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Quotes of the Day:
“Men can be divided into two groups: one that goes ahead and achieves something, and one that comes after and criticizes.”
- Seneca
“The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil.”
- Hannah Arendt
“I want to exist with my own force, like the sun, which gives light and does not suck light.”
- Carl Jung
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 1, 2023
3. Philippines grants U.S. greater access to bases amid China concerns
4. The Overlooked Irregular Warfare Expert the Pentagon Should Study Today
5. Let's Bring Greater Transparency to Foreign Influence on Policy Making
6. Austin Visit to Philippine Base Highlights Benefits of U.S-Philippine Alliance
7. Hard Drinking and Murky Finances: How an American Veterans Group Imploded in Ukraine
8. Influencers, Returnships, and Reimagined Career Progression: Creative Solutions for the Army’s Recruitment Crisis
9. Gen-Z Will Fight: But First, They Need to Know Why
10. An “Unprecedented” Recruitment Crisis
11. Pray the President resists the US push for bases
12. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on February 2, 2023 (US base access in the Philippines)
13. Viewpoint: Emerging ‘Offset-X’ Strategy Addresses Chinese Threat
14. Navy Ends 'Gruesome' Testing on Sheep After PETA Protests
15. REED, WICKER ANNOUNCE SASC MEMBERSHIP FOR 118TH CONGRESS
16. Opinion | We Already Have 18 Intelligence Agencies. We Still Need 1 More.
17. #Reviewing Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century
18. The Case for Caution on Crimea
19. This is why the SCAR Mk16 rifle never became a special operations weapon
20. We asked the new AI to do some simple rocket science. It crashed and burned
21. Defeat in Afghanistan: An Autopsy by Joseph J. Collins
22. DARPA Awards Contracts for Long-Range ‘Liberty Lifter’ Flying Boat Design
23. US opens embassy in Solomon Islands after 30-year absence to counter China
24. 431. Your Adversary is Rational, Just Not the Way You Want Them to Be (Army Mad Scientist Blog)
25. Is Russia’s Wagner Group recruiting US veterans to fight in Ukraine?
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February
Access the foreign policy tracker HERE.
February 1, 2023 | FDD Tracker: January 1-31, 2023
Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February
David Adesnik
Senior Fellow and Director of Research
John Hardie
Russia Program Deputy Director
Trend Overview
By David Adesnik and John Hardie
Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch. This is our first monthly tracker since the special year-end edition we published before the holidays.
The big story in January was Berlin’s refusal to send Ukraine Leopard tanks or even to let other NATO members give their German-made Leopards to Kyiv. As the war reaches a pivotal phase, the impasse threatened to undermine what has thus far been impressive transatlantic unity. But the Biden administration persuaded Berlin to cooperate by pledging to provide Ukraine with Abrams tanks. Washington is also sending Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Stryker armored personnel carriers for the first time. This is all good news, yet the White House still refuses to send Kyiv ATACMS missiles, which would maximize Ukraine’s chances of victory and help hasten the war’s conclusion.
Another difficult question for the administration is why its envoy for nuclear negotiations with Iran held unpublicized talks with Tehran, which a foreign media outlet later revealed. The White House says it will not push for a nuclear deal while Tehran is crushing protests at home, yet it seems unwilling to give its full support to demonstrators marching under the banner of “Woman, Life, Freedom.”
Check back with us next month to see if NATO remains united behind Ukraine and if the White House clarifies its priorities for U.S policy toward Iran.
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 1, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2023
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian officials are continuing to warn about Russia’s intention of conducting a decisive offensive operation in Donbas in February and/or March, supporting ISW’s most likely course of action assessment (MLCOA).
- Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting conditions for further Russian cross-border raids into northeastern areas of Ukraine, likely in an effort to further domestic information operations and pin Ukrainian forces against northern border areas.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and southwest of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions on the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 1.
- Russian forces are continuing to carry out unsuccessful disruption missions on islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast in an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from gaining ground on the islands.
- Russian officials plan to propose a moratorium on the public procurement law to simplify spending procedures amid an increasingly costly war effort.
- The Wagner Group’s prison recruitment efforts may have slowed in previous months.
- Crimean partisans may have conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in occupied Crimea on January 30.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 1, 2023
understandingwar.org
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 1, 7:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian officials are continuing to warn about Russia’s intention of conducting a decisive offensive operation in Donbas in February and/or March, supporting ISW’s most likely course of action assessment (MLCOA). Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated on February 1 that Ukraine is on the eve of an active phase of combat that will take place over the next two months.[1] Yusov noted that the poor state of Russian military equipment will force the Russian military command to mass forces to outnumber Ukrainian defenders in order to make gains. Ukrainian Colonel Serhiy Hrabskyi stated that Russia does not have sufficient forces to conduct an attack along the entire 1,500km frontline in Ukraine and will concentrate its efforts on seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[2] A prominent Russian milblogger observed that the prospect of a Russian offensive operation does not appear to be triggering panic among Ukrainian forces, who are continuing to build out their counteroffensive plans.[3] ISW reported on January 31 that Ukrainian military officials reiterated their intent to launch major counteroffensive operations by summer 2023.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting conditions for further Russian cross-border raids into northeastern areas of Ukraine, likely in an effort to further domestic information operations and pin Ukrainian forces against northern border areas. Putin held a meeting on February 1 to discuss the restoration of residential infrastructure in Crimea, Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts following “shelling by Neo-Nazi formations.”[5] Putin noted that his administration is prioritizing the ending of Ukrainian shelling of border regions, but that this task is “the business of the military department.”[6] Putin’s focus on the supposed danger of Ukrainian shelling of border regions likely serves a two-fold purpose. It furthers an information operation intended to frame the war in Ukraine as an existential threat to Russian citizens in order to generate domestic support for a protracted war. ISW has reported on previous methods by which Russian authorities have engaged in this information operation.[7] Putin may also be setting conditions for escalated cross-border raids in order to distract and disperse Ukrainian forces from critical axes of advance by pinning them to northeastern border areas. ISW continues to assess that a Russian invasion from Belarus is exceedingly unlikely, and the ongoing information operation to pin Ukrainian troops against the northern Ukraine-Belarus border seems to be faltering as Ukrainian officials increasingly assess that this contingency is improbable.[8] The threat of cross-border raids from Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts into northern and northeastern Ukraine is likely an attempt to force Ukraine to deploy limited elements to these areas to protect against such attacks, thus dispersing Ukrainian troops to an extent in advance of a likely Russian offensive operation in the coming months. ISW has previously reported similar Russian distraction and dispersion operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[9]
The Kremlin is likely seizing an opportunity to discredit Igor Girkin, a prominent critical voice within the Russian nationalist space and former Russian officer, following his altercation with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov accused Girkin of cowardice following his decision to retreat from Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast, in July 2014.[10] This is a common criticism Girkin’s enemies direct at him. Solovyov’s remarks echo Prigozhin’s ongoing efforts to attack Girkin across the Russian information space, which ISW assessed was an attempt to undermine Girkin’s patronage networks and influence among Russian ultranationalists.[11] Wagner-affiliated milbloggers also portray Girkin as a coward through shared interviews with individuals claiming to be Girkin’s acquaintances.[12] ISW previously assessed that Prigozhin’s criticism of Girkin will likely benefit the Kremlin, who will seize this opportunity to discredit an avid critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[13]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian officials are continuing to warn about Russia’s intention of conducting a decisive offensive operation in Donbas in February and/or March, supporting ISW’s most likely course of action assessment (MLCOA).
- Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting conditions for further Russian cross-border raids into northeastern areas of Ukraine, likely in an effort to further domestic information operations and pin Ukrainian forces against northern border areas.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and southwest of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions on the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 1.
- Russian forces are continuing to carry out unsuccessful disruption missions on islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast in an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from gaining ground on the islands.
- Russian officials plan to propose a moratorium on the public procurement law to simplify spending procedures amid an increasingly costly war effort.
- The Wagner Group’s prison recruitment efforts may have slowed in previous months.
- Crimean partisans may have conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in occupied Crimea on January 30.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 1. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on February 1 that Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in heavy fighting near Kreminna and Svatove. Haidai added that Russian forces have not yet formed an assault group in the Svatove-Kreminna direction but are continuing to accumulate manpower and military equipment in the area.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District continued offensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line, with the 488th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment reportedly advancing 800 meters into Ukrainian positions.[15] The milblogger added that elements of the 254th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are continuing to carry out counterbattery fire against Ukrainian forces on unspecified segments of the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that the 144th Motorized Rifle Division also repelled Ukrainian efforts to advance into Kreminna, targeted Ukrainian supply routes in the area, and advanced into the forests west of Kreminna.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[17]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne (25km northeast), Rozdolivka (15km northeast), Blahodatne (5km north), Krasna Hora (5km north, and Paraskoviivka (6km north); and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest).[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that as of February 1, Russian forces still have not taken Bakhmut into an operational encirclement and denied January 31 claims from a Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) source that Russian forces took control of Sacco i Vanzetti village (17km north of Bakhmut).[19] Geolocated combat footage shows that Russian forces have made slight advances northeast of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and on the northeastern and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut, as well as south of Bakhmut near Opytne and on Bakhmut’s southern outskirts.[20] A Russian milblogger posted video footage of a Wagner Group fighter in Blahodatne who claimed that Wagner has pushed Ukrainian forces three to four kilometers away from Blahodatne.[21] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner has advanced along certain streets on the northern and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut itself.[22] Russian sources continued to claim that Wagner Group forces are pushing northwest of the Klishchiivka area towards Ivanivske and Bakhmut’s southwestern outskirts in order to cut the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[23]
A Ukrainian serviceman operating in Bakhmut provided granular insight into Russian tactics in the Bakhmut area. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force posted an interview on February 1 with a Ukrainian soldier who stated that the situation in Bakhmut has recently “radically changed” since Russia has committed competent Wagner and Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) operatives to the frontline.[24] Wagner and the GRU may be committing more elite special operations and reconnaissance elements to augment human wave attacks in the Bakhmut area. The serviceman also noted that Russian forces are conducting fairly successful infiltration techniques in Bakhmut by sending unarmed, unequipped “camels” (military personnel) to deliver ammunition and weapons to frontline positions. and that these “camels” often are able to approach Ukrainian positions without detection.[25] The serviceman stated that Russian forces identify and destroy buildings that Ukrainian forces operate out of.[26] These techniques, which are likely helping reinvigorate the stalled Russian advances in and around Bakhmut, are not likely scalable to support larger offensive operations. It is also unclear how effective they would be in terrain lacking the kind of cover they appear to be using immediately around and in Bakhmut.
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks on the western outskirts of Donetsk City or in western Donetsk Oblast on February 1. A Russian milblogger posted footage of the DNR “Sparta” battalion striking a Ukrainian reconnaissance group near Pervomaiske (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[27] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Vuhledar area southwest of Donetsk City.[28] Geolocated combat footage shows elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade assaulting Ukrainian positions southwest of Vuhledar.[29] Russian forces continue to use the military-district-level TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system near Vuhledar, indicating relative prioritization of this area.[30]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces are continuing to carry out disruption missions on islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast in an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from gaining ground on the islands. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on February 1 that Russian forces are increasing the number of reconnaissance and sabotage attempts in the area of the Dnipro River delta likely in an effort to simulate the threat of an escalation south of Kherson City.[31] Geolocated footage published on January 30 also likely showed the aftermath of Ukrainian artillery fire on Russian forces conducting a raid on one of the islands in the delta.[32] Humenyuk noted that Russian force composition, weather conditions, terrain, and the use of civilian boats are not sufficient to force the Dnipro River, however. Humenyuk added that there are no concentrations of the Russian special purpose forces or forces with high combat readiness that could threaten the west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian forces did not have the capacity to hold western Kherson Oblast with an abundance of ammunition and elite forces due to disrupted logistics in fall 2022 and are unlikely to be able to restore lost positions in the region. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), in turn, claimed that Russian forces destroyed two motorboats and eliminated up to 10 Ukrainian servicemen near Kruhle Lake, about 5km south of Kherson City.[33]
Russian forces are continuing intense shelling of Kherson City and western Kherson Oblast likely intending to undermine Ukrainian raids on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River. The UK MoD claimed that some of the most intense shelling is taking place along the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine, likely in an effort to degrade civilian morale and deter any Ukrainian counterattacks across the Dnipro River.[34] Humenyuk also noted that Russian and Ukrainian forces are continuously shelling the Kinburn Spit, which prevents both sides from securing positions on the spit.[35]
Russian occupation officials did not make new territorial claims on February 1 but maintained that Russian forces are continuing to attack in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Head Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces have established a first line of defense that encompasses claimed new Russian positions gained as a result of claimed offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late January.[36] Rogov also claimed that fighting is ongoing along the entire frontline but is largely concentrated around Orikhiv, Hulyaipole, and Charivne.[37] Ukrainian local and military officials did not report ongoing fighting in specified areas or any frontline changes.[38] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military base in the Central Market (Tsentralnyi Rynok) area of Melitopol.[39]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian officials plan to propose a moratorium on the public procurement law to simplify spending procedures amid an increasingly costly war effort. Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko stated on February 1 that she intends to instruct Deputy Speaker Nikolai Zhuravlev to appeal to the Russian government to impose a moratorium on the procurement law until the completion of the war in Ukraine so that Russian officials can quickly disperse funds.[40] Matvienko stated that the moratorium on the procurement law would allow Russian regions to make expedited decisions on the start of construction projects for infrastructure, social, and other facilities.[41] Matvienko stated that she will raise the issue with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and that the current procurement process stipulated by the law would prevent some funds from the annual budget from being available until June or July of 2023.[42] Russian officials likely proposed the moratorium in response to widespread procurement problems that are compounding pervasive provisioning issues in the Russian military. Russian officials, possibly under pressure from the Kremlin to fix procurement issues a soon as possible, likely believe that doing away with established procurement processes will alleviate these issues. The Kremlin’s refusal to put the Russian economy on a war footing has created large discrepancies between demanded provisions and the Russian government’s and economy’s ability to provide requested materiel; and the relaxation of procurement processes is unlikely to resolve this discrepancy. The proposed moratorium would likely allow Russian officials to spend money without normal oversight, which would also likely allow already widespread Russian corruption to flourish, further undermining the effort to resolve procurement problems. Matvienko may also have connections to Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and her proposal to loosen spending procedures may allow figures associated with unconventional and parallel military structures to better fund their efforts.[43]
The Wagner Group may have slowed its prison recruitment efforts in previous months. The Russian Federal Penitentiary Service released statistics on February 1 showing that the decrease in the overall number of prisoners in Russia has slowed since November of 2022.[44] The statistics show that the number of Russian prisoners decreased by 6,000 between November 2022 and January 2023 as compared to a decrease of 23,000 prisoners between September and October of 2022, when the Wagner Group was intensifying its prison recruitment campaign.[45] The Wagner Group’s reputation for committing convict recruits to highly attritional human wave attacks in eastern Ukraine has likely engendered resistance among Russian prisoners to Wagner Group recruitment efforts. Prigozhin bolsters Wagner Group’s reputation as a high casualty service through continued comments that frame service in the Wagner Group as punishment, most recently threatening a Russian journalist with service in a Wagner Group unit deployed to the Bakhmut area.[46] The likely substandard physical condition of the majority of Russia’s prison population for military service is likely also constraining the Wagner Group’s prison recruitment effort. The possible decline in the Wagner Group’s prison recruitment campaign may be an indicator that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intends to sideline the Wagner Group in future offensive operations in Ukraine and thus that the Wagner Group no longer needs large numbers of convict volunteers for a high pace of attritional human wave attacks.
Former Wagner Group fighters further confirmed that the Russian government is likely preemptively expunging records and granting pardons for convicts who volunteer with the Wagner Group in Ukraine. Independent Russian outlet Mediazona conducted an interview with a convict who served with the Wagner Group in Ukraine and later fled, who stated that he signed pardon papers with the Wagner Group before leaving prison.[47] The former Wagner Group fighter stated that he returned to Russia to find that his criminal record was expunged and that he did not have to go through any formal review process with the Wagner Group or Russian authorities on the matter, suggesting that the Russian government issued him a preemptive pardon and expungement of his record before he began serving with the Wagner Group in Ukraine.[48] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on January 27 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine.[49]
The Russian MoD continues to face criticism over the unclear status of volunteer formations. Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD for deciding to address the provisioning of volunteer formations this late into the war in Ukraine and argued that the lack of thorough legislation clarifying the status of volunteer formations will continue to complicate their provisioning.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that regional Russian authorities created volunteer battalion detachments and were responsible for their provisioning, as ISW previously assessed.[51] Russian regional authorities likely ran out of supplies and funds to continue provisioning these volunteer battalion detachments, leading to their overall decline as viable Russian formations in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers argued that Russian officials need to quickly build upon the November 2022 article recognizing volunteer formations in the federal law on defense to resolve issues with their provisioning.[52] A subset of Russian milbloggers have been heavily involved with various Russian volunteer formations in the past and will likely continue to criticize the Russian MoD over issues stemming from their unclear status.
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Crimean partisans may have conducted an IED attack in occupied Crimea on January 30. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on February 1 that members of the Atesh Ukrainian-Tatar resistance movement used an IED to kill two Russian Rosgvardia officers driving from Sevastopol to Simferopol, occupied Crimea, on January 30.[53]
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to lean on Russian federal subject patronages to implement infrastructure projects in occupied territories. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on February 1 to discuss the restoration of residential infrastructure in occupied territories.[54] Putin called for housing construction and an increased pace of restoration of cities and towns in occupied territories, emphasizing the introduction of preferential mortgages (reduced at a 2% rate) in “new, and in fact, old, historical territories.”[55] Putin stated that reconstruction work has already begun on social facilities such as kindergartens, schools, hospitals, clinics, communal infrastructure, roads, and communication networks following the cessation of hostilities in Russian-captured territories. Putin thanked Russian constituent entities for allocating financial resources, specialists, construction teams, and equipment to the “new regions.”[56] Yamal Governor Dmitry Artyukhov stated on February 1 that he personally spent several days overseeing reconstruction projects on schools, hospitals, and a blood transfusion station in occupied Volnovkha, Donetsk Oblast.[57] Artyukhov claimed that Donbas and Yamal share a historical link and emphasized that the Yamal Administration has “big plans” to sponsor residential buildings, life support facilities, and a youth center in Volnovkha in 2023.[58]
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)
Belarusian forces are reportedly operating Russian-provided Iskander systems as of February 1. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Belarusian servicemembers have begun the full independent operation of the Russian-provided Iskander systems, and independent Belarusian monitoring group The Hajun Project reported that the 465th Missile Brigade are operating the systems.[59] The Belarusian MoD stated that Belarusian servicemembers received training on how to use the systems in the Russian Federation and are currently conducting practical training on the systems at Belarusian training grounds.[60] Belarusian President Lukashenko stated in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 19, 2022, that Russia would deliver Iskander complexes to Belarus.[61] The Russian delivery of the Iskander systems to Belarus is likely meant to coerce Belarus into further integration measures with Russia in the context of the Union State, particularly in the realm of defense.[62]
Belarusian and Russian forces may have concluded joint tactical aviation exercises as of February 1. The Belarusian MoD stated on February 1 that Belarusian Air Force Commander Colonel Andrey Lukyanovich presented awards to participants of the joint tactical flight exercises at the Machulishchi military airfield in Minsk Oblast.[63] The Belarusian MoD initially stated on January 8 that Belarusian and Russian aviation units that are a part of the Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) would hold the exercises from January 16 to February 1. Neither Belarusian nor Russian officials have formally announced that the joint tactical aviation exercises have concluded, however.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/rosiiski-komandyry-vykorystovuiut-svoikh-soldativ-iak-harmatne-miaso.html
[2] https://suspilne diot media/371347-rosia-ne-mae-resursiv-dla-nastupu-na-vsij-linii-frontu-polkovnik-zsu/
[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70428; https://t.me/readovkanews/51785
[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70428
[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/01/zbilshennya-kilkosti-rozviduvalnyh-grup-voroga-v-gyrli-dnipra-mozhe-buty-oznakoyu-nagnitannya-sytuacziyi-gumenyuk/
[35] https://suspilne dot media/371314-kinburnskij-pivostriv-na-mikolaivsini-zalisaetsa-v-sirij-zoni-recnica-sil-oboroni-pivdna-gumenuk/
[40] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/16934025
[41] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/16934025
[42] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/16934025 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/884131 ;
[44] https://fsin.gov dot ru/structure/inspector/iao/statistika/Kratkaya%20har-ka%20UIS/
[45] https://fsin.gov dot ru/structure/inspector/iao/statistika/Kratkaya%20har-ka%20UIS/
[47] https://zona dot media/article/2023/02/01/run
[48] https://zona dot media/article/2023/02/01/run
[53] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/02/01/krymski-partyzany-likviduvaly-dvoh-okupantiv/; https://t.me/atesh_ua/336
[54] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70428; https://t.me/readovkanews/51784
[55] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70428; https://t.me/readovkanews/51784
[56] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70428; https://t.me/readovkanews/51784
understandingwar.org
3. Philippines grants U.S. greater access to bases amid China concerns
I understand he also visited Camp Navarro in Zamboanga.
Philippines grants U.S. greater access to bases amid China concerns
Reuters · by Karen Lema
- Summary
- Philippines, U.S. agree to add four locations under EDCA
- Agreement comes amid tension in South China Sea, over Taiwan
- EDCA allows U.S. access to Philippine military bases
- China says greater U.S. access hurts regional stability
MANILA, Feb 2 (Reuters) - The Philippines has granted the United States greater access to its military bases, their defence chiefs said on Thursday, amid mounting concern over China's increasing assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea and tension over self-ruled Taiwan.
The United States would be given access to four more locations under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Philippines' Defense Secretary Carlito Galvez said in a joint news conference at the Philippine military headquarters in Manila.
Austin, in the Philippines for talks as the United States seeks to extend its security options as part of efforts to deter any move by China against self-ruled Taiwan, referred to the Philippine decision as a "big deal" as he and his counterpart reaffirmed their commitment to bolstering their alliance.
"Our alliance makes both of our democracies more secure and helps uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific," said Austin, whose visit follows one by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris in November, which included a stop at Palawan island in the South China Sea.
"We discussed concrete actions to address destabilising activities in the waters surrounding the Philippines, including the West Philippine Sea, and we remain committed to strengthening our mutual capacities to resist armed attack," Austin said.
"That's just part of our efforts to modernize our alliance. And these efforts are especially important as People's Republic of China continues to advance its illegitimate claims in the West Philippine Sea," he added.
China said greater U.S. access to Philippine military bases undermined regional stability and raised tensions.
"This is an act that escalates tensions in the region and endangers regional peace and stability," China's foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said in a regular briefing.
"Regional countries should remain vigilant about this and avoid being used by the U.S."
[1/3] U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III walks past military guards during arrival honors at the Department of National Defense in Camp Aguinaldo military camp in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, February 2, 2023. Rolex dela Pena/Pool via REUTERS
The additional sites under the EDCA bring to nine the number of military bases the United States would have access to. The United States has announced it was allocating more than $82 million for infrastructure at the existing sites.
The EDCA allows U.S. access to Philippine military bases for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment and the building of facilities such as runways, fuel storage and military housing, but not for a permanent presence.
Austin and Galvez did not specify the sites that would be opened to U.S. access. The former Philippine military chief had said the United States had asked for access to bases on the main northern island of Luzon, the closest part of the Philippines to Taiwan, and on Palawan in the southwest, near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
Outside the military headquarters, dozens of protesters opposed to a U.S. military presence chanted anti-U.S. slogans and called for the EDCA to be scrapped.
Before meeting his counterpart, Austin met Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and assured him of U.S. support.
"We stand ready to help you in any way we can," Austin said.
Ties between the United States and its former colony were soured under the previous president, Rodrigo Duterte, who made overtures towards China and was known for anti-U.S. rhetoric and threats to downgrade military ties.
Marcos has met President Joe Biden twice since the son of former dictator, also called Ferdinand Marcos, won a landslide victory in an election last year and reiterated he could not see a future for his country without its longtime treaty ally.
"I have always said, it seems to me, the future of the Philippines and for that matter the Asia-Pacific will always have to involve the United States," Marcos told Austin.
Reporting by Karen Lema; additional reporting by Eduardo Baptista in Beijing; Editing by Ed Davies and Gerry Doyle
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Karen Lema
4. The Overlooked Irregular Warfare Expert the Pentagon Should Study Today
Will we be able to regenerate the capabilities of SORO? This is anecdotal rationale for why we need a SORO - to find thinkers like Fall. Also, here is a link to a recent article on the WAR ROOM that I missed last month: "BERNARD FALL: FORGOTTEN THEORIST OF WAR" https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/bernard-fall/
Excerpt:
Fall subsequently worked for the Special Operations Research Office, established in April 1956, and the Human Relations Area Files, then located at American University. In 1958, Fall joined the faculty at Howard University as a professor of international relations where he worked with such scholars as Ralph Bunche and taught students, including a young Stokely Carmichael, a future key figure in the Black Panther Party. When US involvement in Southeast Asia began escalating in the 1950s, Fall’s experience and scholarship positioned him as one of the foremost authorities on Vietnamese revolutionary warfare. Well before the intervention reached its apex, journalists David Halberstam and Walter Cronkite and military officers, such as Major General William Yarborough, turned to Fall for his expertise.
I always keep in mind these quotes from Street without Joy.
“This is not a military war in the old sense. It is not even a political war. What we’re facing here is a social war, a class war. As long as we don’t destroy the mandarin class, abolish excessive tenancy rates and do fail to give every farmer his own plot of land, this country’ll go Communist as soon as we turn our backs.”
― Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina
"In jungle war, and even more so in a revolutionary war where ideology plays a key role, the air element is unlikely to be able to play a decisive part. In fact, the air element should make it a point to underline its own limitations to the ground commanders, lest they and their troops develop a false sense of over-reliance on air cover, re-supply, and reconnaissance. Many observers have pointed out that in some cases in South Viet-nam, this already has happened." (Fall, 267)
The Overlooked Irregular Warfare Expert the Pentagon Should Study Today - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Nathaniel L. Moir · January 31, 2023
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In his 1961 book about warfare in Southeast Asia, Street Without Joy, Bernard Fall, the Howard University professor and former French Resistance fighter, explained, “A dead Special Forces sergeant is not spontaneously replaced by his own social environment. A dead revolutionary usually is.” Fall’s point was that military capabilities and technologies are important but insufficient when complex politics and long-standing grievances motivate diverse populations to engage in conflict. Through dozens of articles and seven books, including The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis, published in 1963, and Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu, published in 1966, Fall explained why France, the United States, and their allies in the Republic of Vietnam had such difficulty countering Vietnamese revolutionary warfare.
