Quotes of the Day:

“[Strategy] is more than a science: it is the application of knowledge to practical life, the development of thought capable of modifying the original guiding idea in the light of ever-changing situations; it is the art of acting under the pressure of the most difficult conditions."

Helmuth von Moltke, 1800–1891

“Beware of people who hide behind a façade of vague abstractions and impartiality: no one is impartial. A sharply worded question, an opinion designed to offend, will make them react and take sides. Man exists only in so far as he is opposed."

- Georg Hegel, 1770–1831

"And this I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the individual human is the most valuable thing in the world. And this I would fight for: the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. And this I must fight against: any idea, religion, or government which limits or destroys the individual. This is what I am and what I am about."

-John Steinbeck, “East of Eden”

1. U.S. North Korea Strategy Has Failed: New Approach Needed

2. Yoon calls for raising awareness of N.K. human rights situation

3. U.N. rapporteur for N. Korea human rights to visit S. Korea next week

4. White House highlights cryptocurrency risks, citing N. Korean cyber theft

5. N. Korean leader's sister condemns U.S. provision of tanks to Ukraine

6. S. Korea to seek normalization of relations with N. Korea this year: unification ministry

7. Where Is India in South Korea’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy?

8. Secretary Austin to highlight U.S. commitment to S. Korea during upcoming trip to Seoul: Pentagon

9. The Korean Wave’s Rocky Road in China

10. Two Chinese warplanes entered KADIZ earlier this week: S. Korean military

11. The UN COI at 10 Years: Strategic Priorities & Considerations

12. What does persecution look like in North Korea?

13. North Koreans, already struggling, now contend with cold snap, covid

1. U.S. North Korea Strategy Has Failed: New Approach Needed

You can download the proposed strategy here: https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/IS-545.pdf

U.S. North Korea Strategy Has Failed: New Approach Needed 

https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/01/americas-north-korea-strategy-has-failed/?utm_source=pocket_saves

By ROBERT JOSEPH

January 27, 2023 6:30 AM

To end the nuclear threat from North Korea, we need a new approach.

I

n his New Year’s Eve address, North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, called for an “exponential increase” in his country’s nuclear arsenal. This followed a year during which the North launched a record number of ballistic missiles of all ranges, including a new missile assessed to be capable of striking any city on the American homeland. Kim’s intention to expand his nuclear stockpile should not come as a surprise. The previous spring, he directed his weapons program to move forward “at the fastest possible speed” to support a new law calling for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons “automatically and immediately” if the Kim leadership is put in danger. Even earlier, the then–vice chairman of America’s joint chiefs, John Hyden, stated that North Korea “is building new missiles, new capabilities, new weapons as fast as anybody on the planet.”

While Kim’s announcements receive widespread attention, and while there is extensive concern expressed about his nuclear buildup, serious analysis of the political and military significance of the North’s growing arsenal is lacking. Five years ago, it was simply unthinkable for most observers that North Korea would possess a 100-weapon stockpile. That level is now easily in sight with every indication that the growth will continue to accelerate beyond that benchmark. At its current rate, the North’s stockpile could exceed 200 weapons by 2027, approaching those of France and Britain. But unlike France and Britain, the North’s numbers will continue to grow.

Yet in the open literature and in official reports and testimony, the strategic implications of North Korea’s possession of hundreds of nuclear weapons remain mostly unknown. For example, would South Korea and Japan decide to acquire their own nuclear deterrent if the arsenal of their adversary goes from 40 to 200 or more weapons? And if so, how would that impact U.S. interests? Given the North’s record of selling almost every weapon it develops to any buyer able to pay, what would be the likelihood that Kim would sell nuclear weapons to other rogue states or terrorist entities? What would be the effect on the military balance on the peninsula and regionally if North Korea fielded nuclear weapons for battlefield use? How would a much larger North Korean nuclear force affect U.S. nuclear-force and missile-defense requirements? All are difficult questions. But all need to be addressed.

A recent strategy document produced by national-security and human-rights experts, including myself, make clear the need for a realistic appreciation of the implications of the growing North Korean threat and for a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Since the Korean nuclear threat emerged in the early 1990s, the principal U.S. objective has been to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons. While successive administrations have employed varying combinations of carrots and sticks to this end, all have sought denuclearization through negotiations as the signature component of their policy. All have failed.

Recent suggestions that we should acknowledge North Korea as a formal nuclear-weapons state to encourage Pyongyang to enter arms-control talks is a formula for further failure. Conceding that the North is a legitimate nuclear-weapons state would unleash an array of unintended consequences inimical to U.S. interests. And, like past permutations in U.S. policy, it misses the most obvious point: The Kim regime will not give up its nuclear weapons and is determined to build more.

To meet this threat, it is imperative to design and implement a comprehensive strategy incorporating all tools of statecraft — diplomatic, economic, information and intelligence, military, and others. Most important, the strategy must be grounded in a pragmatic understanding of Pyongyang’s determination to continue its nuclear program, which it sees as vital to the survival of the Kim dynasty.

Although elements of the current strategy — such as alliance relationships, defense and deterrence, containment, and economic sanctions — should be retained, the new strategy must reflect a structural shift in the narrative of the past 30 years. While diplomacy to achieve denuclearization will be encouraged, the central feature of the new strategy should not be negotiations with the North over its nuclear program but the promotion of the rights and freedoms of the North Korean people.

The Kim regime’s greatest vulnerability is from within, from the alienation of its people, who suffer under totalitarian repression. While insisting on complete and verifiable denuclearization, the foundation of U.S. strategy should be a human-rights-upfront approach, a comprehensive information and influence campaign, and the advancement of a free and unified Korea. This is not the promotion of human rights solely for the sake of human rights. This is the means to achieve national-security objectives. Only in this way will the nuclear threat, as well as the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Kim regime, be ended.

Four decades ago, many national-security experts criticized President Reagan for insisting on including human rights as a central element of the strategic dialogue with the Soviet Union. We now know that doing so did not derail the pursuit of arms-control agreements; in fact, it contributed to that outcome and ultimately to the end of the Soviet Union itself. Similar to the Reagan approach, the new strategy with North Korea must combine patience with strength. The Soviet Union did not fall because military force was used to achieve regime change; that change came from within as it must with North Korea.

ROBERT JOSEPH served as under secretary of state for arms control and international security in the George W. Bush administration. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. The National Strategy for Countering North Korea can be found HERE.

​

2. Yoon calls for raising awareness of N.K. human rights situation

​It is good to see President Yoon take the lead on a human rights upfront approach.

Yoon calls for raising awareness of N.K. human rights situation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · January 27, 2023

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Jan. 27 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol instructed the unification ministry Friday to raise awareness of North Korea's human rights situation both at home and abroad, his office said.

Yoon gave the instruction while receiving a joint policy briefing from the unification ministry, the interior ministry, the veterans affairs ministry and the personnel management ministry.

"Reunification can happen suddenly, so only when we are prepared can we realize it," he was quoted as saying by senior presidential secretary for press affairs Kim Eun-hye.

"It's especially necessary to inform our people so they understand well the reality of North Korea's human rights and political situation," he said.

Yoon elaborated that in order for reunification to happen, there need to be changes in North Korea, South Korea and in the surrounding region.

"Please prepare with level-headed judgment rather than through an emotional approach," he was quoted as saying. "The unification ministry in particular should study North Korea's political, economic, social, and cultural conditions in more depth, and make sure our people and our surrounding nations have an accurate understanding of the North Korean people's reality."

While discussing the work of the veterans affairs ministry, Yoon called for establishing a culture of respect for all those who dedicated and sacrificed themselves for the nation.

During the interior ministry's report, he stressed the importance of providing accurate, prompt and science-based information to the public in emergency situations.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (front) salutes the national flag during the unification and interior ministries' joint reports for the year 2023 at Cheong Wa Dae, the former presidential office, in Seoul on Jan. 27, 2023. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · January 27, 2023

3.​ U.N. rapporteur for N. Korea human rights to visit S. Korea next week

We have some potential to develop some real synergy on human rights. Perhaps we could have a united push for human rights from the international community that we should have seen after the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry. The stars could be aligning now with the US and ROK starting to put human rights upfront.

U.N. rapporteur for N. Korea human rights to visit S. Korea next week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 심선아 · January 28, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 28 (Yonhap) -- Elizabeth Salmon, the U.N. special rapporteur for North Korea's human rights, will visit South Korea next week, diplomatic sources here said Saturday.

