her in 2004, dying in 2017.

Another defector, Roy Chung, was born in South Korea and defected from his U.S. Army unit in Germany, choosing to join North Korea’s Korean People’s Army instead, where he served until he died. The last defector, Joseph T. White, crossed the DMZ in 1982, in full view of his American Army unit.

According to Maj. Ed Rouse, who was serving as the intelligence officer at Camp Hovey, South Korea at the time, White was an all-American, filled with patriotism and fascinated by the U.S. military. As a soldier, however, he was constantly in trouble, even going AWOL from Kemper Military College.

Pfc. White was sent to Camp Howze, just south of the DMZ in March 1982. There, he became fascinated with Korean culture, Korean women, and, apparently North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung. The trouble began when his unit rotated to Warrior Base at the DMZ, a remote outpost that took a lot of fire from North Korean troops. The monotony of life was as dangerous as the enemy.

The ambush patrols and nightly firefights began to get to him. On August 28, 1982, White suddenly blew the lock off a gate at the Panmunjom region of Korea’s Demilitarized Zone with his rifle after being left alone at his post. He then walked into the DMZ. An American guard hit a panic button, and his entire unit watched him walk across the most heavily-mined area on Earth before being captured by North Korean guards.

Joseph T. White

The Army concluded that he defected of his own free will, but no one saw White again until six months later, when he gave a speech and answered questions for North Korean journalists. His speech criticized South Korean President Park Chung-hee.

White’s parents received their first letter from their son in 1984, a letter that reinforced the belief that he had defected on his own. His next letter was received in November 1985, but instead of an update on his life, it was information on his death. Joseph T. White had apparently drowned while swimming in a river.

After leaving North Korea for Japan, former defector Charles Jenkins said he had seen White’s press conference in 1982, but White was never introduced to the other four Americans. He claimed that someone informed him White had suffered an epileptic seizure and spent the rest of his life paralyzed in North Korea.

wearethemighty.com · by Team Mighty · March 13, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com