The problem the West and its anticommunist allies encountered was an inability to connect military outcomes with often conflicting and shifting political goals. In addition, the network of political organizations that Vietnamese communists created—through an administrative structure Fall called parallel hierarchies—was impossible to counter with military capability alone. These networks, ranging from village-level to large inter-zone regional command elements, thwarted superior military power wielded by the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. Motivation, when it intersected with Maoist-inspired political organization, enabled the Viet Minh and subsequent generations of Vietnamese communists to outlast French and American forces over almost three decades between 1946 and 1975.
The key to the insurgents’ success was irregular warfare, described by Fall as Vietnamese revolutionary warfare, an approach that hinged on more nuanced, precise, and context-dependent policy than that of conventionally minded adversaries. Given the US military’s recent prioritization of large-scale combat operations, Fall’s thoughts about a similar prioritization of conventional warfare in Vietnam seem prescient. Today, US policymakers would do well to study Fall’s insights, or they risk repeating the mistakes of the past.
An Irregular Education: Targeting Collaborators in World War II France
Fall was well equipped to identify and describe connections between guerrilla warfare and political outcomes. Born in Vienna in 1926 to a Jewish family, Fall emigrated to France in 1938 after the Anschluss of Austria. When he was seventeen, Fall joined the Resistance after his mother was deported to Auschwitz and the Gestapo murdered his father. Confronted with the possibility of elimination or conscription for labor, Fall joined several Zionist resistance groups in southern France before landing in the Maquis in Haute-Savoie. During his time in the Resistance, his unit targeted collaborators to undermine Nazi and Vichy authority. Fall later explained how targeting collaborators and assassinating key local leaders isolated occupation forces from the population. Fall’s analysis of warfare in Vietnam is filled with analogies and anecdotes related to his early experiences in the French Resistance. He later moved from the Maquis to the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur, subsequently receiving more formal military experience after D-Day as a mortar platoon leader in the French Army’s 4th Moroccan Mountain Division.
After the war, Fall used his French, German, and English proficiency to work as a translator during the early stages of the Nuremberg trials in 1946. In 1947 and 1948, he continued to work for the War Crimes Commission, analyzing the Krupp manufacturing corporation’s widespread use of slave labor to fabricate materials used in Nazi armaments, especially tanks, artillery, and U-boats. In 1952, Fall moved to the United States as one of the first International Fulbright Scholars, earning a master’s degree in political science at Syracuse University. In 1953, he travelled to Indochina for ten months of research on the Viet Minh, gathering material to complete his doctorate in 1955.
Fall subsequently worked for the Special Operations Research Office, established in April 1956, and the Human Relations Area Files, then located at American University. In 1958, Fall joined the faculty at Howard University as a professor of international relations where he worked with such scholars as Ralph Bunche and taught students, including a young Stokely Carmichael, a future key figure in the Black Panther Party. When US involvement in Southeast Asia began escalating in the 1950s, Fall’s experience and scholarship positioned him as one of the foremost authorities on Vietnamese revolutionary warfare. Well before the intervention reached its apex, journalists David Halberstam and Walter Cronkite and military officers, such as Major General William Yarborough, turned to Fall for his expertise.
A Formula for Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina
Fall’s study of Maoist thought along with French military officers who commanded in Indochina, including Colonels Gabriel Bonnet and Charles Lacheroy, inspired his conception of revolutionary warfare. Fall described the influence of other French officers, including Commandant Jean Hogard and Colonel Roger Trinquier, in the introduction to Trinquier’s Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Many of these officers contributed to the French journal Revue militaire d’information, which was an essential source of information for Fall and provided a basis for his investigation of the critical components of revolutionary warfare. At a time when it was rare to consider Vietnamese sources, Fall also studied and assessed how anti-colonialist thought permeated the nationalism propagated by Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh. These two nationalists laid the groundwork on which communist leaders, such as Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, and Truong Chinh, built the communist-controlled revolution. Fall’s holistic approach to studying the war ultimately integrated political economy, including regional rice production, criticism of US foreign assistance before 1961, and studies of Vietnamese society and religion.
In an article published in Naval War College Review in April 1965, Fall described revolutionary warfare (RW) through a formula: RW = G + P in which guerrilla warfare (G) and politics (P) were variables. While guerrilla warfare emphasized tactics, politics comprised diverse subfactors, including information and propaganda, ideology, diplomacy, economics, and others. In the article’s first section, “The Century of ‘Small Wars,’” he explained, “This formula for revolutionary warfare is the result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system. This is the real difference between partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare, and everything else.” Fall’s central goal was to delineate the relationship between political action and violence. Through efforts to establish what he described as “a competitive system of control over the population,” he pointed out how any “sound revolutionary warfare operator” historically prioritized political action: “The political, administrative, ideological aspect is the primary aspect. Everybody, of course, by definition, will seek a military solution to the insurgency problem, whereas by its very nature, the insurgency problem is militarily only in a secondary sense, and politically, ideologically, and administratively in a primary sense.”
Revolutionary warfare, therefore, was an accumulation of psychological, political, and ideological factors, driving tactical, operational, and strategic decision-making. In what was Fall’s most precise description, he explained, “I would like to put it in even a simpler way: When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front.” To implement such as system, Fall was adamant that revolutionary warfare fighters seek “primarily to establish a rival regime via the system of hiérarchies parallèles.” Ultimately, he believed this political and structural administrative system of parallel hierarchies—a shadow system of governance—characterized the type of warfare the United States encountered in Vietnam. Writing in his book The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis in 1963, he explained why recognizing this system of warfare mattered:
Thus, I believe that the whole problem of the meaning of “war” in the new context will have to be re-examined sooner or later, to take into account the facts that parallel hierarchies, revolutionary warfare, and active sanctuaries are here to stay and that our present response of concentrating on the external military symptoms of the problem simply has no bearing on the preponderant politico-socio-economic components.
When US involvement escalated, committed irregular warfare practitioners began to acknowledge the value of Fall’s scholarship. Yarborough, then commandant of the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, personally invited Fall to speak with Special Forces soldiers preparing to deploy to Vietnam in the early 1960s. According to the base newspaper, The Paraglide, Yarborough introduced Fall as “one of few acknowledged experts on Vietnam.” US Army special warfare courses, including “Problems of Development and Internal Defense” and “Counterinsurgency in Indochina,” relied heavily on Fall’s writings. High-ranking politicians also turned to Fall. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright often met with Fall and would later describe how Fall’s scholarship shaped his views on Vietnamese history and Sino-Vietnamese communist relations in The Arrogance of Power. In an important respect, Fall shaped Fulbright’s disagreements with President Lyndon B. Johnson’s war policies, and this political dissent culminated in the televised Vietnam hearings in 1966.
A Guide for Irregular Warfare Today
Even as early as 1961, Fall believed that “‘international vandalism’ in the form of Revolutionary War is going to be with us for a long time to come.” To address this problem, it was best to “quit inventing new names and slogans for it, and settle down to study its rules.” As a framework for those rules, he emphasized the importance of studying the context of political legitimacy and how military arms might achieve political goals. Escalating military operations in contexts where adequate popular support and competent allied leaders did not exist was folly. In a contemporary contrast with American experiences propping up weakly supported central governments, Eugene Linden recently noted of US support for Ukrainian resistance, “Unlike the U.S.’s experience with corrupt, incompetent allies during the Cuban revolution, as well as in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the U.S. now has a secret weapon on its side—the righteous fervor of the people it is trying to help.” Despite genuine anticommunist Vietnamese allies who fought and died for a free and independent South Vietnam, a series of corrupt and incompetent administrations in the Republic of Vietnam could not unite the South Vietnamese in a manner similar to the way Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has united Ukrainians with their government while justifying large-scale American and NATO support.
In the case of Vietnam, Fall wanted decision makers to understand that military might could not counter the social-political and historical drivers of Vietnamese revolutionary warfare. Excessive military force could not compensate for American and allied lack of political will to fight and would be counterproductive. Willpower, in this sense, is not ambiguous and involves critical mental and moral underpinnings. According to a 2019 RAND study, there is a pattern of failed campaigns that reflect “the wavering emphasis on the will to fight in military doctrine.” During the Vietnam War, domestic dissent tied to civil rights, the draft, and other problems connected to US policies demonstrated damage inflicted within the United States that undermined its military might abroad. Importantly, Fall was adamant that democratic values should remain central to military and policy planning, writing in 1965 that “what America should want to prove in Vietnam is that the Free World is ‘better,’ not that it can kill people more efficiently. If we would induce 100,000 Viet Cong to surrender to our side because our offers of social reform are better than those of the other side’s, that would be victory.” Social reform is not possible in every intervention, but military action without political solutions is unlikely to provide desirable results.
Finally, Fall’s writing evokes the difficulty in conducting irregular warfare when it is viewed as competing with and not fully integrated into conventional operations. In Vietnam, despite the efforts of Navy SEALs, the joint special operations task force MACV-SOG, and the 5th Special Forces Group, integrating irregular warfare with large-scale combat operations was challenging. Similar problems exist today. Despite an increased emphasis on large-scale combat operations, “the most likely form of conflict that Army forces are going to conduct based on the historical record, is irregular warfare.” The Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy perhaps did not go far enough in articulating a US approach to irregular warfare. As David Ucko has explained, the annex is “inadequate in the face of the challenge at hand. . . . This competition for legitimacy and influence is fundamentally what irregular warfare is all about and, for this reason, the annex—while very welcome and important—is also insufficient for the reform and change that must now take place.” Regrettably, Ucko’s 2020 comments remain just as relevant today.
Fall’s ideas on political warfare remain relevant today, as David Kilcullen and Greg Mills demonstrate in The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, like Vietnam, “reminds us of the primacy of politics in war, a lesson that should be noted by outsiders to any conflict.” This is what Fall wanted policymakers to understand before they escalated military intervention in Vietnam. He recognized the primacy of political legitimacy over military force and noted the tendency to over-rely on military power, writing presciently in 1963: “To win the military battle but lose the political war could become the US fate in Vietnam.” Fall believed that no invading force could possess sufficient military power to compensate for its political standing if that force lacked political legitimacy among the society it sought to control. Relying on politically legitimate partners, then as now, remains central to this task.
Tragically, Fall died in February 1967 when he was forty years old after he tripped a landmine while on patrol with US Marines in Thua Thien province, near Hue, Vietnam. His life experiences and insights into irregular warfare in the twentieth century provide much to consider, particularly as it relates to efforts to establish political legitimacy when military force is involved. Revisiting Fall’s papers and his many books will remind readers why political action remains the foundation for whatever form warfare takes.
Nathaniel L. Moir, PhD, is the author of Number One Realist: Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare. He is a critical infrastructure analyst with New York state’s Office of Counter Terrorism and a research associate in the Applied History Project at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is also a major in the US Army Reserve and was formerly an Ernest May postdoctoral fellow in history and policy at the Kennedy School.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image: Bernard Fall with US soldiers in Vietnam, (credit: US Army, via Wikimedia Commons)
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mwi.usma.edu · by Nathaniel L. Moir · January 31, 2023
5. Let's Bring Greater Transparency to Foreign Influence on Policy Making
Let's Bring Greater Transparency to Foreign Influence on Policy Making
LEE ZELDIN , FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
ON 2/1/23 AT 6:00 AM EST
Newsweek · February 1, 2023
In the corridors of power in our nation's capitol, it's an open secret that the more money foreign governments spend on lobbying and influence peddling, the more they will be able to influence policy decisions that affect their interests.
Sometimes, attempts to influence U.S. policy are conducted in plain sight in the form of direct foreign government payments to lobbyists. These lobbyists must register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA). More often, however, this purchase of influence is achieved by funneling money through supposedly objective, independent think tanks.
Many of these think tanks have enormous sway on Capitol Hill. Their experts testify at congressional hearings and help staff draft legislation. Think tanks wield an outsized influence with legislators, who often adopt their positions wholesale, presenting foreign governments a chance to covertly shape U.S. policy. But what happens when the "experts" filling these roles are effectively paid agents of foreign governments like China, Russia, Iran, and Qatar?
There is currently no way for members of Congress to discern which think tanks are funded by foreign governments—making think tanks effective vehicles for foreign funders to shape U.S. policy right under our noses. There exists a widespread belief that think tanks are exempt from FARA disclosure requirements. While that belief is mistaken, FARA is unlikely to be an effective tool to promote transparency around think tank funding.
To tackle this pressing issue, Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Rep. Jack Bergman (R-Mich.) have introduced legislation to require a greater degree of transparency around the foreign funding of think tanks and other public policy-focused nonprofit entities, so that the public and government officials can know about any foreign influence behind research or policy recommendations. The Think Tank Transparency Act would mandate that nonprofits engaged in influencing U.S. policy or public opinion promptly disclose all funds that they receive from foreign entities, as well as all contracts and agreements they enter into with foreign entities. Those nonprofits would have to disclose their funding and contracts to the Department of Justice—which will make such disclosures available for immediate public inspection—within 90 days.
"Think tanks have an enormous influence on U.S. public policy, and many receive millions from foreign entities who have a significant interest in how our policy is shaped," said Rep. Bergman regarding the new legislation. "Congress and the American people deserve to know what these think tanks are up to, and who they're working for."
WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 19: The U.S. Capitol Building dome is seen from the Capitol Visitor Center on January 19, 2023 in Washington, DC. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned Republican and Democratic leaders that the federal government will reach its limit on the amount of money it is able to borrow, and that further action by lawmakers is needed by June 5th when the U.S. could go into economic default. Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images
Several recent incidents—involving the state of Qatar in particular—have highlighted the need to reform the notoriously opaque think tank complex through legislation.
Retired four-star Marine General John Allen allegedly engaged in efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy towards Qatar while working at—and shortly before becoming president of—the Brookings Institution, which counts Qatar among its largest donors. Court filings indicate that Allen misrepresented his role in the lobbying campaign to officials of the U.S government, failing to disclose that he was acting in accordance with what Qatar asked of him, while "simultaneously pursuing multimillion-dollar business deals with the government of Qatar."
Another example of potential Qatari influence involves the Stimson Center, a nonprofit that deals with issues related to international security. Since 2020, the Stimson Center has actively lobbied against the Homeland and Cyber Threat Act (HR 1607), bipartisan legislation to help U.S. companies and citizens who are victims of foreign hacking activity. That bill passed in the House with broad bipartisan support, only to be killed in backroom deals.
The Stimson Center has had an unusually close working relationship with Qatar in recent years. It received at least $600,000 from Qatar in 2019, and the Qataris appear to be the sole funder of the Stimson Center's "Just Security 2020" program, which works on issues related to cyberattacks. Stimson's own literature admits that one of the primary activities of its Qatar-funded program on cybersecurity is "policy dialogues and public/policymaker engagement."
Sadly, there are many examples of think tanks engaging in lobbying, without registering, to influence legislation that would impact their foreign benefactors. We only know how much Qatar has funded this specific think tank because Stimson voluntarily released the information. We need transparency from all think tanks when it comes to foreign influence.
The Think Tank Transparency Act is an essential national security measure to protect our political system from covert foreign influence carried out under the guise of "independent" think tanks.
Lee Zeldin he represented New York's 1st congressional district in the United States House of Representatives from 2015 to 2023.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
Newsweek · by Mark Davis · February 1, 2023
6. Austin Visit to Philippine Base Highlights Benefits of U.S-Philippine Alliance
Some of us have fond memories of spending time in Zamboanga at Camp Navarro.
Austin Visit to Philippine Base Highlights Benefits of U.S-Philippine Alliance
defense.gov · by Jim Garamone
The Philippines and the United States are fundamentally agreed on the vision they see for the Indo-Pacific region — one that is free of coercion and where countries operate according to international law.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III is in the Philippines to strengthen the bonds between the two countries. He visited Camp Navarro in Mindanao where Philippine and U.S. service members are working closely together to ensure the long-term prosperity of the region.
Official Welcome
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III is welcomed to Camp Navarro, Zamboanga, Philippines, Feb. 1, 2023. Austin is traveling to Asia to meet with senior government and military leaders in Korea and the Philippines to advance regional stability, further strengthen the defense partnerships and reaffirm the deep commitment of the United States to work in concert with allies and partners in support of the shared vision of preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific.
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Photo By: Chad McNeeley, DOD
VIRIN: 230201-D-TT977-0207
A U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force operates at the camp alongside Philippine service members as part of Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines — the only named operation in the Indo-Pacific.
While Austin will meet with senior leaders in the Philippine government, he chose to visit Mindanao first to highlight "the consistency and the interoperability of the U.S.-Philippine alliance," a senior defense official said.
"The alliance is about working on shared security challenges together that have an impact here in the Philippines and potentially in the region," the official said. "And I think the successes we've had with counterterrorism cooperation are really emblematic of the alliance."
The Philippines has been dogged by terrorism in the southern part of the 7,000-island Pacific archipelago. Abu Sayyaf, an affiliate of al Qaida, was active in the early 2000s and can still be a problem today. As recently as 2017, an Islamic State affiliate launched attacks on the city of Marawi, which led to five months of bitter, urban fighting.
Austin Visits with Service Members
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III visits with service members assigned to Camp Navarro, Zamboanga, Philippines, Feb. 1, 2023. Austin is traveling to Asia to meet with senior government and military leaders in Korea and the Philippines to advance regional stability, further strengthen the defense partnerships and reaffirm the deep commitment of the United States to work in concert with allies and partners in support of the shared vision of preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific.
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"The assistance and the cooperation that the United States has provided with the Philippines is something that has not only helped them bring a lot more stability to the southern Philippines, but has been successful in enabling us and allies to prevent that violent extremist threat from moving elsewhere in the region," the official said.
A second senior defense official noted that U.S. forces are in the Philippines at the express invitation of the government. He says the effort is a true partnership. "What we're doing with Philippines is working with them," he said. "So that together as an alliance, we can help ensure their future, and so they have the capability to defend their own sovereignty and prevent the kind of coercion that they're facing on a day-to-day basis."
China is the nation doing the coercion, even after losing a landmark ruling at an international tribunal in 2016, that official said. The tribunal in The Hague ruled that China's excessive claims in the South China Sea were illegal according to international law. "What the Philippines is trying to do, is uphold its rights," the official said. "And we're trying to help them do that in the same way we are with other partners around the region. That's what this is really about, not about simply countering China."
Austin Meets Centino
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Philippine Chief of Defense, Gen. Andres Centino at Camp Navarro, Zamboanga, Philippines, Feb. 1, 2023. Austin is traveling to Asia to meet with senior government and military leaders in Korea and the Philippines to advance regional stability, further strengthen the defense partnerships and reaffirm the deep commitment of the United States to work in concert with allies and partners in support of the shared vision of preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific.
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The operation on Mindanao illustrates the way the two militaries work together. U.S. forces are training, advising and assisting Philippine forces. But the Philippines is leading the effort and conducting the counterterrorism operations quite skillfully, the first official said.
But this experience can be broadened, the official said. "We'll need to address issues related to territorial defense for the Philippines and how we think about building on the successes," the official said. "And the day-to-day ties that we have built together down south is an important part of how we're thinking about moving forward."
The alliance and the ties forged are very strong. Austin met with the leaders of the Philippine military at Camp Navarro and many of them attended U.S. military professional education courses. One general officer is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and others graduated from the advanced Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Still more are graduates of the National Defense University at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington.
"Even the new secretary of national defense here did his advanced infantry officer training at Fort Benning where the secretary [Austin] did his, as well," the official said. "So, I think the people-to-people ties that we have in our military-to-military relationship in the Philippines are really important part of what makes the alliance so strong."
Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Focus-on-Indo-Pacific/
defense.gov · by Jim Garamone
7. Hard Drinking and Murky Finances: How an American Veterans Group Imploded in Ukraine
Quite the drama/soap opera that will likely impact other groups trying to do good work.
Hard Drinking and Murky Finances: How an American Veterans Group Imploded in Ukraine
The New York Times · by Jeffrey Gettleman · February 2, 2023
The Mozart Group was training Ukrainian soldiers and evacuating frontline residents until the money ran out. Its collapse sheds light on the stresses faced by such groups.
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Rob, left, a member of the Mozart Group, training Ukrainian soldiers last year.Credit...Laura Boushnak for The New York Times
By
Feb. 1, 2023
KYIV, Ukraine — Andrew Milburn, a former American Marine colonel and leader of the Mozart Group, stood in a chilly meeting room on the second floor of an apartment building in Kyiv about to deliver some bad news. In front of him sat half a dozen men who had traveled to Ukraine on their own dime to work for him.
“Guys, I’m gutted,” he said. “The Mozart Group is dead.”
The men stared back at him with blank faces.
One asked as he walked toward the door, “What should I do with my helmet?”
The Mozart Group, one of the most prominent, private American military organizations in Ukraine, has collapsed under a cloud of accusations ranging from financial improprieties to alcohol-addled misjudgments. Its struggles provide a revealing window into the world of foreign volunteer groups that have flocked to Ukraine with noble intentions only to be tripped up by the stresses of managing a complicated enterprise in a war zone.
“I’ve seen this happen many times,” said one of Mozart’s veteran trainers, who, like many others, spoke only anonymously out of concerns that the Russians might target him. “You got to run these groups like a business. We didn’t do that.”
Hundreds if not thousands of foreign veterans and volunteers have passed through Ukraine. Many of them, like Mr. Milburn and his group, are hard-living men who have spent their adult lives steeped in violence, solo fliers trying to work together in a very dangerous environment without a lot of structure or rules.
The Mozart Group thrived at first, training Ukrainian troops, rescuing civilians from the front lines and raising more than a million dollars in donations to finance it all. But then the money began to run out.
Andrew Milburn after a meeting on Tuesday, when he said the Mozart Group, which he co-founded, “is dead.” At the top of the white board, he drew an X through the group’s initials, TMG. Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times
Ukrainian volunteer soldiers listening to instructions during training by members of the Mozart Group last year.Credit...Laura Boushnak for The New York Times
After months struggling to hold itself together, Mozart was plagued by defections, infighting, a break-in at its office headquarters and a lawsuit filed by the company’s chief financial officer, Andrew Bain, seeking the ouster of Mr. Milburn.
The lawsuit, filed in Wyoming, where Mozart is registered as a limited liability company, is a litany of petty and serious allegations, accusing Mr. Milburn among other things of making derogatory comments about Ukraine’s leadership while “significantly intoxicated,” letting his dog urinate in a borrowed apartment and “diverting company funds” and other financial malfeasance.
The State of the War
“I’ll be the first to admit that I’m flawed,” said Mr. Milburn, who acknowledged in an interview that he had been drinking when he made the comments on Ukraine. “We all are.” But he denied the more serious allegations about financial improprieties, calling them “utterly ridiculous.”
When Mr. Milburn showed up in Ukraine in early March last year, the capital, Kyiv, was seemingly on the precipice. Russian forces were blasting their way in from the suburbs and Ukraine was rushing thousands of inexperienced soldiers to the front.
That’s when, through a mutual friend, Mr. Milburn, 59, met Mr. Bain, 58. Also a former Marine colonel, Mr. Bain had been working in media and marketing in Ukraine for more than 30 years. “The Two Andys,” as Mozart employees would come to call them, shared a vision of doing whatever they could to help Ukraine win the war.
Mr. Milburn, whose career has tracked America’s wars of the past three decades, from Somalia to Iraq, had both the combat experience and the contacts. He counts Marine heavyweights like the author Bing West and a former defense secretary, Gen. James Mattis, as friends.
Mr. Bain had the organization. For eight years, since Russia invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014, he had been running the Ukrainian Freedom Fund, a charity he set up that turned donations into desperately needed gear for the Ukrainian military.
The two founded Mozart, the name a saucy response to the Russian mercenary force that uses the name of another famous composer, the Wagner Group. They also ran a short-lived podcast called “Two Marines in Kyiv.”
But they had very different styles. Mr. Milburn is gregarious, comfortable in the spotlight — he wrote a searing memoir — and by his own admission, hot tempered. Mr. Bain, who studied classics at Yale, is more reserved and cerebral.
From the beginning, there were tensions, both said. “For 30 minutes he’s the most charming man in the world,” Mr. Bain said of Mr. Milburn. “But at minute 31, you’re like, ‘Wait, something’s not working back there.’”
Mr. Milburn said that while he did not want to insult Mr. Bain, “the facts speak for themselves, and I can’t give any more insights into his character than what he’s done.”
Ukrainian soldiers after a training session. As more Ukrainian units sought training, the finances of the donor-supported Mozart Group deteriorated. Credit...Laura Boushnak for The New York Times
Andrew Milburn, center, going over the addresses of possible evacuees with volunteers before heading toward the front in eastern Ukraine last summer.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
With the Ukrainian military desperate for all the Western support it could get, Mozart quickly expanded from a handful of combat vets to more than 50 employees from a dozen countries. The group’s two specialties became last-chance extractions of civilians trapped on the front lines, which was extremely dangerous work, and condensed military training.
As spring passed to summer, more Ukrainian military units asked Mozart for training. But the Ukrainians could not pay for it, leaving Mozart reliant on a small pool of steady donors, including a group of East Coast financiers with Jewish-Ukrainian roots and a Texas tycoon.
Everyone involved said it became stressful just making payroll. And several employees said that the way the money flowed into the organization, which was overseen by Mr. Bain, was opaque.
“I can’t tell you how many people would come up to me at a party and said, “Hey, Marty, I love what you’re doing. I want to give you $10,000,” said Martin Wetterauer, one of Mr. Milburn’s old Marine friends and Mozart’s operations chief. “But we would never know if the money actually came in.”
Mr. Bain said he did absolutely nothing wrong and provided financial information whenever it was asked for, which was rare.
On top of that, the people Mozart hired were not the easiest to manage. Many were grizzled combat vets who admitted to struggling with PTSD and heavy drinking. When they weren’t working, they gravitated to Kyiv’s strip clubs, bars and online dating.
“There was a lot of cursing, a lot of womanizing, a lot of things you wouldn’t want to take to mass,” said another trainer, Rob.