The sources said Salmon will be here for about five days from Sunday to attend a conference on North Korean human rights and meet related activist groups.

During the conference on Monday and Tuesday, she will speak about the situation of human rights of women and children in the communist country and host a session.

She is also scheduled to meet families of six South Korean citizens detained in North Korea early next month to share opinions on the U.N.'s efforts to have them returned to their country

"I understand her visit this time is focused on the issues of North Korean women's rights and South Korean detainees," one of the sources said.

Salmon reportedly has no plan yet to meet ranking South Korean government officials during the visit.

Elizabeth Salmon, the U.N. special rapporteur for North Korea's human rights, is seen in this file photo taken during her last trip to South Korea in September 2022. (Yonhap)

sshim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 심선아 · January 28, 2023

​4​. White House highlights cryptocurrency risks, citing N. Korean cyber theft

Yes, north Korea is a dangerous cyber threat.

White House highlights cryptocurrency risks, citing N. Korean cyber theft | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 28, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 (Yonhap) -- The White House emphasized the need to enhance cyber security on Friday, highlighting cyber thefts committed by North Korean actors.

It said poor cybersecurity has allowed North Korea to steal over US$1 billion in cryptocurrency.

"Some cryptocurrency entities ignore applicable financial regulations and basic risk controls—practices that protect the country's households, businesses, and economy," it said in a press released, titled, "The Administration's Roadmap to Mitigate Cryptocurrencies' Risks."

"And there is poor cybersecurity across the industry that enabled the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to steal over a billion dollars to fund its aggressive missile program," it added.

Anne Neuberger, deputy national security advisor at the White House for cyber and emerging technologies, earlier said Pyongyang is believed to finance some 30 percent of its illicit weapons programs with proceeds from illegal cyber activities.

"North Korean malicious cyber activity is of significant concern. You saw we attributed a number of North Korean cyber attacks against cryptocurrency infrastructure that we believe netted North Korea vast sums of money," Neuberger has said.

The U.S. has said a North Korean hacker group, Lazarus, stole nearly $620 million from online game Axie Infinity in one of the single largest cyber theft cases in 2022.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 28, 2023

5. N. Korean leader's sister condemns U.S. provision of tanks to Ukraine

​Kim Yo Jong is showing her support for Putin's War.

N. Korean leader's sister condemns U.S. provision of tanks to Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · January 27, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 27 (Yonhap) -- The sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un issued a statement Friday criticizing the United States' decision to send tanks to Ukraine to help its fight against Russia's invasion, saying that Washington is crossing the "red line."

"The U.S., which has exposed the whole continent of Europe to the grave danger of war and caused big and small concerns, is now further crossing the red line," Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, said in the statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The remark came after the U.S. decided to send 31 M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine earlier this week.

This undated file photo, captured from the North's Korean Central TV shows Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister and vice department director of the ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

"I express serious concern over the U.S. escalating the war situation by providing Ukraine with military hardware for ground offensive, and strongly denounce it," Kim said.

"Lurking behind this is the U.S. sinister intention to realize its hegemonic aim by further expanding the proxy war for destroying Russia," she added.

The statement did not mention an alleged weapons deal between North Korea and Russia's Wagner mercenary group.

colin@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · January 27, 2023​

6. S. Korea to seek normalization of relations with N. Korea this year: unification ministry

Fantasy? Or smart to offer this because it is unlikely Kim will agree to normalization unless significant concessions are made that could not possibly be acceptable to the South.

And of course for normalization to occur north Korea will have to end its human rights abuses.  No country can be "normal" or have normalized relations with others when it is committing crimes against humanity on a scale not seen since WWII.

(LEAD) S. Korea to seek normalization of relations with N. Korea this year: unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · January 27, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with unification minister's remarks in paras 7, 8; CHANGES photos; ADDS byline)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, Jan. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will push to "normalize" inter-Korean relations this year by seeking to make both "direct and indirect" contact with North Korea, including supporting civilian exchanges, Seoul's unification ministry said Friday.

In its report to President Yoon Suk Yeol on major tasks for 2023, the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs laid out seven key policy objectives focused on improving frosty ties with the North and laying the groundwork for reunification.

While the South will sternly counter North Korea's provocations through cooperation based on the strong Seoul-Washington alliance, the government will also make efforts to restart inter-Korean dialogue this year.

The government plans to "seek direct and indirect contact with North Korea through civic groups and international organizations in a bid to open up chances to improve strained inter-Korean ties," the ministry said.

Unification Minister Kwon Young-se speaks at a press briefing on Jan. 27, 2023, after he made policy reports to President Yoon Suk Yeol over his ministry's major tasks for 2023. (Yonhap)

If inter-Korean dialogues restart, the ministry plans to put its priority on addressing issues stemming from the Koreas' division, such as families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War and South Koreans detained in the North.

Inter-Korean relations remain frayed as the North has spurned Seoul's offer for dialogue and instead focused on advancing missile and nuclear programs.

Unification Minister Kwon Young-se said his ministry is not considering making a new offer of talks to Pyongyang, although it remains willing to resume dialogue at any time.

"It is important for North Korea to come back to dialogue with sincerity," he said at a press briefing following the report to the president.

The ministry also said it plans to draw up a new mid-and long-term blueprint on inter-Korean unification, tentatively named the "New Future Initiative on Unification."

The vision is aimed at paving the groundwork for a peaceful unification based on freedom and the democratic value espoused by the Yoon administration.

The government aims to announce the new vision within this year after fleshing it out based on opinions from experts and the general public.

In regard to North Korea's human rights issues, the ministry said it plans to carry out the work of an envisioned foundation on the North's rights situations until it sets sail.

The creation of the North Korean Human Rights Foundation has been delayed for years, as the main opposition party, which holds a majority of seats at the National Assembly, has not recommended its share of five candidates for a 12-member board committee.

The ministry will also make public its annual report on the North's human rights records for the first time in March. The report will be issued in both Korean and English-language versions.

On the issue of opening the door to North Korean broadcasts and media outlets, the government is considering allowing people to read the Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper, at designated facilities. Online access to the paper will not be allowed.

The ministry earlier said it will push for the lifting of a ban on public access to North Korean broadcasts, media and publications in an effort to restore "national homogeneity" between the Koreas.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (C) speaks at the session of joint policy reports on major tasks for 2023 by South Korea's unification ministry, the interior ministry and other government agencies at the former presidential compound of Cheong Wa Dae on Jan. 27, 2023. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · January 27, 2023

7. Where Is India in South Korea’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy?

Excerpts:

Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy converges with India’s outlook of the region while sharing a common vision that goes beyond great power politics, and toward a stable multipolar order based on multilateralism. One vital way to enhance the India-South Korea partnership is through the Quad (or likely the Quad Plus working groups), which has been of special interest to the Yoon administration.

As a Quad partner, India is a valuable path of entry into the grouping, and Yoon has already asked the Indian government to support South Korea’s inclusion into the Quad’s working groups. Park, too, has highlighted COVID-19, climate change, and emerging technologies as areas of cooperation via the extended Quad formats.

India’s presidency of the G-20 will also facilitate greater coordination between the two sides, particularly to propel the Global South’s concerns. On economic security, India-South Korea cooperation could get impetus via the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, especially in supply chains and clean energy, as India has for now opted out of the trade pillar.

On maritime issues, South Korea’s position as dialogue partner in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) will bolster “future-oriented” cooperation within the wider region. The new strategy clearly embraces the importance of the Indian Ocean region, which is India’s traditional stronghold and where New Delhi is looking to strengthen its influence vis-à-vis the Chinese footprint.

Overall, considering their complementary interests in addressing the challenges posed by China while not forsaking or thwarting engagement opportunities, leveraging greater strategic autonomy, and achieving a global profile, it is important for South Korea to formulate a comprehensive new India policy at the earliest. The signs are promising, but whether such lofty-sounding rhetoric is likely to become a reality will be clear in time.

Where Is India in South Korea’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy?

Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy converges with India’s outlook of the region, while sharing a common vision that goes beyond great power politics.