In September, they lost an important funding stream when a charity called Allied Extract decided to use less expensive Ukrainian teams to rescue civilians. By November, Mozart was so short of cash that Mr. Milburn, Mr. Bain and Mr. Wetterauer gave up their salaries of several hundred dollars a day.
Mr. Bain, who owned 51 percent of the company then approached Mr. Milburn, who held the other 49 percent, about separating, both men said in interviews. Mr. Bain asked Mr. Milburn to pay $5 million to buy him out but Mr. Milburn refused, saying there was no way he could come up with such a sum. The two soon stopped talking.
On Dec. 11, a Sunday morning, Mr. Milburn and a couple of employees went to the company’s headquarters, housed in a Kyiv building Mr. Bain owns, to retrieve winter jackets, body armor and some personal luggage locked in a storeroom.
When a security guard refused to let them in, one of Mr. Milburn’s men pinned him against a wall while Mr. Milburn kicked down the door. He later said they needed the gear for missions in Donbas, the eastern Ukraine region under relentless Russian attack.
Members of the Mozart Group trying to convince residents of Soledar, in eastern Ukraine, to evacuate during intense shelling last summer.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Axel Vilhelmsen, a medic with the Mozart Group, treated a woman who refused to leave her house in the frontline village of Marinka in eastern Ukraine.Credit...Laura Boushnak for The New York Times
Not long after that, a clip of Mr. Milburn disparaging Ukraine’s leadership circulated widely on social media. “I happen to have a Ukraine flag tied to my bag, but I’m not, ‘Oh my God, Ukraine is so awesome,’” he said. “I understand that there are plenty of screwed-up people running Ukraine.”
The clip was taken from The Team House podcast, in which guests are invited into a living room setting to drink hard liquor with the hosts. “Of course I shouldn’t have said that,” Mr. Milburn acknowledged.
As soon as Mr. Bain filed the lawsuit on Jan. 10, an internecine social media battle exploded. Mr. Bain published the allegations on Mozart’s Facebook page, which he controls, and Mr. Milburn fired back nasty comments about Mr. Bain from Mozart’s LinkedIn page, which he controls.
“It was like a domestic dispute,” Rob said.
But of more than half a dozen employees interviewed for this article, all expressed sympathy for Mr. Milburn. Even after the final meeting, on Tuesday, several said he was an inspiring leader and they were waiting to see if he could raise the funds to put them back to work.
Mr. Milburn has rented a new office in Kyiv and says he is determined to resurrect the operation.
“I dream of going back to Donbas,” he said. “When you’re out there, and you’re scared, everything else shrinks into the shadows. You’re not thinking about money. You’re not thinking about your reputation.”
But he’s not going back to the front anytime soon.
Wearing a gray sweatshirt, black sweatpants and running shoes, he spent hours this week in front of his laptop. He’s scouting out new business, such as training courses for hostile environments. He’s writing emails to donors.
And he’s talking to his lawyers.
Ukrainian soldiers at the end of a training session with the Mozart Group in rural eastern Ukraine.Credit...Laura Boushnak for The New York Times
The New York Times · by Jeffrey Gettleman · February 2, 2023
8. Influencers, Returnships, and Reimagined Career Progression: Creative Solutions for the Army’s Recruitment Crisis
Conclusion:
Many government and corporate entities with desirable employer brands, like NASA, Cisco, and Zappos, invest strongly in their brands because it shifts their recruiting strategy from being proactive to reactive to candidates. It can take a long time to transform an employer brand—months or even years. Unfortunately, time is not a luxury the Army can afford. The recruiting strategies that got the Army to where it is today are not the strategies that will get the Army to where it needs to be in the future. A host of factors have changed the recruiting landscape over the last decade—the pandemic, changes in the economy, and the rise of remote work, to isolate a few. However, those are external factors that the Army cannot influence. The Army can only influence how it internally plans and conducts its recruiting activities and presents itself to prospective employees. Fortunately, the Army has competitive advantages that other employers cannot compete with—from benefits to the sense of purpose, camaraderie, and community Army service affords. It also has thousands of soldiers who can potentially amplify that message to their communities and beyond. Bringing back “Be All You Can Be” is an important step and a signal of the Army’s commitment to addressing the recruitment crisis. Leveraging its unique advantages and taking advantage of its greatest resource—its people—are the keys to fully doing so, and to optimizing a strategy for today’s recruiting landscape.
Influencers, Returnships, and Reimagined Career Progression: Creative Solutions for the Army’s Recruitment Crisis - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Laura Keenan · January 31, 2023
Remember the catchy phrase “Be All You Can Be,” which reinvigorated the Army’s brand in the 1980s and 1990s? If you are a member of Gen Z, it might not sound familiar at all, but it soon will. The historic branding showcased the Army’s sense of purpose, camaraderie, and community. The campaign increased the number and quality of Army recruits during the two decades the commercials ran on television. Recently, Major General Alex Fink, chief of the Army Enterprise Marketing Office, acknowledged the Army will return to the iconic slogan. The timing of returning to the successful pitch is ideal as the Army seeks to recover from falling short of its recruiting goals by 25 percent—fifteen thousand soldiers—last year.
Recruiting challenges are not new to the Army. Over the last five decades, the Army’s ability to meet its recruiting goals has ebbed and flowed as economic, societal, and political factors shape America’s perception of the military and the attractiveness of military service. It is wise for the Army to revisit solutions like previous branding campaigns, but it will also need to adapt to the current situation with innovative alternatives. The recruiting landscape has changed significantly in the last two decades: advertising has shifted to social media, the pandemic disrupted the American education system, the competitive employer landscape offers increased compensation and remote work to many, companies are more invested in their employer brands, and trust and confidence in the US military is declining.
Although military recruiting is a persistent challenge, the current state is particularly dire. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth acknowledged that fiscal year 2022 was the most challenging recruiting year since 1973. The size of the active duty Army is the smallest it has been since 1940, just before the United States entered World War II. The service’s authorized end strength has already been dramatically reduced. Adding such heavy recruitment shortfalls as the Army is experiencing, on top of these planned reductions, raises the specter of, in the event of war, being forced to consider past alternatives like a draft or lowering recruiting standards.
Recognizing the recruiting crisis, Secretary Wormuth established a recruiting and retention task force led by Major General Deb Kotulich. The task force works closely with stakeholders including the US Army G1, US Army Recruiting Command, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Army Enterprise Marketing Office. The task force will be the interface between these Army stakeholders and will leverage Army Reserve and Army National Guard resources, such as by mobilizing reservists from the 75th Innovation Command with industry experience in recruiting advertising and employer branding. The task force is the vehicle to assess and triage strategy considerations for Army senior leadership.
As a soldier who worked recently with the task force but whose civilian professional expertise is in sales and branding, I agree that this is an urgent problem that needs innovative solutions. The Army will need to take to risks, but calculated ones, in modernizing its approach, like empowering its service members differently and adopting industry best practices to showcase the competitive advantages of the Army.
Reaching a Broader Audience
I joined the military a few years after my brother. My story is not unique. According to the chief of staff of the Army, 83 percent of service members have at least one family member that served in the armed forces. Education opportunities, health care, retirement benefits, and a sense of purpose are many reasons those who are informed about the military choose to serve. This positive affinity for the Army is aligned with the encouraging statistic that the Army continues to meet and exceed its retention goals.
However, the military cannot solely rely on those with this propensity to serve. The Army must reach new audiences. In the past two decades, the Army created more recruiting opportunities with policy changes such as the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and allowing women into the combat arms. An area of opportunity now is targeting nontraditional candidates outside the usual Army demographics—mainly seventeen- to twenty-four-year-olds. Many corporate programs such as those of Goldman Sachs, Amazon, Deloitte, and Accenture actively recruit from populations with nontraditional backgrounds. These include individuals who took a break from working for caregiving reasons or want to have a career pivot later in life. These opportunities are dubbed “returnships,” matching those with maturity and aptitude with an opportunity to excel. The maximum age to enlist in the Army is thirty-five. Creating and recruiting for opportunities for an older and more experienced demographic may increase recruits.
Telling the Army Story
Marketing is part of the equation, but unfortunately, advertising that worked in the 1980s and 1990s did so because captive audiences watched television. Today the average American spends almost five hundred minutes a day on digital media. As a result, the Army needs to meet potential recruits where they are—like through their social media feeds. Interestingly from an employer branding perspective, the Army has a competitive advantage it is not leveraging fully. Many currently serving soldiers—such as Jessica Burch and Teamswartz—are already independent influencers documenting and chronicling their professional and personal lives.
Influencers have incredible reach, but critically, whether macro, micro, or nano influencers, they also have incredible engagement with their audiences. Many influencers have follower composition that reflects their own demographic, which can be a precise way to target certain audiences. For instance, the Navy recently sponsored Lieutenant Kellie Sbrocchi to document a day in the life of a sailor at the Army-Navy football game. Users who might follow her for nonmilitary reasons are now being exposed passively to content about what life in the Navy is like. In this example, her content is familiarizing possible recruits to the idea and lifestyle of the Navy before ever interacting with a recruiter.
Both this reach and this engagement would be costly if the Army were to purchase it with advertising. Leveraging existing Army influencers could be cost-effective and potentially faster than traditional media advertising. Organic reach is more authentic and can lend a credible, human voice dispelling preconceived notions about what life in the Army is like, highlighting the opportunities that comes with Army service, and generally offering an honest, compelling, and rare glimpse behind the curtain of military service. Efforts to scale brand ambassadors need to be accelerated, and responsible public affairs guidelines must be taught early in their careers. Clear, defined standards and frequently updated guidelines around the type of content and what platforms are authorized will empower those who want to act responsibly.
Unfortunately, the rise of sexual assaults in the military, suicides, post-traumatic stress disorder, and the perception of political involvement by the military in the last two decades, are factors that, I suspect, inject hesitation in possible recruits. Vicariously experiencing military life through the lens of social media could help dispel some of the negative stereotyping that might be preventing recruits and their immediate support network from accepting military service. Encouraging soldiers to use social media responsibly to explain their transformations could have immediate, compounding effects on recruiting.
The Army can give influencers even more access to content or create a culture where soldiers are inclined to share. The hero’s journey is the story template of classics across the full spectrum of narrative art, from mythical tales to Hollywood movies. The premise of a hero who leaves everyday life to navigate an unfamiliar world and endures a personal metamorphosis—this is what someone joining the Army can expect. In my military career I have met countless soldiers whose lives reflect this plotline.
Soldiers have proven they can act responsibly, advocating for the Army’s brand and respecting operational security. If we trust service members with costly weapons, ammunition, and operational security information, we should be able to trust them to use their voices to tell the Army story. The Army’s most important resource is its people, and they can help reshape the narrative and humanize the experience of being a soldier.
Sponsorship
Part of being an ambassador for the Army is not just storytelling but also sponsorship. While transitioning to the corporate sector, I received competing offers from two major technology companies. A recruiter from one of those companies introduced me to former military service members at the company who acted as informal mentors during my decision-making process. I could ask questions that I did not feel comfortable asking my recruiter and saw myself in the woman mentor who volunteered to assist me. The opportunity to connect with someone at the organization was one of the compelling factors in my decision to accept employment. Recruiters in corporations leverage employee ambassadors to help candidates navigate their decisions.
Similarly, the military can consider setting up a buddy program that recruiters can leverage. Talented young soldiers who want to earn promotion points can volunteer as points of contact for recruits who have questions about a particular military occupational specialty or life in the Army. Platforms like Veterati in the civilian sector allow mentees and mentors to connect without exchanging their private information and accommodating their schedules. Early career soldiers could gain a secondary skill for excelling at leadership on social media or virtual mentoring. These preliminary skills could help in identifying future recruiters.
Recruiters are in many ways salespeople and the skills gained are highly transferrable to the civilian sector. Shifting the perception of recruiting so it is seen as a role that will allow soldiers to not only help the Army but invest in their post-military careers by developing business acumen and experience is an important step in rebranding the position.
Invest in the Careers of Those Who Recruit
Creating a pipeline of soldiers who interact with US Army Recruiting Command throughout their careers by being social media ambassadors or who act as virtual mentors can also help identify talent that would excel at recruiting. Soldiers with a natural entrepreneurial spirit or who envision a career in human resources or sales after departing the military could self-identify by working with Recruiting Command before committing to being a recruiter. Recruiting is a public-facing role that requires a unique skill set—the abilities to communicate effectively, build rapport, and manage multiple complex relationships simultaneously. Part of building an effective recruiting force will be identifying talented individuals who are willing to be trained but also have a desire to serve in that capacity, similar to the way certain specialized units, like the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment or the 528th Sustainment Brigade, recruit within the Army for unique skill sets.
To elevate the brand of recruiting internally and thereby attract and retain top recruiters, the Army can also consider creating more defined career paths, such as allowing warrant officers. Warrant officers in other military occupational specialties create opportunities for technical expertise and stability in a career field. For top-performing noncommissioned officers in recruiting, a warrant officer path could be the career progression opportunity that is currently missing.
Currently, the chief of staff of the Army is investing in the officer corps with United States Army Recruiting Scholars Program that will allow junior military officers to attend top-tier graduate programs and then lead recruiting commands. Elevating command of recruiting units with prestigious educational opportunities will attract high performers in the way that similar opportunities presented to those selected for the US Army Congressional Fellowship, White House Fellowship, or Joint Chiefs of Staff Internship programs do.
Similar opportunities could be considered for enlisted members. Also, the training with industry program is available to competitive commissioned and noncommissioned officers to learn best practices from industry. This could be expanded to allow recruiters developmental opportunities at companies that excel in talent attraction and employer branding. During my tenure at LinkedIn, I advised hundreds of clients in recruiting, and the best recruiters were those with a consultative mindset instead of a transactional one focused on selling. The Army can emulate corporate best practices and allow soldiers to develop their professional networks in and out of the military. Doing so ensures recruiters are mindful of current best practices and develop empathy for recruits’ choices in the employment landscape.
Many government and corporate entities with desirable employer brands, like NASA, Cisco, and Zappos, invest strongly in their brands because it shifts their recruiting strategy from being proactive to reactive to candidates. It can take a long time to transform an employer brand—months or even years. Unfortunately, time is not a luxury the Army can afford. The recruiting strategies that got the Army to where it is today are not the strategies that will get the Army to where it needs to be in the future. A host of factors have changed the recruiting landscape over the last decade—the pandemic, changes in the economy, and the rise of remote work, to isolate a few. However, those are external factors that the Army cannot influence. The Army can only influence how it internally plans and conducts its recruiting activities and presents itself to prospective employees. Fortunately, the Army has competitive advantages that other employers cannot compete with—from benefits to the sense of purpose, camaraderie, and community Army service affords. It also has thousands of soldiers who can potentially amplify that message to their communities and beyond. Bringing back “Be All You Can Be” is an important step and a signal of the Army’s commitment to addressing the recruitment crisis. Leveraging its unique advantages and taking advantage of its greatest resource—its people—are the keys to fully doing so, and to optimizing a strategy for today’s recruiting landscape.
Laura Keenan is a lieutenant colonel in the District of Columbia Army National Guard. In her civilian career, she has worked at LinkedIn for almost six years in sales and branding. She is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and a distinguished graduate of the National War College. She has been published by the Modern War Institute, RealClearDefense, and the Strategy Bridge.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the Army National Guard.
Image credit: Kelly Morris, US Army
mwi.usma.edu · by Laura Keenan · January 31, 2023
9. Gen-Z Will Fight: But First, They Need to Know Why
Excerpts:
Ongoing Education
Ongoing education and training are a cornerstone of military service. However, rarely does continuing education seek to connect those areas of responsibilities to the wider mission of the armed forces in a manner that genuinely helps service members to understand the strategic landscape. Every service member should be fully aware of how the work they do impacts the wider mission of the armed forces, as well as how the mission of the armed forces directly impacts the security and wellbeing of the American people and allies. This is a missed opportunity to inject a source of practical, emotional, and intellectual connectivity to the mission.
Closing Thoughts
Gen-Z is a passionate, dedicated, and informed generation that yearns for transparency, knowledge, and data. Understanding the “why” fuels Gen-Z’s motivation and commitment to causes and organizations. It is vital to get them to tap into the “moral character” of their mission.
Gen-Z Will Fight: But First, They Need to Know Why
By Lieutenant Ian Clark and Petty Officer Third Class Kyle Atkinson, U.S. Navy
January 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/1/1,439
usni.org · January 31, 2023
Aristotle, writing in the 4th century BCE, noted that the young people of his day were “unable to resist their impulses” and “cannot bear to be slighted, but they are indignant when they think they have been wronged.” The philosopher laments that the young are naïve, having not yet “experienced want” or “witnessed much wickedness.” They are, he says, “high-minded because they have not yet been humbled by life,” and as a result “live more by the rule of moral character than by that of calculation.”1
Add a mobile phone and a TikTok account to the mix and Aristotle’s youth would be mostly indistinguishable from the current caricature of today’s so-called Gen-Z.2 But is this a true and fair assessment?
Assessing Gen-Z
Scholars, including Stanford University’s Dr. Roberta Katz, would only partially agree. It is indeed true that this generation is driven “more by the rule of moral character,” but Katz and her fellow researchers have also found that Gen-Zers are “self-driver[s]” who favor a rational and informed approach to problem solving.3 For Katz and others, Gen-Z is a “highly collaborative cohort” which “has a pragmatic attitude about the work that has to be done to address” important global issues.
Such insights are important to the armed forces community as Gen-Z comprises virtually all junior enlisted personnel and a significant share of junior officers, not to mention nearly the entire current recruiting pool. From a manning perspective alone, Gen-Z is critical to the military’s mission. Recent analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations demonstrated that some 70 percent of enlisted Marines are aged 24 or younger. For the Navy, that statistic stands at slightly over 40 percent, a number roughly mirrored within the Army and Air Force. While enlisted Coast Guardsmen tend to be a bit older, roughly 30 percent of the service’s enlisted force is 24 or under. In November 2022, Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger addressed significant shortfalls in recruiting and wrote that “Fixing the problems will require . . . innovative approaches and messaging.” We agree.
Put simply, without buy-in from Gen-Z, the U.S. armed forces cannot achieve its strategic goals. Like Aristotle’s caricature of youth, many older Americans today persist in believing that Gen-Z lacks the tenacity, grit, and drive to engage the enemy in a potential combat situation.
The Will to Fight
However, Gen-Z has already proven it is willing to fight for important causes. On issues of national and global significance (for instance, climate change or racial injustices), Gen-Z has mobilized and taken the lead. A recent report by the BBC noted that while “activism has long been synonymous with youth culture . . . this cohort appear to communicate, mobilize, and rally support in way that sets them apart from generations before.”
Activism, of course, is considerably different than warfighting. However, the question that the armed forces must wrestle with is not whether Gen-Z possesses a fighting spirit but how to tap into it and apply it to the military mission. To do that, the armed forces must help Gen-Z to establish a clear link between their service and the betterment of the world.
This is not a new proposition. Service members have always been motivated by a desire to contribute toward peace and global security. However, this generation is unique in that it wants to clearly understand—in a pragmatic and transparent manner—what, exactly, that contribution is. Professor Katz notes that members of Gen-Z “are pragmatic and value direct communication, authenticity and relevance.” Put simply, Gen-Z wants data, not jargon.
Unfortunately, this is where the armed forces are missing the mark. While the military can sell Gen-Z on the benefits of service, it has struggled to communicate the tangible ways in which military service is, or will, contribute to global peace and security. Gen-Z servicemembers are told that their evolving missions relate to vague terminology such as “great power competition.”
This generation did not live through the Cold War, and—if they were even born—were only small children when 9/11 took place. Gen-Z has come of age surrounded by easy access to robust information from a variety of sources. Expressions such as “great power competition” do not have the same emotional or intellectual resonance that they may have for more senior generations. In a 2019 Atlantic article, Uri Friedman writes that phrases such as “great power competition” have become almost meaningless cliches. Other sources note that the phrase loses substance because the military itself speaks of it in such inconsistent terms.
Writing in a piece for the Modern War Institute at West Point, Captain Alexander Boroff, U.S. Army, notes that warfighters “must train to fight with a clear understanding of the strategic environment. The disarray caused by the failure to explicitly conceptualize great power competition is most clearly evident here.” In other words, young service members (and potential service members) are confused about what “great power competition” is and how it impacts global peace and security. The lack of understanding undermines this generation’s appetite to fight.
A similar sentiment was raised in a 2020 Proceedings article on submariners by Ensign Kyle Chiang, suggesting that if the submarine force wanted to recruit and retain top talent, it would need to connect submariners to the “bigger war-fighting picture.” The author noted that “the why that future leaders seek is to know the impact they will make on their subordinates and in serving their country.” The same is true for the wider Navy, and the profession of arms more generally.
Boroff and Chiang, both junior officers at the time of their publications, understood that Gen-Z can and will fight. But first, they need to understand why that fight is necessary. The Navy and the armed forces at large would do well to take a page from the climate change movement which has successfully motivated and mobilized members of Gen-Z. The armed forces need to better tell the story of what great power competition is, why it matters, and how military service contributes to a more peaceful and just world. Military services need to share statistics and data, as well as stories of human impact.
No Need to Reinvent the Wheel
The good news is that the military already has the tools to do this. Public documents such as the National Security Strategy are designed to capture the strategic risks associated with revanchist global powers such as China and Russia, as well as other key threats to global security.
True, Gen-Z has free and open access to these documents—as do all Americans. Both maturity and professional interest should compel them to read them of their volition. However, the absence of this information at all stages of their military journey causes them to be seen as little more than peripheral knowledge and suggests that the military does not prioritize the underlying assumptions about the global political landscape. If something is important enough to shape national defense strategy, it ought to be taught to all military personnel.
Silence can speak volumes. If the services do not share and discuss strategic context, it sends a message that it is not important. The Navy—and indeed the wider profession of arms—should seek to integrate this information more clearly into all primary areas of warfighter development. Doing so would likely bolster recruiting, enhance retention, and elevate motivation.
Recruiting
Gen-Z members strongly consider potential employers’ global impacts when making employment decisions. A study by Deloitte Consulting suggested that while Gen-Z certainly considers issues such as salary in employment decisions, they are almost equally concerned with their potential employers’ ability to “demonstrate their commitment to a broader set of societal challenges.” In a word, Gen-Z wants to understand the impact of their work. They want to understand that they are contributing to real change.
Pay and benefits may motivate young people to join the military. However, it is the ability to connect with a deep sense of purpose that retains and motivates them.
An effort is, indeed, being made to connect recruiting to the interests and concerns of Gen-Z. For instance, the Navy’s primary recruiting website includes important and prominent sections on the Navy’s diversity and inclusion efforts as well as practical career matters. The website is highly transparent, for example, about pay expectations—it even offers a remarkably straightforward pay chart. Absent, however, is the foundational question: why? For a generation that so urgently wishes to connect its efforts with tangible causes, the Navy is leaving them wondering what, exactly, is that cause.
The Marine Corps’ principle recruiting website is similar. Its “Purpose” section speaks of “looming battles” that will occur on “many fronts” and professes that the United States faces a “critical choice: to demand victory or accept defeat.” But the military does not simply fight for fighting’s sake. Acts of war are, necessarily, connected to a just cause. Unfortunately, potential Marine Corps recruits are left scratching their heads as they wonder what that just cause might be.
Of course, general themes, including patriotism and love of country, are important, and studies demonstrate that Gen-Z favors a nationalist approach to policy over a globalist one.4 But Gen-Z is also focused on understanding the implications of their patriotism. If patriotism is going to translate into state violence, Gen-Z wants to understand the necessity of that. For instance, if Chinese aggression in the South China Sea is a potential catalyst for future conflict, Gen-Z wants to know why: How, exactly, does that impact the safety and wellbeing of Americans or other innocents? Senior military leaders may be exploring these concepts, but they are not filtering down to the most junior levels.
Basic Training
One of the authors recently began his Navy career at Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes. The words “Prepare for War” were visible in many places around the training environment, a visual reminder that the training recruits undergo has real-world implications within the context of a future conflict.
Today’s basic training environments emphasize resiliency and toughness, a concept which the Design for Maritime Superiority (v. 2.0) neatly summarizes as “we can take a hit and keep going.” Resiliency, especially in a kinetic environment, is critical to sustained success. However, today’s recruits are not simply interested in how to take or give a punch. They want to understand why it is necessary to fight in the first place.
Basic training provides a unique—and currently untapped—opportunity to help new servicemembers understand the strategic environment in which they will serve. While the geopolitical situation is always fluid, it would be wise to integrate clear and informative briefings on the modern threat landscape into basic training. Doing so would ensure graduates not only possess the baseline professional skills for successful service, but that they also have a baseline level of strategic knowledge about why—as opposed to simply how—the service is “Preparing for War.”
Ongoing Education
Ongoing education and training are a cornerstone of military service. However, rarely does continuing education seek to connect those areas of responsibilities to the wider mission of the armed forces in a manner that genuinely helps service members to understand the strategic landscape. Every service member should be fully aware of how the work they do impacts the wider mission of the armed forces, as well as how the mission of the armed forces directly impacts the security and wellbeing of the American people and allies. This is a missed opportunity to inject a source of practical, emotional, and intellectual connectivity to the mission.
Closing Thoughts
Gen-Z is a passionate, dedicated, and informed generation that yearns for transparency, knowledge, and data. Understanding the “why” fuels Gen-Z’s motivation and commitment to causes and organizations. It is vital to get them to tap into the “moral character” of their mission.
Gen-Z will fight for what they believe in, and they want to be involved in meaningful and impactful work. They are practical and pragmatic, smart and savvy. All of this can and should work in the military’s favor. But to win the hearts of Gen-Z, we need to first win their minds.
Lieutenant Ian Clark, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Clark serves as the battalion chaplain to the Marines, sailors, and recruits of Fourth Recruit Training Battalion at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island. He is a Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at The University of Aberdeen.
Petty Officer Third Class Kyle Atkinson, U.S. Navy
Petty Officer Atkinson serves as the battalion religious program specialist at Fourth Recruit Training Battalion at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island.
usni.org · January 31, 2023
10. An “Unprecedented” Recruitment Crisis
There is an amazing amount of data analyzed in this article. A lot unpack.
Please go to the link to study the charts and graphs. I have never seen this much data analyzed in this way. I wonder if all these other articles that are coming are using this data and analysis.
https://themissingdatadepot.substack.com/p/the-militarys-white-democrat-problem?r=41r9h&utm_source=pocket_reader
The Military’s White Democrat Problem
Conservatives have correctly identified whites and "wokeness" as key components of the military’s recruitment crisis. Unfortunately, they are focusing on the wrong whites and the wrong "wokeness."
KW
19 hr ago
6
An “Unprecedented” Recruitment Crisis
The U.S. military is facing an “unprecedented” recruitment crisis, with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and National Guard all failing to meet their enlistment goals in 2022. This recruitment crisis is partly a function of the fact that so few young people are now able to serve in the military due to obesity, educational deficiencies, mental health problems, or criminal records. In fact, according to the Associated Press, “only 23% [of American youth] are physically, mentally, and morally qualified to serve without receiving some type of waiver.”
The recruitment crisis is not entirely a consequence of these metastasizing physical, mental, and moral problems, however. It is also a direct result of the growing unwillingness of young people to serve in the armed forces. The most recent estimates “show that only 9% [of America’s youth] are even interested in military service.”
So why are so few young people willing to serve in the military? For some conservative observers, the answer is obvious: the Pentagon’s increasingly “woke” diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies are alienating the groups most inclined to serve in the armed forces (white conservatives, white Southerners, and whites living in rural areas).
There’s no shortage of pieces advancing this kind of argument. Consider, for example, Jimmy Byrn’s recent article in the Wall Street Journal (entitled “What if They Gave a War and Everybody Was Woke? The military’s embrace of faddish politics may make activists happy, but it’s driving away recruits”). Byrn begins by reviewing data on the military’s recruitment crisis:
Nearly every branch has struggled to meet its recruitment goals for 2022, with some falling as short as 40%. Worse yet, only about a quarter of America’s youth meet current eligibility standards—and recent surveys show only 9% are even interested.
Byrn then walks through a laundry list of “woke” policies initiated during the first few months of the Biden administration:
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin mandated that every military unit conduct a “stand-down” to confront “extremism in the ranks.” The chief of naval operations, Adm. Mike Gilday, added Ibram X. Kendi’s “How to Be an Antiracist” to his reading list for sailors …The Navy has mandated gender-sensitivity training, and released a video encouraging sailors to closely police the use of pronouns as well as everyday language, declaring that those who fail to comply aren’t “allies” of their fellow sailors.
Byrn argues that these changes are a “repellent” for conservatives and Southerners:
“[S]uch measures have amounted to a form of antirecruitment for prospective enlistees. The Pentagon is appealing to activists at the expense of those most likely to serve. The military has historically drawn an outsize proportion of recruits from conservative Southern states….Unsurprisingly, military members privately skew conservative. In the 2018 midterm elections, nearly 45% of service members surveyed indicated they would back Republican candidates, versus 28% who favored Democrats. Support for Republicans among veterans was similarly strong in 2020.”
Striking a similar tone in Imprimis, Thomas Spoehr argues that:
“Wokeness in the military affects relations between the military and society at large. It acts as a disincentive for many young Americans in terms of enlistment…Recent reports show the military’s dismal failure to gain new recruits in adequate numbers...Is anyone surprised that potential recruits—many of whom come from rural or poor areas of the country—don’t want to spend their time being lectured about white privilege?”
Unlike Byrn, Spoehr sees “wokeness” in the military beginning prior to 2021. As he points out, “The push for it didn’t begin in the last two years under the Biden administration” and many of the military’s “woke” policies have been in place since at least 2015.
The JAMRS Surveys
Is there any evidence that the desire to serve in the military has declined among white Republicans, white Southerners, and white rural residents since 2015 as a result of “wokeness” within the military? The only easily accessible data on this question (i.e. data that an average citizen without advanced knowledge of statistical software packages can locate) comes from eight, short PowerPoint presentations based on the Department of Defense’s JAMRS surveys.
Three times a year, the JAMRS surveys gather a nationally representative sample of more than 3,000 16- to 24-year-olds in the United States. The survey asks its respondents, “How likely is it that you will be serving in the Military in the next few years? (Definitely, Probably, Probably not, Definitely not).” The aforementioned PowerPoint presentations display aggregate and subgroup (racial and gender) trendlines over time:
Figure #1 – Likelihood of Military Service (JAMRS)
As Figure #1 shows, the percentage of 16 to 21-year-olds saying they will “definitely” or “probably” serve in the military during the “next few years” averaged approximately 13% in 2015. After dropping somewhat between 2015 and 2016, the percentage stayed around 12% through 2019. In 2020, however, the aggregate likelihood of military service dropped to 10%. By 2021, the number reached a historic low of 9%.
The JAMRS presentations imply that labor market competition, not “woke” DEI policies, is behind young people’s diminishing propensity to serve. Indeed, the survey data on likelihood is immediately followed in the JAMRS PowerPoint presentations by a section entitled “U.S. Military and Economic Conditions.” In this section, results from a question on job prospects (“How difficult is it for someone your age to get a full-time job in your community?”) are presented:
Figure #2 – Economic Perceptions (JAMRS)
These presentations send a clear message: the likelihood of serving in the military is declining because the difficulty of getting a “full-time job in your community” is also going down. In other words, the recruitment crisis has an economic cause and requires an economic solution.
Unsurprisingly, the publication of the most recent JAMRS PowerPoint slides (Fall 2021) was followed by a steady stream of calls for expanding military pay and benefits so that the armed forces might better compete with other career opportunities. Representative Anthony Brown, for example, issued a statement demanding the Pentagon provide “better pay, training, opportunities, connections, and benefits” as part of an effort to “do more” to encourage young Americans to join the military. Striking a similar tone, Representative Jason Crow told Politico that the Pentagon should “provide enlistment incentives and bonuses” to make military careers seem more desirable to young people than other job opportunities.
The most notable example of how the JAMRS data provoked calls for increased military benefits came with Brittany Dymond’s (the Associate Director of the National Legislative Service for the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States) congressional testimony on the “Status of Military Recruiting and Retention Efforts Across the Department of Defense.” In her statement, Dymond relied exclusively on the JAMRS reports to argue that “Congress must ensure military benefits such as pay, health care, tuition assistance, and retirement are competitive with the private sector, continuously improved, and come without cost increases to members and families as applicable.”
The runaway economic optimism illustrated in Figure #2 is undoubtedly an important factor in the military’s ongoing recruitment crisis and military pay, educational incentives, and benefits are essential for encouraging young people to enlist. What I want to explore here, however, is the idea (implied by the JAMRS presentations) that economic factors are the only drivers of the recruitment crisis. Specifically, I want to test Byrn and Spoehr’s claim that interest in serving in the armed forces is declining among white Republicans, white Southerners, and white rural residents as a result of the military’s growing “wokeness.”
Unfortunately, with the exception of what is contained in the eight short PowerPoint presentations posted on the JAMRS website, the JAMRS data is not publicly available. As a result, we do not know what other questions were asked in the JAMRS survey or how responses to those questions may have correlated with each other (including with the “likelihood of serving” question). Most importantly, we don’t know whether JAMRS asked questions about the desire to serve (as opposed to the mere likelihood of serving) or about political beliefs.
In this post, I’m going to take advantage of a largely unexamined dataset – the Monitoring the Future survey – to explore preferences for military service among whites since 2015. As I demonstrate, both the JAMRS reports and conservative observers are misdiagnosing the causes of the recruitment crisis. The JAMRS reports suggest the military is facing a short-term economic problem. As I will show, the military is actually facing a longer-term political problem. While conservative observers like Byrn and Spoehr correctly intuit the military’s political problem, they are mistakenly locating that problem among Republican, Southern, and rural whites. They are also mistakenly attributing that problem to the Pentagon’s “woke” DEI policies. In fact, the political problem exists almost exclusively among white Democrats and it is almost exclusively a function of this group’s increasingly negative attitudes toward the country and toward the military.
Misdiagnosing the causes of the recruitment crisis will mean policy interventions (e.g. higher pay and more generous benefits) to enhance enlistment will fail. Given the scale of the recruitment crisis already, this failure would be catastrophic. My goal here is to help avoid this catastrophe by drawing attention to the role that political “wokeness” is playing in killing military “willingness.” The military cannot successfully fight what is partly an ideological war with economic weapons alone.
The Monitoring the Future Data
Every year, the Monitoring the Future project collects a “large, distinct, nationally representative samples of 12th-grade students in the United States.” The survey asks over 100 questions to more than 10,000 American high school seniors in order to “explores changes in important values, behaviors, and lifestyle orientations of contemporary American youth.”
Most important for my purposes here, the Monitoring the Future survey asks respondents a question about their partisanship and two questions about their views on military service:
- How likely is it that you will do each of the following things after high school… Serve in the armed forces? (Definitely Won’t, Probably Won’t, Probably Will, Definitely Will)
- Suppose you could do just what you'd like and nothing stood in your way. How many of the following things would you WANT to do? (Mark all that apply.) Serve in the armed forces?
These two questions track distinct, yet closely related dimensions of young people’s orientation toward military service. The “likelihood of serving” question is nearly identical to the item asked in the JAMRS surveys. This question avoids making any reference to the respondent’s preferences about military service. Instead of asking what the respondent “wants” to do, it asks them only what it is “likely” that they will do (independent of their desires). As a result, the question primes respondents to balance their preferences against their opportunities and constraints. It is possible, for example, that a respondent might answer this question by selecting the “definitely will” response because he or she imagines a reinstatement of the military draft (forcing them to serve regardless of whether they want to or not). Alternatively, a respondent might have a lifelong dream to serve in the military but realize that it will not happen because of familial obligations that require them to stay close to home. In short, this question asks respondents for a measured prediction about their future, not for a decontextualized disclosure of their preferences.
By contrast, the question about “wanting” to serve in the military directly taps what young people feel about serving in the military. The question instructs respondents to ignore the opportunities and constraints they face when deciding what to do with their lives. Indeed, it begins with the sentence, “Suppose you could do just what you'd like and nothing stood in your way….”). The question also explicitly primes respondents to think about their desires. Specifically, it asks them, “How many of the following things would you WANT to do? [capitalization in original].”
Byrn and Spoehr’s claims are primarily about the desire of Republican, Southern, and rural whites to serve in the military rather than the likelihood that they will serve. I will focus my attention here, therefore, on this dimension of attitudes toward military service.
Relatedly, I should also point out that the MTF data underscores the problem with focusing on likelihood alone (as the JAMRS data apparently does). Empirically speaking, desire to serve in the military is not a sufficient condition for being likely to serve in the military. As Figure #3 shows, since 2015, only 58.3% of high school seniors who expressed a desire to serve also thought they would eventually enlist in the armed forces. Desire to serve in the military does seem, however, to function as a necessary condition for being likely to serve in the military. As Figure #3 shows, those who do not want to serve in the military stand almost no chance of saying that they will serve in the future. To be more precise, more than 96% of those who said they did not want to serve in the military also said that they “probably won’t” or “definitely won’t” serve in the military.
Figure #3 – The Relationship between Likelihood of and Desire for Military Service (MTF)
The fact that desire works as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for being likely to serve in the military suggests that we need to pay particular attention to the size and growth of the “do not want to serve” category. If it becomes too large, there is very little the military can do (e.g. increase pay and benefits) to recruit the soldiers it needs. The JAMRS data, with its exclusive focus on the estimated likelihood of service, directs our attention away from this basic fact and necessarily leads us to focus entirely on economic solutions to recruitment problems. Any attempts to fully understand the military’s recruitment crisis should, therefore, use the MTF data (and, in particular, the desire to serve question). Surprisingly, however, I was unable to find even a single report, statement, or piece of congressional testimony related to military recruitment from the last 10 years that cited the MTF data.
Testing Byrn and Spoehr with the MTF
Byrn and Spoehr’s claims about “woke” DEI policies acting as a “repellent,” a form of “antirecruitment” and a “disincentive” for white Republicans, white Southerners, and rural whites are testable using the MTF data. Indeed, if the military’s increasing “wokeness” after 2015 (and particularly after Biden took office in early 2021) is driving individuals from these groups away, we should see their disaffection in the results of the MTF survey question asking respondents if they “want” to serve in the armed forces.
Figure #4 – Likelihood of and Desire for Military Service among Whites
Figure #4 displays responses to the MTF’s likelihood and desire questions among white respondents since 2015. The trend lines between 2015 and 2020 are essentially flat and indicate very little change in white orientations towards military service. Figure #4 also shows, however, a significant drop in white desire (14.8% to 10.0%) occurring between 2020 and 2021.
The drop in desire among whites is broadly consistent with Bryn and Spoehr’s claims but we need to investigate the trends among white Republicans, white Southerners and white rural residents to truly assess their argument. Let’s examine partisanship first. As the data in Figure #5 show, there has been no meaningful decline in desire among white Republicans (indicated, in part, by the fact that the 95% confidence intervals overlap with each other when looking across years). In 2015, for example, 18.1% of white Republicans expressed a desire to serve in the military. In 2021, nearly the exact same share (18.9%) of white Republicans expressed a desire to serve in the military. Despite some minor fluctuations in the exact estimates, there were no statistically significant changes across years in white Republican orientations towards military service. If white Republicans have been repelled from military service by “woke” DEI policies, there is no evidence of it yet.
Figure #5 – Military Attitudes among White Republicans
What about the argument that white Southerners are turning away from military service? Once again, there is nothing in the data to indicate that white Southerners have been disincentivized from serving in the armed forces by policies emphasizing “anti-racism,” “gender-sensitivity” or “white privilege.” In 2015, 16.2% of white Southerners wanted to serve in the military. In 2021, 16.6% of white Southerners wanted to serve in the military. Contrary to the claims of Byrn and Spoehr, in other words, there has not been a meaningful decline in desire for military service among white Southerners.
Figure #6 – Military Attitudes among White Southerners
Finally, there’s Byrn and Spoehr’s suggestion that woke DEI policies are delivering an “anti-recruitment” message for rural whites (regardless of which region they hail from). While there is no good measure of urbanicity in the MTF data, the project does provide a dichotomous measure of whether each respondent lives in a large metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or not. In 2015, 16.5% of whites living outside of large MSA’s wanted to serve in the military. In 2021, 16.6% of these whites did. Put differently, there’s really nothing in the MTF data pointing to a change in how rural whites view a career in the armed forces.
Figure #7 – Military Attitudes among White Non-MSA Residents
Collectively, these graphs provide initial evidence against the idea that “woke” DEI policies have significantly depressed white Republican, white Southerner and white rural resident interest in military service. I want to be clear, however, that these results do not mean that Byrn and Spoehr are necessarily wrong about the effects of “woke” DEI policies. It simply means that they are not right yet.
Young white Republicans strongly oppose the kinds of policies Byrn and Spoehr describe. Consider opinions on the question of whether there should be “preferential hiring and promotion of blacks.” Less than 5% of young white Republicans now endorse this kind of race-based affirmative action:
Figure #8 – Support for Affirmative Action Policies by Race and Partisanship
To the extent that policies such as these are implemented by the military, we should expect desire to serve in the military to decline among young white Republicans.
In order for “woke” policies to undermine interest in military, however, they first have to be well-known. Prior to 2022, woke DEI policies in the military received almost no sustained media attention. Indeed, Byrn and Spoehr’s articles were worth publishing in the summer of 2022 precisely because they directed attention to a set of issues that were previously ignored.
At this point, I should point out that the barriers to informing a nontrivial number of young white Republican, Southern, and rural voters of the existence of “woke” military policies are considerable. Most Americans pay little attention to politics and are ignorant about even the most basic and long-standing facts about the American political system. In 2022, for example, less than half of Americans could correctly identify all three branches of government and more than a quarter could not name a single right protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, only 57% of voters under the age of 30 could correctly identify which party controlled the House of Representatives in 2020. If the public has not learned about these foundational aspects of American politics, they are incredibly unlikely to learn about the details of the military’s DEI policies.
With that said, more sustained public discussion of “wokeness” in the armed forces might very well lead to the effects that Byrn and Spoehr describe. We just can’t know until we get more recent data.
If Not White Republicans, Southerners, and Rural Residents, then Who?
While the above analysis helps us reject key parts of Byrn and Spoehr’s argument, it still leaves us with a puzzle: if white Republicans, white Southerners, and white rural residents are not expressing less desire to serve, which whites are responsible for the 5-point decline in desire illustrated in Figure #4?
As it turns out, white Democrats –the group most commonly ignored by conservative diagnoses of the recruitment crisis and the group most likely to support the military’s efforts to implement highly progressive DEI policies (see Figure #8) – are actually the ones driving the aggregate decline in white desire discussed above.
Figure #9 – Military Attitudes among White Democrats
In 2015, 12.2% of white Democrats wanted to serve in the military. That number fell to 3.6% in 2021 (Figure #9). This striking decline does not, however, tell the full story. Most of the collapse in white Democratic interest occurred among men (Figure #10). In 2015, 18.6% of white Democratic men expressed a desire to serve in the military (only slightly lower than the 19.9% of non-Democratic men who wanted to serve). By 2021, that number had dropped to only 2.9%.
Figure #10 – Military Attitudes among White Democrats by Gender
In fact, as Figure #11 shows, black men (12.1%), Hispanic men (14.3%) and white Republican men (25.3%) were all at least 4x more likely than white Democratic men in 2021 to “want” to serve in the armed forces. Democratic white men were also significantly less interested in military service than black women (9.5%) and white Republican women (10.9%).
Figure #11 – Desire to Serve in the Armed Forces by Gender
What’s Dampening Desire among White Democrats?
Why have white Democrats (especially young white Democratic men) soured on military service? Answering this question requires an examination of why people join the military in the first place. Fortunately, understanding the motives that drive young people to enlist in the American military has been a frequent focus of research since the introduction of an all-volunteer force. Survey and in-depth interview data have revealed “a range of motivations for military service, clustering around, on the one hand, the [extrinsic] benefits associated with service [e.g. pay, educational incentives, the opportunity to develop leadership skills, exposure to diverse nations and cultures via travel, an interesting job with variety, and experience to prepare for the future] and, on the other hand, normative commitments to the political community [e.g. patriotism and duty].”
The conservative critique of military “wokeness” alerts us to yet another possibility: orientations towards military service may be shaped by feelings about the military as an institution. It is possible that if young people feel negativelyabout or mistrustful of the military, they will not develop a desire to serve in it (independent of the benefits provided by enlisting and independent of their patriotism). This lack of interest might simply be a function of rational expectations given the perceived nature of the institution. If the military is seen to be untrustworthy, it is unwise to expect it to actually deliver the extrinsic benefits it is promising. If the military is disliked, serving it might not be consonant with one’s sense of patriotism and civic duty.
Overall, then, we want to examine whether perceptions of the military’s extrinsic benefits, the strength of normative commitments to the political community, and feelings towards the military as an institution have disproportionately declined among young white Democrats during the last few years. If so, these changes may be driving the declining desire to serve in the armed forces.
In order to truly assess whether these three attitudes are changing among young white Democrats, we would need to have survey data that: (1) asked questions about economic prospects, patriotism, and feelings towards the military; (2) repeated these questions at multiple points in time between 2015 and 2021; (3) collected sufficiently large sample sizes to yield a nontrivial number of young, white Democrats; and (4) is publicly available.
Unfortunately, there is no polling data that meets all four of these requirements. The best we can do, therefore, is make some educated guesses based on the imperfect data (i.e. meets one or two of the above criteria) that we do have.
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Extrinsic Benefits
The extrinsic benefits provided by military service are equal for every group. In order to believe that perceptions about extrinsic benefits are dampening enthusiasm for military service among young White Democratic men, there would have to be a reason why young white Democratic men were the only subgroup among the general population of young white people to change their perceptions of the military’s extrinsic benefits after 2015 (and particularly after 2020).
One’s perception of the military’s extrinsic benefits is likely shaped, in part, by one’s social position. Young people from more affluent backgrounds are likely to be less attracted to the pay, health care, retirement, job training, and other benefits provided by military service. If young white Democratic men are more likely to be raised in affluent backgrounds than other whites, they may find the military’s extrinsic benefits less appealing. More importantly, if the socioeconomic profile of young white Democratic men improved significantly since 2015, it may explain their declining desire to serve in the military.
Unfortunately, the MTF provides no data on the socioeconomic status of its respondents. It is not possible, therefore, to directly test the hypothesis that young White Democratic men’s declining desire to serve might be a consequence of their improving social position after 2015. Needless to say, however, the idea that the social position of young, white Democratic men (and no other group) shifted so uniformly and dramatically that it altered their short-term perceptions of economic benefits is implausible. It is far more likely that feelings towards the country and the military have evolved among this group over the last seven years.
Patriotism
As mentioned above, patriotism is an important predictor of military service. A majority of soldiers consistently describe their service as motivated by a deep-seated sense of patriotism and duty. For example, when soldiers in two infantry battalions were asked in 2002 to identify all the reasons that “were important in your decision to join the Army,” two of the most popular options were “serve country” (65.8%) and “patriotism” (54.9%).
Surprisingly, the MTF data contains no questions related to national pride or the strength of young people’s attachment to their national identity. Gallup has asked a question about patriotism (“How proud are you to be an American -- extremely proud, very proud, moderately proud, only a little proud or not at all proud?”) on a nearly yearly basis since 2001. While Gallup occasionally reports how responses to this question have varied over time and across groups, they do not provide access to the full dataset and only provide a limited number of group-specific analyses. As a result, we cannot identify changes among young white Democrats.
The data that Gallup has made public, however, are consistent with declining levels of patriotism among young White Democrats. As Figure #7 shows, “extreme pride in being American” have fallen more than 20% among Democrats since 2015 and more than 30% since 2013.
Figure #12 – National Pride by Partisanship
The Gallup data also shows that young people generally express far less national pride than older people. Specifically, as Figure #13 demonstrates, only 25% of 18-34 year olds are “extremely” proud to be American (compared to 51% of those 55 and older).
Figure #13 – National Pride by Gender, Age, and Education
Although the publicly available Gallup data cannot definitively prove that young white Democrats have become less patriotic since 2015, the tables and figures they have provided are consistent with this possibility. Indeed, if young Democrats are merely representative of older Democrats and young people more generally, there has likely been a greater than 25% decline in patriotism within the group over the last eight years. Such a decline could easily account for the 10% reduction in desire for military service documented above.
Unfortunately, Gallup is the only survey organization that has asked a question about national “pride” over time. In 2016, 2020, and 2022, the American National Election Study (ANES) asked a slightly different question about national identity: “How important is being American to your identity?” While this question does not directly tap feelings of patriotism or national pride (e.g. respondents may believe that their national identity is important but dislike the country), it does provide a rough proxy for how people feel about their country.
The ANES data contains relatively few young, white Democrats. With this in mind, the ANES shows significant differences across both age and partisanship. As Figure #13 shows, American national identity is losing its salience among young white Democrats. Between 2016 and 2020, the percentage of white Democrats under 35 who claimed that “being American” was “extremely” or “very” important to their identity fell from roughly one-half (49.1%) to one-quarter (25.3%). Young white Democrats are now far less likely than older white Democrats and white Republicans of all ages to say that their national identity is important to them. Once again, this data is consistent with the idea that declining national attachment explains the declining desire to serve in the military among young white Democrats.
Figure #13 – Importance of American Identity by Age and Partisanship
A number of one-off surveys also indicate that young white Democrats may have much lower levels of patriotism than other groups. The Harvard Youth Poll periodically surveys more than 2,000 young Americans (aged 18 to 29). The Youth Poll asks a wide range of questions about politics, current events, and mental health. While the team behind the Youth Poll provides extensive cross-tabs (e.g. data showing variation in attitudes by age, race, gender, and other individual attributes), they do not provide full access to the data. As a result, it is not possible to examine how young, white Democrats respond to the survey’s questions.
The Fall 2021 iteration of the Youth Poll asked two questions that are helpful in understanding the patriotism of young Americans. First, the poll asked “Which statement comes closest to your own view? ‘America is the greatest country in the world’ or ‘There are other nations as great or greater than America.’” There was a massive partisan gap in responses to this question (see Figure #14). As the survey’s report summarizes, “The views of Democrats and Republicans are inverted with 21% of Democrats saying America is the greatest country and 64% saying other nations are as great or greater; 62% of Republicans believe that America is the greatest with 24% saying other nations are as great or greater.”
Figure #14 – “Great Country” Beliefs among Young People by Partisanship
Additionally, the Harvard Youth Poll asked, “Compared to your parents, do you think you more or less patriotic.” 32% of Democrats reported being “less patriotic” than their parents while only 11% reported being “more patriotic” than their parents. By contrast, 19% of Republicans reported being “less patriotic” than their parents but 21% reported being “more patriotic” than their parents. If young white Democrats are representative of young Democrats overall, the Youth Poll data is indicative of the kind of low and declining patriotism that could explain the collapsing desire of young white Democrats to serve in the armed forces.
More evidence about the declining patriotism of young people can be found in the surveys from the “More in Common Project.” The Project’s 2020 survey discovered that only 51% of Gen Z was proud to be American (compared to 94% of the Silent Generation). What’s more, identifying as “progressive” or “passively liberal” was associated with far less national pride (Figure #15):
Figure #15 – National Pride by Race, Age, Gender, and Ideology
More recently, a Morning Consult poll found that only a tiny percentage of Gen Z feels “proud to live in the United States.”
Figure #16 – Patriotic Sentiment by Age
These disparate surveys tell a common story: patriotism and national pride have evaporated among Democrats and young people over the last decade. Strictly speaking, the evidence summoned here cannot tell us anything about whether young, white Democrats are exceptions to or exemplars of these general trends. The data, however, are entirely consistent with the idea that the attitudes of young, white Democrats are changing in ways that could reduce their interest in military service.
Feelings towards the Military
There is no publicly available, over time data on how young white Democratic men feel about the military as an institution. Gallup has asked a yearly question about confidence in the military but they provide only the topline results (no subgroup analyses) to that question. The Gallup data shows a small and steady overall decline in the public’s confidence in the military since 2015 (dropping from 72% in 2015 to 64% in 2022). It is possible that this decline has occurred entirely among young white Democrats but we cannot know for sure with the data Gallup has provided publicly.
Better data is available from the Reagan National Defense Forum (RNDF). Each year since 2018, the RNDF has asked a nationally representative sample how much “trust and confidence” they have in the military. The RNDF provides crosstab summaries of the results (allowing us to examine how young people and Democrats feel about the military).