By Jagannath Panda and Choong Yong Ahn

January 27, 2023

thediplomat.com · by Jagannath Panda · January 27, 2023

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The launch of South Korea’s first Indo-Pacific vision document, namely the “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific,” in December 2022 by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has raised expectations for enhanced momentum in South Korea’s strategic ties with a rising India – arguably, one of the most significant “like-minded” partners in the region. This heralds a significant break from the long-prevalent worldview in Seoul that sidelined most states other than the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, considered key players in Northeast Asian politics.

Looking back, the previous South Korean administrations’ cautious approach to strategic alignments gave deference to Seoul’s largest trade partner, China, and allowed it significant leeway while cozying with South Korea’s security treaty ally, the United States. The China dilemma for Seoul, which exists for other Asian states – namely the strategic hedging required to manage both the United States and China – became starker after the escalating China-U.S. hostilities arising from the Donald Trump administration.

China’s economic and psychological backlash targeting South Korea after the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system forced then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in to reassess strategic priorities. Among other initiatives, Moon introduced his New Southern Policy (NSP; later rebranded the NSP Plus) while pushing for simultaneously a New Northern Policy embracing more of Russia and Central Asia. In both cases, the goal was to shift some of Seoul’s focus away from the major powers into other regions, primarily Southeast Asia and India, in order to diversify South Korea’’s economic and strategic ties.

Considering Moon’s inordinate focus on the Korean Peninsula peace process and the NSP’s emphasis on trade and investment, bypassing strategic concerns, the NSP (Plus) did not deliver the promised South Korean resurgence in the target regions. Moon did inch toward alignment with the U.S. “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision via the NSP, yet overall the projected ambiguity overshadowed South Korea’s economic as well as middle power potential. This prevented Seoul from realizing its geopolitical ambitions à la Modi’s India.

Such concerns about the NSP’s limitations and the Yoon administration’s pursuit of global diplomacy “taking into consideration South Korea’s stature” have been articulated by the Yoon government’s dynamic Foreign Minister Park Jin. The Indo-Pacific strategy seems to mark the beginning of South Korea’s recent global trajectory toward deepened regional engagement, featuring enhanced cooperation with long-standing partners like India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

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A Surge in India-South Korea Middle-Power Diplomacy?

South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy has a broad geographical scope, covering the Americas, parts of Africa, Europe, and Asia. However, given the centrality of Asia for the vision, two subregions that stand out are South Asia and Southeast Asia. Given India’s burgeoning profile among the Indo-Pacific states, New Delhi will in the coming years become a strategic priority for Seoul. The NSP has already laid the foundation for their security cooperation, besides strengthening the consistently booming bilateral economic ties. The latest strategic document, which lists India as the main actor in Seoul’s South Asian outreach, foreshadows an enhanced strategic partnership based on better communication and upgrading defense, diplomatic, and economic security ties.

Notably, India-South Korea ties are still based on the 2018 Modi-Moon vision for peace and prosperity, along with the joint statement that upgraded their relationship to a “special strategic partnership,” which allowed a synergy between South Korea’s NSP and India’s Act East Policy (AEP). However, their bilateral, not to mention regional, connection needs attentive nurturing. Moreover, geopolitically, a lot has changed in the last few years, including the gradual transformation of the AEP into an Indo-Pacific vision catering to the contemporary global climate and India’s pointed, multi-alignment diplomatic goals and needs.

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The new, emerging threats posed by an increasingly militant China, with its growing divergence with the United States, and convergence with Russia; the Ukraine war and its numerous political and social ramifications; the North Korean nuclear resurgence and its ties with China; and the churning evident in the (declining) U.S. global dominance are some of the ongoing challenges that have compelled middle powers like India, Japan, and now South Korea to step up their engagement, with one another most of all.

In this context, 2023 will be a landmark year. Not only will South Korea and India celebrate 50 years of diplomatic ties, but the synergy of their FOIP visions will provide momentum for such an event. A flurry of high-level visits for quickly implemented actions should be expected. Moreover, there might be a corresponding initiative to take the NSP-AEP convergence to the next level, a rather evident need. Already the process has started with the ninth round of India-ROK Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) upgrade negotiations that were held in Seoul in November 2022. Things are looking up, with both sides resolute about expediting the process in view of the upcoming diplomatic celebrations.

Second, less than a month after Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy was launched, India and South Korea held their fifth Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue in Seoul. Both sides agreed to deepen cooperation in not only areas like trade and investment, science and technology, and cultural exchanges, which have been the focus areas in the earlier NSP/AEP connect too, but also in security and defense, as well as new and emerging technologies. In view of difficulties faced due to the supply chain overdependence on China during the COVID-19 pandemic, India and South Korea have also agreed to work together on creating resilient and robust global supply chains. As a result, India’s Ministry of External Affairs Official Spokesperson Arindam Bagchi hailed South Korea’s new strategy as the foundation for boosting cooperation including in “new areas.”

Another aspect that makes Yoon’s new Indo-Pacific strategy compatible with India’s is that while they have both embraced the FOIP construct, they continue to be unwilling to take an overtly hardline stance on China and wish to maintain a relationship with the economic power. In Yoon’s new document, China is only mentioned once as a “key partner.”

Despite Seoul’s new strategic clarity and trust in its alliance with the U.S., South Korea therefore will continue somewhat to navigate between the China-U.S. rivalry, and could learn some lessons from India’s strategic balancing. India has been able to carve a place for itself where it continues to forge relations with China and Russia, as well as be a “major defense partner” for the United States because of its centrality to Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Similarly, Seoul looks poised to showcase its indispensable stature, so as to be able to maintain some autonomy for diplomacy with China despite endorsing the FOIP.

Thus, together as strong middle powers (keeping aside the definitional aspects) India and South Korea can use their weight to maintain a stable, rules-based regional order in line with the U.S., but without compromising on their own interests or prospects.

Can Trilateral Ties With ASEAN Be Activated?

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The Yoon government is set to strengthen the NSP’s pivot to ASEAN, as evidenced by its continued invocation of ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in its regional endeavors. In May 2022, Foreign Minister Park’s meeting with the Ambassadors of the ASEAN Committee in Seoul was his first official event with the diplomatic corps after taking office. And in November 2022, Yoon outlined his Indo-Pacific strategy at the 23rd ASEAN-Republic of Korea (ROK) Summit. Both events highlight that ASEAN is being projected as the “centerpiece” of Seoul’s new policy.

Through the newly formulated Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI), Yoon intends to expand traditional relations with ASEAN in all areas, including strategic and economic security affairs. Such a strengthening with Southeast Asia via the Indo-Pacific strategy has also been reiterated by the Vietnamese ambassador to South Korea: Welcoming the strategy, he highlighted the “higher level of continuity” in Seoul’s current foreign policy toward ASEAN vis-à-vis Moon administration’s NSP. This will broaden the scope of engagement to include traditional and non-traditional areas of security, including maritime security, cyber challenges, supply chains, and climate action. Besides elevating the partnership at the bloc level, South Korea will also seek to enhance cooperation bilaterally with the ASEAN member states, which are also looking to establish capacity-building partnerships with India especially in the digital economy.

In this context, given the thrust on inclusive cooperation by all three parties, Seoul should simultaneously look to cultivate a trilateral relationship with two linchpins in the Indo-Pacific security architecture, ASEAN and India. For India, too, ASEAN is a long-standing central partner; the AOIP also aligns with Modi’s Indo-Pacific visions such as the AEP as well as its maritime policies of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). Critical technologies, sustainable infrastructure, digital learning, maritime security, and “tailored” development are prospective avenues for common growth. There is immense scope for cooperation even in China-centric issues like the disputes in the South China Sea, including freedom of navigation, which has been acknowledged by both Yoon’s Indo-Pacific document and India.

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Forging Ties Via Multilateral Cooperation

Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy converges with India’s outlook of the region while sharing a common vision that goes beyond great power politics, and toward a stable multipolar order based on multilateralism. One vital way to enhance the India-South Korea partnership is through the Quad (or likely the Quad Plus working groups), which has been of special interest to the Yoon administration.

As a Quad partner, India is a valuable path of entry into the grouping, and Yoon has already asked the Indian government to support South Korea’s inclusion into the Quad’s working groups. Park, too, has highlighted COVID-19, climate change, and emerging technologies as areas of cooperation via the extended Quad formats.

India’s presidency of the G-20 will also facilitate greater coordination between the two sides, particularly to propel the Global South’s concerns. On economic security, India-South Korea cooperation could get impetus via the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, especially in supply chains and clean energy, as India has for now opted out of the trade pillar.