The RNDF results show a massive decline in “trust and confidence” among young people (18-29) and Democrats between 2018 and 2021. In 2018, 87% of young people and 92% of Democrats expressed “a great deal” or “some” confidence in the military. In 2021, however, only 67% of young people and 76% of Democrats expressed this sentiment. These results are broadly consistent with the possibility that young white Democratic men have expressed less desire to serve in the armed forces since 2015 as a result of more negative feelings towards the military.
In addition to the Reagan National Defense Forum data, there are a number of polls that provide a snapshot of how the public feels about various aspects of the. Generally speaking, these polls are also consistent with the idea that young white Democrats have disproportionately negative views towards the military. The Spring 2022 iteration of the Harvard Youth Poll, for example, asked young people to identify the most important areas for ensuring America’s global strength in the future. Only 12% of young Democrats identified the military (compared to 35% of young Republicans).
Figure #17 – Perceptions of the Military’s Importance among 18-29 Year Olds by Party
A number of other studies provide data suggesting generational (but not partisan) differences. In one recent survey, for instance, Morning Consult found only 55% of Gen Z (compared to 86% of Boomers) reported feeling “some” or “a lot” trust in the military (Figure #18). In a different Morning Consult survey, 20% of Gen Z said they would stop “buying from a brand they currently shop at if the company supported the US military” (compared to only 8% of Boomers).
Figure #18 – Institutional Trust by Age
Recent data from the Pew Research Center finds similarly negative views towards the military among young people, with only 49% of 18-29 year olds saying that the military has a “positive effect” on the “way things are going in the country these days.”
Figure #19 – Views on the Effects of Institutions by Age
Once again, if white Democrats are merely representative of Gen Z in general, these surveys provide evidence that young white Democrats harbor very negative feelings towards the military. These feelings may be responsible for the fact that young white Democrats are showing little interest in military service since 2015.
The “Great Awokening”
The dramatic and relatively recent attitudinal shifts among young, white Democrats documented here should not be surprising to anyone who has followed American politics over the last eight years. As Zach Goldberg described in an influential 2019 article, white liberals experienced an unprecedented and profound “Great Awokening” sometime between 2012 and 2016:
“The rapidly changing political ideology of white liberals is remaking American politics….This is evident across a range of issues: the rapid growth in white liberals who favor affirmative action for blacks in the labor force; in the increase in white liberals who feel that we spend too little on helping blacks, and that the government should afford them special treatment; in the increase in white Democrats who think it’s the government’s job to ensure “equal income across all races”; and in the increase in white liberals and Democrats who think that white people have ‘too much’ political influence….[and] “recently they became the only demographic group in America to display a pro-outgroup bias—meaning that among all the different groups surveyed white liberals were the only one that expressed a preference for other racial and ethnic communities above their own.”
Goldberg was not alone in recognizing these changes. In a widely read 2019 article for Vox, Matthew Yglesias wrote:
“In the past five years, white liberals have moved so far to the left on questions of race and racism that they are now, on these issues, to the left of even the typical black voter. This change amounts to a “Great Awokening” — comparable in some ways to the enormous religious foment in the white North in the years before the American Civil War.”
While Goldberg and Yglesias’ analyses focused mostly on the changing racial consciousness of white liberals, the seismic attitudinal shifts described in their articles have had implications that go far beyond race. As this post has shown, in addition to becoming far more progressive on questions of race, gender, and immigration, young white Democrats have also become far less patriotic and supportive of the American military. A predictable consequence of these increasingly negative attitudes is a growing disinterest in military service. The interrelated set of highly progressive political beliefs, best characterized as “wokeness,” in other words, is beginning to represent an existential threat to the continuation of America’s all-volunteer armed forces.
Conclusion
The American military is facing a recruitment crisis driven, in part, by young people’s declining desire to serve in the military. According to some observers, the Pentagon’s recent moves to implement “woke” DEI policies are alienating young white Republicans from the military. This post has shown, however, there is no evidence to suggest that anything the Department of Defense has done since 2015 is exerting a negative effect on young white Republican desire to serve in the armed forces. This may change in time, of course. Growing wokeness within the military has already precipitated growing attention. Growing attention has the potential to precipitate declining desire among young white Republicans. Yet, as of 2021, there’s nothing to suggest young white Republicans are the source of the military’s recruitment problems.
There’s much to suggest, however, that young white Democrats are an important part of the military’s struggles. While the publicly available data is insufficient for providing definitive proof, there is a mountain of survey evidence consistent with the idea that diminishing enthusiasm for military service among young white Democratic men is a function of their increasingly negative views towards the country and the military.
The military needs to take the “Great Awokening” of young white Democrats seriously and not assume that better pay and more generous benefits will persuade an increasingly reluctant and oppositional demographic group to enlist. “Wokeness” is killing desire to serve in the military and the death of desire might mean the death of an all-volunteer armed forces.
One final note, the evidence presented here about recruitment does not mean that there are no reasons to oppose “woke” military policies. Even if “woke” policies do not act as a form of “antirecruitment,” they still may have serious, negative consequences for the ability of the military to carry out its responsibilities. “Woke” policies may, for example, alienate active duty service members and hurt retention efforts. They may also seriously undermine military readiness. If so, the argument against “wokeness” in the military should be more narrowly framed around these claims and not connected to the ongoing recruitment crisis.
11. Pray the President resists the US push for bases
Not all are happy with the new Philippine-US agreement.
Pray the President resists the US push for bases
manilatimes.net · by Ricardo Saludo · February 2, 2023
If the purpose of American military bases is to strengthen American military posture in the Pacific, or in the Indian Ocean and throughout the world, does this not expose the Philippines to the animosities, suspicions and the conflicts arising out of this American military buildup — animosities and conflicts that we have no participation in making, and do not these bases endanger the safety of the Filipinos and the Philippines not only from conventional armed attack, but from possible nuclear attack?
– President Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr. in 1975
A FAMILY friend who emigrated to the United States decades ago asked why it would be a problem to let the US military use bases of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The father of President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., quoted above, explained the threat we would face if we host US armed might.
This immense danger could also be imminent with the risk of war over Taiwan. One US Air Force general, who commands global military air transport, believes hostilities could erupt in 2025, following US and Taiwan elections the year before. Other experts fear invasion before Chinese President Xi Jinping ends his third and probably final term as Communist Party chief in 2027, the year before Marcos Jr.'s term ends.
For possible Taiwan or Korea conflict, Washington wants access to six AFP bases in Luzon — two in Cagayan and one each in Isabela, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Zambales. It also asks for two in Palawan and one each outside Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro. If granted, all would be targeted by America's adversaries.
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Last October and November, a senior US defense official told Filipino journalists visiting the Pentagon that we had agreed to provide 10 bases, and then officer in charge Jose Faustino of the Department of National Defense (DND) confirmed it. And in recent days, ahead of the visit of US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin this week, media here and in America have featured Washington's push for bases.
The Marcos Jr. view
Thankfully, last December, President Marcos Jr. put that bases request "under study" and ordered a review of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) underpinning the US alliance, along with the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), in effect since 1999, and the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which provides for increased US military rotations in the country with access to bases.
In January, OIC Faustino was replaced by former peace process and pandemic adviser Carlito Galvez Jr., one of three appointees of former president Rodrigo Duterte, who stalled the EDCA rollout, now holding top security posts under Marcos Jr., along with National Security Adviser Eduardo Año and AFP chief Andres Centino.
Then, in his visits to China and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, last month, President Marcos Jr. made statements seemingly casting doubt on EDCA bases. He said Asian nations opposed "Cold War" superpower rivalry in the region and preferred not to take sides despite pressure to do so. He also nixed the idea of letting Washington intervene in our maritime issues with Beijing.
"The forces of us going back to that Cold War type of scenario where you have to choose one side or the other are strong," he told a Davos business luncheon. "I think we are determined ... to stay away from that" ("Is the DFA going against Marcos' foreign policy?" https://bit.ly/3wNW62U).
Not taking sides presumably means not letting America attack China from our territory. No wonder Secretary Austin is visiting again, two years after he met with Duterte and successfully pressed for VFA continuation. Now, the Pentagon head is seeking renewal of the 10-year EDCA, expiring in 2024, and 10 bases for US use under the accord.
How badly does America need our bases? In February 2021, leading US think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, whose Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative periodically alleges Chinese encroachment in our exclusive economic zone, wrote President Joseph Biden on the US plan for "small, mobile teams [across Asia to] hold Chinese vessels at risk with ground-based missile units. ... But the Philippines is the only country in Southeast Asia that might realistically host such assets. So, these plans require saving the VFA and implementing EDCA" (https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-alliance-philippines).
This US plan to weaponize our country is made even more pressing for America — and dangerous for us — with rising risk of war over Taiwan.
How the US gets its way
Will President Marcos Jr. give in, despite his father's warning against US bases and his own neutral stance as "a friend to all and an enemy to none"? He also aims to build peaceful, robust relations with Beijing and avoid actions "that could trigger a bigger problem than what we already have" — as hosting nuclear-capable US forces would.
Going by our history, Washington has had much success in winning over Filipino leaders against our national interest. In 1898 American consul Spencer Pratt forged an alliance with revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo to fight against Spanish rule and win Philippine independence. Yet the US took over our country.
After forces of the 1898 Philippine Republic had surrounded Intramuros, American troops in Manila Bay asked to occupy one side of the walled city. Soon after we gave way to US forces, the Spanish colonial government surrendered to the Americans in August 1898, costing our nation's founding fathers the victory they had fought for.
Even in our time, when decades of dealings with America have demonstrated that even our closest ally puts its own national interest above ours, the Aquino 3rd government trusted US officials to our detriment.
As told by fellow columnist Rigoberto Tiglao, in the 2012 standoff between Philippine and Chinese vessels over Scarborough Shoal, we pulled out after a senior American official told our envoy to Washington that the US had brokered a deal for mutual withdrawal. But the Chinese disavowed the purported arrangement and stayed, taking control of the shoal. That loss led our country to forge the EDCA Washington wanted.
We pray President Marcos Jr. heeds his father's counsel and asserts what's best for national security and regional harmony.
manilatimes.net · by Ricardo Saludo · February 2, 2023
12. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on February 2, 2023 (US base access in the Philippines)
The very first statement is a very strong one among statements on a number of other issues.
Excerpt:
Mao Ning: It is China’s consistent belief that defense and security cooperation between countries needs to be conducive to regional peace and stability and not targeted at or harmful to the interests of any third party. The US side, out of selfish interests, holds on to the zero-sum mentality and keeps strengthening military deployment in the Asia-Pacific. This would escalate tensions and endanger peace and stability in the region. Regional countries need to remain vigilant and avoid being coerced or used by the US.
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on February 2, 2023
fmprc.gov.cn
AFP: The US and the Philippines announced a deal today that would give the US access to four more military bases in the Philippines. What’s China’s comment?
Mao Ning: It is China’s consistent belief that defense and security cooperation between countries needs to be conducive to regional peace and stability and not targeted at or harmful to the interests of any third party. The US side, out of selfish interests, holds on to the zero-sum mentality and keeps strengthening military deployment in the Asia-Pacific. This would escalate tensions and endanger peace and stability in the region. Regional countries need to remain vigilant and avoid being coerced or used by the US.
CGTN: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has concluded his visit to the ROK and Japan. During his visit, he mentioned China on several occasions, claiming that China is leading an “authoritarian pushback” against the rules-based, open and democratic international order; that China is developing military capabilities that could also reach NATO countries and is threatening Taiwan; that NATO must “remain united and firm” in the face of security threats posed by China; and that “what is happening in Europe today could happen in East Asia tomorrow”. What is China’s comment on Secretary General Stoltenberg’s visit to the ROK and Japan and his remarks?
Mao Ning: We have stated our position on NATO several times this week. The NATO Secretary General went to the ROK and Japan, yet he kept referring to China and hyping up the so-called “China threat”, drawing ideological lines and sowing discord between countries in the region. The intention behind those moves are quite alarming.
China is committed to world peace and stability. We do not engage in geopolitical contests and has no intention to challenge or threaten any country. The peace, cooperation, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific has been made possible thanks to the concerted efforts of countries in the region. The Asia-Pacific does not welcome Cold-War thinking and bloc confrontation. NATO needs to reflect on itself what kind of role it has played in European security. We have seen what NATO has done to Europe, and NATO must not seek to sow chaos here in the Asia-Pacific or elsewhere in the world.
Bloomberg: The US is beginning to detain imports of aluminum products suspected of being made under conditions of forced labor, particularly in Xinjiang. Does the foreign ministry have any comment on the detention of Chinese aluminum imports?
Mao Ning: This is another example of using the so-called “forced labor” issue, which does not exist in Xinjiang, to politicize normal business cooperation and illegally detain the imported products. This violates international trade rules, destabilizes global industrial and supply chains and will eventually harm the US’s own interests.
We urge the US to stop unjustly going after Chinese companies. China will do what is necessary to firmly safeguard the legitimate and lawful rights and interests of Chinese companies.
Kyodo News: Tsai Ing-wen met with former head of the US Indo-Pacific Command Phil Davidson in Taiwan today. What’s your comment?
Mao Ning: We have time and again made our position clear on Taiwan. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese and must be decided by Chinese ourselves. The tensions across the Taiwan Strait are caused by the DPP authorities, which have kept soliciting US support for “Taiwan independence”, and some people in the US, who intend to use Taiwan to contain China. The US should credibly abide by the one-China principle and the three China-US joint communiqués, deliver on US leaders’ commitment of not supporting “Taiwan independence”, stop all forms of official interaction and military contact with Taiwan, stop meddling in the Taiwan question, and stop creating new factors that could lead to tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
AFP: The US recently reopened its embassy in Solomon Islands. China previously signed a security agreement with the Pacific Island country. What’s your comment on the reopening of the US embassy there?
Mao Ning: China is not opposed to countries’ efforts to grow ties with Pacific Island countries. We stand ready to work with all interested parties to leverage our strengths and contribute jointly to the development and prosperity of the region. I would like to stress that China has no intention to outinfluence anyone in the Pacific Islands region, and we are not interested in geopolitical contest.
Beijing Youth Daily: The leader of Hard Line, a Danish political party, recently burned a copy of the Quran near Türkiye’s embassy in Sweden, which has encouraged similar acts elsewhere. Muslim communities across the world have strongly condemned these acts. The incidents have made international headlines. Does China have any comment?
Mao Ning: Freedom of religious belief should be respected. This is a widely held consensus of the international community. The Muslim faith and religious feelings should be respected.
We have noted recent media reports on individual Western politicians’ public burning of copies of the Quran. The incidents shine a spotlight on the hypocrisy of some Western politicians who pride themselves on their respect for freedom of religious belief.
China will, as always, advocate inter-civilization dialogue together with Islamic countries and work with them to jointly uphold the freedom of religious belief of Muslims and all other population groups.
Prasar Bharati: US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland during her visit to Sri Lanka has said that the terms extended by China to Sri Lanka for getting IMF debt relief are not enough. She said the US expects China, as the largest bilateral creditor to Sri Lanka, to give credible and specific assurance that matches IMF’s standard on debt restructuring. What is China’s comment or response to this and when is China considering to provide credible and specific assurances to Sri Lanka as required for debt relief by the IMF?
Mao Ning: What was said by the US side does not reflect the truth. The Export-Import Bank of China has already provided Sri Lanka with the letter to express support for its debt sustainability. Sri Lanka has responded positively and thanked China for that.
Rather than jabbing fingers at China’s close cooperation with Sri Lanka, the US might as well show some sincerity and actually do something to help Sri Lanka weather through the current difficulties.
As a friendly neighbor and true friend, China has been closely following the difficulties and challenges facing Sri Lanka and providing assistance for its economic and social development to the best of our capabilities. As to Sri Lanka’s debt to the Chinese side, China supports relevant financial institutions in having consultations with Sri Lanka to seek a proper settlement. China stands ready to work with relevant countries and international financial institutions and continue to play a positive role in helping Sri Lanka navigate the situation, easing its debt burden and helping it achieve sustainable development.
Bloomberg: US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy said that China cannot tell him where he can go at any time or any place. He was responding to a question from reporters about the potential trip to Taiwan. Does the foreign ministry have any comment on Speaker McCarthy’s words as to whether China can tell him where he cannot go?
Mao Ning: There is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China. China urges relevant people in the US to credibly abide by the one-China principle and the stipulations of the three China-US joint communiqués, observe the basic norms in international relations, handle Taiwan-related issues in a prudent and proper manner, stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, and refrain from doing anything that could undermine China-US relations or peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. China will continue to resolutely safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
AFP: Recently the Canadian parliament passed a motion to take in 10,000 Uyghur refugees. Do you have any comment on this? Will this motion, if implemented, impact the relations between China and Canada?
Mao Ning: Today’s Xinjiang enjoys security, stability and a sound momentum of development. People there live a peaceful and happy life and their human rights, regardless of their ethnic background, have received better protection. We urge Canada to respect these facts, stop politically manipulating Xinjiang-related issues for ulterior motives, spreading disinformation and misleading the public.
Prasar Bharati: So is there any conversation or talk between China and the IMF where the IMF has confirmed that China’s assurances are credible and enough for the IMF to disburse the debt relief financial support. Or is it only a sort of accusation from the US to China that China is not doing enough?
Mao Ning: We support Chinese financial institutions in having consultations with Sri Lanka to seek a proper settlement to its China-related debt issue. We also stand ready to work with relevant countries and international financial institutions to play a positive role in easing Sri Lanka’s debt burden.
Prasar Bharati: UNGA President Csaba Kőrösi while speaking to media in New Delhi two days ago stressed on bringing reforms in UN Security Council. What are China’s views on this statement? And does China believe that UNSC reforms are overdue?
Mao Ning: China always believes that the reform of the Security Council should enhance the authority and efficacy of the Security Council, increase the representation and say of developing countries and give more small and medium-sized countries the opportunity to participate in the decision-making of the organization and ensure that the Security Council can better function as mandated by the UN Charter. China will continue to play a constructive role in the discussions within the framework of the General Assembly on the reform issue.
Bloomberg: The speaker of the Czech parliament has said that she will visit Taiwan in March. Does the foreign ministry have any comment on the potential visit to Taiwan in March of the Czech parliament speaker?
Mao Ning: The Taiwan question is China’s internal affair and concerns China’s core interest. China firmly opposes any form of official interaction between its Taiwan region and countries having diplomatic ties with China. We oppose any political manipulation using the Taiwan question.
We urge certain Czech politician to take China’s position seriously, respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, cancel the wrong decision, and stop sending wrong signals to “Taiwan independence” separatist forces.
fmprc.gov.cn
13. Viewpoint: Emerging ‘Offset-X’ Strategy Addresses Chinese Threat
Excerpts:
The recommendations outlined above are a subset of a broader competitive strategy to lay the groundwork for achieving and maintaining military-technical superiority over all potential adversaries. They are not intended to be, nor should they be considered, a one-time fix-all. Significant prototyping, experimenting and wargaming will be needed to validate the applicability and effectiveness of various innovative technologies for specific operational demands. The exact combination of emerging technologies and capabilities will need to be determined through the process outlined above to address specific operational challenges and the changing character of war.
But the pursuit and mastery of emerging technologies and innovation can enable the crafting of new operational concepts that can be tailored to meet specific military challenges.
The Offset-X strategy aims to build the foundation for future operations that can more easily and quickly offset adversarial capabilities.
Viewpoint: Emerging ‘Offset-X’ Strategy Addresses Chinese Threat
2/2/2023
By Mark Montgomery and Luke Vannurden
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/2/2/emerging-offset-x--strategy-addresses--chinese-threat?mc_cid=02d8c8267c
iStock illustration
The People’s Republic of China has emerged as the United States’ top strategic competitor, and the pacing challenge for the U.S. military.
In the words of the recently published 2022 National Defense Strategy, China aims “to target the ability of the Joint Force to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and aid our allies in a crisis or conflict” as part of its “endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.”
The situation is further complicated by the rapid development of numerous emerging technologies that are changing the character of war, creating opportunities for both China and the United States to develop new ways to employ force.
If the United States does not meet this challenge with bold and deliberate action, the consequences could be dramatic — a global shift in power, and an upending of the relative peace, development, and stability that the United States has underwritten in the Indo-Pacific for almost 80 years. The U.S. military needs a competitive strategy, grounded in its asymmetric strengths to develop, deploy and employ capabilities that will restore its military-technological superiority.
Meanwhile, new military capabilities, enabled by artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, the development of creative ways to apply them and intensifying geopolitical rivalries are changing the character of war.
At the strategic level, new technologies are enabling persistent disinformation operations, the theft of intellectual property at a massive scale and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, creating a sense of a persistent conflict. The proliferation of sensors, mass collection of shopping, dating, career networking and even biometric data, is enabling adversaries to develop individual targeting packages — moving all of us toward an individualization of war.
As technologies enabling persistent conflict and individualization develop, the United States will often be ethically constrained in its deployment and employment of these new technologies, as it is guided by a set of principles, U.S. and international laws, as well as the Defense Department’s regulations and ethical guidelines. The United States cannot, and should not, expect the same from its adversaries, as has been demonstrated by Russia in Ukraine or China in Xinjiang.
At the more operational level, the proliferation of emerging technologies is creating new ways for military force to be applied. Mass produced and collected data, combined with powerful, AI-enabled software that can make sense of it, can help military leaders reach a level of understanding of the battlefield that was not previously attainable.
At the same time, while the battlefields may become more transparent, discerning truth from fiction will become harder. Deep fakes and other technology-generated disinformation will enable adversaries to disseminate falsehoods, often at scale, to inject uncertainty and confusion into decision-making processes. And as military capabilities and operations become more reliant on software infusions, new pressures and opportunities will likely emerge for militaries to accelerate adaptation by updating, uploading, disseminating and implementing new software as quickly as programmers can develop it.
China appears poised to leverage these trends. For more than two decades, the People’s Liberation Army has closely studied the “American way of war” of guided munitions and battle networks warfare, which they refer to as informatized warfare, and has worked relentlessly to adopt it for its own purposes. It has also developed a theory of victory centered around the idea of systems confrontation, whereby it would seek to destroy the battle networks of its adversaries. This doctrine of system-destruction warfare aims to disrupt the flow of internal information, the time sequencing of control-attack-evaluation systems and essential components of an adversary’s operational system through kinetic and non-kinetic means.
China’s military has also sought to chart a path to leapfrog the United States in readiness for a potential confrontation by capitalizing on the growing capabilities of AI, big data, advanced computing, 5G and supporting technologies to shift from informatized warfare to “intelligentized” warfare. Civilian and military leaders in Beijing believe that the effective integration of people, alongside weapon platforms, will be a deciding factor in the outcome of a potential conflict. If successful, China’s military would become the first great power to harness this new way of war, and in doing so, they hope to hurdle the United States and become the global military superpower.
While the magnitude of today’s challenges may be new, the U.S. military still enjoys asymmetric advantages that can be leveraged to great effects. Traits derived from combat experience, from the democratic nature of America’s institutions or from long-standing organizational practices are difficult to replicate, even with exquisite technology.
For example, the U.S. military enjoys demonstrated experience in joint, combined arms, expeditionary and networked operations. The U.S. military promotes a culture that empowers warfighters at the tactical level. It has a long track record of conducting complex expeditionary logistics. And along with the Department of State, it manages a large network of allies and partners that creates opportunities for a global posture and power projection.
Finally, the U.S. military operates within a resilient democratic society and government, rather than defending an authoritarian regime. Using these asymmetric strengths to shape how the military deploys and employs its capabilities would make it difficult for China to replicate U.S. performance, even if it reproduces the underlying technology.
The United States should not respond to this challenge with despair. It needs to strengthen its ability to deter Chinese military aggression in the Western Pacific, and if deterrence fails, to win a war.
To meet these challenges, members of the Special Competitive Studies Project — a bipartisan initiative working on a series of six special reports — concluded that the United States needs a new competitive strategy — which it terms “Offset-X.”
This strategy would lay the groundwork for the United States to restore its military-technological superiority, and in the process circumvent China’s military advancements, thwart its theory of victory, restore America’s ability to project power in the Indo-Pacific region and position the United States to honor its commitment to the stability and productivity of the region.
This competitive strategy is derived from, and grounded in, America’s asymmetric strengths and envisions the development, deployment and employment of new concepts and capabilities in ways that China will struggle to match or quickly duplicate. Its purpose is to minimize the human and political costs the United States and its allies would suffer during a war with China while driving up the political costs and creating serious dilemmas for the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership.
In our report, we outline 10 recommendations that could better position the United States to triumph in a war with China. Three key ones are outlined here.
First, fully embrace distributed, network-based operations to outlast, out-maneuver and overwhelm adversaries. Hierarchy is a People’s Liberation Army weakness and a vulnerability in today’s wars. The U.S. military should continue to develop and experiment with how it will employ smaller, highly connected, resilient and organically empowered units that practice network-based decision making. Such units would operate in a distributed fashion, inside and outside an adversary’s envisioned battlespace, leveraging U.S. global posture and access arrangements with partners and allies.
Such a network could generate significant dilemmas for adversaries by subverting their operations and creating multiple attack vectors and cross-domain effects.
Second, lead the world’s militaries in human-machine collaboration and human-machine teaming. Essential to the concept of distributed, network-based forces will be an extensive array of low-cost sensors, as well as large numbers of “attritable,” unmanned systems operating at sea, in the air and on the ground to diversify attack vectors, expand attack surfaces and increase lethality. Employing them effectively though will require mastering human-machine cognitive collaboration and human-machine combat teaming. A core concept of these tactics is that humans and machines have comparative advantages and therefore excel in different areas. Augmenting human limitations with machine strengths — and vice versa — can create human-machine collaboration and teaming that outperforms both humans and machines in many of their individual tasks.
Human-machine combat teaming will leverage machines to perform tasks faster, more effectively or at a scale beyond human capacity. It will also allow humans to refocus their mental bandwidth toward gaining situational awareness, understanding enemy plans, developing courses of action and mastering tasks that humans do best.
It could enable the military to generate and employ mass in contested environments and do so in a way that reduces the risk to humans, including threats of collateral damage. Massed machines, assigned tasks by their human teammates, could overwhelm traditional defenses, often at a relatively smaller cost in human casualties compared to more traditional offensive operations. Machines could also serve as the “eyes and ears” of their human teammates, particularly in urban warfare, by helping them gain more information about their environment and taking risks in their place.