On maritime issues, South Korea’s position as dialogue partner in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) will bolster “future-oriented” cooperation within the wider region. The new strategy clearly embraces the importance of the Indian Ocean region, which is India’s traditional stronghold and where New Delhi is looking to strengthen its influence vis-à-vis the Chinese footprint.

Overall, considering their complementary interests in addressing the challenges posed by China while not forsaking or thwarting engagement opportunities, leveraging greater strategic autonomy, and achieving a global profile, it is important for South Korea to formulate a comprehensive new India policy at the earliest. The signs are promising, but whether such lofty-sounding rhetoric is likely to become a reality will be clear in time.

GUEST AUTHOR

Jagannath Panda

Dr. Jagannath Panda is the head of Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden; and a senior fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Netherlands.

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GUEST AUTHOR

Choong Yong Ahn

Prof. Choong Yong Ahn is a Distinguished Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Chung-Ang University, Seoul. He was earlier the president of Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).

thediplomat.com · by Jagannath Panda · January 27, 2023

8.  Secretary Austin to highlight U.S. commitment to S. Korea during upcoming trip to Seoul: Pentagon

For my Korean friends, please do not forget that the 28,500 military personnel and a large number of American civilians on the peninsula is a demonstration of our commitment that should not be overlooked or minimized.

Recall what Hwang Jong Yop said in 1997 when asked why the regime has invested so much in its military capability yet has not resumed hostilities to achieve its objective to dominate the peninsula. He said it was the presence of American forces because the regime believes it cannot win a war against South Korea if it has US support.

Deterring war is job one and the prime directive of the ROKUS Combined Forces Command.

(LEAD) Secretary Austin to highlight U.S. commitment to S. Korea during upcoming trip to Seoul: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 27, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with Seoul official's remarks in paras 7-10; RECASTS dateline)

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, Jan. 27 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will underscore the U.S.' commitment to the security of South Korea during his upcoming trip to Seoul, a Pentagon spokesperson said Thursday.

Sabrina Singh, principal deputy spokesperson for the defense department, also noted the U.S. defense chief looks forward to meeting with his South Korean counterparts, but said she had nothing to offer when asked if Austin will also be meeting with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.

"I think you will see the secretary certainly highlight our commitment to the region," she told a daily press briefing, adding, "Our commitment to South Korea remains rock solid."

Sabrina Singh, principal deputy spokesperson for the Department of Defense, is seen taking questions during a daily press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington on Jan. 26, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

Austin is scheduled to depart Sunday, according to Singh, on the trip that the defense department earlier said will include a visit to the Philippines.

His trip to Seoul, first of its kind since May 2022, follows an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles fired by North Korea.

Pyongyang launched over 90 missiles in 2022 alone, including 69 ballistic missiles that mark the largest number of ballistic missile fired by North Korea in a single year.

Austin and his South Korean counterpart, Lee Jong-sup, are scheduled to hold talks at Seoul's defense ministry Tuesday, according to a ministry official. Their talks will be followed by a joint press conference.

"At the meeting, the two sides plan to discuss various pending alliance issues, including policy coordination over North Korea and the strengthening of the credibility of the U.S.' extended deterrence," the official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

Extended deterrence means America's commitment to use the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.

No plan has been finalized yet for any joint visit by Lee and Austin to the Joint Security Area in the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, according to the official.

An official from South Korea's presidential office earlier said the office was making arrangements for a meeting between Yoon and Austin.

"I don't have anything to read out about a meeting now, but when we are ready to release more details on the trip, we are certainly happy to get them to you," the spokesperson said when asked about a possible meeting between Yoon and Austin.

When asked about a recent weapons deal between North Korea and Russia's Wagner mercenary group, Singh insisted the deal demonstrated Russia's isolation.

"We have seen the Wagner Group try and procure and be successful (in) procuring weapons from North Korea. I think that shows further isolation, that Russia is depleting its stocks pretty quickly," she said.

"And again, when you are turning to a country like North Korea, Iran, these are countries that are already isolated from an incredible alliance built around support for Ukraine, and so I will just leave at that," she added.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 27, 2023

9. The Korean Wave’s Rocky Road in China

Conclusion:

Amid the geopolitical schism taking place in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing and Seoul are growing further apart as the Yoon administration prioritizes strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance. China’s lifting of its ban on hallyu may be a boon to K-pop fans, but it is still a drop in the bucket in the bilateral ties.

The Korean Wave’s Rocky Road in China

After over six years, China has partially removed its ban on South Korean cultural content, but hallyu in China may never return to its glory days.

thediplomat.com · by Wang Linbin · January 28, 2023

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Soon after the summit between the Chinese and South Korean presidents in November 2022, users of the Chinese over-the-top (OTT) platform Tencent Video found that South Korean movie “Hotel by the River” appeared on the content list. That followed a decision in December 2022 to allow the 2020 Korean movie “Oh! My Gran” to show in China. With some South Korean cultural products returning to China after more than six years, observers think China is in the process of lifting its ban on hallyu.

Hallyu, or the Korean Wave, refers to the cultural charm offensive launched by South Korea since the late 1990s, the first targets of which were South Korea’s East Asia neighbors: China and Japan. In fact, the term hallyu was first coined in relation to China, when it was used in the Chinese name of a Korean pop music CD. The word was then widely adopted by Chinese media to describe the success of Korean singers, and later expanded to other media after the airing of K-dramas in China.

In 2000, K-pop boy group H.O.T’s concert attracted 100,000 fans and set a record for attendance at the Beijing Workers Stadium venue. Since then, hallyu has boomed in China and been endorsed by China’s top leaders, such as Hu Jintao and former Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Qishan. In 2005, then-President Hu told Korean journalists that he really enjoyed the drama “Dae Jang Geum,” but was too busy to finish it. Hu also managed to meet the drama’s actress, Lee Young-ae, three years later during his visit to South Korea. Wang, meanwhile, told delegates from Beijing that he occasionally watched K-dramas and acknowledged that “K-dramas are ahead of us” during a national conference in 2014.

Furthermore, when President Xi Jinping visited South Korea in 2014, China’s first lady, Peng Liyuan, told Korean officials that she thought photos of her husband in his youth looked like the protagonist from “My Love from the Star” – a clear confirmation that she had watched the K-drama series.

The comparison indicated hallyu’s popularity in China at that time. Not only were Korean artists coming to China to perform, but many Chinese singers went to South Korea as trainees and eventually made their debuts there, such as Han Geng from Super Junior, Victoria Song from f(x), Meng Jia and Wang Feifei from miss A, and Lu Han and Huang Zitao from EXO.

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However, the landscape totally changed when Beijing decided to retaliate against Seoul’s decision to deploy a U.S. missile defense system in 2016. Although the Chinese authorities never recognized the existence of an official ban on hallyu and said China was open to cultural exchanges, people could easily witness that Korean celebrities disappeared from China since then.

China’s de facto ban on Korean cultural content was summarized in five points: Prohibit Korean media teams from coming to China to direct; prohibit new investment from Korean entertainment companies; prohibit Korean idol groups from performing to audiences of more than 10,000; prohibit new cooperation projects for K-dramas and variety shows; and prohibit Korean actors from appearing in dramas.

China’s ban on hallyu not only caused huge financial losses to the Korean cultural industry, but more importantly, the incident forced the Korean cultural industry to realize the need to reduce reliance on the Chinese market. From 2016 onwards, hallyu has evolved into a more international phase.

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Inspired by the huge success of the song “Gangnam Style” on social media, hallyu began to harness various platforms for greater influence: YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Spotify. Besides, Korean idol groups started to absorb members from outside China and Japan, like Thailand (BLACKPINK’s Lisa), Australia (BLACKPINK’s Rosé) and Canada (NCT’s Mark Lee). Consequently, China fell to third place in terms of South Korean album sales, while sales in Europe and the United States soared significantly in 2020.

On the other hand, because a large group of K-pop artists from China returned to their homeland in the wake of the THAAD issue, China grasped the opportunity to develop its own idol-making TV programs in 2018. Lay Zhang from EXO and Jackson Wang served as judges of “Idol Producer” while Huang Zitao appeared on “Produce 101.” Still, these Chinese talent shows had deep Korean imprints, as in the case of “Idol Producer” champion Cai Xukun, who used to be a trainee in South Korea.