And third, gain and maintain software advantage. A military’s ability to deploy, employ and update software, including AI models, faster than its adversaries is likely to become one of the greatest determining factors in relative military strength.
Software is now integral to every component of decision-making and operations, from sensing a target, to planning and decision-making, to targeting and battle damage assessment. The importance of software will only continue to increase. As militaries around the world increasingly rely on platforms with advanced computing capacities, the quality of software will determine a military’s primacy in collecting and analyzing information, developing an operating picture, thwarting enemy attacks, identifying opportunities in time and space to attack most effectively and helping with target selection and servicing.
The recommendations outlined above are a subset of a broader competitive strategy to lay the groundwork for achieving and maintaining military-technical superiority over all potential adversaries. They are not intended to be, nor should they be considered, a one-time fix-all. Significant prototyping, experimenting and wargaming will be needed to validate the applicability and effectiveness of various innovative technologies for specific operational demands. The exact combination of emerging technologies and capabilities will need to be determined through the process outlined above to address specific operational challenges and the changing character of war.
But the pursuit and mastery of emerging technologies and innovation can enable the crafting of new operational concepts that can be tailored to meet specific military challenges.
The Offset-X strategy aims to build the foundation for future operations that can more easily and quickly offset adversarial capabilities.
Retired Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Luke Vannurden is associate director, Special Competitive Studies Project.
The project’s interim report can be found at: https://www.scsp.ai/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Defense-Panel-IPR.pdf
14. Navy Ends 'Gruesome' Testing on Sheep After PETA Protests
This will likely embolden them to take renewed efforts on live tissue training.
Navy Ends 'Gruesome' Testing on Sheep After PETA Protests
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · February 1, 2023
An animal rights group says that it has successfully lobbied the Navy to end a pair of studies that involved subjecting sheep to conditions that simulated surfacing quickly from a great depth, causing them pain and sometimes leaving the animals paralyzed or dead.
Representatives from the group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, or PETA, say that their campaign of letter writing, protests and legal action has put an end to a series of experiments at the University of Wisconsin's Madison campus that were billed as studying ways of rescuing sailors trapped in sunken submarines.
"These tests are scientifically worthless and fall far short of international standards," Shalin Gala, a vice president with the group, told Military.com earlier in January, before adding that both France and the U.K. scrapped their respective naval animal testing programs long before the U.S. Navy.
Gala called the experiments, which involve putting sheep in chambers that simulate both the pressure one would experience at depth as well as surfacing, "gruesome" and "useless."
The experiments largely revolved around inflicting decompression sickness on the animals by pressurizing the chamber and then rapidly depressurizing it in order to cause nitrogen bubbles to form in the sheep's blood.
The condition is commonly known as "the bends," and it is something both professional and recreational divers take steps to avoid since it is often painful, if not deadly.
Gala said that the experiments left the sheep with conditions such as cardiovascular collapse, spinal cord injury and paralysis. However, he also cited one instance in which a malfunctioning pump on the chamber led researchers to euthanize the animals mid-experiment after they began to show "signs of discomfort." Sheep who survived the experiments were still euthanized and dissected, according to Gala.
When reached by Military.com, both the University of Wisconsin and the Navy confirmed that the experiments had ended. The Navy said the stop was because "the contract for the project came to its natural conclusion at the end of the performance period," while the university said it was because both "the scientists and the Navy ... decided in 2022 not to continue these contracted experiments at UW-Madison."
The University of Wisconsin also said that it is "committed to careful and ethical animal studies like these with immediate potential for life-saving results" and noted that it "would certainly revisit what has been a long and important partnership" with the Navy.
According to Shalin, the reason behind the university's desire to continue these tests is clear: money. The pair of recently halted experiments came with nearly $390,000 of Navy funds.
The school has conducted experiments on animals in the past -- sometimes with great controversy. In 2014, the university drew attention for a planned experiment on monkeys that aimed to separate primate infants from their mothers and then euthanize them to study anxiety and depression. The experiment drew condemnation from both outside and inside the university.
Meanwhile, PETA has a yearslong history of trying to expose what it sees as abusive animal experiments at the university. One of its campaigns in 2020 led the school to allege that the group had misrepresented its research, used "episodes plucked out of context," and was "focused on stopping all animal research, despite the indispensable role animal research has had in eliminating diseases and alleviating the suffering of both people and animals."
In the decompression experiments, PETA took legal action, suing the school in 2010, and more recently launched a public pressure campaign to end the tests.
In a 2022 letter, co-signed by a retired Navy rear admiral who commanded several naval medical institutions, the group urged Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro to halt the experiments and conduct studies on tissues and cells or use data gathered from divers. The group also led protests, with signs and people dressed in sheep costumes, at several events the secretary attended.
The Navy's track record regarding concern for animal welfare has been somewhat mixed and more sensitive to public outcry and legal action.
For example, the service has been sued several times over the past two decades by environmental groups over its use of sonar in submarine exercises. And the service's record of "incidental taking" -- the regulatory term for anything from disrupted behavior to injury or death of a marine mammal -- prompted the governor of Washington to call its behavior "unacceptable" in a letter to a regulator.
The service has been publicly working to offset some of its impact on wildlife including during large exercises like ship shock trials -- a process of setting off large explosives near newly built ships to test them, but is known to harm and kill marine life -- highlighting the steps it takes to protect the welfare of animals.
Gala says that PETA will "continue to urge the Navy and the U.S. Department of Defense to get in line with international standards by not supporting deadly and pointless decompression and oxygen toxicity experiments on any animals at any institutions -- and by backing superior, human-relevant, non-animal research methods instead."
-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · February 1, 2023
15. REED, WICKER ANNOUNCE SASC MEMBERSHIP FOR 118TH CONGRESS
PUBLISHED:
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2023
REED, WICKER ANNOUNCE SASC MEMBERSHIP FOR 118TH CONGRESS
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/reed-wicker-announce-sasc-membership-for-118th-congress?utm
Today, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), and U.S. Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), incoming Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, announced the full roster of SASC members for the 118th Congress.
“I am honored to lead the Committee along with Senator Roger Wicker,” said Chairman Reed. “He is a dedicated public servant, an Air Force veteran, and a real expert on defense and national security issues. We previously led the Seapower Subcommittee together several years ago and I know Roger to be thoughtful, resolute, and fair.
“Together with our colleagues on the Committee, we will continue our bipartisan traditions of rigorous oversight of the Department of Defense and working together to pass a strong National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
“This Committee’s mission is to prioritize America’s national security needs and advance our common defense,” continued Chairman Reed. “We will have an ambitious schedule of hearings and will strive together to match resources with strategic objectives while providing our forces with an enduring advantage, now and in the future.”
Wicker also commented: “Providing for the common defense is one of the most important constitutional duties entrusted to Congress and it is my great honor to join Senator Jack Reed in this effort. Chairman Reed is a proud Army veteran and a stalwart champion for our national defense and not only the state of Rhode Island, but also the whole United States. Through my years of work with Chairman Reed, I have come to know him as a fair and judicious voice who is able to bring people together in support of a shared mission, and we will continue that bipartisan work. During the most dangerous time since the Cold War, it is crucial to work as partners to enhance deterrence and counter our adversaries for the long haul.
“I also look forward to working with the other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. We owe it to our service members and other talented national security professionals to continue our important work with the seriousness and professionalism it requires.”
Senator Reed first joined the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1998 and became the Ranking Member of the panel in 2015. In 2021, Reed became Chairman of the Committee.
Senator Wicker has been a member of the Committee since 2008.
The Committee majority includes 13 members, and the minority includes 12 members. SASC membership of the 118th Congress includes:
Majority:
- Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) – Chairman
- Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)
- Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)
- Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT)
- Senator Mazie Hirono (D-HI)
- Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA)
- Senator Angus King (I-ME)
- Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)
- Senator Gary Peters (D-MI)
- Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV)
- Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL)
- Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV)
- Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ)
Minority:
- Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) – Ranking Member
- Senator Deb Fischer (R-NE)
- Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR)
- Senator Mike Rounds (R-SD)
- Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA)
- Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK)
- Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)
- Senator Rick Scott (R-FL)
- Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL)
- Senator Markwayne Mullin (R-OK)
- Senator Ted Budd (R-NC)
- Senator Eric Schmitt (R-MO)
After the Committee fully organizes in the near future there will be an announcement about subcommittee leadership and membership for the 118th Congress.
Press Contact
Cole Stevens (SASC Democrats) (202) 224-8636
Jack Beyrer (SASC Republicans) (202) 224-0418
16. Opinion | We Already Have 18 Intelligence Agencies. We Still Need 1 More.
Spoiler alert: the Department of Commerce.
Opinion | We Already Have 18 Intelligence Agencies. We Still Need 1 More.
Politico
Magazine
Opinion | We Already Have 18 Intelligence Agencies. We Still Need 1 More.
The Commerce Department needs its own intel officers to take on China.
The American and Chinese flags wave. | Kiichiro Sato/AP Photo
Opinion by Jonathan Panikoff
02/01/2023 04:30 AM EST
Jonathan Panikoff is a senior fellow in the geoeconomics program and director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He is a former career U.S. intelligence officer.
Figuring out what, exactly, China is up to is one of the intelligence community’s top priorities. Countering Beijing also happens to be a rare instance where there’s bipartisan support in Congress.
But what new lawmakers will quickly discover — especially those joining the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — is that a glaring gap exists that will impact Congress’ efforts to do so. The U.S. cannot adequately address its national security challenges related to China, which are increasingly driven by technology, without the help of a potentially surprising partner: the Department of Commerce.
Unfortunately, the department itself lacks the critical support needed for these efforts. Most crucial: Commerce needs its own intelligence agency.
My last job in the U.S. government was overseeing the intelligence community’s role in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), along with an interagency group formerly known as Team Telecom, and being responsible for the intelligence community’s engagement with our foreign allies’ own investment security efforts. The cases that come before CFIUS are privileged and not publicly disclosed. But I can say this: The most challenging ones usually revolved around issues of advanced or dual-use technology, an area in which the Department of Commerce plays a critical role given its international trade and export control responsibilities.
Today, the Department of Commerce is an agency unexpectedly on the frontlines of vital U.S. national and economic security challenges, most prominently demonstrated by its leading role on ensuring critical access to semiconductors, and as evidenced by the CHIPS Act and recent rules promulgated by the department to protect against even knowledge transfers between the United States and China.
But these efforts are certain to be a beginning for Commerce, not an end. And a dedicated in-house intel agency can better identify emerging threats and challenges from China that Commerce needs to tackle, including potential spyware and other intrusions embedded in foreign technology. For instance, in late November, the U.S. issued a ban on new Huawei and ZTE equipment — along with that of three other Chinese companies — for fear it would be used to spy on Americans. Last month, Congress proposed limiting U.S. exposure to Chinese 5G leaders, including Huawei, by restricting their access to U.S. banks, adding them to Treasury’s Specifically Designated Nationals List.
In fact, Commerce’s current position is not unlike that of the Treasury Department’s in 2004.
That year — as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act — Congress established the current iteration of Treasury’s intelligence agency, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and formally made it part of the broader intel community. Since then, OIA has played a critical role for almost two decades combating terrorist financing, helping support sanctions efforts and providing financial intelligence to Treasury policymakers.
OIA’s successes would simply not have been possible without it being a full, integrated member of the intelligence community. Indeed, its assessments often find their way to the White House and to other senior policymakers across town, even as its primary focus is supporting the Treasury Department.
In the same way, the Commerce Department cannot be expected to play a more fulsome role in U.S. national security if its leaders are not fully informed of the strategic goals and illicit tactical efforts of U.S. adversaries. To meet that expectation, requires the launch of a new, 19th intel agency to be housed at the department.
Most Americans think of intelligence and by default conjure up images of the CIA. But there are 18 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, most housed in various departments or military services, and dedicated to providing the kind of intelligence support to a secretary or commander, that CIA continues to lead the way in providing to the White House.
Members of Congress who for the first time are serving on the Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services or other prominent national security-related committees and sub-committees, may be surprised to learn that despite what they may have gleaned from the media, the intel community does not actually make predictions; it makes judgments. The difference is critical.
Predictions are generally fleeting: right and wrong, winners and losers, black and white. Judgments are far more complicated. They address the likelihood of events and emergence of prospective capabilities; the potential follow-on implications and challenges from an event occurring — or not; and the associated risks and opportunities for U.S. national and economic security.
These conclusions are what the intelligence community informs policymakers of, to help them make the best decisions possible.
Not only would Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo benefit greatly from having her own intel agency providing these types of assessments directly to her, but so too would the rest of the department, including the Bureau of Industry and Security, which is responsible for export controls, and the International Trade Administration, which defends U.S. industry against unfair trade practices of foreign allies and adversaries.
In creating the new agency, the Director of National Intelligence and Congress must ensure it does not simply result from merging together overworked and under-supported disparate parts of the department that seem to fit. Less than two years ago, Commerce’s national security work was overshadowed by a rogue and illegal security operation at the department — and neither it nor the U.S. government can afford a repeat.
Rather, a new agency must be stood up and staffed by leaders and analysts who are intel community professionals that know how to blend complex analytic efforts with the priorities of the department. Having this type of experienced leadership will ensure the development of novel and Commerce-centric analysis, all while adhering to intelligence tradecraft and community standards.
A new intel agency at the Commerce Department won’t end the national security challenges the U.S. faces from China; but it will help policymakers mitigate and overcome them.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community, or any other U.S. government agency.
POLITICO
Politico
17. #Reviewing Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century
I, like many people, believe alliances are critical to our national security.
#Reviewing Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century
thestrategybridge.org · February 1, 2023
Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century. Alexander Lanoszka. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
In this welcome addition to the literature on alliances, international relations scholar Alexander Lanoszka makes an optimistic case for the continued salience of the U.S.-led alliance system. In his two-hundred-page study, he reviews the most common areas that past studies have focused on: alliance formation, fears of entrapment and abandonment, burden-sharing, warfare, and alliance termination.
Accessible to both graduate students and seasoned authors on alliances, the book provides a compendium of theoretical support and criticism for alliances from international relations scholars.
The most useful element of the book is its detailed survey of the theoretical literature of the international relations sub-field. Evincing no preference for a single model, he approaches the broad range of arguments in each of the five areas and weighs the respective strengths and weaknesses, most often finding weakness in traditional international relations school models. Such criticism is as applicable to Stephen Walt’s theory on the origins of alliances[1] as it is to Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein’s use of constructivism.[2] Accessible to both graduate students and seasoned authors on alliances, the book provides a compendium of theoretical support and criticism for alliances from international relations scholars.
Lanoszka takes a broad historicist approach, wherein it is stressed that each individual case should be studied on its own merits; this is quite helpful. This view is put most succinctly in the chapter on termination, where Lanoszka targets monocausal explanations and instead argues, “Each type of alliance [termination] has its own logic, thereby complicating any effort to provide a unified account of why or how any one alliance begins, endures, and ends.”[3] Much commentary on alliances offers less of an objective review of history, but rather a theory-driven philosophy of history. Former Czech President Václav Havel was a particularly apt example, in the case of NATO, of placing it not as a military alliance but as part of the broader, Western liberal international project, “one of the guarantors of human and civic freedom in the whole sphere of Euro-Atlantic civilisation.”[4]
Political scientist Francis Fukuyama and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul continue in this vein in arguing NATO expansion was not so much about the expansion of a security umbrella, but rather that the alliance “offered Western multilateral connectivity to the new democracies in eastern and central Europe and served as a bridge as they prepared bids to join the EU.”[5] Other authors take the converse view. The offensive realist scholar John Mearsheimer is perhaps the archetype of alliance criticism in the modern era, predicting both the disintegration of NATO in 1990[6] and pinning the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the alliance’s expansion.[7] Lanoszka avoids this ideological philosophizing, and instead pursues his assessment of what makes alliances form, continue, and terminate.
Lanoszka begins with an exacting definition for an alliance: “arrangements made between two or more sovereign states on the basis of a written treaty that serves to coordinate military policy toward at least one common goal.”[8] With a political scientist’s desire for precision, this definition strictly limits the study to formal treaty allies.
Over the course of the book, a specific difference is made between those allies with firm security guarantees, such as NATO or Japan, and those without such a guarantee, such as Israel and Taiwan.
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This definition offers points with which to contend. Firstly, Lanoszka’s focus on formal treaty alliances, expressed through a metaphor of alliances as a marriage and security partnerships as just dating, overstates the line between alliances and partnerships. Lanoszka’s metaphor that “we distinguish between dating and marriage when we discuss romantic relations because they entail different expectations and obligations. We should make similar distinctions with respect to international security cooperation.”[9] However, and in keeping with this metaphor, if an individual is known for abandoning or cheating on each of their previous dating partners, would others not be worried about the same behavior within the marriage? The salience of this problem can be seen following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern Syria in 2019, leaving behind their Kurdish partners. In the aftermath, other allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia expressed concerns that this could signal a broader trend of unreliable security commitments.[10]
Secondly, the author does not hold strictly to his own definition. Over the course of the book, a specific difference is made between those allies with firm security guarantees, such as NATO or Japan, and those without such a guarantee, such as Israel and Taiwan. This definition however only broadly refers to coordinating military policy, which does not necessarily delimit less firm partnerships. This difference goes beyond pedantry about definitions but impacts the case selection of the remainder of the book.
There are also some notable exclusions from the book, particularly for a work with an analytical focus on the twenty-first century. First and foremost, is Afghanistan. Declared a Major Non-NATO ally (MNNA) by the United States in 2012, there is little mention outside of the combat aspects of the International Security Assistance Force. It is notable that arguably one of the West’s most resource intensive and high-intensity efforts in the past thirty years receives so little attention. This is the case for each of the nineteen MNNAs. This designation, which does not necessarily entail an explicitly written security commitment (for example Israel and Taiwan are MNNAs), would add a layer of complexity to the analysis. Consider also that the U.S. Arms Export Control Act does not make an explicit difference between NATO and MNNA states.[11] For example, why would a treaty ally such as Japan or South Korea seek MNNA status when they already have an existing treaty? Might extending MNNA status create expectations of a security commitment even if one is not written explicitly? What is the reputational cost of not meeting this expectation?
This study is also limited by its meager engagement with the bureaucratic elements of alliances. While there is some mention of bureaucracy in relation to Wallander’s theories explaining NATO’s persistence after the Cold War, it is overly limited to the area of curbs on alliance termination.[12] Each of the five theoretical areas identified by Lanoszka are impacted by bureaucratic dynamics. International and military secretariats play significant internal roles in assuring allies against fears of abandonment or entrapment, play an administrative role in burden-sharing, and are often instrumental in the conduct of warfare.
Lanoszka places himself among the modern optimists about alliances, most particularly NATO.
The bureaucratic lens offers an angle for a more rigorous comparative studies approach that Military Alliances lacks. An underutilized set of cases for comparison are the three U.S.-led regional security pacts of the Cold War, NATO, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as the Baghdad Pact). There has been some study, though dedicated efforts of comparison are quite scarce and generally limited. Lanoszka’s five areas of focus would provide an interesting frame for such a comparison, particularly as only one, NATO, survived the Cold War. Intriguingly, there is an existing entry point for scholarship. Part IV.A.1 of United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, otherwise known as the Pentagon Papers, is a detailed, 51-page comparison of SEATO with NATO.[13] This study provides insight into the role of structured secretariats in alliance outcomes. SEATO, unlike NATO, included only a small secretariat based in Bangkok, which left SEATO with fewer resources than the North Atlantic alliance. Additionally, it was unable to manage the divergence of member differences related to Vietnam, perhaps unsurprising in an alliance with members as varied as the United States, France, South Korea and Pakistan. The report itself notes, “The conflict in Vietnam is a crucible for SEATO; the future of the alliance will be profoundly affected by the outcome of the war.” Given its failure in the Vietnam War, this is an interesting comparative case, not only in the Cold War context, but also when considered alongside the more recent alliance experience of NATO in Afghanistan.
This work provides a frame to consider other puzzles in strategic studies.
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In his final conclusions, Lanoszka places himself among the modern optimists about alliances, most particularly NATO. Recent books on the alliance can be neatly summarized by one of Lanoszka’s concluding remarks, “Dysfunction is a permanent feature of alliance politics, not a temporary bug.”[14] Mark Webber, James Sperling, and Martin A. Smith in their 2021 work What’s Wrong with NATO and How to Fix It[15] centers around a similar argument, as do Jussi Hanhimäki’s[16] and Timothy Sayle’s recent books on NATO.[17] That dysfunction is a feature rather than a bug is often the core logic of the optimists. This is in stark contrast to other recent works from the more pessimistic school, including Ted Galen Carpenter’s NATO: Dangerous Dinosaur[18] and Walt’s broader work targeting liberalism’s failings.[19]
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This work provides a frame to consider other puzzles in strategic studies. Why might Russia and China develop a formalized treaty relationship? Why not? Fears of entrapment or abandonment and expected issues related to burden-sharing or warfare could be central to this puzzle. This is only one question going into the future. There are myriad questions related to how states may organize themselves in the face of shared challenges.
Newly developing research can find itself at a loss for objective scholarship to ground further study of the U.S.-led alliance system. It must consider Lord Palmerston’s speech in the House of Commons to ground them: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”[20] Whichever side of the divide scholarship may find itself on, that is not the point of Lanoszka’s contribution. In the end, and despite its shortcomings, the book reminds us to be wary of universalistic theories and to judge cases based on their individual merits and to be mindful of the salience of national interests in even the closest alliances.
Davis Ellison is a Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a PhD Candidate in the King’s College London Department of War Studies. His research is on civil-military relations within and between NATO’s institutions. This review essay reflects the views of the author alone and not those of any institution referred to within this article.
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Header Image: Opening ceremony for Exercise Saber Strike at the Pabrade Training Area, Lithuania, June 8, 2015. (Sgt Paul Peterson/USMC Photo)
Notes:
[1] Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
[2] Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575-607.
[3] Alexander Lanoszka, Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022), 166.
[4] Václav Havel, To the Castle and Back (New York: Random House Publishing, 2008), 303.
[5] Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul, “Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Winter 2007-08): 23-45.
[6] John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56.
[7] John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September/October 2014): 77-89.
[8] Lanoszka, 13-14.
[9] Lanoszka, 15.
[10] Layla Quran and Bryan Wood, “Why the U.S. decision in Syria has left some allies anxious,” PBS Newshour, October 25, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-the-u-s-decision-in-syria-has-left-some-of-their-allies-anxious.
[11] Arms Control Export Act, Public Law 90-629 (2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1061/pdf/COMPS-1061.pdf.
[12] Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 705-735.
[13] “NATO and SEATO: A Comparison,” in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Part IV.A.1, ed. Leslie Gelb (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1969).
[14] Lanoszka, 198.
[15] Mark Webber, James Sperling, and Martin A. Smith, What’s Wrong with NATO and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021).
[16] Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Pax Transatlantica: America and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
[17] Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).
[18] Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO: Dangerous Dinosaur (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2019).
[19] Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Macmillan, 2018).
[20] “Lord Palmerston 1784–1865,” in Oxford Essential Quotations Fourth Edition, ed. Susan Ratcliffe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
thestrategybridge.org · February 1, 2023
18. The Case for Caution on Crimea
Conclusion:
This approach is not risk-free. There would still be some chance of nuclear escalation. U.S. assessments could prove to be incorrect. As noted above, Ukraine might not abide by any limitations imposed by the United States, though it is better to have such limitations than not. However, the risk would be much smaller than if the United States actively sought to help Ukraine threaten Crimea.
The Ukrainian government would be disappointed by a decision not to help it threaten Crimea, of course. But such a policy would reflect the reality that U.S. and Ukrainian interests are closely — but not perfectly — aligned. Even though the United States rightly recognizes Crimea as Ukrainian, Biden’s risk tolerance in recapturing it should be less than Zelenskyy’s. Recognizing this real difference in interests, Biden should now direct his team to ensure that any military aid supplied to Ukraine could not threaten Russia’s hold on Crimea. As unsatisfactory as it is, the resolution of the peninsula’s status should wait for another day.
The Case for Caution on Crimea - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by James Acton · February 2, 2023
The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has handled Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with consummate skill so far, but may be on the verge of making a potentially catastrophic mistake. According to the New York Times, the administration has concluded that if Ukraine “can show Russia that its control of Crimea can be threatened, that would strengthen Kyiv’s position in any future negotiations.” To this end, Biden’s team is now considering whether to supply Ukraine with weapons that could allow it to put Russia’s hold on Crimea “in jeopardy.”
Crimea should not become an inviolable sanctuary for Russian troops, but helping Ukraine to recapture — or even threaten to recapture — Crimea would be unlikely to lead to productive negotiations and could even spark a nuclear war.
Leverage for Negotiations?
Legally and morally, Crimea is Ukrainian territory. As a sovereign state, Ukraine has every right to try to take back its territory, and the decision about whether doing so would serve Ukrainian interests is for the democratically elected government in Kyiv to make. However, the United States is also a sovereign state. It has every right to assist or decline to assist Ukraine in any attempt to recapture Crimea, depending on American interests.
The Biden administration’s laudable goal is to create the conditions for productive negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. On paper, a credible Ukrainian threat to retake Crimea could help by giving Moscow a lot to lose if it doesn’t negotiate. Armed with this threat, Kyiv could credibly threaten to take back Crimea unless Russia ends the war and recognizes the four newly annexed territories as Ukrainian. The flip side, however, is that as part of this deal, Kyiv would have to be willing to formally cede Crimea, or, at least, openly acquiesce to Russia’s continued occupation. If Kyiv is unwilling to make concessions over the peninsula’s status, it cannot credibly use Crimea as a bargaining chip.
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For better or for worse, Kyiv has no interest in negotiating over Crimea. At the start of the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated that Ukraine and Russia could agree to disagree, but Ukraine’s successes on the battlefield have led him to take a harder line. Now, Zelenskyy says he is unwilling to negotiate over the status of the peninsula. If Ukrainian forces are ever in a position to retake it, he will come under huge — perhaps unstoppable — domestic pressure to push on. For this reason, even if Zelenskyy has privately promised the United States he would negotiate over Crimea in return for increased military aid, Washington should have serious doubts about this ability to deliver. Helping Ukraine to threaten Crimea is therefore unlikely to advance productive negotiations, but it just may spark a nuclear war.