But this indirect influence did not last long, as the Chinese authorities imposed a series of crackdown on the entertainment industry in 2021. Targets included male idols that are derided as too feminine and the fandom culture originating from South Korea.

This brings us back to the unfreezing of hallyu in China since 2022. Even though the restriction on Korean cultural contents has been at least partially lifted, hallyu’s fate is still vulnerable to China’s political sentiments.

Perhaps the most famous example of hallyu intersecting with Chinese politics came in 2016. Chinese netizens expressed indignation after TWICE’s Taiwanese member, Chou Tzu-yu, waved a Republic of China flag in a variety show. This led to Tzuyu making an apology video, in which she asserted that “there is only one China.” The incident even forced the candidates of that year’s Taiwanese presidential election to respond.

In another incident, in 2020 the leader of BTS made a comment on the Korean War while receiving an award celebrating South Korea-U.S. relations, which aroused backlash from China. The foreign ministries of both China and South Korea gave restrained answers regarding the event in a bid to keep ties even.

In recent years, hallyu has also been caught up in the wider cultural controversy among two countries. There have been countless examples of what some Koreans call China’s “cultural imperialism” and some Chinese counter is Koreans’ “cultural appropriation”: China’s Northeast Project regarding the Goguryeo Dynasty, a South Korean city’s application for World Heritage status regarding the Dragon Boat Festival, a delegate wearing hanbok at the opening of Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Chinese paocai vs. Korean kimchi, hanfu vs. hanbok – the list goes on.

Most recently, there was a dispute centered on China’s Chinese New Year and South Korea’s Lunar New Year online. The Instagram post celebrating the New Year from Jang Won-young, a member of the K-pop girl group IVE, was flooded with demands to correct the name to “Chinese New Year.”

Therefore, even if the doors for Korean cultural content are now open, the era when artists could win the hearts of the people of both countries may be over.

According to a survey conducted by Stanford University in January 2022, 84 percent of South Koreans had a negative view of China, with cultural conflicts between the two countries as the main reason. The percentage who had an unfavorable impression of China is at an all-time high. It is also noteworthy that South Korea is the only country where young people had a more unfavorable view on China than the elder generation.

Amid the geopolitical schism taking place in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing and Seoul are growing further apart as the Yoon administration prioritizes strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance. China’s lifting of its ban on hallyu may be a boon to K-pop fans, but it is still a drop in the bucket in the bilateral ties.

Wang Linbin

Wang Linbin is a graduate of Asian Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include Northeast Asia, Taiwan issues, and Chinese politics. His favorite K-pop group is TWICE.

thediplomat.com · by Wang Linbin · January 28, 2023

10. Two Chinese warplanes entered KADIZ earlier this week: S. Korean military

Two Chinese warplanes entered KADIZ earlier this week: S. Korean military

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · January 28, 2023

By Yonhap

Published : Jan 28, 2023 - 10:58 Updated : Jan 28, 2023 - 10:58

•  Back to List
• More article by this Writer

The South Korean flag (right) and Chinese flag. (123rf)

Two Chinese fighter jets flew through the overlapping parts of the air defense identification zones of South Korea and China earlier this week, prompting the military here to put its warplanes on standby, officials here said Friday.

Their flight on Thursday came just before the Pentagon announced Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will visit Seoul for talks with his South Korean counterpart, Lee Jong-sup, next week in what could be an occasion to highlight their commitment to cementing the bilateral alliance.

The Chinese fighters entered the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) at 10:30 a.m. and 11:10 a.m., respectively, from an area southwest of Ieo Islet, a submerged rock south of the southern island of Jeju, and exited it at around noon, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

One of the fighters reentered the KADIZ at 3 p.m. and left it about 30 minutes later.

Both jets did not violate the South's air space, according to the JCS.

When the two approached the KADIZ, the South Korean Air Force was ready to scramble F-15K combat aircraft and others in a tactical step against a potential accidental situation.

The air defense zone is not territorial airspace but is delineated to call on foreign planes to identify themselves so as to prevent accidental clashes.

11. The UN COI at 10 Years: Strategic Priorities & Considerations

A very important essay for all human rights practitioners and for the public and government officials alike. Consider the conclusion.

Conclusion:

Since there is no immediate prospect of major changes to relevant international institutions, should we derive a measure of optimism about the present dangers to humanity that the world did its best? Does a practical and pragmatic approach support an optimistic perspective—that humanity usually muddles its way to survival and to accountability for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes? How, if at all, can we build on the experience of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK to provide enhanced international remedies for grave wrongdoings that comes to light? Or are we doomed to an inescapable failure of the international community to respond quickly enough and effectively enough to the dangers to humanity? And if so, what precisely can we do to enhance human rights, international peace and security, and the attainment of justice?

It would clearly be desirable for a report to be written about the engagements surrounding the 10th anniversary of the COI. This report should be followed by international dialogue and criticism. It should also be presented in an appropriate way to the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the President of the UN HRC, civil society organisations, and national officials and experts.

Those who silently accept the defects in the current response to the existential dangers that humanity faces are themselves part of the problem that threatens the survival of the human species.

The UN COI at 10 Years: Strategic Priorities & Considerations

hrnkinsider.org · by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

By Michael Kirby, former Chair of the UN COI on Human Rights in the DPRK

January 26, 2023

Next year will mark the 10th anniversary of the report issued by the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Discussions have begun in Seoul, Washington D.C., and other capitals about the steps that might be taken to commemorate and reflect upon this milestone. The goal of these efforts would be to revive knowledge about the COI report and its detailed recommendations, and to rekindle a commitment to remedial action by the international community.

With this in mind, I am pleased to offer a non-exhaustive list of follow-up initiatives, together with guidance that might be taken to mark this 10th anniversary (hereafter “COI+10”).

UN MANDATE HOLDERS

From 2013 to 2014, I held the UN mandate of Chair of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK, acting always with the participation of the other members of the Commission, Mr. Marzuki Darusman and Ms. Sonja Biserko. Our mandate was effectively completed when we delivered our report to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on 7 February 2014, or possibly after we followed up with the delivery of the report to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly (GA) in the fall of 2014. On 22 December 2014, we attended the meeting of the UN Security Council, to which the GA had transmitted the COI report, together with expressions of its concern and recommendations.

Since the mandate of the COI has concluded, its members have no current authority to speak or act for the UN. Although individual members of the former COI have been invited by interested audiences to share their reflections on many occasions since 2014—especially in Seoul, Washington D.C., Tokyo, and London—they have always made it clear, as I do now, that their mandate for the UN has concluded. This role belongs to successors appointed by the United Nations, acting through its relevant agencies, including the HRC and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The mandate holder of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK plays an especially important role. This is presently Professor Elizabeth Salmón, who was appointed to replace Tomás Ojea Quintana in that office last year.

It will therefore be important that any follow-up action on the COI taken by member states or their agencies or individuals should always include full notification to, and cooperation with, the Special Rapporteur. In organising any hearings or events (actual or virtual), it will be important to inform the Special Rapporteur to ascertain any views she may wish to express, and to comply as far as possible with scheduling that would facilitate, where so decided, her participation in any follow-up events.