Nuclear Risks
Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons when “the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” Russian President Vladimir Putin considers Crimea to be part of Russia. He is wrong, legally and morally. But given that he, and not international law, holds the authority to launch Russia’s nuclear weapons, his views can’t be ignored. Indeed, some close observers believe Crimea to be a real redline for him. Should Ukraine threaten Russia’s hold on Crimea, Putin could plausibly respond by ordering a limited nuclear attack against, say, Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. His primary goal would likely not be to stabilize the military situation. It would be to terrify Ukraine, its European supporters, and the United States with the threat of further escalation. Putin would probably hope that this threat would compel the United States to pressure Ukraine into abandoning Crimea or at least negotiating seriously.
Russia’s use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. Most obviously, tens or hundreds of millions of lives could be lost if a limited nuclear war escalated into an all-out one. More subtlety, making concessions to Putin after he had used a nuclear weapon would do much greater damage to international security — the nonproliferation regime especially — than reluctantly acquiescing to Russia’s continued possession of the peninsula beforehand. Indeed, were Russia to use a nuclear weapon, Western leaders could come under enormous pressure from their populations to make concessions and avert Armageddon.
The U.S. government, which has been deeply concerned by the possibility of Russian nuclear use for much of this war, now reportedly assesses that the risk has “dimmed.” Indeed, in the last few months, Russia has dialed back its nuclear threats. Moreover, although Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons to defend the four newly annexed territories, he has not done so even as Ukraine has made progress in recapturing them. By contrast, Putin has not explicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons over Crimea since the war began.
Unfortunately, none of this provides grounds to conclude that nuclear escalation is unlikely. Putin’s relative silence about Crimea may be because it has not come under threat so far. That said, his official spokesperson responded to the Times story with what was probably intended to be a veiled nuclear threat, saying strikes on Crimea “will mean raising the conflict to a new level that will not bode well for European security.” Moreover, before the war, Putin personally indicated a willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend the peninsula.
More importantly, Crimea is different from the newly annexed territories. Russia has held Crimea for almost 9 years. Its capture was a crowning achievement of Putin’s reign; its loss could threaten his domestic legitimacy and even undermine his hold on power. By providing access to the Black Sea, Crimea is of greater strategic importance to Russia than other parts of Ukraine. Finally, it must be clear to Putin now that an occupation of the newly annexed territories would be difficult and costly; by contrast, most Crimeans want to be Russian.
To be sure, Russian nuclear use over Crimea would be incredibly dangerous, and Putin would surely not order it lightly. Nonetheless, the consequences of not using weapons could be so deleterious from his perspective that he might conclude that, for him personally, starting a nuclear war was the lesser of two evils.
Constructive Pressure
While it is not in U.S. interests for Ukraine to threaten Russia’s hold on Crimea, it is also not in those interests for Crimea to become a sanctuary for Russian forces. As the Times story notes, Russia uses bases in Crimea to support its operations in the rest of Ukraine. U.S. officials indicated that part of the reason why they are considering augmenting the supply of American weapons to Ukraine is to enable Kyiv to strike those bases and interdict Russian troops leaving Crimea.
In all probability, such operations would only precipitate Russian nuclear use if Moscow believed they were part of an effort to retake Crimea (after all, Ukraine has already conducted operations deep inside Crimea without sparking a nuclear war). The United States, therefore, should adopt a policy of supplying Ukraine with more and better equipment, but only in types and quantities that would not enable Ukraine to credibly recapture Crimea.
Such a policy is admittedly easier to articulate than to design. It would need to be implemented on the basis of detailed analysis by the U.S. military, which can assess the likely effect of U.S. supplies on Ukraine’s ability to retake Crimea, as well as the U.S. intelligence community, which can assess their possible effect on Russian perceptions. Such an analysis could consider, for example, whether to supply Ukraine with longer-range missiles, such as the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb, only in small numbers (with a commitment to replace missiles expended in combat on a one-for-one basis), so that Ukraine could attack individual high-value Russian military facilities in Crimea but not launch a large-scale missile barrage. U.S. officials could also consider whether to supply additional armored vehicles only on condition that Ukraine agreed to limit the number deployed within some distance of the border with Crimea.
Conclusion
This approach is not risk-free. There would still be some chance of nuclear escalation. U.S. assessments could prove to be incorrect. As noted above, Ukraine might not abide by any limitations imposed by the United States, though it is better to have such limitations than not. However, the risk would be much smaller than if the United States actively sought to help Ukraine threaten Crimea.
The Ukrainian government would be disappointed by a decision not to help it threaten Crimea, of course. But such a policy would reflect the reality that U.S. and Ukrainian interests are closely — but not perfectly — aligned. Even though the United States rightly recognizes Crimea as Ukrainian, Biden’s risk tolerance in recapturing it should be less than Zelenskyy’s. Recognizing this real difference in interests, Biden should now direct his team to ensure that any military aid supplied to Ukraine could not threaten Russia’s hold on Crimea. As unsatisfactory as it is, the resolution of the peninsula’s status should wait for another day.
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James M. Acton is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Image: Kremlin
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by James Acton · February 2, 2023
19. This is why the SCAR Mk16 rifle never became a special operations weapon
Photos at the link: https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/this-is-why-the-scar-mk16-rifle-never-became-a-special-operations-weapon/
This is why the SCAR Mk16 rifle never became a special operations weapon
sandboxx.us · by Travis Pike · February 1, 2023
The SCAR Mk16 seems poised to become the newest service rifle, at least with the U.S. special operations community. However, in 2010 the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) revealed it was no longer acquiring Mk16s but kept the Mk17 on hand.
Today we are going to find out why the rifle never made it as a special operations weapon, but first, let’s do a five-minute dive into the history and design of the SCAR series.
What’s the SCAR
The SCAR rifles are gas-operated, short-stroke, gas-piston rifles developed by Fabrique Nationale Herstal, aka FN. SCAR isn’t just a rifle but a competition. SOCOM wanted a Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle, so the SCAR contest led to the SCAR rifle series. SOCOM wanted modular rifles, and the SCAR Mk16 was intended to replace the M4, the MK18, and Mk12 5.56 caliber rifles.
The SCAR rifle (FN)
The SCAR series has grown since then, but in the early 2000s, the weapons only came in 5.56 and 7.62 NATO. In April 2010, FN won the contest, and the SCAR series was adopted, yet in June 2010, SOCOM announced it was canceling the acquisition of the Mk16.
Why the rifle failed
The official answer for why the rifle failed is that SOCOM had limited funds, and the SCAR Mk16 wasn’t that different compared to other 5.56 rifles to justify its continued purchase as when compared to the M4, the SCAR didn’t create a large performance gap.
Admittedly in testing, the SCAR proved to be more reliable, but not substantially so. The M4 series has proven itself a reliable platform, and while the SCAR may have had fewer stoppages in 6,000 rounds, the average firefight isn’t lasting long enough for an on-the-ground operator to see a major difference.
(U.S. Army)
The same could be said about the two weapons’ accuracy. Strap the SCAR Mk16 to a bench, and I bet the groups are smaller than the M4s. However, that’s not necessarily going to be seen on the battlefield.
The cost of the rifle isn’t the only consideration. You also have to train the troops on the rifle, procure replacement parts, retrain armorers, and ensure your accessories function with the new rifle.
US Army
On the other hand, there was already a fair amount of institutional knowledge about the M4 and its series already had an environment built around the gun. Further, according to some anecdotal stories and interviews the M4 was the preferred rifle of special operations troops.
Ultimately, SOCOM decided they could spend the money they were spending on Mk16s elsewhere and have a greater effect.
What the SCAR Mk16 did better
The SCAR is more accurate and reliable than the M4. More than that, the ergonomics were improved with ambidextrous controls and a reversible charging handle. Also, the rifle’s stock both collapsed and folded to make it more compact. Further, the rifle had a monolithic rail allowing for a much longer optics rail than the M4.
(U.S. Army)
Additionally, when shooting it suppressed, the short-stroke gas piston system tends to throw less gas in the operator’s face and that same gas system works well with short barrels. Overall, it’s a more modern rifle than the M4 (and as you can tell, it’s also a very photogenic one).
What the SCAR Mk16 did worse
However, the Mk16 wasn’t all rainbows and glory. It tended to be heavier than the M4 and Mk18 in their respective configurations. Also, at the time, the Mk16’s charging handle reciprocated which was annoying and could create issues (although modern SCARs have eliminated this.) On top of that, the charging handle placement made it easy to hit your knuckles on an optic when charging the weapon.
Lastly, its stock is ergonomic but is somewhat fragile, with breakage being slightly too common.
US Army
What’s next
The SCAR Mk16 might not have been what SOCOM needed, but it’s been a successful rifle. Over 20 countries have adopted the platform for various military and police forces. It’s an outstanding and modern option, especially if you are moving away from a less modular or even a Cold War platform.
The Mk16 is a great rifle, but it just wasn’t what SOCOM needed at the time.
Read more from Sandboxx News
sandboxx.us · by Travis Pike · February 1, 2023
20. We asked the new AI to do some simple rocket science. It crashed and burned
So ChatGPT is not the silver bullet for everything. Some very interesting "tests" below.
We asked the new AI to do some simple rocket science. It crashed and burned
NPR · by Geoff Brumfiel · February 2, 2023
Computers have been used in rocketry for half-a-century, so it's possible to think that the new AI programs could help. They struggled to grasp the basics. NPR staff generated imagery using Midjourney
Oh yeah, this is a fail.
Paulo Lozano, MIT Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
It gets things wrong, because it's not actually designed to get things right.
Emily M. Bender, University of Washington
Tiera Fletcher carefully read through an artificial intelligence chatbot's attempt at rocket science.
"That's true, that's factual," she said thoughtfully as she scanned the AI-generated description of one of the most fundamental equations, known simply as "the rocket equation."
Then she got to the bot's attempt to write the rocket equation itself – and stopped.
"No ... Mmm mmm ... it would not work," she said. "It's just missing too many variables."
Fletcher is a professional rocket scientist and co-founder of Rocket With The Fletchers, an outreach organization. She agreed to review text and images about rocketry generated by the latest AI technology, to see whether the computer programs could provide people with the basic concepts behind what makes rockets fly.
The results were far from stellar. In virtually every case, ChatGPT – the recently released chatbot from the company OpenAI – failed to accurately reproduce even the most basic equations of rocketry. Its written descriptions of some equations also contained errors. And it wasn't the only AI program to flunk the assignment. Others that generate images could turn out designs for rocket engines that looked impressive, but would fail catastrophically if anyone actually attempted to build them.
A real schematic of a rocket engine used by NASA's Apollo program (left), and one imagined by Midjourney's image-generating software (right). "What are those bellows for at the bottom?" asked Paulo Lozano, a puzzled rocket scientist. Left: NASA; Right: NPR staff generated imagery using Midjourney
OpenAI did not respond to NPR's request for an interview, but on Monday it announced an upgraded version with "improved factuality and mathematical capabilities." A quick try by NPR suggested it may have improved, but it still introduced errors into important equations and could not answer some simple math problems.
Independent researchers say these failures, especially in contrast to the successful use of computers for half-a-century in rocketry, reveal a fundamental problem that may put limits on the new AI programs: They simply cannot figure out the facts.
"There are some people that have a fantasy that we will solve the truth problem of these systems by just giving them more data," says Gary Marcus, an AI scientist and author of the book Rebooting AI.
But, Marcus says, "They're missing something more fundamental."
Calculating liftoff
Since the 1960s, computers have been essential tools for space travel. The enormous Saturn V rockets that carried astronauts to the moon used an automatic launch sequence to guide the spacecraft into orbit. Today, rockets are still flown mainly by computers, which can monitor their complex systems and make adjustments far quicker than their human cargo.
"We cannot operate rockets without computers," says Paulo Lozano, a rocket scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computers also play a central role in the design and testing of new rockets, allowing them to be built faster, cheaper and better. "Computers are key," he says.
The latest round of artificial intelligence programs are impressive in their own right. After its release in November, ChatGPT has been tested by human users from virtually every corner of the Internet. A doctor used it to generate a letter to an insurer. The media company Buzzfeed recently announced it would use the program to create personalized quizzes. And colleges and universities have raised fears of rampant cheating using the chatbot.
It seemed possible that AI could be used as a tool to do some basic rocket science.
ChatGPT created authoritative-sounding text around the rocket equation, but the writing contains several errors and the equation is incorrect. NPR staff generated text using ChatGPT/OpenAI
But so far, ChatGPT has proven inept at reproducing even the simplest ideas in rocketry. In addition to messing up the rocket equation, it bungled concepts such as the thrust-to-weight ratio, a basic measure of the rocket's ability to fly.
"Oh yeah, this is a fail," said Lozano after spending several minutes reviewing around a half-dozen rocketry-related results.
Image-generating programs, such as OpenAI's DALL•E2, also came up short. When asked to provide a blueprint of a rocket engine, they produced complex-looking schematics that vaguely resemble rocket motors but lack things like openings for the hot gasses to come out of. Other graphics programs including those from Midjourney and Stable Diffusion produced similarly cryptic motor designs, with pipes leading nowhere and shapes that would never fly.
I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that
The strange results reveal how the programming behind the new AI is a radical departure from the sorts of programs that have been used to aid rocketry for decades, according to Sasha Luccioni, a research scientist for the AI company Hugging Face. "The actual way that the computer works is very, very different," she says.
Midjourney's attempted to recreate the path of a rocket travelling from the earth and the moon. The result, says Tiera Fletcher, is beautiful but too complex: "It should look a lot simpler than this." NPR staff generated image using Midjourney
A traditional computer used to design or fly rockets comes loaded with all the requisite equations. Programmers explicitly tell it how to respond to different situations, and carefully test the computer programs to make sure they behave exactly as expected.
By contrast, these new systems develop rules of their own. They study a database filled with millions, or perhaps billions, of pages of text or images and pull out patterns. Then they turn those patterns into rules, and use the rules to produce new writing or images they think the viewer wants to see.
The results can provide an impressive approximation of human creativity. ChatGPT has generated poems and songs on things like how to get a peanut butter sandwich out of a VCR. Luccioni thinks AI like this might someday help artists come up with new ideas.
"They generate, they hallucinate, they create new combinations of words based on what they learned," Luccioni says.
But the limitations become clear when the program is asked to use its talents for generating new material related to factual information – for example, when it is asked to write out the rocket equation.
"What it's doing is mimicking a bunch of physics textbooks that it's been exposed to," she says. It can't tell if the mashed-up text it's produced is factually correct. And that means anything it generates can contain an error.
AI image-generating software can develop authoritative-looking schematics, but they have trouble processing language and often produce nonsense words. Image generated by NPR Staff using DALL-E2
Moreover, the program may generate inconsistent results if asked to deliver the same information repeatedly. If asked the capital of France, for example, Luccioni says the program is statistically very likely to say Paris, based on its self-training from millions of texts. But because it's trying to simply predict the next word in the exchange with its human counterpart, every once in a while it might choose a different city. (This could explain why ChatGPT produced multiple versions of the rocket equation, some better than others.)
Luccioni points out that these shortcomings shouldn't surprise anyone. At its core, she says, ChatGPT was trained explicitly to write, not to do math. The program has been fine-tuned to respond to human feedback, so it's particularly good at following prompts from people and interacting with them.
"It gets things wrong, because it's not actually designed to get things right," says Emily M. Bender, a professor of linguistics at the University of Washington who studies AI systems. "It's designed to say things that sound plausible."
Bender believes that ChatGPT's prowess with language, combined with its disregard for facts, makes it potentially dangerous. For example, some have proposed using ChatGPT to generate legal documents and even defenses for lesser crimes. But an AI program "doesn't know the laws, it doesn't know what your current situation is," Bender warns. "It can pull together scraps from its training data to make something that looks like a legal contract, but that's not what you want." Similarly, using ChatGPT for medical or mental health services could be potentially catastrophic, given its lack of understanding.
In response to a query to create a schematic for Rocketdyne F-1 engine, an AI program from Midjourney creates elegant-looking designs. Experts say they'd never fly. NPR staff generated image using Midjourney
Getting the facts straight
Just what it would take to get ChatGPT to sort fact from fiction remains unclear. An effort by Meta, the parent company of Facebook, to use an AI system for scientific papers was taken down in a matter of days, in part because it generated fake references.
Because these systems are designed to generate human-sounding text through statistical analysis of enormous databases of information, Bender wonders if there really is a straightforward way to make it select only "correct" information.
"I don't think it can be error-free," she says.
Image-generating software such as Stable Diffusion uses text prompts to reference an enormous catalog of images. It then uses those images to generate new ones, such as this rocket schematic. NPR staff generated image using Stable Diffusion
If improvements can be made, then Luccioni and Bender say they will come from using different training programs to teach the AI systems. Some researchers are already making efforts to improve that training. For example, Yejin Choi, an AI researcher at the University of Washington and the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, has experimented with training an AI program using a virtual textbook of vetted information. The result seemed to improve its ability to understand new situations.
Choi told NPR's Short Wave that the goal of her work is to teach these new AI systems about more than just language: "Really, beneath the surface, there's these huge unspoken assumptions about how the world works," she said.
Autocomplete on steroids
AI researcher Gary Marcus worries that the public may be radically overestimating these new programs. "We're very easily pulled in by things that look a little bit human, into thinking that they're actually human," he says. But these systems, he adds, "are just autocomplete on steroids."
Marcus agrees with Bender's assessment that the new systems' propensity for producing errors may be so innate that there will be no easy way to get them to be more truthful. Although it may be possible to tweak the training to improve their results, it's unclear exactly what's required because these self-taught programs are so complex.
"There's still no fundamental theoretical understanding of exactly how they work," Marcus says.
Ultimately, he believes that AI may need a more head-on approach to figuring out whether it's telling the truth.
"We need an entirely different architecture that reasons over facts," he says. "That doesn't have to be the whole thing, but that has to be in there."
NPR · by Geoff Brumfiel · February 2, 2023
21. Defeat in Afghanistan: An Autopsy by Joseph J. Collins
Download the article at this link: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3196&context=parameters
Defeat in Afghanistan: An Autopsy
Joseph J. Collins
Abstract
Policy initiatives in the Trump administration and the Biden-Harris administration significantly accelerated the Taliban victory in Afghanistan. This article supports the conclusion that the major factors in this defeat were the historical difficulty in governing Afghanistan, the Afghan republic’s two inefficient and corrupt governments, an ineffective US strategy, operational shortcomings by US forces, an ineffective Afghan military, Pakistan’s duplicitous policy, and the strength and determination of the Taliban. This article rejects the claim that the United States’ nation-building effort was a major factor in its defeat and concludes with a discussion of lessons encountered.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3196
Recommended Citation
Joseph J. Collins, "Defeat in Afghanistan: An Autopsy," Parameters 53, no. 1 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3196.
Conclusion
In the end, the United States sought to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a terrorist safe haven that could threaten our homeland. That goal required robust counterterrorist operations, a long-term counterinsurgency effort, some degree of nation building, security assistance, and an attempt at forming a stable government in Kabul. We had many successes, but the overall enterprise failed. After two decades of significant effort, the United States and its partners left behind a country that has an ISIS-K problem and as many as 500 al-Qaeda members closely allied with the Taliban.37 The country is tense, economically depressed, full of modern military equipment, and a human rights nightmare.
Today, the tentacles of the Haqqani Network and the Taliban’s ignorance are much in evidence. The Taliban has few well-developed government policies. The Taliban has again blocked university and high school attendance for Afghan women and girls.38 Vile, physical punishments are back in vogue, and those who aided the coalition are being hunted down. Coalition-sponsored advances in education, health care, and human rights are in extreme jeopardy. The economy, never in good shape, is now cut off from many sources of outside aid. Foreign donors are looking for ways to help the people while avoiding cooperation with the Taliban regime.
At the same time, the Taliban will learn that the nation they conquered in 2021 is not the same one they fled in 2001. Half the population is under 25 years of age. By 2020, due to effective Afghan government efforts under President Karzai and Finance Minister Ghani, 18 million Afghans—half the population—gained access to cell phones. The urban youth have been weaned on television, Western and Indian music, and the Internet. They do not remember the first Taliban regime, and they may well become a resistant element to rule by the Taliban’s harsh version of sharia law. The remnants of the Northern Alliance have been put down, but they are not out. In the north, we have not seen the last of former (or new) Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara warlords.39 ISIS-K is still a vibrant threat to Afghanistan and Pakistan. One must be skeptical about whether so much strife can be confined within the borders of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan will likely be another case that proves Carl von Clausewitz’s sad observation: the results of war are never final.40 Without a doubt, Afghanistan and its people will pay a high price for this tragic defeat and the collapse of the republic that existed from 2002 to 2021. Sadly, Afghanistan’s future is as clouded today as it was before the US intervention in October 2001.
22. DARPA Awards Contracts for Long-Range ‘Liberty Lifter’ Flying Boat Design
We can get it right this time!
Excerpts:
DARPA’s effort isn’t the first time a government has tried to create a ground effect vehicle for military applications.
The Soviet Union experimented with ground effect vehicles with its ekranoplan program – high-speed cargo aircraft for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, but the platforms were largely sidelined in the 1980s.
Perhaps the most famous ground-effect craft was the massive 400,000-pound Hughes H-4 Hercules cargo plane that flew 70 feet above the ground for about a mile in 1947. The so-called Spruce Goose was developed in conjunction with the Pentagon for a similar mission as the Liberty Lifter – transporting cargo across vast distances faster and at less risk from attack than a ship.
DARPA Awards Contracts for Long-Range ‘Liberty Lifter’ Flying Boat Design - USNI News
news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · February 2, 2023
Artist concept of General Atomics bid for DARPA’s Liberty Lifter Program
The Pentagon’s emerging technologies research arm awarded two aviation companies contracts to develop seaplanes that would fly less than 100 feet off the ground and carry 90 tons of cargo more than 6,500 nautical miles, the Department of Defense announced Wednesday.
General Atomics, working with Maritime Applied Physics Corporation, and Aurora Flight Sciences, working with Gibbs & Cox and ReconCraft, each won contracts to start design and development work for a prototype Liberty Lifter cargo aircraft, according to the DARPA announcement.
“The planned Liberty Lifter demonstrator will be a large flying boat similar in size and capacity to the C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft. Goals include takeoff and land in Sea State 4, sustained on-water operation up to Sea State 5, and extended flight close to the water in ground effect with the capability to fly out of ground effect at altitudes up to 10,000 feet above sea level,” reads a statement from DARPA.
Artist’s concept of Aurora Flight Sciences bid for DARPA’s Liberty Lifter Program
“Liberty Lifter will use low-cost manufacturing akin to ship fabrication in building a highly innovative seaplane capable of meeting DoD heavy lift requirements [100+ tons] that operates with runway and port independence.”
General Atomics was awarded $8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract award in support of DARPA’s Liberty Lifter program in November for the work, the company announced Wednesday. Neither Aurora nor DARAPA included the award to the Boeing subsidiary in their statements.
In the first phase of the contract, the two teams will develop an aircraft that will carry two Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicles or six 20-foot-long cargo containers at just above the wave tops using the physics of the ground effect. Fixed-wing aircraft flying close to the behave like they’re riding on a cushion of air between the ground. Airplanes experiencing ground effect use less energy to move through the air at high speeds and in turn take less energy to fly.
Both companies have taken different approaches to their designs.
“The General Atomics team has selected a twin-hull, mid-wing design to optimize on-water stability and seakeeping. It employs distributed propulsion using twelve turboshaft engines,” reads the DARPA release.
“Aurora Flight Sciences point-of-departure design more closely resembles a traditional flying boat, with a single hull, high wing and eight turboprops for primary propulsion.”
Now, the two teams will set out on an 18-month period to refine the operational concepts and design for each proposed Liberty Lifter.
Artist’s concept of General Atomics bid for DARPA’s Liberty Lifter Program
“Phase 1 will transition into Phase 2 in mid-2024 with continued detailed design, manufacturing, and demonstration of a full-scale Liberty Lifter X-Plane. DARPA anticipates teaming with one or more DoD Service and international partners for those activities and further development of the Liberty Lifter concept into an operational vehicle,” DARPA’s statement reads.
DARPA’s effort isn’t the first time a government has tried to create a ground effect vehicle for military applications.
The Soviet Union experimented with ground effect vehicles with its ekranoplan program – high-speed cargo aircraft for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, but the platforms were largely sidelined in the 1980s.
Perhaps the most famous ground-effect craft was the massive 400,000-pound Hughes H-4 Hercules cargo plane that flew 70 feet above the ground for about a mile in 1947. The so-called Spruce Goose was developed in conjunction with the Pentagon for a similar mission as the Liberty Lifter – transporting cargo across vast distances faster and at less risk from attack than a ship.
Related
news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · February 2, 2023
23. US opens embassy in Solomon Islands after 30-year absence to counter China
Just as an aside, Embassies (and country teams) are one of the most important tools in strategic competition. Do we have enough embassies and consulates around the world? Has anyone ever done a study on whether we have enough and if not where we need to establish new ones?
US opens embassy in Solomon Islands after 30-year absence to counter China
Move comes amid concerns about Beijing’s military ambitions in Indo-Pacific region after it struck a security pact with Solomons last year
The Guardian · February 2, 2023
The United States has opened an embassy in Solomon Islands after a 30-year absence as it seeks to boost diplomatic relations in the Pacific as a counter to China.
The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, announced the news late on Wednesday, saying that “more than any other part of the world, the Indo-Pacific region – including the Pacific Islands – will shape the world’s trajectory in the 21st century”.
What deals is China pursuing in the Pacific and why is everyone so worried?
Read more
The top US diplomat announced plans to open a diplomatic mission in the Pacific island nation during a visit to the region last year, with the state department intending to broaden engagement and deepen international cooperation with the Solomons.
The last US embassy in the Solomons closed in 1993 amid post-cold war budget cuts and the US was represented there by an ambassador based in Papua New Guinea.
In a statement on Wednesday, Blinken said the state department informed Solomon Islands’ government that the opening of the new embassy in the capital, Honiara, became official as of 27 January.
Last February, I announced that the United States would establish an embassy in Solomon Islands. Now, that pledge is a reality. The United States is a Pacific country, and we are taking another important step forward in helping deliver for our people and for the region we share. pic.twitter.com/lilp0ywZl9
— Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken) February 1, 2023
He said the US was committed to working for the Indo-Pacific region to be “free and open” and an “environment where democracy can flourish”.
“The opening of the embassy builds on our efforts not only to place more diplomatic personnel throughout the region, but also to engage further with our Pacific neighbours, connect United States programs and resources with needs on the ground, and build people-to-people ties,” Blinken said.