ANNIVERSARY DATES

Many believe that a useful way to mark the 10th anniversary of the COI would be to keep in mind (and try to coincide with) significant dates in the history of the COI, and possibly also at the venue of important earlier events. These dates include:

• 21 March 2013: Resolution of the Human Rights Council at its 22nd session in Geneva to establish the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK. This was done by HRC Resolution 22/13, mandating the body to investigate the “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the DPRK, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations that may amount to crimes against humanity’’ (A/HRC/RES/23/13). The resolution to establish a COI was taken without a vote.
• 
  
• 7 May 2013: Appointment of the members of the COI by the then-President of the HRC, Ambassador Remigiusz Achilles Henczel of Poland. The appointments announced to the HRC were Michael Kirby of Australia (Chair), Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia (then-Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights, who recommended the creation of a COI), and Sonja Biserko of Serbia (human rights expert and subsequently the holder of a mandate of a follow-up UN expert group).
• 
  
• 1 July 2013: First meeting of the COI at the Palais Wilson in Geneva, when the members of the COI established the methodology of transparency and openness that was to be adopted in the discharge of their mandate. This novel methodology was adopted unanimously by the COI and observed throughout the discharge of its mandate.
• 
  
• 20 August 2013: Commencement of the COI’s public hearings and consultations at Yonsei University in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK).
• 
  
• 29 August 2013: Public hearings and consultations at the UN University in Tokyo, Japan.
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• 23 October 2013: Public hearings and consultations in London, UK.
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• 30–31 October 2013: Public hearings and consultations in Washington D.C.
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• 1 December 2013: Commencement of deliberations of the COI at Palais Wilson, followed by approval of the draft report and arrangements for follow-up.
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• 17 February 2014: First official publication of the COI report (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63 and detailed findings, A/HRC/ 25/CRP.1). A press conference was held the same day at Palais des Nations, Geneva.
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• 17 March 2014: Formal presentation of the report by the COI Chair to the HRC plenary session, followed by questions, comments, and remarks.
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• 30 March 2014: Transmission of the COI report by the HRC to the UN General Assembly with strong endorsement (Vote: 30 pro; 6 contra; 9 abstain). This HRC resolution called for the report’s transmission to the GA, and by the GA to the Security Council (A/HRC/RES/25/25).
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• 17 April 2014: Arria-formula meeting at UN headquarters in New York of Security Council members—and by other states as observers—to receive the COI report. The meeting was not attended by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, with apologies conveyed by the latter.
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• 18 November 2014: After many months of deliberation by the GA Third Committee in New York, a Cuban amendment supporting the DPRK was defeated. The GA Third Committee then endorsed the COI report with another strong vote, followed by a GA plenary vote on December 18 (Vote: 116 pro; 20 contra; 53 abstain). As recommended by the COI, exceptionally, the GA transmitted the COI report to the Security Council (A/RES/69/188).
• 
  
• 5 December 2014: Letter initiated by the Ambassadors of France, United States and Australia (then a non-permanent member of the Security Council) to the President of the Security Council (Chad), signed by 10 Council members, for a procedural resolution to place human rights in the DPRK on the Security Council’s agenda. For a procedural resolution to be adopted by the Security Council, an affirmative vote of nine of its members is required.
• 
  
• 22 December 2014: UN Security Council adopted the procedural motion put forward by the 10 states, which was read out by Australia. The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation challenged the contention that the proposed resolution was procedural, but ultimately it was so decided, with 11 states in favour (Vote: 11 pro – Argentina, Australia, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, ROK, and Rwanda together with three permanent member states – France, United Kingdom, and United States; 2 contra – China, Russia; 2 abstain – Nigeria, Chad). The COI report was thus placed on the Security Council’s agenda. Thereafter, the human rights situation in North Korea was raised under the agenda item added by this procedural vote.

THE UN, UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN

The United Nations and its various organs and agencies must be an obvious focus of the consultations surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary. The problem of Korea preceded the formal establishment of the UN in 1945. As the COI report indicated, the origins of the partition of the Korean Peninsula may be found in the meeting of the Allied Powers at the Cairo Conference in 1943 (COI Report, para. 95). They agreed that, after the defeat of Japan, the colonial power, the independence of Korea would be achieved “in due course.”

Thus began, in 1946, the division of Korea into two zones of control: the United States in the south, and the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel. This was a pragmatic decision, intended to be of short duration. It was not consistent with the requirements of the UN Charter of 1945, which envisaged the right of “self-determination” for those who had been under colonial rule. The Korean people have never decided for themselves in favour of partition. Exercise of the right of self-determination is the overriding obligation of the UN and the right of the Korean people.

As the effective cause of the division of Korea, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, as successor to the USSR, have a primary, continuing, unfulfilled obligation. So does the United Nations itself. It is therefore proper that, in consultation, where possible with the post-war Korean states, the United States should play an important role in assisting the Korean people to exercise their fundamental human rights, and the right of peoples to self-determination. This contextual theme should inform the discussions surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary.

It also explains why the two Korean states, intended to be temporary, have an obligation of their own to promote and achieve the self-determination of the Korean people, so far denied. The ROK cooperated fully with the COI. However, despite repeated efforts to make contact and to secure entry and cooperation, the DPRK has so far declined to cooperate either with the UN agencies concerned with human rights, the COI, or with the ROK.

Throughout its work, the COI insisted upon affording opportunities to the DPRK to participate in its work and to provide opportunities for inspection, provision of submissions, and commentary on conclusions. It would be desirable that consultations regarding the post-COI events should likewise insist at every stage on inviting cooperation, entry, inspection, and commentary by the DPRK, just as the COI did in pursuing the neutral interests of the UN and the COI. Renewed efforts at dialogue should be made before, during, and after the 10th anniversary consultations.

In the face of refusal and hostility, there should be the same neutrality as has been displayed by the UN’s organs, agencies, the COI, and the Special Rapporteur. This has an important symbolic value and, even now, may ultimately attract the engagement of the DPRK. Whether it does so or not, it is the correct stance for the UN and all impartial observers to adopt.

Lastly, Japan actively supported the work of the COI throughout its inquiry. It still has a special interest in the issues presented to the world by the DPRK. This includes human rights issues, notably that of the abduction of Japanese nationals from Japan; the abduction of nationals of other countries; the return to Japan of its nationals who were induced to seek a “promised land” in the DPRK and were retained; and the need to account for prisoners of war retained in the DPRK, as well as the remains of abductees and former prisoners; and other problems that overlap with the issue of abduction. The DPRK itself has acknowledged that this issue is not concluded.

The recent international security issue presented by the firing of North Korean missiles over Japanese territory and Japanese waters adds to these further unresolved issues of human rights. The recent re-election of Japan to membership in the UN Security Council also arguably provides another reason for the special involvement of Japan in events surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary. According to media reports, the bilateral relationship between the ROK and Japan has recently improved. Consideration should be given by the sponsors to involving Japan in the COI+10 anniversary events and their design.

CHANGING ADMINISTRATIONS

IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The COI performed its functions during the administration of President Park Geun-hye in the ROK. She extended courtesies to the COI and the assistance of officials. A weakness of the COI’s consultations was the absence of most members of the then-opposition parties and supporters. Since at least the time of President Kim Dae-jung and his “Sunshine Policy,” there have been political differences within the ROK concerning the proper response to reports of human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the investigation and criticism of reported human rights abuses in the north. There have also been differences of opinion about initiatives taken by the ROK for the pursuit of unification, contact with the DPRK, and cooperation with human rights critics, including the COI.

With the election of President Moon Jae-in, the ROK’s policies towards the COI report and responses to evidence of abuses changed. The participation of the ROK in annual UN resolutions condemning the abuse of human rights in the DPRK, in particular ROK co-sponsorship, was suspended. Criminal proceedings (challenged in the Constitutional Court) were brought against citizens of the ROK for releasing balloons containing information critical of the DPRK, including the report of the COI, which is not available in North Korea. The election to succeed President Moon Jae-in led to the election of President Yoon Suk-yeol, who entered office on 10 May 2022.

The Yoon administration appears to have taken several different policy directions from its predecessor. It will be essential that the participants in the 10th anniversary events should be given information, not always available to foreign observers, on the differences already evident in the policies affecting reported human rights abuses in North Korea. Furthermore, it will be important that the omission of the COI to engage effectively with opposition parties and individuals in the ROK should not be repeated.

Without intruding into partisan political issues, it will be the responsibility of public officials to alert overseas participants about any changes in policy towards the COI report; human rights investigations; participation in UN investigations; and responses to activities designed to inform citizens in the DPRK about relevant UN activities, especially the report of the COI and its follow-up. As we mark COI+10, it would be desirable for appropriate experts to give information to participants about the availability of access to international news, including UN investigations of human rights abuses.

CIVIL SOCIETY, DEFECTORS, AND ESCAPEES

Apart from the possible weakness in the COI’s consultation with diverse civil society organisations, resulting from limited time and impartial reliance on official sources, it is also essential for relevant actors to consult more widely with the fullest possible range of civil society organisations, reflecting divergent points of view.

Although some consultation was held with “defectors” (also referred to as escapees or refugees), it would be desirable that appropriate new consultations should be arranged with a larger number of civil society organisations, in general, and organisations of defectors, in particular. Although the number of such entrants into the ROK from the DPRK has diminished, due partly to the impact of COVID restrictions, such persons are vital sources of information on the human rights abuses that drove them to depart from the DPRK.

Leading members of this community (including some who have been elected to the ROK National Assembly) should be sought out and invited to offer their perspectives to the COI+10 consultations, particularly on any changes that have occurred in the situation of human rights in the DPRK over the past 10 years.

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

The 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) will occur on 10 December 2023. The organisation of COI+10 should emphasize this anniversary and its relevance to following up the essential criterion of the COI's critique of abuses of human rights in the DPRK. That critique was grounded in the principles of the UN Charter (with its insistence on universal human rights) and of the UDHR, which gives expression to the content of such rights, as later elaborated by several UN human rights treaties. The DPRK was, and still is, a party to some of these treaties.

Although some criticism of UN organs and agencies is commonly based on alleged Western influence over the contemporary content of human rights, the UN Charter and UDHR are universal statements that apply to all member states, nations, peoples, and individuals. It would be desirable that COI+10 should rebut the suggestions of regional or national exceptionalism. The anniversary of the UDHR affords the international community an opportunity to re-assert its commitment to these universal principles.

It would be desirable for the responses of the DPRK to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), conducted by the HRC, to be analysed and measured against the criticisms expressed in the COI report and subsequently by UN Special Rapporteurs.

DIPLOMATIC TECHNIQUES

When considering the most effective ways to achieve the DPRK’s compliance with universal human rights, it is essential to embrace normal diplomatic techniques for negotiation and securing change. This involves, normally, the avoidance of mere condemnation and noisy criticism. It involves seeking out and identifying issues on the borderline of those held in common with the negotiator concerned.

Although former U.S. President Donald Trump prided himself on reaching a “deal,” his professional career was in real estate. Recent evidence suggests that he was sustained by the fortune secured by his father. Even to those—like myself—who were not opposed to President Trump’s outreach to the DPRK, after years of isolation, his negotiation technique was counterproductive.

It began with his initial speech to the UN General Assembly, threatening the DPRK with destruction “like nothing seen before.’’ He then shifted his approach to a “bromance’’ with Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of the DPRK. He invited Kim first to Singapore and then to Hanoi. He plunged immediately into attempting to secure a deal regarding the most difficult subject for ultimate negotiation: nuclear weapons and long-range missile systems. As these were central to the protection and survival of the Kim family regime, the attempt quickly failed. That failure was compounded by the breakdown of the Hanoi summit on the morning of its second day. Whatever opportunity the U.S. president had from his surprising initiative was squandered and apparently wasted.

The normal technique of diplomacy is to start at the outside of a circle of issues, negotiating first those issues, initially less significant, where there may be common ground and where limited agreements might be reached. This can then lead to more comprehensive agreements. Central, extremely difficult, issues are typically left to be addressed in later negotiations, especially if there is a chance of first building mutual respect and negotiating trade-offs.

In its report, the COI was conscious of this diplomatic technique. Although its recommendations certainly included difficult subjects such as undertaking “profound political and institutional reforms without delay to introduce genuine checks and balances upon the powers of the Supreme Leader’’ (COI Report, conclusions, para. 89a), it was accompanied by other recommendations susceptible to agreement. This included:

• measures to ensure gender equality in practice;
• the right to food without discrimination giving particular attention to the needs of women and vulnerable groups and to providing free and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid;
• a moratorium on execution of the death penalty;
• establishment of independent media and allowing citizens to freely access the Internet, social media, international communications, and foreign broadcasts;
• abolition of the prohibition on foreign travel;
• provision of full information to families of persons abducted;
• ratification of human rights conventions;
• establishment of a field-based presence with technical assistance from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and
• introduction of postal services, restoration of railway and airline services, sporting links, and cultural links (COI Report, conclusions, para. 89).

It would be desirable for COI+10 to have expert advice from diplomats, experienced in difficult international negotiations, to reflect upon how, in practice, success can be achieved where the initial differences between the parties are large and entrenched.

REVIVING AWARENESS OF THE COI REPORT

The passage of 10 years has erased much of the impact caused by the COI report at the time of its issue. One of the problems of UN human rights reports is that they are usually not well published or circulated. A UN report will generally sink like a stone before the ink is dry. Real efforts were made by the COI to render its report accessible and readable. The fact that it was preceded by a series of widely publicised public hearings meant that, on publication, it was something of a sensation. It secured much international publicity. It provided detailed practical cases, based on evidence presented at public hearings, thereby identifying and personifying the human rights abuses found. It remains a different model for the writing of UN human rights reports.

Although highly readable, no readily accessible version of the COI report was made available in print form. The electronic version was available online, but relatively little is known against the background of many other UN human rights reports. The 10-year anniversary affords an opportunity to reconsider creatively what can be done to better distribute the knowledge contained in this report. Perhaps if UN human rights reports were published in an improved format, there would be more follow-up. The COI report should be reconsidered for the lessons it provides for UN human rights reports more generally.

The COI report, the annual reports on the DPRK’s human rights record, and other UN human rights reports should not be filed away and forgotten once delivered. There needs to be a regular system for considering their implementation and follow-up. Auditing the performance of mandate holders will also be more effective if there are available and readable reports.

UN HUMAN RIGHTS APPARATUS

COI+10 affords an appropriate opportunity to review the COI report in the context of the UN’s human rights apparatus more generally. To what extent did the innovations in the procedures of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK provide models that (a) have been followed in the HRC; or (b) should have been followed with or without variations? Inevitably, the immediate danger presented to the UN and international community by the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons, the testing of such weapons, the development of further technology, and the risks of proliferation enliven international concern.

Concern about abuses of universal human rights is important, but human rights issues tend to be regarded as endemic and less urgent when it comes to international action. Given the existential danger of nuclear weapons, the case of North Korea continues to provide an urgent reminder of the inadequacy and weakness of current international institutions to protect global peace and security, to uphold universal human rights and existential values, and to achieve justice. This is the basic lesson from the experience of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK. The present dangers revealed in the COI report and the urgency of the problems disclosed therein have not been matched by enhanced and effective responses by the UN and the international community.

PRAGMATISM, REALISM, AND OPTIMISM

Reflecting on the last 10 years, there are many reasons for pessimism—even despair and alarm. We should use the 10th anniversary of the COI to reflect on whether humanity may take encouragement by reflecting on the alternative. What would have happened if there had been no COI or no UN?

Since there is no immediate prospect of major changes to relevant international institutions, should we derive a measure of optimism about the present dangers to humanity that the world did its best? Does a practical and pragmatic approach support an optimistic perspective—that humanity usually muddles its way to survival and to accountability for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes? How, if at all, can we build on the experience of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK to provide enhanced international remedies for grave wrongdoings that comes to light? Or are we doomed to an inescapable failure of the international community to respond quickly enough and effectively enough to the dangers to humanity? And if so, what precisely can we do to enhance human rights, international peace and security, and the attainment of justice?

It would clearly be desirable for a report to be written about the engagements surrounding the 10th anniversary of the COI. This report should be followed by international dialogue and criticism. It should also be presented in an appropriate way to the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the President of the UN HRC, civil society organisations, and national officials and experts.

Those who silently accept the defects in the current response to the existential dangers that humanity faces are themselves part of the problem that threatens the survival of the human species.

Edited for HRNK by Roberta Cohen, HRNK Co-Chair Emeritus

hrnkinsider.org · by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

12. What does persecution look like in North Korea?

Detailed report on Christian persecution north Korea. The 44 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.opendoors.org/persecution/reports/Full-Country-Dossier-North-Korea-2023.pdf

​Excerpts:

A report issued in 2022 by The International Bar Association and The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea said that Christians are particularly targeted and exposed to torture in North Korean prisons. "Detention periods have been documented as being longer for Christians than other groups, and witnesses have reported that ‘identified Christians are interrogated for longer periods, usually under torture’, and subjected to some of the worst forms of torture to force them to incriminate others during interrogation," it said.

The reason for such extreme persecution is that Christianity is seen as a particular threat to the dictatorial ideology and governance of the country's barbaric regime. Christians are viewed as enemies of both the leadership and society in general.

​

What does persecution look like in North Korea?

opendoors.org

North Korea

World Watch Ranking: 1

Somalia (2) >

What does persecution look like in North Korea?