The US move comes amid concerns among Washington and its allies about Beijing’s military ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region after it struck a security pact with Solomon Islands last year.
Officials at the US embassy opening in Honiara. Photograph: Charley Piringi/The Guardian
In September, the US president, Joe Biden, hosted Pacific island leaders in a Washington summit at which he pledged to help stave off China’s “economic coercion” and promised to work harder with allies and partners to address islanders’ needs.
A joint declaration between Washington and 14 Pacific island states resolved to strengthen their partnership and said they shared a vision for a region where “democracy will be able to flourish”.
Those endorsing the document included the Solomons prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare, whose government had earlier indicated it would not sign, heightening concerns about his ties to China.
The deal that shocked the world: inside the China-Solomons security pact
Read more
On Wednesday, the US embassy’s chargé d’affaires, Russell Comeau, said its opening was “a first step that will hasten the process of establishing permanent facilities and deploying additional diplomatic personnel”.
The embassy “stands as an enduring symbol of our commitment to the country and the region”, he said, and the US would work with the Solomons “based on shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law”.
The Solomon Islands foreign affairs ministry’s permanent secretary, Collin Beck, welcomed the US embassy, saying it renewed the two countries’ partnership and, “most importantly, our shared histories and shared values”.
Collin Beck, right, and Russell Comeau, centre, among officials at the US embassy opening. Photograph: Charley Piringi/The Guardian
On Monday, the remote atoll nation of Kiribati said it would rejoin the Pacific Islands forum, ending a split that had threatened unity at a time of increased superpower tensions in the strategically located region.
Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition from self-ruled but Chinese-claimed Taiwan to Beijing in 2019, as did the Solomons.
The reopening of the embassy in the Solomons comes as Washington has been negotiating the renewal of cooperation agreements with three key Pacific island nations, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau.
Under compacts of free association (Cofa) first agreed in the 1980s, Washington retains responsibility for the islands’ defence and exclusive access to huge swaths of the Pacific.
Washington said it signed memorandums of understanding last month with the Marshall Islands and Palau and had reached consensus with them on terms of US future economic assistance, but has not provided details.
On the streets of Honiara, there were mixed reactions to the embassy reopening.
Local artist Natty Sala described it as a “step in the right direction” for improved diplomatic ties.
Sala hoped the US would step up efforts to remove the tonnes of unexploded Japanese and American ordnance that still litter Solomons’ shores, dating back to some of the fiercest battles of the second world war.
“This is good news for the Solomon Islands.”
Lois Bana, 50, said she appreciated the US re-establishing an embassy but worried whether it was just part of the “geopolitics” in the region.
Reuters and Agence France-Presse contributed to this report
The Guardian · February 2, 2023
24. 431. Your Adversary is Rational, Just Not the Way You Want Them to Be (Army Mad Scientist Blog)
Please go to the link to view the charts.
FEBRUARY 2, 2023 BY USER
431. Your Adversary is Rational, Just Not the Way You Want Them to Be
https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/431-your-adversary-is-rational-just-not-the-way-you-want-them-to-be/
[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist welcomes returning guest blogger LTC Nathan Colvin with today’s insightful post exploring how game theory can help us understand our adversaries’ motivations. Using contemporary Russia as a use case, LTC Colvin explores the dynamics affecting three principal “actors” – the transnational “liberal order” (i.e., the West), the diffuse aggregate needs of the Russian people (a society of individuals), and the individual needs of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin himself (as an autocratic leader) — to clinically explain the rationale underlying the superficially irrational invasion of Ukraine. LTC Colvin’s innovative integration of gaming theories provides us with an additional tool to understand (and predict) our adversaries’ behaviors across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict — Read on!]
It almost goes without saying that war is an intimately human endeavor. The human costs of war bring justifiable emotional turmoil, angst, and shock. Especially in the western world, war thrusts millions into the position of trying to make sense of it. In Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, so much of the sense-making revolves around the narrative of irrationality. People ask, “In modern Europe, what sort of madman makes this possible?” It simply does not make sense in the value system of the West. The only answer must be that the actors causing this pain are mad, insane, or irrational.
While explanations like these may provide emotional refuge, they simply aren’t true. In fact, our adversaries continue to demonstrate their rationality on a daily basis. First, I would offer that when we confuse immorality with irrationality, the issue begins. Among several definitions, rationality can be thought of the logic of achieving one’s goals, whatever those goals might be. At its roots, rationality is about ratios, the weighing of outcomes or chances against each other. In other words, to understand how the world is, the values of the actor are paramount, not whether those values are compatible with our own.
In the summer of 2021, I tested this idea for a Game Theory course I took towards my PhD. The dominate narrative in the media claimed that Vladimir Putin was at best an opportunist, not a strategist. I set about designing a game that could either help support or refute this idea. First, I built a version of the game that reflected a traditional state-on-state interaction, typical of the Kenneth Waltz neorealist perspective of international relations. In a non-cooperative game, analysts look for the Nash Equilibrium – the point of optimal outcome for each player (indicated with green highlights in this paper). Of course, the game’s predicted behavior did not match the observed behavior of Putin’s Russia. The Nash Equilibrium indicated that Russia and the West should cooperate or conduct benign competition. But what Russia actually did was attack nations in their near abroad, despite the increasing economic and reputational cost to the country.
On first glance, this seems irrational – why would Russia act against its state interests? According to game theory, the game ran as it should. However, the game did not reflect the proper actors or their motivation. When the actors were reevaluated to real world conditions rather than ideal ones, the Nash Equilibrium suddenly matched both demonstrated and future behaviors. In the second game, I took a different approach. In a nod to Robert Putnam’s theory of international negotiation, I put the focus on Putin as decision maker, between an external western liberal order and the Russian domestic audience. Putin was treated as a unitary autocratic decision maker, in a three player game. By evidence of the outcome and current events, the results of this game were not only explanatory, but to a degree, predictive.
Major findings were that Putin benefited the most when choosing violence over peacemaking, that he would continuously de-liberalize internally, the West would not intervene militarily, but Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would be effective as a deterrent to an attack on a member.
Design of both games started with Graham Allison’s Rational Choice Theory. Using Allison’s ideas for a non-cooperative game meant first understanding the relevant actors, their goals’ relative ranking, consideration of their options, assessment of the consequences of choices, and utility maximization. Rational Choice Theory traditionally relies on states as actors, as I used in the first game. In the second game, it was necessary to look at the specific goals and utility to different types of actors – the transnational “liberal order” (group of states), the diffuse aggregate needs of the Russian people (a society of individuals), and finally the individual needs of Putin himself (a single person). Using a constructivist approach, I incorporated a number of perspectives in liberal political theory, historical observation, and individual psychology — including the ever-present Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. The result was the ability to compare three very different value systems, inside of one game.
Actors’ Goals Table
When arranging the goals and possible outcomes for these disparate actors, eight possible worlds were created. Although not technically necessary, short narratives of these worlds were created to help recognize them in a qualitative evaluation against recent events. When looking at the narrative alone, it is easy to see where biases such as mirror-imaging can come into play. If someone were to look at the list of worlds, it would be tempting to pick the one that looks the best for everyone. But that is not how non-cooperative games work. Instead each actor seeks their best outcomes. While not necessarily zero-sum (I win – you lose), the players are agnostic to the benefits to the other players. Below is a short description of the eight worlds.
- “Globalization Glasnost” – President Putin chooses relatively benign competition, the Russian people support him, and the liberal order also chooses a form of benign competition.
- “Internal Entropy” – In this scenario, President Putin chooses relatively benign competition, the Russian people do not support him, but the liberal order does not take active involvement.
- “Rapid Expansion” – In this configuration, President Putin chooses regional conflict, the Russian people support this decision, and the liberal order does nothing significant to halt this activity.
- “Regional Chaos” – This case sees President Putin choosing conflict, while the Russian people do not support this activity, but the liberal order does not intercede in either the external or internal conflict.
- “Cold Shoulder” – Here, President Putin chooses benign competition instead of armed conflict in an attempt to repair relations, the Russian people support this move of reconciliation, but the liberal order’s reaction is lukewarm at best.
- “Everyone is Against Me” – When President Putin chooses benign competition, the Russian people cannot understand the sudden reversal and do not support it.
- “Underdog Victory” – In this scenario, President Putin is bolstered by the success of incremental increases in regional conflicts and the Russian people support him, but the liberal order pushes back.
- “Doomsday” – In this final scenario, President Putin chooses conflict and this leads to escalation to large-scale conflict with the liberal order.
Layout of Worlds Table
A decision tree provides a usable framework to evaluate the combination of choices and their utility to each actor/player. This structure helps separate analysts from relying on heuristics, bias, or intuition. Using this adapted rational choice theory and non-cooperative game theory, actors do not seek outcomes that are best for everyone, but what are best for themselves.
The game works like this. Each player is making its decisions based on their specific goals as outlined in the Layout of Worlds table (above). The game is simultaneous, meaning each player evaluates their options based on their understanding of the other player’s goals, and the utility or value of those actions to themselves. But which decision is best? To determine the most rational choice, we look for the dominant choice amongst each option, through a process known as iterated dominance. The first actor to examine is Putin.
Putin’s decision lies between benign competition or attacking. In the long run, if he chooses benign competition, his power base slowly erodes as globalization creates greater liberalization in Russia, eventually requiring leaving the seat of power. If this occurs, there is no guarantee of his personal safety or reputation remaining intact. Likely, his years of political engineering requires an all or nothing approach to power. Therefore, despite conflict having negative impacts to the Russian state, Putin sees clear advantages to remaining in power where he can continue to survive, and possibly even shape a continuing historical legacy for himself. By examining his choice between competition and conflict separately, two Nash Equilibriums highlight his payoffs. Evaluating his options, he sees that competition/cooperation with the West lead to negative (-1) personal outcomes, while conflict leads to positive (+2) personal benefits.
Based on the goals in the Actors’ Goals table (above), the Russian people are better off supporting Putin. This might seem counter-intuitive, since war could have serious economic and physical consequences to the population. However, the likely consequence of war are unevenly distributed – not everyone will be drafted, or face shelling, etc. However, resisting the regime is nearly guaranteed to result in negative consequences such as jail, involuntary service, or other negative impacts. The range of outcomes for supporting Putin is +3 to -2, while non-supporting ranges from +2 to -3. Therefore, the option for the Russian population to resist is nearly immediately eliminated.
Similarly, the West reduces its risk (using the goals defined above) by not directly participating in combat operations. Instead is seeks various ways to compete indirectly, such as security assistance, sanctions, and other deterrent actions. The outcomes for the West to stay out of conflict range from +3 to -1, while directly engaging in conflict with Russia range from +2 to -3.
As the Russian people and the West remove the choices most dangerous to them, they also remove some of the highest risks to Putin as well. While many might advocate for the toughest possible response, realistically, global thermonuclear war will benefit no one. However, when these higher consequences are taken off the table, Putin is emboldened by the lack of either foreign or domestic resistance. There is no longer any counterweight to some of his most aggressive choices, as seen below.
In fact, through the continued application of iterated dominance, there is really only one rational choice. This is where Putin chooses conflict, the Russian people support him (at least passively), and the western liberal order does not go to war. These results are only possible because of the values assigned through careful scoping of the actors and study of their likely goals.
The Crown image in the graphic above is courtesy of Old Dominion University, where LTC Colvin is pursuing his PhD
If there is good news from this game, it is that Article Five of the NATO treaty can be an effective deterrent to conflict that is compatible with the demonstrated behaviors of our actors. Looking at the game scoring there are advantages to Putin and the western liberal order avoiding direct conflict with each other. For example, Putin has choices of 2 (with domestic support) and -1 (without it), if the West does not fight him compared to 1 (with domestic support) and -3 (without it) if the West does fight him. Similarly, it is in the best interests of the Russian people for their country not to attack NATO. From an information warfare perspective, calls to attack NATO or “drive to Berlin” could be signs of splintering between Putin and ultra-nationalists in Russia, who are driven by another set of goals not evaluated in this game. To a degree, Putin’s team will use these narratives to support the idea they are the aggrieved party, or even as a signal to the West that they should not intercede with direct military force. However, the official party line should not support the idea of Russia going on the offensive against NATO. If that occurs, a new game is forming with additional dominant players.
Another phenomenon that is visualized in the results is the dominance of the domestic audience to Putin, even when foreign affairs are the main topic. Especially in modern times, far more rulers leave their offices due to the will of the people rather than foreign intervention. For the autocrat who ruthlessly wields power, enemies accrue over time. Staying in the seat of power becomes a survival strategy, not just a vanity project. Maintaining domestic support is one of the largest components to high payoffs for Putin. This idea circles back to the writing of Robert Putnam who demonstrated that in two-level games, any negation with external parties must have at least tacit agreement of the internal audience.
Controlling most levers for the use of force, autocrats are capable of actively reshaping the game. By repression of the media, assembly, and other forms of domestic resistance, authoritarian regimes (including autocrats) remove domestic audience choice from the playing table. Once a domestic audience is basically compliant, the autocrat’s decisions are the people’s decisions. This speeds decision making for the regime; however the system’s resiliency is then tied to the benevolence of the autocrat. Unfortunately, in both history and psychology, the more means at the disposal of an actor, the more likely they will use that power for their own purposes. For the autocratic actor, power and control are signals to reinforce their behavior; success should begat more success after all. This leads to more concentration of power and repression until such point that the domestic audience is compelled to act. Perhaps this is why so many rulers cannot understand the problem as they are carried to the guillotine.
As I pointed out in the introduction, many of the dominant narratives in media, think pieces, and even academia revolve around the apparent irrationality of Putin and Russia. These narratives rely on a Kantian notion of rationality, based on what is right, ethical, and moral. While morality and ethics are critical in international decision making, they are not particularly predictive if we assume their universality. Instead, we are apt to employ a type of ethnocentrism that blinds us to the true ambition of our adversaries. As TRADOC’s The Red Team Handbook manual points out, this mirror imaging is “the expectation that others will think and act like us despite having different experiences and cultural backgrounds.” When we apply an idea of universal morality to rationality, the world seems like a much more confusing place.
The overall lesson I took away is that if we can limit rationality not to the ideal endstate, but rather to the process of achieving goals, there is hope for rationality to both explain and provide some limited predictive power. In its purest form, rationality is about ratios, the measure of what the utility of a given choice are. By treating the “ends” as a desired state of being and the “ways” as a process of becoming, games such as these can help us methodically gain better understanding. While we may wish for universal values, most evidence supports that when power is concentrated, it is used for personal gain. While morally depressing, understanding the differences in goals allows for better analysis. This drives home the point that cultural education and red teaming skills are as, if not more important in large scale combat operations as they were during the Global War on Terror. Without these skills, it is more difficult to discern who the actors are and what their likely goals might be.
When we apply red teaming type perspectives to game theory, we see that Putin has a dramatically different worldview than the West. From that world view, however, his actions are completely rational. The autocrat’s own survival is the primary concern of international activity. This is why Russia often pursues aims that are not fully aligned with international goals of sovereignty preservation, multilateralism, and protection of borders from actual threats. For the autocrat, all politics is local, even in international politics. International activities are a means to distract from domestic issues, create external straw man threats, quell dissention, and reinforce personal power. For years Putin played a strategic game to keep himself enriched and empowered. Whether facing his own mortality, a lack of information, believing his own hype, or a host of other reasons, Putin may have bitten off more than he can chew in Ukraine. However, the fact that he acted with violence against a non-NATO country was not only rational for him, it was predicted.
If you enjoyed this post, explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with information on the Operational Environment and our how our adversaries fight. If you have a Common Access Card, you’ll be especially interested in our weekly Russia-Ukraine Conflict Running Estimates, capturing what we are learning about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P — access them all here…
… and check out the following related Mad Scientist content on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the dangers of mirror-imaging, and gaming:
Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare
On Surprise Attacks Below the “Bolt from the Blue” Threshold by Lesley Kucharski
Why the Next “Cuban Missile Crisis” Might Not End Well: Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis Management by Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala
Some Thoughts on Futures Work (Part I) by Dr. Nick Marsella
Gaming the System: How Wargames Shape our Future and associated podcast
Would You Like to Play a Game? Wargaming as a Learning Experience and Key Assumptions Check and “No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, by Ian Sullivan
Using Wargames to Reconceptualize Military Power, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth
The Storm After the Flood virtual wargame scenario, video, notes, and Lessons Learned presentation and video, presented by proclaimed Mad Scientists Dr. Gary Ackerman and Doug Clifford, The Center for Advanced Red Teaming, University at Albany, SUNY
Gamers Building the Future Force and associated podcast, with Capt Zach Baumann, Capt Oliver Parsons, and MSgt Michael Sullivan
Fight Club Prepares Lt Col Maddie Novák for Cross-Dimension Manoeuvre, by now COL Arnel David, U.S. Army, and Major Aaron Moore, British Army, along with their interview in The Convergence: UK Fight Club – Gaming the Future Army and associated podcast
About the Author: Nathan Colvin is a Lieutenant Colonel in the TRADOC G-5. He holds a Graduate Certificate in Modeling and Simulations from Old Dominion University, where he is also completing his last semester of coursework toward a Ph.D. in International Studies as an I/ITSEC Leonard P. Gollobin Scholar. He earned master’s degrees in Aeronautics and Space Studies (Embry-Riddle University), Administration (Central Michigan University), and Military Theater Operations (School of Advanced Military Studies). He has deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Latvia as an aviator, operational planner, and strategist. He is currently participating in the HillVets LEAD program.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
25. Is Russia’s Wagner Group recruiting US veterans to fight in Ukraine?
Is Russia’s Wagner Group recruiting US veterans to fight in Ukraine?
The Wagner Group has been designated as a “significant transnational criminal organization” by the US government.
BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED FEB 1, 2023 3:20 PM
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · February 1, 2023
The Wagner Group, Russia’s notorious private military company accused of war crimes and identified as a “significant transnational criminal organization” by the U.S. Treasury Department, may be trying to recruit American veterans as mercenaries.
A video being shared on social media is purportedly a Wagner recruiting commercial that targets U.S. military veterans. However, it is unclear whether the video was produced by Wagner or someone else.
Set to a pulse-pounding techno soundtrack, the video features ample B-roll footage of U.S. service members training and fighting, especially Marines. In fact, it appears that whoever made the video lifted footage directly from the Marine Corps’ 2012 recruiting commercial “Toward the Sound of Chaos.”
A narrator with a thick Russian accent appeals to veterans who joined the military because they “dreamed of doing much to make America great again,” only to be disillusioned by witnessing countries destroyed and civilians killed.
A call for American Patriots to join the ranks of the Wagner PMCs. pic.twitter.com/aMsA4Un1Q8
— Blackrussian (@Blackrussiantv) January 29, 2023
After sprinkling some news footage of the Jan. 6 Capitol Hill riot, the video uses a scene from the 2000 Mel Gibson movie The Patriot as the narrator explains how the United States is no longer the country its Founding Fathers dreamed of. Instead, it has become “the focus of the evil that is destroying the whole world.”
Next comes a shot of Nazis with torches marching in the shape of a swastika juxtaposed with the flag of Ukraine’s Azov Regiment, which has been linked to neo-Nazis, as the narrator says the only country fighting this evil is — wait for it — Russia.
The narrator then urges any American who is a “true patriot” to “join the ranks of the warriors of Russia,” as the video shows the badge that Wagner mercenaries wear along with the company’s owner Yevgeny Prigozhin.
The video closes by warning it may eventually be too late to defeat evil as it shows a scene from the movie Terminator 2: Judgement Day, in which a nuclear explosion destroys Los Angeles.
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U.S. government officials had little to say when Task & Purpose asked if Wagner is trying to recruit American veterans.
“We are aware of the video but don’t have anything additional to offer at this time,” said Marine Lt. Col. Garron Garn, a Pentagon spokesman.
Garn referred further questions on the matter to the State Department, which has sanctioned people and entities linked to Wagner and Prigozhin. But neither the State Department nor the National Security Council provided any comment for this story.
A poster displaying a Russian soldier with a slogan reading ‘Glory to the Heroes of Russia’ decorating a street near the ‘PMC Wagner Centre’ in Saint Petersburg. (Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty Images)
Experts told Task & Purpose that the video looked like something Wagner would produce, but they have not seen it posted on any websites or social media accounts owned or linked to the private military company.
“I do not know if it is 100% authentic – in a sense that it was created by Wagner – or not,” said Sergey Sukhankin, a senior fellow with the Jamestown Foundation think tank in Washington, D.C., who has conducted research into Russian private military companies. “But given Prigozhin’s prior involvement in cyber operations I would not rule it out.”
Prigozhin is one of 13 Russians who were indicted by a grand jury in February 2018 for allegedly spreading disinformation in the United States during the 2016 presidential election. Prosecutors initially claimed that Prigozhin’s company, Concord Management and Consulting, had funded a Russian troll factory.
But in March 2020, the Justice Department abruptly dropped its prosecution of the company, in part because Concord Management and Consulting had failed to comply with subpoenas and Prigozhin had provided prosecutors with a “misleading, at best” affidavit, the Washington Post reported at the time.
Russian billionaire and businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin attends a meeting with foreign investors at Konstantin Palace June 16, 2016 in Saint Petersburg, Russia.(Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)
Jason Blazakis, of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, said he believes it is highly likely that either Wagner or an associate of the company produced the video that targets American military veterans.
“The video is fitting with the high-end productions the group has produced in the past; it is also a propaganda piece aimed at American audiences – and we know that this is a common Prigozhin tactic dating back to the 2016 elections,” said Blazakis, director of the institute’s Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism.
One reason why Wagner may be trying to recruit American veterans is that they could be running low on people, said Molly Dunigan, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation.
Up to 50,000 Wagner mercenaries may be fighting in Ukraine right now, Dunigan told Task & Purpose. That’s a major increase from past conflicts. At most, Wagner had around 5,000 mercenaries in Syria at one time.
While Wagner was able to recruit Ukrainians, Moldavians, and Serbians, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February, people from those countries have been less likely to join the company since the war started, she said.
“They are recruiting extensively and haphazardly across the Russian population,” Dunigan said. “You see these reports of them recruiting amongst the prisons there. Eventually, they are going to run out of people.”
Honor guards escort the coffin of Alexei Nogin, who was killed in combat in Ukraine, during a mourning ceremony, in Volgograd, Russia, on Sept. 24, 2022. Nogin who was the commander of one of the assault detachments of the Wagner Group was posthumously awarded with the Hero of Russia medal for fighting in Ukraine. (AP Photo, File)
U.S. intelligence officials believe Wagner has recruited 40,000 prisoners to fight in Ukraine. A video posted in September shows a man who looks like Prigozhin telling a group of prisoners that Wagner is careful about allowing prisoners convicted of sex crimes to join the company, but he added that Wagner understands that “mistakes happen.”
Wagner initially recruited special operators from the Russian military and intelligence services, Dunigan said. Now, they treat prisoners and other recruits as cannon fodder and promise a brutal death for anyone who tries to desert.
In November, a video emerged showing Wagner killing a former member of the group by hitting the man in the head with a sledgehammer.
“This has several implications if they are trying to recruit U.S. veterans,” Dunigan said. “The first is: What are the veterans’ backgrounds? If they have any sort of Special Forces training, they might actually be able to essentially learn and steal U.S. Special Forces operational art from them, and they certainly would probably treat them like cannon fodder.”
“But, if they are pulling down U.S. veterans who are less skilled,” Dunigan continued, “I would not be surprised if they are treated like cannon fodder as well.”
However, the video may have been produced by the FSB, Russia’s domestic security agency, which has become very concerned about Prigozhin’s growing influence, said Olga Lautman, an expert on Russia and Ukraine who works with the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C., and The Institute for European Integrity in Brussels, Belgium.
Lautman said the FSB could be trying to discredit Prigozhin. She noted the only Russian media outlet that reported on the video was Moskovskij Komsomolets, which is reportedly linked to the FSB.
Moreover, the news article mentioned the U.S. government has designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization without defending the company, Lautman said.
“They do the same thing with various other terrorist organizations,” Lautman said. “When they write someone said something from the Taliban or ISIS, they always put a reminder that this is a terrorist organization. In this case, just to mention it; if they were solely using it for propaganda, then the article would have a different tone, like: Oh look, we’re going to have Americans fighting for Wagner’ – without the reminder that it’s a TCO [transnational criminal organization].”
Any American who ends up becoming a mercenary for Wagner would be risking severe legal consequences for themselves and their families, said Adam Pearlman, an attorney with Lexpat Global Services, an international law firm.
“For starters, Treasury has designated Wagner as a TCO not just once, but three times,” Pearlman told Task & Purpose. “That indicates a pragmatic appetite to ensure the sanctions match the realities of the situation on the ground. Violations for some of these sanctions can be up to $1 million and 20 years in prison.”
Visitors wearing military camouflage stand at the entrance of the ‘PMC Wagner Centre’, which is associated with businessman and founder of the Wagner private military group Yevgeny Prigozhin.(AP Photo, File)
Authorities can also seize the assets of anyone who violates those sanctions, and that would leave their families in economic distress, Pearlman said.
Separately, a bipartisan group of lawmakers has introduced legislation that would designate Wagner as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Pearlman said. Working for or providing other support to such a terrorist organization is a federal crime that carries a maximum punishment of 20 years in prison — or a life sentence if someone dies as a result of the offense.
Since Ukraine has outlawed mercenaries, Americans who fight for Wagner could also find themselves prosecuted under Ukrainian law, Pearlman said.
The Justice Department did not provide a comment for this story.
If American veterans join Wagner, they could lose their benefits as well as their U.S. citizenship, said Chad Lennon, a military law attorney with the Tully Rinckey law firm.
“If a veteran goes out — or even if a citizen goes out — and supports another country’s military and receives benefits, that individual could lose benefits afforded to them through this country,” Lennon said. “If you are looking at somebody who has, let’s say, a military retirement, they could lose that retirement; they could lose any VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] benefits by allying themselves with another country because they’ve joined their military.”
Even though veterans who fight for Ukraine could face the same legal risks, Americans who join Wagner are more likely to be prosecuted because the U.S. government considers Russia as an adversary, while Ukraine is viewed as a partner.
“Obviously, it’s definitely advised for someone who is an American citizen to not go and look to join Wagner or the Russian army or the Russian military,” Lennon said. “I would even say I probably wouldn’t advise someone to go and join the Ukrainian army because of what could potentially happen.”
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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · February 1, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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