North Korea remains a brutally hostile place for Christians to live. If discovered by the authorities, believers are either sent to labour camps as political prisoners where the conditions are atrocious, or killed on the spot – and their families will share their fate as well. Christians have absolutely no freedom. It is almost impossible for believers to gather or meet to worship. Those who dare to meet must do so in utmost secrecy – and at enormous risk. A new 'anti-reactionary thought law' makes it amply clear that being a Christian or possessing a Bible is a serious crime and will be severely punished.

A report issued in 2022 by The International Bar Association and The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea said that Christians are particularly targeted and exposed to torture in North Korean prisons. "Detention periods have been documented as being longer for Christians than other groups, and witnesses have reported that ‘identified Christians are interrogated for longer periods, usually under torture’, and subjected to some of the worst forms of torture to force them to incriminate others during interrogation," it said.

The reason for such extreme persecution is that Christianity is seen as a particular threat to the dictatorial ideology and governance of the country's barbaric regime. Christians are viewed as enemies of both the leadership and society in general.

Who is most vulnerable to persecution?

Christians the length and breadth of North Korea are equally susceptible to extreme persecution at the hands of North Korea’s authoritarian state. Insurgency is unthinkable and the regime keeps a watchful eye on all citizens. The border with China is now more closely monitored, making it even more difficult for citizens to escape.

Christians interred in prison camps and total control zones can be seen as facing the most persecution, but it is not easy to obtain up-to-date information from these camps.

Meet "Yong-Gi"

"Step by step, I realise how the Holy Spirit leads my life. I decide to put all things onto God’s hands"

Yong-Gi is a North Korean Christian who was helped through our safehouse ministry

What has changed this year?

Across the year, Open Doors contacts heard from reliable sources that several dozen North Korean believers from several underground churches had been discovered and executed. More than 100 members of their families were also said to have been rounded up and sent to labor camps.

These reports show that life has got even harder for North Korean Christians, with the recently introduced ‘anti-reactionary thought law’ – which makes it clear that being a Christian and/or possessing a Bible is a serious crime and will be severely punished – coinciding with a rise in reported incidents of violence against believers.

What does Open Doors do to help Christians in North Korea?

Open Doors secret workers are keeping 80,000 North Korean believers alive with vital food and aid through secret networks in China, as well as providing shelter and discipleship training for North Korean refugees at safe houses in China.

How can you pray for North Korea?

• Please pray that the Holy Spirit will continuously pour supernatural peace and strength into believers held in labour camps
• That Christians who bravely gather in secret will be protected from the prying eyes of the authorities
• Pray for the North Korean regime, that they will allow the country to be helped and influenced by the wider world.

a prayer for North Korea

Father God, we thank You for the remarkable bravery of our brothers and sisters in North Korea. Continue to encourage, equip and empower them as they follow You amid such extreme persecution. Protect secret gatherings of believers – may their meetings be places of divine encounter. Give wisdom, boldness and discernment to Your children to know how to express their faith in society without drawing the attention of the authorities. We cry out to You for this nation, Lord, asking that You will build Your church and soften the hardened hearts of Kim Jong-un and his regime. Amen.

Download Summary Report Download Full Report

Persecution Level

Extreme

• Violence 86%
• Private Life 100%
• Family Life 100%
• Community Life 100%
• National Life 100%
• Church Life 100%

Persecution Type

• Communist and post-Communist oppression
• Dictatorial paranoia

Population of Christians

400,000 (OD estimate)

Main Religion

Agnosticism

Government

Single-party dictatorship

Leader

State Affairs Commission President Kim Jong Un

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13. North Koreans, already struggling, now contend with cold snap, covid

Just terrible conditions in north Korea. Think of the suffering of the Korean people in the north.

North Koreans, already struggling, now contend with cold snap, covid

By Min Joo Kim

Updated January 26, 2023 at 8:34 a.m. EST|Published January 26, 2023 at 4:58 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · January 26, 2023

SEOUL — Winter in the northern reaches of North Korea, the inhospitable areas where those deemed “hostile” to the ruling Kim regime are left to their own devices, is difficult at the best of times.

Right now, in the two weeks in the traditional Asian calendar known as the “Major Cold” because it is the most frigid of the year, it is far from the best of times.

It was the “harshest time of the year,” said Choi Song-juk, who comes from the northern North Korean province of Ryanggang, on the border with China.

A brutal wave of cold and snow has swept across northeastern Asia this week. The freezing temperatures and icy conditions have created chaos in Japan and South Korea, grounding flights, stalling traffic and resulting in deaths.

China’s northernmost city recorded a temperature of minus-63.4 degrees (minus-53 Celsius) this week, the coldest measured in the country during modern times. Even in subtropical Taiwan, meteorologists have issued cold weather advisories.

North Korea’s state meteorological agency has also issued alerts for extreme cold this week, describing the onslaught as “the most bitter cold wave in 23 years.” Temperatures in Pyongyang, the capital, were expected to plumb minus-2 degrees (-19C), but in northern areas, like Choi’s hometown, the mercury could get as low as minus-22 (-30C), North Korean state radio warned.

It called for “thorough cold-weather measures to prevent damages in agriculture, power production, urban management, transport and other economic sectors,” and it urged the public to look after their health.

The arctic blast that has hobbled East Asia this week has proved particularly challenging for North Korea, a country with a complex humanitarian crisis, including chronic energy and food shortages.

These northern areas of North Korea — unlike in Japan or South Korea or even northern China — do not have apartment buildings with electric heating. In Ryanggang and Hamgyong provinces on the northern border with China, rural houses rely on underfloor heating fueled by coal or wood. Many use plastic sheeting over their windows to try to insulate their houses from the bitter cold.

Widespread problems in heating supply, food security and health care in North Korea compound the devastation of extreme weather, which meteorologists in South Korea say is becoming more common because of climate change.

It is now even more difficult than usual to get information from North Korea because leader Kim Jong Un has kept the country hermetically sealed for three years, since the outbreak of the coronavirus in neighboring China.

Diplomats, aid workers and traders who usually go back and forth are no longer able to offer glimpses into life in the world’s most closed state. Even the trickle of defectors has dried up.

Kim’s propaganda machine offers only favorable insights. State television this week showed layered-up urban citizens celebrating the Lunar New Year holiday in scenic snow.

But such winter conditions pose life-threatening hardships to those in the impoverished countryside, former residents say. “My hands and feet would freeze climbing the icy mountain to find wood,” said Choi, who escaped to South Korea in 2014. “I was so hungry and thirsty, and eating snow was sometimes the only option.”

Except for privileged citizens living in Pyongyang’s centrally heated homes, most North Koreans are “entirely left on their own to keep themselves warm,” said Lee Sang-yong of Daily NK, a Seoul-based news service with informants inside North Korea.

Those living in impoverished northern provinces like Ryanggang and Hamgyong have to find their own coal or wood, which is in short supply as the extreme cold has increased demand, Lee said.

On top of that, North Korean authorities have recently increased crackdowns on overlogging, making it hard for poor residents to source firewood, according to a report from Radio Free Asia, which has sources inside North Korea, on Wednesday.

Decades of subsistence living has left the mountains bare as North Koreans went farther and farther in search of wood for heating and cooking, prompting the Kim regime to promote reforestation of mountainous areas.

“The crackdown is aggravating firewood shortage for residents,” a Ryanggang resident was quoted as telling RFA. “Many of us are shivering in this severe cold of minus-40 degrees Celsius.”

The pandemic is only adding to wintertime challenges in North Korea. Lacking medical resources for treatment or vaccination against covid, the country has largely relied on severe social distancing restrictions and border lockdowns to fight the infectious disease.

North Korea does not publicize its number of coronavirus cases, but state media outlets continue to report on anti-virus measures in place across the country.

Citing heightened risks of respiratory illness in wintertime, the Korean Central News Agency said this week the “emergency anti-epidemic work is the country’s top priority.”

North Korean authorities have ordered a five-day lockdown in the capital city until Sunday, citing the spread of an unspecified respiratory disease, according to an official order. The Russian Embassy in Pyongyang posted a photo of the order on its Facebook page.

Omicron variants of the coronavirus have been rampaging through China since restrictions were dropped last month, with authorities saying about 80 percent of the population has been infected in this wave.

Experts say North Korean authorities are exploiting the covid restrictions to control people’s movement and justify crackdowns on illegal trade. Lee said that just “adds to the burden” of regular North Koreans. “This is a very harsh winter for them,” he said.

The Washington Post · by Min Joo Kim · January 26, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com